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Considering the discussion through this lens we see that editors supporting "See Aftermath" argue, with considerable evidence, that reliable sources do not support the notion of this being a simple Indian victory, and further support this argument with the documentation for the infobox as well as WP:MILMOS, which instruct us to say "See Aftermath" if the result is nuanced or inconclusive.
In support of "Indian Victory", editors present several arguments; that sources support this being an Indian victory, that sources do not support this being a Pakistani victory, and that the Indians were generally successful in the war; if there was any "victor" in the war, then that was India
, India has been treated as the victor because it had militarily advantage when the ceasefire was announced
, The sources are clear that the pakistani forces failed to acheive their objectives, and the Indian army captured the vast majority of the territory in contention orior to the ceasefire
.
The last two of these arguments were given little weight; they aren't evidence in favor of a clear result that MILMOS requires for the infobox. The first argument, in comparison to the argument presented by the editors who supported "See Aftermath", was insufficiently supported by evidence, and so given less weight than that argument.
Considering this, we find a rough consensus in favor of "See Aftermath". BilledMammal ( talk) 04:11, 13 May 2024 (UTC)
Noting the guidance at
MOS:MIL, the
template documentation and the Aftermath section of the article (
version as at opening the RfC), should the result be: a) Indian victory; b) inconclusive; or, c) See Aftermath section.
Cinderella157 (
talk) 03:28, 22 December 2023 (UTC)
Notified at Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Military history. Cinderella157 ( talk) 03:42, 22 December 2023 (UTC)
Notified at WP:RSN here. Cinderella157 ( talk) 12:32, 3 January 2024 (UTC)
Notified at WP:NPOVN here. Cinderella157 ( talk) 12:41, 3 January 2024 (UTC)
Note I do not condone editors moving the posts of other editors (made as responses) from the comments section to the discussion section per WP:OTHERSCOMMENTS. However, if this is done, it should be made in a way that is totally transparent and preserve the continuity of the discussion - noting that the post was moved and where it was moved from (idealy in small text and at both places [where the post was originally placed and where it was moved to]). The moved text should note to whom the post was originally directed. Please correct any such moves accordingly. Cinderella157 ( talk) 13:53, 23 December 2023 (UTC)
Information provided in passing by an otherwise reliable source that is not related to the principal topics of the publication may not be reliable; editors should cite sources focused on the topic at hand where possible.The assertion is that [all] sources reporting inconclusive/stalemate only do so as passing mentions and should therefore be discounted en masse.
Tinker ... notes that his findings will not be accepted by Indian authors ... Prem Shankar Jha... tried to provide a detailed critique of the contentious aspects of Lamb's treatment of the Kashmir dispute, [3] although David Taylor points out that while providing alternative readings on some points, Jha does not manage to entirely refute Lamb. [4] Srinath Raghavan credits Lamb with discovering that Kashmir's Instrument of Accession was most likely signed on 27 October 1947, after the Indian troops landed in Srinagar, rather than 26 October, as official Indian history maintains. However, he states that in his later work, Birth of a Tragedy, Lamb "overreached" by claiming that the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir never signed the Instrument of Accession at all. He conveniently overlooked other letters where the Maharaja mentioned having signed accession. [5]
There is a lot more to add to the article on Lamb itself, which glosses over many citicisms from the works it cites as praises of Lamb. This is cited to say he was a leading historian, but glosses over the text, which also statesLeo Rose called the book a "special pleading" rather than a scholarly work, which presents the Chinese position extremely well. Lamb points out rightly that China had never ratified the Simla Convention which contained the definition of the McMahon Line but he dismisses the question of whether the British and Tibetan governments were competent to conclude the agreement. Rose also notes that Lamb seems annoyed at the fact that the authorities of independent India do not follow the British imperial line, which he terms "out of place". [15]
Parshotam Mehra, calling the two-volume work a "herculean effort", nevertheless labels it an "outright partisan attempt at demolishing the Indian case and thereby lending countenance to, and buttressing, the Chinese claims." The historian in Alastair Lamb is "fairly sound", he says, but frequently departs from being a historian to a "factionist". [8] Mehra's own later work, McMahon Line and After was judged by Leo Rose to be "more balanced and less advocative" than Lamb's. [16]
Alongside his impressive scholarship, Lamb was an advocate of sometimes outlandish conspiracy theories (or what his friends would call hobby-horses). He was also prone to waspish asides which diminished the authority of his writing.
Lamb once told me he was ‘firmly convinced’ that Nehru and the Kashmiri nationalist leader, Sheikh Abdullah, were half-brothers. While he was more cautious in his published works, he gave some hefty nudges in that direction. “Nehru saw Sheikh Abdullah almost as his political twin,†Lamb declared in Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947. And just to rub in the insinuation, he commented that “some aspects of the Nehru-Sheikh Abdullah connection have yet to be explained satisfactorily – it may well have involved more than shared political opinionsâ€.
Certainly, not everything that Lamb wrote was a lie (else he wouldnt have people praising his work) but it is certainly not a shining beacon of scholarship as the OP claimed. And if this is the quality of the "best" sources, indeed their numerical strength can be brushed aside. Captain Jack Sparrow ( talk) 16:22, 24 January 2024 (UTC)Of the accession document by which the Maharaja of Kashmir belatedly signed up his princely state to India, Lamb caustically observed in Birth of a Tragedy: “There are well informed people who deny that any such document ever existed.†So we have another conspiracy theory – that Jammu and Kashmir’s last princely ruler, Hari Singh, never actually put his name to the Instrument of Accession.
In the first Kashmir war, India occupied two-thirds of the disputed territory and Pakistan was clearly defeated during its first war with India." [1] We must also note that "
the ceasefire came at a time when the Indian forces had the upper hand" [2]. Long term effects should be also counted; "
The war for states had not only ended in Indian military victory but had given its leaders enormous self-confidence and satisfaction over a job well done. The effect of the defeat in Pakistan was no less important but was completely negative." [3] Nobody says that the war was a victory for Pakistan because Pakistan lacked advantages in comparison with India, that's why "inconclusive" makes no sense to me. Abhishek0831996 ( talk) 06:14, 22 December 2023 (UTC)
The Indians had also been successful in effecting a link up with Leh, headquarter of Ladakh Tehsil. These two advances in Novembere - December 1948 caused the loss of huge areas of liberated territory in Poonch sector as well as Northern Areas. The loss in terms of public and army morale was, however, incalculable . There was every danger of another exodus of refugees of "at least five lakhs of people" from Poonch area alone . Sardar Ibrahim, in his book, Kashmir Saga , says: Whatever the merits or demerits of the proposition, if we had to agree to a ceasefire, we should have done it a little earlier. At the time of this agreement, so far as the provinces of Jammu and Kashmir were concerned , we had lost most of the territory in a very brief period. If we had not agreed to the ceasefire , we probably would have lost the rest of Poonch, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad ... If we had lost every inch of territory on this side of Kashmir our bargaining position would have been reduced to nil. I can say with certainty that conditions were so dangerously unfavourable, that it was quite possible that we might have lost whole of the territory." This, I think, adequately explains the true military position and Liaquat Ali Khan's consequent consent to agree to ceasefire." [5] Given all that, there is no issue with stating "Indian victory". â¯â¯â¯ Pravega g=9.8 05:55, 24 December 2023 (UTC)
Although the war ended in a stalemate with international intervention, Pakistan may have rightly concluded that the strategy of using irregular fighters succeeded". [8] Having a few sources state an upper hand in some way during the war by either India or Pakistan doesn't translate to a "victory/success" for any party, this just demonstrates why the war is generally perceived as a stalemate by independent sources. Codenamewolf ( talk) 22:32, 5 February 2024 (UTC)
With the onset of winter and the consequent problems of maintaining the supply line, the military situation reached a stalemate; especially because regular Pakistani troops were also joining the Azad Kashmir forces. On 1 January 1948 , India referred the matter to the Security Council under Article 35 of the Charter , urging that august institution to call upon Pakistan to refrain from interfering in Kashmir by aiding and abetting the tribal invaders[10], Ray wrote on the situation of lack of military progress by either side by the time winter descended (the year being 1947) in her brief consideration of the war. This was misrepresented as Ray's support for the war result being a stalemate! Sumit Ganguly, in his Conflict Unending India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947, tells us that after the relative quiet of winter was the Indian spring offensive of 1948 that accrued it important territorial gains.
In December 1947, logistical difficulties dealt the Indian forces an important military setback. The principal problem that the Indian forces encountered was a lack of supplies and of adequate high - altitude warfare equipment...Taking advantage of the Indian lapse , the ' Azad Kashmir ' ( literally , ' free Kashmir ' ) forces compelled the Indians to retreat . . In the spring of 1948 , the Indians launched a counter - offensive that led to more direct Pakistani involvement in the war . Later in the year , regular Pakistani army units entered the fray as the Indian army made important territorial gains .[11] Another one of their own sources, Peter R. Lavoy, mentions in passing, in his book on Kargil, that the important mountainous towns of Dras, Kargil and the Zozila Pass fell in Indian hands only by December 1948.Ganguly also observes on the false optimism of Pakistan's establishment that convinced it to war with India over Kashmir,
Given the disarray of Pakistan's social , organizational , political , and military structures in the wake of Partition, it is hard to understand how any responsible Pakistani decision - maker could have believed that a war with India over Kashmir would result in Pakistani victory. [12] Subir Bhaumik, scholar, writes, "
The general course of the first Kashmir war went against Pakistani expectations . Pakistan could not bring Kashmir within its fold - neither could it , at that point of time , win the loyalty of the Kashmiri Muslims in the Valley . The Pakistani effort lacked centralized operational planning , proper intelligence and , above all , an accurate assessment of the Indian mindset". [13] Pradeep Barua, in his critique of the performances of the respective armies, writes, "
The campaign in Jammu and Kashmir, the second longest military campaign waged by the Indian army to date, is also one of its most successful. The army's performance reflected the high state of combat efficiency achieved during the Second World War. More importantly, the Indian army's success vindicated the reforms carried out in the interwar British-Indian army. After initially experiencing shock at the strength and organization of the Pakistani- sponsored raiders, the general staff did not panic and flood Kashmir with troops. Instead, it carefully noted the logistical difficulties. As a result, when the Indian counteroffensive eventually opened in early 1948, it was sustained with minor hitches right up until the cease-fire. Despite numerical superi- ority and the advantage of operating close to its supply bases, the Pakistani army failed to make any substantial headway. The inadequacies that char- acterized most Pakistani operations can be traced to their depleted officer corps.[14] MBlaze Lightning ( talk) 19:38, 10 February 2024 (UTC)
References
The infobox documentation for {{
Infobox military conflict}} clearly states:
"this parameter may use one of two standard terms: "X victory" or "Inconclusive". The term used is for the "immediate" outcome of the "subject" conflict and should reflect what the sources say. In cases where the standard terms do not accurately describe the outcome, a link or note should be made to the section of the article where the result is discussed in detail (such as "See the Aftermath section"). Such a note can also be used in conjunction with the standard terms but should not be used to conceal an ambiguity in the "immediate" result. Do not introduce non-standard terms like "decisive", "marginal" or "tactical", or contradictory statements like "decisive tactical victory but strategic defeat". Omit this parameter altogether rather than engage in speculation about which side won or by how much."
This also forms part of Wikipedia's Manual of Style,
WP:MILMOS#INFOBOX: "The "result" parameter has often been a source of contention. Particular attention should be given to the advice therein. The infobox does not have the scope to reflect nuances, and should be restricted to "X victory" or "See aftermath" (or similar) where the result was inconclusive or does not otherwise fit with these restrictions. In particular, terms like "Pyrrhic victory" or "decisive victory" are inappropriate for outcomes. It may also be appropriate to omit the "result"."
_Noor Gee_ÊžlÉʇ 10:30, 25 February 2024 (UTC)
With the onset of winter and the consequent problems of maintaining the supply line, the military situation reached a stalemate; especially because regular Pakistani troops were also joining the Azad Kashmir forces, he writes before transitioning to the political nature of the dispute and the UN handling of it. Ray does not observe on the war result, but on the lack of military progress by either side by the time winter descended. Which isn't true completely either, as Peter R. Lavoy, whom you cited too, tells us in his book on Kargil that Dras, Kargil and the Zozila Pass only fell in Indian hands by December 1948. But that is a different matter and besides the point. Scholars critiquing the result of the military engagement would cater for aspects of disproportionate territorial expansion accruing to India in consequence of the war. The point is clear that you don't quite have or shown the scholarly support for your contention as you otherwise believe. MBlaze Lightning ( talk) 18:25, 22 December 2023 (UTC)
Likewise, the insinuation that there are somehow partisan sources with nationalistic affiliations used remain unsubstantiated by the original posters.I am the original poster of this RfC. Please state where I have made such an insinuation herein or redact the statement as inaccurate. Cinderella157 ( talk) 02:02, 24 December 2023 (UTC)
On September 6, however, India sent some 900,000 men across the border into Pakistan. Superior numbers soon told. In one of the largest tank battles in history, the Indians defeated the Pakistanis at Chawinda (September 14– 19) and reached Lahore, claiming to have destroyed 300 Pakistani tanks in the process. An erronerous observation even for the detractors of Pakistani victory in the battle. So instead of repeatedly badgering others to engage in the same pointless exercise as you, you can come clean on your rationale for going against the dictates of the policy which would perhaps induce understanding in others about the hitherto unclear merits of your contention. MBlaze Lightning ( talk) 05:36, 25 December 2023 (UTC)
non-Indian reviews at the link describe Lamb's work in glowing terms, as do the wider reviews not mentioned there" and it does not matter what is the race/ethnicity of the review. What matters is that Lamb claimed made a number of shocking claims such as no accession of Jammu and Kashmir was ever signed, [25] and these views are clearly fringe views not supported by any scholarly sources. Azuredivay ( talk) 15:33, 20 January 2024 (UTC)
There is a feeling among some Service officers, as well as a section of the civilian population, that India should not have accepted the Cease Fire or any Cease Fire Line, and should have pressed on to liberate the rest of the territories of J & K State. It is argued that the liberation of the remaining territories of J & K was only a matter of a few weeks, and the political decision to have a Cease Fire robbed the Indian Army and the Royal Indian Air Force of a quick and decisive victory in J & K. These opinions are widespread enough to demand notice, and some senior officers who took part in these operations have also urged a discussion of this matter in this detailed history of the operations in J & K.The conclusion on page 375 was:
The enemy could not be defeated decisively by local action within the boundaries of J & K. For decive victory, it was necessary to bring Pakistan to battle on the broad plains of the Punjab itself; the battle of J & K, in the last analysis, had to be fought and won at Lahore and Sialkot, as events brought home in 1965. So, if the whole of J & K had to be liberated from the enemy, a general war against Pakistan was necessary. ... rightly or wrongly, the government did not decide to have a general war with Pakistan.-- Toddy1 (talk) 17:28, 19 January 2024 (UTC)
The best sources have a professional structure for checking or analyzing facts, legal issues, evidence, and arguments. The greater the degree of scrutiny given to these issues, the more reliable the source.That is precisely the process official histories get in countries such as Britain, the United States, and India.-- Toddy1 (talk) 16:04, 21 January 2024 (UTC)
Then they make a case of dispute in sources using passing mentions, which is essentially drawing a false equivalence by juxtaposing reliable sources with those that aren't reliable for this subject. Then they bring out the nationality of the handful(!?) of the scholars to discount all of the sources, which is such a non-serious, broad-brush and parochial utterance that is best consigned to the trash bin as lacking basis in policy.No body has denied that there are some good quality sources that would assert that this is an Indian victory. The issue is that there are also good quality sources asserting that the result was a stalemate or inconclusive. To assert that all of these sources are only making passing mentions is a broad-brush utterance that is best consigned to the trash bin as lacking substantiation. Repeating it over and over does not make it true. Unsubstantiated assertion is no substitute for evidence. Cinderella157 ( talk) 02:03, 5 February 2024 (UTC)
... there is not a single source that support Pakistani victory, thus Indian victory is not disputed at all.This is a non sequitur argument since this is not a binary choice (per MOS:MIL, where disproving one proves the other. Cinderella157 ( talk) 03:52, 26 February 2024 (UTC)
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Change the Pakistani casualties to <1,500, as stated in the majority of reliable neutral sources. The current (rather amusingly) exaggerated figure of 20,000 casualties is taken from Indian sources.
Sources:
::1) These discussions do not mention Ganguly; They are editors giving their own assessments about why the Indian military is more reliable than the Library of Congress country study.
The cost of the 14-month campaign to India was approximately 6,000 casualties: 1,500 killed, 3,500 wounded and 1,000 missing, most of them prisoners of war. Pakistan's casualties were estimated at 20,000, including 6,000 killed.
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M.Bitton (
talk) 17:06, 13 March 2024 (UTC)@ Solblaze: The source that Professor Sumit Ganguly used for his implausible claim that "The best estimate places combined Indian and Pakistani military casualties at 1500." was Singer, J. David; Small, Melvin (1972). The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook. New York: John Wiley.. Google books only allows snippet view, so it is difficult to check the source cited by Professor Ganguly. I have ordered a copy of The Wages of War , it will take 3-4 weeks to arrive.-- Toddy1 (talk) 18:47, 13 March 2024 (UTC)
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Please remove the revisionist claims in the lead and infobox suggesting that Pakistan unilaterally started the Kashmir war by unleashing hoards of of Pathans on October 21. They reflect the Indian government's version of history and do not conform to
WP:NPOV.
Indian troops entered Kashmir on October 17, weeks before the Pashtuns did - and more importantly, there was an internal rebellion against the unpopular Hindu Maharajah of Kashmir which only grew in intensity following Hari Singh's brutal crackdowns including the genocidal
Jammu Massacres (mention of which has also been entirely omitted). For reference:
India has used in this context the word “aggressionâ€. The forces who crossed the Jhelum in the early hours of 22 October 1947 were “aggressors†sponsored by Pakistan; and, therefore, no solution to the Kashmir problem was possible until that “aggression†had been “vacatedâ€. The Indian presence in the State of Jammu and Kashmir was by the express invitation of the Maharaja in order to repel this “aggressionâ€: it was, therefore, perfectly legitimate. But who was “aggressing†on whom?
It has been shown that the crossing of the Jhelum by parties of Pathan tribesmen on the night of 21/22 October 1947 was at the invitation of internal elements in the political struggle then going on in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The clearing of the way into the State at Domel was not that of forced entry by the tribesmen but of a gate being opened, as it were, by rebels within the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the interest of an entity which in two days was to declare itself the independent state of Azad Kashmir. The participa¬ tion of the tribesmen in what amounted to a civil war could well be considered to represent an error of political judgement on the part of those who sought their assistance; but it would be difficult in these particular circumstances to classify it as part of an act of external “aggression†by Pakistan.
Indeed, if we accept Mahajan’s chronology, there is not in reality a great deal of difference between the position of these tribesmen on 22 October and that of the Indian Army airlifted to Srinagar on 27 October. At that moment on 27 October, it can be argued, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was still technically independent. The Indians were there at the invitation of the Maharaja on just about the same basis as the tribesmen were there at the invitation of the Poonch rebels now declared subordinates of the independent state of Azad Kashmir. Only after accession, which it seems highly probable did not legally take place until after the Indian intervention started, could it be argued that the Indians were now defending their own land against invaders. Moreover, whatever might be argued in defence of the timing, actual or intended, of the Indian intervention on 27 October, it could not be said that the Patiala troops, who were certainly in theory subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, only arrived after accession. They were there before the tribal advance of 22 October. Indeed, a good case can be made that the presence of the tribesmen was a direct response to the arrival of the Patiala troops. So, once again, who was “aggressing†against whom?
Likewise, the Kashmir government's pogrom against its Muslim subjects in Jammu was undertaken partly out of revenge for a formiadble uprising in Poonch...In Jine 1947 they commenced a no-tax campaign that rapidly escalated, courtesy of some heavy-handed reprisals by the darbar's police, into a widespread popular insurgency, spearheaded by a well-armed guerilla force of Indian Army veterans led by local zamindar Sardar Qayyum Khan.
This so-called Azad Army would eventually number in excess of 50,000. On 15 August, Independence Day, Paksitan flags were raised all over the region and shortly afterwards the movement's self-appointed supremo, Muslim Conference MLA Sardar Ibrahim Khan, announced Poonch's secession from Kashmir.
"After Partition in 1947, Jammuites engaged in three significant actions. The first was a Muslim uprising in the Poonch area of western Jammu province against the unpopular Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh. The second was serious inter-religious violence throughout the province that killed or displaced larger numbers of people from all religious communities. The third was the creation of Azad (Free) Jammu and Kashmir in the area of western Jammu Province that the 'rebels' had 'freed' or 'liberated'. These significant actions all took place before the Maharaja acceded to India on 26 October 1947. They divided 'his' Muslim-majority state and confirmed that it was undeliverable in its entirety to either India or Pakistan. They instigated the ongoing dispute between India and Pakistan over which state should possess J&K—the so-called 'Kashmir dispute"Solblaze ( talk) 18:41, 15 March 2024 (UTC)
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DaxServer (
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c) 23:03, 15 March 2024 (UTC)::Lamb is a highly respected and unbiased authority on Kashmir.
Citation [49]:
For example Wajahat claims that Pakistani GHQ had no clue about the tribal attack. However Sardar Yahya Effendi clearly mentions on page-151 of his book precisely mentions that Commanding Officer of 11 Cavalry was called by Pakistani Director Military Intelligence Colonel Sher Khan, MC to the GHQ in last week of August 1947 and briefed about Pakistani invasion plan. On page 153 Effendi mentioned that the Pakistani DMI Brigadier Sher Khan instructions to...
Neither Sardar Yahya Effendi nor Agha Humayun Amin are "Indian government". -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 12:06, 16 March 2024 (UTC)
:No one is disputing the fact that sympathetic elements within the Pakistani military such as
Colonel Sher Khan were covertly planning to support the Kashmiris, who had loathed the Maharajah's Dogra rule for centuries. This is a widely accepted fact.
The forces that Alastair Lamb writes about are the state forces of the Patiala State, which was a princely state that had acceded to the Indian Union. The state forces are not war-fighting forces. They were meant for internal security. All the princely states had surrendered external affairs and defence to the British Raj, and that continued after the Indian independence (and the same holds for Pakistan's princely states too). These forces were not under the command of the Indian Army.That integration happened much later, probably around 1950 when India became a Republic and the princely states were integrated into the Indian constitution.
Lamb has estimated precisely how many Patiala troops got sent to Kashmir. There was one battalion that was stationed in Jammu, and one "mountain battery" that was stationed in Srinagar. The Indian military writers that studied the J&K State Forces did not find any records on these troops in J&K. They believe that, since J&K's own forces got stretched out along the border, the Maharaja seems to have borrowed these troops from the neighbouring Patiala ruler for internal security of his capital cities.There is no evidence of the Government of India or the Indian Army being aware of this, since the Indian commander that landed in Srinagar was surprised to find them there. (This is the first time they got mentioned, according to Lamb himself.)
These are the facts. The rest is Lamb's own interpretation, subject to dispute. -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 13:09, 27 March 2024 (UTC)
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Add categories
Rajanyas ( talk) 20:53, 16 April 2024 (UTC)
'''[[
User:CanonNi]]'''
(
talk|
contribs) 01:29, 17 April 2024 (UTC)
@ Rajanyas: what you are asking for is the wrong thing to do. (1) The article on the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948 is about a war; it does not belong in categories with names like Category:Battles involving India or Category:Battles involving China. (2) There is no Category:Battles involving Rajputs.-- Toddy1 (talk) 16:18, 19 April 2024 (UTC)
@ Toddy1: This article is titled after Indian intervention. It was on 26 October 1947 when India entered into this war after accession was signed by Jammu and Kashmir princely state. [28] Abhishek0831996 ( talk) 08:39, 13 May 2024 (UTC)
@ Abhishek0831996: The article title is currently "Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948"; it is not titled the "Indian intervention... " The Wikipedia article is written on the basis that the war started with the tribal invasion that started on 22 October 1947. The Poonch valley rebellion is treated as an event that led up to the war. Given that J&K State was forced to become part of India, from the Indian point of view, a start date for the war of 22 October 1947 makes perfect sense.
If you wanted to get really picky, you could claim that the war only became an Indo-Pakistani war when regular Pakistan Army units moved into J&K State - I think that was probably some date in November 1947. (We saw that kind of pickiness on Wikipedia with the Russian intervention in the Ukraine in 2014, with people claiming that the green men were not Russian.)-- Toddy1 (talk) 14:44, 13 May 2024 (UTC)
What do good quality sources say. That is what we should follow. Cinderella157 ( talk) 22:34, 13 May 2024 (UTC)
In case I was not sufficiently clear, interpreting sources to arrive at a start date (eg India refused help until the instrument of accession was signed) is WP:OR as opposed to sources which say, the war started on X date or the war occurred between X and Y dates. Cinderella157 ( talk) 21:37, 14 May 2024 (UTC)
@ Cinderella157: It is commonly written that the war started with the tribal invasion. For example:
-- Toddy1 (talk) 09:14, 15 May 2024 (UTC)
The first Indo-Pakistani war began following an invasion of Kashmir by armed tribesmenis subtly different from saying
The first Indo-Pakistani war began when armed tribesmen invaded Kashmirand
The first Indo-Pakistani war started after armed tribesmen ...is not the same as saying
The first Indo-Pakistani war started when armed tribesmen ...While it might be human nature to pigeon-hole things neatly, not everything fits into a nice neat box. This is such a case. We should follow the sources. If the sources don't give an exact date nor should we. Interpreting events to derive an exact date would be WP:OR. I have amended the infobox accordingly. I am not seeing that this requires further adjustment to the article. Cinderella157 ( talk) 10:46, 15 May 2024 (UTC)
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Considering the discussion through this lens we see that editors supporting "See Aftermath" argue, with considerable evidence, that reliable sources do not support the notion of this being a simple Indian victory, and further support this argument with the documentation for the infobox as well as WP:MILMOS, which instruct us to say "See Aftermath" if the result is nuanced or inconclusive.
In support of "Indian Victory", editors present several arguments; that sources support this being an Indian victory, that sources do not support this being a Pakistani victory, and that the Indians were generally successful in the war; if there was any "victor" in the war, then that was India
, India has been treated as the victor because it had militarily advantage when the ceasefire was announced
, The sources are clear that the pakistani forces failed to acheive their objectives, and the Indian army captured the vast majority of the territory in contention orior to the ceasefire
.
The last two of these arguments were given little weight; they aren't evidence in favor of a clear result that MILMOS requires for the infobox. The first argument, in comparison to the argument presented by the editors who supported "See Aftermath", was insufficiently supported by evidence, and so given less weight than that argument.
Considering this, we find a rough consensus in favor of "See Aftermath". BilledMammal ( talk) 04:11, 13 May 2024 (UTC)
Noting the guidance at
MOS:MIL, the
template documentation and the Aftermath section of the article (
version as at opening the RfC), should the result be: a) Indian victory; b) inconclusive; or, c) See Aftermath section.
Cinderella157 (
talk) 03:28, 22 December 2023 (UTC)
Notified at Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Military history. Cinderella157 ( talk) 03:42, 22 December 2023 (UTC)
Notified at WP:RSN here. Cinderella157 ( talk) 12:32, 3 January 2024 (UTC)
Notified at WP:NPOVN here. Cinderella157 ( talk) 12:41, 3 January 2024 (UTC)
Note I do not condone editors moving the posts of other editors (made as responses) from the comments section to the discussion section per WP:OTHERSCOMMENTS. However, if this is done, it should be made in a way that is totally transparent and preserve the continuity of the discussion - noting that the post was moved and where it was moved from (idealy in small text and at both places [where the post was originally placed and where it was moved to]). The moved text should note to whom the post was originally directed. Please correct any such moves accordingly. Cinderella157 ( talk) 13:53, 23 December 2023 (UTC)
Information provided in passing by an otherwise reliable source that is not related to the principal topics of the publication may not be reliable; editors should cite sources focused on the topic at hand where possible.The assertion is that [all] sources reporting inconclusive/stalemate only do so as passing mentions and should therefore be discounted en masse.
Tinker ... notes that his findings will not be accepted by Indian authors ... Prem Shankar Jha... tried to provide a detailed critique of the contentious aspects of Lamb's treatment of the Kashmir dispute, [3] although David Taylor points out that while providing alternative readings on some points, Jha does not manage to entirely refute Lamb. [4] Srinath Raghavan credits Lamb with discovering that Kashmir's Instrument of Accession was most likely signed on 27 October 1947, after the Indian troops landed in Srinagar, rather than 26 October, as official Indian history maintains. However, he states that in his later work, Birth of a Tragedy, Lamb "overreached" by claiming that the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir never signed the Instrument of Accession at all. He conveniently overlooked other letters where the Maharaja mentioned having signed accession. [5]
There is a lot more to add to the article on Lamb itself, which glosses over many citicisms from the works it cites as praises of Lamb. This is cited to say he was a leading historian, but glosses over the text, which also statesLeo Rose called the book a "special pleading" rather than a scholarly work, which presents the Chinese position extremely well. Lamb points out rightly that China had never ratified the Simla Convention which contained the definition of the McMahon Line but he dismisses the question of whether the British and Tibetan governments were competent to conclude the agreement. Rose also notes that Lamb seems annoyed at the fact that the authorities of independent India do not follow the British imperial line, which he terms "out of place". [15]
Parshotam Mehra, calling the two-volume work a "herculean effort", nevertheless labels it an "outright partisan attempt at demolishing the Indian case and thereby lending countenance to, and buttressing, the Chinese claims." The historian in Alastair Lamb is "fairly sound", he says, but frequently departs from being a historian to a "factionist". [8] Mehra's own later work, McMahon Line and After was judged by Leo Rose to be "more balanced and less advocative" than Lamb's. [16]
Alongside his impressive scholarship, Lamb was an advocate of sometimes outlandish conspiracy theories (or what his friends would call hobby-horses). He was also prone to waspish asides which diminished the authority of his writing.
Lamb once told me he was ‘firmly convinced’ that Nehru and the Kashmiri nationalist leader, Sheikh Abdullah, were half-brothers. While he was more cautious in his published works, he gave some hefty nudges in that direction. “Nehru saw Sheikh Abdullah almost as his political twin,†Lamb declared in Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947. And just to rub in the insinuation, he commented that “some aspects of the Nehru-Sheikh Abdullah connection have yet to be explained satisfactorily – it may well have involved more than shared political opinionsâ€.
Certainly, not everything that Lamb wrote was a lie (else he wouldnt have people praising his work) but it is certainly not a shining beacon of scholarship as the OP claimed. And if this is the quality of the "best" sources, indeed their numerical strength can be brushed aside. Captain Jack Sparrow ( talk) 16:22, 24 January 2024 (UTC)Of the accession document by which the Maharaja of Kashmir belatedly signed up his princely state to India, Lamb caustically observed in Birth of a Tragedy: “There are well informed people who deny that any such document ever existed.†So we have another conspiracy theory – that Jammu and Kashmir’s last princely ruler, Hari Singh, never actually put his name to the Instrument of Accession.
In the first Kashmir war, India occupied two-thirds of the disputed territory and Pakistan was clearly defeated during its first war with India." [1] We must also note that "
the ceasefire came at a time when the Indian forces had the upper hand" [2]. Long term effects should be also counted; "
The war for states had not only ended in Indian military victory but had given its leaders enormous self-confidence and satisfaction over a job well done. The effect of the defeat in Pakistan was no less important but was completely negative." [3] Nobody says that the war was a victory for Pakistan because Pakistan lacked advantages in comparison with India, that's why "inconclusive" makes no sense to me. Abhishek0831996 ( talk) 06:14, 22 December 2023 (UTC)
The Indians had also been successful in effecting a link up with Leh, headquarter of Ladakh Tehsil. These two advances in Novembere - December 1948 caused the loss of huge areas of liberated territory in Poonch sector as well as Northern Areas. The loss in terms of public and army morale was, however, incalculable . There was every danger of another exodus of refugees of "at least five lakhs of people" from Poonch area alone . Sardar Ibrahim, in his book, Kashmir Saga , says: Whatever the merits or demerits of the proposition, if we had to agree to a ceasefire, we should have done it a little earlier. At the time of this agreement, so far as the provinces of Jammu and Kashmir were concerned , we had lost most of the territory in a very brief period. If we had not agreed to the ceasefire , we probably would have lost the rest of Poonch, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad ... If we had lost every inch of territory on this side of Kashmir our bargaining position would have been reduced to nil. I can say with certainty that conditions were so dangerously unfavourable, that it was quite possible that we might have lost whole of the territory." This, I think, adequately explains the true military position and Liaquat Ali Khan's consequent consent to agree to ceasefire." [5] Given all that, there is no issue with stating "Indian victory". â¯â¯â¯ Pravega g=9.8 05:55, 24 December 2023 (UTC)
Although the war ended in a stalemate with international intervention, Pakistan may have rightly concluded that the strategy of using irregular fighters succeeded". [8] Having a few sources state an upper hand in some way during the war by either India or Pakistan doesn't translate to a "victory/success" for any party, this just demonstrates why the war is generally perceived as a stalemate by independent sources. Codenamewolf ( talk) 22:32, 5 February 2024 (UTC)
With the onset of winter and the consequent problems of maintaining the supply line, the military situation reached a stalemate; especially because regular Pakistani troops were also joining the Azad Kashmir forces. On 1 January 1948 , India referred the matter to the Security Council under Article 35 of the Charter , urging that august institution to call upon Pakistan to refrain from interfering in Kashmir by aiding and abetting the tribal invaders[10], Ray wrote on the situation of lack of military progress by either side by the time winter descended (the year being 1947) in her brief consideration of the war. This was misrepresented as Ray's support for the war result being a stalemate! Sumit Ganguly, in his Conflict Unending India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947, tells us that after the relative quiet of winter was the Indian spring offensive of 1948 that accrued it important territorial gains.
In December 1947, logistical difficulties dealt the Indian forces an important military setback. The principal problem that the Indian forces encountered was a lack of supplies and of adequate high - altitude warfare equipment...Taking advantage of the Indian lapse , the ' Azad Kashmir ' ( literally , ' free Kashmir ' ) forces compelled the Indians to retreat . . In the spring of 1948 , the Indians launched a counter - offensive that led to more direct Pakistani involvement in the war . Later in the year , regular Pakistani army units entered the fray as the Indian army made important territorial gains .[11] Another one of their own sources, Peter R. Lavoy, mentions in passing, in his book on Kargil, that the important mountainous towns of Dras, Kargil and the Zozila Pass fell in Indian hands only by December 1948.Ganguly also observes on the false optimism of Pakistan's establishment that convinced it to war with India over Kashmir,
Given the disarray of Pakistan's social , organizational , political , and military structures in the wake of Partition, it is hard to understand how any responsible Pakistani decision - maker could have believed that a war with India over Kashmir would result in Pakistani victory. [12] Subir Bhaumik, scholar, writes, "
The general course of the first Kashmir war went against Pakistani expectations . Pakistan could not bring Kashmir within its fold - neither could it , at that point of time , win the loyalty of the Kashmiri Muslims in the Valley . The Pakistani effort lacked centralized operational planning , proper intelligence and , above all , an accurate assessment of the Indian mindset". [13] Pradeep Barua, in his critique of the performances of the respective armies, writes, "
The campaign in Jammu and Kashmir, the second longest military campaign waged by the Indian army to date, is also one of its most successful. The army's performance reflected the high state of combat efficiency achieved during the Second World War. More importantly, the Indian army's success vindicated the reforms carried out in the interwar British-Indian army. After initially experiencing shock at the strength and organization of the Pakistani- sponsored raiders, the general staff did not panic and flood Kashmir with troops. Instead, it carefully noted the logistical difficulties. As a result, when the Indian counteroffensive eventually opened in early 1948, it was sustained with minor hitches right up until the cease-fire. Despite numerical superi- ority and the advantage of operating close to its supply bases, the Pakistani army failed to make any substantial headway. The inadequacies that char- acterized most Pakistani operations can be traced to their depleted officer corps.[14] MBlaze Lightning ( talk) 19:38, 10 February 2024 (UTC)
References
The infobox documentation for {{
Infobox military conflict}} clearly states:
"this parameter may use one of two standard terms: "X victory" or "Inconclusive". The term used is for the "immediate" outcome of the "subject" conflict and should reflect what the sources say. In cases where the standard terms do not accurately describe the outcome, a link or note should be made to the section of the article where the result is discussed in detail (such as "See the Aftermath section"). Such a note can also be used in conjunction with the standard terms but should not be used to conceal an ambiguity in the "immediate" result. Do not introduce non-standard terms like "decisive", "marginal" or "tactical", or contradictory statements like "decisive tactical victory but strategic defeat". Omit this parameter altogether rather than engage in speculation about which side won or by how much."
This also forms part of Wikipedia's Manual of Style,
WP:MILMOS#INFOBOX: "The "result" parameter has often been a source of contention. Particular attention should be given to the advice therein. The infobox does not have the scope to reflect nuances, and should be restricted to "X victory" or "See aftermath" (or similar) where the result was inconclusive or does not otherwise fit with these restrictions. In particular, terms like "Pyrrhic victory" or "decisive victory" are inappropriate for outcomes. It may also be appropriate to omit the "result"."
_Noor Gee_ÊžlÉʇ 10:30, 25 February 2024 (UTC)
With the onset of winter and the consequent problems of maintaining the supply line, the military situation reached a stalemate; especially because regular Pakistani troops were also joining the Azad Kashmir forces, he writes before transitioning to the political nature of the dispute and the UN handling of it. Ray does not observe on the war result, but on the lack of military progress by either side by the time winter descended. Which isn't true completely either, as Peter R. Lavoy, whom you cited too, tells us in his book on Kargil that Dras, Kargil and the Zozila Pass only fell in Indian hands by December 1948. But that is a different matter and besides the point. Scholars critiquing the result of the military engagement would cater for aspects of disproportionate territorial expansion accruing to India in consequence of the war. The point is clear that you don't quite have or shown the scholarly support for your contention as you otherwise believe. MBlaze Lightning ( talk) 18:25, 22 December 2023 (UTC)
Likewise, the insinuation that there are somehow partisan sources with nationalistic affiliations used remain unsubstantiated by the original posters.I am the original poster of this RfC. Please state where I have made such an insinuation herein or redact the statement as inaccurate. Cinderella157 ( talk) 02:02, 24 December 2023 (UTC)
On September 6, however, India sent some 900,000 men across the border into Pakistan. Superior numbers soon told. In one of the largest tank battles in history, the Indians defeated the Pakistanis at Chawinda (September 14– 19) and reached Lahore, claiming to have destroyed 300 Pakistani tanks in the process. An erronerous observation even for the detractors of Pakistani victory in the battle. So instead of repeatedly badgering others to engage in the same pointless exercise as you, you can come clean on your rationale for going against the dictates of the policy which would perhaps induce understanding in others about the hitherto unclear merits of your contention. MBlaze Lightning ( talk) 05:36, 25 December 2023 (UTC)
non-Indian reviews at the link describe Lamb's work in glowing terms, as do the wider reviews not mentioned there" and it does not matter what is the race/ethnicity of the review. What matters is that Lamb claimed made a number of shocking claims such as no accession of Jammu and Kashmir was ever signed, [25] and these views are clearly fringe views not supported by any scholarly sources. Azuredivay ( talk) 15:33, 20 January 2024 (UTC)
There is a feeling among some Service officers, as well as a section of the civilian population, that India should not have accepted the Cease Fire or any Cease Fire Line, and should have pressed on to liberate the rest of the territories of J & K State. It is argued that the liberation of the remaining territories of J & K was only a matter of a few weeks, and the political decision to have a Cease Fire robbed the Indian Army and the Royal Indian Air Force of a quick and decisive victory in J & K. These opinions are widespread enough to demand notice, and some senior officers who took part in these operations have also urged a discussion of this matter in this detailed history of the operations in J & K.The conclusion on page 375 was:
The enemy could not be defeated decisively by local action within the boundaries of J & K. For decive victory, it was necessary to bring Pakistan to battle on the broad plains of the Punjab itself; the battle of J & K, in the last analysis, had to be fought and won at Lahore and Sialkot, as events brought home in 1965. So, if the whole of J & K had to be liberated from the enemy, a general war against Pakistan was necessary. ... rightly or wrongly, the government did not decide to have a general war with Pakistan.-- Toddy1 (talk) 17:28, 19 January 2024 (UTC)
The best sources have a professional structure for checking or analyzing facts, legal issues, evidence, and arguments. The greater the degree of scrutiny given to these issues, the more reliable the source.That is precisely the process official histories get in countries such as Britain, the United States, and India.-- Toddy1 (talk) 16:04, 21 January 2024 (UTC)
Then they make a case of dispute in sources using passing mentions, which is essentially drawing a false equivalence by juxtaposing reliable sources with those that aren't reliable for this subject. Then they bring out the nationality of the handful(!?) of the scholars to discount all of the sources, which is such a non-serious, broad-brush and parochial utterance that is best consigned to the trash bin as lacking basis in policy.No body has denied that there are some good quality sources that would assert that this is an Indian victory. The issue is that there are also good quality sources asserting that the result was a stalemate or inconclusive. To assert that all of these sources are only making passing mentions is a broad-brush utterance that is best consigned to the trash bin as lacking substantiation. Repeating it over and over does not make it true. Unsubstantiated assertion is no substitute for evidence. Cinderella157 ( talk) 02:03, 5 February 2024 (UTC)
... there is not a single source that support Pakistani victory, thus Indian victory is not disputed at all.This is a non sequitur argument since this is not a binary choice (per MOS:MIL, where disproving one proves the other. Cinderella157 ( talk) 03:52, 26 February 2024 (UTC)
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Change the Pakistani casualties to <1,500, as stated in the majority of reliable neutral sources. The current (rather amusingly) exaggerated figure of 20,000 casualties is taken from Indian sources.
Sources:
::1) These discussions do not mention Ganguly; They are editors giving their own assessments about why the Indian military is more reliable than the Library of Congress country study.
The cost of the 14-month campaign to India was approximately 6,000 casualties: 1,500 killed, 3,500 wounded and 1,000 missing, most of them prisoners of war. Pakistan's casualties were estimated at 20,000, including 6,000 killed.
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M.Bitton (
talk) 17:06, 13 March 2024 (UTC)@ Solblaze: The source that Professor Sumit Ganguly used for his implausible claim that "The best estimate places combined Indian and Pakistani military casualties at 1500." was Singer, J. David; Small, Melvin (1972). The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook. New York: John Wiley.. Google books only allows snippet view, so it is difficult to check the source cited by Professor Ganguly. I have ordered a copy of The Wages of War , it will take 3-4 weeks to arrive.-- Toddy1 (talk) 18:47, 13 March 2024 (UTC)
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Please remove the revisionist claims in the lead and infobox suggesting that Pakistan unilaterally started the Kashmir war by unleashing hoards of of Pathans on October 21. They reflect the Indian government's version of history and do not conform to
WP:NPOV.
Indian troops entered Kashmir on October 17, weeks before the Pashtuns did - and more importantly, there was an internal rebellion against the unpopular Hindu Maharajah of Kashmir which only grew in intensity following Hari Singh's brutal crackdowns including the genocidal
Jammu Massacres (mention of which has also been entirely omitted). For reference:
India has used in this context the word “aggressionâ€. The forces who crossed the Jhelum in the early hours of 22 October 1947 were “aggressors†sponsored by Pakistan; and, therefore, no solution to the Kashmir problem was possible until that “aggression†had been “vacatedâ€. The Indian presence in the State of Jammu and Kashmir was by the express invitation of the Maharaja in order to repel this “aggressionâ€: it was, therefore, perfectly legitimate. But who was “aggressing†on whom?
It has been shown that the crossing of the Jhelum by parties of Pathan tribesmen on the night of 21/22 October 1947 was at the invitation of internal elements in the political struggle then going on in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The clearing of the way into the State at Domel was not that of forced entry by the tribesmen but of a gate being opened, as it were, by rebels within the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the interest of an entity which in two days was to declare itself the independent state of Azad Kashmir. The participa¬ tion of the tribesmen in what amounted to a civil war could well be considered to represent an error of political judgement on the part of those who sought their assistance; but it would be difficult in these particular circumstances to classify it as part of an act of external “aggression†by Pakistan.
Indeed, if we accept Mahajan’s chronology, there is not in reality a great deal of difference between the position of these tribesmen on 22 October and that of the Indian Army airlifted to Srinagar on 27 October. At that moment on 27 October, it can be argued, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was still technically independent. The Indians were there at the invitation of the Maharaja on just about the same basis as the tribesmen were there at the invitation of the Poonch rebels now declared subordinates of the independent state of Azad Kashmir. Only after accession, which it seems highly probable did not legally take place until after the Indian intervention started, could it be argued that the Indians were now defending their own land against invaders. Moreover, whatever might be argued in defence of the timing, actual or intended, of the Indian intervention on 27 October, it could not be said that the Patiala troops, who were certainly in theory subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, only arrived after accession. They were there before the tribal advance of 22 October. Indeed, a good case can be made that the presence of the tribesmen was a direct response to the arrival of the Patiala troops. So, once again, who was “aggressing†against whom?
Likewise, the Kashmir government's pogrom against its Muslim subjects in Jammu was undertaken partly out of revenge for a formiadble uprising in Poonch...In Jine 1947 they commenced a no-tax campaign that rapidly escalated, courtesy of some heavy-handed reprisals by the darbar's police, into a widespread popular insurgency, spearheaded by a well-armed guerilla force of Indian Army veterans led by local zamindar Sardar Qayyum Khan.
This so-called Azad Army would eventually number in excess of 50,000. On 15 August, Independence Day, Paksitan flags were raised all over the region and shortly afterwards the movement's self-appointed supremo, Muslim Conference MLA Sardar Ibrahim Khan, announced Poonch's secession from Kashmir.
"After Partition in 1947, Jammuites engaged in three significant actions. The first was a Muslim uprising in the Poonch area of western Jammu province against the unpopular Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh. The second was serious inter-religious violence throughout the province that killed or displaced larger numbers of people from all religious communities. The third was the creation of Azad (Free) Jammu and Kashmir in the area of western Jammu Province that the 'rebels' had 'freed' or 'liberated'. These significant actions all took place before the Maharaja acceded to India on 26 October 1947. They divided 'his' Muslim-majority state and confirmed that it was undeliverable in its entirety to either India or Pakistan. They instigated the ongoing dispute between India and Pakistan over which state should possess J&K—the so-called 'Kashmir dispute"Solblaze ( talk) 18:41, 15 March 2024 (UTC)
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DaxServer (
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c) 23:03, 15 March 2024 (UTC)::Lamb is a highly respected and unbiased authority on Kashmir.
Citation [49]:
For example Wajahat claims that Pakistani GHQ had no clue about the tribal attack. However Sardar Yahya Effendi clearly mentions on page-151 of his book precisely mentions that Commanding Officer of 11 Cavalry was called by Pakistani Director Military Intelligence Colonel Sher Khan, MC to the GHQ in last week of August 1947 and briefed about Pakistani invasion plan. On page 153 Effendi mentioned that the Pakistani DMI Brigadier Sher Khan instructions to...
Neither Sardar Yahya Effendi nor Agha Humayun Amin are "Indian government". -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 12:06, 16 March 2024 (UTC)
:No one is disputing the fact that sympathetic elements within the Pakistani military such as
Colonel Sher Khan were covertly planning to support the Kashmiris, who had loathed the Maharajah's Dogra rule for centuries. This is a widely accepted fact.
The forces that Alastair Lamb writes about are the state forces of the Patiala State, which was a princely state that had acceded to the Indian Union. The state forces are not war-fighting forces. They were meant for internal security. All the princely states had surrendered external affairs and defence to the British Raj, and that continued after the Indian independence (and the same holds for Pakistan's princely states too). These forces were not under the command of the Indian Army.That integration happened much later, probably around 1950 when India became a Republic and the princely states were integrated into the Indian constitution.
Lamb has estimated precisely how many Patiala troops got sent to Kashmir. There was one battalion that was stationed in Jammu, and one "mountain battery" that was stationed in Srinagar. The Indian military writers that studied the J&K State Forces did not find any records on these troops in J&K. They believe that, since J&K's own forces got stretched out along the border, the Maharaja seems to have borrowed these troops from the neighbouring Patiala ruler for internal security of his capital cities.There is no evidence of the Government of India or the Indian Army being aware of this, since the Indian commander that landed in Srinagar was surprised to find them there. (This is the first time they got mentioned, according to Lamb himself.)
These are the facts. The rest is Lamb's own interpretation, subject to dispute. -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 13:09, 27 March 2024 (UTC)
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Add categories
Rajanyas ( talk) 20:53, 16 April 2024 (UTC)
'''[[
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contribs) 01:29, 17 April 2024 (UTC)
@ Rajanyas: what you are asking for is the wrong thing to do. (1) The article on the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948 is about a war; it does not belong in categories with names like Category:Battles involving India or Category:Battles involving China. (2) There is no Category:Battles involving Rajputs.-- Toddy1 (talk) 16:18, 19 April 2024 (UTC)
@ Toddy1: This article is titled after Indian intervention. It was on 26 October 1947 when India entered into this war after accession was signed by Jammu and Kashmir princely state. [28] Abhishek0831996 ( talk) 08:39, 13 May 2024 (UTC)
@ Abhishek0831996: The article title is currently "Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948"; it is not titled the "Indian intervention... " The Wikipedia article is written on the basis that the war started with the tribal invasion that started on 22 October 1947. The Poonch valley rebellion is treated as an event that led up to the war. Given that J&K State was forced to become part of India, from the Indian point of view, a start date for the war of 22 October 1947 makes perfect sense.
If you wanted to get really picky, you could claim that the war only became an Indo-Pakistani war when regular Pakistan Army units moved into J&K State - I think that was probably some date in November 1947. (We saw that kind of pickiness on Wikipedia with the Russian intervention in the Ukraine in 2014, with people claiming that the green men were not Russian.)-- Toddy1 (talk) 14:44, 13 May 2024 (UTC)
What do good quality sources say. That is what we should follow. Cinderella157 ( talk) 22:34, 13 May 2024 (UTC)
In case I was not sufficiently clear, interpreting sources to arrive at a start date (eg India refused help until the instrument of accession was signed) is WP:OR as opposed to sources which say, the war started on X date or the war occurred between X and Y dates. Cinderella157 ( talk) 21:37, 14 May 2024 (UTC)
@ Cinderella157: It is commonly written that the war started with the tribal invasion. For example:
-- Toddy1 (talk) 09:14, 15 May 2024 (UTC)
The first Indo-Pakistani war began following an invasion of Kashmir by armed tribesmenis subtly different from saying
The first Indo-Pakistani war began when armed tribesmen invaded Kashmirand
The first Indo-Pakistani war started after armed tribesmen ...is not the same as saying
The first Indo-Pakistani war started when armed tribesmen ...While it might be human nature to pigeon-hole things neatly, not everything fits into a nice neat box. This is such a case. We should follow the sources. If the sources don't give an exact date nor should we. Interpreting events to derive an exact date would be WP:OR. I have amended the infobox accordingly. I am not seeing that this requires further adjustment to the article. Cinderella157 ( talk) 10:46, 15 May 2024 (UTC)