![]() | This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 5 | ← | Archive 9 | Archive 10 | Archive 11 | Archive 12 | Archive 13 | Archive 14 |
I need to say a few things, as the posts on the previous section appear to be attacking me. I may be reading it incorrectly, but that is my impression at this point.
Syrian artillery attacks against Israeli civilian settlements in the vicinity of the border followed by Israeli responses against Syrian positions in the Golan Heights and encroachments of increasing intensity and frequency into the demilitarized zones along the Syrian border,
In the subsection headed "Arab": "As a result of the war, a wave of Palestinians was displaced. An estimated 300,000 Palestinians left the West Bank and Gaza, most of whom settled in Jordan."
I don't think the phrasing to the effect that a "wave" was "displaced" is good English - better to say that as a result of the war, 300k Palestinians were displaced from et etc. Also, were they actually settled in Jordan, or did they become refugees there? (I.e., were they given Jordanian citizenship or otherwise absorbed into the Jordanian population?) PiCo ( talk) 02:48, 31 July 2013 (UTC)
I have a serious problem with the second sentence of the introductory paragraph to this section. 1) The provided reference does not support the entry. 2) The sentence leaves the erroneous impression that only Syria was involved in the admonishment by the UN Security Council. 3) The sentence belongs (if at all) in the sub-section "Events: Israel - Syria. Erictheenquirer ( talk) 04:18, 12 September 2013 (UTC)
your reason: "The Johnston plan wasn't accepted by e.g. Syria, so it's irrelevant to mention here."
I will appreciate it if you un-delete it. Ykantor ( talk) 01:08, 26 August 2013 (UTC)
Will you accept: "Israel tapped the Jordan River (and the Sea of Galilee) by canal for irrigation of the Southern Negev desert, consuming the water quota allocated by the
Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan" ?
Ykantor (
talk)
23:09, 3 September 2013 (UTC)
Your quote's source is: Synthesis of published material that advances a position. As I understand it, our case complies with SYNTH is not mere juxtaposition. I will verfy it with the help desk. Ykantor ( talk) 04:59, 10 September 2013 (UTC)
In order to avoid any [[wp:synth] claims, I have modified my proposal:
[on 1965]Nasser too, assured the American under Secretary of state, Philip Talbot, that the Arabs would not exceed the water quotas prescribed by the Johnston plan</ref>
I have changed the caption in one of the images from "israeli children" to simply "israelies" since 6 of the individuals that can be discerned are children but the other 5 are clearly adults (the other 2 heads are undiscernable with at least one appearing to be another adult as well). Likewise for the caption of "israeili women and children" (changed to "israelies") since an adult male is shown in that picture. Mercy11 ( talk) 17:24, 1 October 2013 (UTC)
Who's that guy ? Pluto2012 ( talk) 18:19, 14 February 2014 (UTC)
Section: "Allegations of military support from the U.S., U.K. and Soviet Union"
Passage: "Many of these allegations and conspiracy theories have been disputed and it has been claimed that some were given currency in the Arab world to explain the Arab defeat. [1]"
Made a minor edit to remove the term 'and conspiracy theories'. If this is just meant to mean 'theories about a conspiracy' it is at best redundant - 'allegations' is quite sufficient - and probably simply inapt, since if 'theories' are supposed to be distinct from 'allegations', then this is the first mention of such 'theories'. If, however, as is the natural reading, 'conspiracy theories' is being used in what has become its usual sense, then it is as a heavily value-laden term, generally used to suggest 'paranoid' fantasising.
user Ykantor has twice reverted my edit so as to reinstate this heavily loaded weasel term. The reasons given by each of us were:
1st edit, stax68: "Removed phrase "and conspiracy theories" which is either redundant or, if not, a 'weasel' term."
1st revert, YKantor: "this is the stable version. you need a reason to delete it"
2nd edit, stax68: " I gave a good reason for my correction"
2nd revert, YKantor: "where is the RS support? you can't change the stable version with no support)"
Since YKantor has twice failed to give any valid reason for reverting my change, I am going to again remove the offending term. I trust that YKantor will not revert the change again without providing a good substantive reason for doing so.
Stax68 ( talk) 23:07, 13 February 2014 (UTC)
OK but my edit is justified regardless of whether the source is properly cited; even if a page number were supplied, the edit should stand - correct? BTW, 'Middle East Quarterly" is not in fact an academic journal but the product of an avowedly political organisation called Middle East Forum ( http://www.meforum.org/about.php ). I wonder whether WP:QS might apply to this source (i.e. the publisher/editorial board). A campaigning organisation seeking to influence opinion for political reasons would seem to have an interest that directly conflicts with a scholarly concern for truth-seeking. I'm a very inexperienced editor, so I don't know about that. I do know that I wouldn't rely on it myself; especially not pre-2009, when it wasn't even nominally peer reviewed: "since the Middle East Quarterly began publication in 1994, its editors have made nearly all publication decisions because, as we noted in our inaugural issue, so few other specialists on the Middle East and Islam shared its mission of considering the region 'explicitly from the viewpoint of American interests.' Indeed, many other journals, we wrote, 'even tend to sympathize with states and organizations hostile' to the United States." ( http://www.meforum.org/2037/editors-note-on-peer-review ). Even after peer review was introduced, the situation seems little improved, since the editor makes it clear that referees are selected on the basis of their political views: "In 2009, circumstances have begun to change. This journal finds itself part of a growing community of specialists not hostile to the United States and its allies. As other journals and organizations have joined our ranks, they increased the circle of those with professional and expert knowledge of the Middle East and created a larger pool of reviewers to engage in a constructive process of refereeing." Maybe this is not the place for ths discussion; maybe my standards are too stringent for WP. Apologies if so, but I thought I'd mention it anyway, since this little disagreement has focused my attention on the publication. Stax68 ( talk) 01:11, 15 February 2014 (UTC)
Here is the Shlaim & Louis p. 63 you asked for. Ykantor ( talk) 17:14, 15 February 2014 (UTC)
In the section 'The mid front (Abu-Ageila) Israeli division' there is a bit that goes 'Sharon's forces came under heavy shelling as they advanced from the north and west. The Israelis had to struggle through sand dunes and mines while under heavy fire, and took heavy casualties.' Now I know this is military history, but still, three uses of the word heavy? I can't edit the article, but I think this sounds rather clumsy. I'd change or remove at least one of them ('heavy' is used a fair bit in the article, so keeping them relatively well-spaced is a good thing) My suggestions would be either to get rid of the middle 'heavy' and let 'fire' stand on its own, or replace the last one with something like 'significant'. Depends a bit on the source though I suppose. 122.61.157.138 ( talk) 12:40, 16 February 2014 (UTC)
yours: "Actually it is a misrepresentation. they are talking about troops into SES not closure of the SoT".
Will you please have a look at the Shlaim & Louis p. 63 and see that although Nasser quote does not contain the straights closure, the previous 6 lines refers to it. In my opinion, it is clear that in this case the author refers to both events as identical. Ykantor ( talk) 17:29, 15 February 2014 (UTC)
user:Dailycare deleted an important , well sourced and concised Nasser quotes, and did not replace it. He said: "Concentrate discussion on Nasser's declarations to one place and have a source characterize it rather than cite verbatim]". He added a separated issue text which has nothing to do with the deleted text.
- The deleted Nasser quotes are:
--on May 27, Nasser stated "Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight." [2]
--According to Shlaim & Louis, in the end of May 1967, Nasser claimed in a public speech to have been aware of the implications of the Egyptian decision to send troops into Sharm El Sheikh: "Taking over Sharm El Sheikh meant confrontation with Israel. It also means that we ready to enter a general war with Israel. It was not a separate operation". [3] On 26 May Nasser declared, "The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel". [4]
- Nasser was the Arab world leader and the strongest Arab state- Egypt president. Those concised quotes are very important . I'll appreciate it if Dailycare returns those important quotes to the article.
- Nishidani supported him and said:"History is not pro'paganda pitched to pander to emotions, rhetoric is not facts, and history is based on cold calculations and hardware".It is not true that using a quote is problematic. e.g. World War II#War breaks out in Europe (1939–40) : "On 6 October Hitler made a public peace overture to the United Kingdom and France, but said that the future of Poland was to be determined exclusively by Germany and the Soviet Union. Chamberlain rejected this on 12 October, saying "Past experience has shown that no reliance can be placed upon the promises of the present German Government."
- The sources are Shlaim and Mutawi, which can not be suspected as biased towards Israel. So, there is no dispute that Nasser said so.
- Since during the relevant period , the 3 weeks before the war, Nasser decisions are a matter of debate among historians, it is especially important to keep his quotes in the article.
- Ben Gurion words: "Expell them" are used here, and I do not see any reason to eliminate it, because it is supposedly a propaganda. On the same token, Nasser words should stay here. Notes:
{{
cite news}}
: Check |url=
value (
help)
On 26 May he declared, "The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel
Ykantor ( talk) 20:53, 16 May 2014 (UTC)
-There is a difference between current historians retrospective assessment of the rhetoric significance, and the real time worries. In fact, according to Oren, Nasser planned to attack Israel at the 27 May , hence his speeches are not of declarative value only.
- Spurred by the virulent Arab rhetoric, mounting concern and pressure from the media, ... the Israeli public sense was of heightened fear and of an approaching holocaust. So it is important to to show what rhetoric caused the worries.
- According to Ramadan, Nasser was not a rational leader. He tended to take important decision without consultation. e.g.
---------Nasser recorded phone call to Hussein, at the war's 1st day, when Nasser told Hussein that U.K aircraft carriers helped Israel and then he asked Hussein whether the U.K has aircraft carriers at all. Nasser was not predictable. He could abruptly change his mind without a consultation. Hypothetically he could say that he won't attack, and in the next day change his mind and decide to attack.
--------- Nasser's ambivalence about his goals and objectives was reflected in his orders to the military. The general staff changed the operational plan four times in May 1967, each change requiring the redeployment of troops, with the inevitable toll on both men and vehicles. Hence, at real time, no one could be sure whether Nasser speeches are just a rhetoric or are a meaningful threat.
- Would you accept : "Nasser said.... However, most historians claims that Nasser had no intention of attacking Israel" ?. Actually, this proposal is problematic, because Egypt planned to attack Israel at the 27 May (Oren) . Also "According to then Egyptian Vice-President Hussein el-Shafei, as soon as Nasser knew what Amer planned, he cancelled the operation". And: "the testimony of Egyptian Chief of Staff General Mahmoud Fawzi to the effect that an Egyptian air attack was scheduled for 27 May, and that the relevant orders had already been signed by Abdel Hakim Amer when Nasser ordered its cancellation on 26 May" (Gluska 2007 , p. 168) Ykantor ( talk) 10:22, 17 May 2014 (UTC) Ykantor ( talk) 04:53, 17 May 2014
)
Ykantor. Apart from the huge mess caused by sections, subsections, all of which have dribs and drabs of a few bits of info that strike your attention, WP:NPOV requires narrative balance. To see what you are doing, reread the two sections above, and tell me, or anyone else, where the narrative balance is. The Israeli section is all about calm, and defensiveness; the Egyptian section all about the opposite. One could easily reverse the impression by highlighting the bluffs on one side, and the cold calculations on the other. As it is, you appear to be accruing and marshalling tidbits to make a thesis of responsibility fall hard on one side. Nishidani ( talk) 14:32, 23 May 2014 (UTC)
I find the page unreadable. It has been split up into numerous sections, each with a favoured dollop of info, usually begging for either expansion or NPOV balance. It has expanded while fragmenting, and all narrative flow is, or has been, lost. I went back to February 2013 and found that readable though many things were questionable. I don't think the main drafting editor has the foggiest idea of how a wiki page is to be edited, and the time required to fix the mess we have would be enormous. In that sense, I'd like to hear from other editors to see if the notion of a revert to the page when it last presented a narrative, and not a 'wretched patchwork' of cherrypicked tidbits by theme is acceptable. And if so, has any one an idea of what the last readable page was? Such a revert need not elide the sources Ykantor has added, if they can be reworked into some version of the earlier narrative. Nishidani ( talk) 14:47, 23 May 2014 (UTC)
- This text was already here at the 30 January, so a February version recovery does not change this specific point.
- Most of the sources are using the word "thwart" for the Syrian diversion, and a words like tap, divert, irrigate etc. for the Israeli and Jordanian projects. see a list of sources, including a real time Reuters and A.P reports.
- the background: Water politics in the Jordan River basin
--------At the early 50's, President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed the irrigation expert Eric Johnston as "Special Representative " to deal with the water conflict between Israel, Jordan, and Syria. He negotiated the Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan with Israel and the Arab states. The plan was based on principles similar to those embodied in the Marshall Plan – reducing the potential for conflict by promoting cooperation and economic stability, and was commissioned by UNRWA. The Arab league technical committee approved the plan but the Arab League have not ratified the plan, due to the League's opposition to formal recognition of Israel. President Nasser assured the U.S, that the Arabs would not exceed the water quotas prescribed by the Johnston plan. Israel and Jordan assured the U.S that they won't use more than their quota, and the U.S financed the diversion projects of both countries .
-------- I guess that the sources describe the Israeli diversion project (and the Jordanian one), using tap, divert, irrigate etc, because its water consumption was within the U.N sponsored Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan. However, the Syrian/ Lebanese diversion projects, the Headwater Diversion Plan (Jordan River), were costly and hardly beneficial. It added water to Jordan and Lebanon which had already used / about to use their quotas. It's main reason was to frustrate the Israeli diversion project, because of it was expected to strengthen the enemy, Israel.
- "thwart" was used by Reuters and A.P at real time: Arabs meet, Arab plot strategy, Arab summit disbands, Syrian... complaining off the conference's weak resolution against Israeli plans.
- "thwart" is used by Murakami [t 1], Shemesh [t 2] [1], Gat p. 34 [2], Gluska p. 29 [3], , Reich p. 443 [4], Khouri p. 227 [5]
-When I edited the Origins of the Six-Day War at the first time, in 10.6.2013, his "readable prose size" was 55 kB (size was 110000 bytes). At the moment, the "readable prose size" is 56 kB (size 115000 bytes). Hence , the article "readable prose size" was hardly changed.
-There were duplicates and triplicates of the same event , along the article. One of the editors wrote:"The article is not without its flaws and certainly needs improvement ,...--Frederico1234". I have listed problems in the talk page , some were wrong and some are correct but still not dealt with. In order to cancel the duplicates and sort the article along the timeline, I improved the structure and shifted text accordingly, without any text modification. My improvements, were not necessarily right, so I have listened to the other editors. You did not like one aspect, and it was changed according to your view.
- As I recall, I have deleted duplicates only, and have added a few sentences only. Most of the initial criticism is still in the talkpage, and have not dealt with yet. If the contents is hardly changed, how come that "YKantor's made an equal POV mess of the Origins article as well now"? I will appreciate it if you tell me where is the POV? Ykantor ( talk) 22:32, 28 May 2014 (UTC)
-When I edited this article at the first time, in 10.6.2013, his "readable prose size" was 80 kB (size was 154000 bytes). At the moment, the "readable prose size" is 89 kB (size 184000 bytes). So, over the last year, the "readable prose size" has been increased in 11%, and I believe that a lot of it is not mine. How come that I supposedly made a POV mess? . to be continued later. Ykantor ( talk) 23:03, 28 May 2014 (UTC)
For the record, I'm OK with reverting to DeCausa's version too. -- Dailycare ( talk) 19:38, 29 May 2014 (UTC)
-General Fawzi told the Egyptian leadership that there are no Israeli forces close to the border with Syria
- The Attack controversy is limited to Israel and Egypt only. Syria and Jordan attacked Israel before Israel attacked them. Ykantor ( talk) 05:59, 30 May 2014 (UTC)
Nisidani deleted: "For these reasons, all levels of Jordanian society (with some exceptions) were in favour of going to war. The Ordinary people, particularly the Palestinians, had been whipped up into a state of frenzy against Israel and in favour of a war" which is a factual sentence. But the analysis of king Hussein joining Egypt, is expanded, based on Mutawi. However, other historians have different analysis. :
- According to Morris in "Victims" , Hussein realized that he might loose his crown if he does not join Nasser
-Shlaim apparently claims that Hussein's actions were prompted by his feelings of Arab nationalism
- Oren discuss the King deeds during the days before he joined Nasser. Oren claims that Hussein had a rational alternative: "Hussein’s only answer, then, was to try to stay out of a war between Syria and Israel, and if Egypt became involved, to participate only indirectly and symbolically, by sending a few regiments to Sinai" (Oren,2002, p. 128). But the mood was not rational. what happened:
----A according to Burns, the U.S ambassador: "Hussein was “prepared for brinkmanship,” and that he would “react like Samson in the temple . . . risking possible annihilation by the Israelis rather than the high probability of internal revolt" .
----"We will watch him like a hawk and sit on him when he goes into orbit,” Touqan confided to Burns (I guess its about Nasser) (Oren,2002, p. 129)
----When Hussein returned from Cairo: "as he told Burns, “shifted the burden of the ‘Palestinian problem’ off his shoulders and onto Nasser’s,” "(Oren,2002, p. 131)
----"In Cairo, Hussein believed that he had purchased “political and military insurance” for Jordan at a time when the U.S. had refused to guarantee its territory and was instead arming Israel. He also believed that Egypt, while not backing down from its blockade, would not start a war but would wait for the Israelis to strike first and then destroy them."
---- "Burns, observing that “the king has opened a Pandora’s box wider than he probably anticipated,” noted how events in Jordan “are alarmingly reminiscent of August 1914)"
---- Moreover, the king placed his army,"Jordan's pride", under an Egyptian General, who planned to use the Jordanian army as a tool to draw Israeli forces and thus relieving some pressure from the Sinai front.
- Hussein was not a rational leader. He stated different motive any now and then. He went to Cairo without preparations and made himself vulnerable to Egyptian pressure and even lost control on his beloved army, his main survival instrument.
- The question is whether it is better to mention Hussein reasons briefly only, and elaborate in a separate article, or to discuss it here , which is a lengthy description of his different motives at different times? Ykantor ( talk) 15:00, 26 May 2014 (UTC)
I compiled this list in order to discuss the POV mess claim and identify the POV contributions. It is based on all my contributions in the history page, and does not include small / unrelated contributions. some edits may have been deleted already . I apologize if have missed some. If required, I can add a similar list sorted by the contribution size.
Please reply in the section "suggestion to revert" or open here a "discussion" sub-section and discuss there.
1 734 bytes added; 28/05/2014 12:00
-- The aftermath of the war: Nasser forestalled any movement toward direct negotiations with Israel. In dozens of speeches and statements, Nasser posited the equation that any direct peace talks with Israel were tantamount to surrender
2 1,042 bytes added; 26/05/2014 13:19
-- Events during the weeks before the war: The U.S. forces planned not to allow the Arab states, to destroy Israel, but also not to allow Israel to expand. On May 20, 1967, a cable of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff was sent to EUCOM and STRICOM. STRICOM
3 1,092 bytes added; 26/05/2014 12:00
-- Israel: On May 22, Nasser declared the Straits closed to Israeli shipping, blocking 90% of Israeli oil that passed through the Straits of Tiran.[9] Oil tankers that were due to pass through the straights have been delayed
4 134 bytes added; 24/05/2014 2:09
-- Israel: on 25 May Israel mobilized the whole army reserves, which caused the economy to come to a standstill.[
5a 149 bytes added; 24/05/2014 1:22
-- Israel: During May- June 1967, Eshkol's government did everything in its power to confine the confrontation to the Egyptian front
5b 391 bytes added; 24/05/2014 0:01
-- Israel: During 22 to 24 May, General Rabin was incapacitated for 2 days because of a nervous breakdown. The collapse may have been triggered by Ben Gurion, who blamed Rabin for his mistaken mobilization of reserves that made the crisis acute and that
6 248 bytes added; 24/05/2014 1:30
-- Golan Heights: n May–June 1967 The Israeli government did everything in its power to confine the confrontation to the Egyptian front. Eshkol and his colleagues took into account the possibility of some fighting on the Syrian front
7a 364 bytes added; 23/05/2014 23:41
-- Israel: Egypt planned to Attack Israel at 27 May. A couple of days before the attack date, Israel discovered it, and asked the Americans to deal with it. The American president called the Soviet leadership, and the Soviet ambassador, in the middle of
7b 278 bytes added; 23/05/2014 23:08
-- Israel: During May 1967 the Israel wanted Jordan to keep out of any war with Egypt, and it had no plans for the conquest of the West Bank or East Jerusalem. The Israelis sent Hussein three messages saying they had no hostile intent towards Jordan
7c 334 bytes added; 23/05/2014 23:03
-- Israel: Israeli military officers had occasionally made reckless and belligerent public statements, but Eshkol had no intention of provoking a war with the Arabs and still less of expanding Israel. Territorial aims developed during the war. The Israel
7d 285 bytes added; 23/05/2014 22:57
-- Israel: add
7e 169 bytes added; 23/05/2014 22:43
-- Israel: Israel and the UN protested that the Russian were falsely reporting on 13 May of Israeli forces concentrations near the border with Syria.
7f 153 bytes added; 23/05/2014 22:27
-- Israel: On May 21, Eshkol had told the cabinet Defense Committee that Egypt wanted to close the straits and to bomb the reactor in Dimona
7g 228 bytes added; 23/05/2014 22:12
-- Israel: Eshkol had sent Nasser secret messages urging deescalation. In public, he continued to assert Israel’s peaceful intentions, call for international mediation, and avoid criticism of Egypt.
7h 388 bytes added; 23/05/2014 22:07
-- Israel: the leaders of the confrontational states were caught by complete surprise when Israel took their threats at face value
7a 987 bytes added; 23/05/2014 18:06
-- Events: Israel–Jordan I am blamed for too long edits to an already long article. So I summarize and then accused for too short writings.
7b 271 bytes added; 23/05/2014 16:20
-- Events: Israel–Jordan According to Mutawi, all levels of Jordanian society (with some exceptions) were in favour of going to war. The Ordinary people, particularly the Palestinians, had been whipped up into a state of frenzy against Israel and in
8 892 bytes added; 13/05/2014 17:21
-- It is a pity to fight against facts. Nasser stated "Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight. It is a different issue wether he planned to initiate the war
9 473 bytes added; 11/05/2014 18:15
-- Events: Israel–Egypt On 26 May Nasser declared, "The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel
10 725 bytes added; 21/04/2014 15:51
-- Events: Israel–Syria add a source
11 330 bytes added; 17/03/2014 23:01
-- Events: Israel–Egypt Eshkol denounced the Egyptians in his speech on 21 May, but his response to this development was a model of moderation. He demanded that Nasser withdraw his forces from Sinai but made no mention of the removal of UNEF from the
12a 111 bytes added; 15/02/2014 10:58
-- Allegations of military support from the U.S., U.K. and Soviet Union: Many of these allegations and conspiracy theories [1] have been disputed and it has been claimed
12b 1,516 bytes added; 15/02/2014 10:46
-- Allegations of military support from the U.S., U.K. and Soviet Union: Anwar Sadat implied that Nasser used this deliberate conspiracy in order to accuse the United States as a political cover-up for domestic consumption
13 359 bytes added; 15/02/2014 9:48
-- Events: Israel–Egypt fix my mistake- p. 63 and not p. 199 , According to Shlaim & Louis, in the end of May 1967, Nasser claimed in a public speech to have been aware of the Straits of Tiran closure implications
14 441 bytes added; 14/02/2014 23:02
-- Events: Israel–Egypt According to Shlaim & Louis, in the end of May 1967, Nasser claimed in a public speech to have been aware of the Straits of Tiran closure implications
15a 1,573 bytes added; 14/02/2014 14:43
-- According to the prominent historian Abd aI-’Azim Ramadan, Nasser mistaken decisions to expel the international peacekeeping force from the Sinai Peninsula and close the Straits of Tiran in 1967, led to a state of war with Israel, despite the lack of mi
15b 834 bytes added; 14/02/2014 12:49
-- According to Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, [Gamal Abdel Nasser| Nasser]] had admitted his responsibility for the military defeat in the June 1967
16 132 bytes added; 3/11/2013 7:39
-- Events: Israel - Egypt Still, Nasser declared full mobilisation in Egypt as of 14 May 1967, citing the joint defence agreement with Syria.
17 316 bytes added; 2/11/2013 0:06
-- The Egyptian army: President Nasser , having learned of the results of the air strike, decided together with Field Marshal Amer to pull out the troops from Sinai within 24 hours. No detailed instructions were given concerning the manner and sequence
18 516 bytes added; 18/09/2013 11:26
-- Events: Israel - Egypt Fawzi (general)]] left for Syria for one day tour, verified that the Soviet report is false and reported that there are no Israeli armed forces near the Syrian border
19 406 bytes added; 17/09/2013 22:05
-- Events: Israel - Egypt the Straits of Tiran were opened to Israeli traffic and The Sinai peninsula was demilitarized
20 183 bytes added; 13/09/2013 0:43
-- Events: Israel - Syria Before 1967, Syria exacerbated the confrontation with Israel, in order to divert attention from its internal economic and political instability.
21 356 bytes added; 11/09/2013 21:19
-- Events: Israel - Syria use a quote
22 79 bytes added; 4/09/2013 1:50
-- Events: Israel - Syria Israel tapped the Jordan River (and the Sea of Galilee) by canal for irrigation of the Southern Negev desert
23 70 bytes added; 30/08/2013 18:48
-- Events: Israel - Syria War over Water was a major factor for the six days war
24 87 bytes added; 30/08/2013 15:56
-- Events: Israel - Syria Syria started the Headwater Diversion Plan (Jordan River) in order to thwart Israel's plans to use the water
25 584 bytes added; 25/08/2013 4:25
-- Events: Israel - Syria Israeli armoured tractors, often guarded by police, would start to plow in a disputed area of the DMZ. From its high ground positions, Syria would fire at those advancing
26 595 bytes added; 25/08/2013 3:08
-- Background and summary of events leading to war: Syria planned to reduce Israeli water consumption well under the allocated Johnston plan quota
27 1,208 bytes added; 10/06/2013 18:58
-- Background and summary of events leading to war
Ykantor ( talk) 14:35, 2 June 2014 (UTC)
— Preceding unsigned comment added by Ykantor ( talk • contribs) 15:12, 29 May 2014 (UTC)
![]() | This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 5 | ← | Archive 9 | Archive 10 | Archive 11 | Archive 12 | Archive 13 | Archive 14 |
I need to say a few things, as the posts on the previous section appear to be attacking me. I may be reading it incorrectly, but that is my impression at this point.
Syrian artillery attacks against Israeli civilian settlements in the vicinity of the border followed by Israeli responses against Syrian positions in the Golan Heights and encroachments of increasing intensity and frequency into the demilitarized zones along the Syrian border,
In the subsection headed "Arab": "As a result of the war, a wave of Palestinians was displaced. An estimated 300,000 Palestinians left the West Bank and Gaza, most of whom settled in Jordan."
I don't think the phrasing to the effect that a "wave" was "displaced" is good English - better to say that as a result of the war, 300k Palestinians were displaced from et etc. Also, were they actually settled in Jordan, or did they become refugees there? (I.e., were they given Jordanian citizenship or otherwise absorbed into the Jordanian population?) PiCo ( talk) 02:48, 31 July 2013 (UTC)
I have a serious problem with the second sentence of the introductory paragraph to this section. 1) The provided reference does not support the entry. 2) The sentence leaves the erroneous impression that only Syria was involved in the admonishment by the UN Security Council. 3) The sentence belongs (if at all) in the sub-section "Events: Israel - Syria. Erictheenquirer ( talk) 04:18, 12 September 2013 (UTC)
your reason: "The Johnston plan wasn't accepted by e.g. Syria, so it's irrelevant to mention here."
I will appreciate it if you un-delete it. Ykantor ( talk) 01:08, 26 August 2013 (UTC)
Will you accept: "Israel tapped the Jordan River (and the Sea of Galilee) by canal for irrigation of the Southern Negev desert, consuming the water quota allocated by the
Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan" ?
Ykantor (
talk)
23:09, 3 September 2013 (UTC)
Your quote's source is: Synthesis of published material that advances a position. As I understand it, our case complies with SYNTH is not mere juxtaposition. I will verfy it with the help desk. Ykantor ( talk) 04:59, 10 September 2013 (UTC)
In order to avoid any [[wp:synth] claims, I have modified my proposal:
[on 1965]Nasser too, assured the American under Secretary of state, Philip Talbot, that the Arabs would not exceed the water quotas prescribed by the Johnston plan</ref>
I have changed the caption in one of the images from "israeli children" to simply "israelies" since 6 of the individuals that can be discerned are children but the other 5 are clearly adults (the other 2 heads are undiscernable with at least one appearing to be another adult as well). Likewise for the caption of "israeili women and children" (changed to "israelies") since an adult male is shown in that picture. Mercy11 ( talk) 17:24, 1 October 2013 (UTC)
Who's that guy ? Pluto2012 ( talk) 18:19, 14 February 2014 (UTC)
Section: "Allegations of military support from the U.S., U.K. and Soviet Union"
Passage: "Many of these allegations and conspiracy theories have been disputed and it has been claimed that some were given currency in the Arab world to explain the Arab defeat. [1]"
Made a minor edit to remove the term 'and conspiracy theories'. If this is just meant to mean 'theories about a conspiracy' it is at best redundant - 'allegations' is quite sufficient - and probably simply inapt, since if 'theories' are supposed to be distinct from 'allegations', then this is the first mention of such 'theories'. If, however, as is the natural reading, 'conspiracy theories' is being used in what has become its usual sense, then it is as a heavily value-laden term, generally used to suggest 'paranoid' fantasising.
user Ykantor has twice reverted my edit so as to reinstate this heavily loaded weasel term. The reasons given by each of us were:
1st edit, stax68: "Removed phrase "and conspiracy theories" which is either redundant or, if not, a 'weasel' term."
1st revert, YKantor: "this is the stable version. you need a reason to delete it"
2nd edit, stax68: " I gave a good reason for my correction"
2nd revert, YKantor: "where is the RS support? you can't change the stable version with no support)"
Since YKantor has twice failed to give any valid reason for reverting my change, I am going to again remove the offending term. I trust that YKantor will not revert the change again without providing a good substantive reason for doing so.
Stax68 ( talk) 23:07, 13 February 2014 (UTC)
OK but my edit is justified regardless of whether the source is properly cited; even if a page number were supplied, the edit should stand - correct? BTW, 'Middle East Quarterly" is not in fact an academic journal but the product of an avowedly political organisation called Middle East Forum ( http://www.meforum.org/about.php ). I wonder whether WP:QS might apply to this source (i.e. the publisher/editorial board). A campaigning organisation seeking to influence opinion for political reasons would seem to have an interest that directly conflicts with a scholarly concern for truth-seeking. I'm a very inexperienced editor, so I don't know about that. I do know that I wouldn't rely on it myself; especially not pre-2009, when it wasn't even nominally peer reviewed: "since the Middle East Quarterly began publication in 1994, its editors have made nearly all publication decisions because, as we noted in our inaugural issue, so few other specialists on the Middle East and Islam shared its mission of considering the region 'explicitly from the viewpoint of American interests.' Indeed, many other journals, we wrote, 'even tend to sympathize with states and organizations hostile' to the United States." ( http://www.meforum.org/2037/editors-note-on-peer-review ). Even after peer review was introduced, the situation seems little improved, since the editor makes it clear that referees are selected on the basis of their political views: "In 2009, circumstances have begun to change. This journal finds itself part of a growing community of specialists not hostile to the United States and its allies. As other journals and organizations have joined our ranks, they increased the circle of those with professional and expert knowledge of the Middle East and created a larger pool of reviewers to engage in a constructive process of refereeing." Maybe this is not the place for ths discussion; maybe my standards are too stringent for WP. Apologies if so, but I thought I'd mention it anyway, since this little disagreement has focused my attention on the publication. Stax68 ( talk) 01:11, 15 February 2014 (UTC)
Here is the Shlaim & Louis p. 63 you asked for. Ykantor ( talk) 17:14, 15 February 2014 (UTC)
In the section 'The mid front (Abu-Ageila) Israeli division' there is a bit that goes 'Sharon's forces came under heavy shelling as they advanced from the north and west. The Israelis had to struggle through sand dunes and mines while under heavy fire, and took heavy casualties.' Now I know this is military history, but still, three uses of the word heavy? I can't edit the article, but I think this sounds rather clumsy. I'd change or remove at least one of them ('heavy' is used a fair bit in the article, so keeping them relatively well-spaced is a good thing) My suggestions would be either to get rid of the middle 'heavy' and let 'fire' stand on its own, or replace the last one with something like 'significant'. Depends a bit on the source though I suppose. 122.61.157.138 ( talk) 12:40, 16 February 2014 (UTC)
yours: "Actually it is a misrepresentation. they are talking about troops into SES not closure of the SoT".
Will you please have a look at the Shlaim & Louis p. 63 and see that although Nasser quote does not contain the straights closure, the previous 6 lines refers to it. In my opinion, it is clear that in this case the author refers to both events as identical. Ykantor ( talk) 17:29, 15 February 2014 (UTC)
user:Dailycare deleted an important , well sourced and concised Nasser quotes, and did not replace it. He said: "Concentrate discussion on Nasser's declarations to one place and have a source characterize it rather than cite verbatim]". He added a separated issue text which has nothing to do with the deleted text.
- The deleted Nasser quotes are:
--on May 27, Nasser stated "Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight." [2]
--According to Shlaim & Louis, in the end of May 1967, Nasser claimed in a public speech to have been aware of the implications of the Egyptian decision to send troops into Sharm El Sheikh: "Taking over Sharm El Sheikh meant confrontation with Israel. It also means that we ready to enter a general war with Israel. It was not a separate operation". [3] On 26 May Nasser declared, "The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel". [4]
- Nasser was the Arab world leader and the strongest Arab state- Egypt president. Those concised quotes are very important . I'll appreciate it if Dailycare returns those important quotes to the article.
- Nishidani supported him and said:"History is not pro'paganda pitched to pander to emotions, rhetoric is not facts, and history is based on cold calculations and hardware".It is not true that using a quote is problematic. e.g. World War II#War breaks out in Europe (1939–40) : "On 6 October Hitler made a public peace overture to the United Kingdom and France, but said that the future of Poland was to be determined exclusively by Germany and the Soviet Union. Chamberlain rejected this on 12 October, saying "Past experience has shown that no reliance can be placed upon the promises of the present German Government."
- The sources are Shlaim and Mutawi, which can not be suspected as biased towards Israel. So, there is no dispute that Nasser said so.
- Since during the relevant period , the 3 weeks before the war, Nasser decisions are a matter of debate among historians, it is especially important to keep his quotes in the article.
- Ben Gurion words: "Expell them" are used here, and I do not see any reason to eliminate it, because it is supposedly a propaganda. On the same token, Nasser words should stay here. Notes:
{{
cite news}}
: Check |url=
value (
help)
On 26 May he declared, "The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel
Ykantor ( talk) 20:53, 16 May 2014 (UTC)
-There is a difference between current historians retrospective assessment of the rhetoric significance, and the real time worries. In fact, according to Oren, Nasser planned to attack Israel at the 27 May , hence his speeches are not of declarative value only.
- Spurred by the virulent Arab rhetoric, mounting concern and pressure from the media, ... the Israeli public sense was of heightened fear and of an approaching holocaust. So it is important to to show what rhetoric caused the worries.
- According to Ramadan, Nasser was not a rational leader. He tended to take important decision without consultation. e.g.
---------Nasser recorded phone call to Hussein, at the war's 1st day, when Nasser told Hussein that U.K aircraft carriers helped Israel and then he asked Hussein whether the U.K has aircraft carriers at all. Nasser was not predictable. He could abruptly change his mind without a consultation. Hypothetically he could say that he won't attack, and in the next day change his mind and decide to attack.
--------- Nasser's ambivalence about his goals and objectives was reflected in his orders to the military. The general staff changed the operational plan four times in May 1967, each change requiring the redeployment of troops, with the inevitable toll on both men and vehicles. Hence, at real time, no one could be sure whether Nasser speeches are just a rhetoric or are a meaningful threat.
- Would you accept : "Nasser said.... However, most historians claims that Nasser had no intention of attacking Israel" ?. Actually, this proposal is problematic, because Egypt planned to attack Israel at the 27 May (Oren) . Also "According to then Egyptian Vice-President Hussein el-Shafei, as soon as Nasser knew what Amer planned, he cancelled the operation". And: "the testimony of Egyptian Chief of Staff General Mahmoud Fawzi to the effect that an Egyptian air attack was scheduled for 27 May, and that the relevant orders had already been signed by Abdel Hakim Amer when Nasser ordered its cancellation on 26 May" (Gluska 2007 , p. 168) Ykantor ( talk) 10:22, 17 May 2014 (UTC) Ykantor ( talk) 04:53, 17 May 2014
)
Ykantor. Apart from the huge mess caused by sections, subsections, all of which have dribs and drabs of a few bits of info that strike your attention, WP:NPOV requires narrative balance. To see what you are doing, reread the two sections above, and tell me, or anyone else, where the narrative balance is. The Israeli section is all about calm, and defensiveness; the Egyptian section all about the opposite. One could easily reverse the impression by highlighting the bluffs on one side, and the cold calculations on the other. As it is, you appear to be accruing and marshalling tidbits to make a thesis of responsibility fall hard on one side. Nishidani ( talk) 14:32, 23 May 2014 (UTC)
I find the page unreadable. It has been split up into numerous sections, each with a favoured dollop of info, usually begging for either expansion or NPOV balance. It has expanded while fragmenting, and all narrative flow is, or has been, lost. I went back to February 2013 and found that readable though many things were questionable. I don't think the main drafting editor has the foggiest idea of how a wiki page is to be edited, and the time required to fix the mess we have would be enormous. In that sense, I'd like to hear from other editors to see if the notion of a revert to the page when it last presented a narrative, and not a 'wretched patchwork' of cherrypicked tidbits by theme is acceptable. And if so, has any one an idea of what the last readable page was? Such a revert need not elide the sources Ykantor has added, if they can be reworked into some version of the earlier narrative. Nishidani ( talk) 14:47, 23 May 2014 (UTC)
- This text was already here at the 30 January, so a February version recovery does not change this specific point.
- Most of the sources are using the word "thwart" for the Syrian diversion, and a words like tap, divert, irrigate etc. for the Israeli and Jordanian projects. see a list of sources, including a real time Reuters and A.P reports.
- the background: Water politics in the Jordan River basin
--------At the early 50's, President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed the irrigation expert Eric Johnston as "Special Representative " to deal with the water conflict between Israel, Jordan, and Syria. He negotiated the Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan with Israel and the Arab states. The plan was based on principles similar to those embodied in the Marshall Plan – reducing the potential for conflict by promoting cooperation and economic stability, and was commissioned by UNRWA. The Arab league technical committee approved the plan but the Arab League have not ratified the plan, due to the League's opposition to formal recognition of Israel. President Nasser assured the U.S, that the Arabs would not exceed the water quotas prescribed by the Johnston plan. Israel and Jordan assured the U.S that they won't use more than their quota, and the U.S financed the diversion projects of both countries .
-------- I guess that the sources describe the Israeli diversion project (and the Jordanian one), using tap, divert, irrigate etc, because its water consumption was within the U.N sponsored Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan. However, the Syrian/ Lebanese diversion projects, the Headwater Diversion Plan (Jordan River), were costly and hardly beneficial. It added water to Jordan and Lebanon which had already used / about to use their quotas. It's main reason was to frustrate the Israeli diversion project, because of it was expected to strengthen the enemy, Israel.
- "thwart" was used by Reuters and A.P at real time: Arabs meet, Arab plot strategy, Arab summit disbands, Syrian... complaining off the conference's weak resolution against Israeli plans.
- "thwart" is used by Murakami [t 1], Shemesh [t 2] [1], Gat p. 34 [2], Gluska p. 29 [3], , Reich p. 443 [4], Khouri p. 227 [5]
-When I edited the Origins of the Six-Day War at the first time, in 10.6.2013, his "readable prose size" was 55 kB (size was 110000 bytes). At the moment, the "readable prose size" is 56 kB (size 115000 bytes). Hence , the article "readable prose size" was hardly changed.
-There were duplicates and triplicates of the same event , along the article. One of the editors wrote:"The article is not without its flaws and certainly needs improvement ,...--Frederico1234". I have listed problems in the talk page , some were wrong and some are correct but still not dealt with. In order to cancel the duplicates and sort the article along the timeline, I improved the structure and shifted text accordingly, without any text modification. My improvements, were not necessarily right, so I have listened to the other editors. You did not like one aspect, and it was changed according to your view.
- As I recall, I have deleted duplicates only, and have added a few sentences only. Most of the initial criticism is still in the talkpage, and have not dealt with yet. If the contents is hardly changed, how come that "YKantor's made an equal POV mess of the Origins article as well now"? I will appreciate it if you tell me where is the POV? Ykantor ( talk) 22:32, 28 May 2014 (UTC)
-When I edited this article at the first time, in 10.6.2013, his "readable prose size" was 80 kB (size was 154000 bytes). At the moment, the "readable prose size" is 89 kB (size 184000 bytes). So, over the last year, the "readable prose size" has been increased in 11%, and I believe that a lot of it is not mine. How come that I supposedly made a POV mess? . to be continued later. Ykantor ( talk) 23:03, 28 May 2014 (UTC)
For the record, I'm OK with reverting to DeCausa's version too. -- Dailycare ( talk) 19:38, 29 May 2014 (UTC)
-General Fawzi told the Egyptian leadership that there are no Israeli forces close to the border with Syria
- The Attack controversy is limited to Israel and Egypt only. Syria and Jordan attacked Israel before Israel attacked them. Ykantor ( talk) 05:59, 30 May 2014 (UTC)
Nisidani deleted: "For these reasons, all levels of Jordanian society (with some exceptions) were in favour of going to war. The Ordinary people, particularly the Palestinians, had been whipped up into a state of frenzy against Israel and in favour of a war" which is a factual sentence. But the analysis of king Hussein joining Egypt, is expanded, based on Mutawi. However, other historians have different analysis. :
- According to Morris in "Victims" , Hussein realized that he might loose his crown if he does not join Nasser
-Shlaim apparently claims that Hussein's actions were prompted by his feelings of Arab nationalism
- Oren discuss the King deeds during the days before he joined Nasser. Oren claims that Hussein had a rational alternative: "Hussein’s only answer, then, was to try to stay out of a war between Syria and Israel, and if Egypt became involved, to participate only indirectly and symbolically, by sending a few regiments to Sinai" (Oren,2002, p. 128). But the mood was not rational. what happened:
----A according to Burns, the U.S ambassador: "Hussein was “prepared for brinkmanship,” and that he would “react like Samson in the temple . . . risking possible annihilation by the Israelis rather than the high probability of internal revolt" .
----"We will watch him like a hawk and sit on him when he goes into orbit,” Touqan confided to Burns (I guess its about Nasser) (Oren,2002, p. 129)
----When Hussein returned from Cairo: "as he told Burns, “shifted the burden of the ‘Palestinian problem’ off his shoulders and onto Nasser’s,” "(Oren,2002, p. 131)
----"In Cairo, Hussein believed that he had purchased “political and military insurance” for Jordan at a time when the U.S. had refused to guarantee its territory and was instead arming Israel. He also believed that Egypt, while not backing down from its blockade, would not start a war but would wait for the Israelis to strike first and then destroy them."
---- "Burns, observing that “the king has opened a Pandora’s box wider than he probably anticipated,” noted how events in Jordan “are alarmingly reminiscent of August 1914)"
---- Moreover, the king placed his army,"Jordan's pride", under an Egyptian General, who planned to use the Jordanian army as a tool to draw Israeli forces and thus relieving some pressure from the Sinai front.
- Hussein was not a rational leader. He stated different motive any now and then. He went to Cairo without preparations and made himself vulnerable to Egyptian pressure and even lost control on his beloved army, his main survival instrument.
- The question is whether it is better to mention Hussein reasons briefly only, and elaborate in a separate article, or to discuss it here , which is a lengthy description of his different motives at different times? Ykantor ( talk) 15:00, 26 May 2014 (UTC)
I compiled this list in order to discuss the POV mess claim and identify the POV contributions. It is based on all my contributions in the history page, and does not include small / unrelated contributions. some edits may have been deleted already . I apologize if have missed some. If required, I can add a similar list sorted by the contribution size.
Please reply in the section "suggestion to revert" or open here a "discussion" sub-section and discuss there.
1 734 bytes added; 28/05/2014 12:00
-- The aftermath of the war: Nasser forestalled any movement toward direct negotiations with Israel. In dozens of speeches and statements, Nasser posited the equation that any direct peace talks with Israel were tantamount to surrender
2 1,042 bytes added; 26/05/2014 13:19
-- Events during the weeks before the war: The U.S. forces planned not to allow the Arab states, to destroy Israel, but also not to allow Israel to expand. On May 20, 1967, a cable of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff was sent to EUCOM and STRICOM. STRICOM
3 1,092 bytes added; 26/05/2014 12:00
-- Israel: On May 22, Nasser declared the Straits closed to Israeli shipping, blocking 90% of Israeli oil that passed through the Straits of Tiran.[9] Oil tankers that were due to pass through the straights have been delayed
4 134 bytes added; 24/05/2014 2:09
-- Israel: on 25 May Israel mobilized the whole army reserves, which caused the economy to come to a standstill.[
5a 149 bytes added; 24/05/2014 1:22
-- Israel: During May- June 1967, Eshkol's government did everything in its power to confine the confrontation to the Egyptian front
5b 391 bytes added; 24/05/2014 0:01
-- Israel: During 22 to 24 May, General Rabin was incapacitated for 2 days because of a nervous breakdown. The collapse may have been triggered by Ben Gurion, who blamed Rabin for his mistaken mobilization of reserves that made the crisis acute and that
6 248 bytes added; 24/05/2014 1:30
-- Golan Heights: n May–June 1967 The Israeli government did everything in its power to confine the confrontation to the Egyptian front. Eshkol and his colleagues took into account the possibility of some fighting on the Syrian front
7a 364 bytes added; 23/05/2014 23:41
-- Israel: Egypt planned to Attack Israel at 27 May. A couple of days before the attack date, Israel discovered it, and asked the Americans to deal with it. The American president called the Soviet leadership, and the Soviet ambassador, in the middle of
7b 278 bytes added; 23/05/2014 23:08
-- Israel: During May 1967 the Israel wanted Jordan to keep out of any war with Egypt, and it had no plans for the conquest of the West Bank or East Jerusalem. The Israelis sent Hussein three messages saying they had no hostile intent towards Jordan
7c 334 bytes added; 23/05/2014 23:03
-- Israel: Israeli military officers had occasionally made reckless and belligerent public statements, but Eshkol had no intention of provoking a war with the Arabs and still less of expanding Israel. Territorial aims developed during the war. The Israel
7d 285 bytes added; 23/05/2014 22:57
-- Israel: add
7e 169 bytes added; 23/05/2014 22:43
-- Israel: Israel and the UN protested that the Russian were falsely reporting on 13 May of Israeli forces concentrations near the border with Syria.
7f 153 bytes added; 23/05/2014 22:27
-- Israel: On May 21, Eshkol had told the cabinet Defense Committee that Egypt wanted to close the straits and to bomb the reactor in Dimona
7g 228 bytes added; 23/05/2014 22:12
-- Israel: Eshkol had sent Nasser secret messages urging deescalation. In public, he continued to assert Israel’s peaceful intentions, call for international mediation, and avoid criticism of Egypt.
7h 388 bytes added; 23/05/2014 22:07
-- Israel: the leaders of the confrontational states were caught by complete surprise when Israel took their threats at face value
7a 987 bytes added; 23/05/2014 18:06
-- Events: Israel–Jordan I am blamed for too long edits to an already long article. So I summarize and then accused for too short writings.
7b 271 bytes added; 23/05/2014 16:20
-- Events: Israel–Jordan According to Mutawi, all levels of Jordanian society (with some exceptions) were in favour of going to war. The Ordinary people, particularly the Palestinians, had been whipped up into a state of frenzy against Israel and in
8 892 bytes added; 13/05/2014 17:21
-- It is a pity to fight against facts. Nasser stated "Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight. It is a different issue wether he planned to initiate the war
9 473 bytes added; 11/05/2014 18:15
-- Events: Israel–Egypt On 26 May Nasser declared, "The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel
10 725 bytes added; 21/04/2014 15:51
-- Events: Israel–Syria add a source
11 330 bytes added; 17/03/2014 23:01
-- Events: Israel–Egypt Eshkol denounced the Egyptians in his speech on 21 May, but his response to this development was a model of moderation. He demanded that Nasser withdraw his forces from Sinai but made no mention of the removal of UNEF from the
12a 111 bytes added; 15/02/2014 10:58
-- Allegations of military support from the U.S., U.K. and Soviet Union: Many of these allegations and conspiracy theories [1] have been disputed and it has been claimed
12b 1,516 bytes added; 15/02/2014 10:46
-- Allegations of military support from the U.S., U.K. and Soviet Union: Anwar Sadat implied that Nasser used this deliberate conspiracy in order to accuse the United States as a political cover-up for domestic consumption
13 359 bytes added; 15/02/2014 9:48
-- Events: Israel–Egypt fix my mistake- p. 63 and not p. 199 , According to Shlaim & Louis, in the end of May 1967, Nasser claimed in a public speech to have been aware of the Straits of Tiran closure implications
14 441 bytes added; 14/02/2014 23:02
-- Events: Israel–Egypt According to Shlaim & Louis, in the end of May 1967, Nasser claimed in a public speech to have been aware of the Straits of Tiran closure implications
15a 1,573 bytes added; 14/02/2014 14:43
-- According to the prominent historian Abd aI-’Azim Ramadan, Nasser mistaken decisions to expel the international peacekeeping force from the Sinai Peninsula and close the Straits of Tiran in 1967, led to a state of war with Israel, despite the lack of mi
15b 834 bytes added; 14/02/2014 12:49
-- According to Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, [Gamal Abdel Nasser| Nasser]] had admitted his responsibility for the military defeat in the June 1967
16 132 bytes added; 3/11/2013 7:39
-- Events: Israel - Egypt Still, Nasser declared full mobilisation in Egypt as of 14 May 1967, citing the joint defence agreement with Syria.
17 316 bytes added; 2/11/2013 0:06
-- The Egyptian army: President Nasser , having learned of the results of the air strike, decided together with Field Marshal Amer to pull out the troops from Sinai within 24 hours. No detailed instructions were given concerning the manner and sequence
18 516 bytes added; 18/09/2013 11:26
-- Events: Israel - Egypt Fawzi (general)]] left for Syria for one day tour, verified that the Soviet report is false and reported that there are no Israeli armed forces near the Syrian border
19 406 bytes added; 17/09/2013 22:05
-- Events: Israel - Egypt the Straits of Tiran were opened to Israeli traffic and The Sinai peninsula was demilitarized
20 183 bytes added; 13/09/2013 0:43
-- Events: Israel - Syria Before 1967, Syria exacerbated the confrontation with Israel, in order to divert attention from its internal economic and political instability.
21 356 bytes added; 11/09/2013 21:19
-- Events: Israel - Syria use a quote
22 79 bytes added; 4/09/2013 1:50
-- Events: Israel - Syria Israel tapped the Jordan River (and the Sea of Galilee) by canal for irrigation of the Southern Negev desert
23 70 bytes added; 30/08/2013 18:48
-- Events: Israel - Syria War over Water was a major factor for the six days war
24 87 bytes added; 30/08/2013 15:56
-- Events: Israel - Syria Syria started the Headwater Diversion Plan (Jordan River) in order to thwart Israel's plans to use the water
25 584 bytes added; 25/08/2013 4:25
-- Events: Israel - Syria Israeli armoured tractors, often guarded by police, would start to plow in a disputed area of the DMZ. From its high ground positions, Syria would fire at those advancing
26 595 bytes added; 25/08/2013 3:08
-- Background and summary of events leading to war: Syria planned to reduce Israeli water consumption well under the allocated Johnston plan quota
27 1,208 bytes added; 10/06/2013 18:58
-- Background and summary of events leading to war
Ykantor ( talk) 14:35, 2 June 2014 (UTC)
— Preceding unsigned comment added by Ykantor ( talk • contribs) 15:12, 29 May 2014 (UTC)