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The current DNA picture looks good large but is not made for an icon. What do you think about ? Markus Schmaus 13:46, 4 Jun 2005 (UTC)
What is described inthe box in the section I have marked is not the hypothetico-deductive method. HD is the method behind Falsificationism; it seeks to falsify a hypothesis by examining deductions derived from it - hence the name. The method described here could just as easily be inductive, Bayesian or Coherentism. HD would test only the predictions made from the theory. Banno June 29, 2005 08:50 (UTC)
Sounds fine; Banno June 29, 2005 10:20 (UTC)
This article is great from a philosophical point of view, but there are some major points missing. Not all problems can be solved with the scientific method, especially areas of science that rely on historical evidence (geology for instance). It is not always possible to test hypotheses through experimentation. In some cases you are solving a problem by searching for evidence and so-called smoking guns. Plate tectonics is a very good example of this. I would like to see this POV added, I have seen a couple of articled in the scientific literature addressing it, but figured I'd mention it here first for some suggestions. -- 24.137.104.16 03:16, 27 July 2005 (UTC)
I think that what I am touching on is that human imagination is a marvellous thing that can span everything -- from what has happened to what could happen. The scientific method merely places constraints on the imagination by stating requirements for lines of reasoning, and then going on from there. In other words, the scientific method does not cover flights of fantasy. (What Francis Bacon cautioned against, as referred to in the history section of the article.) However, the scientific community often takes as a responsibility, to explain that which has happened (as in the evidence for plate tectonics), while not ruling out that which could happen. In that case, the human imagination may yet uncover something as yet unvisioned, and someone could even make that something real. (I am thinking about Robert Goddard dreaming about space exploration.) Ancheta Wis 09:23, 28 July 2005 (UTC)
Have you also considered the use of the Wikipedia:Wikiportal/Scientific method {{Portal}} as a venue for your line of thought? A scientific community can be both a help and a hindrance when working out something new. The portal is currently wide-open for additions. The points to which you are referring could be placed in a point/counterpoint framework there. The talk page there could be used as a venue for your line of reasoning. Ancheta Wis 09:23, 28 July 2005 (UTC)
Today's additions by 139.55.28.254 appear to be copied nearly verbatim from http://www.positiveatheism.org/india/science.htm. I will revert to last version by User:Markus Schmaus. Edwardian 04:50, 29 July 2005 (UTC)
Thinking about the 'No recipe' section; there are those who think that scientific method is, or should be like a recipe in the sense that scientists use it to achieve and reproduce results in a detatched manner. Francis Bacon, for example, desired that "the entire work of the understanding be commenced afresh, and the mind itself be from the very outset not left to take its own course, but guided at every step; and the business be done as if by machinery." (Novum Organum).
Is there some way we could improve on this? It occurs to me that the recipe analogy, which I quite like, could be used to explain a number of points of view. -- Chris 14:04, 29 July 2005 (UTC)
Well, first let me make it clear that I think there is no such recipe. Bacon did, unless I misunderstand him. And his conception of science remained strong throughout the 18th and 19th century. His recipe, if you like, was the method outlined in the history section. From the perspective of the philosophy of science, this view is no longer supportable. But not everyone pays a great deal of attention to what philosophers of science say, indeed it seems that the majority of practising scientists would have trouble naming just one of them (Stephen Jay Gould, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister's Pox). I believe that the scientific community of today (especially those who are also part of the skeptic community) is still basically Baconian in its understanding of scientific method. Can I back that up with some references? Not yet, but I'm curious now to see if I can. -- Chris 16:27, 29 July 2005 (UTC)
Unfortunately, we need to talk about this large change to the article, which has attained an equilibrium for several seasons of a year, now. If we are to now augment the article with some other considerations, such as the relationship of a specific researcher to the larger community or to specific segments of the scientific community, then we need to talk to this point. But a characterization of a specific scientific result as Good or Bad is a judgement which necessarily involves a protocol. Otherwise, the judgement lies outside of the method itself. Based on the considerations of the method, I have reverted. Ancheta Wis 22:05, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
The section on the perihelion precession of Mercury included the statement that
This is incorrect. Einstein used an approximate solution in 1915 to derive the perihelion precession of Mercury. Not only did this preceed Schwarzschild's work, but it even preceeded the finalization of the Einstein field equations. -- EMS | Talk 14:09, 19 August 2005 (UTC)
Short, simple, to the point. FuelWagon 19:15, 23 August 2005 (UTC)
An engineer has formulated a theory of cognition and created a class of predictions for his theory. He is trying to build an intelligent machine. Ancheta Wis 00:32, 19 September 2005 (UTC)
I filed an article RFC on the Methodological naturalism article. You can read the issue here. Essentially, the question is whether or not the scientific method is an example of methodological naturalism (MN) or methodological supernaturalism (MS). Since it involves the Scientific Method, I thought I'd post something here hoping to get someone who knows the topic. Does the scientific method allow for supernatural investigations and causes? Your input would be appreciated. FuelWagon 17:51, 11 September 2005 (UTC)
openning sentence: 'Scientific methods or processes', perhaps a matter of fine semantics; but, are methods processes? To me, a method is a procedure or algorithm describing or defining a process. It becomes an instance of a 'process' when it is put into action. i.e. A process is the execution of a method. Too fine of a distinction?
The latest change blurs the line between 2nd (intuitive) and 3rd stage (logical). " reasoning including deductive reasoning" because reasoning also includes abductive reasoning (guessing) which is clearly 2nd stage (intuitive). That is the whole reason there is a 1st stage (incubation, speculation, observation, justification, belief, etc.), where everything is up for grabs in the face of an unknown. The first stage is the difficult one. The 2nd stage is the first formulation of a coherent thought. The 3rd stage is the logical consequence of the coherent thought. Please justify this change. Ancheta Wis 21:45, 2 October 2005 (UTC)
7. Scientific method and the practice of science
needs such extensive rework that my suggestion is to delete it. Since it only says that publishing and $$ are necesary to practice science, it says either too much or too little. Furthermore the entire last paragraph gives great weight to the complaints of the fringers. So please simply remove the section for now.
8. Quotations
This quotation, from a play, is entirely inappropriate. I suggest replacing it with a quotation from an actual scientist, for example, Sir Issac Newton's quotation about "one man or age".
David B. Benson <dbenson@eecs.wsu.edu> 134.121.64.253 23:18, 26 October 2005 (UTC)
This article is getting really long. It would be a good idea to break up some of the sections into new pages. Karol 16:03, 12 November 2005 (UTC)
I moved most of the content of the History section to a separate page. The text there needs alot of work, I think. Karol 17:17, 12 November 2005 (UTC)
While reading through this article I suddenly noticed the use of a personal pronoun. I don't believe that appeared anywhere else in the article proper.
Changed "the scientist is making a personal choice when she chooses some particular theory over another" to read "the scientist is making a personal choice when using one particular theory over another."
No, I'm not bashing the use of the word "she" in an article -- I'm suggesting that we don't mix our writing styles. In this new iteration, our scientist does not exist; the way it was, suddenly our scientist embodied a particular entity.
- Dr. Morelos
I feel that the either a separate History article should be established or the History section of this article should be fleshed out. Major contributions by those such as DesCartes should receive mention. The Jade Knight 07:05, 9 December 2005 (UTC)
Hello. It seems this page is almost entirely dedicated to explain science as the study of natural phenomena. I would be very interested in knowing what the community of editors of this page thinks of non natural physical phenomena... Let me please explain what I mean by giving you the prototype of a non natural physical phenomenon: a computation. It obeys physical rules, yet it is human crafted: computations (typically) occure inside of physical systems which are man crafted (typically, computers). (Other examples can be thought of, like the study of chemical components which do not exist in nature).
This brings a second question. Computer science (CS), or at least (depending on the acception of CS) scientific aspects of CS can arguably be defined as the study of computations. How doese CS fit into the scientific method? It is (IMHO) very much like mathematics, however it differs in the sense that it studies a physical phenomenon: computations, and that empirical approaches are also used. It probably differs from physics in the sense that the border line between the science (computer science in this case), and technology is much more fuzzy (and, of course, in the fact that the physical phenonenon is non natural...).
I think that the definition of the scientific method tries to capture the essence of scientific practise. Computer science, as I see it, is the newest science. From my POV, the question is not wether CS is a science or not in the sense that it would or would not follow the scientific method. I see CS as a science, and the question is: is the definition of the scientific method up to date? (and therefore doese it captures CS practise?), or doese it need to be adapted in order to aknowledge its failure to capture the fact that CS is a science.
From what I see of this page, and in my opinion, the definition of the scientific method needs updating in order to ackowledge the fact that it misses computer science. (It may also bring an interesting perspective on the question of wether mathematics are a science or not since it seems to me CS is somehow in between physics and mathematics...(So I say informally)).
Do you feel my POV is widely accepted enough to be cited in the article, or yield minor modifications to it? Or is it a POV which (if pushed further) may well belong to an encyclpedia one day, but which needs to succeed in going through an "original research phase" first?
I am only an amateur phylosopher of sciences, so I am very intersted in the POV of wiser wikipedians on this subject. best regards: -- Powo 20:02, 27 December 2005 (UTC)
Good point Powo, I've tried to make this clearer using "the natural world" which is given as an alternative at the start of the nature article, and emphasising that "artificial" works are included as that article equivocates about its philosophical position. Hope that helps. ... dave souza 10:31, 28 December 2005 (UTC)
"Linus Pauling proposed that DNA was a triple helix. Francis Crick and James Watson learned of Pauling's hypothesis, figured out that Pauling was wrong and realized that Pauling would soon realize his mistake. So the race was on to figure out the correct structure. Except that Pauling did not realize at the time that he was in a race!"
Pauling proposed this in early 1953; Watson/Crick had first built a triple-helix model in late 1951. They showed it to Rosalind Franklin, who pointed out several errors with their model. After they saw her X-ray photographs (without her permission), they were able to deduce the correct structure. See [1].
I don't know the history well enough to correct the DNA examples (and incorporate what Watson and Crick might have claimed), but I do know the examples are wrong at present. -- TidyCat 11:12, 30 December 2005 (UTC) -
I am cutting out a chunk of badly-formatted content someone added recently to Science#Scientific method. I guess someone could scrap some material onto this page, if useful, although I notice some of the content overlaps and is contradictory... Karol 09:08, 1 January 2006 (UTC)
FIVE STEPS IN THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
TERMINOLOGY RELATED TO THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
A theory is a generalization based on many observations and experiments; a well-tested, verified hypothesis that fits existing data and explains how processes or events are thought to occur. It is a basis for predicting future events or discoveries. Theories may be modified as new information is gained. This is in contrast to the common usage of the word that refers to ideas that have no firm proof or support. To say "the apple fell" is to state a fact, whereas Newton's theory of universal gravitation is a body of ideas that explain why the apple fell. Thus a multitude of falling objects are reduced to a few concepts or abstractions interacting according to a small set of laws, allowing a scientist to make predictions about the behaviour of falling objects in general. An especially fruitful theory that has withstood the test of time and has an overwhelming quantity of evidence supporting it is considered to be "proven" in the scientific sense. Some universally accepted models such as heliocentric theory, biological evolution, and atomic theory are so well-established that it is nearly impossible to imagine them ever being falsified. Others, such as relativity and electromagnetism have survived rigorous empirical testing without being contradicted, but it is nevertheless conceivable that they will some day be supplanted. Younger theories such as string theory may provide promising ideas, but have yet to receive the same level of scrutiny.
A scientific method or process is considered fundamental to the scientific investigation and acquisition of new knowledge based upon physical evidence. Scientists use observations, hypotheses and deductions to propose explanations for natural phenomena in the form of theories. Predictions from these theories are tested by experiment. If a prediction turns out to be correct, the theory survives. Any theory which is cogent enough to make predictions can then be tested reproducibly in this way. The method is commonly taken as the underlying logic of scientific practice. A scientific method is essentially an extremely cautious means of building a supportable, evidenced understanding of our natural world.
I may be reintroducing this since I have not looked through the talk archives. The introduction seems to be a little long and dense at present. Shouldn't we be aiming this at the layman, specifically school kids who use this page to try and understand the scientific method? This introduction will blow them out of the water. Part of an encylopedias role is to make a difficult concept more understandable. I hope this does not offend editors on this article, but I think the current introduction does the opposite. David D. (Talk) 00:52, 8 January 2006 (UTC)
I looked back at previous version and came up with something along the following lines. I am sure this needs to be refined but it is a starting point. David D. (Talk) 19:17, 8 January 2006 (UTC)
Comment: I like the brevity. What we want is the questioning minds of the high school students. Do you think this will help or hinder? Brevity is good because they can see what is important. Any other points? Anyone? Once they have this under their belts, will they want more? How to get them to scroll down the page? -- Ancheta Wis 20:49, 8 January 2006 (UTC)
Seeing Ancheta's question about whether the intro will grip its intended audience got me thinking. The last paragraph hints at controversy and of course there is an enormous amount of controversy surrounding scientific method, so let’s beef this paragraph up a bit. Here’s a slight re-write,
The newer version looks good to me. David D. (Talk) 22:36, 10 January 2006 (UTC)
Terms like natural and supernatural are likely to turn out either meaningless or tautologous. The critical logical feature is just that explanations must be falsifiable. Jon Awbrey 23:06, 10 January 2006 (UTC)
Here I was responding to the proposed rewrite of a proposed rewrite, namely to insert natural as in this paragraph:
Let me go back to the current version and break this down play by play:
There's a dangling clause there. Maybe this:
Clunky though, maybe two sentences:
I'm merely pointing out that passing the buck to naturalism doesn't have any explanatory value. It used to have some in the days when naturalism meant a definite type of determinism, but we lost any sort of naive determinism like that some time ago. We are left with only a couple of options for naturalism. One is based on the tenet:
But this makes natural a tautologous or unfalsfiable property, and thus one that has no explanatory value.
The second option is to give a rule to nature that makes its domain a contingent property, for example, via this tenet:
This is basically just Aristotle's observation about the limitation of scientific knowledge to phenomena that have a nature, that is, to phenomena that embody general properties or laws, thus limiting science to recurrent phenomena and reproducible results. This is sometimes expressed in the phrase, "there is no science of the idiosyncratic" -- if there were I would certainly know about it! But qualifying the non-contingent everything in (1) with the contingent hedge in (2), we end up with:
So again the invocation of nature explains nothing, and we appear to be reduced to the task of simply describing as best we can what happens, or keeps on happening. Jon Awbrey 04:36, 11 January 2006 (UTC)
Subheading as this was getting rather long. The importance of seeking only "natural" explanations is that the supernatural is inherently inexplicable and bound up with faith. Unfortunately a vocal evangelical movement is seeking to remove this restriction and restore a natural philosophy that gives scientific credibility (and access to classrooms) to religious propositions. In the Kitzmiller case Judge Jones has set our a brief legal assessment of this point. The point is important to a brief definition of the scientific method, but the introduction is not the place for a deep philosophical analysis of what "nature" is – in an encyclopaedia that can reasonably be expected in the body of the article or in another linked article. Please ensure this point is briefly made in the introduction, ... dave souza 18:36, 11 January 2006 (UTC)
Yes, I understand, and fully sympathize, but better no line of demarcation at all than one that leaves science with the short end of the continent. Since the contemporary fuss is not really about faith versus knowledge -- all people in their right minds exhibit some characteristics of hope, faith, charity, etc. -- but predicated on both a 'lack of confidence' and a 'lack of knowledge', of different kinds, on both sides, there is no good reason to play that game by distorting the current understanding of science, as it's understood among those who do it, by engaging in the gambits of noncontingent assertions. Because the public to be educated will not then be able to see the difference in the actual conduct of the players, and that is the difference that really makes a difference. Jon Awbrey 19:26, 11 January 2006 (UTC)
I went ahead and put up the new intro without the controversial 'natural'. Let's see how it goes from there. -- Chris 23:21, 11 January 2006 (UTC)
The passive voice, indefinite person "are considered" is considered by some to fall under the head of "weasel words". It leaves the reader scratching his/her/its head(s) and asking "are considered" by whom?. Jon Awbrey 02:30, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
I mean "weasel word" in the sense of "pay no attention to the man behind the screen" in the Wizard of Oz. If you do ask the "who considers" question, then it can only be the community that agrees with the assertion, so why not make that explicit? Well, maybe because the "community of inquiry" (COI) behind the screen doesn't look so great and powerful when the screen drops. Jon Awbrey 07:12, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: I understand the heat of the battle thing, but ... I think that we need to get our minds out of the courts, lest we give the impression that methods of scientific inquiry rest their defense on the method of authority, whether it be dictated by legal authority or the authority of recipes that we learned from grammar school textbooks. Jon Awbrey 14:48, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: Yes, I understand, but there's nothing terribly new about all that. And the fastest way to lose the baby is to confuse it with the bathwater, and not be clear about the kind of science in which the vast majority of practicing "scientific methodists" have faith, and why exactly they do. There's a whole lot of background to draw on here, and I'm not in any particular hurry myself ... Jon Awbrey 21:30, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: I am getting this strange sense of deja vu all over again, so I think I will recycle the title that I used for this sort of investigation all through my share of the last millennium. I have resolved to do more production, less discussion this year, but still this question of method tugs at the edge of my attention. So maybe I will just widen the horizon a bit and address some of the issues that I know about, especially ones that have been widely discussed over the years of my acquaintance, as much of this discussion already rounds up all the usual suspects and begins to fall into all the usual ruts, and I won't worry so much about the nits that can be picked out of the introduction.
JA: I doubt if the "screened off bodies of thought" (SOBOT's) are really so diverse and numerous as to defy all description, and it does seem like it's our job to describe all sorts of diverse and numerous things, which folks here go about with notorious avidity, so I'm guessing that there's some other kind of resistance involved in the avoidity thereof.
JA: A good start could be made in very broad brush strokes. This is not the philosophy of science article, but it needs to coordinate with it in a sensible way. In that article we need to sort out the working philosophies -- the not always fully articulated philosophies in practice of the reflective practitioners -- from the vicarious philosophies of the speculating spectators. Each group sees different things, sometimes more, sometimes less, by dint of their different perspectives. But here it makes sense to give the bigger ear to the method as she's actually bespoken.
JA = Jon Awbrey 13:44, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
SteenGoddik, it is my opinion that "Scientific Theory or Scientific Law" are not part of this article. The reason is that scientific method is simply that, a list of steps, almost a how-to, which is not necessarily a validation procedure for admitting a concept into the western canon. As the article clearly states, it is the people practicing the method who are the essential ingredient in the method. Thus someone simply stepping through the checklist without the essential understanding of the problem is practicing cargo cult science and anyone who simply proclaimed by fiat that "Concept A" has passed through all the stages of the Scientific Method, and is hereby declared Scientific Law Number 27A-5156. Anyone caught violating 27A-5156 is subject to .... It is not necessary to declare Concept A as Law. It is simply true, or it isn't. And the violations of the law are not subject to punishment by The State. It isn't necessary. The Concept would thus simply be a trope if some exception or limitation to a purported Law A became known. Now if some technology were introduced into our world based on a wrong law, that technology would simply fail.
Now after brutally simplifying the argument, let's examine why Scientist A has mooted some concept A. Well, that's the characterization stage. Scientist A, after some consideration has decided that concept A is notable in some way. If there are conditions and exceptions, the concept must be suitably qualified and limited, or else scientist A has severely limited his employability in the field. Scientist A has noted that this concept seems to solve some problem in the list of unknowns which are all around us.
It may be that you are searching for what John Ziman has termed Reliable Knowledge. -- Ancheta Wis 16:26, 19 February 2006 (UTC)
SteenGoddik, I think you're dead right. Theory is so fundamental to science that it is difficult to see how one can do justice to an article on scientific method without a strong characterization of theory, preferably tying it in with examples. Some of the components of the section 'hypotheses development' would to me be more fittingly stated in relation to the theoretical developments.
Holon
13:38, 20 February 2006 (UTC)
I can sympathize with an abstract statement that recursion includes iteration. However, iteration came first. The primary loop in the scientific method is iterative, and the stack required for recursion is not a given; what if the datatypes are different. It takes experience to properly characterize a problem, and recursion takes a base case to be properly formulated, or else we have a problem with levels of abstraction improperly interacting and confusing the issue. I encourage you to read History of science for the examples. A classic case is the size and shape of Earth.
The DNA example is instructive here. It took several generations of scholars to zero in on the issues and problems. If you are looking for a mathematical analogy, it is similar to the solution of a differential equation, where the solver has to hunt to converge on the answer. Thus iteration involves clarifying the issues. Blocking and tackling, to use a sports analogy. Iteration=try and try again.
But a recursion differs from this. Once a theory is established, then a researcher can build on existing theory as a building block to solve his/her problem. The classic example is the triad of theories Newtonian mechanics / Maxwell's equations / Special relativity. They are not independent; two of them can derive the third. This I submit is the recursion. It takes a basic case, like Einstein's question to himself what would it be like to ride a beam of light?, and based on what he knew, derive SR from the previous 2 legs of the triad.
What's the point of the difference between iteration and recursion? Feynman said it very well: the sciences are an interconnected web of knowledge, with one point from one science dovetailing with another seemingly unrelated point from another science, all consistent with what has gone on before it in a huge web of relationships, not all at the same scale but building on what has come before it. That is the best use of the term recursion. -- Ancheta Wis 00:21, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
the basic methods are observation, hypothisis, experament, conclution, and abstract.
EF: There is some controversy as to whether practicing scientists actually accomplish their real work by any defined and describable method.
JA: There is some controversy, mostly among those who are not, as to whether practicing scientists actually accomplish their real work by any defined and describable method.
JA: Well, not everybody who edits an article bothers to read the previous discussions. The Twinkieth Century was a lot like that. And of course we still have to source stuff that's so familiar that we have forgotten the last place where we read it. I had added what I thought was a fairly balanced and decent summary of the critical regard of method-ism in the second paragraph, but it seems to have gotten buried somewhere in the philosophical epiphenomena. There are times when one simply observes. Jon Awbrey 05:41, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
somebody needs to talk about Descartes in this article.
The Further reading list is very long and not all of it looks notable. I suggest taking some of them out (possibly ones with red linked authors). JoshuaZ 05:30, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: The list is rather carefully chosen to cover some of the standard variations in models of scientific method and the variety of perspectives on it, but let me know which you have in mind deleting. It was not supposed to be a list of celebrities, though I was surprised after I typed it in how many were already notarized in WP. The thing is that many of the more recent texts will tend to have redlinked authors, and I've been told by some old hands that this is really not a problem, as it just flags people who might eventually deserve articles. At any rate it was the works themselves that are intended to be helpful to the reader. Jon Awbrey 05:48, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I'm "planning to" add some exposition based on the sources that I'm adding to the Readings, at which time I will elevate them to References, but it may be a week or three before I can get time and concentration to focus on that, so please indulge me while I pad the bib a bit more and leave it an exercise for the Reader. Jon Awbrey 20:44, 22 March 2006 (UTC)
Several years ago, the hypothesis section of this article used the term guess, which is the blunt truth. Later, it was appended with an exclamation point guessing!, as if the editor could not believe that scientists could dare to admit that they would guess. It was later softened to systematic guessing. Now I see that the Peirce article no longer states his quote abductive reasoning is neither more nor less than guessing.
To be fair to the younger readers of this article, I believe that it is better for the encyclopedia to admit that 'guessing' is a good thing, something not to be ashamed of, or suppressed. In fact, a part of scientific method, along with 'test' (experiment). Ancheta Wis 14:32, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: The Charles Peirce quote must have been excised before I came on board, or I certainly would have insisted on keeping it. But that whole article has been under considerable development over the past few months, and when it grew past 100 Kb there was a request to spin off various subtopics, so the quote may have ended up in one of those. At any rate, wiki-links to article subsections tend to be not very persistent around here. Jon Awbrey 15:10, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Thanks for the look-up, I restored the link. I think that subsection is stable enough to risk it. Jon Awbrey 17:15, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
I think scholasticism should be mentioned in this article, as it is the main alternative to the scientific method. Markus Schmaus 14:48, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I would recommend that we call in some expert help with that, as there are many historically inaccurate cliches about Medieval scholasticism that I don't think we should be in the business of promulgating without doing some serious fact-checking. Jon Awbrey 14:58, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
I'm thinking about something like
Markus Schmaus 16:42, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Sounds harmless enough to me, but then I've done only a smattering of reading in the Scholastics. Jon Awbrey 17:11, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
Scientific method | Scholastic Inquiry |
inductive reasoning | Axioms and Logic |
abductive reasoning | - |
deduction=prediction | deduction |
experiment | - |
Kenosis, what would you say to some wikilinks? In addition, when mooting a concept the grammatical mood might be a little more jussive than imperative.
One of the things which I personally find quite valuable is your bold synopsis of the checklist of factors which are necessary to gain confidence that one truly understands something. Especially the 'gradual process' statement above. Good.
I personally would place the Prediction item at the foot of this list, as Expectations typically do not get formed without an ensemble of supporting data. Otherwise, the Predicted item would necessarily remain personal and unspoken until one gains confidence in the strength of the mooted Prediction. -- Ancheta Wis 07:43, 22 March 2006 (UTC)
Hi Ancheta. Just noticed this. As indicated in the lead-in, "subject only to marginal disagreements about specific aspects". Supernovas are a class of phenomena, so NP there. As to "...to the best achievable extent", this leads into the extremely important discussion at the bottom of the box, which outlines tentative hypotheses/theories, and quest for results which increase confidence. "Confidence" used intentionally to draw on its statistical implications too. As to "must be", this "must" remain because these are general requirements, subject to disagreement only in exceptional cases (this is how intelligent design advocates start, for instance, by questioning the very basics and reading in what they choose to loosen up the method for attack with pseudotheories). As to "gaining the ability", this assumes scientists very commonly work in groups rather than solely as individuals. This basic form of outline is actually a composite from several sources which assumes a wide range of more specific methods within it, and intentionally is formatted to include tenets common to both natural and life sciences. I intentionally did not even dare to mention certain exceptions for idiographic "sciences", which is one of many reasons I included the "subject only to marginal disagreements" caveat. Thanks for the request to review and check the thoughts...
Kenosis
07:24, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
Having said the above, kindly allow me a few days to see if a consistently syntaxed jussive set of the parenthetized explanations hits me? Thanks... Kenosis 09:34, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
Another thing, Ancheta Wis. You raise a good point about whether prediction should be after control here. For this schema, I think it must be before "understanding" because of the importance of explaining tentativeness (related also to falsifiability) and confidence in a hypothesis/theory as a variable (rather than true-false proposition) to the less-than-technical reader unfamiliar with the wisdom of the process of perpetual tentativeness of propositions (I hear the speed of light may be changing too, incidentally--kneejerk creationists ought have a grand time with that one-- now nobody in the "scientific community" knows what they're doing).
The facet of "control" is a bit of a tough one here, because the reason we engage in methodological natualism is so we can control things (else why bother? pass me that spleef again). And of course there's control vs. manipulated variable; and of course there's the attempt to achieve control over an independent variable to manipulate it (assuming it's appropriate of course, recalling some of the Nazi experiments). Maybe an appropriate course here is to think about removing "control" and try a three-tenet explanation with the existing three qualifications to "understanding"?... Kenosis 10:01, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I did not write this, but I think that there are a few ideas in it that are important for the reader to understand — something about the continuity of scientific inquiry with everyday problem-solving maybe — so I will copy it here till I or somebody can think of a way to salvage the good of it. Jon Awbrey 04:06, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
Scope and goals
Scientific method can be applied to anything within the range of our experiences. As long as something has an effect on our lives, we can formulate theories and try to predict what this effect might be. The effect itself is an experiment, testing whether our theory was right.
People use scientific methods all the time. They have hypotheses about devices and make predictions how those will react to their actions. If a device does not work as expected, the experiment may disprove their hypothesis. If they adjust their hypothesis, they are applying scientific methods; if they nevertheless stick to their hypothesis because of nonscientific reasons, they are not.
Scientific method does not aim to give an ultimate answer. Its iterative and recursive nature implies that it will never come to an end, so any answer it gives is provisional. Hence it cannot prove or verify anything in a strong sense. However, if a theory passed many experimental tests without being disproved, it is usually considered superior to any theory that has not yet been put to a test.
I've never heard before that Popper's influence strengthened peer review, do we have a citation for that? JoshuaZ 05:30, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: As far as the US scene goes, and making peer review an integral part of American academic life, I think that a better case could be made for the indefatigable efforts of John Dewey. Jon Awbrey 18:28, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Interesting quote from Bacon here: [2]
JA: It was so much work coming up with that title that I will have to leave it as an "Exercise for the Reader" until after lunch. Jon Awbrey 18:42, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
The current philosophy section is long, rambling and borderline incoherent. Jon, what do you think you are doing to it? JoshuaZ 06:17, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: As best I can recall, I am reponsible for the part of it copied below, though the last paragraph seems to be a residue of an earlier mention of Feyerabend that I was merely trying to make a transition to. You may remember that we had been having some discussion about the "no-method" school of thought, and I was initially for downplaying it, as I know that it really has very little impact on workaday research. But it fills the pop press and the pop phil sci courses, and it needs to be dealt with. That third paragraph was initially in the introduction, and I thought way back when that it was enough to say on the matter. In the mean time, though, I've had some rather odd experiences with (Pseudo-scient)-ologists, in a non-associative way, and it has convinced that we all have a lot more work to do as far as the "public reception of science" (PROS) goes.
JA: One of the big problems is the widespead confusion about the respective roles of science and philosophy of science. There are scientists who reflect on science and who take the time to explain it to the public, but they are rare compared to the numbers of philosophers of science and science writers who shape the public conception of science in ways that are not always very realistic. There's nobody to blame for that really — most doers are too busy doing science to explain how they view it, and there's nothing wrong with having specialized "reflectors" who stand at a distance from the action — sometimes they see things from a distance that the doers fail to see for standing too close to the picture. But somehow or other it is necessary to explain how the different perspectives relate to each other, or else the public gets a distorted picture of science. On this trial effort, I was trying to say all that in a way that places the continuities between doing science and reflecting on it within a natural context.
JA: The second paragraph speaks to the sea-change that occurred with Kant, where he accepted the workings of science at face value as if were just another phenomenon to be explained. This is a novel way to finesse the usual difficulties at the beginning, and it approaches the whole problem of justification in a positive way. That, as I recall, was the original idea of positivism, before it got wacked all out of proportion. So here I am trying to explain the bifurcation that took place historically, arising from a difference in attitude as to what a solution to the problem of justification would have to do.
JA: Okay, I'll have to leave it for tonight. Jon Awbrey 07:22, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
Philosophical reflection on scientific method
Philosophy of science takes its cue from the moment when the play of inquiry is interrupted by a question about the activity of inquiry itself. The inquirer in question may have been, just a moment before, absorbed in a bit of data or immersed in the study of a problematic phenomenon — and throughout history it was normally that way — or maybe a curious bystander, or perhaps a person whose profession is philosophy. In any case, there are a number of questions that a reflective observer will typically think to ask about the conduct of scientific inquiry as a phenomenon that is interesting for its own sake.
What happens next depends on the attitude that the person who examines the phenomenon of science — quite literally the appearance of science — brings to the test. The attitude may be positive, taking the appearance of science at face value as a process that works as it seems to. Or the attitude may be negative, less disposed to accept appearances and more inclined to be critical or even skeptical of the possibilty that anything like science can work as it seems. These choices that any individual can make are also reflected in moments of history when one of the other tended to predominate, at least in particular circles of thought.
The philosophy of science has among its topics of interest the question of how far the actual practice of scientific researchers conforms to the espoused methods or the ostensible norms, to which the majority of them expressly or tacitly assent. In the process of subjecting the conventional assumptions to critically reflective examination, writers in these fields periodically generate controversies as to whether scientific knowledge is actually produced by a defined, describable, or determinate methodology (see, for instance, the writings of Feyerabend and Kuhn).
Perhaps there might be more on the progression from ostensive definition, to extensional definition and intensional definition. In some fields, we have indeed reached a high plane of understanding; some areas of science have progressed to the point where some experts can moot a thought experiment. Other experts can subsequently commit funds and expertise toward the design of experiments. This is Big Science, as for the Space observatories.
But when the same type of methodology is applied to a classroom and children are not benefitting, clearly the science is not there yet. Perhaps the article might benefit from a discussion why. There are other mismatches which we could discuss, if not on this page, then on other Science pages.
I invite you to the wikipedia:scientific peer review pages where there has been lively discussion on how to take this encyclopedia to a new level of quality. -- Ancheta Wis 12:42, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: In my experience argumentum ad revertum and genuine dialogue are mutually exclusive. Good luck with that science by fiat thing. You're really showing the kiddies how it's done. Jon Awbrey 13:48, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: The way I work is gradual, incremental, requiring no small amount of algorhythmic backtracking from time to time, but all importantly I work in public — perhaps you recognize the modus operandi. I appreciate your appreciation of my creativity that you think I could open any doors that are not already swinging wide on every saloon and salon in the Wiki City, but for sooth's sake I must decline the compliment. The loophole that anybody could drive an 18-wheeler semio-truck (articulated lorry in the UK) through, however, is opened up the moment that soi-disant scientists start appealing to the authority of the biggest army as the raison detour of science, if you catch my semantic drift. What's the alternative? Well, it's Popperly known as the via dolorosa of falsifiability, which makes it incumbent on soi-disant scientists to try poking holes in all their own pet theories, even their own theory of how science works. Scientific method? Use it or lose it. Jon Awbrey 20:50, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: That would be a rather, well, creative interpretation of the single word "work". We're all working here. Being bold means making changes on the main attractor, however strange, except when there's some really serious dispute, which I didn't think we were having, not here, not yet. This article is, after all, tagged as a Philosophy article. So why is all the philosophy relegated to an afterthought? Indeed, my whole effort on that issue arose from trying to accord the benefit of the doubt to some perspectives that my first instincts, a month ago, were to discount. Yes, it was clearly a work in progress, begun late at night, and it usually takes me ≥ 3 rewrites to clean thinks up, but reverting that much good faith work on a common issue without discussion is just not WP:COOL in my book. Jon Awbrey 21:28, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I am saying that when we are done with this article, it had better be something more than a WP:PEACOCK paen to the cookbook recipes for scientific method that all of us learned, at least in my day, in our 4th-grade science textbooks. It had better exhibit an up-to-date, > 1-eyed literate, philosophically critical and reflective attempt to tackle the questions that have been being asked and addressed by many people who are genuinely concerned about science education, professional training, and the public reception of science. Otherwise we might as well just paste up a link to some 4th-grade textbook and give it up at that. Jon Awbrey 22:00, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
I removed these two paragraphs becasue the ideas are not effectvely contexted as yet. Here they are, for further consideration if desired.
Kenosis 19:58, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
Agreed, my instinct was to consider it a stranded paragraph which left an extremely important question hanging in mid-air. To start back in along these important lines, the existing paragraph could be followed by a checklist such as that below (courtesy of the intelligent design article editors, but really fairly standard), or some derivative thereof:
Kenosis 16:28, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
I noticed this had recently been removed:
Why?
I propose restoring that passage, since it is apparently well-sourced, and deleting all the "scare quotes" instead. They convey essentially no information, and what they do contain is often only a baised point of view. -- James S. 02:32, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: The levels of misunderstanding that I see exhibited here are turning out to be far worse than I thought. These misunderstandings have to do with:
JA: One of factors that seems to be preventing the sort of genuine dialogue among concerned parties that might help to find real solutions to these misunderstandings is, I'm sad to say, a kind of "bunker mentality" that I see developing in the soi-disant "defenders of science". After many tries it has so far been impossible to get it through to some people that critical thinking is not about picking sides. It involves the critique of sloppy reason wherever it occurs, no matter who does it. It has so far been impossible to get across the simple logical point that many stories have > 2 sides, that a person who criticizes the arguments put forward on behalf of X is not ipso facto an "adherent" of ¬X. I have personally had to endure insinuations and even explicit insults like that from people who have no other data about "what side I'm on" than the fact that I criticize their reasoning on a given point.
JA: I think I understand something about the dynamics that brings this to pass, and up to a point I sympathize with those who have been so embroiled in this or that battle against scientific heresy that they begin to take on the characters of similar inquistors in the past. But I still have hopes that they will do better than their precursers, take pause to clear the fog of war, the "blood in the eye" (BITE), from what should be their better vision. Whether they know it or not, many others have been tackling these problems and trying to do something positive about them, for longer than they seem to realize. Jon Awbrey 03:56, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I believe that I have already made more than a good faith effort to explain all of my contributions to the article and all of the problems that I see with its current condition. When others begin to make a corresponding effort to explain their objections to my additions, then maybe there will be reason to say more. Jon Awbrey 04:08, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
Jon, 1) to put it bluntly you don't explain yourself very well and 2) none of your stuff gives many references, which lead to serious OR problems with your versions, even if it was understood. JoshuaZ 04:12, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Thank you. That at least gives me something concrete to work on. Jon Awbrey 04:21, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: It's late again where I am, so I'll try to be wise and make this short. Look, these are such bedeviled questions that I lose track of which devils I'm advocating on a given day. My POV of the moment is this: There are philosophers of science who show some familiarity with the history and the actual practice of science, like Peirce or Kuhn, and then there are those who show all the marks of being outside speculators, like Popper or Feyerabend. That's not an assignment of different colored hats in the trite Western picture-show sense, but merely a question of recognizing different perspectives for what they are. But a philosophical article on scientific method still has to deal with these issues without simply dimissing them out of hand. Now, I sat back quietly and observed your labors of house-&-stable-cleaning, and on the whole I think that's "that's a good thing". But some stuff that was right on in spirit if not in letter got tossed out with bathwater.
JA: So when things quieted down a bit, I tried to go back and deal with the issues that I know from long experience won't go away, since they have been recurringly raised by whole bodies of curriculum reform folks and hard-nosed science-minded professionals for the last 40 years or so, just since I personally have been paying attention. Because I tried to explain a tricky issue in the vernacular, prompted by many requests and WP guidelines to do so, it suddenly got branded and reverted as "personal essay". But these were nothing more personal or creative than paraphrases of philosophical issues that are as old as the hills. And now I'm told that it's "original research". I suppose that if some people are not aware of the histories that I mentioned here and above then it might seem like news in the WP:NOR sense, but at least providing references is something that I know how to do. So let's all practice what we preach and do likewise. Jon Awbrey 05:12, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I know that some people think that links should not be replicated, but I find that a good compendium of related topics is a very useful study aid, both on first and on subsequent readings. It also serves contributors in helping to see some of the discontinuities that will need to be smoothed out across diverse and sundry regions of Wikipedia. Jon Awbrey 17:42, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
Coming from outside, in that I have not edited this page for quite some time, may I point out that the distinction between the history and philosophy of the scientific method appears quite arbitrary? These two sections could profitably be combined - perhaps by putting the philosophy section in historical order? Banno 20:39, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: There is a rather important distinction between the history of scientific method and the philosophy of scientific method. History is the record of past events. Despite what some people think, philosophy is not purely a thing of the past. Philosophy of science has to do with reflection on scientific inquiry as a whole. This includes (1) comparative and critical examinations of scientific activity, (2a) problems about the different types of reasoning involved in inquiry, (2b) the grounds of their validity, and (2c) their coordination with one another, (3) questions about the justification or warrant of scientific method, that is, whether, how, and why we think it works. And so on, just to mention a few things off the top of my head, as Data would say. Jon Awbrey 02:15, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I cannot make sense of what the issue is here. Maybe the concatenations of "F of G of H of ..." have exceeded the limits of my pushdown stack. If people are saying that the history section could be made more outlinish in view of already having the History of science and History of scientific method main artcles, that makes sense to me. If they are saying that the contemporary academic and cultural conversation about the nature of scientific inquiry can be separated from this article and relegated to a subsection of the Hist of Sci or Phil of Sci articles, then I think that would be a mistake on many grounds. Please clarify. Thanks, Jon Awbrey 15:58, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: And I am trying to say that they are two different topics, indeed, radically different topologies for looking at science. The contemporary philosophical topics are not properly dealt with as history, since the contemporary issues, by definition, all have the time coordinate "now". Jon Awbrey 17:32, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
There is a concept which has been lost in the edits, and which needs to be reinstated in the intro. "Scientific method (and science itself) deals with new knowledge". If no one has thought the thoughts before, then it qualifies as science. Originality is part of the currency with which scientists deal. Other investigations are certainly knowledge, but are rather more scholarship than science. This does not mean that new sounds or words or fashion or other tropes are science. That's where scientific method is applied to demarcate science from other forms of new knowledge. -- Ancheta Wis 16:25, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: As wonderful as all of these quatotions are, their piquancy is considerably weakened by being tossed together in a salad bon mot. For my part I like to use such things as pithy epigraphs to lead off pertinent sections of the text, but I've been told that this practice is "not encyclopedic". So I'll put them here for case by case reconsideration. Jon Awbrey 03:08, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
"The scientific approach to the examination of phenomena is a defense against the pure emotion of fear." - Tom Stoppard, Rosencrantz & Guildenstern Are Dead (1967, page 17 in Grove edition)
"Science is a way of thinking, much more than it is a body of facts." - Carl Sagan
"Science is what we have learned about how to keep from fooling ourselves." - Richard Feynman
"The brightest flashes in the world of thought are incomplete until they have been proven to have their counterparts in the world of fact." - John Tyndall (1820-1893), physicist
"It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." - William Kingdon Clifford
"A habit of basing convictions upon evidence, and of giving to them only that degree of certainty which the evidence warrants, would, if it became general, cure most of the ills from which this world is suffering." - Bertrand Russell
"The plural of anecdote is not data." - Roger Brinner
JA: I will be adding some text to the main article under the heading indicated above on the various models of scientific inquiry that have been discussed in the literature over the years, in good time drawing on some of the references that I've already added — probably starting with Salmon, Hacking, Earman, etc. Jon Awbrey 02:58, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: On third reading of the previous comments about history and philosophy, I think that I can recognize a persistent phenomenon, one that I have tried with no big success to address already, so let me vary a variable or three and make another trial of it today.
JA: The philosophy section needs to be organized by philosophical topics, not by chronological order. The questions that any reflective person or critical thinker will eventually think to ask about the conduct of scientific inquiry are recurrent not serial.
JA: Over the last week there has been a persistent attempt to push any modicum of critical reflection about scientific method off the table, under the rug, anywhere but our backyard, etc. Assuming that most interested parties still want to keep this article under the aegis of Philosophy (a defeasible hypothesis), I think that this tendency is ill-advised and inappropriate. The reader is owed an accurate account of the current scene, with all its wrinkles and warts.
JA: I tried, in what may have been too vernacular or folksy a way, to make the point that reflection on science is not the exclusive preserve of professional philosophers of science, but that it arises "in the wild" anytime anybody pauses to reflect on what they are doing, no matter whether they are doing Big Science or micro-problem-solving in everyday life. This continuity is one route to a better understanding of science on the public scene. So I think that it's very important.
JA: In brief: It is not the profession that constitutes the reflection, it us the quality of the reflection that constitutes the profession. Jon Awbrey 16:24, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: For my part, I do not think that 47 Kb is all that excessive for a keystone article like this, but one way to trim it would be to tighten up the paradigm examples to the few that can be carried through all of the stages in parallel, maybe just two examples from widely diverse fields. I notice that all of them now are from the natural sciences, which is a source of potential warp in the fabric of science being presented. Skimming through the examples, the paragraph on Light seemed most isolated and not so well written in its current state. Jon Awbrey 17:08, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Text deleted:
Light
Light had long been supposed to be made of particles. Isaac Newton, and before him many of the Classical Greeks, was convinced it was so, but his light-is-particles account was overturned by evidence in favor of a wave theory of light suggested most notably in the early 1800s by Thomas Young, an English physician. Light as waves neatly explained the observed diffraction and interference of light when, to the contrary, the light-as-a-particle theory did not. The wave interpretation of light was widely held to be unassailably correct for most of the 19th century. Around the turn of the century, however, observations were made that a wave theory of light could not explain. This new set of observations could be accounted for by Max Planck's quantum theory (including the photoelectric effect and Brownian motion—both from Albert Einstein), but not by a wave theory of light, nor by a particle theory.
JA: Moving this paragraph here for reconsideration:
Formal approaches
Inferential statistics and computational learning theory are concerned with setting out rigorous statistical resp. algorithmic frameworks for induction, or at least practically effective ones. For a near-optimal method in the sense of computable predictions in the context of algorithmic information theory, see the speed prior.
JA: There may be some other section, present or TBA, that it would fit under, but it seemed like a dangling factoid where it was. Jon Awbrey 17:41, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
There are alternatives to cutting back text. One alternative might be to place articles in context. -- Ancheta Wis 18:12, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
Facets of Scientific method |
---|
History of scientific method |
Philosophy of scientific method |
Thought experiment |
Design of experiments |
Formal approaches to scientific method |
Mathematical models |
JA: Yes, I think that these navigation guides can be very useful, as I always try to craft my own in the See also seas anyway. The only problem that I've seen with them in other places, say Semiotics, is the possibility of dismembering aspects of a subject, Osiris-like, that can only be properly integrated when taken up in close coordination with each other. This is part of what I'm getting at when I say that critical reflection is not just for professional critics and reflectors. Jon Awbrey 18:30, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
Jon Awbrey, What would you think if we were to have more of a communications protocol; those little DNA icons which are getting elided were a device to demarcate illustrations of the phases of scientific method. They were placed there in response to a request. This is recorded in the archives. It might help if you were to note your motive before these types of edits. Then others could assent, thus making the editing process more of a collaboration. -- Ancheta Wis 18:22, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Speaking as a mere reader, I found them extremely distracting, causing my eyes simply to skip over the heiroglyphed paragraph. I think that I can understand what somebody was trying to achieve, but it simply did not work in practice. Alas! the way of all experiment. Jon Awbrey 18:38, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I daresay that I have been far above the par of this group in giving notice of my edits, discussing them on the talk page, and preserving for reconsideration on the talk page what some previous soul took the time to type in, and I receive a remark like that with some irony from those who have yet to reciprocate its sentiment. But I will of course observe as best I can, short of due boldness, inconsistency with global norms, and intellectual paralysis, any form of communication protocol that achieves a local consensus. Jon Awbrey 18:52, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Recent edits show a tendency toward a type of progressivist fallacy that wore out its welcome in the late great "modern" era, namely the practice of using words like "modern" as honorific terms, rhetorically fashioned to confer some order of unquestioned — and ∴ "unscientific" — legitimacy on a contemporary doctrine. Now that "modern" has passed from hip to hip replacemnt in our thoroughly post*modern era, the use of the term "contemporary" is more accurate and less of a WP:PEACOCK word. Now, I do not question, too much, that science is one of those domains where most of us have faith that progress can be made, over the long haul, but nobody with a historical (See Elsewhere, Coriolanus) consciousness could dare to call that progression monotonic. Jon Awbrey 04:04, 27 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: It's a deal, if you don't use "modern" I won't use "post-modern". So do what I say and nobody gets hurt.
JA: P.S. That's a Kleene star that I use in "post*modern". Thus it is clear that:
JA: Et sic deinceps, it goes on from there ... Jon Awbrey 05:06, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I have problems with the demarcation section. It's mostly just Popper's bugaboo again, sans citations, and it suffers from the following problems:
JA: No, no, maybe, but not this way.
JA: We already have a highly contentious article on Pseudoscience, and I would prefer not to replicate those peculiar trials here. So I think that it's better to "describe", not necessarily "define", scientific method in positive terms, and now that we have a reasonable outline, to stick with it.
JA: The items on that checklist are usually referred to as heuristic principles. Heuristic principles, much as Bohr observed about "deep truths", and much like muscles, tend to come in opposing pairs. In short, they are approximate maxims, and not internally consistent among themselves. Their proper application requires experience with the exigencies of given domains, that is, "practical wisdom", or what the Greeks called phronesis. Thus they serve even worse as a recipe than the more standard statements of method, and a lot of nonsense can be generated by the novitiate taking them too literally and rigidly. Jon Awbrey 04:40, 27 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Here is one of my previous attempts at delineating the demarcation problem in positive terms. I'll probably feather this in momentarily, though I think that these sorts of border disputes probably do more harm than good.
The criteria for a system of assumptions, methods, and theories to qualify as science vary in their details from application to application, but they typically include (1) the formulation of hypotheses that meet the logical criterion of contingency, defeasibility, or falsifiability and the closely related empirical and practical criterion of testability, (2) a grounding in empirical evidence, and (3) the use of scientific method. The procedures of science typically include a number of heuristic guidelines, such as the principles of conceptual economy or parsimony that fall under the rubric of Occam's Razor. A conceptual system that fails to meet a significant number of these criteria is likely to be considered "nonscience".
I begin to like what I see... Kenosis 05:58, 27 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: The word progressive is malaprop here, as it connotes monotonic to many people. Backtracks cannot be avoided. Jon Awbrey 21:55, 27 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: "Robust" is a fairly respectable term in the engineering circles that I lately buzzed about, though its cousin "agile" has been getting more buzziness of late. But let me remind you that this sorites of heuristics are "rules of thumb". There's a major artery in your thumb. If you try to shave 'em too fine, you end up with blood all over your razor. Nobody wants that, now do they? Jon Awbrey 22:36, 27 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: "Robust" also has a standard meaning in statistics — where I first learned it I think: "A statistic is said to be robust if it is not sensitive to outliers". From there it got used in AI to mean "graceful recovery from anomalies", also "non-brittleness", capable of laughing off a request to divide by zero, etc. John von Neumann, John Holland, etc. Jon Awbrey 23:00, 27 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Y'know, I'm really can't make everything up. The word "robust" really is used in just that technical sense. "Progressive", again, is used in connection with "incrementalism", and progresses from there to progressivist fallacies. Fallacies are a bad thing to fall into. Jon Awbrey 03:56, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
How about something like:
JA: It's okay except for the "progressive", which is a seriously misleading word. I will dig up some references, but it may be a while, schedule interruptions coming up. Jon Awbrey 04:18, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
OK, talk 2ya later then. I still think progressive is essential here, and think it's only marginally open for misinterpretation without the adjuncts... Kenosis 04:22, 28 March 2006 (UTC)Also please see my query in Communications Protocol above Jon... Kenosis 04:22, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: The remark about phrenology clued me in to what the misunderstanding might be. Deriving from its use in statistics, robustness is a property of a measure on distributions that is insensitive to outliers, like the median, but not the mean. For "distribution" think "science as a whole", for "outlier" think "phrenology". It is precisely the ability of science to recover from its local cul-de-sacs (cultist acts) that we call its robustitude. Jon Awbrey 06:10, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Again, the same misunderstanding of the term. If Phrenology were robust it would still be around. Yes, there are some forms of dyad-in-the-wool reductionism that survive by continually changing their names, but never mind that now. The word robust applies to science as a whole — remember your P's & Q's, Polanyi and Quine and their various holisms — not the individual sidetracks that have to be backtracked from time to time. Effective generativity depends on this, otherwise science gets stuck in the hoarse laffitudes of the Markov, the Context-free, and the Primitive recursive. Jon Awbrey 16:44, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: An anonymous editor prepended the definite article before our not so definite article, after all this time of discussing the plurality versus commonality issues, leading me to recognize that something very important must still not be clear about that, so here is what fell out of trying to fix that:
Scientific method refers to a body of techniques for the investigation of phenomena and the acquisition of new knowledge about them, as well as the correction and integration of previous knowledge, as a whole based on observable evidence and subject to laws of reasoning. Alhough specialized procedures vary from one field of inquiry to another, there are identifiable features that distinguish scientific inquiry from other methods of developing knowledge. Specific hypotheses are formed to propose explanations for natural phenomena and experimental studies test the predictions for accuracy in order to make increasingly dependable predictions of future results. Hypotheses in a given field of inquiry are logically bound together by a wider theory that assists researchers in forming new hypotheses, as well as in placing groups of specific hypotheses into a broader context of understanding.
JA: Jon Awbrey 12:50, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Other notes. I also brought forward the mention of laws of reasoning, as the balance between empirical and rational aspects was a bit lopsided. Further, it's best to emphasize "observable" and mention "measurable" as coming of age in the normal course of development, when observations become mature enough to quantify. The historical fact is that fields of science can grow rather robustly for centuries at a time in a condition of making qualitative observations before they are old enough to start measuring anything sensibly. Misunderstanding this point is what got Phrenology into trouble, you'll remember. Jon Awbrey 13:20, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: The word empirical is currently dabbed to empiricism, which is currently a POV article, as it stakes out a philosophical position that is decidedly not the position of all scientific researchers. In time I might be able to fix that article so that it describes a heuristic ism and not a dogmatic Ism, but right now the POV by association is false and misleading. Jon Awbrey 16:04, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Peirce — he would — had a word for it, but it was pure G(r)eek and about 7 slobbles long, and I kant remember it anyway. But looking through Newell's UTOC, the word "integrative" appears to leap off the page in about the same context and sense. Will cite chapter and verse later on. Jon Awbrey 18:14, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: For my part, an ubertous acronym is all-important -- and the irritation of doubt is next to IRCsomeness my estimation, so that starts to fit. Jon Awbrey 19:30, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Look, I confess to being a naturalist myself, which means I think everything that happens is natural. But adjunction of the adjective "natural" to "phenomenon" has a tendency to bias the discussion of phenomena, "that which appears in the world", toward what are conventionally called the "natural sciences" in contradistinction to the "social sciences", and that leads to various distortions in the concept of science that I'm sure are not intended here. This not a substantive matter, but one that has to do with the peculiar usage of words on the modern scene, and I do mean "modern". Jon Awbrey 20:32, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Okay, I looked at the other end of the Natural world, and I have to say that my hypothesis is not disconfirmed — there is a rather rank "hard scientism" connoted by this link:
Nature (also called the material world, the material universe, the natural world, and the natural universe) is all matter and energy, especially in its essential form.
JA: Again, this is not for me a question about whether everything is made of quarks or whatever it is this week, as I'm totally accepting of all that. But there has been 2 or 3 hundred years of discussion already leading to the commonly accepted working basis that the various sciences operate at modular levels that don't really require one to reduce all one's talk about chemico-bio-psycho-socio-poli-sci systems to talk about quarks, even if one buys the whole bag of beans that "it's gotta be possible in principle". So this adjectival link is misleading with regard to how science actually gets done. Jon Awbrey 21:16, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Yes, I get all that, but we can't be reacting like billiard balls here. Probably the answer is to make a better job of the article on Phenomena. Put it on the list. Jon Awbrey 21:24, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
This section is a stub. You can help by expanding it. ... Kenosis 02:59, 29 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I'm not worrying all that much at this stage about blade-running all those replicant wikis — very few trees are harmed in making them, anyway — since the ordering of sections is not all that stable in certain areas. 14:12, 29 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: ja, dat's my gefuhl 2. Jon Awbrey 16:33, 29 March 2006 (UTC)
I would like to get feedback on the possible addition of a very important aspect of method today to the second introductory paragraph of the article, or some variant hereof... Kenosis 17:07, 31 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: People who live in pseudonym houses should not throw peer review rocks. Jon Awbrey 14:55, 2 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: TWISI, the most pernicious form of pseudoscience today is what we might call OOPS, "oval office prestidigitous science", which has already learned how to outwit all the games of im-peerious prestige and manages to keep so many sweating the small stuff while the planet just keeps heating up. Jon Awbrey 19:56, 2 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: The point being this: How is peer review different from other forms of authority-based belief formation? Unless you find that especially easy to explain to the general public, then I would recommend focussing on the ways that scientific inquiry is something more than peer pressure. Jon Awbrey 20:24, 2 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: The more I look at what it will take to do a decent job on that Models of scientific inquiry section, the more I realize it will probably take an article of its own, so I have created a stub at Scientific explanation for that eventuality, or maybe Models of scientific inquiry will fit better, haven't decided yet. Travelling now, so will discuss more when I get back. Jon Awbrey 15:06, 2 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: If there's a better way to split off a section as a separate article, please advise, but I thought this would be unproblematic as we've been discussing the need to do so for a while. Jon Awbrey 18:34, 2 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: I put in some very approximate links for the subsections on the various models of scientific inquiry. These will need to be expanded and refined as time goes on. Jon Awbrey 20:34, 2 April 2006 (UTC)
I have removed the material below for further consideration by the editors. As written, it was off point for this article... Kenosis 00:03, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
This section needs expansion. You can help by
adding to it. (May 2010) |
Hello, Kenosis. I greet "further consideration by the editors" with enthusiasm. You state that it "was off point for this article," yet you give no rationale for this thought. So, I state in retort, "It is right on point for this article, in fact, it is the essence of this topic."
I agree that philosophy MUST aspire to the same rigor as science. And, the only rigor that matters is reality. Judgments of "true, false, and meaningless" imply truth filtered through human experience, political correctness, and adherence to some man-made code that could include bigotry, wrong-headedness, and thinking filled with ruts from the past. Reductionism, for example, is one of the great bug-a-boos of science. Also, scientism often rears its ugly head and stiffles creative searches for truth. Methinks if you had your way, as you describe it, we would all still be working out the problems of Ptolemy. (It is largely thanks to my cousin, Nicolas Copernicus, that we got past the problems of the Ptolemites.)
If you are going to remove my article based on logical positivism, then you are going to have to cite specific examples so we can have a discussion. Amorphous, broad-brush criticisms are no criticisms at all.
I also note that a number of the articles that appear under "Scientific method" contain logical blunders. For example, a number of the articles state that questions must be asked before observations are made. This is truly a case of "the horse before the cart," as one cannot ask questions of many things until observations are made. That's like questioning the decisions of an interior designer in a room that is pitch black. Would you like me to go through this section and remove all those pieces that commit this type of logical suicide?
Finally, removal of my article based on repetition is specious. Most of education depends on repetition. Many of the articles in the Wikipedia contain significant amounts of repetition. In fact, I see a great deal of repetition in this very article between the various sections. If you are worried because articles that follow mine contain repetition of my points, then I say, "Remove those repetitive parts that offend you from the subsequent articles." In books on educational philosophy, one of the undergirding principles is "Tell them what you are going to tell them; then tell them; then tell them what you told them." Will you be canceling that undergirding principle of educational philosophy because of its repetitive nature?
Remember, this article was vetted by 700 members of the ISPE over a period of several years (being first published in 1990). These are, empirically, some of the smartest people in the world. In fact, the ISPE was founded by Chev. Dr. Chris Harding, whom the "Guinness Book of World Records" declared to be the "Smartest Person on Earth." Chris enthusiastically approved of my article . . . giving it, in fact, high praise. Marilyn vos Savant, arguably the smartest woman on earth, is a personal friend of mine and another ISPE member. She approves of my article. These, and the rest of the ISPE members, are some of the people I respect most on this earth. How are you better at judging my article than they are?
Take my advice, Kenosis . . . get past the cubic miles of blather left by past philosophers. The only credo that matters is "dedication to reality at all cost." ( 75.3.241.29 07:20, 27 April 2006 (UTC)) Rich Kapnick 25 April, 2006
(Here is a peer-reviewed introduction that should go at the top of this topic. It has been reviewed by the 700 members of the International Society of Philosophical Enquiry, a worldwide scientific, philosophical research organization. Membership in the ISPE requires that the applicant be at or above the 99.9th percentile of general intellectual functioning. There are five membership levels. Mr. Kapnick is at the level of Diplomate, the highest of these five levels.)
Richard A. Kapnick
Science is the empirical study of patterns and processes in the Universe. (1)
The Scientific Method is the self-correcting tool used by scientists in honestly seeking truth at all costs. It is arranged in six steps to be followed in order.
1. Observation. Using our senses to gather information about the world around us.
A. This includes the "mapping process" used by the human brain to organize this information.
B. It also includes reflection on thoughtful questions that naturally arise after an observation is made.
2. Hypothesis. An hypothesis is a creative idea that helps explain the observation above. It is a trial solution that has not been verified. An hypothesis is stated in a manner that can be tested to see if it is true or false.
3. Prediction. The first step to verify the truth or non-truth of an hypothesis. A prediction extends critical thinking beyond that which is observed. Predictions are a logical "If . . . then" type of statement. ("If x is true, then y must also be true.")
4. Experimentation. An empirical (verified by actual experience) manner of testing the predictions of an hypothesis. All experiments must be repeatable.
A. An experiment may be designed to test the truth of an hypothesis by trying to demonstrate the accuracy of its predictions, or
B. If direct experiments are difficult to perform, experiments may be designed to test and eliminate other hypotheses or explanations, leaving the original hypothesis as the only explanation.
5. Theory. A theory is an hypothesis with some degree of verification by empirical evidence. The evidence appears to indicate the hypothesis might be true. A theory states the apparent relationships and underlying principles of certain observed phenomena that have been verified to some degree. A theory is not a “proven true” idea.
6. Law of Science. A Law of Science is a theory that has undergone extensive testing and has accurately matched the observed phenomena or data again and again and again. It has withstood the "test of time." While Laws of Science are accepted as responsible and accurate factual truth(2), they are continually reviewed in the search for absolute truth. No Law of Science is a final statement of the way the universe is. Laws of Science are modified when new empirical facts are discovered.
The Scientific Method is universal in its application. An hypothesis, thought, idea, or belief that cannot be verified by the Scientific Method cannot be verified by any other means known to man.
_________________________
(1) The idea of “cause and effect” was discarded with the acceptance of quantum mechanics, largely because QM approaches explanations for nature with ranges of probabilities. We now realize that “cause and effect” is a contrived human concept. If two events have a near- absolute correlation, then they are subsets of the whole, larger, summed event–defined within QM’s probability range. "Cause and effect" has now been replaced with "patterns and processes."
(2) Facts are not “the Absolute Truth of the Universe.” Instead, facts are the best current human approximation of the truth. Facts are changed or adjusted as new information is discovered. Knowledgeable people realize facts may change at some future date. However, these folks are able to live comfortably with the best “facts” currently available.
--26 April, 2006
__________________________
I respectfully suggest you are wrong in your assertion about the phrase "law of science" not being an "accepted term of art" for this, or any other, discussion. "Law of Gravity" rushes to mind as a prime example of a law of science. Over the last 147 years, the Theory of Evolution has gradually been proceeding to the Law of Evolution. If not "laws of science," how then would you characterize the undergirding principles of the Cosmos that create what we call "reality"? Further, if Wikipedia limits all discussions to "accepted terms of art," then it has truly smitten its nose to spite its face. Why would Wikipedia---a noble concept to be sure---stiffle its own creativity by banishing/editing/censoring out terms that are outside some amorphous boundary of acceptance by an equally amorphous group of editors? This seems dangerously close to the religion commonly known as "scientism."
The current Wikipedia content of the topic "Scientific method" is, by any definition, too ponderous. As has been previously noted above (by another editor), any high school or college student who reads the opening remarks above the "Contents" is likely to (a) fall asleep, (b) be discouraged and tune to "Sponge Bob, Square Pants" cartoons on his TV, or, (c) decide wrongly that he or she is not capable of understanding the explanation of this topic. The job of teaching often requires breaking a topic into simpler concepts with which the reader has experience. Language must be selected that is appropriate to the reader. A person's readiness issues must be considered. While parts of this article are brilliantly written . . . almost "inspired" . . . other parts need to be moved to an Addendum. Upon request, I shall be more specific on this issue.
One of the great pitfalls of this topic is the issue of where to start a discussion of the Scientific method. The California Department of Education in Sacramento insists that scientific inquiry begins with "asking questions." This thought seems to have become pervasive in the scientific community. Nonetheless, it is obviouisly wrong to all who go much beyond the level of flaneur of the arts and sciences. In truth, the initial sensory intake that results in such questions as "How does this work?" or "Why is that so?" or "There must be something else happening here." can only be classed as "observation." This observation (initial sensory intake of every nature) precedes the development of all questions. One simply cannot question anything unless certain surrounding observations are in a person's experience. This is commonly known as foundational support for additional exploration. The history of knowledge is built on just such a paradigm: "We stand on the shoulders of giants."
The current Wikipedia article makes this same horse-before-the-cart error in several places by assuming that questions precede observation. Hopefully, this can be corrected in the days and weeks ahead.
Finally, it is to the great credit of Wikipedia that such a topic as "Scientic method" is even included. The fifteenth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1990) that is in my library has no significant reference to, nor any article titled, "Scientific method." This fact, by contrast, makes Wikipedia poised for greatness. Let's outdistance EB and all the rest by presenting a well written, finely honed, easily read, substantially accurate article on this important topic.
Respectfully submitted, NC cousin Rich Kapnick 75.3.241.29 16:34, 27 April 2006 (UTC))
Further comment
It is noted that by going to the Wikipedia main topic "Science" and then to the sub-topic "Goals of Science," we find the following statement, " . . . people can form hypotheses based on observations that they make in the world." This is my position that is clearly stated in the piece I propose for the main page of "Scientific method." This position is at odds with the posit made on the current "Scientific method" page that argues hypotheses are based on questions scientists ask. The more this trail of logic is examined, the sillier the "questioning" launch for the Scientific method becomes. Clearly, the beginning of any scientific search begins with sensory intake of various types that I, and apparently others, call "observation." From this flows questions, hypotheses, predictions, experiments, theories, and finally Laws of Science.
BTW, Kenosis' criticism of my article questions the validity of the concept, "Laws of Science." Yet, I see that the "Science" article uses the term "Laws of Reasoning" as some sort of stare decisis that helps define science. How can "Laws of Reasoning" be valid in a discussion of science, and the term "Laws of Science," concomitantly be invalid? Perhaps one of the "editors" can calm the cognitive dissonance I have over this issue.
It took only minutes for Kenosis to remove my article after I posted on the main page. Now, the days roll by and no one has entered a discussion of the editing issues Kenosis raises. How long before this editing begins?
Respectfully submitted, NC cousin ( Rich 10:03, 28 April 2006 (UTC))
The intro of the current version of this article is all over the place and makes it very difficult to grasp abstract conceptualization of the scientific method in my interpretation. I tried to succinctify it with this edit but User:Jon Awbrey reverted that without providing any rational other than discussion page explanation is a prerequisite so here I am. What do Jon and perhaps others disagree with in my attempted change, and do you agree the introduction and article could stand to be massively clarified and succinctified? Excessive wikilinking is known to decrease readability. Plus wikilinks to definitions should be discouraged, if someone doesn't know a word they should use a dictionary separately, comprehension is a multi-step process, not the single step chaos that is the current version of the article in my interpretation. Hollow are the Ori 15:57, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Dear Hollow Are The Ori, the thing is that many people who have been working on this article for a long time now just do not agree with your wholesale criticisms. If you have specific, constructive suggestions, then all concerned will consider them, but there is no pressing need here to make science seem like some Walk-in-the-Garden-of-Eden-or-Garden-of-Versailles. We've all learned that it's best to mention the thorns and the brambles as soon as possible, lest learners-to-come get the wrong idea about the whole Enterprise. Jon Awbrey 18:01, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Boldly go where — well, I'm guessing where most editors have been before — or proceed with caution, but either way the mutation in question will need to be, beneficial, gradual, specific, and clearly an improvement in lucidity without an excess of loose-idiocy, or else it will not stand. That's just the way it is with these kinds of hyper-palimpsests. Jon Awbrey 18:54, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
In my interpretation the current introduction of this article befuddles abstract comprehension of the scientific method. Any introduction should follow these simple rules in my interpretation:
Some have said the word "universe" doesn't cover all the fields of inquiry but I mean it as in "everything" so I don't see how that is possible. Are there any other criticisms? Hollow are the Ori 20:05, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
Don't feed the trolls... Kenosis 22:48, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Iteration is not the "essence" of science — what's important is what steps are repeated, and that we have stated quite clearly alright already. So please refrain from that tiresome refrain. Jon Awbrey 21:14, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Usage note: Repeat = Iterate. Jon Awbrey 22:08, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
Reset. Scientific method details a way to turn something that is unknown (the problem) into something that is known. If one does not know something, then one way to solve the problem is to try, and try again (also called iteration). It takes interest in the subject, to be able to do this ( George Polya calls this 'becoming absorbed in the problem'). As Andrew Wiles characterized it, "eventually, the problem gets 'tired' and sits down" and you can then catch it. (In Wiles' case, it took years of his life to publish an acceptable solution to a problem which has been under attack by generations of mathematicians for centuries.) -- Ancheta Wis 11:51, 6 May 2006 (UTC)
Rather ironically, what I find myself asking is whether there is any experimental evidence to clearly prove that (any particular) scientific method works, i.e. speeds scientific progress - or even, is there any evidence to clearly prove that scientists prefer to use a particular formulation of the scientific method? I ask these questions because over the years I've been presented with quite a range of descriptions of the scientific method, each given with great confidence and quite different from each of the others, and never with any citation that so-and-so compared the two types of 'scientific method' somehow and proved one was better. I don't deny that there is something better about how we do science now than in the time of Aristotle, but whether the methodology of research into the scientific method itself has progressed since his time is another question...
Also, the most common denominator of all these schemes - that hypothesis precedes experiment - seems contradictory to how I've often seen science done today, as well as many historical descriptions. For instance, many people came up with bizarre ideas of the macrocosm and the microcosm over the course of history, but science only progressed when a few optics geeks cobbled together telescopes and microscopes and started simply reporting what they saw - and when that happened all preceding hypotheses were of no use whatsoever. In modern-day biology it seems that perhaps a majority all experiments still progress in a similar fashion, with workers taking a new or favorite tool - gene array experiments, degenerate PCR, allele structure, immunohistochemistry, etc. - and asking, "how can I use this technique to find out something informative about this topic?" Of course, 'informative' here implies a variation between two or more possible hypotheses, but these hypotheses (such as which of 10,000 genes on an array might be involved in tumor progression) are often rather rudimentary.
Is there any citation people can come up with for a study in which, for example, a teacher took a group of fifth-graders and split them up, one half being taught the scientific method and the other not, then handed them an identical set of broken clockworks or weird gadgets to figure out, and measured the relative times students in each group took to solve their problems? (unsigned: User:Mike Serfas 06:00, 8 May 2006)
Apparently the "Methods of science" viewpoint is slowly taking over from recipe-based descriptions or "Scientific Method." In the United States, the National Science Teachers Association (NSTA) has recently turned against "The Scientific Method," or what Medawar derides as "the calculus of discovery," and instead recommends that science educators teach about NOS or "Nature Of Science." This recent change is detailed in the November 2004 issue of the NSTA magazine "The Science Teacher." Also, the NSTA position statement replaces "The Scientific Method's" list of steps with a "Methods of Science" description:
I note that the guest editor for that issue of TST is William McComas, who is already known in education circles for insisting that The Scientific Method is a myth. See myth #4 in his article "THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE NATURE OF SCIENCE: DISPELLING THE MYTHS", from the book "Nature of Science in Science Education," 1998, McComas ed., online at: http://www.usc.edu/dept/education/science-edu/Myths%20of%20Science.pdf -- Wjbeaty 00:10, 30 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Q. Whaddya get wben you cross a ho-hum with a hum-bug? Jon Awbrey 00:00, 30 May 2006 (UTC)
Using the history of the double helix as a "classical" case of the scientific method is fairly laughable by itself, but the real warpage of historical facts to fit the structure is pretty inexcusable here. The case of DNA is not a neat case of "characterization -> hypotheses -> prediction -> experiment -> iterations"; it is not a neat case of anything. It is thoroughly messy as far as the history of science goes, and its messiness is very well known.
The "characterizations" section currently makes it sound like Watson and Crick were just following up on the work of Bragg in studying the structure of DNA. In fact the question of whether DNA's structure was biologically important was still completely up for debate at the time, and Watson and Crick were clearly more obvious inspired in their work by the success Pauling had with the alpha helix. The crystallography-centric approach favored by others did not pan out in comparison with the deliberate aping of Pauling's model-building approach favored by Watson and Crick, which was derided by the other physicists as not being serious science. It worked, in the end, but calling this any sort of an obviously logical path is clearly a post hoc accessment.
The "hypotheses" section makes it sound like Watson and Crick hadn't already perceived it as a race with Pauling before the latter had sent the triple helix manuscript to his son. This is false, and while the discovery of Pauling's error clearly invigorated Watson and Crick, it came relatively late into the game (after they had already considered the idea of a triple helix, for example).
The "predictions" section puts the horse before the cart: Watson had already seen the B-form photograph before they thought of proposing the double helix. The B photograph confirmed that the model was helical, but it did not by itself inspire the idea of a double helix (with the bases on the inside), and still held open the option that it was a triple helix. To call the Crick line from the DNA paper a "prediction" is pretty weak -- it is, at best, a general prediction, not a really scientific one. At worst, it is not a prediction at all: it was a conscious attempt by Crick to claim priority on the idea that the structure suggested ideas about DNA replication, without risking getting any of them wrong in this particular paper (Watson was still hesistant about the model's accuracy).
The "experiments" section doesn't really work either, since the experiments had been conducted before the model, and while they had influenced the possible outcome of the model, they did not confine it in any real way. The model-building clearly played more of a role in the Watson-Crick story than did the photographs, which only Watson had seen and even then only briefly. It misrepresents the role of Franklin as well -- she rebuffed their initial triple helix model on a theoretical basis. She was not initially against the final double helix model at all, and in any case she knew thoroughly well that the B-form of DNA was helical, she was not convinced about the A-form.
The "iterations" section says that Watson and Crick had conducted "fruitless experimentation", which is not true (they hadn't really experimented at all), and oversimplifies to the point of absurdity how they actually arrived at the structure for DNA, and what was important. It was a long, messy, and interesting process, not just a case of bond lengths + photos + models. The real innovation was 1. to try and study the idea at all (often the case in scientific work), and 2. to utilize that specific combination of approaches. But even with that, it required many idiosyncratic ideas, encounters, discussions with others, etc.
I go through the details here not to propose changes be made to them. The discovery of DNA is a lousy example for something like this, but it is not necessarily any more lousy than any other example in the history of science which is not written by scientists or philosophers. Work by historians of science have shown for at least four decades (even longer if you count the only later-appreciated Ludwik Fleck) that you cannot just line up true history of science with the idealized form of the scientific method. Personally, I think the examples should just be dropped. Aside from being inaccurate, they do not clarify anything about the method itself. It would be at least humorous if they were meant to be ironic (they do serve as a nice example of why you can't just say science works in simple, prescribed steps), but I don't think they are. -- Fastfission 19:37, 31 May 2006 (UTC)
This entire article is far too dogmatic (that is, it asserts beliefs about what scientists do and think far beyond any reasonable cognitive grounds), and probably far too long and even more, well, better not say (though one is reminded of the word of Asimov: "not very bright except in an academic sense"). I do understand, the discipline has been trying to figure out what knowledge is and how it's possible for well over 2,500 years, and that discussion does not compress well. In short, unless there is a solid critique of scientific method here — I can't find it... — I suggest the whole thing should be overhauled. -- djenner 03:38, 19 June 2006 (UTC)
So how is the concept of causility or "cause and effect" more justifiable than the existence of God? Both cannot be empirically tested; you can not "experience" both with your five senses. I understand that one concept can be "believed in more" than the other; for example, you COULD say that you believe in cause and effect more than you believe in the existence of God. But you can't say, from an empiricist point of view; that you KNOW casualty or God exists. So what I'm asking is how can scientists (and empiricists) believe in the concept of "cause and effect" more than they believe in the existence of God? How is causility more justified (and therefore, more readily "assumeable") than the existence of God? You can't say you know they both exist according to Hume, if you are an empiricist, but why would anyone be an atheist (not believe in God), but assume that causility exist? 165.196.139.24 21:03, 27 June 2006 (UTC)
Sorry for not reading ALL of the discussion above, but it seems to me that the "Scientific Method" is presented in such a way as to assert that it is an orderly process that scientists usually carry out in a step-by-step way. I think it would be MUCH closer to the truth to say that it is a FORMAT in which scientific research is REPORTED.
There are false starts, abandoned hypotheses, failed experiments, etc., which are (by convention) ALWAYS excluded from journal articles. No one simply tells the story of how they made the discovery, unless they write a POPULAR account specifically aimed at laymen.
Perhaps "scientific method" is a rhetorical technique used to justify one's conclusions (or to "prove" that you've made a valuable discovery), rather than a process used while actually conducting research or making the discovery. -- Math Teacher 13:57, 7 July 2006 (UTC)
This talk page certainly needs archiving. Not a chance of seeing the whole thing in Blazer. Could someone who has been paying attention oblige? Banno 00:07, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
This page is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
The current DNA picture looks good large but is not made for an icon. What do you think about ? Markus Schmaus 13:46, 4 Jun 2005 (UTC)
What is described inthe box in the section I have marked is not the hypothetico-deductive method. HD is the method behind Falsificationism; it seeks to falsify a hypothesis by examining deductions derived from it - hence the name. The method described here could just as easily be inductive, Bayesian or Coherentism. HD would test only the predictions made from the theory. Banno June 29, 2005 08:50 (UTC)
Sounds fine; Banno June 29, 2005 10:20 (UTC)
This article is great from a philosophical point of view, but there are some major points missing. Not all problems can be solved with the scientific method, especially areas of science that rely on historical evidence (geology for instance). It is not always possible to test hypotheses through experimentation. In some cases you are solving a problem by searching for evidence and so-called smoking guns. Plate tectonics is a very good example of this. I would like to see this POV added, I have seen a couple of articled in the scientific literature addressing it, but figured I'd mention it here first for some suggestions. -- 24.137.104.16 03:16, 27 July 2005 (UTC)
I think that what I am touching on is that human imagination is a marvellous thing that can span everything -- from what has happened to what could happen. The scientific method merely places constraints on the imagination by stating requirements for lines of reasoning, and then going on from there. In other words, the scientific method does not cover flights of fantasy. (What Francis Bacon cautioned against, as referred to in the history section of the article.) However, the scientific community often takes as a responsibility, to explain that which has happened (as in the evidence for plate tectonics), while not ruling out that which could happen. In that case, the human imagination may yet uncover something as yet unvisioned, and someone could even make that something real. (I am thinking about Robert Goddard dreaming about space exploration.) Ancheta Wis 09:23, 28 July 2005 (UTC)
Have you also considered the use of the Wikipedia:Wikiportal/Scientific method {{Portal}} as a venue for your line of thought? A scientific community can be both a help and a hindrance when working out something new. The portal is currently wide-open for additions. The points to which you are referring could be placed in a point/counterpoint framework there. The talk page there could be used as a venue for your line of reasoning. Ancheta Wis 09:23, 28 July 2005 (UTC)
Today's additions by 139.55.28.254 appear to be copied nearly verbatim from http://www.positiveatheism.org/india/science.htm. I will revert to last version by User:Markus Schmaus. Edwardian 04:50, 29 July 2005 (UTC)
Thinking about the 'No recipe' section; there are those who think that scientific method is, or should be like a recipe in the sense that scientists use it to achieve and reproduce results in a detatched manner. Francis Bacon, for example, desired that "the entire work of the understanding be commenced afresh, and the mind itself be from the very outset not left to take its own course, but guided at every step; and the business be done as if by machinery." (Novum Organum).
Is there some way we could improve on this? It occurs to me that the recipe analogy, which I quite like, could be used to explain a number of points of view. -- Chris 14:04, 29 July 2005 (UTC)
Well, first let me make it clear that I think there is no such recipe. Bacon did, unless I misunderstand him. And his conception of science remained strong throughout the 18th and 19th century. His recipe, if you like, was the method outlined in the history section. From the perspective of the philosophy of science, this view is no longer supportable. But not everyone pays a great deal of attention to what philosophers of science say, indeed it seems that the majority of practising scientists would have trouble naming just one of them (Stephen Jay Gould, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister's Pox). I believe that the scientific community of today (especially those who are also part of the skeptic community) is still basically Baconian in its understanding of scientific method. Can I back that up with some references? Not yet, but I'm curious now to see if I can. -- Chris 16:27, 29 July 2005 (UTC)
Unfortunately, we need to talk about this large change to the article, which has attained an equilibrium for several seasons of a year, now. If we are to now augment the article with some other considerations, such as the relationship of a specific researcher to the larger community or to specific segments of the scientific community, then we need to talk to this point. But a characterization of a specific scientific result as Good or Bad is a judgement which necessarily involves a protocol. Otherwise, the judgement lies outside of the method itself. Based on the considerations of the method, I have reverted. Ancheta Wis 22:05, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
The section on the perihelion precession of Mercury included the statement that
This is incorrect. Einstein used an approximate solution in 1915 to derive the perihelion precession of Mercury. Not only did this preceed Schwarzschild's work, but it even preceeded the finalization of the Einstein field equations. -- EMS | Talk 14:09, 19 August 2005 (UTC)
Short, simple, to the point. FuelWagon 19:15, 23 August 2005 (UTC)
An engineer has formulated a theory of cognition and created a class of predictions for his theory. He is trying to build an intelligent machine. Ancheta Wis 00:32, 19 September 2005 (UTC)
I filed an article RFC on the Methodological naturalism article. You can read the issue here. Essentially, the question is whether or not the scientific method is an example of methodological naturalism (MN) or methodological supernaturalism (MS). Since it involves the Scientific Method, I thought I'd post something here hoping to get someone who knows the topic. Does the scientific method allow for supernatural investigations and causes? Your input would be appreciated. FuelWagon 17:51, 11 September 2005 (UTC)
openning sentence: 'Scientific methods or processes', perhaps a matter of fine semantics; but, are methods processes? To me, a method is a procedure or algorithm describing or defining a process. It becomes an instance of a 'process' when it is put into action. i.e. A process is the execution of a method. Too fine of a distinction?
The latest change blurs the line between 2nd (intuitive) and 3rd stage (logical). " reasoning including deductive reasoning" because reasoning also includes abductive reasoning (guessing) which is clearly 2nd stage (intuitive). That is the whole reason there is a 1st stage (incubation, speculation, observation, justification, belief, etc.), where everything is up for grabs in the face of an unknown. The first stage is the difficult one. The 2nd stage is the first formulation of a coherent thought. The 3rd stage is the logical consequence of the coherent thought. Please justify this change. Ancheta Wis 21:45, 2 October 2005 (UTC)
7. Scientific method and the practice of science
needs such extensive rework that my suggestion is to delete it. Since it only says that publishing and $$ are necesary to practice science, it says either too much or too little. Furthermore the entire last paragraph gives great weight to the complaints of the fringers. So please simply remove the section for now.
8. Quotations
This quotation, from a play, is entirely inappropriate. I suggest replacing it with a quotation from an actual scientist, for example, Sir Issac Newton's quotation about "one man or age".
David B. Benson <dbenson@eecs.wsu.edu> 134.121.64.253 23:18, 26 October 2005 (UTC)
This article is getting really long. It would be a good idea to break up some of the sections into new pages. Karol 16:03, 12 November 2005 (UTC)
I moved most of the content of the History section to a separate page. The text there needs alot of work, I think. Karol 17:17, 12 November 2005 (UTC)
While reading through this article I suddenly noticed the use of a personal pronoun. I don't believe that appeared anywhere else in the article proper.
Changed "the scientist is making a personal choice when she chooses some particular theory over another" to read "the scientist is making a personal choice when using one particular theory over another."
No, I'm not bashing the use of the word "she" in an article -- I'm suggesting that we don't mix our writing styles. In this new iteration, our scientist does not exist; the way it was, suddenly our scientist embodied a particular entity.
- Dr. Morelos
I feel that the either a separate History article should be established or the History section of this article should be fleshed out. Major contributions by those such as DesCartes should receive mention. The Jade Knight 07:05, 9 December 2005 (UTC)
Hello. It seems this page is almost entirely dedicated to explain science as the study of natural phenomena. I would be very interested in knowing what the community of editors of this page thinks of non natural physical phenomena... Let me please explain what I mean by giving you the prototype of a non natural physical phenomenon: a computation. It obeys physical rules, yet it is human crafted: computations (typically) occure inside of physical systems which are man crafted (typically, computers). (Other examples can be thought of, like the study of chemical components which do not exist in nature).
This brings a second question. Computer science (CS), or at least (depending on the acception of CS) scientific aspects of CS can arguably be defined as the study of computations. How doese CS fit into the scientific method? It is (IMHO) very much like mathematics, however it differs in the sense that it studies a physical phenomenon: computations, and that empirical approaches are also used. It probably differs from physics in the sense that the border line between the science (computer science in this case), and technology is much more fuzzy (and, of course, in the fact that the physical phenonenon is non natural...).
I think that the definition of the scientific method tries to capture the essence of scientific practise. Computer science, as I see it, is the newest science. From my POV, the question is not wether CS is a science or not in the sense that it would or would not follow the scientific method. I see CS as a science, and the question is: is the definition of the scientific method up to date? (and therefore doese it captures CS practise?), or doese it need to be adapted in order to aknowledge its failure to capture the fact that CS is a science.
From what I see of this page, and in my opinion, the definition of the scientific method needs updating in order to ackowledge the fact that it misses computer science. (It may also bring an interesting perspective on the question of wether mathematics are a science or not since it seems to me CS is somehow in between physics and mathematics...(So I say informally)).
Do you feel my POV is widely accepted enough to be cited in the article, or yield minor modifications to it? Or is it a POV which (if pushed further) may well belong to an encyclpedia one day, but which needs to succeed in going through an "original research phase" first?
I am only an amateur phylosopher of sciences, so I am very intersted in the POV of wiser wikipedians on this subject. best regards: -- Powo 20:02, 27 December 2005 (UTC)
Good point Powo, I've tried to make this clearer using "the natural world" which is given as an alternative at the start of the nature article, and emphasising that "artificial" works are included as that article equivocates about its philosophical position. Hope that helps. ... dave souza 10:31, 28 December 2005 (UTC)
"Linus Pauling proposed that DNA was a triple helix. Francis Crick and James Watson learned of Pauling's hypothesis, figured out that Pauling was wrong and realized that Pauling would soon realize his mistake. So the race was on to figure out the correct structure. Except that Pauling did not realize at the time that he was in a race!"
Pauling proposed this in early 1953; Watson/Crick had first built a triple-helix model in late 1951. They showed it to Rosalind Franklin, who pointed out several errors with their model. After they saw her X-ray photographs (without her permission), they were able to deduce the correct structure. See [1].
I don't know the history well enough to correct the DNA examples (and incorporate what Watson and Crick might have claimed), but I do know the examples are wrong at present. -- TidyCat 11:12, 30 December 2005 (UTC) -
I am cutting out a chunk of badly-formatted content someone added recently to Science#Scientific method. I guess someone could scrap some material onto this page, if useful, although I notice some of the content overlaps and is contradictory... Karol 09:08, 1 January 2006 (UTC)
FIVE STEPS IN THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
TERMINOLOGY RELATED TO THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
A theory is a generalization based on many observations and experiments; a well-tested, verified hypothesis that fits existing data and explains how processes or events are thought to occur. It is a basis for predicting future events or discoveries. Theories may be modified as new information is gained. This is in contrast to the common usage of the word that refers to ideas that have no firm proof or support. To say "the apple fell" is to state a fact, whereas Newton's theory of universal gravitation is a body of ideas that explain why the apple fell. Thus a multitude of falling objects are reduced to a few concepts or abstractions interacting according to a small set of laws, allowing a scientist to make predictions about the behaviour of falling objects in general. An especially fruitful theory that has withstood the test of time and has an overwhelming quantity of evidence supporting it is considered to be "proven" in the scientific sense. Some universally accepted models such as heliocentric theory, biological evolution, and atomic theory are so well-established that it is nearly impossible to imagine them ever being falsified. Others, such as relativity and electromagnetism have survived rigorous empirical testing without being contradicted, but it is nevertheless conceivable that they will some day be supplanted. Younger theories such as string theory may provide promising ideas, but have yet to receive the same level of scrutiny.
A scientific method or process is considered fundamental to the scientific investigation and acquisition of new knowledge based upon physical evidence. Scientists use observations, hypotheses and deductions to propose explanations for natural phenomena in the form of theories. Predictions from these theories are tested by experiment. If a prediction turns out to be correct, the theory survives. Any theory which is cogent enough to make predictions can then be tested reproducibly in this way. The method is commonly taken as the underlying logic of scientific practice. A scientific method is essentially an extremely cautious means of building a supportable, evidenced understanding of our natural world.
I may be reintroducing this since I have not looked through the talk archives. The introduction seems to be a little long and dense at present. Shouldn't we be aiming this at the layman, specifically school kids who use this page to try and understand the scientific method? This introduction will blow them out of the water. Part of an encylopedias role is to make a difficult concept more understandable. I hope this does not offend editors on this article, but I think the current introduction does the opposite. David D. (Talk) 00:52, 8 January 2006 (UTC)
I looked back at previous version and came up with something along the following lines. I am sure this needs to be refined but it is a starting point. David D. (Talk) 19:17, 8 January 2006 (UTC)
Comment: I like the brevity. What we want is the questioning minds of the high school students. Do you think this will help or hinder? Brevity is good because they can see what is important. Any other points? Anyone? Once they have this under their belts, will they want more? How to get them to scroll down the page? -- Ancheta Wis 20:49, 8 January 2006 (UTC)
Seeing Ancheta's question about whether the intro will grip its intended audience got me thinking. The last paragraph hints at controversy and of course there is an enormous amount of controversy surrounding scientific method, so let’s beef this paragraph up a bit. Here’s a slight re-write,
The newer version looks good to me. David D. (Talk) 22:36, 10 January 2006 (UTC)
Terms like natural and supernatural are likely to turn out either meaningless or tautologous. The critical logical feature is just that explanations must be falsifiable. Jon Awbrey 23:06, 10 January 2006 (UTC)
Here I was responding to the proposed rewrite of a proposed rewrite, namely to insert natural as in this paragraph:
Let me go back to the current version and break this down play by play:
There's a dangling clause there. Maybe this:
Clunky though, maybe two sentences:
I'm merely pointing out that passing the buck to naturalism doesn't have any explanatory value. It used to have some in the days when naturalism meant a definite type of determinism, but we lost any sort of naive determinism like that some time ago. We are left with only a couple of options for naturalism. One is based on the tenet:
But this makes natural a tautologous or unfalsfiable property, and thus one that has no explanatory value.
The second option is to give a rule to nature that makes its domain a contingent property, for example, via this tenet:
This is basically just Aristotle's observation about the limitation of scientific knowledge to phenomena that have a nature, that is, to phenomena that embody general properties or laws, thus limiting science to recurrent phenomena and reproducible results. This is sometimes expressed in the phrase, "there is no science of the idiosyncratic" -- if there were I would certainly know about it! But qualifying the non-contingent everything in (1) with the contingent hedge in (2), we end up with:
So again the invocation of nature explains nothing, and we appear to be reduced to the task of simply describing as best we can what happens, or keeps on happening. Jon Awbrey 04:36, 11 January 2006 (UTC)
Subheading as this was getting rather long. The importance of seeking only "natural" explanations is that the supernatural is inherently inexplicable and bound up with faith. Unfortunately a vocal evangelical movement is seeking to remove this restriction and restore a natural philosophy that gives scientific credibility (and access to classrooms) to religious propositions. In the Kitzmiller case Judge Jones has set our a brief legal assessment of this point. The point is important to a brief definition of the scientific method, but the introduction is not the place for a deep philosophical analysis of what "nature" is – in an encyclopaedia that can reasonably be expected in the body of the article or in another linked article. Please ensure this point is briefly made in the introduction, ... dave souza 18:36, 11 January 2006 (UTC)
Yes, I understand, and fully sympathize, but better no line of demarcation at all than one that leaves science with the short end of the continent. Since the contemporary fuss is not really about faith versus knowledge -- all people in their right minds exhibit some characteristics of hope, faith, charity, etc. -- but predicated on both a 'lack of confidence' and a 'lack of knowledge', of different kinds, on both sides, there is no good reason to play that game by distorting the current understanding of science, as it's understood among those who do it, by engaging in the gambits of noncontingent assertions. Because the public to be educated will not then be able to see the difference in the actual conduct of the players, and that is the difference that really makes a difference. Jon Awbrey 19:26, 11 January 2006 (UTC)
I went ahead and put up the new intro without the controversial 'natural'. Let's see how it goes from there. -- Chris 23:21, 11 January 2006 (UTC)
The passive voice, indefinite person "are considered" is considered by some to fall under the head of "weasel words". It leaves the reader scratching his/her/its head(s) and asking "are considered" by whom?. Jon Awbrey 02:30, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
I mean "weasel word" in the sense of "pay no attention to the man behind the screen" in the Wizard of Oz. If you do ask the "who considers" question, then it can only be the community that agrees with the assertion, so why not make that explicit? Well, maybe because the "community of inquiry" (COI) behind the screen doesn't look so great and powerful when the screen drops. Jon Awbrey 07:12, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: I understand the heat of the battle thing, but ... I think that we need to get our minds out of the courts, lest we give the impression that methods of scientific inquiry rest their defense on the method of authority, whether it be dictated by legal authority or the authority of recipes that we learned from grammar school textbooks. Jon Awbrey 14:48, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: Yes, I understand, but there's nothing terribly new about all that. And the fastest way to lose the baby is to confuse it with the bathwater, and not be clear about the kind of science in which the vast majority of practicing "scientific methodists" have faith, and why exactly they do. There's a whole lot of background to draw on here, and I'm not in any particular hurry myself ... Jon Awbrey 21:30, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: I am getting this strange sense of deja vu all over again, so I think I will recycle the title that I used for this sort of investigation all through my share of the last millennium. I have resolved to do more production, less discussion this year, but still this question of method tugs at the edge of my attention. So maybe I will just widen the horizon a bit and address some of the issues that I know about, especially ones that have been widely discussed over the years of my acquaintance, as much of this discussion already rounds up all the usual suspects and begins to fall into all the usual ruts, and I won't worry so much about the nits that can be picked out of the introduction.
JA: I doubt if the "screened off bodies of thought" (SOBOT's) are really so diverse and numerous as to defy all description, and it does seem like it's our job to describe all sorts of diverse and numerous things, which folks here go about with notorious avidity, so I'm guessing that there's some other kind of resistance involved in the avoidity thereof.
JA: A good start could be made in very broad brush strokes. This is not the philosophy of science article, but it needs to coordinate with it in a sensible way. In that article we need to sort out the working philosophies -- the not always fully articulated philosophies in practice of the reflective practitioners -- from the vicarious philosophies of the speculating spectators. Each group sees different things, sometimes more, sometimes less, by dint of their different perspectives. But here it makes sense to give the bigger ear to the method as she's actually bespoken.
JA = Jon Awbrey 13:44, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
SteenGoddik, it is my opinion that "Scientific Theory or Scientific Law" are not part of this article. The reason is that scientific method is simply that, a list of steps, almost a how-to, which is not necessarily a validation procedure for admitting a concept into the western canon. As the article clearly states, it is the people practicing the method who are the essential ingredient in the method. Thus someone simply stepping through the checklist without the essential understanding of the problem is practicing cargo cult science and anyone who simply proclaimed by fiat that "Concept A" has passed through all the stages of the Scientific Method, and is hereby declared Scientific Law Number 27A-5156. Anyone caught violating 27A-5156 is subject to .... It is not necessary to declare Concept A as Law. It is simply true, or it isn't. And the violations of the law are not subject to punishment by The State. It isn't necessary. The Concept would thus simply be a trope if some exception or limitation to a purported Law A became known. Now if some technology were introduced into our world based on a wrong law, that technology would simply fail.
Now after brutally simplifying the argument, let's examine why Scientist A has mooted some concept A. Well, that's the characterization stage. Scientist A, after some consideration has decided that concept A is notable in some way. If there are conditions and exceptions, the concept must be suitably qualified and limited, or else scientist A has severely limited his employability in the field. Scientist A has noted that this concept seems to solve some problem in the list of unknowns which are all around us.
It may be that you are searching for what John Ziman has termed Reliable Knowledge. -- Ancheta Wis 16:26, 19 February 2006 (UTC)
SteenGoddik, I think you're dead right. Theory is so fundamental to science that it is difficult to see how one can do justice to an article on scientific method without a strong characterization of theory, preferably tying it in with examples. Some of the components of the section 'hypotheses development' would to me be more fittingly stated in relation to the theoretical developments.
Holon
13:38, 20 February 2006 (UTC)
I can sympathize with an abstract statement that recursion includes iteration. However, iteration came first. The primary loop in the scientific method is iterative, and the stack required for recursion is not a given; what if the datatypes are different. It takes experience to properly characterize a problem, and recursion takes a base case to be properly formulated, or else we have a problem with levels of abstraction improperly interacting and confusing the issue. I encourage you to read History of science for the examples. A classic case is the size and shape of Earth.
The DNA example is instructive here. It took several generations of scholars to zero in on the issues and problems. If you are looking for a mathematical analogy, it is similar to the solution of a differential equation, where the solver has to hunt to converge on the answer. Thus iteration involves clarifying the issues. Blocking and tackling, to use a sports analogy. Iteration=try and try again.
But a recursion differs from this. Once a theory is established, then a researcher can build on existing theory as a building block to solve his/her problem. The classic example is the triad of theories Newtonian mechanics / Maxwell's equations / Special relativity. They are not independent; two of them can derive the third. This I submit is the recursion. It takes a basic case, like Einstein's question to himself what would it be like to ride a beam of light?, and based on what he knew, derive SR from the previous 2 legs of the triad.
What's the point of the difference between iteration and recursion? Feynman said it very well: the sciences are an interconnected web of knowledge, with one point from one science dovetailing with another seemingly unrelated point from another science, all consistent with what has gone on before it in a huge web of relationships, not all at the same scale but building on what has come before it. That is the best use of the term recursion. -- Ancheta Wis 00:21, 26 February 2006 (UTC)
the basic methods are observation, hypothisis, experament, conclution, and abstract.
EF: There is some controversy as to whether practicing scientists actually accomplish their real work by any defined and describable method.
JA: There is some controversy, mostly among those who are not, as to whether practicing scientists actually accomplish their real work by any defined and describable method.
JA: Well, not everybody who edits an article bothers to read the previous discussions. The Twinkieth Century was a lot like that. And of course we still have to source stuff that's so familiar that we have forgotten the last place where we read it. I had added what I thought was a fairly balanced and decent summary of the critical regard of method-ism in the second paragraph, but it seems to have gotten buried somewhere in the philosophical epiphenomena. There are times when one simply observes. Jon Awbrey 05:41, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
somebody needs to talk about Descartes in this article.
The Further reading list is very long and not all of it looks notable. I suggest taking some of them out (possibly ones with red linked authors). JoshuaZ 05:30, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: The list is rather carefully chosen to cover some of the standard variations in models of scientific method and the variety of perspectives on it, but let me know which you have in mind deleting. It was not supposed to be a list of celebrities, though I was surprised after I typed it in how many were already notarized in WP. The thing is that many of the more recent texts will tend to have redlinked authors, and I've been told by some old hands that this is really not a problem, as it just flags people who might eventually deserve articles. At any rate it was the works themselves that are intended to be helpful to the reader. Jon Awbrey 05:48, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I'm "planning to" add some exposition based on the sources that I'm adding to the Readings, at which time I will elevate them to References, but it may be a week or three before I can get time and concentration to focus on that, so please indulge me while I pad the bib a bit more and leave it an exercise for the Reader. Jon Awbrey 20:44, 22 March 2006 (UTC)
Several years ago, the hypothesis section of this article used the term guess, which is the blunt truth. Later, it was appended with an exclamation point guessing!, as if the editor could not believe that scientists could dare to admit that they would guess. It was later softened to systematic guessing. Now I see that the Peirce article no longer states his quote abductive reasoning is neither more nor less than guessing.
To be fair to the younger readers of this article, I believe that it is better for the encyclopedia to admit that 'guessing' is a good thing, something not to be ashamed of, or suppressed. In fact, a part of scientific method, along with 'test' (experiment). Ancheta Wis 14:32, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: The Charles Peirce quote must have been excised before I came on board, or I certainly would have insisted on keeping it. But that whole article has been under considerable development over the past few months, and when it grew past 100 Kb there was a request to spin off various subtopics, so the quote may have ended up in one of those. At any rate, wiki-links to article subsections tend to be not very persistent around here. Jon Awbrey 15:10, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Thanks for the look-up, I restored the link. I think that subsection is stable enough to risk it. Jon Awbrey 17:15, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
I think scholasticism should be mentioned in this article, as it is the main alternative to the scientific method. Markus Schmaus 14:48, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I would recommend that we call in some expert help with that, as there are many historically inaccurate cliches about Medieval scholasticism that I don't think we should be in the business of promulgating without doing some serious fact-checking. Jon Awbrey 14:58, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
I'm thinking about something like
Markus Schmaus 16:42, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Sounds harmless enough to me, but then I've done only a smattering of reading in the Scholastics. Jon Awbrey 17:11, 21 March 2006 (UTC)
Scientific method | Scholastic Inquiry |
inductive reasoning | Axioms and Logic |
abductive reasoning | - |
deduction=prediction | deduction |
experiment | - |
Kenosis, what would you say to some wikilinks? In addition, when mooting a concept the grammatical mood might be a little more jussive than imperative.
One of the things which I personally find quite valuable is your bold synopsis of the checklist of factors which are necessary to gain confidence that one truly understands something. Especially the 'gradual process' statement above. Good.
I personally would place the Prediction item at the foot of this list, as Expectations typically do not get formed without an ensemble of supporting data. Otherwise, the Predicted item would necessarily remain personal and unspoken until one gains confidence in the strength of the mooted Prediction. -- Ancheta Wis 07:43, 22 March 2006 (UTC)
Hi Ancheta. Just noticed this. As indicated in the lead-in, "subject only to marginal disagreements about specific aspects". Supernovas are a class of phenomena, so NP there. As to "...to the best achievable extent", this leads into the extremely important discussion at the bottom of the box, which outlines tentative hypotheses/theories, and quest for results which increase confidence. "Confidence" used intentionally to draw on its statistical implications too. As to "must be", this "must" remain because these are general requirements, subject to disagreement only in exceptional cases (this is how intelligent design advocates start, for instance, by questioning the very basics and reading in what they choose to loosen up the method for attack with pseudotheories). As to "gaining the ability", this assumes scientists very commonly work in groups rather than solely as individuals. This basic form of outline is actually a composite from several sources which assumes a wide range of more specific methods within it, and intentionally is formatted to include tenets common to both natural and life sciences. I intentionally did not even dare to mention certain exceptions for idiographic "sciences", which is one of many reasons I included the "subject only to marginal disagreements" caveat. Thanks for the request to review and check the thoughts...
Kenosis
07:24, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
Having said the above, kindly allow me a few days to see if a consistently syntaxed jussive set of the parenthetized explanations hits me? Thanks... Kenosis 09:34, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
Another thing, Ancheta Wis. You raise a good point about whether prediction should be after control here. For this schema, I think it must be before "understanding" because of the importance of explaining tentativeness (related also to falsifiability) and confidence in a hypothesis/theory as a variable (rather than true-false proposition) to the less-than-technical reader unfamiliar with the wisdom of the process of perpetual tentativeness of propositions (I hear the speed of light may be changing too, incidentally--kneejerk creationists ought have a grand time with that one-- now nobody in the "scientific community" knows what they're doing).
The facet of "control" is a bit of a tough one here, because the reason we engage in methodological natualism is so we can control things (else why bother? pass me that spleef again). And of course there's control vs. manipulated variable; and of course there's the attempt to achieve control over an independent variable to manipulate it (assuming it's appropriate of course, recalling some of the Nazi experiments). Maybe an appropriate course here is to think about removing "control" and try a three-tenet explanation with the existing three qualifications to "understanding"?... Kenosis 10:01, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I did not write this, but I think that there are a few ideas in it that are important for the reader to understand — something about the continuity of scientific inquiry with everyday problem-solving maybe — so I will copy it here till I or somebody can think of a way to salvage the good of it. Jon Awbrey 04:06, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
Scope and goals
Scientific method can be applied to anything within the range of our experiences. As long as something has an effect on our lives, we can formulate theories and try to predict what this effect might be. The effect itself is an experiment, testing whether our theory was right.
People use scientific methods all the time. They have hypotheses about devices and make predictions how those will react to their actions. If a device does not work as expected, the experiment may disprove their hypothesis. If they adjust their hypothesis, they are applying scientific methods; if they nevertheless stick to their hypothesis because of nonscientific reasons, they are not.
Scientific method does not aim to give an ultimate answer. Its iterative and recursive nature implies that it will never come to an end, so any answer it gives is provisional. Hence it cannot prove or verify anything in a strong sense. However, if a theory passed many experimental tests without being disproved, it is usually considered superior to any theory that has not yet been put to a test.
I've never heard before that Popper's influence strengthened peer review, do we have a citation for that? JoshuaZ 05:30, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: As far as the US scene goes, and making peer review an integral part of American academic life, I think that a better case could be made for the indefatigable efforts of John Dewey. Jon Awbrey 18:28, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Interesting quote from Bacon here: [2]
JA: It was so much work coming up with that title that I will have to leave it as an "Exercise for the Reader" until after lunch. Jon Awbrey 18:42, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
The current philosophy section is long, rambling and borderline incoherent. Jon, what do you think you are doing to it? JoshuaZ 06:17, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: As best I can recall, I am reponsible for the part of it copied below, though the last paragraph seems to be a residue of an earlier mention of Feyerabend that I was merely trying to make a transition to. You may remember that we had been having some discussion about the "no-method" school of thought, and I was initially for downplaying it, as I know that it really has very little impact on workaday research. But it fills the pop press and the pop phil sci courses, and it needs to be dealt with. That third paragraph was initially in the introduction, and I thought way back when that it was enough to say on the matter. In the mean time, though, I've had some rather odd experiences with (Pseudo-scient)-ologists, in a non-associative way, and it has convinced that we all have a lot more work to do as far as the "public reception of science" (PROS) goes.
JA: One of the big problems is the widespead confusion about the respective roles of science and philosophy of science. There are scientists who reflect on science and who take the time to explain it to the public, but they are rare compared to the numbers of philosophers of science and science writers who shape the public conception of science in ways that are not always very realistic. There's nobody to blame for that really — most doers are too busy doing science to explain how they view it, and there's nothing wrong with having specialized "reflectors" who stand at a distance from the action — sometimes they see things from a distance that the doers fail to see for standing too close to the picture. But somehow or other it is necessary to explain how the different perspectives relate to each other, or else the public gets a distorted picture of science. On this trial effort, I was trying to say all that in a way that places the continuities between doing science and reflecting on it within a natural context.
JA: The second paragraph speaks to the sea-change that occurred with Kant, where he accepted the workings of science at face value as if were just another phenomenon to be explained. This is a novel way to finesse the usual difficulties at the beginning, and it approaches the whole problem of justification in a positive way. That, as I recall, was the original idea of positivism, before it got wacked all out of proportion. So here I am trying to explain the bifurcation that took place historically, arising from a difference in attitude as to what a solution to the problem of justification would have to do.
JA: Okay, I'll have to leave it for tonight. Jon Awbrey 07:22, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
Philosophical reflection on scientific method
Philosophy of science takes its cue from the moment when the play of inquiry is interrupted by a question about the activity of inquiry itself. The inquirer in question may have been, just a moment before, absorbed in a bit of data or immersed in the study of a problematic phenomenon — and throughout history it was normally that way — or maybe a curious bystander, or perhaps a person whose profession is philosophy. In any case, there are a number of questions that a reflective observer will typically think to ask about the conduct of scientific inquiry as a phenomenon that is interesting for its own sake.
What happens next depends on the attitude that the person who examines the phenomenon of science — quite literally the appearance of science — brings to the test. The attitude may be positive, taking the appearance of science at face value as a process that works as it seems to. Or the attitude may be negative, less disposed to accept appearances and more inclined to be critical or even skeptical of the possibilty that anything like science can work as it seems. These choices that any individual can make are also reflected in moments of history when one of the other tended to predominate, at least in particular circles of thought.
The philosophy of science has among its topics of interest the question of how far the actual practice of scientific researchers conforms to the espoused methods or the ostensible norms, to which the majority of them expressly or tacitly assent. In the process of subjecting the conventional assumptions to critically reflective examination, writers in these fields periodically generate controversies as to whether scientific knowledge is actually produced by a defined, describable, or determinate methodology (see, for instance, the writings of Feyerabend and Kuhn).
Perhaps there might be more on the progression from ostensive definition, to extensional definition and intensional definition. In some fields, we have indeed reached a high plane of understanding; some areas of science have progressed to the point where some experts can moot a thought experiment. Other experts can subsequently commit funds and expertise toward the design of experiments. This is Big Science, as for the Space observatories.
But when the same type of methodology is applied to a classroom and children are not benefitting, clearly the science is not there yet. Perhaps the article might benefit from a discussion why. There are other mismatches which we could discuss, if not on this page, then on other Science pages.
I invite you to the wikipedia:scientific peer review pages where there has been lively discussion on how to take this encyclopedia to a new level of quality. -- Ancheta Wis 12:42, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: In my experience argumentum ad revertum and genuine dialogue are mutually exclusive. Good luck with that science by fiat thing. You're really showing the kiddies how it's done. Jon Awbrey 13:48, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: The way I work is gradual, incremental, requiring no small amount of algorhythmic backtracking from time to time, but all importantly I work in public — perhaps you recognize the modus operandi. I appreciate your appreciation of my creativity that you think I could open any doors that are not already swinging wide on every saloon and salon in the Wiki City, but for sooth's sake I must decline the compliment. The loophole that anybody could drive an 18-wheeler semio-truck (articulated lorry in the UK) through, however, is opened up the moment that soi-disant scientists start appealing to the authority of the biggest army as the raison detour of science, if you catch my semantic drift. What's the alternative? Well, it's Popperly known as the via dolorosa of falsifiability, which makes it incumbent on soi-disant scientists to try poking holes in all their own pet theories, even their own theory of how science works. Scientific method? Use it or lose it. Jon Awbrey 20:50, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: That would be a rather, well, creative interpretation of the single word "work". We're all working here. Being bold means making changes on the main attractor, however strange, except when there's some really serious dispute, which I didn't think we were having, not here, not yet. This article is, after all, tagged as a Philosophy article. So why is all the philosophy relegated to an afterthought? Indeed, my whole effort on that issue arose from trying to accord the benefit of the doubt to some perspectives that my first instincts, a month ago, were to discount. Yes, it was clearly a work in progress, begun late at night, and it usually takes me ≥ 3 rewrites to clean thinks up, but reverting that much good faith work on a common issue without discussion is just not WP:COOL in my book. Jon Awbrey 21:28, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I am saying that when we are done with this article, it had better be something more than a WP:PEACOCK paen to the cookbook recipes for scientific method that all of us learned, at least in my day, in our 4th-grade science textbooks. It had better exhibit an up-to-date, > 1-eyed literate, philosophically critical and reflective attempt to tackle the questions that have been being asked and addressed by many people who are genuinely concerned about science education, professional training, and the public reception of science. Otherwise we might as well just paste up a link to some 4th-grade textbook and give it up at that. Jon Awbrey 22:00, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
I removed these two paragraphs becasue the ideas are not effectvely contexted as yet. Here they are, for further consideration if desired.
Kenosis 19:58, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
Agreed, my instinct was to consider it a stranded paragraph which left an extremely important question hanging in mid-air. To start back in along these important lines, the existing paragraph could be followed by a checklist such as that below (courtesy of the intelligent design article editors, but really fairly standard), or some derivative thereof:
Kenosis 16:28, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
I noticed this had recently been removed:
Why?
I propose restoring that passage, since it is apparently well-sourced, and deleting all the "scare quotes" instead. They convey essentially no information, and what they do contain is often only a baised point of view. -- James S. 02:32, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: The levels of misunderstanding that I see exhibited here are turning out to be far worse than I thought. These misunderstandings have to do with:
JA: One of factors that seems to be preventing the sort of genuine dialogue among concerned parties that might help to find real solutions to these misunderstandings is, I'm sad to say, a kind of "bunker mentality" that I see developing in the soi-disant "defenders of science". After many tries it has so far been impossible to get it through to some people that critical thinking is not about picking sides. It involves the critique of sloppy reason wherever it occurs, no matter who does it. It has so far been impossible to get across the simple logical point that many stories have > 2 sides, that a person who criticizes the arguments put forward on behalf of X is not ipso facto an "adherent" of ¬X. I have personally had to endure insinuations and even explicit insults like that from people who have no other data about "what side I'm on" than the fact that I criticize their reasoning on a given point.
JA: I think I understand something about the dynamics that brings this to pass, and up to a point I sympathize with those who have been so embroiled in this or that battle against scientific heresy that they begin to take on the characters of similar inquistors in the past. But I still have hopes that they will do better than their precursers, take pause to clear the fog of war, the "blood in the eye" (BITE), from what should be their better vision. Whether they know it or not, many others have been tackling these problems and trying to do something positive about them, for longer than they seem to realize. Jon Awbrey 03:56, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I believe that I have already made more than a good faith effort to explain all of my contributions to the article and all of the problems that I see with its current condition. When others begin to make a corresponding effort to explain their objections to my additions, then maybe there will be reason to say more. Jon Awbrey 04:08, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
Jon, 1) to put it bluntly you don't explain yourself very well and 2) none of your stuff gives many references, which lead to serious OR problems with your versions, even if it was understood. JoshuaZ 04:12, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Thank you. That at least gives me something concrete to work on. Jon Awbrey 04:21, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: It's late again where I am, so I'll try to be wise and make this short. Look, these are such bedeviled questions that I lose track of which devils I'm advocating on a given day. My POV of the moment is this: There are philosophers of science who show some familiarity with the history and the actual practice of science, like Peirce or Kuhn, and then there are those who show all the marks of being outside speculators, like Popper or Feyerabend. That's not an assignment of different colored hats in the trite Western picture-show sense, but merely a question of recognizing different perspectives for what they are. But a philosophical article on scientific method still has to deal with these issues without simply dimissing them out of hand. Now, I sat back quietly and observed your labors of house-&-stable-cleaning, and on the whole I think that's "that's a good thing". But some stuff that was right on in spirit if not in letter got tossed out with bathwater.
JA: So when things quieted down a bit, I tried to go back and deal with the issues that I know from long experience won't go away, since they have been recurringly raised by whole bodies of curriculum reform folks and hard-nosed science-minded professionals for the last 40 years or so, just since I personally have been paying attention. Because I tried to explain a tricky issue in the vernacular, prompted by many requests and WP guidelines to do so, it suddenly got branded and reverted as "personal essay". But these were nothing more personal or creative than paraphrases of philosophical issues that are as old as the hills. And now I'm told that it's "original research". I suppose that if some people are not aware of the histories that I mentioned here and above then it might seem like news in the WP:NOR sense, but at least providing references is something that I know how to do. So let's all practice what we preach and do likewise. Jon Awbrey 05:12, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I know that some people think that links should not be replicated, but I find that a good compendium of related topics is a very useful study aid, both on first and on subsequent readings. It also serves contributors in helping to see some of the discontinuities that will need to be smoothed out across diverse and sundry regions of Wikipedia. Jon Awbrey 17:42, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
Coming from outside, in that I have not edited this page for quite some time, may I point out that the distinction between the history and philosophy of the scientific method appears quite arbitrary? These two sections could profitably be combined - perhaps by putting the philosophy section in historical order? Banno 20:39, 25 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: There is a rather important distinction between the history of scientific method and the philosophy of scientific method. History is the record of past events. Despite what some people think, philosophy is not purely a thing of the past. Philosophy of science has to do with reflection on scientific inquiry as a whole. This includes (1) comparative and critical examinations of scientific activity, (2a) problems about the different types of reasoning involved in inquiry, (2b) the grounds of their validity, and (2c) their coordination with one another, (3) questions about the justification or warrant of scientific method, that is, whether, how, and why we think it works. And so on, just to mention a few things off the top of my head, as Data would say. Jon Awbrey 02:15, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I cannot make sense of what the issue is here. Maybe the concatenations of "F of G of H of ..." have exceeded the limits of my pushdown stack. If people are saying that the history section could be made more outlinish in view of already having the History of science and History of scientific method main artcles, that makes sense to me. If they are saying that the contemporary academic and cultural conversation about the nature of scientific inquiry can be separated from this article and relegated to a subsection of the Hist of Sci or Phil of Sci articles, then I think that would be a mistake on many grounds. Please clarify. Thanks, Jon Awbrey 15:58, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: And I am trying to say that they are two different topics, indeed, radically different topologies for looking at science. The contemporary philosophical topics are not properly dealt with as history, since the contemporary issues, by definition, all have the time coordinate "now". Jon Awbrey 17:32, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
There is a concept which has been lost in the edits, and which needs to be reinstated in the intro. "Scientific method (and science itself) deals with new knowledge". If no one has thought the thoughts before, then it qualifies as science. Originality is part of the currency with which scientists deal. Other investigations are certainly knowledge, but are rather more scholarship than science. This does not mean that new sounds or words or fashion or other tropes are science. That's where scientific method is applied to demarcate science from other forms of new knowledge. -- Ancheta Wis 16:25, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: As wonderful as all of these quatotions are, their piquancy is considerably weakened by being tossed together in a salad bon mot. For my part I like to use such things as pithy epigraphs to lead off pertinent sections of the text, but I've been told that this practice is "not encyclopedic". So I'll put them here for case by case reconsideration. Jon Awbrey 03:08, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
"The scientific approach to the examination of phenomena is a defense against the pure emotion of fear." - Tom Stoppard, Rosencrantz & Guildenstern Are Dead (1967, page 17 in Grove edition)
"Science is a way of thinking, much more than it is a body of facts." - Carl Sagan
"Science is what we have learned about how to keep from fooling ourselves." - Richard Feynman
"The brightest flashes in the world of thought are incomplete until they have been proven to have their counterparts in the world of fact." - John Tyndall (1820-1893), physicist
"It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." - William Kingdon Clifford
"A habit of basing convictions upon evidence, and of giving to them only that degree of certainty which the evidence warrants, would, if it became general, cure most of the ills from which this world is suffering." - Bertrand Russell
"The plural of anecdote is not data." - Roger Brinner
JA: I will be adding some text to the main article under the heading indicated above on the various models of scientific inquiry that have been discussed in the literature over the years, in good time drawing on some of the references that I've already added — probably starting with Salmon, Hacking, Earman, etc. Jon Awbrey 02:58, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: On third reading of the previous comments about history and philosophy, I think that I can recognize a persistent phenomenon, one that I have tried with no big success to address already, so let me vary a variable or three and make another trial of it today.
JA: The philosophy section needs to be organized by philosophical topics, not by chronological order. The questions that any reflective person or critical thinker will eventually think to ask about the conduct of scientific inquiry are recurrent not serial.
JA: Over the last week there has been a persistent attempt to push any modicum of critical reflection about scientific method off the table, under the rug, anywhere but our backyard, etc. Assuming that most interested parties still want to keep this article under the aegis of Philosophy (a defeasible hypothesis), I think that this tendency is ill-advised and inappropriate. The reader is owed an accurate account of the current scene, with all its wrinkles and warts.
JA: I tried, in what may have been too vernacular or folksy a way, to make the point that reflection on science is not the exclusive preserve of professional philosophers of science, but that it arises "in the wild" anytime anybody pauses to reflect on what they are doing, no matter whether they are doing Big Science or micro-problem-solving in everyday life. This continuity is one route to a better understanding of science on the public scene. So I think that it's very important.
JA: In brief: It is not the profession that constitutes the reflection, it us the quality of the reflection that constitutes the profession. Jon Awbrey 16:24, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: For my part, I do not think that 47 Kb is all that excessive for a keystone article like this, but one way to trim it would be to tighten up the paradigm examples to the few that can be carried through all of the stages in parallel, maybe just two examples from widely diverse fields. I notice that all of them now are from the natural sciences, which is a source of potential warp in the fabric of science being presented. Skimming through the examples, the paragraph on Light seemed most isolated and not so well written in its current state. Jon Awbrey 17:08, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Text deleted:
Light
Light had long been supposed to be made of particles. Isaac Newton, and before him many of the Classical Greeks, was convinced it was so, but his light-is-particles account was overturned by evidence in favor of a wave theory of light suggested most notably in the early 1800s by Thomas Young, an English physician. Light as waves neatly explained the observed diffraction and interference of light when, to the contrary, the light-as-a-particle theory did not. The wave interpretation of light was widely held to be unassailably correct for most of the 19th century. Around the turn of the century, however, observations were made that a wave theory of light could not explain. This new set of observations could be accounted for by Max Planck's quantum theory (including the photoelectric effect and Brownian motion—both from Albert Einstein), but not by a wave theory of light, nor by a particle theory.
JA: Moving this paragraph here for reconsideration:
Formal approaches
Inferential statistics and computational learning theory are concerned with setting out rigorous statistical resp. algorithmic frameworks for induction, or at least practically effective ones. For a near-optimal method in the sense of computable predictions in the context of algorithmic information theory, see the speed prior.
JA: There may be some other section, present or TBA, that it would fit under, but it seemed like a dangling factoid where it was. Jon Awbrey 17:41, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
There are alternatives to cutting back text. One alternative might be to place articles in context. -- Ancheta Wis 18:12, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
Facets of Scientific method |
---|
History of scientific method |
Philosophy of scientific method |
Thought experiment |
Design of experiments |
Formal approaches to scientific method |
Mathematical models |
JA: Yes, I think that these navigation guides can be very useful, as I always try to craft my own in the See also seas anyway. The only problem that I've seen with them in other places, say Semiotics, is the possibility of dismembering aspects of a subject, Osiris-like, that can only be properly integrated when taken up in close coordination with each other. This is part of what I'm getting at when I say that critical reflection is not just for professional critics and reflectors. Jon Awbrey 18:30, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
Jon Awbrey, What would you think if we were to have more of a communications protocol; those little DNA icons which are getting elided were a device to demarcate illustrations of the phases of scientific method. They were placed there in response to a request. This is recorded in the archives. It might help if you were to note your motive before these types of edits. Then others could assent, thus making the editing process more of a collaboration. -- Ancheta Wis 18:22, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Speaking as a mere reader, I found them extremely distracting, causing my eyes simply to skip over the heiroglyphed paragraph. I think that I can understand what somebody was trying to achieve, but it simply did not work in practice. Alas! the way of all experiment. Jon Awbrey 18:38, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I daresay that I have been far above the par of this group in giving notice of my edits, discussing them on the talk page, and preserving for reconsideration on the talk page what some previous soul took the time to type in, and I receive a remark like that with some irony from those who have yet to reciprocate its sentiment. But I will of course observe as best I can, short of due boldness, inconsistency with global norms, and intellectual paralysis, any form of communication protocol that achieves a local consensus. Jon Awbrey 18:52, 26 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Recent edits show a tendency toward a type of progressivist fallacy that wore out its welcome in the late great "modern" era, namely the practice of using words like "modern" as honorific terms, rhetorically fashioned to confer some order of unquestioned — and ∴ "unscientific" — legitimacy on a contemporary doctrine. Now that "modern" has passed from hip to hip replacemnt in our thoroughly post*modern era, the use of the term "contemporary" is more accurate and less of a WP:PEACOCK word. Now, I do not question, too much, that science is one of those domains where most of us have faith that progress can be made, over the long haul, but nobody with a historical (See Elsewhere, Coriolanus) consciousness could dare to call that progression monotonic. Jon Awbrey 04:04, 27 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: It's a deal, if you don't use "modern" I won't use "post-modern". So do what I say and nobody gets hurt.
JA: P.S. That's a Kleene star that I use in "post*modern". Thus it is clear that:
JA: Et sic deinceps, it goes on from there ... Jon Awbrey 05:06, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I have problems with the demarcation section. It's mostly just Popper's bugaboo again, sans citations, and it suffers from the following problems:
JA: No, no, maybe, but not this way.
JA: We already have a highly contentious article on Pseudoscience, and I would prefer not to replicate those peculiar trials here. So I think that it's better to "describe", not necessarily "define", scientific method in positive terms, and now that we have a reasonable outline, to stick with it.
JA: The items on that checklist are usually referred to as heuristic principles. Heuristic principles, much as Bohr observed about "deep truths", and much like muscles, tend to come in opposing pairs. In short, they are approximate maxims, and not internally consistent among themselves. Their proper application requires experience with the exigencies of given domains, that is, "practical wisdom", or what the Greeks called phronesis. Thus they serve even worse as a recipe than the more standard statements of method, and a lot of nonsense can be generated by the novitiate taking them too literally and rigidly. Jon Awbrey 04:40, 27 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Here is one of my previous attempts at delineating the demarcation problem in positive terms. I'll probably feather this in momentarily, though I think that these sorts of border disputes probably do more harm than good.
The criteria for a system of assumptions, methods, and theories to qualify as science vary in their details from application to application, but they typically include (1) the formulation of hypotheses that meet the logical criterion of contingency, defeasibility, or falsifiability and the closely related empirical and practical criterion of testability, (2) a grounding in empirical evidence, and (3) the use of scientific method. The procedures of science typically include a number of heuristic guidelines, such as the principles of conceptual economy or parsimony that fall under the rubric of Occam's Razor. A conceptual system that fails to meet a significant number of these criteria is likely to be considered "nonscience".
I begin to like what I see... Kenosis 05:58, 27 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: The word progressive is malaprop here, as it connotes monotonic to many people. Backtracks cannot be avoided. Jon Awbrey 21:55, 27 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: "Robust" is a fairly respectable term in the engineering circles that I lately buzzed about, though its cousin "agile" has been getting more buzziness of late. But let me remind you that this sorites of heuristics are "rules of thumb". There's a major artery in your thumb. If you try to shave 'em too fine, you end up with blood all over your razor. Nobody wants that, now do they? Jon Awbrey 22:36, 27 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: "Robust" also has a standard meaning in statistics — where I first learned it I think: "A statistic is said to be robust if it is not sensitive to outliers". From there it got used in AI to mean "graceful recovery from anomalies", also "non-brittleness", capable of laughing off a request to divide by zero, etc. John von Neumann, John Holland, etc. Jon Awbrey 23:00, 27 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Y'know, I'm really can't make everything up. The word "robust" really is used in just that technical sense. "Progressive", again, is used in connection with "incrementalism", and progresses from there to progressivist fallacies. Fallacies are a bad thing to fall into. Jon Awbrey 03:56, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
How about something like:
JA: It's okay except for the "progressive", which is a seriously misleading word. I will dig up some references, but it may be a while, schedule interruptions coming up. Jon Awbrey 04:18, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
OK, talk 2ya later then. I still think progressive is essential here, and think it's only marginally open for misinterpretation without the adjuncts... Kenosis 04:22, 28 March 2006 (UTC)Also please see my query in Communications Protocol above Jon... Kenosis 04:22, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: The remark about phrenology clued me in to what the misunderstanding might be. Deriving from its use in statistics, robustness is a property of a measure on distributions that is insensitive to outliers, like the median, but not the mean. For "distribution" think "science as a whole", for "outlier" think "phrenology". It is precisely the ability of science to recover from its local cul-de-sacs (cultist acts) that we call its robustitude. Jon Awbrey 06:10, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Again, the same misunderstanding of the term. If Phrenology were robust it would still be around. Yes, there are some forms of dyad-in-the-wool reductionism that survive by continually changing their names, but never mind that now. The word robust applies to science as a whole — remember your P's & Q's, Polanyi and Quine and their various holisms — not the individual sidetracks that have to be backtracked from time to time. Effective generativity depends on this, otherwise science gets stuck in the hoarse laffitudes of the Markov, the Context-free, and the Primitive recursive. Jon Awbrey 16:44, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: An anonymous editor prepended the definite article before our not so definite article, after all this time of discussing the plurality versus commonality issues, leading me to recognize that something very important must still not be clear about that, so here is what fell out of trying to fix that:
Scientific method refers to a body of techniques for the investigation of phenomena and the acquisition of new knowledge about them, as well as the correction and integration of previous knowledge, as a whole based on observable evidence and subject to laws of reasoning. Alhough specialized procedures vary from one field of inquiry to another, there are identifiable features that distinguish scientific inquiry from other methods of developing knowledge. Specific hypotheses are formed to propose explanations for natural phenomena and experimental studies test the predictions for accuracy in order to make increasingly dependable predictions of future results. Hypotheses in a given field of inquiry are logically bound together by a wider theory that assists researchers in forming new hypotheses, as well as in placing groups of specific hypotheses into a broader context of understanding.
JA: Jon Awbrey 12:50, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Other notes. I also brought forward the mention of laws of reasoning, as the balance between empirical and rational aspects was a bit lopsided. Further, it's best to emphasize "observable" and mention "measurable" as coming of age in the normal course of development, when observations become mature enough to quantify. The historical fact is that fields of science can grow rather robustly for centuries at a time in a condition of making qualitative observations before they are old enough to start measuring anything sensibly. Misunderstanding this point is what got Phrenology into trouble, you'll remember. Jon Awbrey 13:20, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: The word empirical is currently dabbed to empiricism, which is currently a POV article, as it stakes out a philosophical position that is decidedly not the position of all scientific researchers. In time I might be able to fix that article so that it describes a heuristic ism and not a dogmatic Ism, but right now the POV by association is false and misleading. Jon Awbrey 16:04, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Peirce — he would — had a word for it, but it was pure G(r)eek and about 7 slobbles long, and I kant remember it anyway. But looking through Newell's UTOC, the word "integrative" appears to leap off the page in about the same context and sense. Will cite chapter and verse later on. Jon Awbrey 18:14, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: For my part, an ubertous acronym is all-important -- and the irritation of doubt is next to IRCsomeness my estimation, so that starts to fit. Jon Awbrey 19:30, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Look, I confess to being a naturalist myself, which means I think everything that happens is natural. But adjunction of the adjective "natural" to "phenomenon" has a tendency to bias the discussion of phenomena, "that which appears in the world", toward what are conventionally called the "natural sciences" in contradistinction to the "social sciences", and that leads to various distortions in the concept of science that I'm sure are not intended here. This not a substantive matter, but one that has to do with the peculiar usage of words on the modern scene, and I do mean "modern". Jon Awbrey 20:32, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Okay, I looked at the other end of the Natural world, and I have to say that my hypothesis is not disconfirmed — there is a rather rank "hard scientism" connoted by this link:
Nature (also called the material world, the material universe, the natural world, and the natural universe) is all matter and energy, especially in its essential form.
JA: Again, this is not for me a question about whether everything is made of quarks or whatever it is this week, as I'm totally accepting of all that. But there has been 2 or 3 hundred years of discussion already leading to the commonly accepted working basis that the various sciences operate at modular levels that don't really require one to reduce all one's talk about chemico-bio-psycho-socio-poli-sci systems to talk about quarks, even if one buys the whole bag of beans that "it's gotta be possible in principle". So this adjectival link is misleading with regard to how science actually gets done. Jon Awbrey 21:16, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: Yes, I get all that, but we can't be reacting like billiard balls here. Probably the answer is to make a better job of the article on Phenomena. Put it on the list. Jon Awbrey 21:24, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
This section is a stub. You can help by expanding it. ... Kenosis 02:59, 29 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: I'm not worrying all that much at this stage about blade-running all those replicant wikis — very few trees are harmed in making them, anyway — since the ordering of sections is not all that stable in certain areas. 14:12, 29 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: ja, dat's my gefuhl 2. Jon Awbrey 16:33, 29 March 2006 (UTC)
I would like to get feedback on the possible addition of a very important aspect of method today to the second introductory paragraph of the article, or some variant hereof... Kenosis 17:07, 31 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: People who live in pseudonym houses should not throw peer review rocks. Jon Awbrey 14:55, 2 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: TWISI, the most pernicious form of pseudoscience today is what we might call OOPS, "oval office prestidigitous science", which has already learned how to outwit all the games of im-peerious prestige and manages to keep so many sweating the small stuff while the planet just keeps heating up. Jon Awbrey 19:56, 2 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: The point being this: How is peer review different from other forms of authority-based belief formation? Unless you find that especially easy to explain to the general public, then I would recommend focussing on the ways that scientific inquiry is something more than peer pressure. Jon Awbrey 20:24, 2 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: The more I look at what it will take to do a decent job on that Models of scientific inquiry section, the more I realize it will probably take an article of its own, so I have created a stub at Scientific explanation for that eventuality, or maybe Models of scientific inquiry will fit better, haven't decided yet. Travelling now, so will discuss more when I get back. Jon Awbrey 15:06, 2 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: If there's a better way to split off a section as a separate article, please advise, but I thought this would be unproblematic as we've been discussing the need to do so for a while. Jon Awbrey 18:34, 2 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: I put in some very approximate links for the subsections on the various models of scientific inquiry. These will need to be expanded and refined as time goes on. Jon Awbrey 20:34, 2 April 2006 (UTC)
I have removed the material below for further consideration by the editors. As written, it was off point for this article... Kenosis 00:03, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
This section needs expansion. You can help by
adding to it. (May 2010) |
Hello, Kenosis. I greet "further consideration by the editors" with enthusiasm. You state that it "was off point for this article," yet you give no rationale for this thought. So, I state in retort, "It is right on point for this article, in fact, it is the essence of this topic."
I agree that philosophy MUST aspire to the same rigor as science. And, the only rigor that matters is reality. Judgments of "true, false, and meaningless" imply truth filtered through human experience, political correctness, and adherence to some man-made code that could include bigotry, wrong-headedness, and thinking filled with ruts from the past. Reductionism, for example, is one of the great bug-a-boos of science. Also, scientism often rears its ugly head and stiffles creative searches for truth. Methinks if you had your way, as you describe it, we would all still be working out the problems of Ptolemy. (It is largely thanks to my cousin, Nicolas Copernicus, that we got past the problems of the Ptolemites.)
If you are going to remove my article based on logical positivism, then you are going to have to cite specific examples so we can have a discussion. Amorphous, broad-brush criticisms are no criticisms at all.
I also note that a number of the articles that appear under "Scientific method" contain logical blunders. For example, a number of the articles state that questions must be asked before observations are made. This is truly a case of "the horse before the cart," as one cannot ask questions of many things until observations are made. That's like questioning the decisions of an interior designer in a room that is pitch black. Would you like me to go through this section and remove all those pieces that commit this type of logical suicide?
Finally, removal of my article based on repetition is specious. Most of education depends on repetition. Many of the articles in the Wikipedia contain significant amounts of repetition. In fact, I see a great deal of repetition in this very article between the various sections. If you are worried because articles that follow mine contain repetition of my points, then I say, "Remove those repetitive parts that offend you from the subsequent articles." In books on educational philosophy, one of the undergirding principles is "Tell them what you are going to tell them; then tell them; then tell them what you told them." Will you be canceling that undergirding principle of educational philosophy because of its repetitive nature?
Remember, this article was vetted by 700 members of the ISPE over a period of several years (being first published in 1990). These are, empirically, some of the smartest people in the world. In fact, the ISPE was founded by Chev. Dr. Chris Harding, whom the "Guinness Book of World Records" declared to be the "Smartest Person on Earth." Chris enthusiastically approved of my article . . . giving it, in fact, high praise. Marilyn vos Savant, arguably the smartest woman on earth, is a personal friend of mine and another ISPE member. She approves of my article. These, and the rest of the ISPE members, are some of the people I respect most on this earth. How are you better at judging my article than they are?
Take my advice, Kenosis . . . get past the cubic miles of blather left by past philosophers. The only credo that matters is "dedication to reality at all cost." ( 75.3.241.29 07:20, 27 April 2006 (UTC)) Rich Kapnick 25 April, 2006
(Here is a peer-reviewed introduction that should go at the top of this topic. It has been reviewed by the 700 members of the International Society of Philosophical Enquiry, a worldwide scientific, philosophical research organization. Membership in the ISPE requires that the applicant be at or above the 99.9th percentile of general intellectual functioning. There are five membership levels. Mr. Kapnick is at the level of Diplomate, the highest of these five levels.)
Richard A. Kapnick
Science is the empirical study of patterns and processes in the Universe. (1)
The Scientific Method is the self-correcting tool used by scientists in honestly seeking truth at all costs. It is arranged in six steps to be followed in order.
1. Observation. Using our senses to gather information about the world around us.
A. This includes the "mapping process" used by the human brain to organize this information.
B. It also includes reflection on thoughtful questions that naturally arise after an observation is made.
2. Hypothesis. An hypothesis is a creative idea that helps explain the observation above. It is a trial solution that has not been verified. An hypothesis is stated in a manner that can be tested to see if it is true or false.
3. Prediction. The first step to verify the truth or non-truth of an hypothesis. A prediction extends critical thinking beyond that which is observed. Predictions are a logical "If . . . then" type of statement. ("If x is true, then y must also be true.")
4. Experimentation. An empirical (verified by actual experience) manner of testing the predictions of an hypothesis. All experiments must be repeatable.
A. An experiment may be designed to test the truth of an hypothesis by trying to demonstrate the accuracy of its predictions, or
B. If direct experiments are difficult to perform, experiments may be designed to test and eliminate other hypotheses or explanations, leaving the original hypothesis as the only explanation.
5. Theory. A theory is an hypothesis with some degree of verification by empirical evidence. The evidence appears to indicate the hypothesis might be true. A theory states the apparent relationships and underlying principles of certain observed phenomena that have been verified to some degree. A theory is not a “proven true” idea.
6. Law of Science. A Law of Science is a theory that has undergone extensive testing and has accurately matched the observed phenomena or data again and again and again. It has withstood the "test of time." While Laws of Science are accepted as responsible and accurate factual truth(2), they are continually reviewed in the search for absolute truth. No Law of Science is a final statement of the way the universe is. Laws of Science are modified when new empirical facts are discovered.
The Scientific Method is universal in its application. An hypothesis, thought, idea, or belief that cannot be verified by the Scientific Method cannot be verified by any other means known to man.
_________________________
(1) The idea of “cause and effect” was discarded with the acceptance of quantum mechanics, largely because QM approaches explanations for nature with ranges of probabilities. We now realize that “cause and effect” is a contrived human concept. If two events have a near- absolute correlation, then they are subsets of the whole, larger, summed event–defined within QM’s probability range. "Cause and effect" has now been replaced with "patterns and processes."
(2) Facts are not “the Absolute Truth of the Universe.” Instead, facts are the best current human approximation of the truth. Facts are changed or adjusted as new information is discovered. Knowledgeable people realize facts may change at some future date. However, these folks are able to live comfortably with the best “facts” currently available.
--26 April, 2006
__________________________
I respectfully suggest you are wrong in your assertion about the phrase "law of science" not being an "accepted term of art" for this, or any other, discussion. "Law of Gravity" rushes to mind as a prime example of a law of science. Over the last 147 years, the Theory of Evolution has gradually been proceeding to the Law of Evolution. If not "laws of science," how then would you characterize the undergirding principles of the Cosmos that create what we call "reality"? Further, if Wikipedia limits all discussions to "accepted terms of art," then it has truly smitten its nose to spite its face. Why would Wikipedia---a noble concept to be sure---stiffle its own creativity by banishing/editing/censoring out terms that are outside some amorphous boundary of acceptance by an equally amorphous group of editors? This seems dangerously close to the religion commonly known as "scientism."
The current Wikipedia content of the topic "Scientific method" is, by any definition, too ponderous. As has been previously noted above (by another editor), any high school or college student who reads the opening remarks above the "Contents" is likely to (a) fall asleep, (b) be discouraged and tune to "Sponge Bob, Square Pants" cartoons on his TV, or, (c) decide wrongly that he or she is not capable of understanding the explanation of this topic. The job of teaching often requires breaking a topic into simpler concepts with which the reader has experience. Language must be selected that is appropriate to the reader. A person's readiness issues must be considered. While parts of this article are brilliantly written . . . almost "inspired" . . . other parts need to be moved to an Addendum. Upon request, I shall be more specific on this issue.
One of the great pitfalls of this topic is the issue of where to start a discussion of the Scientific method. The California Department of Education in Sacramento insists that scientific inquiry begins with "asking questions." This thought seems to have become pervasive in the scientific community. Nonetheless, it is obviouisly wrong to all who go much beyond the level of flaneur of the arts and sciences. In truth, the initial sensory intake that results in such questions as "How does this work?" or "Why is that so?" or "There must be something else happening here." can only be classed as "observation." This observation (initial sensory intake of every nature) precedes the development of all questions. One simply cannot question anything unless certain surrounding observations are in a person's experience. This is commonly known as foundational support for additional exploration. The history of knowledge is built on just such a paradigm: "We stand on the shoulders of giants."
The current Wikipedia article makes this same horse-before-the-cart error in several places by assuming that questions precede observation. Hopefully, this can be corrected in the days and weeks ahead.
Finally, it is to the great credit of Wikipedia that such a topic as "Scientic method" is even included. The fifteenth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1990) that is in my library has no significant reference to, nor any article titled, "Scientific method." This fact, by contrast, makes Wikipedia poised for greatness. Let's outdistance EB and all the rest by presenting a well written, finely honed, easily read, substantially accurate article on this important topic.
Respectfully submitted, NC cousin Rich Kapnick 75.3.241.29 16:34, 27 April 2006 (UTC))
Further comment
It is noted that by going to the Wikipedia main topic "Science" and then to the sub-topic "Goals of Science," we find the following statement, " . . . people can form hypotheses based on observations that they make in the world." This is my position that is clearly stated in the piece I propose for the main page of "Scientific method." This position is at odds with the posit made on the current "Scientific method" page that argues hypotheses are based on questions scientists ask. The more this trail of logic is examined, the sillier the "questioning" launch for the Scientific method becomes. Clearly, the beginning of any scientific search begins with sensory intake of various types that I, and apparently others, call "observation." From this flows questions, hypotheses, predictions, experiments, theories, and finally Laws of Science.
BTW, Kenosis' criticism of my article questions the validity of the concept, "Laws of Science." Yet, I see that the "Science" article uses the term "Laws of Reasoning" as some sort of stare decisis that helps define science. How can "Laws of Reasoning" be valid in a discussion of science, and the term "Laws of Science," concomitantly be invalid? Perhaps one of the "editors" can calm the cognitive dissonance I have over this issue.
It took only minutes for Kenosis to remove my article after I posted on the main page. Now, the days roll by and no one has entered a discussion of the editing issues Kenosis raises. How long before this editing begins?
Respectfully submitted, NC cousin ( Rich 10:03, 28 April 2006 (UTC))
The intro of the current version of this article is all over the place and makes it very difficult to grasp abstract conceptualization of the scientific method in my interpretation. I tried to succinctify it with this edit but User:Jon Awbrey reverted that without providing any rational other than discussion page explanation is a prerequisite so here I am. What do Jon and perhaps others disagree with in my attempted change, and do you agree the introduction and article could stand to be massively clarified and succinctified? Excessive wikilinking is known to decrease readability. Plus wikilinks to definitions should be discouraged, if someone doesn't know a word they should use a dictionary separately, comprehension is a multi-step process, not the single step chaos that is the current version of the article in my interpretation. Hollow are the Ori 15:57, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Dear Hollow Are The Ori, the thing is that many people who have been working on this article for a long time now just do not agree with your wholesale criticisms. If you have specific, constructive suggestions, then all concerned will consider them, but there is no pressing need here to make science seem like some Walk-in-the-Garden-of-Eden-or-Garden-of-Versailles. We've all learned that it's best to mention the thorns and the brambles as soon as possible, lest learners-to-come get the wrong idea about the whole Enterprise. Jon Awbrey 18:01, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Boldly go where — well, I'm guessing where most editors have been before — or proceed with caution, but either way the mutation in question will need to be, beneficial, gradual, specific, and clearly an improvement in lucidity without an excess of loose-idiocy, or else it will not stand. That's just the way it is with these kinds of hyper-palimpsests. Jon Awbrey 18:54, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
In my interpretation the current introduction of this article befuddles abstract comprehension of the scientific method. Any introduction should follow these simple rules in my interpretation:
Some have said the word "universe" doesn't cover all the fields of inquiry but I mean it as in "everything" so I don't see how that is possible. Are there any other criticisms? Hollow are the Ori 20:05, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
Don't feed the trolls... Kenosis 22:48, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Iteration is not the "essence" of science — what's important is what steps are repeated, and that we have stated quite clearly alright already. So please refrain from that tiresome refrain. Jon Awbrey 21:14, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Usage note: Repeat = Iterate. Jon Awbrey 22:08, 4 May 2006 (UTC)
Reset. Scientific method details a way to turn something that is unknown (the problem) into something that is known. If one does not know something, then one way to solve the problem is to try, and try again (also called iteration). It takes interest in the subject, to be able to do this ( George Polya calls this 'becoming absorbed in the problem'). As Andrew Wiles characterized it, "eventually, the problem gets 'tired' and sits down" and you can then catch it. (In Wiles' case, it took years of his life to publish an acceptable solution to a problem which has been under attack by generations of mathematicians for centuries.) -- Ancheta Wis 11:51, 6 May 2006 (UTC)
Rather ironically, what I find myself asking is whether there is any experimental evidence to clearly prove that (any particular) scientific method works, i.e. speeds scientific progress - or even, is there any evidence to clearly prove that scientists prefer to use a particular formulation of the scientific method? I ask these questions because over the years I've been presented with quite a range of descriptions of the scientific method, each given with great confidence and quite different from each of the others, and never with any citation that so-and-so compared the two types of 'scientific method' somehow and proved one was better. I don't deny that there is something better about how we do science now than in the time of Aristotle, but whether the methodology of research into the scientific method itself has progressed since his time is another question...
Also, the most common denominator of all these schemes - that hypothesis precedes experiment - seems contradictory to how I've often seen science done today, as well as many historical descriptions. For instance, many people came up with bizarre ideas of the macrocosm and the microcosm over the course of history, but science only progressed when a few optics geeks cobbled together telescopes and microscopes and started simply reporting what they saw - and when that happened all preceding hypotheses were of no use whatsoever. In modern-day biology it seems that perhaps a majority all experiments still progress in a similar fashion, with workers taking a new or favorite tool - gene array experiments, degenerate PCR, allele structure, immunohistochemistry, etc. - and asking, "how can I use this technique to find out something informative about this topic?" Of course, 'informative' here implies a variation between two or more possible hypotheses, but these hypotheses (such as which of 10,000 genes on an array might be involved in tumor progression) are often rather rudimentary.
Is there any citation people can come up with for a study in which, for example, a teacher took a group of fifth-graders and split them up, one half being taught the scientific method and the other not, then handed them an identical set of broken clockworks or weird gadgets to figure out, and measured the relative times students in each group took to solve their problems? (unsigned: User:Mike Serfas 06:00, 8 May 2006)
Apparently the "Methods of science" viewpoint is slowly taking over from recipe-based descriptions or "Scientific Method." In the United States, the National Science Teachers Association (NSTA) has recently turned against "The Scientific Method," or what Medawar derides as "the calculus of discovery," and instead recommends that science educators teach about NOS or "Nature Of Science." This recent change is detailed in the November 2004 issue of the NSTA magazine "The Science Teacher." Also, the NSTA position statement replaces "The Scientific Method's" list of steps with a "Methods of Science" description:
I note that the guest editor for that issue of TST is William McComas, who is already known in education circles for insisting that The Scientific Method is a myth. See myth #4 in his article "THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE NATURE OF SCIENCE: DISPELLING THE MYTHS", from the book "Nature of Science in Science Education," 1998, McComas ed., online at: http://www.usc.edu/dept/education/science-edu/Myths%20of%20Science.pdf -- Wjbeaty 00:10, 30 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: Q. Whaddya get wben you cross a ho-hum with a hum-bug? Jon Awbrey 00:00, 30 May 2006 (UTC)
Using the history of the double helix as a "classical" case of the scientific method is fairly laughable by itself, but the real warpage of historical facts to fit the structure is pretty inexcusable here. The case of DNA is not a neat case of "characterization -> hypotheses -> prediction -> experiment -> iterations"; it is not a neat case of anything. It is thoroughly messy as far as the history of science goes, and its messiness is very well known.
The "characterizations" section currently makes it sound like Watson and Crick were just following up on the work of Bragg in studying the structure of DNA. In fact the question of whether DNA's structure was biologically important was still completely up for debate at the time, and Watson and Crick were clearly more obvious inspired in their work by the success Pauling had with the alpha helix. The crystallography-centric approach favored by others did not pan out in comparison with the deliberate aping of Pauling's model-building approach favored by Watson and Crick, which was derided by the other physicists as not being serious science. It worked, in the end, but calling this any sort of an obviously logical path is clearly a post hoc accessment.
The "hypotheses" section makes it sound like Watson and Crick hadn't already perceived it as a race with Pauling before the latter had sent the triple helix manuscript to his son. This is false, and while the discovery of Pauling's error clearly invigorated Watson and Crick, it came relatively late into the game (after they had already considered the idea of a triple helix, for example).
The "predictions" section puts the horse before the cart: Watson had already seen the B-form photograph before they thought of proposing the double helix. The B photograph confirmed that the model was helical, but it did not by itself inspire the idea of a double helix (with the bases on the inside), and still held open the option that it was a triple helix. To call the Crick line from the DNA paper a "prediction" is pretty weak -- it is, at best, a general prediction, not a really scientific one. At worst, it is not a prediction at all: it was a conscious attempt by Crick to claim priority on the idea that the structure suggested ideas about DNA replication, without risking getting any of them wrong in this particular paper (Watson was still hesistant about the model's accuracy).
The "experiments" section doesn't really work either, since the experiments had been conducted before the model, and while they had influenced the possible outcome of the model, they did not confine it in any real way. The model-building clearly played more of a role in the Watson-Crick story than did the photographs, which only Watson had seen and even then only briefly. It misrepresents the role of Franklin as well -- she rebuffed their initial triple helix model on a theoretical basis. She was not initially against the final double helix model at all, and in any case she knew thoroughly well that the B-form of DNA was helical, she was not convinced about the A-form.
The "iterations" section says that Watson and Crick had conducted "fruitless experimentation", which is not true (they hadn't really experimented at all), and oversimplifies to the point of absurdity how they actually arrived at the structure for DNA, and what was important. It was a long, messy, and interesting process, not just a case of bond lengths + photos + models. The real innovation was 1. to try and study the idea at all (often the case in scientific work), and 2. to utilize that specific combination of approaches. But even with that, it required many idiosyncratic ideas, encounters, discussions with others, etc.
I go through the details here not to propose changes be made to them. The discovery of DNA is a lousy example for something like this, but it is not necessarily any more lousy than any other example in the history of science which is not written by scientists or philosophers. Work by historians of science have shown for at least four decades (even longer if you count the only later-appreciated Ludwik Fleck) that you cannot just line up true history of science with the idealized form of the scientific method. Personally, I think the examples should just be dropped. Aside from being inaccurate, they do not clarify anything about the method itself. It would be at least humorous if they were meant to be ironic (they do serve as a nice example of why you can't just say science works in simple, prescribed steps), but I don't think they are. -- Fastfission 19:37, 31 May 2006 (UTC)
This entire article is far too dogmatic (that is, it asserts beliefs about what scientists do and think far beyond any reasonable cognitive grounds), and probably far too long and even more, well, better not say (though one is reminded of the word of Asimov: "not very bright except in an academic sense"). I do understand, the discipline has been trying to figure out what knowledge is and how it's possible for well over 2,500 years, and that discussion does not compress well. In short, unless there is a solid critique of scientific method here — I can't find it... — I suggest the whole thing should be overhauled. -- djenner 03:38, 19 June 2006 (UTC)
So how is the concept of causility or "cause and effect" more justifiable than the existence of God? Both cannot be empirically tested; you can not "experience" both with your five senses. I understand that one concept can be "believed in more" than the other; for example, you COULD say that you believe in cause and effect more than you believe in the existence of God. But you can't say, from an empiricist point of view; that you KNOW casualty or God exists. So what I'm asking is how can scientists (and empiricists) believe in the concept of "cause and effect" more than they believe in the existence of God? How is causility more justified (and therefore, more readily "assumeable") than the existence of God? You can't say you know they both exist according to Hume, if you are an empiricist, but why would anyone be an atheist (not believe in God), but assume that causility exist? 165.196.139.24 21:03, 27 June 2006 (UTC)
Sorry for not reading ALL of the discussion above, but it seems to me that the "Scientific Method" is presented in such a way as to assert that it is an orderly process that scientists usually carry out in a step-by-step way. I think it would be MUCH closer to the truth to say that it is a FORMAT in which scientific research is REPORTED.
There are false starts, abandoned hypotheses, failed experiments, etc., which are (by convention) ALWAYS excluded from journal articles. No one simply tells the story of how they made the discovery, unless they write a POPULAR account specifically aimed at laymen.
Perhaps "scientific method" is a rhetorical technique used to justify one's conclusions (or to "prove" that you've made a valuable discovery), rather than a process used while actually conducting research or making the discovery. -- Math Teacher 13:57, 7 July 2006 (UTC)
This talk page certainly needs archiving. Not a chance of seeing the whole thing in Blazer. Could someone who has been paying attention oblige? Banno 00:07, 21 July 2006 (UTC)