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Unsure how this would be best added, considering the table already in the article with extensive notes.
Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 199:
Staff, 21st Army Group (already cited in article), full quote:
Total casualties of the Airborne Corps were 9,600, of which the Brit element was 6986 including 322 killed."
Forest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 288: "A German analysis, captured by the Allies after the operation, concluded that the Al- lies’ “chief mistake was not to have landed the entire First British Airborne Division at once rather than over a period of 3 days and that a second airborne division was not dropped in the area west of Arnhem.”"
XXX Corps commander General Horrocks had expected that the Irish Guards would have been able to advance the 13 miles (21 km) to Eindhoven within two-three hours. However, in the event, they started out at 14:35, 2 hours AFTER the first airborne units were ON THE GROUND and only covered 7 miles (11 km) to Valkenswaard before stopping at nightfall, already 4 hours behind schedule. The plan was for Guard to reach Eindhoven [another 6 miles, (9.7 km) further] just after 17:00 in order to relieve 1st Airborne in Arhem in 48 hours. But, they did not restart for 8 hours, making them a full 12 hours behind schedule. Where was Montgomery's urgency during this loss of 12 precious hours?
Montgomery's tanks DID NOT OPERATE AFTER DARK! William Buckingham wrote in his "Arnhem 1944"(2002) pages 119-120:
"By the time the British Liberation Army set foot on the European mainland, the dictum that armour ONLY FOUGHT BY DAY and carried out maintenance and rearming after dark appears to have become set in stone. It is unclear where this originated. The practice may have grown out of the unreliability and heavy maintenance demands of British tanks earlier in the war [see example John Ellis"The Sharp End" p.126], although the advent of the US-produced M4 Sherman, with its exemplary reliability should have done much to offset this. it may also have been a carry over from the long years of training in the UK between Dunkirk [where the British lost ALL of their tanks and heavy equipment and had to train on obsolete, worn out equipment] and the Normandy invasion. Certainly, the British tank crew training in the run up to the Normandy invasion had to make a conscious effort to break potentially lethal habits engendered by peacetime-training regulations [see example John Foley "Mailed Fist" pp 17-18]. During static phases in the Normandy fighting it became standard practice for British tanks to move up to the line in the pre-dawn darkness and to withdraw after dark [I am indebted to Mr Robert Field of TankNet Military Discussion Forum for bringing this to my attention. The information appears in Tim Saunders', "Hell's Highway” (Battleground Europe Series)].
"This practice appears to have been largely based on the assumption that tanks were too vulnerable to operate in darkness. However Germans, and more especially the Soviets, did not subscribe to this view. Nor, incidentally, did everyone in the British and Canadian armies in North-West Europe. Operation "Totalize," launched by the 2nd Canadian Corps, on the night of 7-8 August 1944 saw a large force Canadian and British tanks and armoured infantry pass virtually unscathed through strong German defences along the Caen-Falaise road. They achieved what they had repeatedly failed to do in daylight, because the darkness nullified the expertly sited German anti-tank guns. But the Guards Armoured Division being Guardsmen, and thus not the most flexible of formations, preferred to limit their offensive activities to the hours of daylight.
Sbrenerkener (
talk) 20:01, 24 August 2023 (UTC)
This description, in the 'German preparation' paragraph, is highly inappropriate. For one thing, Nazi SS officers should not be accorded normal military ranks. For another, following his promotion in August 1944, Bittrich was an SS-Obergruppenfuhrer und General der Waffen-SS, equivalent to full general despite his only holding a corps and not an army command. The SS equivalent of lieutenant-general would be one step down, SS-Gruppenfuhrer und Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS. Khamba Tendal ( talk) 19:08, 18 March 2024 (UTC)
This is the
talk page for discussing improvements to the
Operation Market Garden article. This is not a forum for general discussion of the article's subject. |
Article policies
|
Find sources: Google ( books · news · scholar · free images · WP refs) · FENS · JSTOR · TWL |
Archives: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5Auto-archiving period: 90 days |
This article is written in British English, which has its own spelling conventions (colour, travelled, centre, defence, artefact, analyse) and some terms that are used in it may be different or absent from other varieties of English. According to the relevant style guide, this should not be changed without broad consensus. |
Operation Market Garden is a former featured article. Please see the links under Article milestones below for its original nomination page (for older articles, check the nomination archive) and why it was removed. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
This
level-5 vital article is rated C-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Archives
| |||||
|
|||||
This page has archives. Sections older than 90 days may be automatically archived by Lowercase sigmabot III when more than 5 sections are present. |
Unsure how this would be best added, considering the table already in the article with extensive notes.
Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 199:
Staff, 21st Army Group (already cited in article), full quote:
Total casualties of the Airborne Corps were 9,600, of which the Brit element was 6986 including 322 killed."
Forest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 288: "A German analysis, captured by the Allies after the operation, concluded that the Al- lies’ “chief mistake was not to have landed the entire First British Airborne Division at once rather than over a period of 3 days and that a second airborne division was not dropped in the area west of Arnhem.”"
XXX Corps commander General Horrocks had expected that the Irish Guards would have been able to advance the 13 miles (21 km) to Eindhoven within two-three hours. However, in the event, they started out at 14:35, 2 hours AFTER the first airborne units were ON THE GROUND and only covered 7 miles (11 km) to Valkenswaard before stopping at nightfall, already 4 hours behind schedule. The plan was for Guard to reach Eindhoven [another 6 miles, (9.7 km) further] just after 17:00 in order to relieve 1st Airborne in Arhem in 48 hours. But, they did not restart for 8 hours, making them a full 12 hours behind schedule. Where was Montgomery's urgency during this loss of 12 precious hours?
Montgomery's tanks DID NOT OPERATE AFTER DARK! William Buckingham wrote in his "Arnhem 1944"(2002) pages 119-120:
"By the time the British Liberation Army set foot on the European mainland, the dictum that armour ONLY FOUGHT BY DAY and carried out maintenance and rearming after dark appears to have become set in stone. It is unclear where this originated. The practice may have grown out of the unreliability and heavy maintenance demands of British tanks earlier in the war [see example John Ellis"The Sharp End" p.126], although the advent of the US-produced M4 Sherman, with its exemplary reliability should have done much to offset this. it may also have been a carry over from the long years of training in the UK between Dunkirk [where the British lost ALL of their tanks and heavy equipment and had to train on obsolete, worn out equipment] and the Normandy invasion. Certainly, the British tank crew training in the run up to the Normandy invasion had to make a conscious effort to break potentially lethal habits engendered by peacetime-training regulations [see example John Foley "Mailed Fist" pp 17-18]. During static phases in the Normandy fighting it became standard practice for British tanks to move up to the line in the pre-dawn darkness and to withdraw after dark [I am indebted to Mr Robert Field of TankNet Military Discussion Forum for bringing this to my attention. The information appears in Tim Saunders', "Hell's Highway” (Battleground Europe Series)].
"This practice appears to have been largely based on the assumption that tanks were too vulnerable to operate in darkness. However Germans, and more especially the Soviets, did not subscribe to this view. Nor, incidentally, did everyone in the British and Canadian armies in North-West Europe. Operation "Totalize," launched by the 2nd Canadian Corps, on the night of 7-8 August 1944 saw a large force Canadian and British tanks and armoured infantry pass virtually unscathed through strong German defences along the Caen-Falaise road. They achieved what they had repeatedly failed to do in daylight, because the darkness nullified the expertly sited German anti-tank guns. But the Guards Armoured Division being Guardsmen, and thus not the most flexible of formations, preferred to limit their offensive activities to the hours of daylight.
Sbrenerkener (
talk) 20:01, 24 August 2023 (UTC)
This description, in the 'German preparation' paragraph, is highly inappropriate. For one thing, Nazi SS officers should not be accorded normal military ranks. For another, following his promotion in August 1944, Bittrich was an SS-Obergruppenfuhrer und General der Waffen-SS, equivalent to full general despite his only holding a corps and not an army command. The SS equivalent of lieutenant-general would be one step down, SS-Gruppenfuhrer und Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS. Khamba Tendal ( talk) 19:08, 18 March 2024 (UTC)