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The article doesn't even skim on the preceding St Nazaire Raid which actually reached its objectives, and led to reinforcement of the Atlantic Wall, surely this is important context? JidGom ( talk) 14:44, 15 July 2019 (UTC)
27 Oct 2005 - not only should the "R" in "raid" be capitalized, but it in military usage, the names of operations always appear in all-caps, ie Operation JUBILEE, etc. - Michael Dorosh
Maybe I linkified it a little too much? Opinions?
Ok, thanks! :)
Why is the "R" in Raid capitalized? RickK 08:06, 8 Nov 2003 (UTC)
Changed CEF to a generic "Canadian forces". As far as I can tell, the CEF (Canadian Expeditionary Force) served in WWI, not WWII.
"Casualty figures vary, but of the 6,090 men, according to one source..." - which should be cited IMHO. TwoOneTwo, I choose you! ;)
I have added some figures specifically about Canadians from a very good source, i can be more specific if anyone would like, i can not find out if it was 2211 (stated on pg 385 of the official hist of can in ww2) or 2210 (pg 389 in a chart), if anyone can figure this out feel free to revise my figures, i also stated the specific numbers of Fusiliers (584 not 600, not a big deal) - Neil McKay
What does LCT stand for "L...? Tank Carrier"? Mintguy 17:33, 8 Nov 2003 (UTC)
Wouldn't it be better to have the Commando links go directly to British Commandos instead of adding one-shot redirects?
I see we also now have links for several other units. Do we really want to have an article for every unit that participated, either in this battle, or all of WWII? Maybe in a military history wiki, but in a general-purpose encyclopedia? I think it's too fine a level of detail.
would somebody please take a look at the first section of the article. reference is made the the 'joint chiefs of staff' this should read the 'combined chiefs of staff'. the joint chiefs were essentially american and the 'combined chiefs' consisted of the british imperial general staff together with the joint chiefs. both staffs were based in washington D.C.. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Bruce Condell ( talk • contribs) 07:20, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
Please do not delete references to the Calgary Highlanders who were at the Dieppe Raid. Someone keeps deleting it. They were in LCT 6. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 70.70.160.153 ( talk) 20:21, 21 July 2010 (UTC)
I deleted this:
And rewrote this:
I have a problem with the notes showing no page number, and the elliptical quote is inappropriate. Moreover, if it is "spin", what is "undeniable" about it? Also, "spin" is inappropriate usage for an encyclopedia. Anyone who wants to restore the notes with specific citation, & preferably a superscript number, go ahead. Trekphiler 09:18, 16 December 2005 (UTC)
If 3 were awarded, who were the recipients? Surely this is worth mentioning, for the UK's highest award for bravery... Trekphiler 09:32, 16 December 2005 (UTC)
Done
The Three V.C. recipients were: Cec Merritt from Vancouver C.O. of the SSR. Rev. J.W. Foote attached to the RHLI & Pat Porteous of No.4 Commando — Preceding unsigned comment added by 50.67.235.114 ( talk) 00:25, 21 January 2014 (UTC)
I added critcism of Roberts' based on Hughes-Wilson's Military Intelligence Blunders & Cover-Ups, & of small units based on a TV documentary I've seen (the title of which escapes me...) claiming many were "led from behind", while those who were "led from the front" succeeded in comparable conditions. Trekphiler 09:41, 16 December 2005 (UTC)
Small unit leadership will need a better source than that - cowardice is a strong accusation to make. I'd recommend pulling the reference to this until you find a decent source. I do know that at it is claimed that at least one boatload of Royals refused to disembark until a naval officer pulled a revolver on them - I'd have to find the source before using it on the page though; an issue of the Canadian Infantry Journal discusses it in detail.
Ive heard that Mike Myers would like to make a movie about the Dieppe Raid, which war is his life-long passion. Would it be to add this into this page? paat 23:10, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Why is there no mention of the second reason that Hitler issued the shackle order, i.e. Dead German POWs found with their hands tied behind their back?
http://uboat.net/articles/index.html?article=47
http://www.oliverchronicle.com/1996_19.htm
By the way; here one can follow the discussions in the British government in the following months on how to resolve the prisoner shackling issue.
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_1_transcript.pdf
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_2_transcript.pdf
Don’t go in for any further reprisal yet.
Distinction betwn. manacling men in custody and tying up men not yet in custody.
Canadians think we have put ourselves in a false posn. by concealing the truth.
What we thght wrong was the advance instrn. to tie hands in every case to prevent destruction of documents wthr. or not any need to do so to prevent escape.
Before any other action taken, we shd. invite views of Dom. Govts.
We shd. now give more informn. for our own people, about what happened at Dieppe.
Stor stark7 13:53, 17 April 2006 (UTC)
According to the personal accounts of L/Cpl Gene LaBonte of the Essex Scottish on October the 8th 1942 until sometime in November the men of his unit were bound with “Red Cross ropes” the chains replaced the ropes at that time an remain on these men until November 22nd 0f 1944 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.216.186.138 ( talk) 06:29, 9 July 2008 (UTC)
Not sure this latest edit "was a major victory over Canada" reflects that it was a joint arms operation with the infantry mainly supplied by Canada and the marine and air elements mainly by UK. I think it should be referred to as Allied. Also I don't think the repulse of an attack of only Divisional size which was non-strategic can be described as a 'major victory' although possibly the attack could be described as a total failure (barring the lessons learned) Stephen Kirrage 11:53, 3 September 2006 (UTC)
The description of the battle is quite good an interesting, however a map would be wonderful.
Makes no sense to have a military article without maps or air photos of the battlefield. 68.5.64.178 19:41, 20 August 2007 (UTC)
"While dozens of books have been written on the subject, the three titles above are generally considered the best. The first contains a great deal of first person detail; the second is a detailed and very scholarly look at high level planning almost exclusively, and the last is a mixture of both first person account (Whitaker was the only officer of his brigade to return from the main beach unwounded and later commanded the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry in Northwest Europe) and scholarly history. Villa's book offers up tantalizing theories on deliberate leaks of information to the Germans, and attempts to prove the thesis that Admiral Mountbatten mounted the raid without approval from above. Whitaker's book attempts to prove that valuable lessons were learned at Dieppe and may be forgiven for some measure of bias due to his personal involvement in the historical action. Robertson's book is the most even-handed but suffers from being written before many files were available to researchers, especially those relating to Ultra."
I've moved this here because it seems like a personal opinion being inserted. However, I don't know much about historical sources, so I didn't outright delete it. -- Wafulz 01:38, 1 February 2007 (UTC)
This is begining to annoy me. Stop writing "Decisive German Victory" for every battle the Germans won...THEY DIDN'T WIN THE WAR, stop using the word "Decisive". Decsive would means: putting an end to controversy; crucial or most important. This victory would have been decisive if the Germans would have as a result of it (for example) ended up conquering Britain. This battle was a "Strategic" German victory. Bogdan 03:28, 24 March 2007 (UTC)
Thank you. Bogdan 02:26, 6 April 2007 (UTC)
It also led to major advancements in landing equipment for the allies, and significant changes in doctrine for thee types of operations. Enderwigginau ( talk) 04:18, 27 December 2019 (UTC)
The naval action where the invasion forces stumbled across a german coastal convoi did not involve S-Boats, but rather converted trawlers and whalers. Nothing was torpedoed anywhere, but it was rather a very confused gun action fought with automatic Flak guns at close ranges. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by JCRitter ( talk • contribs) 16:33:02, August 19, 2007 (UTC).
I have assessed this as B Class, as it contains a large amount of detail and organization, although it requires more in-line citations. I have assessed this as mid importance as I do feel that the subject of this article plays a strong role in understanding Canada. Cheers, CP 22:10, 14 November 2007 (UTC)
I thought about adding this to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Military_scandals
Do it if you want. -- 84.234.60.154 ( talk) 17:01, 4 April 2008 (UTC)
The Dieppe raid was a tragedy and a disaster for the allied forces who took part in this operation, which consisted, mainly, of Canadian forces. However, this does not excuse the poor standards of reporting in the Wiki-article on Dieppe and the biased vocabulary. Would somebody please instill standards which are normally associated with a basic university degree (mod-history 101) and, at least, tighten up the text. Note: for whoever is interested: editing does not consist only of removing tracts of text which you disagree with. It also includes revisions of policy, grammar, punctuation, vocabulary, content, voice and substance; as it would be the case if any of you had found work on a newspaper as a Sub-Editor. I assume that we are all using the same University of Chicago Style Book (the standard work). If not, please get a copy before meddling with text. I also assume that 'wiki-editors' are experts in the fields of the articles which they are editing and will, at least, be able to show past higher studies work in the area which they are working on. This is not a collection of blogs for the inexpert, or the poorly literate!! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.194.53.104 ( talk) 21:52, 5 April 2008 (UTC) bruce ( talk) 13:00, 7 April 2008 (UTC)
In the paragraph:
Canadian assault (para) incomplete location reference
Bodies of a Canadian soldier and a U.S. Army Ranger lying among damaged landing craft and "Churchill" tanks of the Calgary Regiment following Operation 'Jubilee'Credit: Library and Archives Canada / C-014160 Bodies of a Canadian soldier and a U.S. Army Ranger lying among damaged landing craft and "Churchill" tanks of the Calgary Regiment following Operation 'Jubilee' Credit: Library and Archives Canada / C-014160
The Canadians in the centre suffered greatly, at least in part due to the inexperience of Roberts, who unwisely committed the reserve force to the main beaches. Poor small unit leadership has also been blamed for failures once men went ashore.
The landing at Puys by the Royal Regiment of Canada was delayed and the potential advantages of surprise and darkness were lost. The well-placed German forces held the Canadians that did land on the beach with little difficulty. 225 men were killed, 264 surrendered and 33 made it back to England. The beach was defended by just 60 Germans, who at no time felt the need to reinforce their position. Several platoons of the Black Watch were also employed at Blue Beach; some of their casualties were suffered in a grenade-priming accident on the transport ships during the channel crossing.
The Black Watch landing is the first mention of Blue Beach as a location, but it is referred to as if it were mentioned previously. It is not. One might assume that Blue Beach is at Puys, but that is only implied.
Please clarify this. Did the Black Watch in fact land at Puys, and is that where Blue beach is? (As is implied by the text) Or is Blue beach somewhere else, perhaps close to Puys?
(I lost an uncle at Dieppe, I am proud to say that he single handedly took out a machine gun nest and got mention for it in The Shame and The Glory.)
-- Tsingi ( talk) 19:15, 13 April 2008 (UTC)
The article states 200 german fighter planes whereas the linked article (like most other sources) about the Focke Wulf FW190 states 115 fighters. That's a vast difference in numbers.
Also i cannot find any other sources confirming the appraisement that the allied fighter planes where at the extent of their operating range, giving the Luftwaffe fighters de facto numerical or/and air superiority over the battlefield. This is even entirely unlogical considering that one of the targets of the raid was to lure the Luftwaffe into a large encounter.
On the other hand i miss any reference of the factor - again i refer to the Fw190 article - that the Focke Wulf Fw190 was at that time a scourge for the RAF, outperforming the Spitfire in almost every aspect. It seems appropriate to conclude the RAF fighters actually HAD a decent numerical superiority over the battlefield but took a severe beating nevertheless (RAF fighter losses 106 vs. Luftwaffe fighter losses 25 including crashes, once again refering to the Fw190 article).
Flip a wig ( talk) 19:44, 17 April 2008 (UTC)
See the line: Them damned Brits did not plan on success and sent the Canucks through a mass slaughter to appease those Commies in the East. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 201.229.40.153 ( talk) 00:46, 25 May 2008 (UTC)
I have corrected dates and casualty figures which were off. For example, 1946 was liberally used as the year of the raid, and zeros had been added to casualty figures for some unknown reason.
I think good idea is adding Poland to list of participants in this operation. In oppose to Free France, which send 15 soldiers, Poland send Destroyer - ORP Ślązak, which shot down 4 aircrafts, (2x Do-217, 1x Me-109 and 1x Ju-88), together with other British destroyer sunk German Patrol Boat and carry shore bombardment operations. Also in battle fought Polish Air Force in number of 5 SQNs (302nd, 303th, 306th, 309th and 317th). Together it will be roughly more than 300 soldiers, 20 times more than Free France. 94.101.16.13 ( talk) 23:24, 19 January 2010 (UTC)
Is there any source talking about the reasons why the british sended canadians to this "suicide" attack ?
Blablaaa (
talk) 06:09, 18 July 2010 (UTC)
Someone keeps removing the mention of the Calgary Highlanders at Dieppe. This involvement is porved by the Mention in Despatches. Please leave in. 70.70.160.153 70.70.160.153 ( talk) 15:01, 21 July 2010 (UTC) ( talk) 14:59, 21 July 2010 (UTC)
|supp=
(
help)). 22 December 1942. This has a DCM to Harry Wichtacz for Dieppe, but that's the only award listed. Also the Clagary Highlanders officer who was killed ashore was a staff officer, not holding a regimetnal appointment, so it seems a little misleading to mention him.
David Underdown (
talk) 15:51, 21 July 2010 (UTC)|supp=
(
help)). 2 October 1942. Both are named, and it's clearly stated that all the Mentions are for Dieppe. In fact this Gazette seems to be the main set of rewards for the raid, it's already listed in teh article for the VCs, but I didn't think to look in that yesterday. Can't see why the name search wouldn't work anyway, I did also trying to search on their army numebrs, which would have worked if I'd thought to try without the M prefix on the front.
David Underdown (
talk) 16:10, 22 July 2010 (UTC)The intro says the navy lost 34 ships, but the figure seems a lot less impressive when you learn that 33 of them were only landing craft. Should those be counted as ships? You couldn't sail one to Rio... -- Piledhigheranddeeper ( talk) 02:50, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
I seems that the British broadcast their intentions over the airwaives. Google News list 12 related stories from around June 9, see here. -- Petri Krohn ( talk) 17:41, 10 September 2010 (UTC)
I have restored the {{ Citation}} templates. They are the Wikipedia norm. If you do not like the way the the references differ, please consider mowing the other sources to templates as well. An please – do not ask to be nominated for the lamest edit wars page! -- Petri Krohn ( talk) 10:32, 11 September 2010 (UTC)
I have deleted a claim* concerning a link between the shackling of German EPWs and the Commando order that has been questioned since August of last year. It currently posses as much credibility as the statement "Some mathematicians believe that 1+1=3" without a sorce as to which would think so.
"the headstones have been placed back-to-back in double rows, the norm for a German war cemetery, but unlike any other Commonwealth War Graves Commission site. "
There was another curious incident. In a book called (I think) "Dieppe - Dawn of Decision" there was a reproduction of a newspaper advertisement which appeard a little before the raid, mentioning Dieppe, and showing a woman gathering roses. But the roses' stems were of barbed wire, and she was cutting them with wire cutters. Again, if I remember, it was investigated, but nothing suspicious was uncovered. Baska436 ( talk) 03:10, 27 November 2011 (UTC)
There is an alternative explanation, the raid was intended to fail.
-- Petri Krohn ( talk) 00:40, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
Polish forces is not supported in article, and the Americans weren't involved either. -- Walter Görlitz ( talk) 05:31, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
To be honest, I can't say I agree with the American listing n the infobox. 50 observers, who did not even constitute a combat unit, doesn't to my mind seem like a force or belligerent to include. Nations with far greater contributions are routinely excluded from infoboxes as they do not count as a significant enough element of the conflict. In this case, I'd also be tempted to remove the Poles form the infobox, as their contribution doesn't appear to have been any greater than the Norwegians or Belgians who also had RAF squadrons involved. Ranger Steve Talk 14:04, 29 August 2012 (UTC)
Rangers at Dieppe: The First Combat Action of U.S. Army Rangers in World War II by Jim DeFelice, 2009, pp. 105, 111; the 49 "observers" made up of 44 troops and five officers from the 1st Ranger Battalion were assigned as observers but in the heat of battle, participated fully with at least three Rangers killed and several captured. FWiW Bzuk ( talk) 16:02, 29 August 2012 (UTC).
But they should certainly be mentioned in the body of the article, expanded to state this was the first ground engagement of US troops in the European theatre. Its noteworthy. How about a note by Belligerent or strength box making a note of that point? Irondome ( talk) 16:45, 29 August 2012 (UTC)
I've just seen the source video for the argument that the 'purpose' of the raid was to obtain an Enigma machine and documentation. I'm not convinced, although the video doesn't mention any primary sources. The Brits already had a fully-functional Enigma by Aug '42 ( http://www.intelligentanswers.co.uk/index.php?topic=4544.0), so what would have been the point of mounting a Division-sized op to obtain one? Codebooks etc would have been more valuable though, clearly. In the video clip, a lot got made of the presence of Ian Fleming offshore, but the fact he was there is hardly news - he's mentioned in one book I've seen from '93.
I wonder, is this a case of desperately looking for a purpose behind the tragedy? I'm speculating because I haven't seen the sources that O'Keefe bases his argments on, but the argument that the purpose of Dieppe (as opposed to one of the objectives along the way) being to do with Enigma) is an after-the-fact justification as much as anything else. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Fulleraaron ( talk • contribs) 19:43, 15 August 2012 (UTC)
The claim made by David O'Keefe has some merit in that original source documents were obtained and echoing Andy's thoughts, with a bit of revision, the "pinch" mission may have been a "secondary" not "second" goal of the Dieppe Raid. The Indiana Jones treatment, however, of the docu-drama shown on History Channel is not as convincing. The role of O'Keefe as resident military historian on at least four other documentaries, may or may not lend credence to his assertions of a "find." FWiW Bzuk ( talk) 17:42, 20 August 2012 (UTC).
The released documents themselves show that the attack on the Naval HQ to get anew model 4 wheel Enigma was objective NO2. The fact that planning for this attack was started early on before the attack developed into a major operation is very important. This is all consistent with the Enigma pinch being an early and a key objective. Churchill was always attracted to the unusual in operations. He was depending very heavily on Enigma to read enemy intentions. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 122.62.226.243 ( talk) 21:28, 3 April 2013 (UTC)
Just saw a documentary on this, which is presumably the documentary referred to. Have to say I found it convincing and littered with references to original documentation supporting his case. Certainly these are oblique, but given the entire question of codebreaking was utmost secret, this is not surprising. The most convincing argument above against the raid being for the central aim of capturing a 4 rotor enigma and ancillary documentation is the question whether this could be done in secret without Germans realising it had taken place, which would lead them to change their codes again. However, virtually all British successes in breaking German codes relied upon actual captures of equipment and codes, even where these only showed the general areas of attack. It might therefore be considered vital to capture more machinery. It is quite possible Germans would have reacted by changing their procedures but still used the actual machine, believing it to be inherently unbreakable with known technology, which of course it was (the British having started to use newly invented electronic computers to do this).
I think I saw something recently which suggested the actual breaking of the 4 rotor enigma was a question of sheer genius by one individual. This is not the sort of thing you can rely upon in a desperate situation. Had the naval code remained unbroken and worse been adopted by the army, this might have led to a reverse of the final result of the war. Against this background losing a few thousand lives in a raid is pretty small beer, even if from the outset you felt it had a small chance of success. Anything else said about it officially would naturally be aimed at providing a credible explanation why it took place, though it remains true it did increase pressure on Germany to take seriously attacks against France, thereby tying down troops.
This interpretation of events also explains a couple of other points mentioned in the article and considered criticisms of British planning. Logically, a bombardment of the harbour would be completely counterproductive if it blew up the German intelligence headquarters they were seeking to raid. Committing reserves to what was already a failed operation makes rather more sense, if the reserves in question were not reserves at all, but the central commando group tasked with the central objective, who saw a slim alternative way to carry out their mission. Given the stakes here, their total loss would be a small price against a potential huge payoff. O'Keefe also suggests that this only took place after the raid commander and intelligence officers on board the British ships had met to discuss the possibilities.
It immediately occurs to me to question some of the failings in planning of the raid, in light of the actual objective rather than the claimed ones. I don't know enough to comment on this, but am not at all surprised that even a very important military operation would suffer from bad planning. I was struck by the extreme youth of some of the important people in the operation, which most probably reflects the huge unpreparedness of Britain for all out war and lack of practical experience. However, I must also consider just what would be a successful outcome from the British perspective? To launch a successful raid leading to the capture of Dieppe might be considered a disastrous outcome since it might then lead to Germany taking the risk of invasion far too seriously. Ideally, the raid would capture its objective and then allow itself to be beaten back. So it might have been a difficult decision to decided how to scale a raid intended to appear to fail. Ultimate failure in invading France was part of the plan, and this is pretty much agreed.
Flemming, who personally took part in the raid, wrote the Bond books because of his real intelligence experiences. O'Keefe's work is a crunch point reinterpretation of past events. While it may continue to take some years to become mainstream, this article is fundamentally failing to inform readers of the true situation regarding academic interpretation of this raid if does not properly explain O'Keefe's reinterpretation. Sandpiper ( talk) 14:30, 18 April 2015 (UTC)
I will add an analogy. At the start of WW1 a number of German warships were stationed around the world, and for a while they carried out very successful raids on British Shipping and ports. Eventually, however, the British diverted sufficient powerful ships to chase them down and deal with the problem. Churchill was forced to send sufficient forces, diverted from England at a time a German naval strike at home was feared. Exactly the same applies here, Churchill again in charge. If the British succeeded too well, they would make their own task of invading France more difficult. Everyone agrees invading Europe was already in mind as a longer term plan. I have also seen historical review of the Germans consideration of whether or not they needed to extend their defences. Another example is the Gallipoli fiasco from WW1, which Churchill must have had very much in mind, since he was the cabinet minister responsible for overseeing it, and who got the blame for its failure. That was a classic example of successively more powerful attacks, but which were all too small to deal with the defences as they existed at the time, and merely served to tip the hand of the Turks that the Brits would be coming back with bigger forces, and they needed to prepare. Churchill more than anyone must have had this in mind. Sandpiper ( talk) 17:33, 27 April 2015 (UTC)
Happened to see an edition of the antiques roadshow from Bletchley park. One of the staff there bought out an enigma machine and was talking about it. He said, as I said somewhere above, that never in the war did the Germans come to believe that it was possible to decode an enigmas message without the relevant settings, the total number of combinations being so vast. This is as I said above, the Germans never believed that the British possessing a machine compromised its security. Sandpiper ( talk) 18:48, 9 May 2015 (UTC)
Ok, so got hold of the guy's book. 2013, pub Alfred Knopf, Toronto, Canada, isbn 9780345807694. Some reviews of the book comment that a large part of it is not about the raid, but about the intelligence war leading up to it, and in particular the naval war. I noticed a few points so far, with regard to the discussion above.
The book comments on the very high importance placed on ensuring that the British could continue to read German coded messages. At one point it cites Churchill authorising an unlimited budget for the codebreaking effort, and the setting up of combined operations groups to carry out military action with the express aim of obtaining codes.
He quotes an intelligence document, the Connaught report, which investigated the best ways to obtain codes, etc, and which concluded that an attack on a land command centre would be one of the best ways to do this. One difficulty was identifying targets where codes would be available, but another was preventing Germans destroying any such material as soon as they realised capture was inevitable. In this regard the report considered that a command post would be amongst the slowest in taking any such action, because of the need to maintain communications to the very last moment. Surprise was always essential. It was also considered always essential that any operation have an overt military significance other than capturing codes. Every proposed operation against Germany was vetted to consider its potential for capturing code materials, and nothing by way of naval operations was advanced unless it had this potential. Significant resistance to O'Keef's view above is based on the difficulty of Dieppe as a target. O'Keefe's argument is that documentary evidence exists that British intelligence had concluded this was the right approach.
British success was not simply due to breaking the enigma codes, but also to information gained from simpler codes. These were used by Germans in emergency when the enigma failed, for very short messages and for support services, such as harbour management. All these provided clues which cumulatively were of significant value. The British maintained a file of the most useful codes to break, and it wasnt just the obvious ones. Germans concentrating on destroying the highest priority items might miss some which turned out to be very valuable. British understanding of the code system and the mechanical bombe machines designed to run through combinations much faster than an operator could, meant the codebreakers could make use of partial information to break codes. However the bombes designed to assist in breaking three rotor enigma were highly sophisticated devises for the time which could not be mass produced, and were anyway too slow to break codes for the four rota enigma machines in time for the information to be useful. Practically, the limited number of machines were used to break three rotor codes still in use.
The Germans were correct to assume that simply possessing enigma machines was not in itself sufficient to break the codes. At least at this point in the war, the British relied upon captured information about settings to be able to read the messages. So definitive knowledge by Germans that the British had machines was not in itself sufficient to cause them to drop the system. Yes, if they knew settings had been compromised they would change them, but obtaining the new machine was a critical essential step which in itself would not be self-negating, even if the Germans knew it had happened. The British always took steps to hide the fact codes might have been taken whenever possible.
The introduction of the 4 rotor enigma was an event anticipated by the British, because of a captured box (without machine) and because of errors in German codes sent out, where they were supposed to use 4 rotor machines in three rotor mode as they were being introduced. The 4 rotor began to be used 1 February 1942, and at the same time other codes were changed. This led to essentially a complete break in the intelligence which the British had been using to guide convoy routes and direct naval ships to attack German submarines. Three rotor enigma was still used for surface ships (British codename 'dolphin'), but German submarines were using the four rotor system (codename 'shark') to direct their movements at sea. German submarines extended their operations to the US coast in Feb 1942, where US defences were less than well organised.(Ok p.148) Before the four rotor system was finally cracked in December, 7.1 million tons of shipping was lost to submarines, compared to the 4.5 million tons which was regarded as acceptable loss rate, based on new building.(OK. p.160) 1.5 million tons of tankers lost, reaching a 1 in 4 loss rate per journey, while replacement was running at 200,000 tons per year. Convoy routes were made longer by thousands of miles to try to avoid submarines, meaning turnaround times were extended and each ship could transport less per year. Submarine numbers were something the British could still track, and they were steadily increasing. Fuel deliveries in 1942 dropped by 10% and were only delivering 75% of demand. U-boat commanders described this as their 'second happy time'. This was a crisis potentially sufficient to lose the war for lack of intelligence material which could stem the losses of physical material.
O'Keefe quotes the Admiralty Plans Division, " All this points to the expectation, and intelligence tends to confirm this, that in the Atlantic the German navy will during the spring and summer of this year [1942] make an all out effort to break down our sea power, and bring the war to an end. For us it is vital to win this battle by providing the adequate counter to the anticipated German naval and air measures".(Ok p.165) His point is that in fact the situation was fast approaching desperate, which again relates to comments made above as to why the British might apply such a high level of resources to a pretty suicidal mission. On the US side he quotes General George Marshall writing to Admiral Ernest King in June 42 (heads of army and navy), "losses by submarine off our Atlantic seaboard and in the Caribbean now threaten our entire war effort...I am fearful that another month or two of this will so cripple our means of transport that we will be unable to bring sufficient men and planes to bear against the enemy". The US gave equal priority and funding to its own codebreaking efforts as to the Manhattan Project. The US was getting very upset at the UK's inability to come up with useful intelligence.(Ok p.174) Sandpiper ( talk) 20:34, 14 May 2015 (UTC)
O'Keefe rounds up his argument on the importance of pinches to aid codebreaking by stating that the four rotor code was finally broken because of material taken from a captured U-boat in October 2014.(P.399) He argues that there is written contemporary evidence that the concept of a pinch as one aim of the raid was always there. He further argues that there is sufficient evidence to conclude it was the primary aim. Somewhere he states that Churchill issued an order that no discussion of 'ultra' material should be included in minutes of meetings at all, and of course some of this material still remains secret today. It is therefore unsurprising and no discredit on previous historians, that none has addressed this aspect of the raid.
He argues the plan for the raid evolved as it went. Originally there were two plans, one calling for a frontal assault on Dieppe, and another concentrating the attack from behind the town, from landings either side and with air drops of troops. Also an initial bombardment before the attack by bomb and potentially shipboard artillery was considered. It was originally planned to take place in June over the sweep of two tides, which was reduced to one both due to practical reasons because of the changed tide heights at other times, but also because the raid planners preferred the reduction in time ashore, even though it required objectives to be achieved very quickly. These changes also necessitated reduction in scope of the targets, but these always included an attack by specially trained commandos on the potential sources of code information within and near the harbour. In fact, all orders to troops concentrated on the need to take pinch targets within the harbour, and directed successive groups of troops to concentrate on this if their predecessors had failed, rather than concentrating on other specific targets (although these never actually mentioned a pinch). Priority was placed on taking and holding the route for pinch forces, the few who were briefed on exactly where to look and what to take, to enter the harbour and get out with whatever they might obtain. Half the troops involved were detailed to the pinch operation (p.400). During the raid, senior commanders ignored alternatives where German resistance was less and they might have broken out into the town, continuing to concentrate initial forces and reserves on the pinch route. Potential for material damage, which might have formed the basis for a claimed victory over the Germans was ignored.(p.401) As predicted, during the raid, code materials from the ships in harbour was collected and dropped overboard by a team of German troops with these specific standing orders. This didnt go quite as well as planned, with the result material ended up scattered over the quay, where it might still have been captured.(p. 402)
Mountbatten, in charge of Combined operations headquarters, in charge of planning the raid, writing in 1969 commented, 'Brookie spoke to me personally about the desire of the Canadians to be brought into the raiding operation as soon as possible. My recollection is that I protested strongly because Dieppe was such a large scale and uncertain operation. We were still trying to find out things and even if successful in all our aims there would be nothing much to show for it to the outside world and we were bound to have heavy casualties". In 1969 Ultra remained completely secret, but this acknowledged without really explaining, that even at best case outcome the raid would publicly have little gain which could be admitted to. This also addressed the question of why Canadian troops were used, which had no little to do with their desire to become involved in some tangible action against Germany rather than just sitting about in England. (p.255-257) There was always the difficulty of not sending any more people than absolutely necessary on any raid who really understood the aims of capturing code materials, in case they were captured. Sandpiper ( talk) 07:54, 18 May 2015 (UTC)
I have started listing above some of the main points I have spotted from O'Keefe's book. This is work in progress, and so far I have only just reached the planning stage for the raid. While there is a specific section in the article about a pinch raid theory, it is clear from the book that this is far more than a theory. The book refers to contemporary secret documents which in general show that a very high priority was placed on pinch raids because of the vital need to break German codes, and a recognised danger of losing the war if this could not be done, both by the UK and the US. Plainly there is much more to be said about this, but it impacts more than the section currently listed as 'Enigma pinch theory'. For example, it needs a mention in the lead, background section, plan section, and I dare say further on where the course of the raid is described. It remains to be seen what O'Keefe has to say about evaluation of the raid, but I rather thing his view will completely contradict earlier analysis that the raid was misconceived because it had no clear objective rather than being a gesture to keep Germans busy, and have something to say about why it was planned the way it was, which has also been criticised in the past.
The book seems perfectly sensible to me and referenced to contemporary documents. On the basis of what it says, I would go ahead and make relevant alterations to the article. There does seem to be some resistance to this, however, so I would ask anyone interested to list here alternative sources which contradict O'Keefe. In this regard I would point out the difficulty of relying on any sources predating O'Keefe's work, which makes use of secret documents only released in recent years. Some of these have been available for some time, so there may be comment taking them into account, or there may not.
A quick look at some other articles on wiki about raids on Germany suggests that they too need updating. O'Keefe essentially addresses the question of raiding from the perspective of the need to obtain codebreaking materials, and how this impacted on all planning for raids. Sandpiper ( talk) 08:09, 16 May 2015 (UTC)
Actually, Irondome, I don't think the lede is the place for lengthy quotations, especially as this one doesn't add much. Nor is it really suitable for a lot of references or links. I feel that my re-sequencing of the material did actually clarify the story. 109.154.9.232 ( talk) 02:26, 20 May 2013 (UTC)
Whilst the majority of infantrymen, thus casualties, were Canadian, and the Raid was a key event in Canadian military history (perhaps as important as Vimy Ridge), I think that this article over-eggs the role of the Canadian contingent to the detriment of the other forces. Whilst Canada is mentioned twice in the opening paragraph, none of the other countries involved (UK, USA, France) is mentioned at all. Including Royal Navy and Royal Air Force commitments, the UK had almost as many servicemen involved as Canada did. In fact, of the British forces, 555 sailors and 275 commandos died, countless more were wounded or captured, 1 destroyer and 33 landing craft were destroyed, and 106 planes were shot down. The attack was also important in the history of American involvement in World War Two on account of it being the first combat between American and German ground forces in the war. Whilst it is understandable that the latter is reduced to a footnote, it is unacceptable that the former is. I am editing the opening paragraph to rectify the problem and to change some wording (as part of it is just a copy of a later paragragh); if there is an objection to the phrasing or stylistics, please keep the message the same: That this was a true Allied mission. Bastin8 13:12, 22 September 2005 (UTC)
Good point Bastin8; I've included the US Rangers under "trivia" - not to trivialize their experiences there, but I don't know that their contribution was especially significant in any tactical sense, as they were employed in small groups. It certainly does deserve a mention however. I am not aware of any "French" involvement in the land forces at Dieppe. I disagree that Dieppe was a "key" moment in Canadian military history. It was nothing of the sort. It was a bloody disaster. Far more important were the military skills we developed later on - the APC, for example, was a Canadian invention in Normandy. Dieppe should be a footnote to our own history yet Canadians seem to dwell on it with relish. Why, frankly, escapes me. Michael Dorosh 23:14, 5 December 2005 (UTC) EDIT - ah, I see the French component has been added under 'trivia' - well done, and thanks! Michael Dorosh 18:00, 6 December 2005 (UTC)
More than this is needed as no authoritative reference source lists the Polish forces as a substantial or meaningful element in the Dieppe Raid. If there is a reference source that can be cited, it would considerably bolster the case. FWiW, I am a Polish-Canadian, and a RCAF Historian, and have never considered the Free Polish forces playing a significant role in the Dieppe Raid. FWiW Bzuk ( talk) 13:41, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
The article says: Dieppe and the flanking cliffs were well defended; the 1,500-strong garrison from the 302nd German Infantry Division comprised the 570th, 571st and 572nd Infantry Regiments, each of two battalions, the 302nd Artillery Regiment, the 302nd Reconnaissance Battalion, the 302nd Anti-tank Battalion, the 302nd Engineer Battalion and 302nd Signal Battalion.
How can that be? A German regiment in itself was 3,000 men strong. Should one say that the garrison originated from the 302.ID, that in itself comprised three regiments and an arty regiment as well as some additional support, it would seem right. In its current form - it is beloney! There was a much stronger German force in the Dieppe region than a mere 1,500 men (of 571.IR). The around 1,500 men strong garrison itself comprised some men of 571.IR and some division support troops as well as coastal battery and FLAK units. The 302nd division was positioned behind the coast line in the entire region. Grebbegoos ( talk) 12:05, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
If a link to the article Beach Comber, a war pigeon highly decorated for heroism for his important role in the Dieppe Raid, can not be worked into this article, might it be listed in a "See Also" or some such? Chrisrus ( talk) 20:19, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
The usage of Dieppe is under discussion, see talk:Dieppe -- 76.65.128.222 ( talk) 04:04, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
The large number of photos is in restored after deletion by this edit is problematic because:
Also on procedural notes
I see a similar large number of images on same subject was added some time back but removed. whole topic of big changes and getting past opposition is covered here under WP:BRD. GraemeLeggett ( talk) 06:02, 20 August 2017 (UTC)
Not sure 173Sqn was the correct unit to have bombed the gun battery, as they were in Egypt. Enderwigginau ( talk) 10:39, 26 August 2017 (UTC)
Landing Craft Assault holds significant descriptions of the landings involving LCAs (not Yellow Beach). May transfer some of the well referenced descriptions across. Enderwigginau ( talk) 09:50, 27 August 2017 (UTC)
A reference for Orange and Yellow Beaches
https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2018/10/11/hess-and-goebbels-gun-batteries-at-dieppe/ Enderwigginau ( talk) 03:21, 13 February 2020 (UTC)
Adjusting the position of images to adjust the flow and understanding, but unfortunately it looks great on a mobile device but not on a PC. Mayne I just need more knowledge of coding the image locations. Enderwigginau ( talk) 22:31, 13 February 2020 (UTC)
Why has this article been converted to Canadian English. It was, and is, more correctly in British English, as an article on a Commonwealth operation controlled by the British high command...... Enderwigginau ( talk) 02:08, 19 March 2020 (UTC)
Which are the instances of Canadian English in the text that aren't British English? GraemeLeggett ( talk) 07:23, 13 July 2020 (UTC)
Need to clean up the references to combine repeated references into single ref names Enderwigginau ( talk) 04:37, 18 June 2020 (UTC)
Other than the mention of fighters, there's not much on air contribution. Hurricane fighter bonbers, Mustang reconnaissance and light bombers provided - did they do anything in the battle, or to isolate the area, or act as diversions? Seven squadrons of light bombers and all the article says is that some of them were lost. GraemeLeggett ( talk) 06:13, 18 June 2020 (UTC)
Does anyone object to me using sfns? It's the only style I really know. Regards Keith-264 ( talk) 20:08, 21 June 2020 (UTC)
Please remember to read and understand each section BEFORE working on it, then reread AFTER making any changes, so as to avoid removing information and meaning from sections. Recent changes to the Enigma Pinch section have lost the flow and information of previous edits. Enderwigginau ( talk) 04:28, 22 June 2020 (UTC)
There is no need to add a red link into the text, albeit within the guidelines. Mention that you are writing the page here in the talk page so we the other editors know you are doing so, esp if you are going to redlink. It is much better to keep redlinks to those items that have delinked and need fixing. But if you are going to, mention it in the talk pages. Enderwigginau ( talk) 00:53, 22 July 2020 (UTC)
This article has been revised as part of a large-scale clean-up project of multiple article copyright infringement. (See the investigation subpage) Earlier text must not be restored, unless it can be verified to be free of infringement. For legal reasons, Wikipedia cannot accept copyrighted text or images borrowed from other web sites or printed material; such additions must be deleted. Contributors may use sources as a source of information, but not as a source of sentences or phrases. Accordingly, the material may be rewritten, but only if it does not infringe on the copyright of the original or plagiarize from that source. Please see our guideline on non-free text for how to properly implement limited quotations of copyrighted text. Wikipedia takes copyright violations very seriously. Moneytrees🏝️ Talk🌴 Help out at CCI! 18:39, 3 September 2020 (UTC)
Some idiot on Wikicommons flagged my legally created map images, which Google maps allows, so I’m trying to get that reversed. 2001:8004:12C2:521D:90D5:B592:6D:65BB ( talk) 20:36, 27 October 2020 (UTC) Enderwigginau ( talk) 00:19, 28 October 2020 (UTC)
The final sentence of the lede represents the consensus about the lessons of the mission. The current wording reads:
I would suggest:
Update 1/2/21. Have re-redrafted final part of lede. Valetude ( talk) 21:01, 1 February 2021 (UTC)
I made this comment some years ago, but I am still interested. Many years ago I had a book, called, I think, Dieppe Dawn of Decision, or similar, on the raid. In it it discussed an advertisement that appeared in an English newspaper a short time before the raid. It said something like "remember holidays in Dieppe", and showed a fashionable woman picking roses near a beach. But the roses had barbed wire stems, and she was picking them with wire cutters. Has anyone a copy of the book, or can anyone confirm my recollections? If my recollections are correct, it seems at least interesting. Baska436 ( talk) 09:24, 4 March 2021 (UTC)
This article is written in British English, which has its own spelling conventions (colour, travelled, centre, defence, artefact, analyse) and some terms that are used in it may be different or absent from other varieties of English. According to the relevant style guide, this should not be changed without broad consensus. |
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A fact from this article was featured on Wikipedia's Main Page in the On this day section on August 19, 2004, August 19, 2005, August 19, 2006, August 19, 2007, August 19, 2010, August 19, 2012, and August 19, 2013. |
The article doesn't even skim on the preceding St Nazaire Raid which actually reached its objectives, and led to reinforcement of the Atlantic Wall, surely this is important context? JidGom ( talk) 14:44, 15 July 2019 (UTC)
27 Oct 2005 - not only should the "R" in "raid" be capitalized, but it in military usage, the names of operations always appear in all-caps, ie Operation JUBILEE, etc. - Michael Dorosh
Maybe I linkified it a little too much? Opinions?
Ok, thanks! :)
Why is the "R" in Raid capitalized? RickK 08:06, 8 Nov 2003 (UTC)
Changed CEF to a generic "Canadian forces". As far as I can tell, the CEF (Canadian Expeditionary Force) served in WWI, not WWII.
"Casualty figures vary, but of the 6,090 men, according to one source..." - which should be cited IMHO. TwoOneTwo, I choose you! ;)
I have added some figures specifically about Canadians from a very good source, i can be more specific if anyone would like, i can not find out if it was 2211 (stated on pg 385 of the official hist of can in ww2) or 2210 (pg 389 in a chart), if anyone can figure this out feel free to revise my figures, i also stated the specific numbers of Fusiliers (584 not 600, not a big deal) - Neil McKay
What does LCT stand for "L...? Tank Carrier"? Mintguy 17:33, 8 Nov 2003 (UTC)
Wouldn't it be better to have the Commando links go directly to British Commandos instead of adding one-shot redirects?
I see we also now have links for several other units. Do we really want to have an article for every unit that participated, either in this battle, or all of WWII? Maybe in a military history wiki, but in a general-purpose encyclopedia? I think it's too fine a level of detail.
would somebody please take a look at the first section of the article. reference is made the the 'joint chiefs of staff' this should read the 'combined chiefs of staff'. the joint chiefs were essentially american and the 'combined chiefs' consisted of the british imperial general staff together with the joint chiefs. both staffs were based in washington D.C.. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Bruce Condell ( talk • contribs) 07:20, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
Please do not delete references to the Calgary Highlanders who were at the Dieppe Raid. Someone keeps deleting it. They were in LCT 6. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 70.70.160.153 ( talk) 20:21, 21 July 2010 (UTC)
I deleted this:
And rewrote this:
I have a problem with the notes showing no page number, and the elliptical quote is inappropriate. Moreover, if it is "spin", what is "undeniable" about it? Also, "spin" is inappropriate usage for an encyclopedia. Anyone who wants to restore the notes with specific citation, & preferably a superscript number, go ahead. Trekphiler 09:18, 16 December 2005 (UTC)
If 3 were awarded, who were the recipients? Surely this is worth mentioning, for the UK's highest award for bravery... Trekphiler 09:32, 16 December 2005 (UTC)
Done
The Three V.C. recipients were: Cec Merritt from Vancouver C.O. of the SSR. Rev. J.W. Foote attached to the RHLI & Pat Porteous of No.4 Commando — Preceding unsigned comment added by 50.67.235.114 ( talk) 00:25, 21 January 2014 (UTC)
I added critcism of Roberts' based on Hughes-Wilson's Military Intelligence Blunders & Cover-Ups, & of small units based on a TV documentary I've seen (the title of which escapes me...) claiming many were "led from behind", while those who were "led from the front" succeeded in comparable conditions. Trekphiler 09:41, 16 December 2005 (UTC)
Small unit leadership will need a better source than that - cowardice is a strong accusation to make. I'd recommend pulling the reference to this until you find a decent source. I do know that at it is claimed that at least one boatload of Royals refused to disembark until a naval officer pulled a revolver on them - I'd have to find the source before using it on the page though; an issue of the Canadian Infantry Journal discusses it in detail.
Ive heard that Mike Myers would like to make a movie about the Dieppe Raid, which war is his life-long passion. Would it be to add this into this page? paat 23:10, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Why is there no mention of the second reason that Hitler issued the shackle order, i.e. Dead German POWs found with their hands tied behind their back?
http://uboat.net/articles/index.html?article=47
http://www.oliverchronicle.com/1996_19.htm
By the way; here one can follow the discussions in the British government in the following months on how to resolve the prisoner shackling issue.
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_1_transcript.pdf
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_2_transcript.pdf
Don’t go in for any further reprisal yet.
Distinction betwn. manacling men in custody and tying up men not yet in custody.
Canadians think we have put ourselves in a false posn. by concealing the truth.
What we thght wrong was the advance instrn. to tie hands in every case to prevent destruction of documents wthr. or not any need to do so to prevent escape.
Before any other action taken, we shd. invite views of Dom. Govts.
We shd. now give more informn. for our own people, about what happened at Dieppe.
Stor stark7 13:53, 17 April 2006 (UTC)
According to the personal accounts of L/Cpl Gene LaBonte of the Essex Scottish on October the 8th 1942 until sometime in November the men of his unit were bound with “Red Cross ropes” the chains replaced the ropes at that time an remain on these men until November 22nd 0f 1944 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.216.186.138 ( talk) 06:29, 9 July 2008 (UTC)
Not sure this latest edit "was a major victory over Canada" reflects that it was a joint arms operation with the infantry mainly supplied by Canada and the marine and air elements mainly by UK. I think it should be referred to as Allied. Also I don't think the repulse of an attack of only Divisional size which was non-strategic can be described as a 'major victory' although possibly the attack could be described as a total failure (barring the lessons learned) Stephen Kirrage 11:53, 3 September 2006 (UTC)
The description of the battle is quite good an interesting, however a map would be wonderful.
Makes no sense to have a military article without maps or air photos of the battlefield. 68.5.64.178 19:41, 20 August 2007 (UTC)
"While dozens of books have been written on the subject, the three titles above are generally considered the best. The first contains a great deal of first person detail; the second is a detailed and very scholarly look at high level planning almost exclusively, and the last is a mixture of both first person account (Whitaker was the only officer of his brigade to return from the main beach unwounded and later commanded the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry in Northwest Europe) and scholarly history. Villa's book offers up tantalizing theories on deliberate leaks of information to the Germans, and attempts to prove the thesis that Admiral Mountbatten mounted the raid without approval from above. Whitaker's book attempts to prove that valuable lessons were learned at Dieppe and may be forgiven for some measure of bias due to his personal involvement in the historical action. Robertson's book is the most even-handed but suffers from being written before many files were available to researchers, especially those relating to Ultra."
I've moved this here because it seems like a personal opinion being inserted. However, I don't know much about historical sources, so I didn't outright delete it. -- Wafulz 01:38, 1 February 2007 (UTC)
This is begining to annoy me. Stop writing "Decisive German Victory" for every battle the Germans won...THEY DIDN'T WIN THE WAR, stop using the word "Decisive". Decsive would means: putting an end to controversy; crucial or most important. This victory would have been decisive if the Germans would have as a result of it (for example) ended up conquering Britain. This battle was a "Strategic" German victory. Bogdan 03:28, 24 March 2007 (UTC)
Thank you. Bogdan 02:26, 6 April 2007 (UTC)
It also led to major advancements in landing equipment for the allies, and significant changes in doctrine for thee types of operations. Enderwigginau ( talk) 04:18, 27 December 2019 (UTC)
The naval action where the invasion forces stumbled across a german coastal convoi did not involve S-Boats, but rather converted trawlers and whalers. Nothing was torpedoed anywhere, but it was rather a very confused gun action fought with automatic Flak guns at close ranges. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by JCRitter ( talk • contribs) 16:33:02, August 19, 2007 (UTC).
I have assessed this as B Class, as it contains a large amount of detail and organization, although it requires more in-line citations. I have assessed this as mid importance as I do feel that the subject of this article plays a strong role in understanding Canada. Cheers, CP 22:10, 14 November 2007 (UTC)
I thought about adding this to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Military_scandals
Do it if you want. -- 84.234.60.154 ( talk) 17:01, 4 April 2008 (UTC)
The Dieppe raid was a tragedy and a disaster for the allied forces who took part in this operation, which consisted, mainly, of Canadian forces. However, this does not excuse the poor standards of reporting in the Wiki-article on Dieppe and the biased vocabulary. Would somebody please instill standards which are normally associated with a basic university degree (mod-history 101) and, at least, tighten up the text. Note: for whoever is interested: editing does not consist only of removing tracts of text which you disagree with. It also includes revisions of policy, grammar, punctuation, vocabulary, content, voice and substance; as it would be the case if any of you had found work on a newspaper as a Sub-Editor. I assume that we are all using the same University of Chicago Style Book (the standard work). If not, please get a copy before meddling with text. I also assume that 'wiki-editors' are experts in the fields of the articles which they are editing and will, at least, be able to show past higher studies work in the area which they are working on. This is not a collection of blogs for the inexpert, or the poorly literate!! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.194.53.104 ( talk) 21:52, 5 April 2008 (UTC) bruce ( talk) 13:00, 7 April 2008 (UTC)
In the paragraph:
Canadian assault (para) incomplete location reference
Bodies of a Canadian soldier and a U.S. Army Ranger lying among damaged landing craft and "Churchill" tanks of the Calgary Regiment following Operation 'Jubilee'Credit: Library and Archives Canada / C-014160 Bodies of a Canadian soldier and a U.S. Army Ranger lying among damaged landing craft and "Churchill" tanks of the Calgary Regiment following Operation 'Jubilee' Credit: Library and Archives Canada / C-014160
The Canadians in the centre suffered greatly, at least in part due to the inexperience of Roberts, who unwisely committed the reserve force to the main beaches. Poor small unit leadership has also been blamed for failures once men went ashore.
The landing at Puys by the Royal Regiment of Canada was delayed and the potential advantages of surprise and darkness were lost. The well-placed German forces held the Canadians that did land on the beach with little difficulty. 225 men were killed, 264 surrendered and 33 made it back to England. The beach was defended by just 60 Germans, who at no time felt the need to reinforce their position. Several platoons of the Black Watch were also employed at Blue Beach; some of their casualties were suffered in a grenade-priming accident on the transport ships during the channel crossing.
The Black Watch landing is the first mention of Blue Beach as a location, but it is referred to as if it were mentioned previously. It is not. One might assume that Blue Beach is at Puys, but that is only implied.
Please clarify this. Did the Black Watch in fact land at Puys, and is that where Blue beach is? (As is implied by the text) Or is Blue beach somewhere else, perhaps close to Puys?
(I lost an uncle at Dieppe, I am proud to say that he single handedly took out a machine gun nest and got mention for it in The Shame and The Glory.)
-- Tsingi ( talk) 19:15, 13 April 2008 (UTC)
The article states 200 german fighter planes whereas the linked article (like most other sources) about the Focke Wulf FW190 states 115 fighters. That's a vast difference in numbers.
Also i cannot find any other sources confirming the appraisement that the allied fighter planes where at the extent of their operating range, giving the Luftwaffe fighters de facto numerical or/and air superiority over the battlefield. This is even entirely unlogical considering that one of the targets of the raid was to lure the Luftwaffe into a large encounter.
On the other hand i miss any reference of the factor - again i refer to the Fw190 article - that the Focke Wulf Fw190 was at that time a scourge for the RAF, outperforming the Spitfire in almost every aspect. It seems appropriate to conclude the RAF fighters actually HAD a decent numerical superiority over the battlefield but took a severe beating nevertheless (RAF fighter losses 106 vs. Luftwaffe fighter losses 25 including crashes, once again refering to the Fw190 article).
Flip a wig ( talk) 19:44, 17 April 2008 (UTC)
See the line: Them damned Brits did not plan on success and sent the Canucks through a mass slaughter to appease those Commies in the East. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 201.229.40.153 ( talk) 00:46, 25 May 2008 (UTC)
I have corrected dates and casualty figures which were off. For example, 1946 was liberally used as the year of the raid, and zeros had been added to casualty figures for some unknown reason.
I think good idea is adding Poland to list of participants in this operation. In oppose to Free France, which send 15 soldiers, Poland send Destroyer - ORP Ślązak, which shot down 4 aircrafts, (2x Do-217, 1x Me-109 and 1x Ju-88), together with other British destroyer sunk German Patrol Boat and carry shore bombardment operations. Also in battle fought Polish Air Force in number of 5 SQNs (302nd, 303th, 306th, 309th and 317th). Together it will be roughly more than 300 soldiers, 20 times more than Free France. 94.101.16.13 ( talk) 23:24, 19 January 2010 (UTC)
Is there any source talking about the reasons why the british sended canadians to this "suicide" attack ?
Blablaaa (
talk) 06:09, 18 July 2010 (UTC)
Someone keeps removing the mention of the Calgary Highlanders at Dieppe. This involvement is porved by the Mention in Despatches. Please leave in. 70.70.160.153 70.70.160.153 ( talk) 15:01, 21 July 2010 (UTC) ( talk) 14:59, 21 July 2010 (UTC)
|supp=
(
help)). 22 December 1942. This has a DCM to Harry Wichtacz for Dieppe, but that's the only award listed. Also the Clagary Highlanders officer who was killed ashore was a staff officer, not holding a regimetnal appointment, so it seems a little misleading to mention him.
David Underdown (
talk) 15:51, 21 July 2010 (UTC)|supp=
(
help)). 2 October 1942. Both are named, and it's clearly stated that all the Mentions are for Dieppe. In fact this Gazette seems to be the main set of rewards for the raid, it's already listed in teh article for the VCs, but I didn't think to look in that yesterday. Can't see why the name search wouldn't work anyway, I did also trying to search on their army numebrs, which would have worked if I'd thought to try without the M prefix on the front.
David Underdown (
talk) 16:10, 22 July 2010 (UTC)The intro says the navy lost 34 ships, but the figure seems a lot less impressive when you learn that 33 of them were only landing craft. Should those be counted as ships? You couldn't sail one to Rio... -- Piledhigheranddeeper ( talk) 02:50, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
I seems that the British broadcast their intentions over the airwaives. Google News list 12 related stories from around June 9, see here. -- Petri Krohn ( talk) 17:41, 10 September 2010 (UTC)
I have restored the {{ Citation}} templates. They are the Wikipedia norm. If you do not like the way the the references differ, please consider mowing the other sources to templates as well. An please – do not ask to be nominated for the lamest edit wars page! -- Petri Krohn ( talk) 10:32, 11 September 2010 (UTC)
I have deleted a claim* concerning a link between the shackling of German EPWs and the Commando order that has been questioned since August of last year. It currently posses as much credibility as the statement "Some mathematicians believe that 1+1=3" without a sorce as to which would think so.
"the headstones have been placed back-to-back in double rows, the norm for a German war cemetery, but unlike any other Commonwealth War Graves Commission site. "
There was another curious incident. In a book called (I think) "Dieppe - Dawn of Decision" there was a reproduction of a newspaper advertisement which appeard a little before the raid, mentioning Dieppe, and showing a woman gathering roses. But the roses' stems were of barbed wire, and she was cutting them with wire cutters. Again, if I remember, it was investigated, but nothing suspicious was uncovered. Baska436 ( talk) 03:10, 27 November 2011 (UTC)
There is an alternative explanation, the raid was intended to fail.
-- Petri Krohn ( talk) 00:40, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
Polish forces is not supported in article, and the Americans weren't involved either. -- Walter Görlitz ( talk) 05:31, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
To be honest, I can't say I agree with the American listing n the infobox. 50 observers, who did not even constitute a combat unit, doesn't to my mind seem like a force or belligerent to include. Nations with far greater contributions are routinely excluded from infoboxes as they do not count as a significant enough element of the conflict. In this case, I'd also be tempted to remove the Poles form the infobox, as their contribution doesn't appear to have been any greater than the Norwegians or Belgians who also had RAF squadrons involved. Ranger Steve Talk 14:04, 29 August 2012 (UTC)
Rangers at Dieppe: The First Combat Action of U.S. Army Rangers in World War II by Jim DeFelice, 2009, pp. 105, 111; the 49 "observers" made up of 44 troops and five officers from the 1st Ranger Battalion were assigned as observers but in the heat of battle, participated fully with at least three Rangers killed and several captured. FWiW Bzuk ( talk) 16:02, 29 August 2012 (UTC).
But they should certainly be mentioned in the body of the article, expanded to state this was the first ground engagement of US troops in the European theatre. Its noteworthy. How about a note by Belligerent or strength box making a note of that point? Irondome ( talk) 16:45, 29 August 2012 (UTC)
I've just seen the source video for the argument that the 'purpose' of the raid was to obtain an Enigma machine and documentation. I'm not convinced, although the video doesn't mention any primary sources. The Brits already had a fully-functional Enigma by Aug '42 ( http://www.intelligentanswers.co.uk/index.php?topic=4544.0), so what would have been the point of mounting a Division-sized op to obtain one? Codebooks etc would have been more valuable though, clearly. In the video clip, a lot got made of the presence of Ian Fleming offshore, but the fact he was there is hardly news - he's mentioned in one book I've seen from '93.
I wonder, is this a case of desperately looking for a purpose behind the tragedy? I'm speculating because I haven't seen the sources that O'Keefe bases his argments on, but the argument that the purpose of Dieppe (as opposed to one of the objectives along the way) being to do with Enigma) is an after-the-fact justification as much as anything else. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Fulleraaron ( talk • contribs) 19:43, 15 August 2012 (UTC)
The claim made by David O'Keefe has some merit in that original source documents were obtained and echoing Andy's thoughts, with a bit of revision, the "pinch" mission may have been a "secondary" not "second" goal of the Dieppe Raid. The Indiana Jones treatment, however, of the docu-drama shown on History Channel is not as convincing. The role of O'Keefe as resident military historian on at least four other documentaries, may or may not lend credence to his assertions of a "find." FWiW Bzuk ( talk) 17:42, 20 August 2012 (UTC).
The released documents themselves show that the attack on the Naval HQ to get anew model 4 wheel Enigma was objective NO2. The fact that planning for this attack was started early on before the attack developed into a major operation is very important. This is all consistent with the Enigma pinch being an early and a key objective. Churchill was always attracted to the unusual in operations. He was depending very heavily on Enigma to read enemy intentions. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 122.62.226.243 ( talk) 21:28, 3 April 2013 (UTC)
Just saw a documentary on this, which is presumably the documentary referred to. Have to say I found it convincing and littered with references to original documentation supporting his case. Certainly these are oblique, but given the entire question of codebreaking was utmost secret, this is not surprising. The most convincing argument above against the raid being for the central aim of capturing a 4 rotor enigma and ancillary documentation is the question whether this could be done in secret without Germans realising it had taken place, which would lead them to change their codes again. However, virtually all British successes in breaking German codes relied upon actual captures of equipment and codes, even where these only showed the general areas of attack. It might therefore be considered vital to capture more machinery. It is quite possible Germans would have reacted by changing their procedures but still used the actual machine, believing it to be inherently unbreakable with known technology, which of course it was (the British having started to use newly invented electronic computers to do this).
I think I saw something recently which suggested the actual breaking of the 4 rotor enigma was a question of sheer genius by one individual. This is not the sort of thing you can rely upon in a desperate situation. Had the naval code remained unbroken and worse been adopted by the army, this might have led to a reverse of the final result of the war. Against this background losing a few thousand lives in a raid is pretty small beer, even if from the outset you felt it had a small chance of success. Anything else said about it officially would naturally be aimed at providing a credible explanation why it took place, though it remains true it did increase pressure on Germany to take seriously attacks against France, thereby tying down troops.
This interpretation of events also explains a couple of other points mentioned in the article and considered criticisms of British planning. Logically, a bombardment of the harbour would be completely counterproductive if it blew up the German intelligence headquarters they were seeking to raid. Committing reserves to what was already a failed operation makes rather more sense, if the reserves in question were not reserves at all, but the central commando group tasked with the central objective, who saw a slim alternative way to carry out their mission. Given the stakes here, their total loss would be a small price against a potential huge payoff. O'Keefe also suggests that this only took place after the raid commander and intelligence officers on board the British ships had met to discuss the possibilities.
It immediately occurs to me to question some of the failings in planning of the raid, in light of the actual objective rather than the claimed ones. I don't know enough to comment on this, but am not at all surprised that even a very important military operation would suffer from bad planning. I was struck by the extreme youth of some of the important people in the operation, which most probably reflects the huge unpreparedness of Britain for all out war and lack of practical experience. However, I must also consider just what would be a successful outcome from the British perspective? To launch a successful raid leading to the capture of Dieppe might be considered a disastrous outcome since it might then lead to Germany taking the risk of invasion far too seriously. Ideally, the raid would capture its objective and then allow itself to be beaten back. So it might have been a difficult decision to decided how to scale a raid intended to appear to fail. Ultimate failure in invading France was part of the plan, and this is pretty much agreed.
Flemming, who personally took part in the raid, wrote the Bond books because of his real intelligence experiences. O'Keefe's work is a crunch point reinterpretation of past events. While it may continue to take some years to become mainstream, this article is fundamentally failing to inform readers of the true situation regarding academic interpretation of this raid if does not properly explain O'Keefe's reinterpretation. Sandpiper ( talk) 14:30, 18 April 2015 (UTC)
I will add an analogy. At the start of WW1 a number of German warships were stationed around the world, and for a while they carried out very successful raids on British Shipping and ports. Eventually, however, the British diverted sufficient powerful ships to chase them down and deal with the problem. Churchill was forced to send sufficient forces, diverted from England at a time a German naval strike at home was feared. Exactly the same applies here, Churchill again in charge. If the British succeeded too well, they would make their own task of invading France more difficult. Everyone agrees invading Europe was already in mind as a longer term plan. I have also seen historical review of the Germans consideration of whether or not they needed to extend their defences. Another example is the Gallipoli fiasco from WW1, which Churchill must have had very much in mind, since he was the cabinet minister responsible for overseeing it, and who got the blame for its failure. That was a classic example of successively more powerful attacks, but which were all too small to deal with the defences as they existed at the time, and merely served to tip the hand of the Turks that the Brits would be coming back with bigger forces, and they needed to prepare. Churchill more than anyone must have had this in mind. Sandpiper ( talk) 17:33, 27 April 2015 (UTC)
Happened to see an edition of the antiques roadshow from Bletchley park. One of the staff there bought out an enigma machine and was talking about it. He said, as I said somewhere above, that never in the war did the Germans come to believe that it was possible to decode an enigmas message without the relevant settings, the total number of combinations being so vast. This is as I said above, the Germans never believed that the British possessing a machine compromised its security. Sandpiper ( talk) 18:48, 9 May 2015 (UTC)
Ok, so got hold of the guy's book. 2013, pub Alfred Knopf, Toronto, Canada, isbn 9780345807694. Some reviews of the book comment that a large part of it is not about the raid, but about the intelligence war leading up to it, and in particular the naval war. I noticed a few points so far, with regard to the discussion above.
The book comments on the very high importance placed on ensuring that the British could continue to read German coded messages. At one point it cites Churchill authorising an unlimited budget for the codebreaking effort, and the setting up of combined operations groups to carry out military action with the express aim of obtaining codes.
He quotes an intelligence document, the Connaught report, which investigated the best ways to obtain codes, etc, and which concluded that an attack on a land command centre would be one of the best ways to do this. One difficulty was identifying targets where codes would be available, but another was preventing Germans destroying any such material as soon as they realised capture was inevitable. In this regard the report considered that a command post would be amongst the slowest in taking any such action, because of the need to maintain communications to the very last moment. Surprise was always essential. It was also considered always essential that any operation have an overt military significance other than capturing codes. Every proposed operation against Germany was vetted to consider its potential for capturing code materials, and nothing by way of naval operations was advanced unless it had this potential. Significant resistance to O'Keef's view above is based on the difficulty of Dieppe as a target. O'Keefe's argument is that documentary evidence exists that British intelligence had concluded this was the right approach.
British success was not simply due to breaking the enigma codes, but also to information gained from simpler codes. These were used by Germans in emergency when the enigma failed, for very short messages and for support services, such as harbour management. All these provided clues which cumulatively were of significant value. The British maintained a file of the most useful codes to break, and it wasnt just the obvious ones. Germans concentrating on destroying the highest priority items might miss some which turned out to be very valuable. British understanding of the code system and the mechanical bombe machines designed to run through combinations much faster than an operator could, meant the codebreakers could make use of partial information to break codes. However the bombes designed to assist in breaking three rotor enigma were highly sophisticated devises for the time which could not be mass produced, and were anyway too slow to break codes for the four rota enigma machines in time for the information to be useful. Practically, the limited number of machines were used to break three rotor codes still in use.
The Germans were correct to assume that simply possessing enigma machines was not in itself sufficient to break the codes. At least at this point in the war, the British relied upon captured information about settings to be able to read the messages. So definitive knowledge by Germans that the British had machines was not in itself sufficient to cause them to drop the system. Yes, if they knew settings had been compromised they would change them, but obtaining the new machine was a critical essential step which in itself would not be self-negating, even if the Germans knew it had happened. The British always took steps to hide the fact codes might have been taken whenever possible.
The introduction of the 4 rotor enigma was an event anticipated by the British, because of a captured box (without machine) and because of errors in German codes sent out, where they were supposed to use 4 rotor machines in three rotor mode as they were being introduced. The 4 rotor began to be used 1 February 1942, and at the same time other codes were changed. This led to essentially a complete break in the intelligence which the British had been using to guide convoy routes and direct naval ships to attack German submarines. Three rotor enigma was still used for surface ships (British codename 'dolphin'), but German submarines were using the four rotor system (codename 'shark') to direct their movements at sea. German submarines extended their operations to the US coast in Feb 1942, where US defences were less than well organised.(Ok p.148) Before the four rotor system was finally cracked in December, 7.1 million tons of shipping was lost to submarines, compared to the 4.5 million tons which was regarded as acceptable loss rate, based on new building.(OK. p.160) 1.5 million tons of tankers lost, reaching a 1 in 4 loss rate per journey, while replacement was running at 200,000 tons per year. Convoy routes were made longer by thousands of miles to try to avoid submarines, meaning turnaround times were extended and each ship could transport less per year. Submarine numbers were something the British could still track, and they were steadily increasing. Fuel deliveries in 1942 dropped by 10% and were only delivering 75% of demand. U-boat commanders described this as their 'second happy time'. This was a crisis potentially sufficient to lose the war for lack of intelligence material which could stem the losses of physical material.
O'Keefe quotes the Admiralty Plans Division, " All this points to the expectation, and intelligence tends to confirm this, that in the Atlantic the German navy will during the spring and summer of this year [1942] make an all out effort to break down our sea power, and bring the war to an end. For us it is vital to win this battle by providing the adequate counter to the anticipated German naval and air measures".(Ok p.165) His point is that in fact the situation was fast approaching desperate, which again relates to comments made above as to why the British might apply such a high level of resources to a pretty suicidal mission. On the US side he quotes General George Marshall writing to Admiral Ernest King in June 42 (heads of army and navy), "losses by submarine off our Atlantic seaboard and in the Caribbean now threaten our entire war effort...I am fearful that another month or two of this will so cripple our means of transport that we will be unable to bring sufficient men and planes to bear against the enemy". The US gave equal priority and funding to its own codebreaking efforts as to the Manhattan Project. The US was getting very upset at the UK's inability to come up with useful intelligence.(Ok p.174) Sandpiper ( talk) 20:34, 14 May 2015 (UTC)
O'Keefe rounds up his argument on the importance of pinches to aid codebreaking by stating that the four rotor code was finally broken because of material taken from a captured U-boat in October 2014.(P.399) He argues that there is written contemporary evidence that the concept of a pinch as one aim of the raid was always there. He further argues that there is sufficient evidence to conclude it was the primary aim. Somewhere he states that Churchill issued an order that no discussion of 'ultra' material should be included in minutes of meetings at all, and of course some of this material still remains secret today. It is therefore unsurprising and no discredit on previous historians, that none has addressed this aspect of the raid.
He argues the plan for the raid evolved as it went. Originally there were two plans, one calling for a frontal assault on Dieppe, and another concentrating the attack from behind the town, from landings either side and with air drops of troops. Also an initial bombardment before the attack by bomb and potentially shipboard artillery was considered. It was originally planned to take place in June over the sweep of two tides, which was reduced to one both due to practical reasons because of the changed tide heights at other times, but also because the raid planners preferred the reduction in time ashore, even though it required objectives to be achieved very quickly. These changes also necessitated reduction in scope of the targets, but these always included an attack by specially trained commandos on the potential sources of code information within and near the harbour. In fact, all orders to troops concentrated on the need to take pinch targets within the harbour, and directed successive groups of troops to concentrate on this if their predecessors had failed, rather than concentrating on other specific targets (although these never actually mentioned a pinch). Priority was placed on taking and holding the route for pinch forces, the few who were briefed on exactly where to look and what to take, to enter the harbour and get out with whatever they might obtain. Half the troops involved were detailed to the pinch operation (p.400). During the raid, senior commanders ignored alternatives where German resistance was less and they might have broken out into the town, continuing to concentrate initial forces and reserves on the pinch route. Potential for material damage, which might have formed the basis for a claimed victory over the Germans was ignored.(p.401) As predicted, during the raid, code materials from the ships in harbour was collected and dropped overboard by a team of German troops with these specific standing orders. This didnt go quite as well as planned, with the result material ended up scattered over the quay, where it might still have been captured.(p. 402)
Mountbatten, in charge of Combined operations headquarters, in charge of planning the raid, writing in 1969 commented, 'Brookie spoke to me personally about the desire of the Canadians to be brought into the raiding operation as soon as possible. My recollection is that I protested strongly because Dieppe was such a large scale and uncertain operation. We were still trying to find out things and even if successful in all our aims there would be nothing much to show for it to the outside world and we were bound to have heavy casualties". In 1969 Ultra remained completely secret, but this acknowledged without really explaining, that even at best case outcome the raid would publicly have little gain which could be admitted to. This also addressed the question of why Canadian troops were used, which had no little to do with their desire to become involved in some tangible action against Germany rather than just sitting about in England. (p.255-257) There was always the difficulty of not sending any more people than absolutely necessary on any raid who really understood the aims of capturing code materials, in case they were captured. Sandpiper ( talk) 07:54, 18 May 2015 (UTC)
I have started listing above some of the main points I have spotted from O'Keefe's book. This is work in progress, and so far I have only just reached the planning stage for the raid. While there is a specific section in the article about a pinch raid theory, it is clear from the book that this is far more than a theory. The book refers to contemporary secret documents which in general show that a very high priority was placed on pinch raids because of the vital need to break German codes, and a recognised danger of losing the war if this could not be done, both by the UK and the US. Plainly there is much more to be said about this, but it impacts more than the section currently listed as 'Enigma pinch theory'. For example, it needs a mention in the lead, background section, plan section, and I dare say further on where the course of the raid is described. It remains to be seen what O'Keefe has to say about evaluation of the raid, but I rather thing his view will completely contradict earlier analysis that the raid was misconceived because it had no clear objective rather than being a gesture to keep Germans busy, and have something to say about why it was planned the way it was, which has also been criticised in the past.
The book seems perfectly sensible to me and referenced to contemporary documents. On the basis of what it says, I would go ahead and make relevant alterations to the article. There does seem to be some resistance to this, however, so I would ask anyone interested to list here alternative sources which contradict O'Keefe. In this regard I would point out the difficulty of relying on any sources predating O'Keefe's work, which makes use of secret documents only released in recent years. Some of these have been available for some time, so there may be comment taking them into account, or there may not.
A quick look at some other articles on wiki about raids on Germany suggests that they too need updating. O'Keefe essentially addresses the question of raiding from the perspective of the need to obtain codebreaking materials, and how this impacted on all planning for raids. Sandpiper ( talk) 08:09, 16 May 2015 (UTC)
Actually, Irondome, I don't think the lede is the place for lengthy quotations, especially as this one doesn't add much. Nor is it really suitable for a lot of references or links. I feel that my re-sequencing of the material did actually clarify the story. 109.154.9.232 ( talk) 02:26, 20 May 2013 (UTC)
Whilst the majority of infantrymen, thus casualties, were Canadian, and the Raid was a key event in Canadian military history (perhaps as important as Vimy Ridge), I think that this article over-eggs the role of the Canadian contingent to the detriment of the other forces. Whilst Canada is mentioned twice in the opening paragraph, none of the other countries involved (UK, USA, France) is mentioned at all. Including Royal Navy and Royal Air Force commitments, the UK had almost as many servicemen involved as Canada did. In fact, of the British forces, 555 sailors and 275 commandos died, countless more were wounded or captured, 1 destroyer and 33 landing craft were destroyed, and 106 planes were shot down. The attack was also important in the history of American involvement in World War Two on account of it being the first combat between American and German ground forces in the war. Whilst it is understandable that the latter is reduced to a footnote, it is unacceptable that the former is. I am editing the opening paragraph to rectify the problem and to change some wording (as part of it is just a copy of a later paragragh); if there is an objection to the phrasing or stylistics, please keep the message the same: That this was a true Allied mission. Bastin8 13:12, 22 September 2005 (UTC)
Good point Bastin8; I've included the US Rangers under "trivia" - not to trivialize their experiences there, but I don't know that their contribution was especially significant in any tactical sense, as they were employed in small groups. It certainly does deserve a mention however. I am not aware of any "French" involvement in the land forces at Dieppe. I disagree that Dieppe was a "key" moment in Canadian military history. It was nothing of the sort. It was a bloody disaster. Far more important were the military skills we developed later on - the APC, for example, was a Canadian invention in Normandy. Dieppe should be a footnote to our own history yet Canadians seem to dwell on it with relish. Why, frankly, escapes me. Michael Dorosh 23:14, 5 December 2005 (UTC) EDIT - ah, I see the French component has been added under 'trivia' - well done, and thanks! Michael Dorosh 18:00, 6 December 2005 (UTC)
More than this is needed as no authoritative reference source lists the Polish forces as a substantial or meaningful element in the Dieppe Raid. If there is a reference source that can be cited, it would considerably bolster the case. FWiW, I am a Polish-Canadian, and a RCAF Historian, and have never considered the Free Polish forces playing a significant role in the Dieppe Raid. FWiW Bzuk ( talk) 13:41, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
The article says: Dieppe and the flanking cliffs were well defended; the 1,500-strong garrison from the 302nd German Infantry Division comprised the 570th, 571st and 572nd Infantry Regiments, each of two battalions, the 302nd Artillery Regiment, the 302nd Reconnaissance Battalion, the 302nd Anti-tank Battalion, the 302nd Engineer Battalion and 302nd Signal Battalion.
How can that be? A German regiment in itself was 3,000 men strong. Should one say that the garrison originated from the 302.ID, that in itself comprised three regiments and an arty regiment as well as some additional support, it would seem right. In its current form - it is beloney! There was a much stronger German force in the Dieppe region than a mere 1,500 men (of 571.IR). The around 1,500 men strong garrison itself comprised some men of 571.IR and some division support troops as well as coastal battery and FLAK units. The 302nd division was positioned behind the coast line in the entire region. Grebbegoos ( talk) 12:05, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
If a link to the article Beach Comber, a war pigeon highly decorated for heroism for his important role in the Dieppe Raid, can not be worked into this article, might it be listed in a "See Also" or some such? Chrisrus ( talk) 20:19, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
The usage of Dieppe is under discussion, see talk:Dieppe -- 76.65.128.222 ( talk) 04:04, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
The large number of photos is in restored after deletion by this edit is problematic because:
Also on procedural notes
I see a similar large number of images on same subject was added some time back but removed. whole topic of big changes and getting past opposition is covered here under WP:BRD. GraemeLeggett ( talk) 06:02, 20 August 2017 (UTC)
Not sure 173Sqn was the correct unit to have bombed the gun battery, as they were in Egypt. Enderwigginau ( talk) 10:39, 26 August 2017 (UTC)
Landing Craft Assault holds significant descriptions of the landings involving LCAs (not Yellow Beach). May transfer some of the well referenced descriptions across. Enderwigginau ( talk) 09:50, 27 August 2017 (UTC)
A reference for Orange and Yellow Beaches
https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2018/10/11/hess-and-goebbels-gun-batteries-at-dieppe/ Enderwigginau ( talk) 03:21, 13 February 2020 (UTC)
Adjusting the position of images to adjust the flow and understanding, but unfortunately it looks great on a mobile device but not on a PC. Mayne I just need more knowledge of coding the image locations. Enderwigginau ( talk) 22:31, 13 February 2020 (UTC)
Why has this article been converted to Canadian English. It was, and is, more correctly in British English, as an article on a Commonwealth operation controlled by the British high command...... Enderwigginau ( talk) 02:08, 19 March 2020 (UTC)
Which are the instances of Canadian English in the text that aren't British English? GraemeLeggett ( talk) 07:23, 13 July 2020 (UTC)
Need to clean up the references to combine repeated references into single ref names Enderwigginau ( talk) 04:37, 18 June 2020 (UTC)
Other than the mention of fighters, there's not much on air contribution. Hurricane fighter bonbers, Mustang reconnaissance and light bombers provided - did they do anything in the battle, or to isolate the area, or act as diversions? Seven squadrons of light bombers and all the article says is that some of them were lost. GraemeLeggett ( talk) 06:13, 18 June 2020 (UTC)
Does anyone object to me using sfns? It's the only style I really know. Regards Keith-264 ( talk) 20:08, 21 June 2020 (UTC)
Please remember to read and understand each section BEFORE working on it, then reread AFTER making any changes, so as to avoid removing information and meaning from sections. Recent changes to the Enigma Pinch section have lost the flow and information of previous edits. Enderwigginau ( talk) 04:28, 22 June 2020 (UTC)
There is no need to add a red link into the text, albeit within the guidelines. Mention that you are writing the page here in the talk page so we the other editors know you are doing so, esp if you are going to redlink. It is much better to keep redlinks to those items that have delinked and need fixing. But if you are going to, mention it in the talk pages. Enderwigginau ( talk) 00:53, 22 July 2020 (UTC)
This article has been revised as part of a large-scale clean-up project of multiple article copyright infringement. (See the investigation subpage) Earlier text must not be restored, unless it can be verified to be free of infringement. For legal reasons, Wikipedia cannot accept copyrighted text or images borrowed from other web sites or printed material; such additions must be deleted. Contributors may use sources as a source of information, but not as a source of sentences or phrases. Accordingly, the material may be rewritten, but only if it does not infringe on the copyright of the original or plagiarize from that source. Please see our guideline on non-free text for how to properly implement limited quotations of copyrighted text. Wikipedia takes copyright violations very seriously. Moneytrees🏝️ Talk🌴 Help out at CCI! 18:39, 3 September 2020 (UTC)
Some idiot on Wikicommons flagged my legally created map images, which Google maps allows, so I’m trying to get that reversed. 2001:8004:12C2:521D:90D5:B592:6D:65BB ( talk) 20:36, 27 October 2020 (UTC) Enderwigginau ( talk) 00:19, 28 October 2020 (UTC)
The final sentence of the lede represents the consensus about the lessons of the mission. The current wording reads:
I would suggest:
Update 1/2/21. Have re-redrafted final part of lede. Valetude ( talk) 21:01, 1 February 2021 (UTC)
I made this comment some years ago, but I am still interested. Many years ago I had a book, called, I think, Dieppe Dawn of Decision, or similar, on the raid. In it it discussed an advertisement that appeared in an English newspaper a short time before the raid. It said something like "remember holidays in Dieppe", and showed a fashionable woman picking roses near a beach. But the roses had barbed wire stems, and she was picking them with wire cutters. Has anyone a copy of the book, or can anyone confirm my recollections? If my recollections are correct, it seems at least interesting. Baska436 ( talk) 09:24, 4 March 2021 (UTC)