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"the truth consists of hard-to-vary assertions about reality is the most important fact about the physical world" -- David Deutsch#Invariants is already cited in the article.
If a thought experiment were to become the basis of a science, it would need to be invariant. That's a high barrier, compared to a real experiment. -- Ancheta Wis (talk | contribs) 15:57, 14 October 2023 (UTC)
The big difference Popper identifies between science and pseudo-science is a difference in attitude. While a pseudo-science is set up to look for evidence that supports its claims, Popper says, science is set up to challenge its claims and look for evidence that might prove it false. In other words, pseudo-science seeks confirmations and science seeks falsifications.
— Janet D. Stemwedel, Scientific American [1]
Binksternet left
a message on my talk page that said: Please do not add commentary, your own point of view, or your own personal analysis to Wikipedia articles, as you did to
Scientific method. Doing so violates Wikipedia's
neutral point of view policy and breaches the formal tone expected in an encyclopedia.
Binksternet's response is puzzling, as it refers to
this edit in which I did not add anything to the article—there is no "commentary" or "personal analysis" to be found!
As for my justification of the removal of the Stemwedel quote from the beginning of the "Overview" section: I said in
the edit summary: science may also seek confirmations—see, e.g., the footnotes in
Critical rationalism#Variations, such as "Producing evidence" (Bunge 1983)
. I will quote the footnote on
Mario Bunge to which I referred:
Critical rationalism (e.g. Popper, 1959) agrees that experience is a test of theories (its only concern) but claims that only negative evidence counts (against), for positive evidence is too easy to come by. True, unsuccessful attempts to refute a theory (or discredit a proposal or an artifact) are more valuable than mere empirical confirmation. However, (a) the most general theories are not refutable, although they are indirectly confirmable by turning them into specific theories upon adjoining them specific hypotheses (Bunge, 1973b); (b) true (or approximately true) predictions are not that cheap, as shown by the predictive barrenness of pseudoscience; (c) positive evidence for the truth of an idea or the efficiency of a proposal, procedure, or artifact, does count: thus the US Food and Drug Administration will rightly demand positive evidence for the efficiency [efficacy] of a drug before permitting its marketing.
Earlier Bunge had argued:
Quite apart from their historical merits, is either of the two criteria [of science—confirmability versus falsifiability] actually satisfied by today's science? Have they withstood four decades of momentous advances in pure and applied science? This is the problem of the present investigation. The outcome of it will be negative: neither confirmability nor refutability is either necessary or sufficient for every single component of science. Nor will any other single trait do: science is too complex an object to be characterizable by a single property.
These quotes from Bunge refute the claim in the Stemwedel quote that "pseudo-science seeks confirmations and science seeks falsifications", which is a far too simplistic characterization of science, as the quotes from Bunge indicate. As I said in
another edit summary reverting the addition of the same quote to another article, the Stemwedel quote seems to conflate
falsifiability as a demarcation criterion with falsifications—a hypothesis can be falsifiable and yet still be confirmed/corroborated, and it's fine for scientists to seek confirmations/corroborations as long as they use sufficiently severe tests
.
Even critical rationalist philosopher John W. N. Watkins emphasized that science involves confirmations/corroborations:
(2) A main component of Popper's methodology was his theory of corroboration (see the concluding chapter and appendix *ix of his [1959]); corroborations are what ultimately govern the rational acceptance of theories. This disappears without trace in Miller's 'restatement'. In his index there are six entries against 'corroboration', five of which refer to places where an author is being quoted or reported. The sixth comes in the course of an examination of my [1984]. I had tried to give a fresh answer to the question, 'Why do corroborations matter?' Miller writes: 'The answer is that corroboration doesn't matter' (p. 120). (3) Popper had a horror of anything like rationality-scepticism. He insisted that a theory's being currently the best corroborated, while not justifying the theory, does justify a preference for it over its rivals. He may not have kept these two kinds of justification as separate as he should have done, but his philosophy allows there to be sufficient reasons for accepting one theory as better than its rivals at the present time.
Or if those quotes aren't sufficient, take Graham Oddie's summary of why falsification without confirmation/corroboration is insufficient:
Pseudoscientific theories (Popper's examples were psychoanalysis and astrology) are replete with 'confirming instances.' Everything that happens appears to confirm them only because they rule nothing out. Popper argued that genuine theories must forever remain conjectures. But science is still rational, because we can submit falsifiable theories to severe tests. If they fail, we weed them out. If they survive? Then we submit them to more tests, until they too fail, as they almost assuredly will. There are three serious problems with falsificationism. First, it does not account for the apparent epistemic value of confirmations. The hardline falsificationist must maintain that the appearance is an illusion. Second, it cannot explain why it is rational to act on the unrefuted theories. Confidence born of experimental success reeks of inductivism. Third, pessimism about the enterprise of science seems obligatory. Although truth is the goal of inquiry, the best we can manage is to pronounce a refuted theory false.
In summary, the Stemwedel quote is not a good summary of scientific method or of demarcation of science from pseudoscience. That is why I removed the quote. Biogeographist ( talk) 23:25, 2 February 2024 (UTC)
References
I iterated this post several times now as I worked through the article (and hopefully managed to make useful changes).
The only question I have remaining is on the general scope of the article. Several sections (Scientific inquiry, Philosophy, and Relationship with mathematics) seem they are very much their own thing and, to me, well-outside the scope of the article.
Are they here simply because of the high article traffic and to give people jumping off points to further reading? And have they been justified previously?
JackTheSecond ( talk) 22:42, 8 March 2024 (UTC)
This 2018 diff shows that the vision for the 'History' section of the article had been to give a brief overview with a link to the article 'History of scientific method'. It has now grown and there should probably be a conversation about what to do with it and the 'Theory' section.
JackTheSecond ( talk) 19:42, 10 March 2024 (UTC)
The further I get into the topic of the article, the more I come around to the idea that the first sentence of the lead section should not read 'empirical' and even more so not 'empirical method'. My arguments are:
The previous (quite high-quality) discussion that added the term was started by User:Markworthen and is archived here: 2018.
What I would change the opening line to (without the brackets):
I like 1 most, because the way Kuhn's definition works allows for other interpretations of it as well—no matter if one's views on it are informed by Dewey, Feyerabend or anyone in between. JackTheSecond ( talk) 23:58, 19 March 2024 (UTC)
Empirical implies empiricism(where empiricism refers to a particular epistemological view opposed to, e.g., rationalism) as JackTheSecond said above. Empirical can refer to the experiential or experimental aspect of a procedure, as opposed to, e.g., guessing or looking up data in an actuarial table. And, again, that empirical aspect is central to what this article is talking about.
Good point - empirical method is imprecise and not consistent with the article as a whole. How about replacing it with scholarly method? Scholarly method is not controversial (I don't think) and is consistent with the article as a whole. Mark D Worthen PsyD (talk) [he/him] 17:37, 20 March 2024 (UTC)
empirical method is imprecise and not consistent with the article as a whole. I was defending the use of the word "empirical", which I consider to be an essential differentiator of science as factual knowledge from purely formal a priori knowledge, on the one hand, and wildly imaginative guessing on the other hand: this article is not primarily about either of the latter two cognitive modes. Scientific method for factual knowledge is more than only empirical, but the empirical is an essential aspect.
Most openly available sources do not actually use 'empirical'. But all of the cited sources use one or more of the terms 'empirical', 'observing', 'observation', 'measurement', 'experiment', which are variations on the same empirical aspect. Biogeographist ( talk) 19:33, 20 March 2024 (UTC)
---
I've gotten around to User:Markworthen's idea of icluding 'scholarly method'. It's a neat way of putting things into context and avoids stating a definitive definition (that doesn't seem to have a scientific consensus anyway). New stab at a complete lead section (kind of deleting Popper; the inclusion seemed unduly selective // potential issue is that the second sentence of the first paragraph might count as copyvio from the (referenced) Stanford Encyclopedia; to me, it seems generic enough not to~):
The scientific method is a scholarly method for acquiring knowledge that has characterized the development of the sciences since at least the 17th century. [a] It is often characterized by systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories. [2]
Although procedures vary from one field of inquiry to another, the underlying process is frequently the same. The process in the scientific method involves making hypothetical explanations, deriving predictions from the hypotheses as logical consequences, and then carrying out experiments or empirical observations based on those predictions. [3]
Though the scientific method is often presented as a fixed sequence of steps, it represents rather a set of general principles. [4] Not all steps take place in every scientific inquiry (nor to the same degree), and they are not always in the same order. [5] [6]
JackTheSecond ( talk) 17:55, 4 April 2024 (UTC)
FWIW some notes on the above conversation:
... which doesn't mention experiments at all; 'the scientific method' as well as 'observation' twice; and is just generally useless. JackTheSecond ( talk) 13:38, 5 April 2024 (UTC)The scientific method is an empirical method for acquiring knowledge that has characterized the development of science since at least the 17th century. The scientific method involves careful observation coupled with rigorous scepticism, because cognitive assumptions can distort the interpretation of the observation.
"The implication of the word is wrong."Sorry, it is how modern English works. We are meant to take that into account. I am a native speaker of English. If I am seeing that implication others will, and so we need another solution.
"you mean 'not all science' in a historical context"Your third bullet is impossible to parse. Can you explain your point please?
not all science is "modern science"and I was clarifying that I had not understood that previous. Doesn't matter, though, since I chose to retire the argument.
it does not define what unites all forms of scientific method. An issue with that is that there is significant disagreement with there being such a thing. But I recognise that you mean that we should write a Wikipedia lead a certain way, and agree with the assessment.
should there really be a "the"?That basically seems to be a lie to children, perhaps harmless if the lack of consensus can be clarified later? Or do a more complicated lead that doesn't try to start with a (too simple) definition, as in the SEP article, which starts by talking about "The study of scientific method...". Biogeographist ( talk) 22:24, 6 April 2024 (UTC)
A possible first sentence for consideration, attempting to avoid jargon or specific controversial positions, at least for the first sentence: Scientific method is any sceptical systematic approach used by scientists, especially modern scientists, when they interpret physical evidence.
--
Andrew Lancaster (
talk) 10:50, 7 April 2024 (UTC)
approach(lets not combine it with sceptical, though); it sets a direction quite nicely. ~ And I think 'systematic' is defendable as well, as just because nobody understands it, doesn't mean that it is not systematic; also the SEP uses it.
The scientific method is a systematic approach used by scientists to investigate phenomena, formulate hypotheses, conduct experiments or observations, analyse data, and draw conclusions. The discussion on how to best advance knowledge has defined the sciences since at least the 17th century,(insert previous note on the scientific revolution) and has at all points in time been subject to debate and disagreement.
Scientific method is any systematic approach used by scientists to try to minimize error and bias when interpreting phenomena, formulating hypotheses, and planning experiments or observations.In this example the bit which covers the sceptical or cautious aspect is the bit I have added about trying to avoid error or bias.-- Andrew Lancaster ( talk) 08:59, 8 April 2024 (UTC)
anyworks fine. Pluralism seems the way to go, from what I've read, anyway. ~ I think you're going way to far with
minimize error and biasthough. The goal of science (and therefore of 'method') is progress, and therefore forward-looking. Trying to minimize error and bias is too self-reflective and implies sitting down and thinking about 'how to do things' not walking ahead and progressing science. We leave the thinking part to the philosophers. (Or us, in their absence...) JackTheSecond ( talk) 10:10, 8 April 2024 (UTC)
Scientific method is the systematic approach used by scientists to investigate phenomena, formulate hypotheses, and draw conclusions. It involves careful characterizations, coupled with rigorous scepticism because cognitive assumptions can distort initial perceptions and compromise the integrity of inferences.
I think we also have to be careful about letting the first sentence become a run on sentence, with lots of bits and pieces added to cover specific talk page issues. Maybe the first sentence should be simpler, in order to help make it easier to cover various points in other sentences. Here is an idea. Scientific method is any systematic approach or
method used to construct and criticize
scientific understandings of
nature.
--
Andrew Lancaster (
talk) 06:20, 10 April 2024 (UTC)
Notes
References
The [philosophical] study of scientific method is the attempt to discern the activities by which [the success of science] is achieved. Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories.
The [philosophical] study of scientific method is the attempt to discern the activities by which [the success of science] is achieved. Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories.
While adding details to a math sub-article in lambda calculus I was surprised to see a note explaining how John Forbes Nash arrived at his Nobel-level result in Nash equilibrium. (Nash's method was to apply the fixpoint concept to game theory. Nash used the Kakutani fixed-point theorem. A Hair whorl is a concrete example of a fixpoint; fixpoints are a feature of lambda calculus, but the meaningful use of fixpoint requires the ability to shift one's ontological level midstream during one's investigation (This can be implemented with lambda calculus' abstraction operator etcetera (The lambda and the dot demarcate the level of discourse about the topic, which is denoted etcetera here). Thus philosophical training (e.g. ethics, ontology, deontology ...) is needed to understand a scientific result (see John Locke's influence on scientific training). I learned this scientific requirement from a comment by Allen Newell (namely that he usually thinks on multiple levels simultaneously). The discussion on this talk page is an illustration of our need to denote the contextual level when we are communicating with each other.
There is a surprising breadth to the Wikipedia corpus, isn't there. (This italicized name was bestowed by the big data websites.) [1]
References
-- Ancheta Wis (talk | contribs) 08:43, 8 April 2024 (UTC)
I propose to include belief revision, defeasible reasoning, and non-monotonic logic in the most recent 'Citation needed' as efns. These are topics in philosophy of logic which are now approachable with advances in formal syntax (meaning type theory). It should be possible to bridge to new contexts this way. So the efns will allow 'work in process' in parallel with the re-write now in process. -- Ancheta Wis (talk | contribs) 23:58, 9 April 2024 (UTC)
References
JackTheSecond, you can remove my lengthy response as appropriate. I learned this from another editor, The Tetrast. American readers might recognize the relationship to Deism (which is not a religion --see Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, Douglas Hume, Freemasonry, etc.). Basarab Nicolescu has another stance/theory. Here is a real-time example for the discovery of like-minded collaborators. -- Ancheta Wis (talk | contribs) 11:26, 11 April 2024 (UTC)
As @
Andrew Lancaster suggested
in this reversion with friendly revert of very bold editing. there is clearly no consensus for this radical change, and it would definitely need discussion first. there is no one canonical method, statistics is not essential to science, empiricism is diffierent from empirical science, etc.
I should make my reasoning for a new way to lead the article clear.
I normally wouldn't have made changes this drastic without prior discussion... but the History section as is stands was unable to defend itself on merit. But even if it was, and even if it does again, I genuinely believe that the history of science is better framed in the examples throughout the text, as useful historic examples coupled with needed inspiration. The history section frames either the discord or the myth of science best; not method. It is therefore best placed with the Philosophy section to frame the discord that continues.
It seems to me as if the history of the 'History' section was that of first growing into a monster before discussion rectified that. It then tried... hard, at not really being a history section at all, before being cut dramatically again. It's now in a bit of a weird state, looking unfinished and with a focus on recent debate.
I also want to argue that anything that is 'current discussion' is not (strictly) history, and would be better covered in context; so should be moved, regardless of the other changes, into the section on 'philosophy' entirely. This would also prevent duplication.
Also, I figure if a lead section on reasoning was good enough for the Principia, it might just work for us as well... JackTheSecond ( talk) 12:37, 12 April 2024 (UTC)
And on the side note of statistics not being essential to science... that's true, and maybe someone could find a better way to word the phrasing there. I do maintain that at least the principles of statistics are important in science; at least important enough to be of import to the public understanding of science, and therefore of relevance to this article. JackTheSecond ( talk) 12:46, 12 April 2024 (UTC)
It might also be useful to my argument to point out that the paragraph of empiricism vs rationalism lead the article before the latest revisions as part of the history sections. And has stood for quite a while as well. My change *looks* quite a bit more radical than it really is.
I took two sources used in the lead but not in the article and expanded on them (Newton and Pierce), I wrote a section on inductive and deductive reasoning, phrasology used quite often throughout the article but unexplained -- the only actually controversial part are the principles of statistics.
Everything else, while likely to not be perfect (and maybe not even that good, what do I know...) is quite in line with what the article already was trying to be.
Sorry, I'm done with my argument now, and confident in it. JackTheSecond ( talk) 15:18, 12 April 2024 (UTC)
the section on predictions currently does not cite any sources, and the SEP article suggests predictions to be a goal of science, not a method as such. Maybe the content there should be moved elsewhere? JackTheSecond ( talk) 20:51, 14 April 2024 (UTC)
Taleb is used in various statements throughout the article. His wikipage indicated he was... a stock-trader? I am sure he writes well, but should his writing as it is used here in context with method be scrutinized as WP:SYNTH? JackTheSecond ( talk) 21:58, 15 April 2024 (UTC)
I want to move the lead image to 'Elements of inquiry#overview' as the diagram features neither reasoning or integrity/truth/objectivity. Since it's a bit of a larger scale change, I thought I'd ask for indications of objections first. JackTheSecond ( talk) 17:30, 23 April 2024 (UTC)
It kind of seems to me that the post-modern arguments and the debate of realism vs anti-realism are both not strictly relevant to this article as well as not at all useful... (*cough* to the article, neutral pov and stuff)
Also, there is a lot of 'the scientific method is this and can be represented as such' in the article, which seems reads a bit too definitive in places (especially as related to the simplified, circular model) ... are there issues with softening that?
2 points, feedback pls :) JackTheSecond ( talk) 18:24, 24 April 2024 (UTC)
This ongoing debate, known as the science wars, is the result of conflicting values and assumptions between the postmodernist and realist camps. Whereas postmodernists assert that scientific knowledge is simply another discourse (this term has special meaning in this context) and not representative of any form of fundamental truth, realists in the scientific community maintain that scientific knowledge does reveal real and fundamental truths about reality. Many books have been written by scientists which take on this problem and challenge the assertions of the postmodernists while defending science as a legitimate method of deriving truth.
that form the base of the scientific method – namely, that reality is objective and consistent, that humans have the capacity to perceive reality accurately, and that rational explanations exist for elements of the real world.
the "theory-laden" character of observationseems fine for example, even if I don't yet understand what exactly is going on there. It's about postpositivism and bias, but who exactly is saying what I haven't bothered overly much with yet.
not as the pursuit of truth per se but as the struggle to move from irritating, inhibitory doubts born of surprises, disagreements, and the like, and to reach a secure belief, the belief being that on which one is prepared to actbtw, which relates the nature of knowledge with the pursuit. JackTheSecond ( talk) 18:47, 24 April 2024 (UTC)
This is the
talk page for discussing improvements to the
Scientific method article. This is not a forum for general discussion of the article's subject. |
Article policies
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Find medical sources: Source guidelines · PubMed · Cochrane · DOAJ · Gale · OpenMD · ScienceDirect · Springer · Trip · Wiley · TWL |
Archives: Index, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23Auto-archiving period: 12 months |
This page is not a forum for general discussion about Scientific method. Any such comments may be removed or refactored. Please limit discussion to improvement of this article. You may wish to ask factual questions about Scientific method at the Reference desk. |
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"the truth consists of hard-to-vary assertions about reality is the most important fact about the physical world" -- David Deutsch#Invariants is already cited in the article.
If a thought experiment were to become the basis of a science, it would need to be invariant. That's a high barrier, compared to a real experiment. -- Ancheta Wis (talk | contribs) 15:57, 14 October 2023 (UTC)
The big difference Popper identifies between science and pseudo-science is a difference in attitude. While a pseudo-science is set up to look for evidence that supports its claims, Popper says, science is set up to challenge its claims and look for evidence that might prove it false. In other words, pseudo-science seeks confirmations and science seeks falsifications.
— Janet D. Stemwedel, Scientific American [1]
Binksternet left
a message on my talk page that said: Please do not add commentary, your own point of view, or your own personal analysis to Wikipedia articles, as you did to
Scientific method. Doing so violates Wikipedia's
neutral point of view policy and breaches the formal tone expected in an encyclopedia.
Binksternet's response is puzzling, as it refers to
this edit in which I did not add anything to the article—there is no "commentary" or "personal analysis" to be found!
As for my justification of the removal of the Stemwedel quote from the beginning of the "Overview" section: I said in
the edit summary: science may also seek confirmations—see, e.g., the footnotes in
Critical rationalism#Variations, such as "Producing evidence" (Bunge 1983)
. I will quote the footnote on
Mario Bunge to which I referred:
Critical rationalism (e.g. Popper, 1959) agrees that experience is a test of theories (its only concern) but claims that only negative evidence counts (against), for positive evidence is too easy to come by. True, unsuccessful attempts to refute a theory (or discredit a proposal or an artifact) are more valuable than mere empirical confirmation. However, (a) the most general theories are not refutable, although they are indirectly confirmable by turning them into specific theories upon adjoining them specific hypotheses (Bunge, 1973b); (b) true (or approximately true) predictions are not that cheap, as shown by the predictive barrenness of pseudoscience; (c) positive evidence for the truth of an idea or the efficiency of a proposal, procedure, or artifact, does count: thus the US Food and Drug Administration will rightly demand positive evidence for the efficiency [efficacy] of a drug before permitting its marketing.
Earlier Bunge had argued:
Quite apart from their historical merits, is either of the two criteria [of science—confirmability versus falsifiability] actually satisfied by today's science? Have they withstood four decades of momentous advances in pure and applied science? This is the problem of the present investigation. The outcome of it will be negative: neither confirmability nor refutability is either necessary or sufficient for every single component of science. Nor will any other single trait do: science is too complex an object to be characterizable by a single property.
These quotes from Bunge refute the claim in the Stemwedel quote that "pseudo-science seeks confirmations and science seeks falsifications", which is a far too simplistic characterization of science, as the quotes from Bunge indicate. As I said in
another edit summary reverting the addition of the same quote to another article, the Stemwedel quote seems to conflate
falsifiability as a demarcation criterion with falsifications—a hypothesis can be falsifiable and yet still be confirmed/corroborated, and it's fine for scientists to seek confirmations/corroborations as long as they use sufficiently severe tests
.
Even critical rationalist philosopher John W. N. Watkins emphasized that science involves confirmations/corroborations:
(2) A main component of Popper's methodology was his theory of corroboration (see the concluding chapter and appendix *ix of his [1959]); corroborations are what ultimately govern the rational acceptance of theories. This disappears without trace in Miller's 'restatement'. In his index there are six entries against 'corroboration', five of which refer to places where an author is being quoted or reported. The sixth comes in the course of an examination of my [1984]. I had tried to give a fresh answer to the question, 'Why do corroborations matter?' Miller writes: 'The answer is that corroboration doesn't matter' (p. 120). (3) Popper had a horror of anything like rationality-scepticism. He insisted that a theory's being currently the best corroborated, while not justifying the theory, does justify a preference for it over its rivals. He may not have kept these two kinds of justification as separate as he should have done, but his philosophy allows there to be sufficient reasons for accepting one theory as better than its rivals at the present time.
Or if those quotes aren't sufficient, take Graham Oddie's summary of why falsification without confirmation/corroboration is insufficient:
Pseudoscientific theories (Popper's examples were psychoanalysis and astrology) are replete with 'confirming instances.' Everything that happens appears to confirm them only because they rule nothing out. Popper argued that genuine theories must forever remain conjectures. But science is still rational, because we can submit falsifiable theories to severe tests. If they fail, we weed them out. If they survive? Then we submit them to more tests, until they too fail, as they almost assuredly will. There are three serious problems with falsificationism. First, it does not account for the apparent epistemic value of confirmations. The hardline falsificationist must maintain that the appearance is an illusion. Second, it cannot explain why it is rational to act on the unrefuted theories. Confidence born of experimental success reeks of inductivism. Third, pessimism about the enterprise of science seems obligatory. Although truth is the goal of inquiry, the best we can manage is to pronounce a refuted theory false.
In summary, the Stemwedel quote is not a good summary of scientific method or of demarcation of science from pseudoscience. That is why I removed the quote. Biogeographist ( talk) 23:25, 2 February 2024 (UTC)
References
I iterated this post several times now as I worked through the article (and hopefully managed to make useful changes).
The only question I have remaining is on the general scope of the article. Several sections (Scientific inquiry, Philosophy, and Relationship with mathematics) seem they are very much their own thing and, to me, well-outside the scope of the article.
Are they here simply because of the high article traffic and to give people jumping off points to further reading? And have they been justified previously?
JackTheSecond ( talk) 22:42, 8 March 2024 (UTC)
This 2018 diff shows that the vision for the 'History' section of the article had been to give a brief overview with a link to the article 'History of scientific method'. It has now grown and there should probably be a conversation about what to do with it and the 'Theory' section.
JackTheSecond ( talk) 19:42, 10 March 2024 (UTC)
The further I get into the topic of the article, the more I come around to the idea that the first sentence of the lead section should not read 'empirical' and even more so not 'empirical method'. My arguments are:
The previous (quite high-quality) discussion that added the term was started by User:Markworthen and is archived here: 2018.
What I would change the opening line to (without the brackets):
I like 1 most, because the way Kuhn's definition works allows for other interpretations of it as well—no matter if one's views on it are informed by Dewey, Feyerabend or anyone in between. JackTheSecond ( talk) 23:58, 19 March 2024 (UTC)
Empirical implies empiricism(where empiricism refers to a particular epistemological view opposed to, e.g., rationalism) as JackTheSecond said above. Empirical can refer to the experiential or experimental aspect of a procedure, as opposed to, e.g., guessing or looking up data in an actuarial table. And, again, that empirical aspect is central to what this article is talking about.
Good point - empirical method is imprecise and not consistent with the article as a whole. How about replacing it with scholarly method? Scholarly method is not controversial (I don't think) and is consistent with the article as a whole. Mark D Worthen PsyD (talk) [he/him] 17:37, 20 March 2024 (UTC)
empirical method is imprecise and not consistent with the article as a whole. I was defending the use of the word "empirical", which I consider to be an essential differentiator of science as factual knowledge from purely formal a priori knowledge, on the one hand, and wildly imaginative guessing on the other hand: this article is not primarily about either of the latter two cognitive modes. Scientific method for factual knowledge is more than only empirical, but the empirical is an essential aspect.
Most openly available sources do not actually use 'empirical'. But all of the cited sources use one or more of the terms 'empirical', 'observing', 'observation', 'measurement', 'experiment', which are variations on the same empirical aspect. Biogeographist ( talk) 19:33, 20 March 2024 (UTC)
---
I've gotten around to User:Markworthen's idea of icluding 'scholarly method'. It's a neat way of putting things into context and avoids stating a definitive definition (that doesn't seem to have a scientific consensus anyway). New stab at a complete lead section (kind of deleting Popper; the inclusion seemed unduly selective // potential issue is that the second sentence of the first paragraph might count as copyvio from the (referenced) Stanford Encyclopedia; to me, it seems generic enough not to~):
The scientific method is a scholarly method for acquiring knowledge that has characterized the development of the sciences since at least the 17th century. [a] It is often characterized by systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories. [2]
Although procedures vary from one field of inquiry to another, the underlying process is frequently the same. The process in the scientific method involves making hypothetical explanations, deriving predictions from the hypotheses as logical consequences, and then carrying out experiments or empirical observations based on those predictions. [3]
Though the scientific method is often presented as a fixed sequence of steps, it represents rather a set of general principles. [4] Not all steps take place in every scientific inquiry (nor to the same degree), and they are not always in the same order. [5] [6]
JackTheSecond ( talk) 17:55, 4 April 2024 (UTC)
FWIW some notes on the above conversation:
... which doesn't mention experiments at all; 'the scientific method' as well as 'observation' twice; and is just generally useless. JackTheSecond ( talk) 13:38, 5 April 2024 (UTC)The scientific method is an empirical method for acquiring knowledge that has characterized the development of science since at least the 17th century. The scientific method involves careful observation coupled with rigorous scepticism, because cognitive assumptions can distort the interpretation of the observation.
"The implication of the word is wrong."Sorry, it is how modern English works. We are meant to take that into account. I am a native speaker of English. If I am seeing that implication others will, and so we need another solution.
"you mean 'not all science' in a historical context"Your third bullet is impossible to parse. Can you explain your point please?
not all science is "modern science"and I was clarifying that I had not understood that previous. Doesn't matter, though, since I chose to retire the argument.
it does not define what unites all forms of scientific method. An issue with that is that there is significant disagreement with there being such a thing. But I recognise that you mean that we should write a Wikipedia lead a certain way, and agree with the assessment.
should there really be a "the"?That basically seems to be a lie to children, perhaps harmless if the lack of consensus can be clarified later? Or do a more complicated lead that doesn't try to start with a (too simple) definition, as in the SEP article, which starts by talking about "The study of scientific method...". Biogeographist ( talk) 22:24, 6 April 2024 (UTC)
A possible first sentence for consideration, attempting to avoid jargon or specific controversial positions, at least for the first sentence: Scientific method is any sceptical systematic approach used by scientists, especially modern scientists, when they interpret physical evidence.
--
Andrew Lancaster (
talk) 10:50, 7 April 2024 (UTC)
approach(lets not combine it with sceptical, though); it sets a direction quite nicely. ~ And I think 'systematic' is defendable as well, as just because nobody understands it, doesn't mean that it is not systematic; also the SEP uses it.
The scientific method is a systematic approach used by scientists to investigate phenomena, formulate hypotheses, conduct experiments or observations, analyse data, and draw conclusions. The discussion on how to best advance knowledge has defined the sciences since at least the 17th century,(insert previous note on the scientific revolution) and has at all points in time been subject to debate and disagreement.
Scientific method is any systematic approach used by scientists to try to minimize error and bias when interpreting phenomena, formulating hypotheses, and planning experiments or observations.In this example the bit which covers the sceptical or cautious aspect is the bit I have added about trying to avoid error or bias.-- Andrew Lancaster ( talk) 08:59, 8 April 2024 (UTC)
anyworks fine. Pluralism seems the way to go, from what I've read, anyway. ~ I think you're going way to far with
minimize error and biasthough. The goal of science (and therefore of 'method') is progress, and therefore forward-looking. Trying to minimize error and bias is too self-reflective and implies sitting down and thinking about 'how to do things' not walking ahead and progressing science. We leave the thinking part to the philosophers. (Or us, in their absence...) JackTheSecond ( talk) 10:10, 8 April 2024 (UTC)
Scientific method is the systematic approach used by scientists to investigate phenomena, formulate hypotheses, and draw conclusions. It involves careful characterizations, coupled with rigorous scepticism because cognitive assumptions can distort initial perceptions and compromise the integrity of inferences.
I think we also have to be careful about letting the first sentence become a run on sentence, with lots of bits and pieces added to cover specific talk page issues. Maybe the first sentence should be simpler, in order to help make it easier to cover various points in other sentences. Here is an idea. Scientific method is any systematic approach or
method used to construct and criticize
scientific understandings of
nature.
--
Andrew Lancaster (
talk) 06:20, 10 April 2024 (UTC)
Notes
References
The [philosophical] study of scientific method is the attempt to discern the activities by which [the success of science] is achieved. Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories.
The [philosophical] study of scientific method is the attempt to discern the activities by which [the success of science] is achieved. Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories.
While adding details to a math sub-article in lambda calculus I was surprised to see a note explaining how John Forbes Nash arrived at his Nobel-level result in Nash equilibrium. (Nash's method was to apply the fixpoint concept to game theory. Nash used the Kakutani fixed-point theorem. A Hair whorl is a concrete example of a fixpoint; fixpoints are a feature of lambda calculus, but the meaningful use of fixpoint requires the ability to shift one's ontological level midstream during one's investigation (This can be implemented with lambda calculus' abstraction operator etcetera (The lambda and the dot demarcate the level of discourse about the topic, which is denoted etcetera here). Thus philosophical training (e.g. ethics, ontology, deontology ...) is needed to understand a scientific result (see John Locke's influence on scientific training). I learned this scientific requirement from a comment by Allen Newell (namely that he usually thinks on multiple levels simultaneously). The discussion on this talk page is an illustration of our need to denote the contextual level when we are communicating with each other.
There is a surprising breadth to the Wikipedia corpus, isn't there. (This italicized name was bestowed by the big data websites.) [1]
References
-- Ancheta Wis (talk | contribs) 08:43, 8 April 2024 (UTC)
I propose to include belief revision, defeasible reasoning, and non-monotonic logic in the most recent 'Citation needed' as efns. These are topics in philosophy of logic which are now approachable with advances in formal syntax (meaning type theory). It should be possible to bridge to new contexts this way. So the efns will allow 'work in process' in parallel with the re-write now in process. -- Ancheta Wis (talk | contribs) 23:58, 9 April 2024 (UTC)
References
JackTheSecond, you can remove my lengthy response as appropriate. I learned this from another editor, The Tetrast. American readers might recognize the relationship to Deism (which is not a religion --see Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, Douglas Hume, Freemasonry, etc.). Basarab Nicolescu has another stance/theory. Here is a real-time example for the discovery of like-minded collaborators. -- Ancheta Wis (talk | contribs) 11:26, 11 April 2024 (UTC)
As @
Andrew Lancaster suggested
in this reversion with friendly revert of very bold editing. there is clearly no consensus for this radical change, and it would definitely need discussion first. there is no one canonical method, statistics is not essential to science, empiricism is diffierent from empirical science, etc.
I should make my reasoning for a new way to lead the article clear.
I normally wouldn't have made changes this drastic without prior discussion... but the History section as is stands was unable to defend itself on merit. But even if it was, and even if it does again, I genuinely believe that the history of science is better framed in the examples throughout the text, as useful historic examples coupled with needed inspiration. The history section frames either the discord or the myth of science best; not method. It is therefore best placed with the Philosophy section to frame the discord that continues.
It seems to me as if the history of the 'History' section was that of first growing into a monster before discussion rectified that. It then tried... hard, at not really being a history section at all, before being cut dramatically again. It's now in a bit of a weird state, looking unfinished and with a focus on recent debate.
I also want to argue that anything that is 'current discussion' is not (strictly) history, and would be better covered in context; so should be moved, regardless of the other changes, into the section on 'philosophy' entirely. This would also prevent duplication.
Also, I figure if a lead section on reasoning was good enough for the Principia, it might just work for us as well... JackTheSecond ( talk) 12:37, 12 April 2024 (UTC)
And on the side note of statistics not being essential to science... that's true, and maybe someone could find a better way to word the phrasing there. I do maintain that at least the principles of statistics are important in science; at least important enough to be of import to the public understanding of science, and therefore of relevance to this article. JackTheSecond ( talk) 12:46, 12 April 2024 (UTC)
It might also be useful to my argument to point out that the paragraph of empiricism vs rationalism lead the article before the latest revisions as part of the history sections. And has stood for quite a while as well. My change *looks* quite a bit more radical than it really is.
I took two sources used in the lead but not in the article and expanded on them (Newton and Pierce), I wrote a section on inductive and deductive reasoning, phrasology used quite often throughout the article but unexplained -- the only actually controversial part are the principles of statistics.
Everything else, while likely to not be perfect (and maybe not even that good, what do I know...) is quite in line with what the article already was trying to be.
Sorry, I'm done with my argument now, and confident in it. JackTheSecond ( talk) 15:18, 12 April 2024 (UTC)
the section on predictions currently does not cite any sources, and the SEP article suggests predictions to be a goal of science, not a method as such. Maybe the content there should be moved elsewhere? JackTheSecond ( talk) 20:51, 14 April 2024 (UTC)
Taleb is used in various statements throughout the article. His wikipage indicated he was... a stock-trader? I am sure he writes well, but should his writing as it is used here in context with method be scrutinized as WP:SYNTH? JackTheSecond ( talk) 21:58, 15 April 2024 (UTC)
I want to move the lead image to 'Elements of inquiry#overview' as the diagram features neither reasoning or integrity/truth/objectivity. Since it's a bit of a larger scale change, I thought I'd ask for indications of objections first. JackTheSecond ( talk) 17:30, 23 April 2024 (UTC)
It kind of seems to me that the post-modern arguments and the debate of realism vs anti-realism are both not strictly relevant to this article as well as not at all useful... (*cough* to the article, neutral pov and stuff)
Also, there is a lot of 'the scientific method is this and can be represented as such' in the article, which seems reads a bit too definitive in places (especially as related to the simplified, circular model) ... are there issues with softening that?
2 points, feedback pls :) JackTheSecond ( talk) 18:24, 24 April 2024 (UTC)
This ongoing debate, known as the science wars, is the result of conflicting values and assumptions between the postmodernist and realist camps. Whereas postmodernists assert that scientific knowledge is simply another discourse (this term has special meaning in this context) and not representative of any form of fundamental truth, realists in the scientific community maintain that scientific knowledge does reveal real and fundamental truths about reality. Many books have been written by scientists which take on this problem and challenge the assertions of the postmodernists while defending science as a legitimate method of deriving truth.
that form the base of the scientific method – namely, that reality is objective and consistent, that humans have the capacity to perceive reality accurately, and that rational explanations exist for elements of the real world.
the "theory-laden" character of observationseems fine for example, even if I don't yet understand what exactly is going on there. It's about postpositivism and bias, but who exactly is saying what I haven't bothered overly much with yet.
not as the pursuit of truth per se but as the struggle to move from irritating, inhibitory doubts born of surprises, disagreements, and the like, and to reach a secure belief, the belief being that on which one is prepared to actbtw, which relates the nature of knowledge with the pursuit. JackTheSecond ( talk) 18:47, 24 April 2024 (UTC)