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Battle of Khe Sanh in popular culture was nominated for deletion. The discussion was closed on 19 April 2011 with a consensus to merge. Its contents were merged into Battle of Khe Sanh. The original page is now a redirect to this page. For the contribution history and old versions of the redirected article, please see its history; for its talk page, see here. |
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Text and/or other creative content from this version of Battle of Khe Sanh in popular culture was copied or moved into Battle of Khe Sanh with this edit. The former page's history now serves to provide attribution for that content in the latter page, and it must not be deleted as long as the latter page exists. |
The battle was a defeat for the U.S. Under concerted pressure and bombardment the U.S. forces and their allies were driven into and confined to the base area of Khe Sanh. The PAVN controlled the entire western third of Quang Tri provence with American forces holding the base trapped, vulnerable, and difficult to resupply. Westmoreland's removal and replacement as commander of U.S. forces in Viet Nam signalled the end of the battle and defeat, as his replacement abandoned Khe Sanh and pulled back to the mountians at the edge of the coastal lowlands. Subsequent attmepts to push inland toward Khe Sanh were checked at Fire Bases Henderson and Holcomb. The brief reoccupation of Khe Sanh in Lom Son 719 was an unmittigated disaster for the U.S. forces, leaving the entire western portion of Quang Tri provence firmly in PAVN hands and set the stage for the Easter Offensive of 1972 which resulted in the loss of the defensive line along the DMZ. Having complete air superiority allowed the U.S. to halt PAVN advances with carpet bombing and intense tactical air strikes giving the illusion of tactical victory. Continued pressure by the PAVN against U.S. ground forces, however, led to a U.S. casualty rate that was unacceptable to the American public. We could hold Khe Sanh, but at what cost? Not one we were willing to continue to pay with no end in sight. Thus, despite the huge advantage of complete air superiority by the U.S., North Viet Nam could turn most so-called tactical victories for the U.S. into strategic defeats in the end. They hoped and guessed correctly that they could outlast us in battle, as the price they were willing to pay and the sacrefices they would make were far greater for far longer. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Tonygumbrell ( talk • contribs) 23:54, 21 January 2010 (UTC)
People have argued a number of factors to evaluate victory:
Using this fourth criterion, in my opinion the most sound argument is that the NVA instigated the battle, their primary objective was to take the base and kill or capture its occupants ala Dien Bien Phu (publicly stated by North Vietnamese I believe, and evidenced by the fact the NVA endured huge losses to come very near to the base), and they eventually withdrew and ended the siege failing to achieve their objective.
I am open to discussions and would love to hear any rational arguments as to how the battle's result could be no more definitive than "Both sides claimed victory" which strikes me as disingenuous and weasel wording at best. I am reverting my previous edit and will be happy to take it down if someone can make a rational argument why this reasoning is faulty. By the way, the claimed citation to a publication by Peter Brush is a dead link and I could not find it after a quick search on the web. IMHO a citation to an author claiming one side achieved a victory or not is not very relevant in this case as there is no problem finding biased authors especially ones biased against the U.S.' involvement in Vietnam. However I will add one since *Treker requested it. — MBbjv ( talk) 10:06, 4 September 2016 (UTC)
The other problem i have with your argument is that you assume vietnamese intentions and base victory/defeat on that; obviously a force can win a strategic victory even if they do not achieve their intended objective but instead another that supersedes it or another after changing strategic considerations made the first obsolete, etc. I would argue by observing what happened and how the different sides profited. In the end the Vietnamese were left in possession of the site, free to bring supplies through the surrounding valleys (the base had been part of a programm to cut off supply via the Ho Chi Minh path by a series of heavily fortified bases), free to operate in the surrounding country site (the CIDG programm also ended with the evacuation as far as i can tell), etc. As far as i can score it would make it a tactical USA/AVRN victory (casualties inflicted, objective held, no second Bien Dien Phu), an operational draw leaning towards the North Vietnamese (they ended up in command of the site and the province, took pressure of their supply routes while expnading significant assets), but a clear cut North Vietnamese strategic victory (no more American troops in Khe Sahn). In my opinion this is a classic example of a excellent strategic consideration, since the North Vietnamese established circumstances where they were highly likely to benefit no matter how things turned out: If they stormed Khe Sanh outright this repeat of Bien Dien Phu would most likely break American morale, if they could not, they would still bind significant forces (and attention) as well as support assets (the airpower used to ensure resupply alone and therefore not available elsewhere was probably enough to make it worthwhile) and thereby facilitate operations else. In other words: They fought a battle that would profit them on way or the other. The Americans did not. Either Khe Sahn was obsolete, in which case it should have been evacuated even before the siege started or it was worthwhile to have in which case it should not have been abandoned after the battle had been 'won'. The attritional concept espoused by top brass at the time and some times still today was obsolete by 1918, let alone 1968. 212.100.51.120 ( talk) 00:26, 23 October 2016 (UTC)
This again goes to the heart of the problem of US strategy in Vietnam. This was a guerilla war with parallel state structures being established by the enemy. Airmobile operations or even mobile operations can under such circumstances not maintain control over a territory. The troops roll in during the day and everybody who cooperates with them gets the axe at night when they are back at base. In the same vein it is no surprise that the US was able to reoccupy the base. That was never in question. To reoccupy you can use that foremost characteristic of American military though which is indiscriminate firepower. But they lost the ability to exercise control over the province or the population. Tactical superiority of the American forces in Vietnam was never in question as far as firepower and standup fights were concerned, but strategically they failed to secure the center of gravity (the population) and instead alienated them by what today is known as 'colleteral damage'. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 5.10.44.116 ( talk) 17:26, 23 October 2016 (UTC)
Either the Americans commit ever more ressource to a garrison that has already been cut off by land and basically feed men and machines and materiel in an attrition scenario with an enemy who regards an exchange rate of 1:10 as acceptable (and achieved much better) and can force the Americans to expand extraordinary levels of supply alone for the resupply runs, that is only keeping their troops alive inflicts a considerably heightened cost in supplies (Petroluem, Oil, lubricants, spare parts, ammunition for the combat aircrafts, etc.) and more attrition (a helicopter or aircraft only has so many hours until it breaks down) or evacuate the basis, weakening both the CIDG programm and the possibilities of intercepting supply through the DMZ as well giving the Vietcong/North Vietnamese breathing space and control over the local population. It is the ideal battle: How ever it turns out the North Vietnamese will get something for their commitment. 94.229.145.154 ( talk) 15:51, 25 October 2016 (UTC)
The policy regarding popular culture entries in military history articles is outlined here: WP:MILPOP. This provides the following: "In popular culture sections should be avoided unless the subject has had a well-cited and notable impact on popular culture. Any popular culture reference being considered for inclusion must be attributed to a reliable secondary source for the article topic. Items meeting these requirements should typically be worked into the text of the article..a separate section for popular culture items, and in particular the following, should be avoided: compendiums of every trivial appearance of the subject in pop culture (trivia), unsupported speculation about cultural significance or fictional likenesses (original research)". At the article's recent A-class review it was determined that the entries were not strongly referenced and hence they were removed. However, there seems to be a tendency to slowly add these back in. If there is a desire to add these back in, can I please ask that the entries be strongly referenced? The current entry is not well referenced (the references do not talk about the song's significance, just that it exists) and probably should be removed as such, and the one I removed here is not even referenced at all. Regards, AustralianRupert ( talk) 05:21, 25 January 2018 (UTC)
This is the
talk page for discussing improvements to the
Battle of Khe Sanh article. This is not a forum for general discussion of the article's subject. |
Article policies
|
Find sources: Google ( books · news · scholar · free images · WP refs) · FENS · JSTOR · TWL |
Archives: 1Auto-archiving period: 30 days |
Battle of Khe Sanh is a former featured article candidate. Please view the links under Article milestones below to see why the nomination failed. For older candidates, please check the archive. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Battle of Khe Sanh in popular culture was nominated for deletion. The discussion was closed on 19 April 2011 with a consensus to merge. Its contents were merged into Battle of Khe Sanh. The original page is now a redirect to this page. For the contribution history and old versions of the redirected article, please see its history; for its talk page, see here. |
This article is rated A-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Text and/or other creative content from this version of Battle of Khe Sanh in popular culture was copied or moved into Battle of Khe Sanh with this edit. The former page's history now serves to provide attribution for that content in the latter page, and it must not be deleted as long as the latter page exists. |
The battle was a defeat for the U.S. Under concerted pressure and bombardment the U.S. forces and their allies were driven into and confined to the base area of Khe Sanh. The PAVN controlled the entire western third of Quang Tri provence with American forces holding the base trapped, vulnerable, and difficult to resupply. Westmoreland's removal and replacement as commander of U.S. forces in Viet Nam signalled the end of the battle and defeat, as his replacement abandoned Khe Sanh and pulled back to the mountians at the edge of the coastal lowlands. Subsequent attmepts to push inland toward Khe Sanh were checked at Fire Bases Henderson and Holcomb. The brief reoccupation of Khe Sanh in Lom Son 719 was an unmittigated disaster for the U.S. forces, leaving the entire western portion of Quang Tri provence firmly in PAVN hands and set the stage for the Easter Offensive of 1972 which resulted in the loss of the defensive line along the DMZ. Having complete air superiority allowed the U.S. to halt PAVN advances with carpet bombing and intense tactical air strikes giving the illusion of tactical victory. Continued pressure by the PAVN against U.S. ground forces, however, led to a U.S. casualty rate that was unacceptable to the American public. We could hold Khe Sanh, but at what cost? Not one we were willing to continue to pay with no end in sight. Thus, despite the huge advantage of complete air superiority by the U.S., North Viet Nam could turn most so-called tactical victories for the U.S. into strategic defeats in the end. They hoped and guessed correctly that they could outlast us in battle, as the price they were willing to pay and the sacrefices they would make were far greater for far longer. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Tonygumbrell ( talk • contribs) 23:54, 21 January 2010 (UTC)
People have argued a number of factors to evaluate victory:
Using this fourth criterion, in my opinion the most sound argument is that the NVA instigated the battle, their primary objective was to take the base and kill or capture its occupants ala Dien Bien Phu (publicly stated by North Vietnamese I believe, and evidenced by the fact the NVA endured huge losses to come very near to the base), and they eventually withdrew and ended the siege failing to achieve their objective.
I am open to discussions and would love to hear any rational arguments as to how the battle's result could be no more definitive than "Both sides claimed victory" which strikes me as disingenuous and weasel wording at best. I am reverting my previous edit and will be happy to take it down if someone can make a rational argument why this reasoning is faulty. By the way, the claimed citation to a publication by Peter Brush is a dead link and I could not find it after a quick search on the web. IMHO a citation to an author claiming one side achieved a victory or not is not very relevant in this case as there is no problem finding biased authors especially ones biased against the U.S.' involvement in Vietnam. However I will add one since *Treker requested it. — MBbjv ( talk) 10:06, 4 September 2016 (UTC)
The other problem i have with your argument is that you assume vietnamese intentions and base victory/defeat on that; obviously a force can win a strategic victory even if they do not achieve their intended objective but instead another that supersedes it or another after changing strategic considerations made the first obsolete, etc. I would argue by observing what happened and how the different sides profited. In the end the Vietnamese were left in possession of the site, free to bring supplies through the surrounding valleys (the base had been part of a programm to cut off supply via the Ho Chi Minh path by a series of heavily fortified bases), free to operate in the surrounding country site (the CIDG programm also ended with the evacuation as far as i can tell), etc. As far as i can score it would make it a tactical USA/AVRN victory (casualties inflicted, objective held, no second Bien Dien Phu), an operational draw leaning towards the North Vietnamese (they ended up in command of the site and the province, took pressure of their supply routes while expnading significant assets), but a clear cut North Vietnamese strategic victory (no more American troops in Khe Sahn). In my opinion this is a classic example of a excellent strategic consideration, since the North Vietnamese established circumstances where they were highly likely to benefit no matter how things turned out: If they stormed Khe Sanh outright this repeat of Bien Dien Phu would most likely break American morale, if they could not, they would still bind significant forces (and attention) as well as support assets (the airpower used to ensure resupply alone and therefore not available elsewhere was probably enough to make it worthwhile) and thereby facilitate operations else. In other words: They fought a battle that would profit them on way or the other. The Americans did not. Either Khe Sahn was obsolete, in which case it should have been evacuated even before the siege started or it was worthwhile to have in which case it should not have been abandoned after the battle had been 'won'. The attritional concept espoused by top brass at the time and some times still today was obsolete by 1918, let alone 1968. 212.100.51.120 ( talk) 00:26, 23 October 2016 (UTC)
This again goes to the heart of the problem of US strategy in Vietnam. This was a guerilla war with parallel state structures being established by the enemy. Airmobile operations or even mobile operations can under such circumstances not maintain control over a territory. The troops roll in during the day and everybody who cooperates with them gets the axe at night when they are back at base. In the same vein it is no surprise that the US was able to reoccupy the base. That was never in question. To reoccupy you can use that foremost characteristic of American military though which is indiscriminate firepower. But they lost the ability to exercise control over the province or the population. Tactical superiority of the American forces in Vietnam was never in question as far as firepower and standup fights were concerned, but strategically they failed to secure the center of gravity (the population) and instead alienated them by what today is known as 'colleteral damage'. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 5.10.44.116 ( talk) 17:26, 23 October 2016 (UTC)
Either the Americans commit ever more ressource to a garrison that has already been cut off by land and basically feed men and machines and materiel in an attrition scenario with an enemy who regards an exchange rate of 1:10 as acceptable (and achieved much better) and can force the Americans to expand extraordinary levels of supply alone for the resupply runs, that is only keeping their troops alive inflicts a considerably heightened cost in supplies (Petroluem, Oil, lubricants, spare parts, ammunition for the combat aircrafts, etc.) and more attrition (a helicopter or aircraft only has so many hours until it breaks down) or evacuate the basis, weakening both the CIDG programm and the possibilities of intercepting supply through the DMZ as well giving the Vietcong/North Vietnamese breathing space and control over the local population. It is the ideal battle: How ever it turns out the North Vietnamese will get something for their commitment. 94.229.145.154 ( talk) 15:51, 25 October 2016 (UTC)
The policy regarding popular culture entries in military history articles is outlined here: WP:MILPOP. This provides the following: "In popular culture sections should be avoided unless the subject has had a well-cited and notable impact on popular culture. Any popular culture reference being considered for inclusion must be attributed to a reliable secondary source for the article topic. Items meeting these requirements should typically be worked into the text of the article..a separate section for popular culture items, and in particular the following, should be avoided: compendiums of every trivial appearance of the subject in pop culture (trivia), unsupported speculation about cultural significance or fictional likenesses (original research)". At the article's recent A-class review it was determined that the entries were not strongly referenced and hence they were removed. However, there seems to be a tendency to slowly add these back in. If there is a desire to add these back in, can I please ask that the entries be strongly referenced? The current entry is not well referenced (the references do not talk about the song's significance, just that it exists) and probably should be removed as such, and the one I removed here is not even referenced at all. Regards, AustralianRupert ( talk) 05:21, 25 January 2018 (UTC)