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(part one of the Japanese plan having been successful just six months earlier at Pearl Harbor)

This is misleading, as it makes Midway seem like part of a one-two punch, along with Pearl Harbor. The reality is, the Japanese failed to destroy the American carrier fleet at Pearl Harbor (and more generally, to neutralize American naval power in the Pacific), and because of this failure they had to come back and try again.

The attack on Midway was part one of a much larger plan. Part two was the invasion and conquest of Hawaii. The Japanese carriers were sailing ahead of troop transports filled with (I believe) 100,000 Japanese troops. They were all expecting to be landing on Hawaii very soon, once the US carriers were out of the way and the islands defenceless. This is all in Walter Lord's masterful book Incredible Victory, but it is surprisingly absent in almost every account of the Battle of Midway you will see (including ours - I'd do something about this but I don't have handy Lord's book or anything equivalent to reference). -- user:TimShell - 10 Aug 2004

Well, no. IJA didn't have the manpower or shipping to take & occupy, let alone supply, Hawaii. It was a persistent fantasy of Yamamoto's. See Hawaii under the Rising Sun, for instance. Trekphiler 14:59, 12 December 2005 (UTC)

It is today's feature artcle and is being constantly vandalised. Could we get a lock please? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 199.172.246.196 ( talk • contribs)

See Talk:Battle of Midway#Page has been vandalised below. DrKiernan 11:53, 7 June 2007 (UTC)

Midway was the first purely carrier battle.

I do believe that statement could be applied to either Battle of Taranto (November, 1940) or Battle of the Coral Sea (May, 1942), obviously both of which predate the Battle of Midway. →Raul654 09:40, Feb 8, 2004 (UTC)

Taranto was a raid on a port from a carrier. This was nothing new. The RNAS carried out raids from carriers as far back as WW1. The first carrier vs carrier battle was indeed the Battle of the Coral Sea, as Raul suggests. This was before Midway. Tannin 10:37, 8 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Mention is made in the article of the possibility of the United States suing for peace in the event of the destruction of the American pacific fleet and the occupation of Hawaii. This is exceedingly unlikely due to a large number of factors. First the American people were incensed by the attacks on Pearl Harbor and wouldnt have acquiesed to capitulation. More importantly the United States had enormously greater military potential than Japan. It could have built a continental land Army in the tens of millions which would have made any invasion by Japan impossible. Even discounting its overwhelming superiority as a land power in North America, the US could have protected its west coast from attack through the use of long range air power until such time as naval forces were constructed in California or elsewhere with which the Japanese Navy could not hope to cope. Any history of WW2 in the pacific should begin and end with the question of why Japan attacked a power many times its size. Japan of the 1930-40s was a mostly agrarian power and, although possessed of reasonably high quality military industries, was simply not capable of engineering a victory over the fairly mature industrial economy of the United States.

Will McElgin 9/14/04

I'm inclined to agree with the anon above - the Japanese *hoped* the US would sue for peace, but realistically, it wasn't going to happen. Yamamato, who had himself had lived and travelled in the US for some years, realized the US would never sue for peace. He realized it on the day of the Pearl Harbor attack, upon being informed that the envoys had been late delivering the war declaration, and that the attack came as a suprise (Hence, his "I fear we have awakened a sleeping Giant, and filled him with a terrible resolve" comment). He knew the national outrage over the attack would never allow the US to sue for peace. →Raul654 07:21, Sep 14, 2004 (UTC)

I have changed the discussion of Japanese prospects for achieving their strategic objectives in the Pacific back to what it was when I last edited it on 9/14/04. There is certainly some significant controversy about Japanese objectives but there is very little doubt about their prospects for victory. The Japanese attack on the US was a huge strategic blunder (see my comments above) which made a catastrophe for Japan inevitable unless Germany could quickly secure a defeat of both Russia and Britain. To suggest that the US would have sued for peace, given its overwhelming industrial superiority and its immense anger and disdain toward Japan, due to an attack that was by no means crippling of American strategic potential is just a huge distortion. It would have run totally counter to American self conceptions and centuries of behavior of other nations in similar situations. It was the Japanese attack itself that was the anomaly; a weaker power attacking a clearly stronger one is quite rare in history. I wont persist in this effort if people insist upon reinserting this distortion but at least I have tried to correct it twice.

Will McElgin 10/02/04

Let me just say that the IJN wasn't really calling the shots in 1941. *They* knew if things went well, which they were duty-bound to effect, they could only hold off the USN for a year or three, but the army was full of piss and vinegar and knew it could defeat any force (other than the Russians perhaps) that could ship itself into the theatre. And to a large extent that was true. The IJA underestimated the logistical difficulties of empire and got bloodied in the various island fights, but these were largely IJN shows... the IJA's focus was still on China and the newly-won southern resource areas. In 1944 and 1945 the introduction of the B-29 into the theatre and the change of tactics to firebombing Japanese cities changed the rules on the IJA and their plans for home defense became rather inoperative.

There is an error in the third paragraph of the section entitled "Before the Battle". In this paragraph, it states that Yamomoto was on board the Yamata in the southern Aleutians. This last bit is clearly in error, because the Yamata and the rest of the main battle group with Yamomoto was located several hundred miles to the west of Midway. This reference to the southern Aleutians should be corrected.

Yamato.-- 131.238.92.62 09:45, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

I added a small section discussing Robert D. Ballard's effort to locate the sunken ships from the Battle of Midway.

I removed this paragraph:

An example of the difference in fighting orders between the American and Japanese navies was evident in that while Admirals Fletcher and Spruance commanded their groups from the carriers, Admiral Yamamoto was safe, impregnable - and impotent - on the heavily armored deck of Yamato, hundreds of miles away in the southern Aleutians. Fletcher and Spruance changed their battle plans on the fly (especially when the loss of Yorktown cost Fletcher his flagship and placed full command of the mission on Spruance, whose flag was in Enterprise), while Yamamoto was locked into his. The fluidity of carrier battle in the Pacific in 1942 favored the Americans and their on-the-scene command style.

This seems rather biased to me. (1) The Japanese were in fact able to change their plans during the battle (preparing to make second strike on Midway, for example). (2) The on-the-scene command style almost led to disaster for the Americans at Leyte Gulf. (3) The Japanese counterpart to Fletcher and Spruance was surely Nagumo (present at the battle), not Yamamoto. Please comment. Gdr 12:21, 2004 Nov 8 (UTC)

Shows the hazards of amateur analysis. If there's a historian Foo who says this, then it's a "according to Foo, ..." and we can take it as one of several intrepretations. There are plenty of authorities whose analyses we can (and should) quote, shouldn't be inventing our own. Stan 16:21, 8 Nov 2004 (UTC)

It's half right. Yamamoto was out of touch of his lead elements because he didn't dare compromise radio silence. Nimitz could & did keep Fletcher (SOPA) in the pic from HI, as Yamamoto should have been doing. Nagumo's "on the fly" decision was based on bad intel, the product of Yamamoto's incompetent starting dispositions: all the cruiser scout planes were covering his heavies, denying their eyes to Nagumo, who desperately needed them--which is precisely why he got caught with birds on deck. Trekphiler 12:46, 12 December 2005 (UTC)

Quoted from article: Having scored a decisive victory, American forces retired. The loss of four carriers stopped the expansion of the Japanese Empire in the Pacific, and put Japan on the defensive. It had been six months to the day since the attack on Pearl Harbor. Admiral Yamamoto had predicted to his superiors that Japan would prevail for only six months to a year against the United States, after which American resources would begin to overwhelm the Japanese Navy. He had been exactly correct. This was good.

I'm removing the comment emphasised. This is as non-neutral as it gets. nihil 20:14, 25 Apr 2005 (UTC)

A new section on Midways's overall impact. Sparten

I just did some copyediting on this interesting new section. I can't claim to be a great expert on this battle, so I have to wonder if perhaps much of this is your own original analysis? If so, then regardless of how insightful it might be, it's contrary to official policy and needs to go. Could you possibly provide a reference? Csernica 05:44, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC)

This is not original reserch. This is based on the analysis placed on the Battle by Theodore F Cook Jr, which he wrote for the book "What if". In it he wrote about a Japanese Victory at Midway and its results on the war. He wrote this as an analysis of what a victory would have ment acedemically (not a counter-factual history as written by some authors). These are his conclusions. I have read that book and the particular article a dozen times and can almost quote it from memory. I had misplaced the original, so could not provide a reference, but have since gone and bought a new one. I have added the reference. ISBN  0330487248,plz check this on Amazon, and on the "further reading" section

Sparten

Excellent. Thank you. Csernica 06:36, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Nonsense. If that's your source, you need to redefine what you call history. Cowley is a collection of counterfactuals. And Cook's is fantastic, not accurate. I've read it. Trekphiler 15:05, 12 December 2005 (UTC)

I've added a sentence to the effect that a defeat at Midway might have put so much political presssure on FDR that the "Germany First" priority might've been challenged. -- Andersonblog 03:20, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

Could they have mounted a successful assault against the Hawaiian Islands? It took them four months to beat a polygot American infantry division in the Phillipenes, without adequate supply.

I edited the final paragraphs, because I don't feel comfortable about the inclusion of long term strategic hypotheticals. They are also factually inaccurate, since the IJA had no plans to invade Hawaii should the Midway operation had succeeded; also, the US Navy had two additional carriers in the Pacific, not one, and another one operating in the Atlantic--the USS Ranger--which would have certainly been transferred to the pacific had the Americans lost catastrophically at Midway.

Please read the book I reffered to. The Japanese did have plans to invade Hawaii, if they won Midway. Yamamoto's aide was the man responsible for planning. In anycase the Americans would have given up Hawaii as a bad job, at least for the time being. USS Ranger was too small. Yamamoto had planned that to win the war, they would have to capture Hawaii and destroy Panama.

Finally

Remember the Part about "No original research?."

I am trying to keep this discussion real, not an exercise in counterfact which ignores the logistical difficulties the Japanese army and Navy suffered under.

I recommend the book "Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan" by Mitsuo Fuchida & Masatake Okumiya. It is an in-depth discussion of the battle, its plans and objectives by two Japanese naval aviators who were privy to the plans and personalities involved. They mention nothing about a hawaiian invasion.

I also recommend that you look at the US Army order of battle for the hawaiian islands in August, 1942.

Fuchida & Okumiya let Yamamoto off the hook & hang Scout 4, per the Japanese line; I had a history prof parroting it. Not unbiased. See Wilmott (cited in the article & below). Trekphiler 15:09, 12 December 2005 (UTC)

Fuchida's "Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan" is terribly flawed. According to recent research ("Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway", Parshall & Tully, 2005), it is full of outright lies and half-truths. Among the most glaring "inaccuracies" is the bit about the "fateful five minutes": Fuchida says all four carriers had a strike spotted, on deck and ready to take off. The first couple of fighters take off, and then the carriers get hit by dive-bombers, when five minutes could have changed history. The truth is that none of the carriers had anything on deck except a few CAP fighters taking off or landing. They were at least 45 minutes from getting a strike off. There are numerous other falsehoods and distortions carefully dissected by Parshall & Tully.-- Shyland 22:43, 27 October 2006 (UTC)

It didn't make any difference. Fletcher's strike birds were already on the way. Nagumo had to hit him before he launched to win. Trekphiler 10:01, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

I made a pass through the Battle section, fixing various inaccuracies. This could still use some more editing; I have a lot more respect for historical writers now!

I also edited out the conclusions about Hawaii being abandoned, the Panama canal being closed, the Manhattan project being shelved, and the Pacific campaign being stopped all due to the hypothetical Japanese victory... Sheer idiocy. Japan didn't have the oil or fleet oilers to do much of anything, OK? Japan trying to take and hold Hawaii (with what army???) would have ended the war quicker, given the relative logistics advantages the US enjoyed there.

I used to think it was that simple, too. I've seen extensive debate in a newsgroup suggesting it wasn't. Could IJA have taken HI? In their dreams. Would it have been a bonanza for the U.S. if they had? Probably not. Would the war have been longer? Maybe. (That's "original research" territory.) Trekphiler 15:12, 12 December 2005 (UTC)

From the "orphaned" references and purple prose, and from the way that sections have been placed without regard to existing text, it would seem that much of this article has been lifted from other sources without attribution. I agree with the previous poster that it needs work, which I've done; but more is needed. Others, please lend a hand. This should be just as well done as the Pearl Harbor article.
— J M Rice 06:12, 15 August 2005 (UTC)

I removed the line about Yamamoto's attack plan being bold and ingenious. He divided his forces in a failed diversionary attempt, and thus lost the battle. It couldn't have been that ingenious.

Well, theoretically it was ingenious. An ingenious plan can still fail. With luck Yamamoto's might have succeeded. If you happened to agree with this POV, I bet you'd have left it alone. ;-)

Anyway, the kind of editorializing you've flagged again suggests that the article was lifted from another source without attribution. From all the descriptive language, sounds like it came from a popular history. — J M Rice 22:18, 15 August 2005 (UTC)

Theoretically it was ingenious. Factually, it was overcomplicated & stupid. The dispositions were plain wrong, & success didn't depend on luck, it depended (as it often did in IJN planning) on the U.S. doing exactly what was expected. If anything else (such as IJN submarines being late because Yamamoto was in an infernal hurry, & so missing the sorite of U.S. carriers) happened, the plan falls apart. It did. See Wilmott, Barrier & the Javelin. Trekphiler 12:53, 12 December 2005 (UTC)

The division of forces was a violation of one of the basic principles of war, mass.-- 131.238.92.62 09:50, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

Well when you had already lost superiority what can you do except of being "creative" ? Ericd 20:52, 25 May 2006 (UTC)

How about "not stupid"? Yamamoto, per doctrine, led with his carriers & held his heavies back, heavies which were better for destroying island installations & would have been next to immune to U.S. air attack from Midway. Leave Nagumo's CVs for roving & air cover, hammer the island for a day or so, then walk ashore. Or, better still, invade Fiji & Samoa, cut LOC to Oz, & get MacArthur relegated to PR duty in Canberra & USN submarines withdrawn to Pearl. Both will hasten Japan's defeat...but Yamamoto couldn't know that. Trekphiler 13:05, 15 February 2007 (UTC)

Yamamoto kept the heavies back & led with his carriers (scouts), per doctrine. (Nobody I've read suggests BBs screen CVs.) Had he put his battleships in front, he could have pounded Midway's installations with little risk from air attack, leaving Nagumo to rove & cover him. With all the cruisers' VSs (denied Nagumo in the event), he'd also have found Fletcher in time to strike before Fletcher's birds turned his carriers into funeral pyres. Trekphiler 23:46, 16 February 2007 (UTC) (P.S. I lifted this from the Yamamoto page.)

I rewrote the intel section. Jasper's plan didn't call for a message en clair (tho it's often rendered as such) but in a compromised cypher (probably 1 captured at Wake). Trekphiler 12:55, 12 December 2005 (UTC)

It seems to me the following needs rewriting:

"Meanwhile, as a result of their participation in the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese aircraft carrier Zuikaku was laid up, at Truk in the Caroline Islands, waiting for an air group to be brought to her to replace her decimated planes, while the lightly damaged Shōkaku was awaiting repairs. One has to wonder how the battle would have unfolded if the Japanese had not assumed that the United States would be sending only the Enterprise and Hornet, to meet Sōryū, Hiryū, Akagi and Kaga. Also, although Yamamoto had a large superiority in surface ships overall, he did not commit all his forces to the battle. As a result, only the Japanese carrier force engaged the U.S., while several other detachments, including key battleships and cruisers, did not see combat."

It smacks of POV, contains the questionable claim Japan assumed 2 carriers & the implication Yamamoto's surface forces made any difference, while overlooking the flawed dispositions (by now a familiar refrain). "One has to wonder" is an inappropriate tone. And it misses a fundamental fact of inadequate IJN recon of Midway before Nagumo's first wave launched, & the role of Midway's PBYs. Something about navy doctrine should probably be said, too; Yamamoto's plan of attack at Midway was in keeping with that of every major navy at the time (& at odds with his myth as the "brilliant carrier pioneer"), leading with the carriers (scouts), holding his heavies back for the "decisive battle". Only naval war had changed, & it was carriers that were decisive, now.

Also, something should be said to Yorktown; a "virtual wreck" she wasn't, tho often believed to be. In fact, her damage was not so severe as that, tho it was serious; her hull was mainly intact, & they got her flight deck & lifts working, which was what mattered. Trekphiler 13:41, 12 December 2005 (UTC)

I deleted this:

"It had been six months to the day since the attack on Pearl Harbor. Admiral Yamamoto had predicted to his superiors that Japan would prevail for only six months to a year against the United States, after which American resources would begin to overwhelm the Japanese Navy. He had been exactly correct. American industrial output was greater than the combined Japanese and German industrial output. Nonetheless American victory was never inevitable; only probable."

It smacks of POV, & its tone is inappropriate for an encyclopedia.

I also deleted this:

"The true importance of the Battle of Midway can be assessed by examining the counter-factual of assuming the destruction of the US aircraft carrier fleet. The United States would likely have had to devote much greater resources to rebuilding their aircraft carrier fleet, possibly delaying amphibious operations in the Mediterranean and at Normandy. Some feel that technological advances in other areas, such as the Manhattan Project, may also have been impacted by the necessity of reforming naval power in the Pacific, perhaps increasing the length of the war by years or even preventing the unconditional surrender of Japan."

While interesting, it is speculation, which has no place in an encyclopedia. It is nothing like a settled issue, even amongst those who've studied it (& I've seen extensive exchanges in newsgroups on it, not even counting professional historiography). Sounds like the writer's on a soapbox. Trekphiler 14:50, 12 December 2005 (UTC)

I rewrote this:

"full command of the battle—and ultimate credit for its victory—passed from Admiral Fletcher, into the hands of Admiral Spruance."

Fletcher was still senior officer; credit was still his. Afterward, when described as "victor at Midway", Spruance by tradition (& to his eternal credit) denied it, granting the honor to Fletcher. Trekphiler 14:33, 12 December 2005 (UTC)

It needs an intelligent re-write. Spruance won the battle despite Fletcher's lack of coherent effort. Good peace admiral, terrible war admiral.-- 131.238.92.62 09:54, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

•   Fletcher commanded the entire Battle of Midway on June 4th in which all four enemy carriers were sunk. His flagship was badly damaged in the engagement and he passed command to Spruance at dusk as the US fleet retired for the night. The next day Spruance sank a lingering cruiser as Fletcher tried to salvage Yorktown. A submarine put her under and Fletcher's shutout game became a 4:1 victory. With a life-time record (6-months) of sinking six enemy carriers for the loss of two, and done with the remnants of a depression error fleet while outnumber 10 to four, makes Fletcher the greatest admiral of the 20th Century. His successors lost two carriers in a few weeks for no gain. The more famous admirals late in the war had over a hundred carriers and could not lose. Fletcher should have lost, but didn't.

"With a life-time record (6-months) of sinking six enemy carriers for the loss of two, and done with the remnants of a depression error fleet while outnumber 10 to four, makes Fletcher the greatest admiral of the 20th Century." In your dreams. Fletcher had no guts, or he wouldn't have run away at Guadalcanal. You don't make a career on 1 battle. Spruance got it right at Midway & again at Saipan (?); had he been at Leyte instead of Halsey, he'd have destroyed Mikawa & Ozawa & won the greatest naval victory in history (until "DS9", anyhow). Trekphiler 01:35, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

There's a new book that's just come out called " Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway" that basically says we've got the history of it all wrong: The US did not triumph against overwhelming odds, the Aleutians Operation was not a diversion, the Japanese airplanes were not sitting on deck loaded with fuel and bombs, and Japan's aviators were not wiped out during the battle. Apologies if this sounds like a teaser or like spam, but I got the book for Christmas and it appears to be very-well researched (It focuses more on Japanese carrier doctrine and flight logs than on memoirs to reach its conclusions). I'd put more down but I've got several projects going already, but I thought you all should know. Palm_Dogg 01:06, 29 December 2005 (UTC)

The strength field in the infobox should probably list the number of planes deployed by both sides. Fornadan (t) 14:37, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

I'm likely to make some corrections to the main page based on Tony Tully and my research for "Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway." I'll try not to be too heavy-handed or oaf-like!  ;-) -jon parshall-

• JP, be as heavy-handed as you like. I was going to do the same thing eventually. BTW, am a big fan of your book and website. If you're thinking of doing some serious editing, I'd suggest that you only use Shattered Sword as a reference for the new research and stick to other works like Incredible Victory or The Nagumo Report just for variety in the bibliography. Are you and Tully ever getting out to Washington DC? Palm_Dogg 18:16, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

Hey Dogg, well I was heavier handed than I intended, but that's how it went. Thanks for the kind comments on the book. I'd like to offer to you, and anyone with questions/comments about the edits I made, to feel free to contact me directly at jonp@combinedfleet.com. As for DC, yeah, that's likely--dunno when, though. Tony and I just spoke last week at the Pritzker Military History Library (www.pritzkermilitarylibrary.org), and you can view the webcast of the talk from their site if you get yourself a login. Just an FYI.

2.15.2006 I updated the air strength information with new figuress from Shattered Sword. It may be too much detail; I dunno. I don't want to do an actual OB here, but I also wanted to be thorough with the aircraft types. I won't be heartbroken if someone decides to condense what I've done.

Speaking of OBs, someone (probably not me) is going to need to retrofit the OB inforamtion in Shattered Sword into the Wikipedia "Midway Order of Battle" page at some point. We made *many* corrections to the Japanese OB for the book that supersede the older OBs found in books like Fuchida's or Prange's. But I just don't have the gumption to tackle that at the moment--typesetting the OB in "Shattered Sword" was the nearest thing to the Chinese water torture that I've ever had to endure.

• There's an image in your book of the Hiryū launching Kobayashi's strike during the battle, which I believe you claim is the only picture of Japanese carriers launching aircraft during the battle. If it's not copyrighted, would you mind uploading it? Palm_Dogg 21:07, 15 February 2006 (UTC)

It is copyright, and I had to give up a couple of body parts to get ahold of it, unfortunately. I don't want to burn bridges in Japan, as it was very difficult (as in, multiple bottles of Maalox, and not a few stiff shots of gin)(not to mention probably the need for therapy) to get photo perms outta Japan. So as much as I'd like to, I'm gonna pass. It is a cool picture, though. Cheers, JP

Meanwhile, as a result of their participation in the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese aircraft carrier Zuikaku was in port in Kure (near Hiroshima), waiting for an air group to be brought to her to replace her destroyed planes, while the heavily damaged Shōkaku wagroup, the Japanese made no serious attempt to get her into the forthcoming battle

2.24.2006 I have reverted to an earlier version of my description of the aviator losses. The notion that Midway's aviator losses somehow represented a "year's worth" of "pilots" for the Japanese is utterly fallacious. Now, it *is* true that pre-war Japanese pilot training programs had only cranked out a few hundred *pilots* (as distinct from "aviators", which are pilots, navigator/observer, and any other aircrew), but even by the time of Midway that picture was changing radically. The Japanese had already instituted the "ko" and "otsu" supplemental training classes for high school students, and were gearing up their mainline programs as well. Remember, Japan lost *50,000* aircraft during the course of the war, the majority of which were manned at the time of their loss. Granted, the late-war pilots weren't very good, but the point is that the Japanese were eventually able to address their pilot production issues, and actually cranked out a lot of pilots (not to mention aviators in general). That process was already underway by the time of Midway. Thus, applying a pre-war statistic for *pilot* losses to the *aviator* losses at Midway is misleading in two different dimensions, and must be corrected.

-jon parshall-

• JP. Going to spare you some future agony and grief. People will keep reverting to the "popular" history of Midway unless you give them a reason not to. I would suggest checking out the Featured article Polish September Campaign; near the bottom they have a section called "Myths" where they talk about similar misconceptions that most people regard as facts. Have to apologize, since I was going to add your Shattered Sword "Myths of Midway" to the page, but have been detained on other articles. Palm_Dogg 21:12, 24 February 2006 (UTC)

2.25.2006 Oh, I knew that going in, of course.  ;-) You can't change the mythology of a battle this important overnight. But I'm in a unique position. Since I've literally re-written the book on this particular battle, I figure I ought to be able to argue my points fairly effectively. But I know, too, that people don't necessarily read the Discussion before they go edit. They just edit, and a lot of them are going to edit on the basis of the conventional wisdom, because that's all they've read (so far). So I knew that the nature of the medium meant that this would be a slow, iterative process. That's cool. I'm good with it.

-jon parshall-

3.10.2006 I added the passage in question. High school students may have made good losses in terms of numbers (look at the Battle of the Philipine Sea; no shortage of Japanese aircraft) but they could never make up for the loss of quality. The pre-war IJN chose a strategy of quality over quantity: a small pool of exceptional pilots and air crew. The loss of so many in one day was a much greater blow than you are prepared to give credit for. Pilots and aircrew who had taken a full year to train, were seasoned combat veterans and represented the elite of the navy, were gone. As you point out, in the battles for Guadalcanal, the remaining pool of pre-war pilots were ground down in a war of attrition. Your book makes the point that the Japanese training programs, although able to produce sufficient quanitity, were never able to produce good quality. That was my point, and I believe it still holds true. I've rewritten and reinserted that paragraph and trust that it has been made more clear.

-Michael Lyle-

3.15.2006 Nice rewrite, Michael; I do think that's clearer. Thanks very much for putting up with my nitpickiness.

-jon parshall-

The Plan

"As was typical of many Japanese naval plans during the Second World War, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's Yamamoto was later released from the Japenese Army for beingcaught in the middle of the night performing inappropriate acts on a sleeping man battle plan was complicated and intricate."

Just thought you'd want to know. 64.121.192.62 22:08, 2 March 2006 (UTC)

All the work that's been done on this article in the last few months appears, IMO, to have it worthy of nomination as a featured article (FA). However, one issue that I think would inhibit its acceptance as an FA is the lack of citations in the body of the text. Although numerous quality references are listed at the end of the entry, they aren't cited or specifically referenced throughout the article. If someone who has worked heavily on the article would be willing to go through and add the specific references, I would then hope that the article would be nominated and accepted for FA status. Cla68 12:49, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

+++

If I have the cycles, I will do that. Certainly, citation shouldn't be a problem--Shattered Sword had 1,318 endnotes (but who's counting?) and I should be able to bring appropriate citation to bear. I just didn't really know how far people wanted to go on that--too many endnotes may be seen as tedious.

-jon parshall-

I'm definitely no expert on getting FA status for an article, but, from what I've seen, most easily arguable assertions should be backed-up with some kind of reference or citation. Of course, defining what an "easily arguable assertion" is very subjective in and of itself. However, I think if there are a moderate number of citations in the text, especially in the sections that contain more analysis, I think it will pass the FA review. I think FA status is a deserved recognition for all the work that you all have put into this excellent article. Cla68 19:52, 18 April 2006 (UTC)

By the way, examples of articles with the kind of in-line citations that would help this article pass "featured article" review are: Operation Ten-Go and Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Cla68 17:05, 19 May 2006 (UTC)

+++

All right, I added some citation (May 25, 2006). There's too much of Shattered Sword, and not enough of prior sources. But then again, dang it all, when it comes to the Japanese side of things, and some of the more recent research on the battle, our book is pretty much it. I could go back and fill some more in (frankly, you could do it simply by reading through the citations we give (all 1,318 of 'em), to trace back to the original primary sources, but that would take a while. And I have my daughter's room to sheetrock.  ;-)

Cheers,

-jon parshall-

P.S. Added some more on May 26, and fleshed it out a bit.

I think it looks great. I just now rearranged the references section somewhat and put the "notes" section at the bottom of the article, but I didn't delete or add any content. If you're ready, I think we can go ahead and nominate it now for FA. Cla68 03:45, 4 June 2006 (UTC)

• We win, as of this morning (06/09/2006). I still don't understand who the Featured Article Gods are who pulled the trigger and promoted it... it just... happened. Whatever; I'll take it! -jon-

I changed the main article to explicitly note that Capt. Richard Fleming, although the recipient of the Medal of Honor, did not in fact hit Mikuma, either with his bomb or his aircraft. That's a common myth of the battle, although interestingly contemporary Marine Corps reports make it clear that Fleming went down off Mikuma's fantail by a good distance. However, the famous photos of Mikuma taken near her sinking seem to show some sort of wreckage on the top of Turret #4, and this has commonly been described as wreckage from Fleming's plane--I remember seeing that very citation in one of the American Heritage books as a child in the early 1970s. However, this wreckage is, in fact, the remains of Mikuma's mainmast and aft superstructure, as well as torn up lagging sheeting on the roof of the turret. Finally, of course, the Japanese records make absolutely no mention of having been struck by an American aircraft, and all things being equal they must of course be given greater weight of consideration over American aviator accounts--it was, after all, *their* ship, and the conditions of Mikuma's damage are *very* well documented by the Japanese.

-jon parshall-

I've removed it until you can provide a citation.

Removed Text: Although contemporary research has revealed that neither Fleming's bomb nor his aircraft actually struck the ship itself.

68.97.2.180 18:09, 6 February 2007 (UTC)

I reverted a recent change edit that called Midway the largest naval battle of World War II, because that honor belongs to the Battle of Leyte gulf.

-jon parshall-

John Ford directed the film he didn't shot footage of the battle himself. I've just verified from my mp4 copy of the movie. "The following authentic scene were made by U.S. Navy photographers.". Please notice that the film also include some fictional scenes but the US navy didn't care about this at that time. Ericd 17:54, 5 June 2006 (UTC)

"some fictional scenes" well I first wrote this from memory. But soon after I spent some time to verify. Well not much but they're there. Probably less than 10 seconds in an 18 minutes movie. Ericd 18:01, 5 June 2006 (UTC)

Can anyone think of a reason why Image:VT-6TBDs.jpg should not be cropped? savidan ^{(talk) (e@)} 01:50, 15 June 2006 (UTC)

(Tried)to highlight questionable areas Jonathan smith 112281 00:41, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

• See Military forces section. (I've removed the highlighting in the article — impact on rendering and request is now here. — ERcheck ( talk) 01:44, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

In the paragraph about how Midway was confirmed to be the identity of objective "AF", Cdr Rochefort is described as having the idea to get the IJN to confirm this themselves by the intrigue of the supposed drinking water shortage on Midway. The paragraph concludes with the following: "Rochefort died in 1976; in 1985 he was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Medal (United States) and later in 1986 he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom." As written, this sentence is off-topic for the paragraph and sounds more like a biographical note on Rochefort. It should either be removed or re-worded to more clearly point back to Rochefort's intelligence coup. I have done the latter. Comments? Mike 15:23, 14 September 2006 (UTC)

"Likewise, it is arguable that reallocation of air and naval resources might have delayed amphibious operations in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and perhaps at Normandy."

I have a small issue with this sentence - as far as I'm aware, the amphibious operations in the Med were limited by the availability of transport shipping, especially landing craft and would therefore have been largely unaffected by any US carrier losses at Midway. One could argue that a US deafeat at Midway would have put the Allies on the strategic defensive in the Pacific, which would have released shipping for use in the Med and in fact brought operations in this theatre [B]forward[/B] and not delayed them. Any thoughts? Rubisco 14:38, 28 September 2006 (UTC)

This line seems unrealistic. If the U.S. had lost all three carriers at Midway, they could not have transferred any significant units to bolster their defenses. Wasp was transferred to the Pacific right after the battle, and she and Saratoga would probably have been expected to fight a static defense until more carriers could be made available. It's possible that in such desperate circumstances the Ranger might have been deployed to the Pacific as well, but it seems unlikely since she rolled too much in rough seas and had weak defensive armor. The U.S. might have been forced to write off the New Hebrides and even Hawaii and relocate the fleet to the West Coast. Since carriers were the primary instrument of battle in the theater, no ammount of shipping transfers would have alieviated the situation. Dallan007 20:39, 16 October 2006 (UTC)

It's speculation, but it's safe to say, had MacArthur & Nimitz had to hold on the defensive a few more months, the dearth of landing craft that delayed Anvil would never have happened, increasing effectiveness & shortening the war. It's also possible Nimitz would have increased emphasis on submarines, calling them back from Oz as too vulnerable & putting them in the Luzon Strait, increasing their effectiveness & also shortening the war... Trekphiler 01:39, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

This may have been corrected by other scholars, but I thought "Miracle at Midway" and other books stated that Sōryū was sunk by Yorktown's squadron and Akagi and Kaga were sunk by Enterprise. I understand the issue may be in doubt, but has evidence shown that the current article (Kaga sunk by Yorktown, Sōryū and Akagi by Enterprise) the accepted version? 75.25.65.83 04:48, 16 October 2006 (UTC)Dallan007

• Your traditional targets are supported by Lunstrom, "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral", 2006.

I don't see much mention of the USMC's part in the battle. Major Lofton Henderson (for whom Henderson Field on Guadalcanal was named) led a mixed squadron of SBD Dauntlesses and SB2U Vindicators against the Japanese fleet. See the article on the Midway order of battle. 198.49.81.33 14:30, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

Corrected number of hits on Akagi from 2 and a near miss to 1 and a near miss. Strangely Shattered Sword is cited, which is my source as well, and clearly says that there was only one direct hit, plus a very near miss that caused rudder damage. -- Shyland 22:59, 27 October 2006 (UTC)

• I think that 'Shattered Sword' is an excellent book on the Midway episode. However, I disagree with replacing everything that has been called into question with their version. Nobody knows if one or two bombs actually impacted some part of the Akagi's structure.

Neither of the authors are professional historians. They go too far in trying to break the battle down into a minute by minute explication of 'what really happened.' Just because a record or note says something happened at 1057 doesn't mean it did for certain. In a courtroom eyewitness testimony usually trumps written records. And while they have much evidence (not to mention cool graphics) to support their theories and suppositions, that does not automatically make them all true. Especially if it requires discounting much competent eyewitness testimony.

They offer good arguments for why it is unlikely that Akagi was hit by more than one bomb. On the other hand, they offer that a 'geyser' of water pushed up the steel framework and wood of isthe Akagi's aft flight deck. Is this plausible? Maybe, maybe not. Interestingly, one key piece of evidence cited to 'prove' the aft bomb 'plunged' into the water is from the recollections of someone who WAS FOCUSED ON SOMETHING ELSE, namely, the Kaga attack. The witness was filming the Kaga attack so it seems unlikely that he was also hanging out over cothe side of the Akagi to see the bomb 'plunge' into the water.

Parshall and Tully also state that the American and Japanese (like Fuchida, who was very ill by the way) who say the Akagi's deck was full of ready aircraft are mistaken, or, worse still, lying. And while Fuchida himself may have had post-war reasons to exaggerate, not everyone else did. It is an interesting question. The 'Shattered Sword' authors appear to discount the possibility that perhaps a part of the strike force WAS in place on the deck when Richard Best & company struck. They seem to suggest that AT MOST there were some CAP Zeros on deck and no other aircraft. This is not settled, and most of the eyewitnesses are no longer around to rebut this conclusion. I would think that a NPOV would take into account ALL the sources and conclude that there may have been as many as 1/3 of the strike force on deck, or perhaps far fewer.

My point is that I think it is a mistake to simply plug in everything from this excellent work and summarily overwrite five or six decades of scholarship, not to mention eyewitness testimony. Don't get me wrong, I wrote a positive review of this work on Amazon and have recommended it to many colleagues, especially the ones to whom I already recommended the Fuchida book. Markm62 15:58, 28 October 2006 (UTC)

Lengthy Response from Shyland follows, you might want a bathroom break before plowing in... Firstly Parshall & Tully are cited as the source for the information stating there were two direct hits, when in fact they make a good case for only one hit. If someone changed the hit count from one to two they should have removed the citation. Not to say I wouldn't have changed it anyway, but I assumed whoever wrote that just misread their source. Secondly they do refer to a good bit of eyewitness testimony...much of it conflicting. Japanese eyewitnesses are cited as opposed to US pilots. Thirdly, as carefully explained in Shattered Sword, the rudder damage could only reasonably have been caused by a bomb hit in the water, rather than penetrating multiple decks inside the ship. The aft part of the flight deck was supported by struts, with 60 feet of empty air below. Then there's the armored main deck, which an HE bomb would be very unlikely to penetrate at all, much less after coming through the flight deck. Then (according to the cool graphic) two more decks and finally the area containing the rudder mechanism. A bomb going through the flight deck and detonating in the air underneath might raise the flight deck (or it might not!), but could not conceivably have caused rudder damage. If it exploded deep enough to cause rudder damage (which is hard to imagine due to the penetration required), it would not be likely to damage the flight deck as extensively as some eyewitnesses reported. A bomb pushing the flight deck up AND damaging the rudder can only be explained by an explosion in the water. Also the Nagumo Report states the bomb caused "holes in aft deck" and 1 casualty, hardly consistent with a direct hit severe enough to cause rudder damage plus other eyewitness accounts of "huge fires."

And, given the dual-hangar deck design, it was absolutely imperative to limit top weight in any way possible, leading to gun tub struts described as "flimsy". Who knows what weight-saving measures were taken with the flight deck, especially to withstand force applied from below rather than above? This was a 1000-pound bomb! ...and it seems plausible that it could damage the flight deck with water pressure alone; I've read of surprising amounts of damage attributed to near-misses. All that energy has to go somewhere.

Not to the flight deck, I wouldn't think. You'd get a "mining" effect. Trekphiler 19:47, 19 November 2006 (UTC)

Also, the Japanese newsman's attention seems very unlikely to be focused on Kaga. She had been bombed 4 or 5 minutes before. It would be difficult to ignore all the shouting and anti-aircraft batteries blazing away at bombers currently diving on his OWN ship.

Parshall & Tully had the good fortune to discover "five or six decades of scholarship" that desperately NEEDED to be "summarily overwritten". Fuchida's book has been discredited in Japan for 20-odd years as a fanciful, intentionally inaccurate account of the battle. Even as far back as 1971 when the Japanese Defense Agency published their official account (Midowei Kansen), Fuchida's work was overturned. Due in part to the language barrier, and at least in part to deficient "scholarship" in the US until recently, this fact was overlooked. Much of the intervening English-language "scholarship" draws on Fuchida's work and VERY few other translated Japanese sources.

As to the speculation that there may have been a partial spot on Akagi's deck at the time she was bombed, disproving that concept for all four carriers is one of the main tenets of Shattered Sword and it is analyzed very thoroughly using Japanese sources as well as U.S. eyewitnesses. 1) Dick Best, who landed the direct hit that doomed Akagi, reported afterward that there were 6 or 7 planes on deck, and that they were all "clearly Zeroes" (presumably intended to reinforce the CAP.) Best's was one of only 3 planes to attack Akagi, and he was leader of his 3-plane element, thus his account is probably be the most credible U.S. report as to Akagi. 2) Akagi's flight log shows she recovered CAP aircraft at 1010, just 15 minutes before the attack. Japanese carriers at the time could only do ONE of these things on their deck: SPOT aircraft; LAUNCH aircraft; LAND aircraft. Spotting a strike would take about 45 minutes; and it could not have started before landing those CAP aircraft at 1010. Since, according to Lt. Best, she was launching (or preparing to launch) CAP Zeroes when bombed, she could not have been in the process of spotting a strike. 3) Midowei Kansen (official Japanese account published 1971) also states that all strike aircraft were in the hangars on all four carriers, except a few intended to bolster the CAP.

These two points (the bomb hits and the number of planes on deck) seem well supported. I don't accept Shattered Sword as Bible either. Much of it seems to be extrapolation about what the crews were doing. But these two items are difficult to disprove. I'm not saying five or six decades of scholarship needs to be tossed out the window in toto...but SOME of it clearly does, starting with Fuchida's fairy tale and anything based on it, which is a lot. -- Shyland 12:56, 6 November 2006 (UTC)

p.s. Evidently it's not like Shattered Sword is coming out of the blue and attempting to stand everything we know about Midway on its head. According to Parshall & Tully's references, Willmott's Pearl Harbor (1981?), pp.143-157, "presents compelling evidence" that Fuchida deliberately falsified his account of incidents in that battle; and John Prados' Combined Fleet Decoded (1995), in the chapter "Incredible Victories?", "sharply [questions] many of the same conventional American wisdoms [scrutinized in Shattered Sword.]" I guess I'll be buying more books...-- Shyland 00:45, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

followup...I added a note saying other sources claim a stern hit but Shattered Sword makes a case for a water burst in light of the rudder damage. -- Shyland 12:22, 8 November 2006 (UTC)

Currently the "Impact" section states, "worst case", that if they had won Midway, the Japanese could have invaded Australia and Hawaii, "knocking the U.S. out of the Pacific." Maybe they could have established a foothold somewhere on Australia's north coast, but Hawaii was totally beyond their military and logistic capabilities from all that I have read. It needs changing. -- Shyland 23:31, 27 October 2006 (UTC)

I altered the section and removed the references to possible Hawaii and Australian invasions. It does seem unlikely that the Japanese Army would have assented to such huge undertakings, to say nothing of the amount of shipping it would have taken. Dallan007 04:25, 8 November 2006 (UTC)

I do believe that part of the Japanese plan was to either make Pearl Harbor untenable as a naval base, and possibly to occupy Hawaii in order to attempt to force the US to the peace table. The Japanese strategy for the war was to win a quick victory over the US, after all, since they were utterly screwed over in terms of industrial capacity. -- M45k3d N1Nj4 G4R0 17:18, 30 November 2006 (UTC)

It's a fantasy. IJA never had the manpower or shipping for invading Hawaii; invading Oz was an opium smoker's dream. Trekphiler 01:49, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

I commented on this under "Impact," but whether the Japanese could've really attacked/invaded Hawaii is one thing; the political impact in the U.S. would've been something else, not based on cold calculations about what the Japanese were really capable of. "Germany First" might have become much more difficult to sustain in the face of a Japanese victory, particularly if they'd sunk all our participating carriers rather than vice-versa. -- Andersonblog 03:33, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

Don't bet on it making any difference. PTO was already getting more manpower than Europe as it was, thanks to Ernie King (betcha didn't know). Germany was far & away a bigger threat, & both FDR & Winston knew it; they might have had to change building priorities, & in the short term, some ops would've been cancelled (Wasp ferry mission of Spitfires to Malta, for instance), but I doubt it'd shift them off "Germany First" (or need to). It's as likely MacArthur would've gotten lower billing, or maybe Oz's PM (Curtin?) would've gotten more diggers from Winnie, or been able to hold back some. If General Ego did get lowered, it's probable Chips Carpenter's subs would've gone to Pearl, & shortened the war (being more effective from there). This, tho, is a mix of speculation & OR.... Trekphiler 01:49, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

"Had the Japanese captured Midway, the northeastern Pacific Rim would have been essentially defenseless. Success also would have removed the last capital ships in the U.S. Pacific Fleet, insuring Japanese naval supremacy in the Pacific until perhaps late 1943." I think this statement is a little over-reaching. Even if the Japanese had taken Midway, they still wouldn't have taken out Hawaii or the US fleet.-- 205.157.110.11 16:29, 3 November 2006 (UTC)

The statement is somewhat overreaching. The Japanese lacked the shipping to mount an assault on Hawaii and the Army would not release the soldiers needed in any case. The loss of all three carriers at Midway would have left only Saratoga and Wasp available until Essex was commissioned in December of 1942. Saratoga and Wasp, however, would not have been able to stop Nagumo's four to six carriers from continuing to dominate the Pacific. Dallan007 04:31, 8 November 2006 (UTC)

The statement is preposterous. Midway was a trap for a garrison Japan would've been incapable of supporting. Trekphiler 19:50, 19 November 2006 (UTC)

Article says: "Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard worked around the clock to patch up the carrier. Though several months of repairs was estimated for the Yorktown, 72 hours at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard was enough to restore it to a battle-worthy..." Someone who knows more about this than I and/or has access to the cited book should fix or clarify this apparent contradiction. Thanks. ColinClark 00:37, 30 November 2006 (UTC)

I'm damn sure that they didn't drive Yorktown all the way to Puget Sound for a 72 hour repair. I think it's supposed to mean that it would've required 3 months at Puget Sound, but instead took 72 hours at Pearl Harbor. -- M45k3d N1Nj4 G4R0 17:21, 30 November 2006 (UTC)

Thanks. Sounds good now. ColinClark 23:47, 1 December 2006 (UTC)

Looks like a proofreading error. Her hull was basically sound, so the "3mo" estimate was off anyhow. 15:57, 6 December 2006 (UTC)

in this article, what is standard of data and Time? US time or Japan time? -- Rheo1905 10:45, 24 December 2006 (UTC)

Seems to me Midway local time makes the most sense. Or is that too sensible? Trekphiler 01:57, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

What's this nonsense about a loss at Midway removing the last capital ships from the US OOB? There was still the Saratoga and the Wasp--and assuming their subsequent easy loss is a pointless exercise in counterfact. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Steve Dallas ( talk • contribs) 08:06, 10 January 2007 (UTC).

Am I nitpicking by arguing carriers aren't capital ships? Battleships are... (OK, I got your meaning...) As for "off the OOB", it was the Pacific Fleet's OOB in question, no? Sara was laid up, & IIRC, Wasp was detailed to the Atlantic Fleet. And USN only had 6 fleet carriers. (Ranger doesn't count.) Trekphiler 20:01, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

Added another line to make the Discoveries heading appear underneath the Mikuma image rather than next to it. Probably doesn't even need to be entered here, but I'm bored. JeffKo427 10:18, 3 February 2007 (UTC)

Currently: Kaga, with Akagi, forming Division 1; Hiryū and Sōryū, as the 2nd Division. This isn't an area I know anytyhing about, but should the text not be parallel? "Division 1... Division 2," "first division...second division," or "1st Division...2nd Division," whichever conforms to Japanese practice. — OtherDave 14:10, 7 June 2007 (UTC)

The article says, "in the hands of both Nagumo and Yamamoto prior to the battle." This is far from certain. In Yamamoto's, yes; it seems Nagumo (in time-honored military tradition) didn't get the word from Tokyo, & Yamamoto, to conceal the fact Yamato was at sea, didn't tell him... Trekphiler 04:10, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

The article says,

"In addition, the impending arrival of yet more American air strikes at 07:53 made Nagumo's window of decision quite short. In the end Nagumo made the fateful decision to wait for his first strike force to land, and then launch the reserve strike force (which would by then be properly armed). ^[1]"

"Nagumo's window of decision" & his "fateful decision" were irrelevant; Spruance had begun launching at 07.00, & his birds would hit Nagumo before Nagumo's hit him. The outcome was already decided. The problem is, I can't find a historiographer who expressly says so... Trekphiler 05:10, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

It also says

"at 07:40 a scout plane from the cruiser Tone"

The first message from Scout 4 was at 0720, with an amplification at 0740; see Willmott, Barrier, & Fuchida & Okumiya. Trekphiler 10:09, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

The article says,

"Just two months later, the US took the offensive and attacked Guadalcanal, catching the Japanese off-balance. Given a defeat instead of a major victory at Midway, the US may not have struck at such an early date, or had the same degree of success. Securing Allied supply lines to Australia and the Indian Ocean in this time frame, along with the heavy attrition inflicted on the Japanese at Guadalcanal, had far-reaching effects on the length of the war (see Guadalcanal campaign, Aftermath and Historical Significance.) For example, the British defense of the Suez Canal against the Afrika Korps was resupplied and reinforced via Allied shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean. ^[2]"

I don't see the connection. "Allied supply lines to the Indian Ocean" were little threatened by the Japanese, so its effect on the Suez or Africa is trivial. I'm less than completely convinced the attrition at Guadalcanal made much difference, either, considering U.S. submarines had brought the Japanese economy more or less to a halt by January 1945. See Blair, Silent Victory. I'd say this needs a rewrite. Trekphiler 05:33, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

Absent any objection I deleted

"For example, the British defense of the Suez Canal against the Afrika Korps was resupplied and reinforced via Allied shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean. ^[3]"

Also, I rewote "inflicted on the Japanese during the Guadalcanal campaign, had far-reaching effects on the length of the war." & added " Its effect on the length is debatable, given the Pacific Fleet's Submarine Force having brought Japan's economy essentially to a stop by January 1945. ^[4]"

Trekphiler 01:44, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

The article notes "several new squadrons (drawn from carrier Saratoga". The Japanese didn't do this for Shōkaku, intact after Coral Sea; mention it? I've never seen a source specifically say they didn't, but no source I've seen says they did, & there were air groups available... Trekphiler 01:13, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

I have to learn to read the article before I post here... Matt Murdock 01:48, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

Aside from the TBDs on the Hornet, there was a detachment on Midway Island which flew the TBF Avenger. They didn't have much better luck, I think 5 of 6 aircraft were lost. The surviving Avenger was damaged, but made it back to Midway: Here are some photos from www.history.navy.mil.

I removed the words "sole survivor of VT-8" from the image of George Gay, because a couple of VT-8 aircrew also survived. He ws the sole survivor of VT-8s TBD aircrew though. Anynobody 03:57, 26 March 2007 (UTC)

In the context, it was the aircrew being dealt with, not the ship's maintenence people... Trekphiler 19:46, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

Windows 42

I rewrote

"yet more American air strikes at 07:53 made Nagumo's window of decision quite short. In the end Nagumo made the fateful decision to wait for his first strike force to land"

based on Willmott & on Fuchida & Okumiya. As noted above, "the fateful decision" wasn't; it was out of his hands when Strawberry 5 spotted him. Trekphiler 02:19, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

In the first paragraph there is too much pointless information that does not pertain to the article at all. I suggest major revisions of that portion are done. Designdroide 23:09 Mountian Tine

I am serious about this. I see no relavance to having all that pointless jabber inb the first paragraph. I am trying to see if I can get support on this so that I dont get into an agruement after wards, or if I do then I have support. Design droide 00:21, 27 May 2007 (UTC)

in the cryptology section, what does it mean by the cryptoanalysts were "blacked out"? 71.161.41.63 22:25, 22 May 2007 (UTC)

The discovery section (repeated below) has been vandalised - how can it be rolled back to its non juevinille state?

[edit] Discovery ===U.S. vessel was as big as my giant dingaling depth of the ocean in the area of the battle (more than 17,000 feet/5200 m), researching the battlefield has presented extraordinary difficulties. However, on May 19, 1998, Robert Ballard and a team of masterbaters and ball suckers (including Japanese participants) located and photographed Yorktown. The ship was remarkably intact for a vessel that sank in 1942; much of the original equipment, and even the original paint scheme were still visible.

Vandalism has since been removed. To remove a malicious edit, simply click the history tab at the top of the article, click the "last edit" button for the most recent edit, and click undo. See WP:REVERT for more info on reverting vandalism. -- _Hdt83 ^Chat 02:56, 7 June 2007 (UTC)

• You could also request protection here: Wikipedia:Requests for page protection, although requests are rarely granted, despite the consensus desiring the contrary (See Wikipedia talk:Main Page featured article protection#Consensus). DrKiernan 09:12, 7 June 2007 (UTC)

'The battle was an American victory widely regarded as the most important naval engagement of World War II.'

Let the facts of the article speak for themself rather than peacocking it up with unsourced statements. Narson 11:47, 7 June 2007 (UTC)

But it is worth stating... Brutannica 00:14, 8 June 2007 (UTC)

I may have been brainwashed, growing up in American schools, but that's how all the textbooks refer to it. I'd say there's a good argument for it being widely regarded that way, whether or not its true. -wizzard2k ^{( C• T• D)} 00:24, 8 June 2007 (UTC)

Just needs a cite putting in from a textbook or a website....best I've found in my books label it as important, but mine are BRitish books and so the Pacific War is not generally covered in the detail I'd like, I'm sure someone with the American books can cite it in. Narson 19:35, 13 June 2007 (UTC)

This really is common knowledge, and I don't believe it requires a source. Even the current US President refers to it as the most important naval battle in our history. 24.181.107.187 20:08, 13 June 2007 (UTC)

I found one that seemed to indicate its importance. (As for it being common knowledge, I don't know, I would certainly think Pearl Harbour was a pretty important Naval Battle, without it Midway et al wouldn't have happened, though I suppose one could argue that Pearl Harbour wasn't strictly a naval battle as the ships were in dock. Midway certainly receives very little focus in European education) Narson 20:18, 13 June 2007 (UTC)

"Despite the intrinsic and artificial limitations to the usefulness of Allied access to the enemies secret traffic, both Ultra and the American 'Magic' organizations were undoubtedly responsible for major, even crucial, strategic success in the Second World War. The first and most important was the victory ad Midway, where knowledge of the Japanese intentions allowed the Americans to position their inferior fleet of carriers in such a way as to destroy the much larger enemy force. Midway, the most important naval battle of the Second World War, reversed the tide of the advantage in the Pacific and laid the basis fore America's eventual triumph" -- John Keegan, The Second World War (1989), pg 501. Raul654 00:34, 17 June 2007 (UTC)

This paragraph frankly seems almost apologetic for the Japanese. That the captured American flyers were murdered is fairly well documented, by Prange and others.

128.165.87.144 22:01, 11 July 2007 (UTC)

The page for William Satterlee Pye states that Admiral Pye ordered seven battleships sortied from San Fran to Midway, but they are not mentioned here. Does anyone have any information on this? -- Daysleeper47 16:16, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

The information on that page is incorrect. Pye order Task Force One, comprised of six battleships, to sortie from San Francisco and patrol the California coast during the Midway operation. There was still a concern that either Hawaii or California might be the actual target. Dallan007 19:32, 16 October 2006 (UTC)

Not as clear as that. Nimitz had them available, but knew they were too slow to keep up with Fletcher, so he decided not to attach them. Too bad he wasn't so clearheaded about his sub dispositions. (And him a sub engineer officer. For shame.) Trekphiler 20:10, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

I'm rather surprised that this article doesn't even contain a cursory reference to American cryptanalysis. It's surely not controversial to assert that breaking the JN-25 naval code was a major factor in the American victory, is it? Shouldn't there be at least a few links, if not a paragraph in the before-the-battle section? NewEnglandYankee 19:30, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

Not having noted any objections, I've added a brief paragraph summarizing these events, with links to more detailed articles. If this information would be better presented elsewhere, feel free to move it. Also, I don't have my books handy, so more citations couldn't hurt. NewEnglandYankee 21:33, 16 February 2007 (UTC)

I am surprised that an interesting story about the codebreaking was not included. According to several sources, the American codebreakers had decoded messages that Japan was about to attack an island with the code word "AF". They were pretty sure that "AF" meant Midway, but because of the state of the US navy they had to make certain. To do this, an officer was sent to Midway with verbal orders that the Commandant should send a message {in a code that they knew the Japanese had broken} to the effect that Midway's water distillation plant had broken down. Three days later the codebreakers intercepted a message from the Japanese at Kawajalein Atoll that "AF" was short of water, and this enabled Nimitz to commit his forces to the plan. User: Plerdsus 20:03 7 June 2007

"an officer was sent to Midway with verbal orders". Well, no. There's debate who's idea it was (some credit Joe Rochefort, others Jasper Holmes), but the orders were sent via cable. And what I've seen leaves some doubt whether it was a compromised cypher (one captured at Wake) or en clair; it wasn't "a code that they knew the Japanese had broken", because AFAIK, Japanese cryppies were incompetent to break even the simplest codes. It is one more example of how a single brilliant officer can tip the balance; had Rochefort not twigged to AF, the signal would never have gone on the cable. Unfortunately, it gives rise to the myth (which I've had a history prof spout) intel & radar won Midway. Sheesh. Give more credit to bad planning by Yamamoto, & even more to the PBY guys who gave Fletcher the eyes Nagumo didn't have. (Thanks to Ann Medina for calling my attention to that one.) Trekphiler 19:57, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

Spotting

what does "Spotting" in the sentence "Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would require at least 30–45 minutes to accomplish." mean?

I believe its similar to spotting in weight-lifting, where someone is there watching from the outside making sure nothing goes wrong. -wizzard2k ^{( C• T• D)} 16:15, 8 June 2007 (UTC)

Putting the aircraft on the flightdeck, making them ready for immidiate take-off. -- 89.54.185.75 12:08, 17 June 2007 (UTC)

As in "on their spots", ready to be moved for launch as needed. They weren't all "ready for immediate takeoff"; they had to be spotted to make it possible to select what was needed & move those to ready positions. Gerry Carroll describes it "like a Chinese fire drill", & he'd know; the deck of a carrier is just short of complete chaos at the best of times, & it seems like everything is constantly in motion in all directions. It is; as Gerry notes, it's all too easy to FOD a sailor & not realize it til the engine loses power. Trekphiler 19:43, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

Not challenging, but would like to know why the romance in the movie would/should be considered a "preposterous romance". Thx.

Besides the fact the writing was terrible, it was extremely convenient considering who was involved... And I'm far from convinced interracial romance was as common, or accepted, in 1942 as in 1976. Also, honestly, what was the idea of putting it in a war movie? (Yeah, I know, the producer wanted to bring women into the theatre...) Trekphiler 19:33, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

Excellent article. Perhaps this is a nit, but did the Japanese call their attack against the Aleutians "Operation AL"? "Operation MI" is a little more believable, but were the Japanese war plans drafted in English? How would you spell "AL" in kana? 65.114.23.6 19:12, 1 September 2007 (UTC)

The Japanese (habitually) used the first two letters of the Japanese name, which (as I understand it) was a close translation of the English. Trekphiler 19:30, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

I deleted this

"Worse for the Japanese, their habit of leaving expert pilots in combat was detrimental to the training of their forces. The U.S. Navy, by contrast, rotated its best aviators home on a regular basis to teach pilot trainees the techniques they would use to defeat Japan."

and this

"In the subsequent battles around Guadalcanal in late 1942, such as Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, Japanese naval aviation was ground down by attrition despite roughly equal losses on both sides;"

and this

"Although wartime Japanese training programs produced pilots, they were insufficiently trained as the war continued, an imbalance that became worse as increasingly potent U.S. fighters became available that outmatched Japanese aircraft."

as irrelevant to Midway; put it in Pacific War, if you think it's of value. I also deleted this

"(Had there been a defeat at Midway, the U.S. might not have struck at such an early date or had the same degree of success.)"

and this

"The importance of the Battle of Midway can also be assessed by considering the hypothetical scenario of an American defeat and the destruction of the U.S. aircraft carrier fleet. With only two carriers ( USS Saratoga and USS Wasp) available, the U.S. would have been forced onto the strategic defensive for at least the remainder of 1942. The Japanese could have continued their advance on the New Hebrides and cut off communication with Australia, and completed their conquest of New Guinea. Furthermore, a catastrophic failure at Midway might have resulted in the removal of key figures like Nimitz and Spruance from their positions. Offensive operations in the Pacific might have been delayed until as late as mid-1943, when Essex and Independence-class carriers became available in appreciable numbers.

"A hypothetically longer Pacific War does raise the question of the role the Soviet Union would have played in Japan's demise, and whether the USSR would have gained a postwar presence in a partitioned Japan, similar to Germany. The actual implications of an American defeat are unknowable, but there is little question losing at Midway would have narrowed U.S. options dramatically, at least in the short term. ^[5] A defeat at Midway, by implicitly jeopardizing Hawaii and Pearl Harbor, might have put the " Germany First" priority of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs in grave political peril. ^[6] Had the United States been obliged to focus its efforts on Japan, American intervention in Europe might well have been delayed, with incalculable implications for Germany and the Soviet Union."

as speculation. It's equally probable it would have shifted forces out of the SWPA, away from MacArthur, as FDR realized he didn't have the luxury of a "dual road" strategy; moving Oz submarines to Pearl would have significantly shortened the war, as would the preclusion of MacArthur's obsessive "return" to the Philippines. It would also have freed up landing craft, which would have made it possible to execute ANVIL and NEPTUNE similtaneously, as originally intended, which would (probably) have shortened the war. It might also have freed up Oz & AUS troops, making it more likely (if not extremely so) NEPTUNE might go off in 1943, instead; now, it's speculation about whether the Italian campaign would have happened, & whether a "disaster" at Midway would've given FDR leverage with Winston to call off Italy: that would indubitably have shortened the war. The bigger question is, would Japan have been defeated without use of the Bomb; it it wasn't, it's been suggested there might have been a major nuclear war, as the Soviets (or Stalin) doubt the West's willingness to actually use it. (I have a suspicion this was Spinrad's vision in Iron Dream.) And there's enormous flexibility in planning, economic & military; loss of two carriers, against the number actually built, was trivial. (The Essexes wouldn't arrive until 1943 in any case, but it might have put pressure on the earlier development of bulk carrier MAC-conversions, & on the priority for LCs; realizing carriers could not be built faster without significant diversion, LCs might have ended up with higher priority than historically, with results like above, plus the ability to land more men at ANVIL and NEPTUNE: a French corps, say...?) Regardless, this is no place for speculation; want to speculate, write a novel. (Don't bet on FDR replacing Nimitz; he wasn't near as quick to fire people as Winnie was.) Trekphiler 19:30, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

"Another 40 minutes elapsed before Tone's scout finally detected and radioed the presence of a single carrier in the American force"

I was reading Decision at Sea by Craig L. Symonds, and I think he actually says the time between Nagumo's demand for a confirmation from the scout plane and the plane actually finding a carrier was 10 minutes rather than 40. I may have to check again, though Masterblooregard 10:38, 30 September 2007 (UTC)

It was about 30, IIRC, between the two reports. Nagumo, when he passed the information along, suggested they were nearly similtaneous. Trekphiler 14:10, 30 September 2007 (UTC)

Changed: 'Despite their horrific sacrifices' => 'Despite their losses' Removed for use of weasel words: 'It is generally agreed the valor of the torpedo squadrons was responsible for the success of the dive bombers' —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.117.50.2 ( talk) 17:58, 24 October 2007 (UTC)

"...the Japanese had never had an opportunity to spot their reserve strike force for launch." What is that sentence fragment telling me?

"History would show the submarine had already made a more important contribution." I don't get this statement either.

Thanks, Daniel.Cardenas ( talk) 16:30, 15 December 2007 (UTC)

"reserve strike force for launch" Nagumo had birds in reserve, but couldn't get them ready to launch before the DBs arrived.

Re Nautilus, read the article: she fired on a CV & was counterattacked by the DD the DBs (McClusky?) followed back. Trekphiler ( talk) 07:31, 16 December 2007 (UTC)

CAP

Hi, How to decipher "CAP" in "CAP fighters", etc.? Thanks in advance. Сергей Олегович ( talk) 09:43, 2 November 2008 (UTC)

Combat air patrol. Jehochman ^Talk 10:33, 2 November 2008 (UTC)

Which raises something that's nagged at me for awhile: should we be using a U.S. term for IJN practise? And, to nitpick, was it combat air patrol then? Or carrier? I've seen both. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 10:38, 2 November 2008 (UTC)

These valid criticisms that should be investigated. Jehochman ^Talk 10:54, 2 November 2008 (UTC)

TY (means "thank you"). Сергей Олегович ( talk) 11:18, 2 November 2008 (UTC)

A source is given for This operation was considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji and Samoa, as well as an invasion of Hawaii. it is "For a detailed discussion of anticipated follow-on Hawaiian operations, see Parshall & Tully, pp. 43–45, & Stephan, Hawaii under the Rising Sun." But what does the source say for example what was the name of the contingency plan if it existed for an invasion or was it just a contingency plan for a raid? Or is it speculation by the author that the Japanese might have been planning an invasion or a raid. -- Philip Baird Shearer 10:43, 10 October 2007 (UTC)

Looks like I'll be hunting down a copy of that book so I can see what the name of the notional operation(s) would have been. I understand Parshall and Tully uncovered a true invasion, not a raid. Personally, I think it would have been the Japanese's Bridge Too Far as they had no way to stream materiel out to Hawaii in greater quantity than the US could have. Binksternet 20:20, 10 October 2007 (UTC)

"Bridge too Far"? Raid or putative invasion (it was a dream of Yamamoto's for years, from what Stephan sez) doesn't make any difference, because invading Hawaii was a fantasy beyond IJA means to execute, in manpower or shipping. If you want to read fantasy, read Stephan. Trekphiler 21:51 & 22:16, 10 October 2007 (UTC)

Comment: Prospects for a Hawaii invasion improved if the Battle of Midway had been won by the Japanese i.e., large numbers of US ships, including most or all aircraft carriers, destroyed (& correspondingly, in a best case scenario, few, if any, Japanese ships lost). Also, if such an outcome had occurred, the timing of a Hawaii invasion could have been delayed for as long as practical in order for the general momentum to be optimum. 76.14.240.177 ( talk) 03:45, 23 November 2008 (UTC)

No, they didn't. It was beyond IJA shipping & manpower even Fletcher lost his entire force at Midway. It was a pipedream. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 08:09, 23 November 2008 (UTC)

The "untrained" pilots remark got del, but it's not completely wrong. Some of the crews hadn't completed training yet. I just can't recall if they came from Midway or 1 of Fletcher's airwings... I think they were from Midway's Windindicator squadrons. Can somebody check? Trekphiler ( talk) 13:38, 22 January 2008 (UTC)

The article currently reads:

As darkness fell, both sides took stock and made tentative plans for continuing the action. Admiral Fletcher, obliged to abandon the derelict Yorktown and feeling he could not adequately command from a cruiser, ceded operational command to Spruance. Spruance knew the United States had won a great victory, but was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained at hand and was determined to safeguard both Midway and his carriers. To aid his aviators, who had launched at extreme range, he had continued to close Nagumo during the day, and persisted as night fell.

But Prange and other authors mention that Spruance withdrew to the east until midnight and then turned back west. This decision was critical because it avoided a possible night engagement with Kondo's battleships, who were pursuing the Americans at the time. Should this not be corrected? Dallan007 ( talk) 22:42, 11 February 2008 (UTC)

It's true. Spruance turned east in response to Murphy's sighting, which led Spruance to believe the Invasion Force was inbound still, when in fact Yamamoto had ordered his cruisers (which Murphy spotted) to turn back. Murphy's signal was at 02.15 (Blair, p.246-8). Trekphiler ( talk) 10:39, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

More mention here should be made that Midway was won with fantastic luck and skill by a small group of diver bombers lead by Wade McCluskey.

It was McCluskey decision to go further then they should have. It was then his decision to go north-west where they were lucky to sight the Japanese destroyer Arashii. Following the direction this destroyer was going, the US diver bombers found the Japanese fleet then they perfectly executed an assault.

Also mention here should be made of Lt. Richard Best miracle shot that took out the Akagi.

Solomon is Wise ( talk) 14:47, 13 March 2008 (UTC)

And if Nautilus hadn't fired on Soryu (?), Arashi would never have been there to chase... Trekphiler ( talk) 17:22, 14 March 2008 (UTC)

As I understand the Japanies forces were already discovered at the moment of the divers' attack and assaulted by Torpedo Squadron. So what was the reason of divers weren't directed acordingly? Radio comm inadequate? Сергей Олегович ( talk) 05:27, 10 November 2008 (UTC)

Without solid sourcing in front of me, I can offer 2 possibilities: Intersquadron comm was pretty bad (recall, VFs couldn't always find their own VT/VBs, so cross-air wing comm had to be bad), & Fletcher, who could (if "Midway" is to be believed) hear everything wouldn't open up, at risk of giving his pos away. Don't forget, the idea (or capability) of an airborne "CP", in the fashion of Hillsboro in 'nam, didn't exist yet. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 17:21, 10 November 2008 (UTC)

Sounds reasonable. Thanks for the explanation. Сергей Олегович ( talk) 05:42, 11 November 2008 (UTC)

I have renamed External links Further reading and moved all the books that are not cited out of "References" into "Further reading" and copied all the books I could find in Notes into References sorting them on the surname of the author. See WP:CITE and WP:LAYOUT, I was surprised that as this is a Featured Article this had not already been done.

Some of the entries in the reference list now need additional information such as: edition/year of publication, publisher, and ISBN-- Philip Baird Shearer ( talk) 11:07, 10 May 2008 (UTC)

Would someone add in information about the squadron of Marine dive bombers based on Midway? It was led by Major Lofton Henderson, who was killed during the attack on the Japanese fleet, and for whom Henderson Field on Guadalcanal was named. This is a pretty big omission. 74.194.82.219 ( talk) 02:48, 4 June 2008 (UTC)

From a reader (not a historian.)

The last line of the "Attacks on the Japanese fleet" section reads, "History would show Nautilus had already made a more important contribution."

It's not clear in the article what the Nautilus's contribution was. Was it locating Japanese ships?

If this could be clarified, thanks. Accordion Noir ( talk) 08:26, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

The USS Nautilus (SS-168) article doesn't support such a claim, so I'm taking it out. Clarityfiend ( talk) 16:12, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

Not clear? Nautilus fired at Kaga & was counterattacked by Arashi, which was followed back to the Kido Butai by Leslie & McClusky ("The destroyer was steaming at full speed back to Nagumo's carrier force, after having unsuccessfully depth-charged the U.S. submarine Nautilus, which had earlier carried out an unsuccessful attack"). If the Nautilus page doesn't support it, the page is wrong; between Blair & others, the support is there. I do wonder where "battleship Kirishima" comes in, but... TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 16:39, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

"The USS Nautilus (SS-168) article doesn't support such a claim"? What's this, then?

"Unknown to Brockman at the time, the destroyer counterattacking him, in her rush to rejoin, was tracked by Enterprise's VB-6, led by Wade McClusky, back to the Japanese task force."

Looks like confirmation to me... It's backed up by Lord & Blair, & by Fuchida & Prange, too, I think. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 17:03, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

Frankly, the sentence strikes me as a mild example of WP:PEACOCK. (If a hadn't done b, then c wouldn't have happened, and the whole course of the battle would have changed.) However, if you're going to restore it, at least address the OP's concerns and explain in the article just what the contribution was. Clarityfiend ( talk) 17:12, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

I'll have a look. As it reads, tho, the dismal failure of her attack undermines the pivotal importance of Arashi. Without Nautilus, would McClusky have found the task force? I'm not objective enough about the Sub Force to leave the failed attack as the last impression of Nautilus, given the earlier role's importance. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 19:00 & 19:06, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

Try it now. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 21:33, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

That doesn't work. It puts Nautilus's later attack out of chronological order and breaks up the flow of the narrative, so I've restored the original version, more or less. I don't see that the pivotal role of Arashi being diminished by the sub's lack of hits nor do I consider the latter to be a dismal failure, but whatever the case, it's not our job to sugarcoat events. However, one sentence isn't going to make a lot of difference, so the status quo is acceptable to me. Clarityfiend ( talk) 02:36, 8 September 2008 (UTC)

<--I'd leave it, aside "out of chronological order", because it really didn't amount to anything much. If she'd sunk, or even damaged, Kaga, I'd agree. She didn't, so it's not like it matters. Also, put in a footnote, its importance in the broader narrative is subdued, so "out of sequence" is less significant; given no real effect, total omission of the Kaga attack wouldn't bother me, either. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 02:47, 8 September 2008 (UTC)

Absent howls of protest, I'm going to take out Nautilus's failed attack, as having no effect on the battle, & because it's already on her page. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 22:10, 9 September 2008 (UTC)

I don't know why I didn't notice this before... Nautilus says (based on Blair) the "BB" ID as Kirishima here, which also claims Nagara attacked with depth charges (which Brockman stated, & both Blair, & I, don't believe.), is more probably a cruiser (Nagara?). I don't know what the original source for the website's material is, but there's a clear contradiction. (I'd call it "obvious", if I had seen it sooner...) TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 22:41, 9 September 2008 (UTC) Or maybe not.... More careful (...) reading of Blair, which I should have done before, clarifies: Nautilus got a shot at a BB; Blair doesn't ID her, & credits Kirishima to Red Ramage's Trout. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 03:04, 10 September 2008 (UTC)

When showing the Strength of Japanese forces in table on the right side of the article, it shows 264 carrier aircraft, and 16 floatplanes.

When showing the Casualties and Losses, it shows 332 aircraft destroyed.

The losses are more than the total forces indicated. Something is wrong here.

98.203.18.250 ( talk) 03:16, 11 September 2008 (UTC)

This Office of Naval Intelligence report estimates 275 Japanese planes lost. Clarityfiend ( talk) 06:42, 11 September 2008 (UTC)

Conventional wisdom Nagumo didn't have time to launch his strike birds before the inbound strike arrived is contradicted by Bicheno's Midway (which I just read, but don't have in front of me...), which says Nagumo had time but was persuaded against it by his staffers (not Fuchida or Tomonaga, but Kobayashi & Kikumi, IIRC). If somebody's got a copy handy, the "quandry" bears revision. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 22:15, 17 October 2008 (UTC)

Looking at my notes, Bicheno (p134) says there were 18 Vals each abd Hiryu & Sōryū ready to launch immediately, & half the CAP detail could've been sent. There's a clear contradiction. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 08:46, 19 October 2008 (UTC)

In reply Clarityfiend, no, USN boats wern't so effective yet. They were, however, easily reaching Home Waters, Tsushima Strait, Yellow Sea, & Luzon/Formosa Straits with virtually no interference from Japanese ASW for the duration. The need for bases to (try to) plug the gaps was fairly clear, even to IJN's incompetent ASW command. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 02:08, 20 November 2008 (UTC)

There have been some new additions by TREKphiler recently. They are appropriately sourced, but it's getting somewhat confusing. Now we have sections stating that Japan's aim was to extend the "defence perimeter", while other say that the attack was aimed at the US carrier force or demoralizing the US in order to obtain a better negotiating position.

While all those paragraphs may be "correct" in themselves, they create a somewhat confusing picture when read together. I say they should be rewritten in order to create a coherent picture again.

I also object to the introduction getting too detailed. Some of the information may easily be moved into the article body. Remember that the introduction is meant to give a broad overview of the subject. Averell ( talk) 17:10, 21 November 2008 (UTC)

The latest paragraph was not added by Trekphiler, but by somebody else. However, I agree it strays a bit too far from the battle itself, so I've said goodbye to Mr. CCHIPSS' contribution, other than a mention of the Doolittle Raid.

As for the length and detail of the remaining introductory section, I feel it is appropriate to an article of this size. (However, I wouldn't object to getting rid of "Japan was unable to keep pace with American shipbuilding and aircrew training programs in providing replacements. By 1942, the United States was three years into a ship building program, mandated by the Second Vinson Act, intended to make the navy larger than Japan's.") Clarityfiend ( talk) 22:55, 21 November 2008 (UTC)

I was trying to keep it factual, 'cause it wasn't strictly wrong, so there wasn't a basis for taking it out. I did, however, lose sight of the bigger picture. (All too EZ to do...) As a motivation for the attack, tho, U.S. shipbuilding was a very important factor; Yamamoto knew he had to strike before the Vinson building caught up with him... TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 04:25, 22 November 2008 (UTC)

I wasn't suggesting to remove factual information. I'm not an expert on the topic, so I'm commenting this as a reader. And as a reader, when I see various reasons for this attack given just so, I get a bit confused. I'd like to learn how these play together or if maybe there's a disagreement in the literature or if they are all valid at the same time and which ones were the most important. Something that puts those things into a common context. As for the intro, it should only mention the central motives, while the rest should be in the article body (not removed). Averell ( talk) 08:48, 22 November 2008 (UTC)

No argument on either point, & only a small one with moving: had I been paying a bit more attention, I would have moved it... (Whence "bigger picture".) TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 09:39, 22 November 2008 (UTC)

I'd like to delete or modify the passage It remains unclear why Yorktown had not been placed under tow immediately after being hit, to get her out of reach of Japanese attack. Nimitz ordered the nearest ocean tug, the U.S.S. Vireo, to take the Yorktown under tow. But the Vireo was 160 miles away from the Yorktown. At a top speed of ten knots, it couldn't arrive until midday on the fifth.-- Work permit ( talk) 00:07, 23 November 2008 (UTC)

It's not as if a salvage tug was the only way to place her under tow, which was the point. Bicheno (which I just finished) says there was trouble with the tow parting to begin with (a DD/2 used, which I was presuming), & I imagine there were issues of doing repairs on her with way on, in particular trying to pump her out (including trying to relight the boilers?), but I don't have any sources for it. Better info on what was going on aboard would be helpful, if anybody's got it. (And, d*mmit, I had B&J in my hands yesterday, & I forgot to look & see what he says about her sailing...! #@*#%$%)