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anyone want to incorporate the famous quote "we have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs... we have got to have [a] bloody Union Jack on top of it..." , [1], [2], [3] also quoted in the TUBE ALLOYS arricle Pickle 17:43, 22 March 2006 (UTC)
It's fairly widely-agreed (even by some of those who are no means enthusiastic supporters of Israel) that he messed up Britain's Palestine policy, partly by allowing free reign to some of his less endearing personality characteristics (which may have served him well in British trade-union politics, but which very conspicuously failed to accomplish anything whatsoever productive or constructive in the realm of mid-east diplomacy). To be brief, he caused many Jews to hate him passionately and intensely with some of his tactless remarks (such as accusing Jews of "jumping the queue"), and by pursuing certain highly controversial policies (such as returning attempted Jewish immigrants to Palestine to European refugee camps) far beyond the point of diminishing political returns -- but without thereby making the Arabs in the slightest degree more cooperative, or any more likely to agree to any compromise of any kind. It's hard to characterize this particular result as anything more than a personal failure on Bevin's part. Furthermore, he gratuitously (pointlessly and unnecessarily) offended and disgusted many politically-active people in America, at a time when the United States was beginning to take a more active role in middle eastern affairs... AnonMoos 00:46, 25 January 2007 (UTC)
Well if you, Mr. Moos, read the whole of my dissertation (which you haven't asked for a copy of) you would know that I do suggest that Bevin's Palestine policy did indeed have the potential to undermine his wider policy in respect of, arguably, more important things. His relationship with Truman and Secretary of States' Byrnes and Marshall was strained by his position on Palestine, but they left him no alternative. Nevertheless this clearly wasn't fatal, as the Marshall plan did happen, the US did step into the breach in Greece when the UK could no longer continue, NATO was established and the influence of the Soviet Union was circumscribed.
What you fail to appreciate is that the Foreign Secretary is not simply a diplomat, but the author national of strategy (particularly when supported by the Prime Minister; which he was). Both Bevin and Attlee correctly foresaw where the creation of a Zionist citadel on Arab land would lead. Both Bevin and Attlee were further infuriated by Truman's repeated attempts to bounce them into accepting mass Jewish immigration into Palestine. There exists in the UK's national archive a telegram of the most perfect understated fury from Attlee (normally the very personification of diplomatic calm) to Truman, sent in response to one of Truman's particularly unhelpful interventions. The US position was intolerable, both because of its hypocrisy, and because of the US refusal to back their rhetoric (however wrong headed) with resources. To wit, if the US really wanted Palestine to accommodate the overwhelming majority of Jewish displaced persons then they really ought to have sent a sufficient military force to suppress the inevitable Arab uprising that would have followed; because Britain was bankrupt and could not do it alone, even if it had wanted to. This is a mark of their perceptiveness as statesmen. Therefore the policy was not a failure, but the least worst course of action available. Add to this the trivial consideration that it was right in principle.
As to the point about no original research, this is a tricky one. Whilst you obviously can't have every whack ball peddling their own theories, there must come a point at which new perspectives are generally held to be accepted as correct, or wiki would still hold that the world is flat. The generally accepted scientific method on this is publication and peer review. As I state on http://www.richardhall.org.uk my dis has been accepted for publication by an academic journal, and therefore one may reasonably infer that its editors believe it to be a valid piece of scholarship. If you would like to verify this please feel free. Sirtoyou 18:18, 27 January 2007 (UTC)
1) Sirtoyou's edits gloss over the obvious fact that Bevin was an objective failure in not achieving the UK government's publicly-stated goals of arriving at a political settlement in Palestine and avoiding major Arab-Jewish fighting there. (Whether or not these were also Bevin's personal goals doesn't change the aforementioned fact.)
2) Sirtoyou's edits ignore the conspicuous fact that by his gratuitously tactless remarks and obstinacy in sticking to unproductive high-negative-publicity policies (things which he no doubt saw as West-country bluntness and steely resolve, but which many others saw as at best surly boorish churlishness, and at worst as motivated by racist bigotry), Bevin offended and alienated many of those whose support and goodwill could have facilitated Palestine political negotiations. AnonMoos 17:23, 30 January 2007 (UTC)
Feel free to add any valid relevant information about Bevin's attitudes and motivations (which throws light on why he did what he did), but please do not remove well-founded information about his failure to achieve the publicly-stated diplomatic goals of the British government, and the widespread negative reactions of many at the time to certain of his statements and actions -- statements and actions which appear to have made it even more difficult to achieve the publicly-stated diplomatic goals of the British government. Of course, not everybody had a negative reaction, so if you have information on positive reactions, you could add that as well (without removing information on negative reactions). AnonMoos 09:36, 10 February 2007 (UTC)
He failed to achieve just about all of the British government's publicly-stated policy goals in Palestine (it's hard to think of one he did manage to attain). Of course, a person would not ordinarily be called a "failure" for not accomplishing an impossible task -- but Bevin gratuitously chose to make his task (however difficult it may have been to start with) even more difficult than it needed to be, so the label sticks. AnonMoos 22:16, 14 March 2007 (UTC)
If as a result of his tactless boorish remarks ("queue-jumping" etc.) Bevin had managed to get the Arabs to agree to a compromise plan, then he would be remembered today as a brilliant manoeuvering diplomatic strategist. However, since instead the result was that he caused many Jews to intensely hate him, and offended many Americans, without thereby making the Arabs at all more likely to assent to any proposal which included any element of Jewish sovereignty whatsoever, therefore he is now largely remembered as an overall failure who took an already-screwed up Middle East situation, and gratuitously screwed it up even further through his inability to restrain some of his less endearing personality characteristics. AnonMoos 04:07, 3 July 2007 (UTC)
Where do you think that his name is 'execrated'? Certainly not in Britain, where he is considered by both historians and more general commentators as a statesman and one of the greatest Foreign Secretaries that the country has ever had. There is a celebrated three volume biography by Alan Bullock, considered to be one of the best pieces of modern historical writing. If you read that, you will find that Bevin was an outstanding trade union leader, the 'Docker's Q.C.' (after a high profile court case in which he argued the claims of the dock workers for a living wage) and the founder of the Transport and General Workers Union. He was a far sighted man, who grasped the importance of Keynsian economics before many economists, and gave evidence to the Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry. Bevin, more than anyone else, organised the British economy for total war, and can be regarded as one of the architects of victory. As Foreign Secretary, Bevin was responsible for helping to bring about Marshall Aid, for helping to set up Nato, for helping to defuse the problems of postwar Europe. For that alone, he deserves to be remembered. Yes, he was blunt. Yes, he did not suffer fools gladly. Yes, he told people things that they did not want to hear. So why has this article been hijacked, to some extent, by American zionists with an axe to grind?-- Train guard ( talk) 14:54, 28 November 2007 (UTC)
But this is an encyclopeadia article about Ernest Bevin....and a very poor one at that. You simply cannot concentrate upon one issue to the exclusion of anything else. Look, the majority of British historians (and people who are aware of him) couldn't really give a toss about what Americans thought of him at the time, or what some Zionists think of him, except in passing. This is not an article about Bevin and Palestine. Please stop treating it as if it was.-- Train guard ( talk) 11:15, 29 November 2007 (UTC)
And his foreign policy successes? If I, and others, expand these sections, will you and your friends leave well enough alone? (I also propose to add material from Bullock to the section dealing with Palestine.)-- Train guard ( talk) 11:36, 30 November 2007 (UTC)
I edited the paragraph 'Bevin was undeniably a plain-spoken man, some of whose remarks struck many as insensitive, but his biographer Alan Bullock rejects suggestions that he was motivated by personal anti-Semitism. The historian Howard Sachar cites a source which suggests otherwise. Sachar quotes a remark by Richard Grossman, a Labour Party MP and a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine, who met Bevin on 4 August 1947. Sachar claims that Grossman described Bevin's outlook as:
"corresponding roughly with the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a notorious anti-Semitic canard of the 1920s[6]. The main points of Bevin's discourse were ... that the Jews had successfully organised a worldwide conspiracy against Britain and against him personally."[7]' last night to include a comment that the references to [Richard] Grossman should be replaced by references to [Richard] Crossman. This edit was deleted without the suggested changes being made. There was no Labout MP Richard Grossman in 1947. I have checked lists of members of parliament published in Whitakers Almanac for for 1946 (the first year after the 1945 general election) and for 1950 (the last publication before the 1950 general election). In addition I have checked against the possibility that someone of this name entered parliament at a by-election after 1946 and left before 1950 on the page "List of United Kingdom by-elections (1931–1950)". The fact that additional material in footnote 7 ascribes very similar sentiments to Richard Crossman, and that Richard Crossman fits the description given exactly, suggests that Grossman is just a mis-typing of Crossman. I don't know whether such a mis-typing arose in Howard Sachar's work or in the writing of this Wikipedia page. However it arose, I do think that it could usefully be corrected, and therefore I am disappointed that this was not done when the error had been highlighted. Martin Lunnon —Preceding unsigned comment added by 91.125.99.127 ( talk) 20:48, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
Who put the text in this article about the Palmach? It was NOT an American Zionist organisation, as the text implied, but a military unit of the Haganah. Scott Adler 23:13, 3 July 2007 (UTC)
1. Has it been established who in the British government allowed al-Kaukji's army into Palestine in February, 1948? 2. Who was responsible for the transfer of the Arab Legion to "Transjordanian" control, with its British personnel infrastructure in place? Was the Imperial General Staff still in control during the Battle of Latrun? 3. Who ordered the RAF to intervene in unmarked aircraft in the later stages of the war? 4. Who was responsibile for isolatint UN representatives and preventing them from doing their jobs? 5. Who ordered "Operation Chaos" -- the British government's policy of shutting down the mandate by ripping out phones, burning files, and doing whatever it could to prevent an orderly transfer of power to any successor state?
Was Bevin responsible for any of this? And does Bevin share any blame for the Indian partition disaster?
When I have time, I'll add some text regarding the amusing behavior of UK diplomats at the UN following the withdrawal. It demonstrated remarkably childish stubbornness. Scott Adler 00:39, 3 July 2007 (UTC)
Don't want to monotonously harp on a single theme, but the recent edit of an anonymous IP, boiling down all references to Bevin's quasi-inflammatory remarks (and their effects) to the clause "his policies inspired resentment and violence from both Arabs and Jews", is completely inadequate. Arabs were of course disappointed that Britain didn't side with the Arabs against the Jews outright -- but many Arabs were in fact moderately or guardedly satisfied with the general trend of British Palestine policy under Bevin, while many Jews had feelings of resentment and even rage.
In 1946-47, Jewish leaders didn't necessarily insist that the problems of Jewish displaced persons in Europe were worse than other problems of displaced persons (whatever the word "worse" would even mean in such a context), but they did insist that the problem of Jewish displaced persons had certain very special and unique features, and that the Jewish displaced persons had some needs (beyond food, clothing, and shelter) that had to be dealt with almost immediately (and which couldn't wait for the slow negotiation of the Ultimate Grand Diplomatic Settlement of All European Problems and/or the Ultimate Grand Diplomatic Settlement of All Middle-Eastern Problems). If staying "in the queue" meant that the special problems of the Jewish situation would not be recognized, and that urgent needs of Jewish refugees would not be dealt with, then Jewish leaders were not willing to wait in the queue, and they were not in the slightest degree ashamed or embarrassed about not being willing to wait in the queue -- and many Jews became grimly determined to make Britain pay as high a price as possible for Bevin's attempts to make them wait in the queue (something which did not lay a foundation of goodwill for the success of British middle-eastern policies). AnonMoos ( talk) 08:45, 8 July 2008 (UTC)
AnonMoos, please provide reliable sources if you want to keep the sentence: Bevin failed to secure the stated British objectives in this area of foreign policy. When somebody's bluff is called, it means that, when challenged, they fail to carry out a threat. In this case, Bevin threatened, then did, hand the problem of Palestine to the UN to solve. -- ZScarpia ( talk) 00:14, 17 March 2010 (UTC)
In The Debate About 1948 chapter of The Israel/Palestine Question (edited by Ilan Pappé), Avi Shlaim writes about the differences between the new and old history accounts of the events of 1948, including the role of Ernest Bevin and British policy:
"Zionist historiography, reflecting the suspicions of Zionist
leaders at that time, is laden with charges of hostile plots that are alleged to have been hatched against the Yishuv during the twilight of British rule in Palestine. The central charge is that Britain armed and secretly encouraged her Arab allies, and especially her client, King Abdullah of Jordan, to invade Palestine upon expiry of the British Mandate and do battle with the Jewish state as soon as it came into the world. For Ernest Bevin, the foreign secretary in the Labour government headed by Clement Attlee, is reserved the
role of chief villain in this alleged conspiracy."
"The key to British policy during
this period is summed up by Pappé in two words: Greater Transjordan. Bevin felt that if Palestine had to be partitioned, the Arab area could not be left to stand on its own but should be united with Transjordan. A Greater Transjordan would compensate Britain for the loss of bases in Palestine. Hostility to Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who had cast his lot with the Nazis during World War II, and hostility to a Palestinian state, which in British eyes was always equated with a Mufti state, were important and constant features of British policy after the war. By February 1948, Bevin and his Foreign Office advisers were pragmatically reconciled to the inevitable emergence of the Jewish state. What they
were not reconciled to was the emergence of a Palestinian state."
"The policy of Greater Transjordan implied discreet support for a bid by Abdullah ... to enlarge his
kingdom by taking over the West Bank. At a secret meeting in London on 7 February 1948, Bevin gave Tawfiq Abul Huda, Jordan’s prime minister, the green light to send the Arab Legion into Palestine immediately following the departure of the British forces. But Bevin also warned Jordan not to invade the area allocated by the UN to the Jews. An attack on Jewish state territory, he said, would compel Britain to withdraw her subsidy and officers from the Arab Legion. Far from being driven by blind anti-Semitic prejudice to unleash the Arab Legion against the Jews, Bevin in fact urged restraint on the Arabs in
general and on Jordan in particular."
"If Bevin was guilty of conspiring to unleash the Arab Legion, his target was not the
Jews but the Palestinians. The prospect of a Palestinian state was pretty remote in any case because the Palestinians themselves had done so little to build it. But by supporting Abdullah’s bid to capture the Arab part of Palestine adjacent to his kingdom, Bevin indirectly helped to ensure that the Palestinian state envisaged in the UN partition plan would be stillborn. In short, if there is a case to be made against Bevin, it is not that he tried to abort the birth of the Jewish state but that he endorsed the understanding between King Abdullah and the Jewish Agency to partition Palestine between themselves and
leave the Palestinians out in the cold."
"The Zionist charge that Bevin deliberately instigated hostilities in Palestine and gave
encouragement and arms to the Arabs to crush the infant Jewish state thus represents almost the exact opposite of the historical truth as it emerges from the British, Arab, and Israeli documents. The charge is without substance and may be safely discarded as the
first in the series of myths that have come to surround the founding of the State of Israel."
← ZScarpia 00:34, 23 April 2010 (UTC)
Mohommed Fadhel Jamali wrote in Arab Struggle, Experiences of Mohammed Fadhel Jamali, published in 1974, that at a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Saleh Jabr, Nuri Sa’id and Jamali a week after the signing ceremony for the Portsmouth Treaty:
Mr Bevin opened the discussion saying, “We have decided to leave Palestine. What you want us to do now?” Nuri Sa'id answered, "we want you to hasten in terminating the Mandate and to do it immediately if possible.” Mr Creech-Jones answered that the military authorities agreed that there should not be a long period between terminating the Mandate and the complete withdrawal of the British army, for ending the civil administration would have a direct effect on the plans for the military withdrawal. Mr Bevin added, "It seems that this is the only point on which you are in agreement with the Zionists, for they also want us to terminate the Mandate quickly and withdraw. We will do our best to terminate the Mandate and withdraw in the shortest possible time." Nuri as-Sa’id suggested that the military should be asked to review their program and quicken their withdrawal. I intervened and asked, "Is it true that the process of withdrawal will be delayed on account of the season for exporting oranges from Palestine?" Mr Creech-Jones answered, "The press has written a good deal on this subject, but it is not correct. Exporting oranges has absolutely nothing to do with the plan for withdrawal." Nuri as-Sa’id raised the problem of control of petroleum. He did not want it to pass to the Zionist so that they could fight the Arabs. Mr Creech-Jones said, "Control of petroleum is under consideration. I told the representatives of the oil companies to inform their American counterparts to be frank with President Truman about the difficulties which the oil companies face as a result of American policy in Palestine. I was told by them that this week the American oil companies in the Arab world approached both President Truman and General Marshall, Secretary of State, and informed them a bout the critical situation of the oil companies in the Arab world and the unreadiness of the Arabs to take any new steps in expanding their oil projects so long as the situation in Palestine end the Arab world remains as it is. I proposed to the representatives of the Ministry of Fuel that they under take a similar move to make the Americans understand."
Then we dealt with the military aspects and we stated that Iraq alone, mobilizing the Palestinians for self-defence, would undertake to save Palestine. It was agreed that Iraq would buy for the Iraqi police force 50,000 tommy-guns. We intended to hand them over to the Palestine army volunteers for self-defence. Great British was ready to provide the Iraqi army with arms and ammunition as set forth in a list prepared by the Iraqi General Staff. The British undertook to withdraw from Palestine gradually, so that Arab forces could enter every area evacuated by the British in order that the whole of Palestine should be in Arab bands after the British withdrawal. The meeting ended and we were all optimistic about the future of Palestine. While still in London Saleh Jabr thought of purchasing some German torpedo boats that were for sale in Belgium. They were small, swift boats which he thought would protect the shores of Palestine and prevent any support coming to the Zionists from outside. The Treaty of Portsmouth, which was neither seen nor read by 99% of those who attacked it, was intended to be a pattern of cooperation between Britain and the Arab states It was hoped that other Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Egypt would join a defence agreement with the West so that the West could guarantee that Communism and Soviet influence would not penetrate the Middle East. However, it seems that this policy became known to the Zionists who considered Bevin as a bitter opponent. They cooperated with the Communists in Iraq and exploited the sentiments of some Iraqi nationalists to organize al-wathbeh, a sanguinary uprising against the Treaty. Iraqi public opinion was mobilized not only against the Portsmouth Treaty but against any defensive cooperation whatever its nature with the West.
The result was that the Portsmouth Treaty was abandoned, and the Iraqi Cabinet which signed it had to resign after the sanguinary events in Baghdad. Mr Bevin's whole defence system against Communism in the Middle East fell to pieces. Mr Bevin himself lost his political battle inside the British Cabinet. He was overcome by the supporters of Zionism who were quite strong in the Labour Cabinet and in the British Parliament. The sanguinary disturbances in Baghdad, the resignation of Saleh Jabr's Cabinet, and the abandonment of the Portsmouth Treaty, all led to the defeat of Mr Bevin's policy, which was intended to gain Arab friend ship and to guarantee security in the Middle East. After the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty by the succeeding Iraqi Cabinet, Iraq did not get the arms which were intended to save Palestine. This reversal was capped, when the British army was leaving Palestine, by a British General who handed over guns and tanks to the Zionists so that they could fight the Arabs. This was done, as the General is reported to have said, "to defend the honour of Britain" which had been tarnished by Mr Bevin. There is no doubt that thoughtful Arabs today regret the losses and sacrifices in Baghdad caused by the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty, especially since world strategy has been fundamentally changed by modern arms, so that military bases, treaties and alliances do not carry the same significance that they carried when the Portsmouth Treaty was signed. Regret for the sanguinary events in Baghdad connected with the Portsmouth Treaty is increased when one realizes that they were probably the immediate cause of the Arab defeat in Palestine. It can be clearly seen then, that the Arabs did not utilize the strategic position of their lands in order to win the Palestine case.
From The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (Cambridge Middle East Studies):
p. 131 (December 1947) -
"Nuri al-Sa'id, who was sent to Cairo at the behest of the British to
exercise a moderating influence on Jabr, backed him instead and criticized
the other Arab states for doing so little to help the Palestinians. ... The other Arab states, more cautious in
their public approach and unwilling to commit themselves to radical
economic sanctions or to military action, found themselves outflanked
by Iraq. ... Instead, they agreed merely to increase financial aid and small arms supplies
to the Palestinian Arabs and to the rapidly forming Arab volunteer
forces."
p. 132 -
"Despite the Iraqi government’s rhetoric and despite their
reiteration of Iraq’s right to act unilaterally in defense of the Palestinians,
neither on the economic nor the military fronts did Iraq take any initiative
that might have had irreversible consequences. Nor was the government
of Salih Jabr at all eager for a confrontation with Great Britain at a
time when he was trying to negotiate a revised Anglo-Iraqi Treaty which
he believed would be to Iraq’s advantage – and would enhance his own
political standing. Consequently, whilst the public, symbolic face of the Iraqi state
corresponded to the most pan-Arab interpretation of its obligations,
other important aspects of that state were making themselves felt with
greater weight. Nuri and Jabr had linked Zionism with communism to
prevent their domestic critics from using the Palestine question and its
anti-imperialist overtones to mobilize opposition to their regime. This
had been accompanied by a repressive campaign designed to disrupt the
organization of the ICP and to throw into confusion their many fellowtravellers.
In this respect, they sought to insulate the Iraqi state as hierarchy
and structured inequality from the radicalizing effect of campaigns in
support of Palestine. This identification was easier to make once the Soviet Union had come
out in support of the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a
Jewish state. ... At the same time that Jabr was advocating the intervention of
all the Arab armies, if the partition plan were implemented, he was privately
telling British officials that he was in favor of cooperating with
'Abdullah in the take-over of Palestine."
p. 133 -
"The
Transjordanian and the Iraqi governments were as one in their refusal to
allow al-Husayni to play any part in the deliberations of the Arab League
and, partly as a result, the League failed to decide on a future Arab government
of Palestine when it met in Cairo in December 1947."
p. 133 -
"Nuri al-Sa'id had by this stage become convinced that the British were
unwilling to countenance the take-over of the whole of Palestine by the
armed forces of Iraq and Transjordan, as he had once hoped. Furthermore,
he saw little chance that the Arab states, individually or collectively, could
deflect the United States from its chosen course of supporting the partition
of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state. He seemed therefore to
accept that partition would take place and put his energies into trying to
persuade the British to withdraw sooner than planned in order to deprive
the Zionist forces of the advantages they enjoyed in the developing civil
war. He also tried to convince the British of the need to send increased military
supplies to Iraq, within the context of the renegotiated Anglo-Iraqi
Treaty. Nuri’s efforts were unsuccessful, but it was the question of the treaty,
embodying the British connection with the Iraqi state, which was the major
preoccupation of Salih Jabr’s government, overshadowing the question of
Palestine."
p. 133 -
"However, there was a convergence of British and Iraqi thinking on
Palestine. In December 1947, Jabr and Nuri visited Amman on their way
back from London and told King 'Abdullah that Great Britain not only
favored partition, but was also in favor of Transjordan taking over the Arab
areas of Palestine. They also pledged Iraqi support for such a move."
p. 134 -
"It was at this point, however, that the Iraqi government’s attempt to
renegotiate Iraq’s relations with Great Britain came to a violent and
abrupt end in the events known as al-Wathba [the leap] which brought
down Jabr’s government. In January 1948 most Iraqis learnt, to their surprise,
that their government had been secretly negotiating a new Anglo-
Iraqi treaty, the terms of which became known publicly only with its
signature at Portsmouth in January 1948. Great Britain was to withdraw
all its forces from Iraq and hand over the RAF’s two air bases to Iraqi
control. However, a joint defense board of British and Iraqi officials
would oversee Iraq’s military planning, Great Britain would remain Iraq’s
principal military supplier and would be allowed to take over the air bases
again in time of war. Furthermore, this treaty would last until 1973,
fifteen years beyond the expiry date of the treaty it superseded.
The reaction in Iraq was one of outrage, mixed with political opportunism
since most of the government were in Great Britain for the signing
ceremony. Protest marches and demonstrations erupted on the streets of
Baghdad and soon spread to the other cities of Iraq. Although initially
organized against the Portsmouth Treaty, the processions and demonstrations
were used to protest against many features of the Iraqi political
establishment. ... The regent,
who had initially supported the Portsmouth Treaty, took fright and now
declared that he would refuse to endorse it."
Personally, I get the impression that Mohommed Fadhel Jamali's account was a bit self-serving. Jamali's account is a primary source which, as far as its claim about the intention of the British to withdraw at such a speed as to enable Arabs to control the whole of Palestine is concerned, contradicts itself and is contradicted by reliable secondary sources.(preceeding sentence inserted - ←
ZScarpia 17:40, 30 April 2010 (UTC)) ←
ZScarpia
03:01, 28 April 2010 (UTC)
Sorry for rather belated reply, but here's a source:
At the end of December 1947, the [British] Chiefs of Staff had been quite convinced that "in the long run the Jews would not be able to cope with the Arabs and would be thrown out of Palestine unless they came to terms with them. The Arabs would succeed by guerilla activities."[Bevin-CIGS interview, December 22, 1947, E12325, FO 371/61583] Cunningham had also initially been of the opinion that the Arabs would prevail... -- Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers 1945-48 (1982 ISBN 0691053715), p.311.
The London military men and politicians eventually came to a different understanding in 1948, but all the deliberations which led to the British decision to withdraw happened in 1947, when most of them still thought that the Arabs would win... AnonMoos ( talk) 02:30, 16 March 2011 (UTC)
The text currently suggests that Bevin's opposition to Jewish actions in Palestine was "motivated by personal anti-Semitism" This is based on a quotation from Crossman ("(Bernie) had become convinced that the Jews were organising a world conspiracy against poor old Britain and, in particular, against poor old Ernie"), but IMO it is taken out of context. In context, it reads like this:
"Ernest Bevin felt himself unbearably provoked when the Jews wantonly rejected his solution of their problem. The provocation grew when he discovered that the Russians were exploiting the issue against him and, and even worse, the Americans were ganging up with the Russians. Driven by a frightening mixture of anger and violent self-pity, he became convinced that the Jews were organising a world conspiracy against poor old Britain and, in particular, against poor old Ernie. Of course, there were plenty of sound reasons why any British Foreign Secretary at this time would have been angry with Mr. Truman..."
Thus, Crossman is describing Bevin's emotional reaction to a specific, unusually strained moment in the crisis, in which the two other Great Powers, who were each other's main Cold War rivals, seemed to be be uniting against him. Crossman is not describing Bevin's preliminary opinion about the Jews in general, or some kind of principled, ingrained anti-Semitism that he had always held. It cannot be claimed that his conviction (that the Jews were organising a conspiracy), which is cited here as evidence of anti-Semitism, had "motivated" his position in the Palestinian conflict, because this conviction arose only in a certain critical moment in that conflict, when his overall position had already long been a fact. The tense is not past perfect ("had become"), as in the quote in the text, but past simple ("became").
The significance of this quotation is first exaggerated by Sachar, who compares it to the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion", when he does not even have a direct quotation from Bevin but only a very approximate description of Bevin's alleged feelings by Crossman. Still, judging from the available excerpts, even Sachar does not state directly that Bevin was personally anti-Semitic, and he does not venture to claim that a pre-conceived anti-Semitic bias had motivated Bevin's overall position on the Palestinian conflict from the start. These steps are taken by the Wikipedia editor here - and they constitute Original Research.-- 91.148.159.4 ( talk) 23:01, 1 June 2010 (UTC)
The quote is rather grandiose, but I don't see a problem with it in terms of Britain not being a great power. In 1945, the UK was still more powerful than everyone other than the U.S.A. and Soviet Union, and its second-tier status did not fully become clear until 1956... AnonMoos ( talk) 02:18, 7 February 2015 (UTC)
The article already discusses how Britain in the late 1940s and early 1950s expected to continue as a World Power for the foreseeable future, with a huge army and air force, colonies in Africa, client states in the Middle East and military bases in both areas. It was only from the late 1950s/early 1960s that Britain's economic travails really began to be seen as symptomatic of a deeper malaise (the "British disease") rather than merely temporary. Hence (as well as Suez) the reappraisal which began under Macmillan. Paulturtle ( talk) 22:51, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
Added some material on the above, as one of the key things to understand about the 1945-55 era is the degree to which Britain was still trying to be the third superpower and going along with, whilst remaining slightly aloof from, US pressure for West European integration. As for the comments above about the Truman Administration "treating Britain with contempt" over Korea, the USA regarded the Pacific as her own sphere even to the point (during WW2) of pulling off Australia as an ally and putting on the pressure for Indian independence (Richard Thorne Allies of a Kind still remains a classic work on this). The US was glad to receive a division or so of Commonwealth troops but did not take kindly to being told what to do in Korea. British hopes for reciprocal US support in Palestine, Iran and Egypt were largely in vain. Paulturtle ( talk) 16:26, 8 March 2015 (UTC)
Lend Lease and the Atlantic Charter in 1941 marked the end of the UK being a world power as it surrendered its independence and its empire to the United States. Bullock was a very stupid man and as he was a Labour peer his POV is too obviously biased. The reappraisal of the UK's role in world affairs began under Attlee with the independence of India, Burma, Sri Lanka, Israel, Ireland etc and the evacuation from Greece and Iran. (
DelmarAndrews (
talk)
17:53, 15 June 2015 (UTC))
Perhaps it's me but IMO the picture showing his bust looks nothing like him at all. Wouldn't be the slightest surprised if it's a mistake. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.31.250.123 ( talk) 09:56, 25 September 2015 (UTC)
The claim the Israel and Transjordan had reached an agreement not to attack each other is, as far as I can tell, a pet fringe theory promoted by Avi Shlaim, and debunked by multiple other historians (not to mention being clearly false - see Battles of Latrun (1948)). In any case, the statement in the article was not sourced, and I replaced it with a sourced one. It is questionable if any of this even belongs in a biography of Bevin, unless sources are provided to show that he personally participated in the alleged collusion. Bad Dryer ( talk) 15:58, 19 October 2015 (UTC)
Isaac Herzog, leader of the Israeli ZU alliance (i.e. old Israel Labor party) compared Jeremy Corbyn to Bevin, saying: "Corbyn represents a consistent stance of hatred toward Israel, like the infamous Ernest Bevin, and like Bevin, who failed, Corbyn will fail, as well." [4] --- AnonMoos ( talk) 23:15, 2 July 2016 (UTC)
Eden was just as influential as Bevin during his second term as Foreign Secretary during 1951 to 1955. ( 2A00:23C4:6392:3C00:CC0E:E611:D9F8:8ABC ( talk) 14:06, 1 April 2017 (UTC))
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Aneurin Bevan is the only person listed in section # 8 See also (and in an unusual way). Is he listed only because he and Bevin are sometimes confused? Mcljlm ( talk) 18:30, 20 July 2022 (UTC)
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anyone want to incorporate the famous quote "we have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs... we have got to have [a] bloody Union Jack on top of it..." , [1], [2], [3] also quoted in the TUBE ALLOYS arricle Pickle 17:43, 22 March 2006 (UTC)
It's fairly widely-agreed (even by some of those who are no means enthusiastic supporters of Israel) that he messed up Britain's Palestine policy, partly by allowing free reign to some of his less endearing personality characteristics (which may have served him well in British trade-union politics, but which very conspicuously failed to accomplish anything whatsoever productive or constructive in the realm of mid-east diplomacy). To be brief, he caused many Jews to hate him passionately and intensely with some of his tactless remarks (such as accusing Jews of "jumping the queue"), and by pursuing certain highly controversial policies (such as returning attempted Jewish immigrants to Palestine to European refugee camps) far beyond the point of diminishing political returns -- but without thereby making the Arabs in the slightest degree more cooperative, or any more likely to agree to any compromise of any kind. It's hard to characterize this particular result as anything more than a personal failure on Bevin's part. Furthermore, he gratuitously (pointlessly and unnecessarily) offended and disgusted many politically-active people in America, at a time when the United States was beginning to take a more active role in middle eastern affairs... AnonMoos 00:46, 25 January 2007 (UTC)
Well if you, Mr. Moos, read the whole of my dissertation (which you haven't asked for a copy of) you would know that I do suggest that Bevin's Palestine policy did indeed have the potential to undermine his wider policy in respect of, arguably, more important things. His relationship with Truman and Secretary of States' Byrnes and Marshall was strained by his position on Palestine, but they left him no alternative. Nevertheless this clearly wasn't fatal, as the Marshall plan did happen, the US did step into the breach in Greece when the UK could no longer continue, NATO was established and the influence of the Soviet Union was circumscribed.
What you fail to appreciate is that the Foreign Secretary is not simply a diplomat, but the author national of strategy (particularly when supported by the Prime Minister; which he was). Both Bevin and Attlee correctly foresaw where the creation of a Zionist citadel on Arab land would lead. Both Bevin and Attlee were further infuriated by Truman's repeated attempts to bounce them into accepting mass Jewish immigration into Palestine. There exists in the UK's national archive a telegram of the most perfect understated fury from Attlee (normally the very personification of diplomatic calm) to Truman, sent in response to one of Truman's particularly unhelpful interventions. The US position was intolerable, both because of its hypocrisy, and because of the US refusal to back their rhetoric (however wrong headed) with resources. To wit, if the US really wanted Palestine to accommodate the overwhelming majority of Jewish displaced persons then they really ought to have sent a sufficient military force to suppress the inevitable Arab uprising that would have followed; because Britain was bankrupt and could not do it alone, even if it had wanted to. This is a mark of their perceptiveness as statesmen. Therefore the policy was not a failure, but the least worst course of action available. Add to this the trivial consideration that it was right in principle.
As to the point about no original research, this is a tricky one. Whilst you obviously can't have every whack ball peddling their own theories, there must come a point at which new perspectives are generally held to be accepted as correct, or wiki would still hold that the world is flat. The generally accepted scientific method on this is publication and peer review. As I state on http://www.richardhall.org.uk my dis has been accepted for publication by an academic journal, and therefore one may reasonably infer that its editors believe it to be a valid piece of scholarship. If you would like to verify this please feel free. Sirtoyou 18:18, 27 January 2007 (UTC)
1) Sirtoyou's edits gloss over the obvious fact that Bevin was an objective failure in not achieving the UK government's publicly-stated goals of arriving at a political settlement in Palestine and avoiding major Arab-Jewish fighting there. (Whether or not these were also Bevin's personal goals doesn't change the aforementioned fact.)
2) Sirtoyou's edits ignore the conspicuous fact that by his gratuitously tactless remarks and obstinacy in sticking to unproductive high-negative-publicity policies (things which he no doubt saw as West-country bluntness and steely resolve, but which many others saw as at best surly boorish churlishness, and at worst as motivated by racist bigotry), Bevin offended and alienated many of those whose support and goodwill could have facilitated Palestine political negotiations. AnonMoos 17:23, 30 January 2007 (UTC)
Feel free to add any valid relevant information about Bevin's attitudes and motivations (which throws light on why he did what he did), but please do not remove well-founded information about his failure to achieve the publicly-stated diplomatic goals of the British government, and the widespread negative reactions of many at the time to certain of his statements and actions -- statements and actions which appear to have made it even more difficult to achieve the publicly-stated diplomatic goals of the British government. Of course, not everybody had a negative reaction, so if you have information on positive reactions, you could add that as well (without removing information on negative reactions). AnonMoos 09:36, 10 February 2007 (UTC)
He failed to achieve just about all of the British government's publicly-stated policy goals in Palestine (it's hard to think of one he did manage to attain). Of course, a person would not ordinarily be called a "failure" for not accomplishing an impossible task -- but Bevin gratuitously chose to make his task (however difficult it may have been to start with) even more difficult than it needed to be, so the label sticks. AnonMoos 22:16, 14 March 2007 (UTC)
If as a result of his tactless boorish remarks ("queue-jumping" etc.) Bevin had managed to get the Arabs to agree to a compromise plan, then he would be remembered today as a brilliant manoeuvering diplomatic strategist. However, since instead the result was that he caused many Jews to intensely hate him, and offended many Americans, without thereby making the Arabs at all more likely to assent to any proposal which included any element of Jewish sovereignty whatsoever, therefore he is now largely remembered as an overall failure who took an already-screwed up Middle East situation, and gratuitously screwed it up even further through his inability to restrain some of his less endearing personality characteristics. AnonMoos 04:07, 3 July 2007 (UTC)
Where do you think that his name is 'execrated'? Certainly not in Britain, where he is considered by both historians and more general commentators as a statesman and one of the greatest Foreign Secretaries that the country has ever had. There is a celebrated three volume biography by Alan Bullock, considered to be one of the best pieces of modern historical writing. If you read that, you will find that Bevin was an outstanding trade union leader, the 'Docker's Q.C.' (after a high profile court case in which he argued the claims of the dock workers for a living wage) and the founder of the Transport and General Workers Union. He was a far sighted man, who grasped the importance of Keynsian economics before many economists, and gave evidence to the Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry. Bevin, more than anyone else, organised the British economy for total war, and can be regarded as one of the architects of victory. As Foreign Secretary, Bevin was responsible for helping to bring about Marshall Aid, for helping to set up Nato, for helping to defuse the problems of postwar Europe. For that alone, he deserves to be remembered. Yes, he was blunt. Yes, he did not suffer fools gladly. Yes, he told people things that they did not want to hear. So why has this article been hijacked, to some extent, by American zionists with an axe to grind?-- Train guard ( talk) 14:54, 28 November 2007 (UTC)
But this is an encyclopeadia article about Ernest Bevin....and a very poor one at that. You simply cannot concentrate upon one issue to the exclusion of anything else. Look, the majority of British historians (and people who are aware of him) couldn't really give a toss about what Americans thought of him at the time, or what some Zionists think of him, except in passing. This is not an article about Bevin and Palestine. Please stop treating it as if it was.-- Train guard ( talk) 11:15, 29 November 2007 (UTC)
And his foreign policy successes? If I, and others, expand these sections, will you and your friends leave well enough alone? (I also propose to add material from Bullock to the section dealing with Palestine.)-- Train guard ( talk) 11:36, 30 November 2007 (UTC)
I edited the paragraph 'Bevin was undeniably a plain-spoken man, some of whose remarks struck many as insensitive, but his biographer Alan Bullock rejects suggestions that he was motivated by personal anti-Semitism. The historian Howard Sachar cites a source which suggests otherwise. Sachar quotes a remark by Richard Grossman, a Labour Party MP and a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine, who met Bevin on 4 August 1947. Sachar claims that Grossman described Bevin's outlook as:
"corresponding roughly with the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a notorious anti-Semitic canard of the 1920s[6]. The main points of Bevin's discourse were ... that the Jews had successfully organised a worldwide conspiracy against Britain and against him personally."[7]' last night to include a comment that the references to [Richard] Grossman should be replaced by references to [Richard] Crossman. This edit was deleted without the suggested changes being made. There was no Labout MP Richard Grossman in 1947. I have checked lists of members of parliament published in Whitakers Almanac for for 1946 (the first year after the 1945 general election) and for 1950 (the last publication before the 1950 general election). In addition I have checked against the possibility that someone of this name entered parliament at a by-election after 1946 and left before 1950 on the page "List of United Kingdom by-elections (1931–1950)". The fact that additional material in footnote 7 ascribes very similar sentiments to Richard Crossman, and that Richard Crossman fits the description given exactly, suggests that Grossman is just a mis-typing of Crossman. I don't know whether such a mis-typing arose in Howard Sachar's work or in the writing of this Wikipedia page. However it arose, I do think that it could usefully be corrected, and therefore I am disappointed that this was not done when the error had been highlighted. Martin Lunnon —Preceding unsigned comment added by 91.125.99.127 ( talk) 20:48, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
Who put the text in this article about the Palmach? It was NOT an American Zionist organisation, as the text implied, but a military unit of the Haganah. Scott Adler 23:13, 3 July 2007 (UTC)
1. Has it been established who in the British government allowed al-Kaukji's army into Palestine in February, 1948? 2. Who was responsible for the transfer of the Arab Legion to "Transjordanian" control, with its British personnel infrastructure in place? Was the Imperial General Staff still in control during the Battle of Latrun? 3. Who ordered the RAF to intervene in unmarked aircraft in the later stages of the war? 4. Who was responsibile for isolatint UN representatives and preventing them from doing their jobs? 5. Who ordered "Operation Chaos" -- the British government's policy of shutting down the mandate by ripping out phones, burning files, and doing whatever it could to prevent an orderly transfer of power to any successor state?
Was Bevin responsible for any of this? And does Bevin share any blame for the Indian partition disaster?
When I have time, I'll add some text regarding the amusing behavior of UK diplomats at the UN following the withdrawal. It demonstrated remarkably childish stubbornness. Scott Adler 00:39, 3 July 2007 (UTC)
Don't want to monotonously harp on a single theme, but the recent edit of an anonymous IP, boiling down all references to Bevin's quasi-inflammatory remarks (and their effects) to the clause "his policies inspired resentment and violence from both Arabs and Jews", is completely inadequate. Arabs were of course disappointed that Britain didn't side with the Arabs against the Jews outright -- but many Arabs were in fact moderately or guardedly satisfied with the general trend of British Palestine policy under Bevin, while many Jews had feelings of resentment and even rage.
In 1946-47, Jewish leaders didn't necessarily insist that the problems of Jewish displaced persons in Europe were worse than other problems of displaced persons (whatever the word "worse" would even mean in such a context), but they did insist that the problem of Jewish displaced persons had certain very special and unique features, and that the Jewish displaced persons had some needs (beyond food, clothing, and shelter) that had to be dealt with almost immediately (and which couldn't wait for the slow negotiation of the Ultimate Grand Diplomatic Settlement of All European Problems and/or the Ultimate Grand Diplomatic Settlement of All Middle-Eastern Problems). If staying "in the queue" meant that the special problems of the Jewish situation would not be recognized, and that urgent needs of Jewish refugees would not be dealt with, then Jewish leaders were not willing to wait in the queue, and they were not in the slightest degree ashamed or embarrassed about not being willing to wait in the queue -- and many Jews became grimly determined to make Britain pay as high a price as possible for Bevin's attempts to make them wait in the queue (something which did not lay a foundation of goodwill for the success of British middle-eastern policies). AnonMoos ( talk) 08:45, 8 July 2008 (UTC)
AnonMoos, please provide reliable sources if you want to keep the sentence: Bevin failed to secure the stated British objectives in this area of foreign policy. When somebody's bluff is called, it means that, when challenged, they fail to carry out a threat. In this case, Bevin threatened, then did, hand the problem of Palestine to the UN to solve. -- ZScarpia ( talk) 00:14, 17 March 2010 (UTC)
In The Debate About 1948 chapter of The Israel/Palestine Question (edited by Ilan Pappé), Avi Shlaim writes about the differences between the new and old history accounts of the events of 1948, including the role of Ernest Bevin and British policy:
"Zionist historiography, reflecting the suspicions of Zionist
leaders at that time, is laden with charges of hostile plots that are alleged to have been hatched against the Yishuv during the twilight of British rule in Palestine. The central charge is that Britain armed and secretly encouraged her Arab allies, and especially her client, King Abdullah of Jordan, to invade Palestine upon expiry of the British Mandate and do battle with the Jewish state as soon as it came into the world. For Ernest Bevin, the foreign secretary in the Labour government headed by Clement Attlee, is reserved the
role of chief villain in this alleged conspiracy."
"The key to British policy during
this period is summed up by Pappé in two words: Greater Transjordan. Bevin felt that if Palestine had to be partitioned, the Arab area could not be left to stand on its own but should be united with Transjordan. A Greater Transjordan would compensate Britain for the loss of bases in Palestine. Hostility to Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who had cast his lot with the Nazis during World War II, and hostility to a Palestinian state, which in British eyes was always equated with a Mufti state, were important and constant features of British policy after the war. By February 1948, Bevin and his Foreign Office advisers were pragmatically reconciled to the inevitable emergence of the Jewish state. What they
were not reconciled to was the emergence of a Palestinian state."
"The policy of Greater Transjordan implied discreet support for a bid by Abdullah ... to enlarge his
kingdom by taking over the West Bank. At a secret meeting in London on 7 February 1948, Bevin gave Tawfiq Abul Huda, Jordan’s prime minister, the green light to send the Arab Legion into Palestine immediately following the departure of the British forces. But Bevin also warned Jordan not to invade the area allocated by the UN to the Jews. An attack on Jewish state territory, he said, would compel Britain to withdraw her subsidy and officers from the Arab Legion. Far from being driven by blind anti-Semitic prejudice to unleash the Arab Legion against the Jews, Bevin in fact urged restraint on the Arabs in
general and on Jordan in particular."
"If Bevin was guilty of conspiring to unleash the Arab Legion, his target was not the
Jews but the Palestinians. The prospect of a Palestinian state was pretty remote in any case because the Palestinians themselves had done so little to build it. But by supporting Abdullah’s bid to capture the Arab part of Palestine adjacent to his kingdom, Bevin indirectly helped to ensure that the Palestinian state envisaged in the UN partition plan would be stillborn. In short, if there is a case to be made against Bevin, it is not that he tried to abort the birth of the Jewish state but that he endorsed the understanding between King Abdullah and the Jewish Agency to partition Palestine between themselves and
leave the Palestinians out in the cold."
"The Zionist charge that Bevin deliberately instigated hostilities in Palestine and gave
encouragement and arms to the Arabs to crush the infant Jewish state thus represents almost the exact opposite of the historical truth as it emerges from the British, Arab, and Israeli documents. The charge is without substance and may be safely discarded as the
first in the series of myths that have come to surround the founding of the State of Israel."
← ZScarpia 00:34, 23 April 2010 (UTC)
Mohommed Fadhel Jamali wrote in Arab Struggle, Experiences of Mohammed Fadhel Jamali, published in 1974, that at a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Saleh Jabr, Nuri Sa’id and Jamali a week after the signing ceremony for the Portsmouth Treaty:
Mr Bevin opened the discussion saying, “We have decided to leave Palestine. What you want us to do now?” Nuri Sa'id answered, "we want you to hasten in terminating the Mandate and to do it immediately if possible.” Mr Creech-Jones answered that the military authorities agreed that there should not be a long period between terminating the Mandate and the complete withdrawal of the British army, for ending the civil administration would have a direct effect on the plans for the military withdrawal. Mr Bevin added, "It seems that this is the only point on which you are in agreement with the Zionists, for they also want us to terminate the Mandate quickly and withdraw. We will do our best to terminate the Mandate and withdraw in the shortest possible time." Nuri as-Sa’id suggested that the military should be asked to review their program and quicken their withdrawal. I intervened and asked, "Is it true that the process of withdrawal will be delayed on account of the season for exporting oranges from Palestine?" Mr Creech-Jones answered, "The press has written a good deal on this subject, but it is not correct. Exporting oranges has absolutely nothing to do with the plan for withdrawal." Nuri as-Sa’id raised the problem of control of petroleum. He did not want it to pass to the Zionist so that they could fight the Arabs. Mr Creech-Jones said, "Control of petroleum is under consideration. I told the representatives of the oil companies to inform their American counterparts to be frank with President Truman about the difficulties which the oil companies face as a result of American policy in Palestine. I was told by them that this week the American oil companies in the Arab world approached both President Truman and General Marshall, Secretary of State, and informed them a bout the critical situation of the oil companies in the Arab world and the unreadiness of the Arabs to take any new steps in expanding their oil projects so long as the situation in Palestine end the Arab world remains as it is. I proposed to the representatives of the Ministry of Fuel that they under take a similar move to make the Americans understand."
Then we dealt with the military aspects and we stated that Iraq alone, mobilizing the Palestinians for self-defence, would undertake to save Palestine. It was agreed that Iraq would buy for the Iraqi police force 50,000 tommy-guns. We intended to hand them over to the Palestine army volunteers for self-defence. Great British was ready to provide the Iraqi army with arms and ammunition as set forth in a list prepared by the Iraqi General Staff. The British undertook to withdraw from Palestine gradually, so that Arab forces could enter every area evacuated by the British in order that the whole of Palestine should be in Arab bands after the British withdrawal. The meeting ended and we were all optimistic about the future of Palestine. While still in London Saleh Jabr thought of purchasing some German torpedo boats that were for sale in Belgium. They were small, swift boats which he thought would protect the shores of Palestine and prevent any support coming to the Zionists from outside. The Treaty of Portsmouth, which was neither seen nor read by 99% of those who attacked it, was intended to be a pattern of cooperation between Britain and the Arab states It was hoped that other Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Egypt would join a defence agreement with the West so that the West could guarantee that Communism and Soviet influence would not penetrate the Middle East. However, it seems that this policy became known to the Zionists who considered Bevin as a bitter opponent. They cooperated with the Communists in Iraq and exploited the sentiments of some Iraqi nationalists to organize al-wathbeh, a sanguinary uprising against the Treaty. Iraqi public opinion was mobilized not only against the Portsmouth Treaty but against any defensive cooperation whatever its nature with the West.
The result was that the Portsmouth Treaty was abandoned, and the Iraqi Cabinet which signed it had to resign after the sanguinary events in Baghdad. Mr Bevin's whole defence system against Communism in the Middle East fell to pieces. Mr Bevin himself lost his political battle inside the British Cabinet. He was overcome by the supporters of Zionism who were quite strong in the Labour Cabinet and in the British Parliament. The sanguinary disturbances in Baghdad, the resignation of Saleh Jabr's Cabinet, and the abandonment of the Portsmouth Treaty, all led to the defeat of Mr Bevin's policy, which was intended to gain Arab friend ship and to guarantee security in the Middle East. After the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty by the succeeding Iraqi Cabinet, Iraq did not get the arms which were intended to save Palestine. This reversal was capped, when the British army was leaving Palestine, by a British General who handed over guns and tanks to the Zionists so that they could fight the Arabs. This was done, as the General is reported to have said, "to defend the honour of Britain" which had been tarnished by Mr Bevin. There is no doubt that thoughtful Arabs today regret the losses and sacrifices in Baghdad caused by the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty, especially since world strategy has been fundamentally changed by modern arms, so that military bases, treaties and alliances do not carry the same significance that they carried when the Portsmouth Treaty was signed. Regret for the sanguinary events in Baghdad connected with the Portsmouth Treaty is increased when one realizes that they were probably the immediate cause of the Arab defeat in Palestine. It can be clearly seen then, that the Arabs did not utilize the strategic position of their lands in order to win the Palestine case.
From The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (Cambridge Middle East Studies):
p. 131 (December 1947) -
"Nuri al-Sa'id, who was sent to Cairo at the behest of the British to
exercise a moderating influence on Jabr, backed him instead and criticized
the other Arab states for doing so little to help the Palestinians. ... The other Arab states, more cautious in
their public approach and unwilling to commit themselves to radical
economic sanctions or to military action, found themselves outflanked
by Iraq. ... Instead, they agreed merely to increase financial aid and small arms supplies
to the Palestinian Arabs and to the rapidly forming Arab volunteer
forces."
p. 132 -
"Despite the Iraqi government’s rhetoric and despite their
reiteration of Iraq’s right to act unilaterally in defense of the Palestinians,
neither on the economic nor the military fronts did Iraq take any initiative
that might have had irreversible consequences. Nor was the government
of Salih Jabr at all eager for a confrontation with Great Britain at a
time when he was trying to negotiate a revised Anglo-Iraqi Treaty which
he believed would be to Iraq’s advantage – and would enhance his own
political standing. Consequently, whilst the public, symbolic face of the Iraqi state
corresponded to the most pan-Arab interpretation of its obligations,
other important aspects of that state were making themselves felt with
greater weight. Nuri and Jabr had linked Zionism with communism to
prevent their domestic critics from using the Palestine question and its
anti-imperialist overtones to mobilize opposition to their regime. This
had been accompanied by a repressive campaign designed to disrupt the
organization of the ICP and to throw into confusion their many fellowtravellers.
In this respect, they sought to insulate the Iraqi state as hierarchy
and structured inequality from the radicalizing effect of campaigns in
support of Palestine. This identification was easier to make once the Soviet Union had come
out in support of the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a
Jewish state. ... At the same time that Jabr was advocating the intervention of
all the Arab armies, if the partition plan were implemented, he was privately
telling British officials that he was in favor of cooperating with
'Abdullah in the take-over of Palestine."
p. 133 -
"The
Transjordanian and the Iraqi governments were as one in their refusal to
allow al-Husayni to play any part in the deliberations of the Arab League
and, partly as a result, the League failed to decide on a future Arab government
of Palestine when it met in Cairo in December 1947."
p. 133 -
"Nuri al-Sa'id had by this stage become convinced that the British were
unwilling to countenance the take-over of the whole of Palestine by the
armed forces of Iraq and Transjordan, as he had once hoped. Furthermore,
he saw little chance that the Arab states, individually or collectively, could
deflect the United States from its chosen course of supporting the partition
of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state. He seemed therefore to
accept that partition would take place and put his energies into trying to
persuade the British to withdraw sooner than planned in order to deprive
the Zionist forces of the advantages they enjoyed in the developing civil
war. He also tried to convince the British of the need to send increased military
supplies to Iraq, within the context of the renegotiated Anglo-Iraqi
Treaty. Nuri’s efforts were unsuccessful, but it was the question of the treaty,
embodying the British connection with the Iraqi state, which was the major
preoccupation of Salih Jabr’s government, overshadowing the question of
Palestine."
p. 133 -
"However, there was a convergence of British and Iraqi thinking on
Palestine. In December 1947, Jabr and Nuri visited Amman on their way
back from London and told King 'Abdullah that Great Britain not only
favored partition, but was also in favor of Transjordan taking over the Arab
areas of Palestine. They also pledged Iraqi support for such a move."
p. 134 -
"It was at this point, however, that the Iraqi government’s attempt to
renegotiate Iraq’s relations with Great Britain came to a violent and
abrupt end in the events known as al-Wathba [the leap] which brought
down Jabr’s government. In January 1948 most Iraqis learnt, to their surprise,
that their government had been secretly negotiating a new Anglo-
Iraqi treaty, the terms of which became known publicly only with its
signature at Portsmouth in January 1948. Great Britain was to withdraw
all its forces from Iraq and hand over the RAF’s two air bases to Iraqi
control. However, a joint defense board of British and Iraqi officials
would oversee Iraq’s military planning, Great Britain would remain Iraq’s
principal military supplier and would be allowed to take over the air bases
again in time of war. Furthermore, this treaty would last until 1973,
fifteen years beyond the expiry date of the treaty it superseded.
The reaction in Iraq was one of outrage, mixed with political opportunism
since most of the government were in Great Britain for the signing
ceremony. Protest marches and demonstrations erupted on the streets of
Baghdad and soon spread to the other cities of Iraq. Although initially
organized against the Portsmouth Treaty, the processions and demonstrations
were used to protest against many features of the Iraqi political
establishment. ... The regent,
who had initially supported the Portsmouth Treaty, took fright and now
declared that he would refuse to endorse it."
Personally, I get the impression that Mohommed Fadhel Jamali's account was a bit self-serving. Jamali's account is a primary source which, as far as its claim about the intention of the British to withdraw at such a speed as to enable Arabs to control the whole of Palestine is concerned, contradicts itself and is contradicted by reliable secondary sources.(preceeding sentence inserted - ←
ZScarpia 17:40, 30 April 2010 (UTC)) ←
ZScarpia
03:01, 28 April 2010 (UTC)
Sorry for rather belated reply, but here's a source:
At the end of December 1947, the [British] Chiefs of Staff had been quite convinced that "in the long run the Jews would not be able to cope with the Arabs and would be thrown out of Palestine unless they came to terms with them. The Arabs would succeed by guerilla activities."[Bevin-CIGS interview, December 22, 1947, E12325, FO 371/61583] Cunningham had also initially been of the opinion that the Arabs would prevail... -- Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers 1945-48 (1982 ISBN 0691053715), p.311.
The London military men and politicians eventually came to a different understanding in 1948, but all the deliberations which led to the British decision to withdraw happened in 1947, when most of them still thought that the Arabs would win... AnonMoos ( talk) 02:30, 16 March 2011 (UTC)
The text currently suggests that Bevin's opposition to Jewish actions in Palestine was "motivated by personal anti-Semitism" This is based on a quotation from Crossman ("(Bernie) had become convinced that the Jews were organising a world conspiracy against poor old Britain and, in particular, against poor old Ernie"), but IMO it is taken out of context. In context, it reads like this:
"Ernest Bevin felt himself unbearably provoked when the Jews wantonly rejected his solution of their problem. The provocation grew when he discovered that the Russians were exploiting the issue against him and, and even worse, the Americans were ganging up with the Russians. Driven by a frightening mixture of anger and violent self-pity, he became convinced that the Jews were organising a world conspiracy against poor old Britain and, in particular, against poor old Ernie. Of course, there were plenty of sound reasons why any British Foreign Secretary at this time would have been angry with Mr. Truman..."
Thus, Crossman is describing Bevin's emotional reaction to a specific, unusually strained moment in the crisis, in which the two other Great Powers, who were each other's main Cold War rivals, seemed to be be uniting against him. Crossman is not describing Bevin's preliminary opinion about the Jews in general, or some kind of principled, ingrained anti-Semitism that he had always held. It cannot be claimed that his conviction (that the Jews were organising a conspiracy), which is cited here as evidence of anti-Semitism, had "motivated" his position in the Palestinian conflict, because this conviction arose only in a certain critical moment in that conflict, when his overall position had already long been a fact. The tense is not past perfect ("had become"), as in the quote in the text, but past simple ("became").
The significance of this quotation is first exaggerated by Sachar, who compares it to the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion", when he does not even have a direct quotation from Bevin but only a very approximate description of Bevin's alleged feelings by Crossman. Still, judging from the available excerpts, even Sachar does not state directly that Bevin was personally anti-Semitic, and he does not venture to claim that a pre-conceived anti-Semitic bias had motivated Bevin's overall position on the Palestinian conflict from the start. These steps are taken by the Wikipedia editor here - and they constitute Original Research.-- 91.148.159.4 ( talk) 23:01, 1 June 2010 (UTC)
The quote is rather grandiose, but I don't see a problem with it in terms of Britain not being a great power. In 1945, the UK was still more powerful than everyone other than the U.S.A. and Soviet Union, and its second-tier status did not fully become clear until 1956... AnonMoos ( talk) 02:18, 7 February 2015 (UTC)
The article already discusses how Britain in the late 1940s and early 1950s expected to continue as a World Power for the foreseeable future, with a huge army and air force, colonies in Africa, client states in the Middle East and military bases in both areas. It was only from the late 1950s/early 1960s that Britain's economic travails really began to be seen as symptomatic of a deeper malaise (the "British disease") rather than merely temporary. Hence (as well as Suez) the reappraisal which began under Macmillan. Paulturtle ( talk) 22:51, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
Added some material on the above, as one of the key things to understand about the 1945-55 era is the degree to which Britain was still trying to be the third superpower and going along with, whilst remaining slightly aloof from, US pressure for West European integration. As for the comments above about the Truman Administration "treating Britain with contempt" over Korea, the USA regarded the Pacific as her own sphere even to the point (during WW2) of pulling off Australia as an ally and putting on the pressure for Indian independence (Richard Thorne Allies of a Kind still remains a classic work on this). The US was glad to receive a division or so of Commonwealth troops but did not take kindly to being told what to do in Korea. British hopes for reciprocal US support in Palestine, Iran and Egypt were largely in vain. Paulturtle ( talk) 16:26, 8 March 2015 (UTC)
Lend Lease and the Atlantic Charter in 1941 marked the end of the UK being a world power as it surrendered its independence and its empire to the United States. Bullock was a very stupid man and as he was a Labour peer his POV is too obviously biased. The reappraisal of the UK's role in world affairs began under Attlee with the independence of India, Burma, Sri Lanka, Israel, Ireland etc and the evacuation from Greece and Iran. (
DelmarAndrews (
talk)
17:53, 15 June 2015 (UTC))
Perhaps it's me but IMO the picture showing his bust looks nothing like him at all. Wouldn't be the slightest surprised if it's a mistake. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.31.250.123 ( talk) 09:56, 25 September 2015 (UTC)
The claim the Israel and Transjordan had reached an agreement not to attack each other is, as far as I can tell, a pet fringe theory promoted by Avi Shlaim, and debunked by multiple other historians (not to mention being clearly false - see Battles of Latrun (1948)). In any case, the statement in the article was not sourced, and I replaced it with a sourced one. It is questionable if any of this even belongs in a biography of Bevin, unless sources are provided to show that he personally participated in the alleged collusion. Bad Dryer ( talk) 15:58, 19 October 2015 (UTC)
Isaac Herzog, leader of the Israeli ZU alliance (i.e. old Israel Labor party) compared Jeremy Corbyn to Bevin, saying: "Corbyn represents a consistent stance of hatred toward Israel, like the infamous Ernest Bevin, and like Bevin, who failed, Corbyn will fail, as well." [4] --- AnonMoos ( talk) 23:15, 2 July 2016 (UTC)
Eden was just as influential as Bevin during his second term as Foreign Secretary during 1951 to 1955. ( 2A00:23C4:6392:3C00:CC0E:E611:D9F8:8ABC ( talk) 14:06, 1 April 2017 (UTC))
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Aneurin Bevan is the only person listed in section # 8 See also (and in an unusual way). Is he listed only because he and Bevin are sometimes confused? Mcljlm ( talk) 18:30, 20 July 2022 (UTC)