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Does anyone know what the effect of reparations had on the economy of the other state except Germany? What did the Entente states (France, UK or Italy) with the goods they got from Germany for free? Did they sell them on the own market? What effect had this cheap business competion to companies in those nation? A bad one? A good one? Please tell me if somebody knows informations about that. Maxian D-C ( talk) 12:06, 25 May 2012 (UTC)
I express a personal point of view: I think the importation of “excessively” cheep goods from one country to another damages the recipient countries economy. There are a number of things that effect the economy of a country, perhaps, the most important are the (1) amount of money in circulation (2) its distribution and (3) it's velocity, how quickly it changes hands. “Paper money” is in reality a human construct, has no real value and is in fact a promissory note. True wealth is crated by people at work, example; if farmers don't grow food we all starve. If people are unemployed no wealth is crated. If no wealth is created then the promissory notes we call money is just a piece of paper and its promise is false one. I believe Hitler understood this which is why in 1933, when he came to power, he put people to work building the autobahns and his war machine, interestingly in the early day he did not allow industry to use labour saving machines. This is counter intuitive, but in this way he put money in the hands of working people, who create wealth, this increasing the amount of money in the real economy improved its distribution and increased its velocity. Today we see the effect that “excessively cheep” goods, first from Japan and now China, are having on the economies of American and European. Buying these cheep imports removes money from the real economy concentrates it in the hands of the few and reduces its velocity. Let me make it clear I am not a fan of Mr Hitler's however the fact is came to power January 1933 by 1939 just a little over six years the German economy was strong enough to fight another war and he nearly won.
German wikipedia has contradicting information regarding by when payment of reparations will have finished; accd to them, all payments should be over by 2010. And they have good sources, as they link to the article by German Ministry of Finance. Anyone knows who's right and who's wrong? agnus ( talk) 13:19, 25 January 2009 (UTC)
Germany is officially done paying reparations. I don't remember when, but now we can talk about it as a past occurence. 99.235.193.246 ( talk) 01:57, 24 December 2010 (UTC)
It means that germany had to pay reparitions. It matters when they have finished, and it when it is done, it will be put in. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 208.27.38.9 ( talk) 18:36, 4 May 2012 (UTC)
This article seems to have been the target of POV pushing. Note especially these two sets of edits: [1], [2].
The POV pushing can also be learned from the sources used: John Maynard Keynes, eminent economist and financial representative for England in Versailles is used for 3 sentences. Meanwhile Sally Marks (who is that?) is used as a source a whooping 43(!) times, for a total of several paragraphs. The unknown french economist Étienne Mantoux is also cited at length to disprove Keynes calculations (a ridiculous excercise, since data is taken from years when the original reparations had already been reduced).
Or look at another source that is widely used to back up the pushed POV: A lengthy paragraph is made out of Niall Ferguson's claim that Germany could have easily paid the reparations. Take a look at some other claims made in that book (taken from the wiki page):
Calling this guy controversial is a huge understatement.
At the moment this article is hugely unbalanced and needs a lot of changes. -- Xeeron ( talk) 16:23, 1 October 2010 (UTC)
Moreover, John Kenneth Galbraith, (who was a friend and an admirer of Keynes) writing in his memories in 1986 stated in retrospect Keynes was wrong and Mantoux was right. The same goes even more with Marks. To answer the question, who is Sally Marks? She is the Professor Emerita of History at Rhode Island College, Providence, and one of the most respect historians working on the field of international relations in the 1920s. It is a very strange procedure that because Keynes is so much famous than Marks that must prove him and her wrong. Marks wrote that essay, which everyone around here finds so objectionable in 1978, and thus had much better access to all sorts of sources that Keynes did not have in 1919. How very odd that the fame of the individual as opposed to what they actually have to say just be used as the basis for who is right and who is wrong on this issue. If I understand the rules correctly here, what an article is supposed to say is what the current scholarly consensus is, not just citing the most famous person who on a subject. I resent that charge I was engaged in POV-pushing, through perhaps I did use somewhat aggressive language. I just merely trying to this article up to reflect what is the current consensus on the subject, by citing some well regarded sources that must people had never heard of, let alone used-- A.S. Brown ( talk) 03:05, 3 February 2011 (UTC)
I understand and agree with the need for balance. Certainly one area that might add balance is that Germany was politically unwilling - perhaps unable - to pay the reparations. They did make a conscious choice to inflate their currency and that choice was political, not economic. The French annexation of the Ruhr seemed the pivot point that led to Von Havenstein printing money at the Reichsbank. While it was a political calculation, it was a calculation driven by reparations. Most of my information is coming from Liaquat Ahamed's book Lords of Finance. Hawesg ( talk) 01:11, 25 June 2011 (UTC)
As I see it, the reparations were two things: 1) an Allied demand for German money (or goods), and 2) an important element of the scolding and punishment of Germany. Keynes discusses both of these in the "Economic Consequences"; the Wikipedia article, only the first. RobLandau ( talk) 19:17, 9 June 2013 (UTC)
I corrected an obvious discrepancy (probably a typo) between the "Evolution of Reparations" chart and the text. I'm assuming that the table should have read 28.35 as in the text, rather than 8. However, the numbers still seem inconsistent. For example, 28.35/112 = 0.253. However, this conversion factor suggests that 2 billion gold marks should equal $506 million as opposed to the figure provided. This may be the result of a change in the conversion rate, but it would be helpful if this could be clarified. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.46.186.240 ( talk) 08:07, 18 October 2010 (UTC)
On pg 447 the initial amount is 226 billion gold marks which in the source says 55 billion dollars: [3]
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help)On p. 261 the initial amount is 225 billion gold marks which in the source says 56.25 billion dollars:
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help)But then it appears that London Ultimatum of May 1921 fixed Germany's aggregate liability at 132 billion gold marks:
On p. 410 the initial amount is 226 billion gold marks which in April of 1921 was changed to 132 billion gold marks [4]:
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help) - Total pages: 674 On p. 61 the initial amount is 226 billion gold marks which in April of 1921 was changed to 132 billion gold marks or 33 billion dollars in 1921: [5]:
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help) - Total pages: 263 Therefore I'd like to edit the article to show that in early 1921 the initial amount was about 226 billion gold marks or $US 56 billion (US$ 957 in 2024) but after the London Ultimatum of May 1921 fixed the German amount at 132 billion gold marks or $US 33 billion (US$ 564 in 2024). -- Esemono ( talk) 00:30, 19 October 2010 (UTC)
Article is fantastic as it is. No need for change, it is backed with fact and historical representation. There is weight, and this is appropriated with different opinions. 222.110.9.203 ( talk) 02:55, 8 February 2011 (UTC)
Perhaps it would be best to have a separate resource for historical money convertibility for this and other articles.
The Measuring Worth calculator, linked from Historical Dollar-to-Marks Currency Conversion Page, written by Professor of German History at UC Santa Barbara, provides the following conversion range:—
From Measuring Worth,
In 2013, the relative value of $12,500,000,000.00 from 1921 ranges from $130,000,000,000.00 to $2,820,000,000,000.00.
A perspective as to the magnitude of Germany's debt.
The calculator arrives at valuations from $130 Billion to $2.8 trillion USD — a lot more than the misleading "$12.5 billion" (in 1921 dollars). Saying "$12.5 billion dollars" does not give the reader any perspective or appreciation for the amount of debt. The article could say instead "$12.5 billion in 1921 US Dollars [link to currency calculator]".
Measuring valuation in gold, the so-called "original research" is informative, if not too conservative. Xkit ( talk) 19:49, 18 October 2014 (UTC)
I renamed the "Bibliography" section to "References." I'm guessing that is ok because all other articles have "References" as its bibliography section. Please do correct me if I am wrong (and reply to this message). -- Michaelzeng7 ( talk) 00:22, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
This article currently has a mixture of "British" and American spelling and formatting. I propose standardizing on (non-OUP) British spelling and formatting, and flagging this to request maintenance of consistency.
-- Boson ( talk) 18:22, 5 February 2012 (UTC)
In 1921, the Reparation Payment figure was established at 132,000 million gold marks seperated into three caterogies. 80,000 million marks were classified as class C. Class C "amounted to indefintate postponement of about 80,000 millions...".(Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe, pp. 22-23) — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.8.192.142 ( talk) 12:51, 23 May 2012 (UTC)
Can someone who has access to the Sally Marks reference please check whether the 50 million stated is correct? 132 Billion to 50 million does not seem plausible given the statements later in the article. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Pmarshal ( talk • contribs) 10:18, 11 January 2013 (UTC) I changed the 50 million to 50 billion, since later in the article it is quoted that the A and B bonds together valued 50 billion marks. Pmarshal ( talk) 10:30, 11 January 2013 (UTC)
In many ways, the Versailles reparations were a reply to the reparations placed upon France by Germany through the 1871 Treaty of Frankfurt, signed after the Franco-Prussian War. citation needed Indemnities of the Treaty of Frankfurt were in turn calculated, on the basis of population, as the precise equivalent of the indemnities demanded by Napoleon after the defeat of Prussia. citation needed
- the above needs solid sourcing before being reintegrated into the article
Infrastructure damage caused by the retreating German troops was also cited. In her book, Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War, Margaret MacMillan described the significance of the claims for French and Belgium: "From the start, France and Belgium argued that claims for direct damage should receive priority in any distribution of reparations. In the heavily industrialized north of France, the Germans had shipped out what they wanted for their own use and destroyed much of the rest. Even as German forces were retreating in 1918, they found time to blow up France's most important coal mine".(MacMillan, p. ?)
- the above has mostly been sourced through other books and is largely within the article. The point that the French and Belgians wanted reps for damages and the Germans transported material they did not destroy, should be added back into the article. However, having checked the history of the article for the last three years, no page information has ever been given. Can anyone verify MacMillan stated these things? EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 21:28, 15 December 2013 (UTC)
I am aware that the main feature of the Young Plan was sorting out how much Germany had to pay per year and for how long. However, looking back through the article it notes that it also reduced - by 25 per cent - the sum of reparations Germany had to pay from 132 to 116 billion. As we all know, the Germans only needed to pay 50 billion of the former sum. Did the Young Plan take into account the A, B, and C Bonds? Did the Young Plan actually increase the amount Germany was obliged to pay? EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 00:13, 18 December 2013 (UTC)
Until a better source is found that deals with the issue as a whole, the following two discuss what Bulgaria paid. Would use, in something akin to the below, breech WP:SYN?
Example: Between the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine and April 1922, Bulgaria paid 173 million gold francs in reparations.( link). In March 1923, the Bulgarian reparation figure was lowered to 555 million gold francs. Between 1925 and 1925, Bulgaria paid a further 41 million gold francs, before reparations were abandoned at the Lausanne conference.( link) EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 23:44, 20 December 2013 (UTC)
Notes: Gold francs converted to pound sterling
Bulgarian reps were very reasonable : link on the other hand they produced a heavy economic burden link
German (132bil) and Bulgarian reps in pound sterling: link
collapse of Hungarian and Austrian economy meant it paid nothing: link
Strain on Bulgarian economy: link
brief history of Bulgarian reps: link
"The Protocols applying the Hoover Moratorium to the reparation payments of Bulgaria and Hungary were not signed until January 22, 1932": link
To deal with the implementation of the Dawes Plan, a conference took place in London in July–August 1924. [1] The British Prime Minister J. Ramsay MacDonald, who accepted Keynes's view of reparations as impossible to pay successfully pressured the French Premier Édouard Herriot into a whole series of concessions to Germany. [2] A British onlooker, the diplomat Sir Eric Phipps commented that “The London Conference was for the French “man in the street” one long Calvary…as he saw M. Herriot abandoning one by one the cherished possessions of French preponderance on the Reparations Commission, the right of sanctions in the event of German default, the economic occupation of the Ruhr, the French-Belgian railroad Régie, and finally, the military occupation of the Ruhr within a year.” [3]
"Frustrated at Germany's unwillingness to pay reparations, Poincaré hoped for joint Anglo-French economic sanctions against Germany in 1922 and opposed military action. However by December 1922 he was faced with Anglo-American-German hostility and saw coal for French steel production draining away. Poincaré was exasperated with British failure to act, and wrote to the French ambassador in London:"
Is this supported by Schwarzschild, p. 140? EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 12:15, 21 February 2014 (UTC)
Mantoux was a Frenchman seeking a new round of German reparations after WW2. His polemics are not accepted by scholars, for as Feinstein (1995) has pointed out there were deep flaws in Mantoux's argument. He made all sorts of unhistorical assumptions regarding the Allies (he assumed they would not raise reparations as the German economy grew) and he underestimated the reluctance of the Germans to pay more taxes when they already saw reparations as oppressive and unjust. Feinstein concludes, "The payments were a paramount cause of instability and a barrier to international economic co-operation." see Feinstein, Charles H. (1995). Banking, Currency, and Finance in Europe Between the Wars. Oxford UP. p. 32. This is serious scholarship that has to be included or readers might think that Mantoux had the last word and is still considered valid by scholars. Rjensen ( talk) 16:42, 1 March 2014 (UTC)
This table by Ritschl has the A+B bonds (50bn not 40) together as 98% of 1913 GNP. Not unpayable but not exactly measly either. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.90.253.55 ( talk) 03:29, 12 July 2015 (UTC)
Mantoux said that Germany could pay for the whole damage caused by the war, and he set out to prove that many of Keynes' forecasts were not verified by subsequent events. For example, Keynes believed European output in iron would decrease, but by 1929 iron output in Europe was up 10 per cent from the 1913 figure. Keynes predicted that German iron and steel output would decrease, but by 1927 steel output increased by 30 per cent and iron output increased by 38 per cent from 1913 (within the pre-war borders). Keynes also argued that German coal mining efficiency would decrease but labour efficiency by 1929 had increased on the 1913 figure by 30 per cent. Keynes contended that Germany would be unable to export coal immediately after the Treaty but German net coal exports were 15 million tons within a year and by 1926 the tonnage exported reached 35 million. He also put forward the claim that German national savings in the years after the Treaty would be less than 2 billion marks; however, in 1925 the German national savings figure was estimated at 6.4 billion marks and in 1927, 7.6 billion marks. Keynes also believed that Germany would be unable to pay the more than 2 billion marks in reparations for the next 30 years, but Mantoux contends that German rearmament spending was seven times as much as that figure in each year between 1933 and 1939. Mantoux, however, ignores numerous intervening factors, such as the relaxation and eventual suspension of reparations payments, and the frequent defaults of Germany, and the serious economic consequences when these payments were carried out on time.
The above has been pulled from the article due to a lack of citations. Can anyone help with citing? Regards EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 23:06, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
"Historians, such as the Canadian historian Margaret MacMillan in her 2001 book Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War, have since disagreed with this analysis made by Keynes."
I only have access to the preview of this work via google books. From what I can preview, I can only see her commenting about what Keynes' thought, published, or said. I do not see any analytical comments. Can anyone provide a particular page for me to look at, or a quote to use?
From "Modern", per WP:COATRACK (article is about reparations, not Keynes vs. Mantoux:
Robert Cord comments that until the release of Mantoux's work, "nobody seemed capable of mounting a serious challenge to his economic arguments." Despite Mantoux mounting a "convincing broadside" against Keynes' work, his "attack came far too late to do any real damage to Keynes's reputation". [4] Ruth Henig notes that while Mantoux did not rival Keynes' "in terms of immediate impact or huge sales" his "arguments have been supported and reinforced in more recent historical writing" resulting in the scholarly consensus now resting on the position that Germany was capable of paying what had been asked for. [5]
References
Marks p. 245
was invoked but never defined (see the
help page).Marks p. 249
was invoked but never defined (see the
help page).Cord41
was invoked but never defined (see the
help page).Henig63
was invoked but never defined (see the
help page).Cheers, Baffle gab1978 ( talk) 02:04, 9 June 2014 (UTC)
The section that says article 231 was mistranslated which features only an excerpt of the article seems like complete bullshit.
This is the complete English version of the article:
"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."
Only the bold part is cited in the article. How does "imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." at the end not mean exclusive war guilt? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:8108:1E00:1924:1865:1FF6:7CE:B7F3 ( talk) 22:09, 11 July 2015 (UTC)
WTF Enigma you can't remove talk page discussions like this. The problem is not what the intention of the authors were (to establish a legal framework for reparations rather than assign guilt) the problem is that this article claims the guilt question came about only by intentional mis-translation of the devious German government for domestic and foreign propaganda purposes which is demonstrably false when the authoritative English version of the article already allows a reading (to put it mildly) of assigned German guilt. It even states that only people who didn't read the English article could for this alleged German propaganda.
I'll cite the whole section of the article I find problematic:
Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles was not correctly translated. Instead of stating "... Germany accepts responsibility of Germany and her allies causing all the loss and damage ...", the German Government's edition reads, "Germany admits it, that Germany and her allies, as authors of the war, are responsible for all losses and damages ...".[22] This resulted in a prevailing belief of humiliation among Germans; the article was seen as an injustice and there was a view that Germany had signed "away her honor".[23][24] Despite the public outrage, German government officials were aware "that Germany's position on this matter was not nearly so favorable as the imperial government had led the German public to believe during the war".[25] Politicians seeking international sympathy would continue to use the article for its propaganda value, persuading many who had not read the treaties that the article implied full war guilt.[19] German revisionist historians who later tried to ignore the validity of the clause found a ready audience among revisionist writers in France, Britain, and the USA.[26] The objective of both the politicians and historians was to prove that Germany was not solely guilty for causing the war; if that guilt could be disproved the legal requirement to pay reparations would disappear.[27]
A condensed version of this: /info/en/?search=Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles#Writing_of_the_article would be far more appropriate. Note that one of the American authors later expressed regret about the specific wording chosen.
(I do admit that my original post was not particular useful in outlining my concerns and starting a constructive discussion)
The introduction currently includes "The remaining 'C' bonds, which Germany did not have to pay, were designed to deceive the Anglo-French public into believing Germany was being heavily fined and punished for the war."
Changing this unsourced statement to "to induce the United States government to cancel war debts owed by the Allied countries", as per http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Reparations-The-versailles-settlement.html.
There is also an issue with this quote in the article:
This should probably be deleted as I cannot see how to justify inclusion while providing facts that contrast with it. The Treaty of Frankfurt (1871) required the payment of 5 billion francs, at a time when 1 franc = 0.290322581 g gold, so 1451 tons (1,451,613 kg) of gold. The German war debt was 132 billion gold marks, when 1 mark = 0.358 g gold, so 47,256 tons of gold (~47,256,000 kg). This is not similar, it is about 32 times higher. 2601:600:8500:B2D9:39C2:C75C:DEF0:5B44 ( talk) 03:19, 16 July 2015 (UTC)
Germany did continue paying off the World War I reparations after 1945. At the London Agreement on German External Debts, Germany agreed to pay 16 billion Deutschmarks that were still on the books due to the Treaty of Versailles and had been converted into private debts in 1930. Germany paid these 16 billions in the years 1952 up until 1983. In 1990, interests on the Versailles debts for the years 1945 up until 1952 became due thanks to re-unification, and from 1990 up until 2010, Germany paid another 56 million Euros. -- 79.242.222.168 ( talk) 14:33, 5 June 2016 (UTC)
The article doesn't mention the vast powers attributed to the Reparation Commission, which The Economic Consequences of the Peace describes in a rather detailed way. Did the Commission succeed in confiscating German property abroad? Did it formally use its power to authorise the invasion of Germany to exact payments? Or to require that Germany enact certain laws as required to pay for reparations? Did it establish a staff of hundreds? Did it ever receive all the documents about German assets/liabilities which were to be sent within 6 months?
The article seems to be written under the 1918 mindset, described by Keynes, according to which all such clauses were irrelevant because Germany could have easily paid if only it wanted and the clauses would only be necessary in case of a lack of German will. A century later, we know a bit more than that, we don't need to repeat the same worn arguments of the demagogues of 1918. Nemo 08:52, 21 January 2019 (UTC)
This article if very focused on listing chronological events and providing a series of selected opinions by various historians, but seems to entirely disregard any economic consideration. Britannicus above claims that «Since the 1970s, with access to archives unavailable to previous historians of the outdated Keynesian consensus, historians now largely concur [...]» which again neglects how macroeconomic conclusions can be reached.
The central tenant of The Economic Consequences of the Peace ( text) is that the economic capacity to pay for reparations needed a functioning international trade system and that paying for financial reparations would require an enormous improvement in Germany's balance of trade. Yet this is not even mentioned, except one point where we're informed of one historian's opinion (William R. Keylor) that it would be easy to generate an "export surplus" by means of taxation (on what? wine?). Towards the end of chapter V.3, Keynes does say that
On the side of imports, rather more is possible. By lowering the standard of life, an appreciable reduction of expenditure on imported commodities may be possible. But, as we have already seen, many large items are incapable of reduction without reacting on the volume of exports.
For such macroeconomic considerations, it would be more prudent to refer to economic studies. Nemo 08:52, 21 January 2019 (UTC)
As for the suggestion that Sally Marks is virtually unknown, please see: https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/september-2018/sally-marks-(1931%E2%80%932018)
The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.
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Reviewer: MrClog ( talk · contribs) 01:27, 23 March 2020 (UTC)
I will start reviewing in the coming 7 days. -- MrClog ( talk) 01:27, 23 March 2020 (UTC)
German Government" consistently written with the capital "[G]overnment"?
in the autumn of 1918 because the Central Powers, one after another, defeated in battle and overtaken by revolution". I dont think it would be a big deal to remove it though, without undermining the sourcing of the info. EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 15:25, 1 April 2020 (UTC)
French troops were to withdraw from the Ruhr" - Why only the French troops?
However, they considered the plan a temporary measure and expected a revised plan at a future date." - Why did they?
5.8 million voters" - How many voted in total?
In effect, therefore, America paid reparations to Germany—four times more, in price-adjusted terms, than the U.S. furnished to West Germany under the post-1948 Marshall Plan." This sentence as a whole confuses me; why would the U.S. pay reparations to Germany?
subject — Preceding unsigned comment added by NaethanC76 ( talk • contribs) 17:48, 13 July 2020 (UTC)
The Young plan was widely regarded as a German diplomatic victory, including by Germany itself. But as the table in the article says the Young plan stipulated payment of 112 billion Goldmark. That is more than double of the 50 billion Goldmark of the A and B bonds.
Why would Germany regard a doubling of it's reparations as a victory? It only makes sense if the C-Bonds were meant to be payed since then we have a reduction of 20 Billion Goldmark. 2A02:8109:9B80:3CDC:59A0:64:E384:67A ( talk) 12:13, 24 February 2023 (UTC)
As an opening sentence this is not particularly good. Of the Central Powers, only Germany signed the Versailles treaty. The reparations paid by Bulgaria, for example, were not decided by the Art. 231 of the Versailles treaty but by Art. 121 of the Treaty of Neuilly. "Were made" in passive voice is also not a good start - the Central Powers themselves signed the treaties that agreed this. "pay" is a more accurate term than "give" since this was hardly charity. FOARP ( talk) 11:38, 22 February 2024 (UTC)
World War I reparations was a History good articles nominee, but did not meet the good article criteria at the time. There may be suggestions below for improving the article. Once these issues have been addressed, the article can be renominated. Editors may also seek a reassessment of the decision if they believe there was a mistake. | ||||||||||||||||
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Does anyone know what the effect of reparations had on the economy of the other state except Germany? What did the Entente states (France, UK or Italy) with the goods they got from Germany for free? Did they sell them on the own market? What effect had this cheap business competion to companies in those nation? A bad one? A good one? Please tell me if somebody knows informations about that. Maxian D-C ( talk) 12:06, 25 May 2012 (UTC)
I express a personal point of view: I think the importation of “excessively” cheep goods from one country to another damages the recipient countries economy. There are a number of things that effect the economy of a country, perhaps, the most important are the (1) amount of money in circulation (2) its distribution and (3) it's velocity, how quickly it changes hands. “Paper money” is in reality a human construct, has no real value and is in fact a promissory note. True wealth is crated by people at work, example; if farmers don't grow food we all starve. If people are unemployed no wealth is crated. If no wealth is created then the promissory notes we call money is just a piece of paper and its promise is false one. I believe Hitler understood this which is why in 1933, when he came to power, he put people to work building the autobahns and his war machine, interestingly in the early day he did not allow industry to use labour saving machines. This is counter intuitive, but in this way he put money in the hands of working people, who create wealth, this increasing the amount of money in the real economy improved its distribution and increased its velocity. Today we see the effect that “excessively cheep” goods, first from Japan and now China, are having on the economies of American and European. Buying these cheep imports removes money from the real economy concentrates it in the hands of the few and reduces its velocity. Let me make it clear I am not a fan of Mr Hitler's however the fact is came to power January 1933 by 1939 just a little over six years the German economy was strong enough to fight another war and he nearly won.
German wikipedia has contradicting information regarding by when payment of reparations will have finished; accd to them, all payments should be over by 2010. And they have good sources, as they link to the article by German Ministry of Finance. Anyone knows who's right and who's wrong? agnus ( talk) 13:19, 25 January 2009 (UTC)
Germany is officially done paying reparations. I don't remember when, but now we can talk about it as a past occurence. 99.235.193.246 ( talk) 01:57, 24 December 2010 (UTC)
It means that germany had to pay reparitions. It matters when they have finished, and it when it is done, it will be put in. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 208.27.38.9 ( talk) 18:36, 4 May 2012 (UTC)
This article seems to have been the target of POV pushing. Note especially these two sets of edits: [1], [2].
The POV pushing can also be learned from the sources used: John Maynard Keynes, eminent economist and financial representative for England in Versailles is used for 3 sentences. Meanwhile Sally Marks (who is that?) is used as a source a whooping 43(!) times, for a total of several paragraphs. The unknown french economist Étienne Mantoux is also cited at length to disprove Keynes calculations (a ridiculous excercise, since data is taken from years when the original reparations had already been reduced).
Or look at another source that is widely used to back up the pushed POV: A lengthy paragraph is made out of Niall Ferguson's claim that Germany could have easily paid the reparations. Take a look at some other claims made in that book (taken from the wiki page):
Calling this guy controversial is a huge understatement.
At the moment this article is hugely unbalanced and needs a lot of changes. -- Xeeron ( talk) 16:23, 1 October 2010 (UTC)
Moreover, John Kenneth Galbraith, (who was a friend and an admirer of Keynes) writing in his memories in 1986 stated in retrospect Keynes was wrong and Mantoux was right. The same goes even more with Marks. To answer the question, who is Sally Marks? She is the Professor Emerita of History at Rhode Island College, Providence, and one of the most respect historians working on the field of international relations in the 1920s. It is a very strange procedure that because Keynes is so much famous than Marks that must prove him and her wrong. Marks wrote that essay, which everyone around here finds so objectionable in 1978, and thus had much better access to all sorts of sources that Keynes did not have in 1919. How very odd that the fame of the individual as opposed to what they actually have to say just be used as the basis for who is right and who is wrong on this issue. If I understand the rules correctly here, what an article is supposed to say is what the current scholarly consensus is, not just citing the most famous person who on a subject. I resent that charge I was engaged in POV-pushing, through perhaps I did use somewhat aggressive language. I just merely trying to this article up to reflect what is the current consensus on the subject, by citing some well regarded sources that must people had never heard of, let alone used-- A.S. Brown ( talk) 03:05, 3 February 2011 (UTC)
I understand and agree with the need for balance. Certainly one area that might add balance is that Germany was politically unwilling - perhaps unable - to pay the reparations. They did make a conscious choice to inflate their currency and that choice was political, not economic. The French annexation of the Ruhr seemed the pivot point that led to Von Havenstein printing money at the Reichsbank. While it was a political calculation, it was a calculation driven by reparations. Most of my information is coming from Liaquat Ahamed's book Lords of Finance. Hawesg ( talk) 01:11, 25 June 2011 (UTC)
As I see it, the reparations were two things: 1) an Allied demand for German money (or goods), and 2) an important element of the scolding and punishment of Germany. Keynes discusses both of these in the "Economic Consequences"; the Wikipedia article, only the first. RobLandau ( talk) 19:17, 9 June 2013 (UTC)
I corrected an obvious discrepancy (probably a typo) between the "Evolution of Reparations" chart and the text. I'm assuming that the table should have read 28.35 as in the text, rather than 8. However, the numbers still seem inconsistent. For example, 28.35/112 = 0.253. However, this conversion factor suggests that 2 billion gold marks should equal $506 million as opposed to the figure provided. This may be the result of a change in the conversion rate, but it would be helpful if this could be clarified. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.46.186.240 ( talk) 08:07, 18 October 2010 (UTC)
On pg 447 the initial amount is 226 billion gold marks which in the source says 55 billion dollars: [3]
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help)On p. 261 the initial amount is 225 billion gold marks which in the source says 56.25 billion dollars:
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help)But then it appears that London Ultimatum of May 1921 fixed Germany's aggregate liability at 132 billion gold marks:
On p. 410 the initial amount is 226 billion gold marks which in April of 1921 was changed to 132 billion gold marks [4]:
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help) - Total pages: 674 On p. 61 the initial amount is 226 billion gold marks which in April of 1921 was changed to 132 billion gold marks or 33 billion dollars in 1921: [5]:
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help) - Total pages: 263 Therefore I'd like to edit the article to show that in early 1921 the initial amount was about 226 billion gold marks or $US 56 billion (US$ 957 in 2024) but after the London Ultimatum of May 1921 fixed the German amount at 132 billion gold marks or $US 33 billion (US$ 564 in 2024). -- Esemono ( talk) 00:30, 19 October 2010 (UTC)
Article is fantastic as it is. No need for change, it is backed with fact and historical representation. There is weight, and this is appropriated with different opinions. 222.110.9.203 ( talk) 02:55, 8 February 2011 (UTC)
Perhaps it would be best to have a separate resource for historical money convertibility for this and other articles.
The Measuring Worth calculator, linked from Historical Dollar-to-Marks Currency Conversion Page, written by Professor of German History at UC Santa Barbara, provides the following conversion range:—
From Measuring Worth,
In 2013, the relative value of $12,500,000,000.00 from 1921 ranges from $130,000,000,000.00 to $2,820,000,000,000.00.
A perspective as to the magnitude of Germany's debt.
The calculator arrives at valuations from $130 Billion to $2.8 trillion USD — a lot more than the misleading "$12.5 billion" (in 1921 dollars). Saying "$12.5 billion dollars" does not give the reader any perspective or appreciation for the amount of debt. The article could say instead "$12.5 billion in 1921 US Dollars [link to currency calculator]".
Measuring valuation in gold, the so-called "original research" is informative, if not too conservative. Xkit ( talk) 19:49, 18 October 2014 (UTC)
I renamed the "Bibliography" section to "References." I'm guessing that is ok because all other articles have "References" as its bibliography section. Please do correct me if I am wrong (and reply to this message). -- Michaelzeng7 ( talk) 00:22, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
This article currently has a mixture of "British" and American spelling and formatting. I propose standardizing on (non-OUP) British spelling and formatting, and flagging this to request maintenance of consistency.
-- Boson ( talk) 18:22, 5 February 2012 (UTC)
In 1921, the Reparation Payment figure was established at 132,000 million gold marks seperated into three caterogies. 80,000 million marks were classified as class C. Class C "amounted to indefintate postponement of about 80,000 millions...".(Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe, pp. 22-23) — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.8.192.142 ( talk) 12:51, 23 May 2012 (UTC)
Can someone who has access to the Sally Marks reference please check whether the 50 million stated is correct? 132 Billion to 50 million does not seem plausible given the statements later in the article. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Pmarshal ( talk • contribs) 10:18, 11 January 2013 (UTC) I changed the 50 million to 50 billion, since later in the article it is quoted that the A and B bonds together valued 50 billion marks. Pmarshal ( talk) 10:30, 11 January 2013 (UTC)
In many ways, the Versailles reparations were a reply to the reparations placed upon France by Germany through the 1871 Treaty of Frankfurt, signed after the Franco-Prussian War. citation needed Indemnities of the Treaty of Frankfurt were in turn calculated, on the basis of population, as the precise equivalent of the indemnities demanded by Napoleon after the defeat of Prussia. citation needed
- the above needs solid sourcing before being reintegrated into the article
Infrastructure damage caused by the retreating German troops was also cited. In her book, Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War, Margaret MacMillan described the significance of the claims for French and Belgium: "From the start, France and Belgium argued that claims for direct damage should receive priority in any distribution of reparations. In the heavily industrialized north of France, the Germans had shipped out what they wanted for their own use and destroyed much of the rest. Even as German forces were retreating in 1918, they found time to blow up France's most important coal mine".(MacMillan, p. ?)
- the above has mostly been sourced through other books and is largely within the article. The point that the French and Belgians wanted reps for damages and the Germans transported material they did not destroy, should be added back into the article. However, having checked the history of the article for the last three years, no page information has ever been given. Can anyone verify MacMillan stated these things? EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 21:28, 15 December 2013 (UTC)
I am aware that the main feature of the Young Plan was sorting out how much Germany had to pay per year and for how long. However, looking back through the article it notes that it also reduced - by 25 per cent - the sum of reparations Germany had to pay from 132 to 116 billion. As we all know, the Germans only needed to pay 50 billion of the former sum. Did the Young Plan take into account the A, B, and C Bonds? Did the Young Plan actually increase the amount Germany was obliged to pay? EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 00:13, 18 December 2013 (UTC)
Until a better source is found that deals with the issue as a whole, the following two discuss what Bulgaria paid. Would use, in something akin to the below, breech WP:SYN?
Example: Between the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine and April 1922, Bulgaria paid 173 million gold francs in reparations.( link). In March 1923, the Bulgarian reparation figure was lowered to 555 million gold francs. Between 1925 and 1925, Bulgaria paid a further 41 million gold francs, before reparations were abandoned at the Lausanne conference.( link) EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 23:44, 20 December 2013 (UTC)
Notes: Gold francs converted to pound sterling
Bulgarian reps were very reasonable : link on the other hand they produced a heavy economic burden link
German (132bil) and Bulgarian reps in pound sterling: link
collapse of Hungarian and Austrian economy meant it paid nothing: link
Strain on Bulgarian economy: link
brief history of Bulgarian reps: link
"The Protocols applying the Hoover Moratorium to the reparation payments of Bulgaria and Hungary were not signed until January 22, 1932": link
To deal with the implementation of the Dawes Plan, a conference took place in London in July–August 1924. [1] The British Prime Minister J. Ramsay MacDonald, who accepted Keynes's view of reparations as impossible to pay successfully pressured the French Premier Édouard Herriot into a whole series of concessions to Germany. [2] A British onlooker, the diplomat Sir Eric Phipps commented that “The London Conference was for the French “man in the street” one long Calvary…as he saw M. Herriot abandoning one by one the cherished possessions of French preponderance on the Reparations Commission, the right of sanctions in the event of German default, the economic occupation of the Ruhr, the French-Belgian railroad Régie, and finally, the military occupation of the Ruhr within a year.” [3]
"Frustrated at Germany's unwillingness to pay reparations, Poincaré hoped for joint Anglo-French economic sanctions against Germany in 1922 and opposed military action. However by December 1922 he was faced with Anglo-American-German hostility and saw coal for French steel production draining away. Poincaré was exasperated with British failure to act, and wrote to the French ambassador in London:"
Is this supported by Schwarzschild, p. 140? EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 12:15, 21 February 2014 (UTC)
Mantoux was a Frenchman seeking a new round of German reparations after WW2. His polemics are not accepted by scholars, for as Feinstein (1995) has pointed out there were deep flaws in Mantoux's argument. He made all sorts of unhistorical assumptions regarding the Allies (he assumed they would not raise reparations as the German economy grew) and he underestimated the reluctance of the Germans to pay more taxes when they already saw reparations as oppressive and unjust. Feinstein concludes, "The payments were a paramount cause of instability and a barrier to international economic co-operation." see Feinstein, Charles H. (1995). Banking, Currency, and Finance in Europe Between the Wars. Oxford UP. p. 32. This is serious scholarship that has to be included or readers might think that Mantoux had the last word and is still considered valid by scholars. Rjensen ( talk) 16:42, 1 March 2014 (UTC)
This table by Ritschl has the A+B bonds (50bn not 40) together as 98% of 1913 GNP. Not unpayable but not exactly measly either. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.90.253.55 ( talk) 03:29, 12 July 2015 (UTC)
Mantoux said that Germany could pay for the whole damage caused by the war, and he set out to prove that many of Keynes' forecasts were not verified by subsequent events. For example, Keynes believed European output in iron would decrease, but by 1929 iron output in Europe was up 10 per cent from the 1913 figure. Keynes predicted that German iron and steel output would decrease, but by 1927 steel output increased by 30 per cent and iron output increased by 38 per cent from 1913 (within the pre-war borders). Keynes also argued that German coal mining efficiency would decrease but labour efficiency by 1929 had increased on the 1913 figure by 30 per cent. Keynes contended that Germany would be unable to export coal immediately after the Treaty but German net coal exports were 15 million tons within a year and by 1926 the tonnage exported reached 35 million. He also put forward the claim that German national savings in the years after the Treaty would be less than 2 billion marks; however, in 1925 the German national savings figure was estimated at 6.4 billion marks and in 1927, 7.6 billion marks. Keynes also believed that Germany would be unable to pay the more than 2 billion marks in reparations for the next 30 years, but Mantoux contends that German rearmament spending was seven times as much as that figure in each year between 1933 and 1939. Mantoux, however, ignores numerous intervening factors, such as the relaxation and eventual suspension of reparations payments, and the frequent defaults of Germany, and the serious economic consequences when these payments were carried out on time.
The above has been pulled from the article due to a lack of citations. Can anyone help with citing? Regards EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 23:06, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
"Historians, such as the Canadian historian Margaret MacMillan in her 2001 book Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War, have since disagreed with this analysis made by Keynes."
I only have access to the preview of this work via google books. From what I can preview, I can only see her commenting about what Keynes' thought, published, or said. I do not see any analytical comments. Can anyone provide a particular page for me to look at, or a quote to use?
From "Modern", per WP:COATRACK (article is about reparations, not Keynes vs. Mantoux:
Robert Cord comments that until the release of Mantoux's work, "nobody seemed capable of mounting a serious challenge to his economic arguments." Despite Mantoux mounting a "convincing broadside" against Keynes' work, his "attack came far too late to do any real damage to Keynes's reputation". [4] Ruth Henig notes that while Mantoux did not rival Keynes' "in terms of immediate impact or huge sales" his "arguments have been supported and reinforced in more recent historical writing" resulting in the scholarly consensus now resting on the position that Germany was capable of paying what had been asked for. [5]
References
Marks p. 245
was invoked but never defined (see the
help page).Marks p. 249
was invoked but never defined (see the
help page).Cord41
was invoked but never defined (see the
help page).Henig63
was invoked but never defined (see the
help page).Cheers, Baffle gab1978 ( talk) 02:04, 9 June 2014 (UTC)
The section that says article 231 was mistranslated which features only an excerpt of the article seems like complete bullshit.
This is the complete English version of the article:
"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."
Only the bold part is cited in the article. How does "imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." at the end not mean exclusive war guilt? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:8108:1E00:1924:1865:1FF6:7CE:B7F3 ( talk) 22:09, 11 July 2015 (UTC)
WTF Enigma you can't remove talk page discussions like this. The problem is not what the intention of the authors were (to establish a legal framework for reparations rather than assign guilt) the problem is that this article claims the guilt question came about only by intentional mis-translation of the devious German government for domestic and foreign propaganda purposes which is demonstrably false when the authoritative English version of the article already allows a reading (to put it mildly) of assigned German guilt. It even states that only people who didn't read the English article could for this alleged German propaganda.
I'll cite the whole section of the article I find problematic:
Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles was not correctly translated. Instead of stating "... Germany accepts responsibility of Germany and her allies causing all the loss and damage ...", the German Government's edition reads, "Germany admits it, that Germany and her allies, as authors of the war, are responsible for all losses and damages ...".[22] This resulted in a prevailing belief of humiliation among Germans; the article was seen as an injustice and there was a view that Germany had signed "away her honor".[23][24] Despite the public outrage, German government officials were aware "that Germany's position on this matter was not nearly so favorable as the imperial government had led the German public to believe during the war".[25] Politicians seeking international sympathy would continue to use the article for its propaganda value, persuading many who had not read the treaties that the article implied full war guilt.[19] German revisionist historians who later tried to ignore the validity of the clause found a ready audience among revisionist writers in France, Britain, and the USA.[26] The objective of both the politicians and historians was to prove that Germany was not solely guilty for causing the war; if that guilt could be disproved the legal requirement to pay reparations would disappear.[27]
A condensed version of this: /info/en/?search=Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles#Writing_of_the_article would be far more appropriate. Note that one of the American authors later expressed regret about the specific wording chosen.
(I do admit that my original post was not particular useful in outlining my concerns and starting a constructive discussion)
The introduction currently includes "The remaining 'C' bonds, which Germany did not have to pay, were designed to deceive the Anglo-French public into believing Germany was being heavily fined and punished for the war."
Changing this unsourced statement to "to induce the United States government to cancel war debts owed by the Allied countries", as per http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Reparations-The-versailles-settlement.html.
There is also an issue with this quote in the article:
This should probably be deleted as I cannot see how to justify inclusion while providing facts that contrast with it. The Treaty of Frankfurt (1871) required the payment of 5 billion francs, at a time when 1 franc = 0.290322581 g gold, so 1451 tons (1,451,613 kg) of gold. The German war debt was 132 billion gold marks, when 1 mark = 0.358 g gold, so 47,256 tons of gold (~47,256,000 kg). This is not similar, it is about 32 times higher. 2601:600:8500:B2D9:39C2:C75C:DEF0:5B44 ( talk) 03:19, 16 July 2015 (UTC)
Germany did continue paying off the World War I reparations after 1945. At the London Agreement on German External Debts, Germany agreed to pay 16 billion Deutschmarks that were still on the books due to the Treaty of Versailles and had been converted into private debts in 1930. Germany paid these 16 billions in the years 1952 up until 1983. In 1990, interests on the Versailles debts for the years 1945 up until 1952 became due thanks to re-unification, and from 1990 up until 2010, Germany paid another 56 million Euros. -- 79.242.222.168 ( talk) 14:33, 5 June 2016 (UTC)
The article doesn't mention the vast powers attributed to the Reparation Commission, which The Economic Consequences of the Peace describes in a rather detailed way. Did the Commission succeed in confiscating German property abroad? Did it formally use its power to authorise the invasion of Germany to exact payments? Or to require that Germany enact certain laws as required to pay for reparations? Did it establish a staff of hundreds? Did it ever receive all the documents about German assets/liabilities which were to be sent within 6 months?
The article seems to be written under the 1918 mindset, described by Keynes, according to which all such clauses were irrelevant because Germany could have easily paid if only it wanted and the clauses would only be necessary in case of a lack of German will. A century later, we know a bit more than that, we don't need to repeat the same worn arguments of the demagogues of 1918. Nemo 08:52, 21 January 2019 (UTC)
This article if very focused on listing chronological events and providing a series of selected opinions by various historians, but seems to entirely disregard any economic consideration. Britannicus above claims that «Since the 1970s, with access to archives unavailable to previous historians of the outdated Keynesian consensus, historians now largely concur [...]» which again neglects how macroeconomic conclusions can be reached.
The central tenant of The Economic Consequences of the Peace ( text) is that the economic capacity to pay for reparations needed a functioning international trade system and that paying for financial reparations would require an enormous improvement in Germany's balance of trade. Yet this is not even mentioned, except one point where we're informed of one historian's opinion (William R. Keylor) that it would be easy to generate an "export surplus" by means of taxation (on what? wine?). Towards the end of chapter V.3, Keynes does say that
On the side of imports, rather more is possible. By lowering the standard of life, an appreciable reduction of expenditure on imported commodities may be possible. But, as we have already seen, many large items are incapable of reduction without reacting on the volume of exports.
For such macroeconomic considerations, it would be more prudent to refer to economic studies. Nemo 08:52, 21 January 2019 (UTC)
As for the suggestion that Sally Marks is virtually unknown, please see: https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/september-2018/sally-marks-(1931%E2%80%932018)
The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.
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I will start reviewing in the coming 7 days. -- MrClog ( talk) 01:27, 23 March 2020 (UTC)
German Government" consistently written with the capital "[G]overnment"?
in the autumn of 1918 because the Central Powers, one after another, defeated in battle and overtaken by revolution". I dont think it would be a big deal to remove it though, without undermining the sourcing of the info. EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 15:25, 1 April 2020 (UTC)
French troops were to withdraw from the Ruhr" - Why only the French troops?
However, they considered the plan a temporary measure and expected a revised plan at a future date." - Why did they?
5.8 million voters" - How many voted in total?
In effect, therefore, America paid reparations to Germany—four times more, in price-adjusted terms, than the U.S. furnished to West Germany under the post-1948 Marshall Plan." This sentence as a whole confuses me; why would the U.S. pay reparations to Germany?
subject — Preceding unsigned comment added by NaethanC76 ( talk • contribs) 17:48, 13 July 2020 (UTC)
The Young plan was widely regarded as a German diplomatic victory, including by Germany itself. But as the table in the article says the Young plan stipulated payment of 112 billion Goldmark. That is more than double of the 50 billion Goldmark of the A and B bonds.
Why would Germany regard a doubling of it's reparations as a victory? It only makes sense if the C-Bonds were meant to be payed since then we have a reduction of 20 Billion Goldmark. 2A02:8109:9B80:3CDC:59A0:64:E384:67A ( talk) 12:13, 24 February 2023 (UTC)
As an opening sentence this is not particularly good. Of the Central Powers, only Germany signed the Versailles treaty. The reparations paid by Bulgaria, for example, were not decided by the Art. 231 of the Versailles treaty but by Art. 121 of the Treaty of Neuilly. "Were made" in passive voice is also not a good start - the Central Powers themselves signed the treaties that agreed this. "pay" is a more accurate term than "give" since this was hardly charity. FOARP ( talk) 11:38, 22 February 2024 (UTC)