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Zm2020 added the following paper to show the attacks on YAK and an improved version of YAK. However, only an abstract is provided. A proper discussion on this paper is needed to establish the relevance and validity of its result.
Mohammad, Zeyad (11 March 2020). "Cryptanalysis and improvement of the YAK protocol with formal security proof and security verification via Scyther". International Journal of Communication Systems. 33 (9): e4386. doi:10.1002/dac.4386. ISSN 1099-1131.
In this paper, Mohammad described three attacks on YAK.
To prevent the above attacks, Mohammad proposed to modify the Schnorr non-interactive zero-knowledge proof used in YAK to a different one (Figure 3 in Mohammad's paper). Briefly, the modified Schnorr non-interactive zero-knowledge proof works as follows. Let and . , . To prove the knowledge of , Alice sends and , where is Alice’s the long-term private key, is a hash of several public values. and are defined by Mohammad as random oracles to map inputs into a value in .
It should be clear that in the above modified Schnorr scheme, and are ephemeral secrets in a session. Once these session-specific ephemeral secrets are revealed (allowed in an e-CK model), an attacker is able to trivially compute the long-term private key, hence completely breaking the system.
To sum up, the attacks and the countermeasure proposed in Mohammad's paper don't appear to be valid despite it being a peer-reviewed publication. Reference to this paper should be removed from the Wikipedia page, or alternatively, the attacks and the countermeasure described in this paper should be fully expanded to justify the relevance and validity. Fh240 ( talk) 19:25, 18 April 2021 (UTC)
![]() | This article is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | ||||||||||||||||
|
Zm2020 added the following paper to show the attacks on YAK and an improved version of YAK. However, only an abstract is provided. A proper discussion on this paper is needed to establish the relevance and validity of its result.
Mohammad, Zeyad (11 March 2020). "Cryptanalysis and improvement of the YAK protocol with formal security proof and security verification via Scyther". International Journal of Communication Systems. 33 (9): e4386. doi:10.1002/dac.4386. ISSN 1099-1131.
In this paper, Mohammad described three attacks on YAK.
To prevent the above attacks, Mohammad proposed to modify the Schnorr non-interactive zero-knowledge proof used in YAK to a different one (Figure 3 in Mohammad's paper). Briefly, the modified Schnorr non-interactive zero-knowledge proof works as follows. Let and . , . To prove the knowledge of , Alice sends and , where is Alice’s the long-term private key, is a hash of several public values. and are defined by Mohammad as random oracles to map inputs into a value in .
It should be clear that in the above modified Schnorr scheme, and are ephemeral secrets in a session. Once these session-specific ephemeral secrets are revealed (allowed in an e-CK model), an attacker is able to trivially compute the long-term private key, hence completely breaking the system.
To sum up, the attacks and the countermeasure proposed in Mohammad's paper don't appear to be valid despite it being a peer-reviewed publication. Reference to this paper should be removed from the Wikipedia page, or alternatively, the attacks and the countermeasure described in this paper should be fully expanded to justify the relevance and validity. Fh240 ( talk) 19:25, 18 April 2021 (UTC)