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From discussion at WT:BLOCK. Merits its own page rather than a section in WP:BLOCK, if the communal sense is that this is likely to recur and a policy to prevent abuse is required.
Draft only - comments and improvements welcomed. FT2 ( Talk | email) 19:45, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
I would suggest that the person assembling the secret evidence not be the one who issues the block. The blocking administrator should be a person not involved in any dispute with the editor being blocked not should they have been involved in assembling the information. To do otherwise is to create the appearance of being the prosecutor, judge and jury. JodyB talk 21:07, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
After the block is placed, a notice naming the person assembling the evidence and the persons reviewing and approving the block are to be listed under their own signatures. JodyB talk 21:08, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
Considered:
Thoughts? FT2 ( Talk | email) 21:14, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
Further to JodyB's comments above, try this:
-- Process-- Administrative sanction actions should not be imposed by a person involved in any dispute with the editor being blocked or involved in assembling the secret information. This is to avoid the appearance of being the prosecutor, judge and jury. In the case of emergency, a short term block which does not relate to secret evidence may be used, to allow time for proper review. After sanctions are imposed, a notice naming the person assembling the evidence and the person(s) reviewing and approving the block are to be listed under their own signatures. If communal consensus so decides, a review by a mutually agreed independent administrator (who may be an arbcom member) may be requested, to state whether they feel the matter was justified and appropriate, and whether reasonable doubts exist. |
Slight modification below from me. JodyB talk 21:45, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
-- Process-- In all but presently occurring vandalism, blocking based upon secret or confidential information occurs only after prior review. In such cases, block as usual for the vandalism. Blocking should not be imposed by a person who assembles the secret evidence. This is to avoid the appearance of being the prosecutor, judge and jury. After blocking is imposed, a notice naming the person assembling the evidence and the person(s) reviewing and approving the block are to be listed under their own signatures. The person blocked retains all usual rights of appeal. |
After all, if there's ongoing vandalism, a block can be issued for that without the need for confidential evidence. (Thus including this as an exception seems to open up the process to harm). -- Bfigura ( talk) 22:28, 20 November 2007 (UTC)In all cases, blocking based upon secret or confidential information occurs only after prior review
One fairly basic point that appears to have been missed in at least one case recently. When evidence is circulated cofidentially, agreement of reviewers has to be evidenced by them actually commenting in agreement. Absence of comment does not indicate agreement or disagreement, it may very well indicate that the recipient of the circulated evidence has either not yet read it or not yet investigated themselves and come to a conclusion. GRBerry 22:10, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
This proposed policy is poorly worded and full of loopholes. It contains much wording such as "They are expected to use -- and expected to be able to demonstrate -- independent advice was sought and reasonable good faith employed, in case of review." Such awkward phrases mean nothing as they require nothing. Instead policy should avoid all such ambiguity -- use wording instead like "must use" and "must demonstrate." The entire document should be retooled with an eye to avoiding such gaping loopholes. The proposal also contains too much expository text which can be wikilawyered. Maybe if a succint policy is given in bold and for any accompanying expository text it is made clear that it is elucidation rather than the policy itself. Quatloo ( talk) 22:38, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
A few comments on the current proposal:
If there is a question how to handle a matter like this, it should be referred to the Arbitration Committee (or an uninvolved Arbcom member) for advice, as the representative body best placed to advise on confidential matters that may have disclosure concerns. For matters specifically related to oversight and checkuser issues, those two lists may be suitable instead.
Disclosure of non-public evidence relevant to a decision can be requested for examination by any bona-fide arbcom member, oversight, or checkuser user. An involved individual should nontheless recuse if this would show good judgement , and such evidence should not be circulated on the relevant email lists.
Kirill 22:43, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
Note - "who to contact" now fixed per Kirill's suggestions. FT2 ( Talk | email) 13:30, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Wasn't Esperanza decentralized because of lack of transparency, or that was part of the reasons anyway? Wouldn't this be exactly the same thing again? Kwsn (Ni!) 23:31, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
This is much different subject than Esperanza. Thanks This is a Secret account 00:03, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Perhaps we could make clear what exactly the words "acted upon", in the nutshell (Evidence that is not publicly available can be presented, and acted upon, in certain unusual cases), or in the proposed guideline itself? Perhaps something like "blocking or otherwise restricting the actions of an editor"? Otherwise (particularly when the "background" box is removed, as I assume it will be eventually) this guideline is a bit mystifying to those unfamiliar with Wikipedia. ("Confidential information" for lawsuits? Firing an employee? Reverting all of an editor's prior edits?)
I realize that experienced editors know that there isn't much that Wikipedia can do to an editor other than revoke sysop privileges, restrict editing and/or block or ban an editor, but I'm hoping it's possible to spell things out a bit for less experienced editors who happen on this (not to mention trolls who want to cite the guideline as enabling Wikipedia to do anything to anyone on the basis of information that isn't made public. -- John Broughton (♫♫) 02:22, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Would just like to add that I put in a negative vote for this proposed policy. If it can't be an open process then it can't be presented. There are many people in jail today (Jonathan Pollard being one of them) who are rotting due to "confidential evidence". I abhor this. Thus, I veto it (for whatever it's worth). Bstone ( talk) 02:47, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Now and again I've seen cases where condiential evidence is mentioned, and it mystifies me as to why it needs to be kept confidential. One of the things I'd like to see included in the proposal is that a rationale should be offered whenever confidential evidence is used: "to protect <user's> identity" or the like. Ideally, it ought to be as specific as possible short of defeating the purpose of the condfidentiality; something like "for reasons of privacy" is pointlessly vague.-- Father Goose ( talk) 03:04, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
I support the effort to clarify where the correct parameters are and will abide by community consensus.
I also have a question: under the legitimate reasons section, involved parties are presumed to have a legitimate reason. That looks highly gameable. Let's say an editor stacked RFA votes using Exploit A, which was foiled by Sleuthing Skill B, and that B could be foiled by New and Improved Exploit C. What's to stop this editor from demanding the evidence, then coming back a few months later and implementing New and Improved Exploit C? For that matter, what's to stop any banned troll from picking up a sockpuppet, heading over to a location where an investigation is taking place, and insinuating himself or herself into the status of an "involved party" to get a look at the investigation?
That'd be the worst of all worlds, wouldn't it? The community wouldn't be able to see what's going on, but the people who most want to abuse Wikipedia would get free classes in How to Exploit Wikipedia Better. Durova Charge! 04:50, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Just to confirm a subtle point that's not necessarily obvious on reading: "legitimate reasons" is not in the policy as a basis for demanding information. That's an important subtlety. They are a basis for determining when information should be considered in practice, as being "confidential". If you have a legitimate interest in a case, but you are not allowed to know the evidence - that's the bright line test that some information is non-public/confidential.
If I'm willing to tell everyone who has a half-decent reason for needing to know, what the evidence in case X was, and I tell the person involved, the others who might give evidence, any admin who wants to check it, then it's not "confidential". It's got all the review it needs, even if not * every * user has seen it. But the moment I tell some party who has a decent genuine reason to ask, "sorry, not telling you", that's when it needs to be treated as "confidential information" and the other provisions to protect users kick in.
Essentially it's an anti-trolling criteria: not everyone needs to know evidence (so preventing users who don't really have a good reason from seeing sensitive evidence isn't going to cause a major problem in terms of fairness), but all those with actual legitimate involvement or who habitually watch cases, do have a good reason (and not letting them know does mean that review is less effective than it might have been, and makes unfairness more possible).
If you post that the evidence is available to anyone who wants it, but you aren't going to say it publicly, and you do in fact make it available to those involved in the case, and all admins, and non-admins who watch ANI, then its not really "confidential" even if you didn't tell it to well known troll X or unknown dubious IP user Y or casually curious 300-edit user Z. It's going to get plenty of review by anyone who matters and wishes to do so, and anyone who wishes and has a good reason, can.
It's at the moment you make clear you're actually not going to tell it to some user who is involved, or has a legitimate interest either -- then you have to consider it as being "confidential" and you have to comply with these precautions and processes to ensure its fair and necessary.
That's the concept anyhow. FT2 ( Talk | email) 13:05, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Rspeer's thoughts here are the same for a lot of people. This policy proposal makes it "legal" for Durova to keep doing "sleuthing", while retroactively justifying the method used to block !! in the first place. Therefore, I oppose the creation of this policy as it is essentially gaming the system. Kwsn (Ni!) 12:42, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
I'm not sure I follow that. The essence of the proposed policy is:
Those measure involve some exceptionally stringent requirements for checking, communication, proactive disclosure when possible, and disclosing weakness in evidence not just strength, and advise in fact to say nothing until you've asked someone like an arbcom member, who's got a load of independence and good judgement, what they think. The requirements for a user who feels important evidence can't be publicly presented are fair to all interests... but some of the most demanding of any policy we have.
Better for you? FT2 ( Talk | email) 13:20, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Kwsn, might you be persuaded to reconsider your opposition? Different editors have supported (implicitly or explicitly) some pretty different standards concerning permissibility of confidential evidence. I think the big problem with the status quo is that there's no central set of community standards, so outliers are free to act as they please (within reason). We can't satisfy everyone entirely, but with codified standards I think we'll see less extremity being pushed on both sides of the issue. If you feel the proposal doesn't currently reflect a balanced view of the community, I hope you'll stick around so that we can ensure that it does. I suggest that after the proposal has had some time to mature, we conduct a straw poll with options like "I feel the standards for using confidential evidence outlined in the current proposal are too lenient," and likewise for too stringent. — xDanielx T/ C\ R 03:57, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
I've been asked to give examples for this discussion. So I'll start with examples that are already public and work from there.
The first in-depth investigation I did is documented at User:Durova/Complex vandalism at Joan of Arc. A single individual had been disrupting articles on the topics of Catholicism, Christianity, homosexuality, and cross-dressing for two years. Occasionally he had gotten blocked, but he kept shifting accounts and tactics and exploited the untraceability of AOL accounts until that loophole got closed.
The Midnight Syndicate arbitration case is another good example: Wikipedia:Requests_for_arbitration/Midnight_Syndicate/Evidence#Evidence_presented_by_Durova. That was a business relationship turned bad in a gothic rock band.
The core of my method is to examine Wikipedia site history files. Most investigations are simple, but some rabbit holes are pretty deep. I may look through thousands of edits over scores of pages. Sometimes there's a smoking gun to be found: during the BooyakaDell investigation we had trouble getting a checkuser since the suspected sockmaster had been blocked for too long. So we looked at edit patterns. The suspected sockmaster, JB196, had disclosed his real name on his original account and wrote for some online publications. He liked to link to his articles and so did the new account. BooyakaDell claimed to be a fan of the real-life JB196. We spotted BooyakaDell citing the author by name on an article that had no byline.
JB196 has created over 500 sockpuppets. Obviously he isn't going to cite himself by name for an article that lacks a byline again. If the wikisleuths disclose every method we use to crack a case, then the people who set out to exploit Wikipedia will just get more skilled at it. Not a whole lot of people do this work. Have a look at what we're up against.
Thanks for working out clear parameters in the interests of the site. I'd like to know where the green zone is so I can respect the community's concerns while I do this work. Durova Charge! 06:09, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
Unusually, I think it matters; repost copy of my comment in a previous section. I do a lot of work with 'warriors'. I wrote previously (and its relevant here):
Hope this comment helps here, too. FT2 ( Talk | email) 02:23, 23 November 2007 (UTC)
I mentioned this on WT:BP in relation to a small change to the text there, but I think it's worth saying here too: the use of confidential evidence in certain circumstances should not abrogate from the general obligation to provide reasons for making a block. -- bainer ( talk) 11:46, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
I hope we all agree that there are some investigations for which it is not appropriate for the investigators to disclose every detail to the general public. The reasons are varied, and many are given above so I won't recount them. I hope we also agree that there has to be accountability for actions carried out. To a certain extent these are competing needs. So the practice up to now is that accountability has been achieved in a way that preserves confidentiality, and yet provides the check on rogue behaviour that is needed. The community places trust (or should) in ArbCom to be that check here at en:wp... and project wide, the board has created the m:ombudsman process to add accountability. I hope that this proposed policy, whatever the outcome, preserves these general notions, as they seem appropriate to me. ++ Lar: t/ c 16:07, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
I think I represent a proper understanding when I say that most agree a block should not be implemented by the person assembling the confidential information/evidence. It seems that most agree that evidence should be reviewed before the block. But we have not answered the question of who is a reliable reviewer? Nor have we determined how many people should review the evidence before taking action. I am creating two subsections for that discussion. JodyB talk 17:01, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
Certainly ARBCOM members would be reliable in my mind. Are there others? JodyB talk 17:01, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
I would argue for at least two in addition to the person assembling the evidence. Is that enough? JodyB talk 17:01, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
One of the provisions mentioned is "If the evidence is accessible to problem users, disclosing it might give them more insight on how to circumvent identification." Are we clear that this is really an important concern? In the most recent circumstance, the only insight I could see that a "problem user" might glean is that new accounts which know wiki-markup and know their way around Wikipedia might raise suspicion that that user has edited before under another username or as an IP. While I've never attempted to set up a sleeper account, my guess is that anyone who does would probably take this into account. Have there been other situations where investigative techniques alone (rather than privacy concerns in the evidence) are really so compelling and powerful that the need to keep them secret is more important than the need for transparency? JavaTenor ( talk) 00:36, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
There also seem to be two classes of confidential information here: information that's truly private (names, identities, checkuser info, etc.), and information we'd like to keep out of the hands of deliberate disrupters. Is there any truly compelling reason that the second class of information needs to be held so close to the chest (i.e., ArbComm)? Couldn't it be emailed on request to individual users that the assembler has some level of trust in? I think this is somewhat close to how things are currently done, and I'd prefer this policy not hint that its okay to restrict pseudo-confidential information to ArbCom, just to keep it out of the hands of vandals. Perhaps some language like:
Information that would can be released without harming the privacy of members of the community should be available by private email to trusted editors, on request. Trust may be defined by those assembling the evidence. Editors who ask for such information should be prepared to respect the confidentiality of the information, and not distribute it without permission. This process in no way alleviates the need for a prior review of the evidence by ArbCom before blocks should be issued. |
Thoughts? -- Bfigura ( talk) 02:45, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
This proposal doesn't add much at all really. It states that the user will disclose to "trusted editors". That is, presumably, editors the person trusts (since no further list of "people who must be trusted" is given). But that doesn't help. Of course a person with evidence will disclose it to someone they themselves trust. The issue here is disclosure to indepdendent reviewers that allow the community a measure of trust. This wording just says that essentially, they will show the evidence to the (few/very few?) people they'd have decided to show it to anyhow. FT2 ( Talk | email) 13:13, 25 November 2007 (UTC)
For example, users can @ ArbCom instead of posting evidence.... -- Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus | talk 05:00, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
See also "KISS" below. Rklawton ( talk) 23:27, 27 November 2007 (UTC)
I'd propose saying that the only two agencies justified in acting on secret evidence are 1) The Board and 2) The Entirety of the Arbcom. Secret evidence cannot be reviewed, so this really boils down to: who do we, as a project, trust to the extent that we cede any right whatsoever to review their actions?. Individual admins, and even fairly large subsets of admins clearly do not meet this criteria. Honestly, left up to me, I would prefer Arbcom not even be able to act on secret evidence, but that might not be feasible.
Also remember-- if secret evidence is needed to prove a case, than there is no active disruption going on. There shouldn't be any "emergency need" for immediate action based on secret evidence. Secret evidence is INCREDIBLY dangerous-- if anyone is going to do this, let it be arbcom and only arbcom. -- Alecmconroy ( talk) 13:19, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
I agree with the need for rules regarding confidential evidence but I disagree with the approach taken here. I feel that this proposal is far too restrictive on the use of such evidence, and editorializes to an undue degree that such evidence should not be used. Rather than getting into a dispute over the matter, or making bold edits that are sure to be opposed, I have written an alternate proposal based on this one, at Wikipedia:Confidential evidence/alternate.
Before actually modifying or getting on the talk page there, could I please get some feedback about whether it's okay to make a fork like this? It seems to me to be the best thing to do under the circumstances. Unless there's a convincing objection I'd also like to notice the alternate proposal as well as this one to the village pump, the Durova RfC and ArbCom hearings, and any other appropriate places. (btw, to any administrator reading this, I initially created the proposal at the wrong place and then moved it to its present location - would you kindly delete that page?)
Thanks, Wikidemo ( talk) 14:41, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
Personally I think the current proposal raises the standards slightly too high for use of confidential evidence, but I feel that alternate errs to far in the opposite direction. The alternative seems to convey a message of using confidential evidence is fine when there's a reason to do so, but such use should follow these (relatively strict) guidelines, instead of confidential evidence should be used only when there's a compelling reason to do so, and should follow these (relatively strict) guidelines. Well to be fair, the #6 consideration does say the opposite (limit use as much as reasonably possible), but I think it should be stressed more than it presently is in the alternate. Whatever regulations we come up with in this guideline will likely be underexaggerated to some extent by those who act on private evidence, as our blocking policy sometimes is. — xDanielx T/ C\ R 20:07, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
The issue here, to drive right to the heart of the matter, is whether Durova's investigative techniques should remain secret.
I personally must start with the assumption that investigative techniques do not need to be kept secret (unless they are wrongful, at which point any secrecy becomes a cover-up). The justifications I've seen so far have been that if the vandals knew what behavior got them in trouble, they would avoid it, and be even harder to spot.
Isn't this what we want? Does it matter if a so-called problem user is out there covertly doing non-problematic things? Do we need to act at all except when destructive behavior is spotted -- and is there some kind of destructive behavior that is somehow unidentifiable or irreversible unless secret techniques are used? Why can we not rely on transparent methods of investigation only? (Note that I consider checkuser an adequately transparent method of evaluating privileged information.)
Convince me that "secret investigations" are not dead, dead wrong. I don't care if lots of people are in on the secret as some sort of check against abuse. I have not heard a single convincing reason why they should be secret in the first place. Convince me. Convince everyone.-- Father Goose ( talk) 05:32, 25 November 2007 (UTC)
I fully support this proposal (that is the first version), and had recently considered initiating something like this myself. However, I am still a little uncertain of the concerns that users with second or multiple accounts would be gaining material potentially damaging to the project by the mere revealing of evidence because such evidence would enable them better to create a secret second account. I am quite naive as regards the damaging effects of users with second or multiple accounts, though my assumption is that this relates to block voting in order to push a certain point of view. My feeling is that if discussions on Wiki are locked into knowledge, reason and experience rather than tally counting, then we have less reason to fear users with multiple accounts. If a view presented in a discussion makes sense then it would make sense regardless of who presented the information, and that view doesn't get better or worse for being repeated. If a view presented in a discussion doesn't make sense or is harmful, then that view doesn't become less harmful by being reiterated by a handful of different accounts - regardless of who is behind the accounts. I am wondering, perhaps, if we didn't hand out guns then we wouldn't need to hand out bullet proof jackets and bandages. I'd like to see some tightening up of conclusions and decisions reached in discussions so that the incentive to create secret secondary accounts is lessened. SilkTork * SilkyTalk 10:25, 25 November 2007 (UTC)
Eh? No. So I've marked rejected for now. If you'd like people to look at it seriously, leave off the tags. :-)
In other news, people think secret evidence is allowed at any time? Well, just don't try to use secret evidence while I'm around... grrr! -- Kim Bruning ( talk) 01:43, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
Can I have a check on people's views on one perspective that's come up?
The issue is not the private collating of evidence (which happens often) nor even the decision to block based on private observations, or those made following private discussions.
The issue is the need that if action is taken (a block, an accusation etc), then the evidence must have some form of credible independent review whose finding is public and endorsed by the reviewer. If drama or doubt arises, they may possibly need to be open to a second review of the evidence after the action is public, by parties trusted by the wider community. The reviews does not have to be by arbcom necessarily, but must be sufficiently credible and independent, that it can satisfy the community the conclusion was well founded to the point that individual editors and administrators would not need to see the evidence to check it for themselves. Nonetheless, despite this, whatever idea can be given of the evidence, should be given, and any non-disclosure confirmed by the independent reviewer as reasonable too. |
Thoughts? FT2 ( Talk | email) 03:18, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
I do not believe that this proposal is nearly strong enough. Even I can figure out how to game it, and I don't have the extra buttons. At a very minimum, I believe that all confidential evidence (i.e., that which is covered by the privacy policy or by OFFICE) bxvfgcgvęeing linked to an administrative action made by someone who is not acting on the basis of OTRS, oversight request or checkuser should immediately and without prior request be provided to the entirety of the ArbComm for review. Further, if there is a legal issue identified during the course of an investigation, this should be immediately and without prior request be sent to the Foundation and/or its legal counsel; this could include a proposed action plan. Individual editors and admins are not in a position to determine the best course of action in response to legal issues; law is often counterintuitive and well-meaning admins could place the Foundation in an untenable position unwittingly. Risker ( talk) 03:29, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
Policy:
Process:
The community now has a full description, by a named trusted independent crat/arb member/oversighter who has reviewed the non-public evidence and fully stated their view. They can also check the evidence was disclosed to the extent the reviewer stated. This meets the public need for valid good quality independent information on what has gone on. If there is still a problem or need for a 2nd review, a second review can easily be held by mutual agreement - you'd probably need a short discussion to pick someone from the same trusted set whom everyone is comfortable with, eg different arbcom member or oversighter (or arbcom if no agreement) but that's going to be easy. |
That is closer to a reasonable vision. Why not use this simplified version as the policy? It is the layers of complexity in the document on the project page that make it easy to game. Risker ( talk) 04:04, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
(This summarises the process. No need to duplicate explanation and see also's etc) --Review-- A user who wishes to take action or make a claim, to be justified in part or whole by information that will not be released to public scrutiny, must seek review from one or more reviewers of their choice before doing so, and disclose immediately the action is taken. Valid reviewers for this policy are:
Reviewers must not have a prior involvement in the issue or a connected issue, or prior history with the user against whom action is proposed. Any reviewer who becomes aware they may face a conflict of interest must recuse. --Process--
--Miscellaneous--
|
Thoughts on this one? FT2 ( Talk | email) 05:22, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
I'm not clear on the exact meaning of the Factual evidence paragraph of the Careful handling and judgment section. Wording: Factual evidence. The matters confidentially disclosed should be factual, based on evidence or strong likelihood, with flaws and questions disclosed as the matter progresses. Is this saying: Factual evidence. Any material that is not presented should be factual, based on evidence or strong likelihood rather than interpretation.? And if so, shouldn't this be saying: Factual evidence. Any material should be factual, based on evidence or strong likelihood rather than interpretation., regardless of the fact that the material is being withheld or presented. Or is the suggestion that speculation is acceptable as long as it is out in the open for people to openly discuss, but when the material is withheld that speculative evidence is not acceptable? SilkTork * SilkyTalk 13:23, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
This article focuses entirely on Confidential evidence in Wikipedia-related matters. When reading this on WP:CENT, I immediately thought of something else: whistleblowers. People with access to sensitive information they do not want associated with their name, but do want to be available to the public. Usually, these people go to the news media. However, as Wikipedia's name spreads and the number of readers increases, one could very well be contacting a Wikipedia editor in the future. What to do then?
Though the above question is the main question I think this page needs to answer, I want to point out that the above is not entirely distinct from what the page currently answers. Whistleblowing, or, more specifically, the use of confidential sources in the article space, is most likely to occur in Wikipedia-related matters. For example, thinks like the Essjay controversy could very well have presented difficult problems with confidential evidence. User:Krator ( t c) 23:21, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
Complex investigations are challenging enough without tying an admin's hands even further with yards of red tape. As a result, I suggest a variation on proposed version 3.
I believe an admin should be free to use secret evidence to warn, revert, or block as the admin deems appropriate. But... upon request from any other admin the admin with the secret evidence must turn it over to any requesting admin OR turn it over to arbcom (per v.3) OR recuse themselves from further involvement in the matter. Rklawton ( talk) 16:20, 27 November 2007 (UTC)
Even simpler: No secret evidence. This is a complete turnabout from the days that "offwiki information does not have play onwiki". If you think something requires confidential evidence in the first place, there's something seriously seriously wrong. Sure, maybe it needs to be handled, but it should be handled like the exceptional case that it is. We don't need to make up new rules for this. (That and wikipedia is NOT a bureaucracy.) -- Kim Bruning ( talk) 16:29, 27 November 2007 (UTC)
Based on a principle coming out of the arbcom case that started all this, I'm wondering if this proposed policy has been made moot. From one of the proposed (and certain to pass) principles:
Users are responsible for the editorial and administrative actions they undertake, and must be willing and prepared to discuss the reasons for their actions in a timely manner. If a user feels that they cannot justify their actions in public, they are obliged to refrain from that action altogether or to bring the matter before the Arbitration Committee. This does not apply to users carrying out official tasks as authorized by the Foundation or the Committee (including, but not limited to, CheckUser, OverSight, and OTRS activity)
So, is there more to discuss here? In my reading, the arbcom ruling would seem to state that confidential evidence must go through arbcom (barring checkuser / oversight). Thought / criticisms / beatings? :) -- Bfigura ( talk) 03:34, 28 November 2007 (UTC)
The arbitration case that triggered this discussion is almost over, and has already garnered the necesary votes to pass this provision:
Without regard to the role of ArbCom precedent, or whether we could in theory adopt a policy contrary to an ArbCom ruling, I propose that this ruling is a good one that solves the problems we were working on, so we should simply adopt it. Therefore, let's wait until the ruling is officially announced, then close this discussion with a decision to endorse that paragraph and seek to place it in an appropriate section of WP:BLOCK and perhaps WP:BOLD. What do you think? Wikidemo ( talk)
Reading through the points made since my first comment in this thread, I am now probably in favor of rejection/cancellation of this proposal. We are likely to either constrain the use of confidential evidence too much or too little. I'm not aware of any particular controversy over the use of confidential evidence aside from the present Durova controversy, and that use is being rebuffed in arbitration and elsewhere. If we are not faced with any continuing, systemic abuse, we can probably leave things the way they were, with the arbitration case serving as a cautionary tale regarding the use of confidential evidence in general.-- Father Goose ( talk) 02:29, 29 November 2007 (UTC)
I don't think the ArbCom ruling is sufficiently comprehensive. Whether the community could adopt a policy in conflict with an ArbCom ruling is an interesting question — I'm inclined to suggest that a comprehensive, detailed analysis of the issue by ArbCom should cause us to regard any such decisions as inviolable, but I would certainly hope that they would not shun community efforts to develop a more elaborate process based on informed consensus. Regardless, though, I think the ArbCom motion leaves us free to lay out guidelines on the use of Checkuser and other special tools. See here/ here for an example. If we decide to continue with this proposal, I suggest that we aim for guideline status instead of policy. If we can't agree on any other direction to take, I suggest that we archive the proposals, then replace the main page with a neutral summary of the ideas that have been expressed and the community's response to them. — xDanielx T/ C\ R 02:36, 29 November 2007 (UTC)
There was a version above that seemed to be considered by some, useful and not too wordy or complex, but effective.
I've tidied it up and added it as version 4, in case it's a good balance. I also cut it down somewhat so its fairly short. (For this sort of thing)
The arbcom ruling probably doesn't change that we'd be best to have our own view formed.
Thoughts? FT2 ( Talk | email) 01:54, 1 December 2007 (UTC)
No arbitration ruling should be construed as to prevent or otherwise hinder the development of new policies or the changing of old policies, unless the committee has made a specific declaration to the contrary. In almost all arbitration rulings the committee merely states policy as it presently understands it, and reconciles or resolves unclear and/or conflicting policies. Mackensen (talk) 21:44, 1 December 2007 (UTC)
Questions and responses. |
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How about a simple rule: Evidence should only be limited to those to whom it is actually limited (i.e. evidence involving only contributions and logs must be provided to everyone, evidence involving deleted material should be provided to all admins, evidence involving checkuser information should be provided to all checkusers, etc.), rather than claiming that the "arrangement" of evidence is somehow more confidential than the evidence itself. Let the thing speak for itself; if you cannot, there is far too great a risk that it doesn't actually say what you think it does. If you feel you have to put together an evidence page, your block automatically deserves more, not less, scrutiny than one that does not need one. — Random832 14:09, 3 December 2007 (UTC)
I recommend that the primary editors of this proposed policy review the content of WP:PRIVATE, another proposed policy that overlaps this one and provides different instructions for the provision of confidential information to the Arbcom. I suggest that consideration be given to a single policy, if a policy is required at all. Risker 23:25, 3 December 2007 (UTC)
I may not be reading this sprawling policy proposal correctly; tell me if I'm misunderstanding this?
Am I reading this wrong? Lawrence Cohen 23:02, 5 December 2007 (UTC)
Under v.4, what would happen is -
FT2 ( Talk | email) 03:13, 6 December 2007 (UTC)
As an occasional editor who just happens to have filled a spare hour starting at the history of Wikipedia and reading up on the Durova/!! fiasco before ending up here, I'd like to support FatherGoose, JavaTenor and Bstone with a simple plea: remember the cost-benefit analysis of what you're proposing. The potential damage caused by instituting a policy which fundamentally undermines your entire principle of openness is surely greater than the potential damage caused by "disclosing investigative techniques or raw results [which] might give [bad actors] an unacceptable level of insight into how to circumvent detection". As a completely archetypal joe average Wikipedian with little to no knowledge of internal processes, arbitration, etc., I am unconvinced by this debate that there is any reason at all to allow users to be blocked without the evidence against them being made public. I know Wikipedia is not a democracy, and that's fine - as long as the actions of the undemocratic cabal can be clearly and openly scrutinised, by anyone. Magnate ( talk) 15:03, 7 December 2007 (UTC)
As I see it, there are a few directions we could go from here:
If anyone feels the branches need more time to mature I'm happy with waiting, but I figure we'll need to do this eventually, so if no one objects I suggest we go ahead and pick a direction. — xDanielx T/ C\ R 05:42, 8 December 2007 (UTC)
3 is an adequate course of action for this page, because it provides an actual reflection of consensus. 1 is extremely destructive (sends page participation count over the magic boundary of 150 users where you lose control, and won't even tell us anything real about consensus), and 2 is too complex, more work, and end result would be inferior to 3, due to inevitable loss due to consolidation. -- Kim Bruning ( talk) 09:50, 8 December 2007 (UTC)
(Reply to Daniel, above)
Yes, I think we do. The one liner from "Durova" and the various other notes, are obviously able to be interpreted strictly or otherwise, and this was why I asked for clarification. The clarification just (to me) confirms that despite what some believe, we don't actually have a clear handling at all, and without that we'll have a repeat (only moreso, since next time everyone will believe we did have it and that others are wilfully flouting it).
I feel this has all the taste of another "BADSITES" situation - a "one line" ruling in one case that each user will interpret their own way and believe is resolved, until it happens again with more drama and people split whether User X should or shouldn't have sent the material to Arbcom and user Y should or shouldn't have unblocked, and finally after much damage and mayhem and another case, a policy is agreed by the community anyway that addresses it. But by then the damage is done. It's best to learn from MONGO/BADSITES, that reliance on partial or insufficient rulings that weren't meant to be taken that way, on important, recurring, significant issues, are not helpful, and get a communal proposal agreed first on this occasion. In that sense, the principle in Durova is like that in MONGO - a principle in one case that will be taken differently from how Arbcom intended it by some, with others expecting it to be adhered to perfectly. A brief principle in MONGO's case didn't stop "Attack sites" blowing up either. What came out was that the original principle had been over-relied upon and too much read into it by some, and it was taken too literally. But the harm was real - bans were proposed due to supposed "breach" of this excessively strict interpretation, before the case was done. In short as things stand, we may end up with a 2nd "secret evidence" case that will make Durova look like a piece of cake (like BADSITES did some time after MONGO), if we just naively rely on the arbcom principle (as some did the MONGO arbcom principle).
Back to the present. Arbcom's reply (3 times!) (above) was consistently that they don't make policy but only interpret and apply existing norms, they've all but spoken out to encourage development of one (also see above), they still won't be handling all cases like this but expect "commonsense" to be used, and they haven't said a word to suggest a view on cases where blocking isn't considered. Arbcom do not make policy as such. The community does that. So I don't actually think we have a statement "how to handle it"; rather we have only an affirmation that in genuinely serious cases arbcom can be sent non-public evidence (our current norm) but that this isn't expected to be how we solve it generally, and a policy might be a good idea if the community feels the area might benefit from one.
For example of why we need to form a policy ourselves as a community, consider these statements as a whole:
Really, we really don't have anything now that we didn't have before November, except a statement that commonsense should be used and serious cases should still be sent to Arbcom, so unless we create some kind of policy that we can refine over time on the general handling of such matters, we really have nothing, pretty much. FT2 ( Talk | email) 14:13, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
I think we can make do with the original best practice as also explained in part at WP:WIARM. If you have evidence for something but don't want to show it on wikipedia, then your hands are tied, you shall have to forever hold your silence on the matter.
It's ok to discuss stuff offwiki, but if you want to take it on-wiki, then you'll have to take your evidence and reasoning along with it.
Even OTRS won't do things entirely in secret, and they always leave ticket-id's that can be checked by anyone with relevant access.
Any other use of confidential evidence is nonroutine at best, and runs the risk of running counter to consensus.
I don't think it is necessary for the community to throw away transparency, and it is in fact a fairly destructive and dangerous move.
-- Kim Bruning ( talk) 02:30, 14 December 2007 (UTC)
Neither here nor at WP:Private correspondence have I seen any discussion of principles of natural justice (maybe I haven't read closely enough). It appears to me to be relevant to thinking on this issue. Paul foord ( talk) 15:05, 27 December 2007 (UTC)
I haven't been keeping close track of all the proposals discussed in
the recent MfD, but for this one in particular I really don't like the idea of using the {{
rejected}}
tag. I think the discussions show that the idea behind this policy was actually quite popular; we've just had trouble agreeing on implementation specifics. Rightly or wrongly, {{
rejected}}
is taken to mean that the community didn't buy it, or at least that there was strong resistance to the concept; either way I think it's somewhat misleading.
As for what I suggest... well, if some editors want to persist in trying to get guideline status, I'd support leaving on the {{
proposal}}
tag for now. Most of
Category:Wikipedia proposals is comprised of inactive proposals already, so we wouldn't really be making the system less functional. If no one really has the interest/energy/optimism for that, I'd suggest that we go with the
summary (which others are free to edit, as long as it's done with high standards of neutrality). If others don't like the idea, I would go with {{
historical}}
. I think "historical" may be slightly misleading since in the context of proposals it usually indicates a change in consensus, but I'd prefer that option over {{
rejected}}
.
Thoughts?
— xDanielx T/ C\ R 04:30, 12 January 2008 (UTC)
{{
rejected}}
template is misleading. The idea of a confidential evidence policy or guideline certainly hasn't been rejected by the community; it received considerable support, it just hasn't been actualized due to lack of interest and what not. We don't really have an "inactive proposal" template (as far as I know), but standard procedure is to just let the regular proposal template sit regardless of inactivity. The template itself says rejection status is independent of "whether there is active discussion or not."
Template:Rejected is an indicator of lack of supporting consensus, and while the consensus here has been imperfect (as with any proposal), I don't think it's reasonable to say that this proposal died because of strength of opposition.{{
rejected}}
signifies that support was overcome with resistance, or at least that there was insufficient support. I don't think that's a reasonable characterization of what happened here. Had we managed to consolidate ideas more effectively instead of creating a trainwreck, I'm quite certain that the proposal would have passed with little or no resistance. Calling it "rejected" implies the opposite. —
xDanielx
T/
C\
R
03:52, 12 March 2008 (UTC)
I don't know if I've convinced anyone that {{
rejected}}
is terribly inappropriate, but since no one seems to have a problem with the summary I'll put it in place for now. —
xDanielx
T/
C\
R
19:19, 27 April 2008 (UTC)
![]() | This page is currently inactive and is retained for
historical reference. Either the page is no longer relevant or consensus on its purpose has become unclear. To revive discussion, seek broader input via a forum such as the village pump. |
![]() | This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. |
![]() | This page was nominated for deletion on 2007-12-17. The result of the discussion was closed as defective. |
From discussion at WT:BLOCK. Merits its own page rather than a section in WP:BLOCK, if the communal sense is that this is likely to recur and a policy to prevent abuse is required.
Draft only - comments and improvements welcomed. FT2 ( Talk | email) 19:45, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
I would suggest that the person assembling the secret evidence not be the one who issues the block. The blocking administrator should be a person not involved in any dispute with the editor being blocked not should they have been involved in assembling the information. To do otherwise is to create the appearance of being the prosecutor, judge and jury. JodyB talk 21:07, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
After the block is placed, a notice naming the person assembling the evidence and the persons reviewing and approving the block are to be listed under their own signatures. JodyB talk 21:08, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
Considered:
Thoughts? FT2 ( Talk | email) 21:14, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
Further to JodyB's comments above, try this:
-- Process-- Administrative sanction actions should not be imposed by a person involved in any dispute with the editor being blocked or involved in assembling the secret information. This is to avoid the appearance of being the prosecutor, judge and jury. In the case of emergency, a short term block which does not relate to secret evidence may be used, to allow time for proper review. After sanctions are imposed, a notice naming the person assembling the evidence and the person(s) reviewing and approving the block are to be listed under their own signatures. If communal consensus so decides, a review by a mutually agreed independent administrator (who may be an arbcom member) may be requested, to state whether they feel the matter was justified and appropriate, and whether reasonable doubts exist. |
Slight modification below from me. JodyB talk 21:45, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
-- Process-- In all but presently occurring vandalism, blocking based upon secret or confidential information occurs only after prior review. In such cases, block as usual for the vandalism. Blocking should not be imposed by a person who assembles the secret evidence. This is to avoid the appearance of being the prosecutor, judge and jury. After blocking is imposed, a notice naming the person assembling the evidence and the person(s) reviewing and approving the block are to be listed under their own signatures. The person blocked retains all usual rights of appeal. |
After all, if there's ongoing vandalism, a block can be issued for that without the need for confidential evidence. (Thus including this as an exception seems to open up the process to harm). -- Bfigura ( talk) 22:28, 20 November 2007 (UTC)In all cases, blocking based upon secret or confidential information occurs only after prior review
One fairly basic point that appears to have been missed in at least one case recently. When evidence is circulated cofidentially, agreement of reviewers has to be evidenced by them actually commenting in agreement. Absence of comment does not indicate agreement or disagreement, it may very well indicate that the recipient of the circulated evidence has either not yet read it or not yet investigated themselves and come to a conclusion. GRBerry 22:10, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
This proposed policy is poorly worded and full of loopholes. It contains much wording such as "They are expected to use -- and expected to be able to demonstrate -- independent advice was sought and reasonable good faith employed, in case of review." Such awkward phrases mean nothing as they require nothing. Instead policy should avoid all such ambiguity -- use wording instead like "must use" and "must demonstrate." The entire document should be retooled with an eye to avoiding such gaping loopholes. The proposal also contains too much expository text which can be wikilawyered. Maybe if a succint policy is given in bold and for any accompanying expository text it is made clear that it is elucidation rather than the policy itself. Quatloo ( talk) 22:38, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
A few comments on the current proposal:
If there is a question how to handle a matter like this, it should be referred to the Arbitration Committee (or an uninvolved Arbcom member) for advice, as the representative body best placed to advise on confidential matters that may have disclosure concerns. For matters specifically related to oversight and checkuser issues, those two lists may be suitable instead.
Disclosure of non-public evidence relevant to a decision can be requested for examination by any bona-fide arbcom member, oversight, or checkuser user. An involved individual should nontheless recuse if this would show good judgement , and such evidence should not be circulated on the relevant email lists.
Kirill 22:43, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
Note - "who to contact" now fixed per Kirill's suggestions. FT2 ( Talk | email) 13:30, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Wasn't Esperanza decentralized because of lack of transparency, or that was part of the reasons anyway? Wouldn't this be exactly the same thing again? Kwsn (Ni!) 23:31, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
This is much different subject than Esperanza. Thanks This is a Secret account 00:03, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Perhaps we could make clear what exactly the words "acted upon", in the nutshell (Evidence that is not publicly available can be presented, and acted upon, in certain unusual cases), or in the proposed guideline itself? Perhaps something like "blocking or otherwise restricting the actions of an editor"? Otherwise (particularly when the "background" box is removed, as I assume it will be eventually) this guideline is a bit mystifying to those unfamiliar with Wikipedia. ("Confidential information" for lawsuits? Firing an employee? Reverting all of an editor's prior edits?)
I realize that experienced editors know that there isn't much that Wikipedia can do to an editor other than revoke sysop privileges, restrict editing and/or block or ban an editor, but I'm hoping it's possible to spell things out a bit for less experienced editors who happen on this (not to mention trolls who want to cite the guideline as enabling Wikipedia to do anything to anyone on the basis of information that isn't made public. -- John Broughton (♫♫) 02:22, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Would just like to add that I put in a negative vote for this proposed policy. If it can't be an open process then it can't be presented. There are many people in jail today (Jonathan Pollard being one of them) who are rotting due to "confidential evidence". I abhor this. Thus, I veto it (for whatever it's worth). Bstone ( talk) 02:47, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Now and again I've seen cases where condiential evidence is mentioned, and it mystifies me as to why it needs to be kept confidential. One of the things I'd like to see included in the proposal is that a rationale should be offered whenever confidential evidence is used: "to protect <user's> identity" or the like. Ideally, it ought to be as specific as possible short of defeating the purpose of the condfidentiality; something like "for reasons of privacy" is pointlessly vague.-- Father Goose ( talk) 03:04, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
I support the effort to clarify where the correct parameters are and will abide by community consensus.
I also have a question: under the legitimate reasons section, involved parties are presumed to have a legitimate reason. That looks highly gameable. Let's say an editor stacked RFA votes using Exploit A, which was foiled by Sleuthing Skill B, and that B could be foiled by New and Improved Exploit C. What's to stop this editor from demanding the evidence, then coming back a few months later and implementing New and Improved Exploit C? For that matter, what's to stop any banned troll from picking up a sockpuppet, heading over to a location where an investigation is taking place, and insinuating himself or herself into the status of an "involved party" to get a look at the investigation?
That'd be the worst of all worlds, wouldn't it? The community wouldn't be able to see what's going on, but the people who most want to abuse Wikipedia would get free classes in How to Exploit Wikipedia Better. Durova Charge! 04:50, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Just to confirm a subtle point that's not necessarily obvious on reading: "legitimate reasons" is not in the policy as a basis for demanding information. That's an important subtlety. They are a basis for determining when information should be considered in practice, as being "confidential". If you have a legitimate interest in a case, but you are not allowed to know the evidence - that's the bright line test that some information is non-public/confidential.
If I'm willing to tell everyone who has a half-decent reason for needing to know, what the evidence in case X was, and I tell the person involved, the others who might give evidence, any admin who wants to check it, then it's not "confidential". It's got all the review it needs, even if not * every * user has seen it. But the moment I tell some party who has a decent genuine reason to ask, "sorry, not telling you", that's when it needs to be treated as "confidential information" and the other provisions to protect users kick in.
Essentially it's an anti-trolling criteria: not everyone needs to know evidence (so preventing users who don't really have a good reason from seeing sensitive evidence isn't going to cause a major problem in terms of fairness), but all those with actual legitimate involvement or who habitually watch cases, do have a good reason (and not letting them know does mean that review is less effective than it might have been, and makes unfairness more possible).
If you post that the evidence is available to anyone who wants it, but you aren't going to say it publicly, and you do in fact make it available to those involved in the case, and all admins, and non-admins who watch ANI, then its not really "confidential" even if you didn't tell it to well known troll X or unknown dubious IP user Y or casually curious 300-edit user Z. It's going to get plenty of review by anyone who matters and wishes to do so, and anyone who wishes and has a good reason, can.
It's at the moment you make clear you're actually not going to tell it to some user who is involved, or has a legitimate interest either -- then you have to consider it as being "confidential" and you have to comply with these precautions and processes to ensure its fair and necessary.
That's the concept anyhow. FT2 ( Talk | email) 13:05, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Rspeer's thoughts here are the same for a lot of people. This policy proposal makes it "legal" for Durova to keep doing "sleuthing", while retroactively justifying the method used to block !! in the first place. Therefore, I oppose the creation of this policy as it is essentially gaming the system. Kwsn (Ni!) 12:42, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
I'm not sure I follow that. The essence of the proposed policy is:
Those measure involve some exceptionally stringent requirements for checking, communication, proactive disclosure when possible, and disclosing weakness in evidence not just strength, and advise in fact to say nothing until you've asked someone like an arbcom member, who's got a load of independence and good judgement, what they think. The requirements for a user who feels important evidence can't be publicly presented are fair to all interests... but some of the most demanding of any policy we have.
Better for you? FT2 ( Talk | email) 13:20, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Kwsn, might you be persuaded to reconsider your opposition? Different editors have supported (implicitly or explicitly) some pretty different standards concerning permissibility of confidential evidence. I think the big problem with the status quo is that there's no central set of community standards, so outliers are free to act as they please (within reason). We can't satisfy everyone entirely, but with codified standards I think we'll see less extremity being pushed on both sides of the issue. If you feel the proposal doesn't currently reflect a balanced view of the community, I hope you'll stick around so that we can ensure that it does. I suggest that after the proposal has had some time to mature, we conduct a straw poll with options like "I feel the standards for using confidential evidence outlined in the current proposal are too lenient," and likewise for too stringent. — xDanielx T/ C\ R 03:57, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
I've been asked to give examples for this discussion. So I'll start with examples that are already public and work from there.
The first in-depth investigation I did is documented at User:Durova/Complex vandalism at Joan of Arc. A single individual had been disrupting articles on the topics of Catholicism, Christianity, homosexuality, and cross-dressing for two years. Occasionally he had gotten blocked, but he kept shifting accounts and tactics and exploited the untraceability of AOL accounts until that loophole got closed.
The Midnight Syndicate arbitration case is another good example: Wikipedia:Requests_for_arbitration/Midnight_Syndicate/Evidence#Evidence_presented_by_Durova. That was a business relationship turned bad in a gothic rock band.
The core of my method is to examine Wikipedia site history files. Most investigations are simple, but some rabbit holes are pretty deep. I may look through thousands of edits over scores of pages. Sometimes there's a smoking gun to be found: during the BooyakaDell investigation we had trouble getting a checkuser since the suspected sockmaster had been blocked for too long. So we looked at edit patterns. The suspected sockmaster, JB196, had disclosed his real name on his original account and wrote for some online publications. He liked to link to his articles and so did the new account. BooyakaDell claimed to be a fan of the real-life JB196. We spotted BooyakaDell citing the author by name on an article that had no byline.
JB196 has created over 500 sockpuppets. Obviously he isn't going to cite himself by name for an article that lacks a byline again. If the wikisleuths disclose every method we use to crack a case, then the people who set out to exploit Wikipedia will just get more skilled at it. Not a whole lot of people do this work. Have a look at what we're up against.
Thanks for working out clear parameters in the interests of the site. I'd like to know where the green zone is so I can respect the community's concerns while I do this work. Durova Charge! 06:09, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
Unusually, I think it matters; repost copy of my comment in a previous section. I do a lot of work with 'warriors'. I wrote previously (and its relevant here):
Hope this comment helps here, too. FT2 ( Talk | email) 02:23, 23 November 2007 (UTC)
I mentioned this on WT:BP in relation to a small change to the text there, but I think it's worth saying here too: the use of confidential evidence in certain circumstances should not abrogate from the general obligation to provide reasons for making a block. -- bainer ( talk) 11:46, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
I hope we all agree that there are some investigations for which it is not appropriate for the investigators to disclose every detail to the general public. The reasons are varied, and many are given above so I won't recount them. I hope we also agree that there has to be accountability for actions carried out. To a certain extent these are competing needs. So the practice up to now is that accountability has been achieved in a way that preserves confidentiality, and yet provides the check on rogue behaviour that is needed. The community places trust (or should) in ArbCom to be that check here at en:wp... and project wide, the board has created the m:ombudsman process to add accountability. I hope that this proposed policy, whatever the outcome, preserves these general notions, as they seem appropriate to me. ++ Lar: t/ c 16:07, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
I think I represent a proper understanding when I say that most agree a block should not be implemented by the person assembling the confidential information/evidence. It seems that most agree that evidence should be reviewed before the block. But we have not answered the question of who is a reliable reviewer? Nor have we determined how many people should review the evidence before taking action. I am creating two subsections for that discussion. JodyB talk 17:01, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
Certainly ARBCOM members would be reliable in my mind. Are there others? JodyB talk 17:01, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
I would argue for at least two in addition to the person assembling the evidence. Is that enough? JodyB talk 17:01, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
One of the provisions mentioned is "If the evidence is accessible to problem users, disclosing it might give them more insight on how to circumvent identification." Are we clear that this is really an important concern? In the most recent circumstance, the only insight I could see that a "problem user" might glean is that new accounts which know wiki-markup and know their way around Wikipedia might raise suspicion that that user has edited before under another username or as an IP. While I've never attempted to set up a sleeper account, my guess is that anyone who does would probably take this into account. Have there been other situations where investigative techniques alone (rather than privacy concerns in the evidence) are really so compelling and powerful that the need to keep them secret is more important than the need for transparency? JavaTenor ( talk) 00:36, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
There also seem to be two classes of confidential information here: information that's truly private (names, identities, checkuser info, etc.), and information we'd like to keep out of the hands of deliberate disrupters. Is there any truly compelling reason that the second class of information needs to be held so close to the chest (i.e., ArbComm)? Couldn't it be emailed on request to individual users that the assembler has some level of trust in? I think this is somewhat close to how things are currently done, and I'd prefer this policy not hint that its okay to restrict pseudo-confidential information to ArbCom, just to keep it out of the hands of vandals. Perhaps some language like:
Information that would can be released without harming the privacy of members of the community should be available by private email to trusted editors, on request. Trust may be defined by those assembling the evidence. Editors who ask for such information should be prepared to respect the confidentiality of the information, and not distribute it without permission. This process in no way alleviates the need for a prior review of the evidence by ArbCom before blocks should be issued. |
Thoughts? -- Bfigura ( talk) 02:45, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
This proposal doesn't add much at all really. It states that the user will disclose to "trusted editors". That is, presumably, editors the person trusts (since no further list of "people who must be trusted" is given). But that doesn't help. Of course a person with evidence will disclose it to someone they themselves trust. The issue here is disclosure to indepdendent reviewers that allow the community a measure of trust. This wording just says that essentially, they will show the evidence to the (few/very few?) people they'd have decided to show it to anyhow. FT2 ( Talk | email) 13:13, 25 November 2007 (UTC)
For example, users can @ ArbCom instead of posting evidence.... -- Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus | talk 05:00, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
See also "KISS" below. Rklawton ( talk) 23:27, 27 November 2007 (UTC)
I'd propose saying that the only two agencies justified in acting on secret evidence are 1) The Board and 2) The Entirety of the Arbcom. Secret evidence cannot be reviewed, so this really boils down to: who do we, as a project, trust to the extent that we cede any right whatsoever to review their actions?. Individual admins, and even fairly large subsets of admins clearly do not meet this criteria. Honestly, left up to me, I would prefer Arbcom not even be able to act on secret evidence, but that might not be feasible.
Also remember-- if secret evidence is needed to prove a case, than there is no active disruption going on. There shouldn't be any "emergency need" for immediate action based on secret evidence. Secret evidence is INCREDIBLY dangerous-- if anyone is going to do this, let it be arbcom and only arbcom. -- Alecmconroy ( talk) 13:19, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
I agree with the need for rules regarding confidential evidence but I disagree with the approach taken here. I feel that this proposal is far too restrictive on the use of such evidence, and editorializes to an undue degree that such evidence should not be used. Rather than getting into a dispute over the matter, or making bold edits that are sure to be opposed, I have written an alternate proposal based on this one, at Wikipedia:Confidential evidence/alternate.
Before actually modifying or getting on the talk page there, could I please get some feedback about whether it's okay to make a fork like this? It seems to me to be the best thing to do under the circumstances. Unless there's a convincing objection I'd also like to notice the alternate proposal as well as this one to the village pump, the Durova RfC and ArbCom hearings, and any other appropriate places. (btw, to any administrator reading this, I initially created the proposal at the wrong place and then moved it to its present location - would you kindly delete that page?)
Thanks, Wikidemo ( talk) 14:41, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
Personally I think the current proposal raises the standards slightly too high for use of confidential evidence, but I feel that alternate errs to far in the opposite direction. The alternative seems to convey a message of using confidential evidence is fine when there's a reason to do so, but such use should follow these (relatively strict) guidelines, instead of confidential evidence should be used only when there's a compelling reason to do so, and should follow these (relatively strict) guidelines. Well to be fair, the #6 consideration does say the opposite (limit use as much as reasonably possible), but I think it should be stressed more than it presently is in the alternate. Whatever regulations we come up with in this guideline will likely be underexaggerated to some extent by those who act on private evidence, as our blocking policy sometimes is. — xDanielx T/ C\ R 20:07, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
The issue here, to drive right to the heart of the matter, is whether Durova's investigative techniques should remain secret.
I personally must start with the assumption that investigative techniques do not need to be kept secret (unless they are wrongful, at which point any secrecy becomes a cover-up). The justifications I've seen so far have been that if the vandals knew what behavior got them in trouble, they would avoid it, and be even harder to spot.
Isn't this what we want? Does it matter if a so-called problem user is out there covertly doing non-problematic things? Do we need to act at all except when destructive behavior is spotted -- and is there some kind of destructive behavior that is somehow unidentifiable or irreversible unless secret techniques are used? Why can we not rely on transparent methods of investigation only? (Note that I consider checkuser an adequately transparent method of evaluating privileged information.)
Convince me that "secret investigations" are not dead, dead wrong. I don't care if lots of people are in on the secret as some sort of check against abuse. I have not heard a single convincing reason why they should be secret in the first place. Convince me. Convince everyone.-- Father Goose ( talk) 05:32, 25 November 2007 (UTC)
I fully support this proposal (that is the first version), and had recently considered initiating something like this myself. However, I am still a little uncertain of the concerns that users with second or multiple accounts would be gaining material potentially damaging to the project by the mere revealing of evidence because such evidence would enable them better to create a secret second account. I am quite naive as regards the damaging effects of users with second or multiple accounts, though my assumption is that this relates to block voting in order to push a certain point of view. My feeling is that if discussions on Wiki are locked into knowledge, reason and experience rather than tally counting, then we have less reason to fear users with multiple accounts. If a view presented in a discussion makes sense then it would make sense regardless of who presented the information, and that view doesn't get better or worse for being repeated. If a view presented in a discussion doesn't make sense or is harmful, then that view doesn't become less harmful by being reiterated by a handful of different accounts - regardless of who is behind the accounts. I am wondering, perhaps, if we didn't hand out guns then we wouldn't need to hand out bullet proof jackets and bandages. I'd like to see some tightening up of conclusions and decisions reached in discussions so that the incentive to create secret secondary accounts is lessened. SilkTork * SilkyTalk 10:25, 25 November 2007 (UTC)
Eh? No. So I've marked rejected for now. If you'd like people to look at it seriously, leave off the tags. :-)
In other news, people think secret evidence is allowed at any time? Well, just don't try to use secret evidence while I'm around... grrr! -- Kim Bruning ( talk) 01:43, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
Can I have a check on people's views on one perspective that's come up?
The issue is not the private collating of evidence (which happens often) nor even the decision to block based on private observations, or those made following private discussions.
The issue is the need that if action is taken (a block, an accusation etc), then the evidence must have some form of credible independent review whose finding is public and endorsed by the reviewer. If drama or doubt arises, they may possibly need to be open to a second review of the evidence after the action is public, by parties trusted by the wider community. The reviews does not have to be by arbcom necessarily, but must be sufficiently credible and independent, that it can satisfy the community the conclusion was well founded to the point that individual editors and administrators would not need to see the evidence to check it for themselves. Nonetheless, despite this, whatever idea can be given of the evidence, should be given, and any non-disclosure confirmed by the independent reviewer as reasonable too. |
Thoughts? FT2 ( Talk | email) 03:18, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
I do not believe that this proposal is nearly strong enough. Even I can figure out how to game it, and I don't have the extra buttons. At a very minimum, I believe that all confidential evidence (i.e., that which is covered by the privacy policy or by OFFICE) bxvfgcgvęeing linked to an administrative action made by someone who is not acting on the basis of OTRS, oversight request or checkuser should immediately and without prior request be provided to the entirety of the ArbComm for review. Further, if there is a legal issue identified during the course of an investigation, this should be immediately and without prior request be sent to the Foundation and/or its legal counsel; this could include a proposed action plan. Individual editors and admins are not in a position to determine the best course of action in response to legal issues; law is often counterintuitive and well-meaning admins could place the Foundation in an untenable position unwittingly. Risker ( talk) 03:29, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
Policy:
Process:
The community now has a full description, by a named trusted independent crat/arb member/oversighter who has reviewed the non-public evidence and fully stated their view. They can also check the evidence was disclosed to the extent the reviewer stated. This meets the public need for valid good quality independent information on what has gone on. If there is still a problem or need for a 2nd review, a second review can easily be held by mutual agreement - you'd probably need a short discussion to pick someone from the same trusted set whom everyone is comfortable with, eg different arbcom member or oversighter (or arbcom if no agreement) but that's going to be easy. |
That is closer to a reasonable vision. Why not use this simplified version as the policy? It is the layers of complexity in the document on the project page that make it easy to game. Risker ( talk) 04:04, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
(This summarises the process. No need to duplicate explanation and see also's etc) --Review-- A user who wishes to take action or make a claim, to be justified in part or whole by information that will not be released to public scrutiny, must seek review from one or more reviewers of their choice before doing so, and disclose immediately the action is taken. Valid reviewers for this policy are:
Reviewers must not have a prior involvement in the issue or a connected issue, or prior history with the user against whom action is proposed. Any reviewer who becomes aware they may face a conflict of interest must recuse. --Process--
--Miscellaneous--
|
Thoughts on this one? FT2 ( Talk | email) 05:22, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
I'm not clear on the exact meaning of the Factual evidence paragraph of the Careful handling and judgment section. Wording: Factual evidence. The matters confidentially disclosed should be factual, based on evidence or strong likelihood, with flaws and questions disclosed as the matter progresses. Is this saying: Factual evidence. Any material that is not presented should be factual, based on evidence or strong likelihood rather than interpretation.? And if so, shouldn't this be saying: Factual evidence. Any material should be factual, based on evidence or strong likelihood rather than interpretation., regardless of the fact that the material is being withheld or presented. Or is the suggestion that speculation is acceptable as long as it is out in the open for people to openly discuss, but when the material is withheld that speculative evidence is not acceptable? SilkTork * SilkyTalk 13:23, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
This article focuses entirely on Confidential evidence in Wikipedia-related matters. When reading this on WP:CENT, I immediately thought of something else: whistleblowers. People with access to sensitive information they do not want associated with their name, but do want to be available to the public. Usually, these people go to the news media. However, as Wikipedia's name spreads and the number of readers increases, one could very well be contacting a Wikipedia editor in the future. What to do then?
Though the above question is the main question I think this page needs to answer, I want to point out that the above is not entirely distinct from what the page currently answers. Whistleblowing, or, more specifically, the use of confidential sources in the article space, is most likely to occur in Wikipedia-related matters. For example, thinks like the Essjay controversy could very well have presented difficult problems with confidential evidence. User:Krator ( t c) 23:21, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
Complex investigations are challenging enough without tying an admin's hands even further with yards of red tape. As a result, I suggest a variation on proposed version 3.
I believe an admin should be free to use secret evidence to warn, revert, or block as the admin deems appropriate. But... upon request from any other admin the admin with the secret evidence must turn it over to any requesting admin OR turn it over to arbcom (per v.3) OR recuse themselves from further involvement in the matter. Rklawton ( talk) 16:20, 27 November 2007 (UTC)
Even simpler: No secret evidence. This is a complete turnabout from the days that "offwiki information does not have play onwiki". If you think something requires confidential evidence in the first place, there's something seriously seriously wrong. Sure, maybe it needs to be handled, but it should be handled like the exceptional case that it is. We don't need to make up new rules for this. (That and wikipedia is NOT a bureaucracy.) -- Kim Bruning ( talk) 16:29, 27 November 2007 (UTC)
Based on a principle coming out of the arbcom case that started all this, I'm wondering if this proposed policy has been made moot. From one of the proposed (and certain to pass) principles:
Users are responsible for the editorial and administrative actions they undertake, and must be willing and prepared to discuss the reasons for their actions in a timely manner. If a user feels that they cannot justify their actions in public, they are obliged to refrain from that action altogether or to bring the matter before the Arbitration Committee. This does not apply to users carrying out official tasks as authorized by the Foundation or the Committee (including, but not limited to, CheckUser, OverSight, and OTRS activity)
So, is there more to discuss here? In my reading, the arbcom ruling would seem to state that confidential evidence must go through arbcom (barring checkuser / oversight). Thought / criticisms / beatings? :) -- Bfigura ( talk) 03:34, 28 November 2007 (UTC)
The arbitration case that triggered this discussion is almost over, and has already garnered the necesary votes to pass this provision:
Without regard to the role of ArbCom precedent, or whether we could in theory adopt a policy contrary to an ArbCom ruling, I propose that this ruling is a good one that solves the problems we were working on, so we should simply adopt it. Therefore, let's wait until the ruling is officially announced, then close this discussion with a decision to endorse that paragraph and seek to place it in an appropriate section of WP:BLOCK and perhaps WP:BOLD. What do you think? Wikidemo ( talk)
Reading through the points made since my first comment in this thread, I am now probably in favor of rejection/cancellation of this proposal. We are likely to either constrain the use of confidential evidence too much or too little. I'm not aware of any particular controversy over the use of confidential evidence aside from the present Durova controversy, and that use is being rebuffed in arbitration and elsewhere. If we are not faced with any continuing, systemic abuse, we can probably leave things the way they were, with the arbitration case serving as a cautionary tale regarding the use of confidential evidence in general.-- Father Goose ( talk) 02:29, 29 November 2007 (UTC)
I don't think the ArbCom ruling is sufficiently comprehensive. Whether the community could adopt a policy in conflict with an ArbCom ruling is an interesting question — I'm inclined to suggest that a comprehensive, detailed analysis of the issue by ArbCom should cause us to regard any such decisions as inviolable, but I would certainly hope that they would not shun community efforts to develop a more elaborate process based on informed consensus. Regardless, though, I think the ArbCom motion leaves us free to lay out guidelines on the use of Checkuser and other special tools. See here/ here for an example. If we decide to continue with this proposal, I suggest that we aim for guideline status instead of policy. If we can't agree on any other direction to take, I suggest that we archive the proposals, then replace the main page with a neutral summary of the ideas that have been expressed and the community's response to them. — xDanielx T/ C\ R 02:36, 29 November 2007 (UTC)
There was a version above that seemed to be considered by some, useful and not too wordy or complex, but effective.
I've tidied it up and added it as version 4, in case it's a good balance. I also cut it down somewhat so its fairly short. (For this sort of thing)
The arbcom ruling probably doesn't change that we'd be best to have our own view formed.
Thoughts? FT2 ( Talk | email) 01:54, 1 December 2007 (UTC)
No arbitration ruling should be construed as to prevent or otherwise hinder the development of new policies or the changing of old policies, unless the committee has made a specific declaration to the contrary. In almost all arbitration rulings the committee merely states policy as it presently understands it, and reconciles or resolves unclear and/or conflicting policies. Mackensen (talk) 21:44, 1 December 2007 (UTC)
Questions and responses. |
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|
How about a simple rule: Evidence should only be limited to those to whom it is actually limited (i.e. evidence involving only contributions and logs must be provided to everyone, evidence involving deleted material should be provided to all admins, evidence involving checkuser information should be provided to all checkusers, etc.), rather than claiming that the "arrangement" of evidence is somehow more confidential than the evidence itself. Let the thing speak for itself; if you cannot, there is far too great a risk that it doesn't actually say what you think it does. If you feel you have to put together an evidence page, your block automatically deserves more, not less, scrutiny than one that does not need one. — Random832 14:09, 3 December 2007 (UTC)
I recommend that the primary editors of this proposed policy review the content of WP:PRIVATE, another proposed policy that overlaps this one and provides different instructions for the provision of confidential information to the Arbcom. I suggest that consideration be given to a single policy, if a policy is required at all. Risker 23:25, 3 December 2007 (UTC)
I may not be reading this sprawling policy proposal correctly; tell me if I'm misunderstanding this?
Am I reading this wrong? Lawrence Cohen 23:02, 5 December 2007 (UTC)
Under v.4, what would happen is -
FT2 ( Talk | email) 03:13, 6 December 2007 (UTC)
As an occasional editor who just happens to have filled a spare hour starting at the history of Wikipedia and reading up on the Durova/!! fiasco before ending up here, I'd like to support FatherGoose, JavaTenor and Bstone with a simple plea: remember the cost-benefit analysis of what you're proposing. The potential damage caused by instituting a policy which fundamentally undermines your entire principle of openness is surely greater than the potential damage caused by "disclosing investigative techniques or raw results [which] might give [bad actors] an unacceptable level of insight into how to circumvent detection". As a completely archetypal joe average Wikipedian with little to no knowledge of internal processes, arbitration, etc., I am unconvinced by this debate that there is any reason at all to allow users to be blocked without the evidence against them being made public. I know Wikipedia is not a democracy, and that's fine - as long as the actions of the undemocratic cabal can be clearly and openly scrutinised, by anyone. Magnate ( talk) 15:03, 7 December 2007 (UTC)
As I see it, there are a few directions we could go from here:
If anyone feels the branches need more time to mature I'm happy with waiting, but I figure we'll need to do this eventually, so if no one objects I suggest we go ahead and pick a direction. — xDanielx T/ C\ R 05:42, 8 December 2007 (UTC)
3 is an adequate course of action for this page, because it provides an actual reflection of consensus. 1 is extremely destructive (sends page participation count over the magic boundary of 150 users where you lose control, and won't even tell us anything real about consensus), and 2 is too complex, more work, and end result would be inferior to 3, due to inevitable loss due to consolidation. -- Kim Bruning ( talk) 09:50, 8 December 2007 (UTC)
(Reply to Daniel, above)
Yes, I think we do. The one liner from "Durova" and the various other notes, are obviously able to be interpreted strictly or otherwise, and this was why I asked for clarification. The clarification just (to me) confirms that despite what some believe, we don't actually have a clear handling at all, and without that we'll have a repeat (only moreso, since next time everyone will believe we did have it and that others are wilfully flouting it).
I feel this has all the taste of another "BADSITES" situation - a "one line" ruling in one case that each user will interpret their own way and believe is resolved, until it happens again with more drama and people split whether User X should or shouldn't have sent the material to Arbcom and user Y should or shouldn't have unblocked, and finally after much damage and mayhem and another case, a policy is agreed by the community anyway that addresses it. But by then the damage is done. It's best to learn from MONGO/BADSITES, that reliance on partial or insufficient rulings that weren't meant to be taken that way, on important, recurring, significant issues, are not helpful, and get a communal proposal agreed first on this occasion. In that sense, the principle in Durova is like that in MONGO - a principle in one case that will be taken differently from how Arbcom intended it by some, with others expecting it to be adhered to perfectly. A brief principle in MONGO's case didn't stop "Attack sites" blowing up either. What came out was that the original principle had been over-relied upon and too much read into it by some, and it was taken too literally. But the harm was real - bans were proposed due to supposed "breach" of this excessively strict interpretation, before the case was done. In short as things stand, we may end up with a 2nd "secret evidence" case that will make Durova look like a piece of cake (like BADSITES did some time after MONGO), if we just naively rely on the arbcom principle (as some did the MONGO arbcom principle).
Back to the present. Arbcom's reply (3 times!) (above) was consistently that they don't make policy but only interpret and apply existing norms, they've all but spoken out to encourage development of one (also see above), they still won't be handling all cases like this but expect "commonsense" to be used, and they haven't said a word to suggest a view on cases where blocking isn't considered. Arbcom do not make policy as such. The community does that. So I don't actually think we have a statement "how to handle it"; rather we have only an affirmation that in genuinely serious cases arbcom can be sent non-public evidence (our current norm) but that this isn't expected to be how we solve it generally, and a policy might be a good idea if the community feels the area might benefit from one.
For example of why we need to form a policy ourselves as a community, consider these statements as a whole:
Really, we really don't have anything now that we didn't have before November, except a statement that commonsense should be used and serious cases should still be sent to Arbcom, so unless we create some kind of policy that we can refine over time on the general handling of such matters, we really have nothing, pretty much. FT2 ( Talk | email) 14:13, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
I think we can make do with the original best practice as also explained in part at WP:WIARM. If you have evidence for something but don't want to show it on wikipedia, then your hands are tied, you shall have to forever hold your silence on the matter.
It's ok to discuss stuff offwiki, but if you want to take it on-wiki, then you'll have to take your evidence and reasoning along with it.
Even OTRS won't do things entirely in secret, and they always leave ticket-id's that can be checked by anyone with relevant access.
Any other use of confidential evidence is nonroutine at best, and runs the risk of running counter to consensus.
I don't think it is necessary for the community to throw away transparency, and it is in fact a fairly destructive and dangerous move.
-- Kim Bruning ( talk) 02:30, 14 December 2007 (UTC)
Neither here nor at WP:Private correspondence have I seen any discussion of principles of natural justice (maybe I haven't read closely enough). It appears to me to be relevant to thinking on this issue. Paul foord ( talk) 15:05, 27 December 2007 (UTC)
I haven't been keeping close track of all the proposals discussed in
the recent MfD, but for this one in particular I really don't like the idea of using the {{
rejected}}
tag. I think the discussions show that the idea behind this policy was actually quite popular; we've just had trouble agreeing on implementation specifics. Rightly or wrongly, {{
rejected}}
is taken to mean that the community didn't buy it, or at least that there was strong resistance to the concept; either way I think it's somewhat misleading.
As for what I suggest... well, if some editors want to persist in trying to get guideline status, I'd support leaving on the {{
proposal}}
tag for now. Most of
Category:Wikipedia proposals is comprised of inactive proposals already, so we wouldn't really be making the system less functional. If no one really has the interest/energy/optimism for that, I'd suggest that we go with the
summary (which others are free to edit, as long as it's done with high standards of neutrality). If others don't like the idea, I would go with {{
historical}}
. I think "historical" may be slightly misleading since in the context of proposals it usually indicates a change in consensus, but I'd prefer that option over {{
rejected}}
.
Thoughts?
— xDanielx T/ C\ R 04:30, 12 January 2008 (UTC)
{{
rejected}}
template is misleading. The idea of a confidential evidence policy or guideline certainly hasn't been rejected by the community; it received considerable support, it just hasn't been actualized due to lack of interest and what not. We don't really have an "inactive proposal" template (as far as I know), but standard procedure is to just let the regular proposal template sit regardless of inactivity. The template itself says rejection status is independent of "whether there is active discussion or not."
Template:Rejected is an indicator of lack of supporting consensus, and while the consensus here has been imperfect (as with any proposal), I don't think it's reasonable to say that this proposal died because of strength of opposition.{{
rejected}}
signifies that support was overcome with resistance, or at least that there was insufficient support. I don't think that's a reasonable characterization of what happened here. Had we managed to consolidate ideas more effectively instead of creating a trainwreck, I'm quite certain that the proposal would have passed with little or no resistance. Calling it "rejected" implies the opposite. —
xDanielx
T/
C\
R
03:52, 12 March 2008 (UTC)
I don't know if I've convinced anyone that {{
rejected}}
is terribly inappropriate, but since no one seems to have a problem with the summary I'll put it in place for now. —
xDanielx
T/
C\
R
19:19, 27 April 2008 (UTC)