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Is this the warhead Samuel T. Cohen discusses in his Autobiography?
"In the way of predictions of things to come, that I’d never see Los Alamos again after the Albuquerque fiasco turned out to be dead wrong. Several years later, when I still was working with Bennie, he called me into his office one day. He had a problem. The Minuteman ICBM was in its final stages of development and, sitting atop the program, he had to make a decision on what kind of thermonuclear warhead to put into it. By “what kind”, I’m referring to the choice he had to make as to whether to put in a warhead being developed by Los Alamos or by the Livermore lab, that had matured considerably by then and was in hot competition with Los Alamos. He wanted me to go to both labs, size up their proposals, and report back to him with a recommendation. He was aware that I was still banned from Los Alamos and on the best of possible terms with Livermore, but thought I was capable of reaching an objective conclusion on the matter. I reluctantly accepted Bennie’s request; Los Alamos reluctantly accepted my visit despite Bradbury’s feelings toward me (he had no choice since this time it was Bennie who was sitting in the catbird seat); and Livermore was delighted no end to be able to push their product to their pal Sam. Off I went to the labs. At Livermore I was personally hosted by the director, Harold Brown, who later on became Jimmy Carter’s Defense Secretary. At Los Alamos, Bradbury refused to see me and put me in the hands of his deputy, an old friend of mine from wartime days. I listened as best I could to both sides (which wasn’t easy for me), took copious notes (far less easy), went back home and mulled over the matter. Pretty exhaustively, I might say, for my emotions were, to put it mildly, pretty torn. Finally, I came down on the side of the Los Alamos proposal, for reasons I won’t bother to explain here. I went to seeThe Commies Are Coming 83 Bennie and told him of my preference and why. He thanked me but gave no indication of what his decision might be. If you’re holding your breath waiting to find out which lab got the warhead you can start breathing again. Los Alamos. If you think, in telling you this tale, I’m trying to gain some credit for the decision, forget it. It’s possible I may have influenced Bennie with my analysis of the problem. However, as for the decision itself, I’ll requote the Joint Chiefs colonel: “Because it seemed like a good idea at the time.” Except in this case it wasn’t. Having gotten the bid, Los Alamos now set about to test the warhead. It was a miserable failure, going off, as I recall, at like about half the predicted yield. Which sure said a lot about my technical judgment. In the meantime, Livermore, having put in so much time and effort on the warhead, was determined to test it. It went off at about twice the predicted bang. There were a lot of red faces around, including mine. However the decision had been made and Los Alamos was now put to work, with help from Livermore, which really had to be humiliating, to bring the bang up to the promised level. They finally did, after a couple more tests."
Editors suggested that the RfC be restarted with a neutral and brief summary per Wikipedia:Requests for comment#Statement should be neutral and brief. Cunard ( talk) 01:12, 4 June 2017 (UTC)
At least one undisputed and one potential concern with source reliability exist in our article
W56 in the last sentence: "One warhead, owing to its use of high performance but high sensitivity PBX nearly experienced a high-explosive detonation with no nuclear yield in 2005 because an unsafe amount of pressure was applied to the non-insensitive high explosive while it was being disassembled.[3]". More sources of information on the "W56 mishap" exist, one of which refers to the nuclear detonation hazard and to statements made by workers at the plant where W56 mishap happened. Which of these sources should be used to provide more nearly accurate coverage of this notable mishap, a danger common to all W56 warheads?. Thanks in advance!
loupgarous (
talk)
01:26, 23 April 2017 (UTC)
Relevant information:
This seems to be the source for the information reported by UPI in reference three. Is it primary or secondary? The executive director of POGO refers to "safety experts knowledgeable about this event" (the W56 event) and to a letter signed by workers at the plant where the W56 mishap occurred.
While this is a blog entry (self-published) and of comparatively lower reliability than the UPI article or POGO's letter to the US Secretary of Energy (depending whether it's considered a primary or secondary source), it's also the opinion or someone with credentials to speak authoritatively on nuclear weapon safety issues.
It might be a good idea to quote Dr. Lewis and/or the late Mr. Hansen on the Pantex W56 mishap to balance the press reports based on POGO's letter to Secretary Bodman, and the letter from Pantex employees quoted by POGO, in order to make the article more closely NPOV. The relatively small pertinent excerpts from each of these sources could be paraphrased in a small paragraph in our article.
loupgarous ( talk) 03:47, 21 April 2017 (UTC)
![]() | This article is rated C-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Is this the warhead Samuel T. Cohen discusses in his Autobiography?
"In the way of predictions of things to come, that I’d never see Los Alamos again after the Albuquerque fiasco turned out to be dead wrong. Several years later, when I still was working with Bennie, he called me into his office one day. He had a problem. The Minuteman ICBM was in its final stages of development and, sitting atop the program, he had to make a decision on what kind of thermonuclear warhead to put into it. By “what kind”, I’m referring to the choice he had to make as to whether to put in a warhead being developed by Los Alamos or by the Livermore lab, that had matured considerably by then and was in hot competition with Los Alamos. He wanted me to go to both labs, size up their proposals, and report back to him with a recommendation. He was aware that I was still banned from Los Alamos and on the best of possible terms with Livermore, but thought I was capable of reaching an objective conclusion on the matter. I reluctantly accepted Bennie’s request; Los Alamos reluctantly accepted my visit despite Bradbury’s feelings toward me (he had no choice since this time it was Bennie who was sitting in the catbird seat); and Livermore was delighted no end to be able to push their product to their pal Sam. Off I went to the labs. At Livermore I was personally hosted by the director, Harold Brown, who later on became Jimmy Carter’s Defense Secretary. At Los Alamos, Bradbury refused to see me and put me in the hands of his deputy, an old friend of mine from wartime days. I listened as best I could to both sides (which wasn’t easy for me), took copious notes (far less easy), went back home and mulled over the matter. Pretty exhaustively, I might say, for my emotions were, to put it mildly, pretty torn. Finally, I came down on the side of the Los Alamos proposal, for reasons I won’t bother to explain here. I went to seeThe Commies Are Coming 83 Bennie and told him of my preference and why. He thanked me but gave no indication of what his decision might be. If you’re holding your breath waiting to find out which lab got the warhead you can start breathing again. Los Alamos. If you think, in telling you this tale, I’m trying to gain some credit for the decision, forget it. It’s possible I may have influenced Bennie with my analysis of the problem. However, as for the decision itself, I’ll requote the Joint Chiefs colonel: “Because it seemed like a good idea at the time.” Except in this case it wasn’t. Having gotten the bid, Los Alamos now set about to test the warhead. It was a miserable failure, going off, as I recall, at like about half the predicted yield. Which sure said a lot about my technical judgment. In the meantime, Livermore, having put in so much time and effort on the warhead, was determined to test it. It went off at about twice the predicted bang. There were a lot of red faces around, including mine. However the decision had been made and Los Alamos was now put to work, with help from Livermore, which really had to be humiliating, to bring the bang up to the promised level. They finally did, after a couple more tests."
Editors suggested that the RfC be restarted with a neutral and brief summary per Wikipedia:Requests for comment#Statement should be neutral and brief. Cunard ( talk) 01:12, 4 June 2017 (UTC)
At least one undisputed and one potential concern with source reliability exist in our article
W56 in the last sentence: "One warhead, owing to its use of high performance but high sensitivity PBX nearly experienced a high-explosive detonation with no nuclear yield in 2005 because an unsafe amount of pressure was applied to the non-insensitive high explosive while it was being disassembled.[3]". More sources of information on the "W56 mishap" exist, one of which refers to the nuclear detonation hazard and to statements made by workers at the plant where W56 mishap happened. Which of these sources should be used to provide more nearly accurate coverage of this notable mishap, a danger common to all W56 warheads?. Thanks in advance!
loupgarous (
talk)
01:26, 23 April 2017 (UTC)
Relevant information:
This seems to be the source for the information reported by UPI in reference three. Is it primary or secondary? The executive director of POGO refers to "safety experts knowledgeable about this event" (the W56 event) and to a letter signed by workers at the plant where the W56 mishap occurred.
While this is a blog entry (self-published) and of comparatively lower reliability than the UPI article or POGO's letter to the US Secretary of Energy (depending whether it's considered a primary or secondary source), it's also the opinion or someone with credentials to speak authoritatively on nuclear weapon safety issues.
It might be a good idea to quote Dr. Lewis and/or the late Mr. Hansen on the Pantex W56 mishap to balance the press reports based on POGO's letter to Secretary Bodman, and the letter from Pantex employees quoted by POGO, in order to make the article more closely NPOV. The relatively small pertinent excerpts from each of these sources could be paraphrased in a small paragraph in our article.
loupgarous ( talk) 03:47, 21 April 2017 (UTC)