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This article depicts the McMahon Line primarily as a territorial dispute between China and India and the cause of the 1962 war, a view I can't agree with. Mao is on record as saying that the disputed territory was worthless [Auhtor: Could you point out a source for your strange claim?] If the Chinese had really thought the territory they occupied in 1962 was their's, they would not have withdrawn so quickly. I am sure they logistical problems and so forth, but I assume such problems were anticipated by Chinese military planners.
[The following is entirely personal biased view] The purpose of the invasion of 1962 was to enhance the prestige of China and the Maoists by giving some foreigners a beating. It kicked off a propaganda campaign which glorified the Chinese army and Lin Biao, at that time China's defense minister and Mao's intended successor.
Why did Mao picked India and not some other country? Aside from the obvious (military opportunity), India was a prominent Soviet ally and China had recently broken with the Soviets.
The only historically Tibetan town south of the line is Tawang. Chinese maps show a large swath of Indian territory as "South Tibet" and therefore belonging to China, but this is sheer mapsmanship.
The McMahon Line is also significant for a reason not mentioned in the article: It was establish through a bilateral treaty between Britain and Tibet. Recognition of the line by Britain and India implies recognition of Tibet's power to concluded treaties at the time of the Simla Convention (1914).
Kauffner 14:02, 23 February 2006 (UTC)Kauffner
Its funny China doesnot recognize the already demarcated boundaries of countries it occupied i.e, Tibet and East Turkestan(Xinjiang), boundaries which these countries agreed to, as a result it squeezed thousands of square kilometeres out of land out of Pakistan, Nepal and soon to Bhutan. On the other side after the fall of soviet union it forced Kyrgyzstan and Kazkhstan to cede territory to China. India is the only country resisting so far, but china occupies Askai Chin as a result of 1962 war anyways, Aksai Chin has been a part of Ladakh for centuries. March 21, 2006 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.117.79.209 ( talk • contribs) 08:09, 22 March 2007
I have a few issues with recent edit by 219.79.122.73. First off, the gist seems to be that not only was China always right, but everyone else knew it. By the end of the article, you're wondering if there is any real dispute.
This article is written from an extremely Sino centric point of view and needs to be cleaned up
--> "cleaned up"? In my opinion we can offer the two points of view, saying that are two points of view (from India and from China). The things about which all people agree, we can write them in the first part. Why always "clean up" things?
Several editors of this page seem to have relied on unreliable sources of modern Chinese history, most notably Jung Chang (see Mao: the Unknown Story for details for problems with her works). While some of these views are commonly espoused, it is a grave WP:NPOV error to present them as facts. For example, Mao starting a war to groom his successor is almost purely speculation, and should be presented as such. -- PalaceGuard008 ( Talk) 06:34, 12 November 2007 (UTC)
I have restored a suppresed text citing Jung Chang. -- Rédacteur Tibet ( talk) —Preceding comment was added at 11:18, 12 April 2008 (UTC)
does anyone have a map of exactly here the line is? an indian map has all the borders, how am one suppose to know which part is part is covered by the line? Akinkhoo ( talk) 10:32, 2 April 2008 (UTC)
New section called "British Discards the McMahon Line" has started under History section. Due to British's policy change in Oct 2008, this entry has to be updated to reflect the change. The section includes British's policy change, and some of its implications. If anyone wants to change it, please bring the change up here for discussion first. Thanks. Xingdong ( talk) 04:31, 24 March 2009 (UTC)
The phrase
Line of Actual Control comes from a 1959 diplomatic message by Zhou Enlai to Nehru. Zhou defined the LAC as "the so-called McMahon Line in the east and the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west."
[1] The LAC therefore pre-dates the 1962 war and is at a fixed location. If India goes north of the line or China south, the line stays where it is.
Many authors more prominent than Robert Barnett have commented on this subject over the years. To put his comments in the lede is both
WP:UNDUE and
WP:RECENTISM.
Kauffner (
talk)
04:29, 6 June 2009 (UTC)
Do you have a reference for this claim? "LAC" was just Zhou's name for the McMahon Line. Kauffner ( talk) 04:16, 12 June 2009 (UTC)
The article seems to echo the Chinese contention. SDas ( talk) 07:25, 2 October 2009 (UTC)
From one extreme we falled into another extreme. Some edits made earlier are nothing but typical Indian side's wishful thinking. For example, I replaced "...1962, when Indian and Chinese forces struggled to control the state of Arunachal Pradesh" because AP didn't exist until 1972.
Political motivation shall have no place here. MainBody ( talk) 09:00, 2 November 2009 (UTC)
It did exist, and it had a different name "North-Eastern Frontier Angency" But we are supposed to use the current names. Like Mumbai and not Bombay. -- HFret ( talk) 13:35, 2 November 2009 (UTC)
I see zero credibility on the above "answere", AP is the institutional name for a political establishment which has no pre-1971 historical root, as you said it is the "State of AP". And no evidence shows it existed before 1971, neither geographic nor political. (Or you can show us any pre-1972 document which uses this name.)
FYI, the name of AP is nothing but Indian unilateral invention. I believe the Chinese side still officially regarded it as South Tibet. Charles Bell even call the Simla Convention invalid becasue of non-existence of Chinese and Russian signatures. (Goldstein, 1989)
We want professional editorship instead of baseless original research. MainBody ( talk) 01:10, 3 November 2009 (UTC)
Me too! (I totally agree with you for once) -- HFret ( talk) 01:28, 3 November 2009 (UTC)
Therefore, per WP policy I with no doubts revert the Oct 2009 edits including the undiscussed/no-consensus wordings of "international boundary"[etc] and recovering the original term "Line".
Undiscussed edits include:
User:HFret is once again urged to provide third-party sources claiming the existence of the "State of Arunachal Pradesh" in the 1960s. Indian propaganda does't count.
For the definition of "vandalism", read WP:VANDAL. - MainBody ( talk) 10:11, 3 November 2009 (UTC)
OK.. as I have no evidence... all hail Main-Body! Haha! roflol XD -- HFret ( talk) 12:17, 4 November 2009 (UTC)
Various changes by an IP here, but no additional sources or discussion to justify them. This was added: "However, the Chinese delegate also signed the McMahon line map part of the treaty, hence making it legal from even this point of view " Says who? This was removed: "Simla (along with the McMahon Line) was initially rejected by the British-run Government of India as incompatible with the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention." This convention was renounced in 1921. After Simla, the McMahon Line was forgotten until 1935, when British civil service officer Olaf Caroe convinced the government to publish the Simla Convention and use the McMahon Line on official maps." Some cruft was added to the top of the article: "The Chinese eventually withdrew." (no context) Kauffner ( talk) 04:43, 17 June 2011 (UTC)
Practical significance of the McMahon Line—— McMahon Line is neither "official boundary" nor "effective boundary" and even the line of actual control not. It is roughly the same line of actual control, India's unilateral claim of the border.-- 天下第一菜 ( talk) 02:23, 28 January 2012 (UTC)
The main article and the sub-heading "Drawing the Line" is almost surreal. The main article in the first line states "Tibet which was not the official representative of the Peoples Republic of China". Of course Tibet was not then "the representative of the PRC", because the PRC did not exist before October 1949!! Then the second paragraph states that Sir Henry McMahon wad the Foreign Secretary - he was not. Then it is stated the McMahon Line was found contrary to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and in 1921 it was "renounced". Does this refer to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 or the Simla Convention of 1914? Renounced by whom and on what authority? The three parties to the Simla Confernce in 1913-14 were Britain, China and Tibet (yes, Tibet!) and they were represented by their Ambassadors Plenipotentiaries (that is, authorised to enter into negotiations on soverign basis and to conclude agreements). The credentials were checked by each and were accepted and the Conference began. After about 8 moths of negotiations, the draft agreement was tabled on 22nd April 1914 and was signed/initialled by the three Plenipotentiaries on 25th April 1914. The Simla Convention was repudiated by China on 27th April 1914. Thereupon, with the full knowledge of the Chinese Ambassador, Mr. Ivan Chen, the bi-partite Anglo-Tibetan Agreement including the provision on the McMahon Line was signed on 3rd July 1914. At no stage during the deliberations on the Simla Agreement of April 1914 or the Anglo-Tibetan Agreement of July 1914 or the even in the months and years that followed did Mr. Chen or the Chiense Foreign Office raise any objections to the Mcmahon Line. These are matters of record, supported by official documents. For authentication, one may refer to Dr. Alastair Lamb's volumes on the McMahon Line, Dorothy Woodman's "Himalayan Frontiers", Margaret Fisher & Robert Huttenback's "Himanlayan Battleground" and Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh's "Himalayan Triangle". For those seriously interested, further references may be furnished as to what the then Chinese President and the Chinese Foreign Ministry said or did (or failed to say or do)with respect to the Sino-Indian border and specifically about the McMahon Line in the following months and years. It is high time that the main article was thoroughly reviwed on the basis of published documents about the Simla Conference of 1913-14 and the McMahon Line that emerged from it. Pidiji ( talk) 02:47, 6 September 2012 (UTC)
Thanks for the PRC correction. To help improve the authenticity and therefore the credibility of the article, further corrections would be useful and I suggest a few for the section "Drawing the Line" - (1) Tawang is not "Tibetan territory" but is the site of an important Tibetan Lamaist monastery around which some estates of the landed gentry of Tibet came up. This was admitted by the Tibetan Plenipotentiary to the Simla Convention in 1913-14; (2) The point about the "Outer Line" along the Himalayan foothills is entirely erroneous as the Bengal Frontier Regulations of 1873 had an "Inner Line" more or less along the foothills (depending on the sector)as there were frequent clashes between the tribals of that area and the local cultivators, with looting and burning, and the Inner Line was an administrative measure to prevent any such clashes. The "Outer Line" was more or less according to the alignment given in the McMahon Line, as may be seen from the surveys conducted around that time and incorporated in the Survey of India map of 1874 that roughly covers the area between Longitudes 87 Deg. 50 mins. East to 96 Deg. East and Latitudes 34 deg. 20 mins North to 28 deg. 20 mins North;Tawang is shown at approx. 92 deg. 30 mins.Longitude, 27 deg. 30 mins. North.(3) It is true that Tibet refused to accept the Sikkim boundary drawn up between Britain and China and that really shows up that as sovereign or suzerain China could not make Tibet agree (irrespective of the merit or demerit of that boundary). (4) Younghusband did have a Treaty in 1904 with Tibetan officials with all the necessary seals (the Dalai Lama had escaped to Mongolia at that time, but that is a different story)and this Treaty was recognised in the subsequent Treaty between China and Britain with respect to the trading posts within Tibet and facilities for British officials manning the Trading posts (incidentally these facilities continued up to 1954, when independent India relinquished these posts in a fresh Treaty with PRC), (5) the pillage, looting and burning by the Chinese forces under Chou-Erh-feng in the eastern boundary areas on Tibet between 1910-12 was enough to make Tibet realise the usefulness of having peace and stability in that area and she now possibly felt that Britiain could play a moderating/mediating role - hence the Simla Conference in 1913. The principal aim of the Simla Conference was to settle the eastern boundary of Tibet with China in the middle of claims and counter-claims over that border. The rest is history. One could go on and on but it is requested that reliance may be made at least on Dr. Alastair Lamb, Dorothy Woodman and Margaret Fisher's books to give some solid credibility to the article and sections. Pidiji ( talk) 02:20, 7 September 2012 (UTC)
As far as records indicate, the people in and around Tawang used to give donations for the upkeep of the Tawang monastery and this was admitted as such in course of the Simla Conference of 1913-14 by Lochen Satra, Ambassador Plenipotentiary of Tibet, and again later by the Tibetan authorities (prior to 1950. There are several books by scholars on the deliberations at Simla and later British-Tibetan exchanges. Such donations and gifts may be distinguished from taxes and tributes - Pidiji ( talk) 02:44, 12 September 2012 (UTC)
Usually when there are such claims and counter-claims being made, the balance of evidence has to be examined as also any understandings or clarifications accepted by both sides, here British India and later India, and Tibet, up to 1950. There are two aspects, one the donations, contributions, gifts etc. made by the local people for the upkeep of the Tawang monastery and education and training of the lamas, and the other, some agricultural holdings by Tibetans near and around Tawang (it would be appreciated that apart from traditional and customary acceptance of the frontier, it had not been specifically designated or delineated - far less demarcated - in 1908) and the taxes if any imposed on them. That may have been the situation in 1908 when Capt. Lightfoot visited the area. However, in 1914 at the Simla Conference, this aspect of status of Tibetan landholders in Tawang was discussed and sorted out between Sir Henry McMahon and Lonchen Satra, the Tibetan Ambassador, by exchange of notes (as any authoritative account of the Simla Conference will show up) and this understanding was also accepted later by the Tsona Dzongpon of Tibet. Pidiji ( talk) 01:27, 13 September 2012 (UTC)
It was signed by Sir Henry McMahon and Lonchen Satra on behalf of the Tibetan Government and was clearly accepted by the Tibetian government as per references. 171.76.52.67 ( talk) 21:59, 26 May 2017 (UTC)
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There is an RfC about the definition of the McMahon Line here. — MarkH21 talk 09:28, 21 July 2020 (UTC)
Here is the Survey of India map of 1888, which counts as an official map of India. Where is the "Outer Line"? -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 22:52, 10 August 2021 (UTC)
Ok, even granting that the line shown here is the "Outer Line", the map says "Boundary undefined" in 1888, whereas the sources claim that it was fully laid out in 1873 or 1875. So something still doesn't fit. -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 21:59, 11 August 2021 (UTC)
It is important to note that just to the east of Bhutan was the Tawang tract. Tawang was a part of Tibet but the people who lived there were Bhutanese who were influenced by Tawang Buddhism and not tribal people. The foot of the hill was a trading zone, called Kariapar duar, that was not wholly part of the Ahom kingdom. So this tract did not become a part of British India till about the 1840s. The main point is that not all those who lived north of the outer line were tribal people. Chaipau ( talk) 16:30, 12 August 2021 (UTC)
Chaipau, I am afraid the edits you have been making to the lead bit by bit [13] are not satisfactory and do not follow what the sources state. For example,
I should also say that you are also exhibiting a WP:Lead fixation on this page. -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 05:12, 21 August 2021 (UTC)
The long and short of it was that by 25 March the 'Red Line' on McMahon's map had been settled), but the major point is that the McMahon line is defined as the "red line" settled on 25 March 1914. The lead that I used
The McMahon Line is the demarcation between British India and Tibet settled between the respective plenipotentiaries Henry McMahon and Lonchen Shatra on 24 March 1914 in Delhi amidst the 1914 Simla Convention.is in alignment with both RfC as well as Mehra p.233. Your preference,
The McMahon Line is the demarcation line agreed between Tibet and British Raj as part of the 1914 Simla Convention, separating their respective spheres of influence in the eastern Himalayan region along northeast India and northern Burma (Myanmar).OTOH has a number of problems. It specifies "spheres of influence" (leave contentious matters to later) and "northeast India" and "northern Myanmar" (these are post colonial formations---there was no northeast India then, just Assam).
The Republic of China was not a party to the agreement,[3] but its representative had agreed the overall boundary of Tibet, which included the McMahon Linein the lead seems to suggest that China had accepted the McMahon line—which is not true because even though the Chinese plenipotentiary had initialed the map including the McMahon line, the Chinese government did not accept it. When McMahon drew the line on the map the war was still a half century away and the bigger concerns were Russia, China and Tea from the British perspectives and in this context the British tried to use Tibet as a buffer. The McMahon line was essentially a British line on a map, and it was the product of these British perspectives. Finally, it was the product of a series of discussions between Charles Bell and Lonchem Shatra, in which Tibet intriguingly gave up its claim to Tawang but continued to collect taxes. Unlike what you suggest, it is the Sino-Indian War which is giving this article the "tunnel vision".
I was to try to induce him (the Amir) to stand back behind a certain line: that is to say, he was to agree that he would not interfere beyond a certain line. It by no means followed that we were to advance up to that line. We were, however, free to do so if we saw fit; he was not to interfere with us. [1]
It is necessary to underline that the [Chinese] Minister's protest did not concern itself with the ML boundary: a graphic representation[8] bears out clearly that its preoccupation was with the contours which the Chinese wanted etched as between Inner and Outer Tibet. [2]
References
@ Kautilya3: you moved back the "sphere of influence" sentence to the first paragraph, without giving a proper edit summary. If you object to my reason for moving it to the second paragraph please say so explicitly. I stated clearly why it should not be in the lead. Chaipau ( talk) 21:30, 22 August 2021 (UTC)
In this phrase from the sentence—"The line was intended to delimit the respective spheres of influence of the two countries
in the eastern Himalayan region along northeast India and northern Burma (Myanmar)"—the impression is that we are dealing with the two independent countries. British India and Tibet. But did the British at that point consider Tibet to be independent? It obviously did not (Mehra 1974, p29-30ff).
Chaipau (
talk)
11:48, 23 August 2021 (UTC)
Somewhere in the middle of 1913, the Army Department in India submitted a ‘ Note on the Military Frontier on the North-east ’ wherein it endorsed, for most part, the Chief of the General Staff’s earlier recommendations. Opportunity, however, was taken to stress, inter alia, the maxim that a mountain-barrier is a ‘satisfactory’ military frontier, that owing to the Chinese disposition to expand in the direction of Burma and Assam, the frontier to the east of Bhutan was more important than to its west. Again, the ‘ideal’ to be aimed at in determining a frontier in mountainous country, was that
the line chosen should follow some prominent geographical feature, preferably the main watershed of the mountain system and...to facilitate effective occupation if necessary, the communications upto the frontier should be such as to afford reasonable access to the line selected. A lateral communication running parallel to and a short distance to the rear of the frontier is also a considerable asset.
Kautilya3 when you inserted the citation Mehra 1974, p225, the quote you cited had ellipses [15] The text you had omitted is crucial and it changed the entire meaning of the cite. This is the entire quote, with the part you left out highlighted:
there was no intention of 'administering' the country 'within the proposed frontier line' much less of undertaking 'military operations' in the area in question. And yet,
as Chinese incursions at Hpimaw had demonstrated,it was 'desirable' to maintain some semblance of authority that could be backed by force, 'if necessary'.
As you can see, the entire meaning of this citation changes when we quote fully. I have changed the text to bring it in alignment with the full quote [16].
This is also a request to you not to cite selectively and misrepresent sources.
Chaipau ( talk) 14:26, 23 August 2021 (UTC)
yet it was felt that they fell within the sphere of British influence. So the British felt they had a sphere of influence? I can see that you are struggling to get a citation to support the "sphere of influence" claim, from Crewe to Mehra to Lamb, and have not found a satisfactory one yet. Chaipau ( talk) 17:35, 24 August 2021 (UTC) (edited) Chaipau ( talk) 17:47, 24 August 2021 (UTC)
understands the Government of India to mean an agreement as to the spheres, at present undefined. On 23 October 1913, Lord Crewe considered the spheres to be undefined. You cannot have undefined spheres of influences. Chaipau ( talk) 23:23, 24 August 2021 (UTC)
The term may refer to a political claim to exclusive control, which other nations may or may not recognize as a matter of fact, or it may refer to a legal agreement by which another state or states pledge themselves to refrain from interference within the sphere of influence. It is in the latter, legal significance that the term first gained currency in the 1880s when the colonial expansion of the European powers in Africa and Asia was nearing its completion. The last stage of that expansion was characterized by the endeavour of all major colonial powers to carry on the mutual competition for colonies peacefully through agreed-upon procedures. Agreements on spheres of influence served this purpose.So if you are using sphere of influence, then you will need to have a boundary. BTW, the British did not have any influence in the Tawang Tract before 1914 (or even after for a while). That was why the boundary was important. Chaipau ( talk) 01:57, 25 August 2021 (UTC) (edited) 02:21, 25 August 2021 (UTC)
I have added "hitherto undefined" to bring the sentence in alignment with Crewe's quote, where he says "at present undefined". Chaipau ( talk) 11:12, 25 August 2021 (UTC)
@ Kautilya3: if you disagree with the change I have made here we will go the DR route. Chaipau ( talk) 13:33, 25 August 2021 (UTC)
@ Kautilya3: This part is problematic: "along northeast India and northern Burma (Myanmar)". This is because there was nothing called Northeast India in 1914. In fact the definition of Northeast India, as we understand it now, depends on the McMahon line. In time, McMahon line came first and then Northeast India. Furthermore none of the citations mention this either. So I propose,the following sentence should be: "The line was intended to delimit the respective spheres of influence of the two countries, hitherto undefined, in the eastern Himalayan region." Do you have an objection to this? I have already made the changes [18]. Do you have a problem with that? Chaipau ( talk) 16:15, 25 August 2021 (UTC)
This entire article needs a rewrite but I am keen to hear what issues Chaipau take with the current version — arguably, the busiest page on my watchlist for last few days. TrangaBellam ( talk) 21:17, 26 August 2021 (UTC)
An editor called Kauffner (long gone) added this sentence:
In the 1950s, India-China relations were cordial and the boundary dispute quiet. Indian Prime Minister Nehru promoted the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (India and China are brothers).
The citation was given was Maxwell's India's China War, which says only "But in the middle 1950s, when resentment and alarm at the assertion of Chinese authority in Tibet had died down, the policy and slogan of Hindee Chinee bhai-bhai, or India-China brotherhood, became popular in India.
." There is no mention of who promoted it. Moreover, the context makes clear that the slogan arose during Zhou En-lai's visit to India in 1954, after signing the
Sino-Indian Agreement 1954.
The current text says:
In the 1950s, when India-China relations were cordial and the boundary dispute quiet, the Indian government under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru promoted the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai.
and the citation is gone. I suppose the weakening of Nehru as the originator of the slogan to "Indian government under Nehru" as the originator, is in the right direction. But the alleged involvement of Nehru in the slogan is still unsourced. A book review of Maxwell's book says:
He [Maxwell] has seriously and with significant data questioned the popular view that Prime Minister Nehru was taken in by the slogan of Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai [Indians and Chinese are brothers] and did not wake up to the Chinese danger until it was too late. [1]
This implies that Nehru was not a party to the slogan. We need more clarity on this issue. -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 18:10, 7 March 2022 (UTC)
References
An editor Rigley added in 2010:
Zhou Enlai offered to accept the McMahon Line in 1956, but only in the context of border negotiations as equals, because simply accepting the British boundary would leave the stigma of the unequal treaty and hurt Chinese pride. But Nehru maintained his 1950 statement that he would not accept negotiations if China brought the boundary dispute up, hoping that "China would accept the fait accompli. [1]
The term "fait accompli" appears in the source on page 100:
Upon further consultations with defense minister Krishna Menon and K. M. Pannikkar, Indian ambassador to China, Nehru decided that India would refuse to subject the border question to serious negotiation even if the Chinese did raise it,[4: Maxwell, "Un-negotiated Dispute", 50] in the hope that China would have no recourse but to accept the fait accompli. Preoccupied with consolidating their rule and socializing the economy, the Chinese Communist leadership did not pursue the boundary question until Premier Zhou Enlai raised that issue on his first visit to New Delhi in 1956. [2]
The italised text following the citation to Maxwell is clearly the scholar's personal interpretation. I can't see how it can be attributed to Nehru's supposed intention, as if it were a fact. Did Nehru write anything or say anything that he was "hoping for a fait accompli"?
Secondly, Maxwell cannot be taken as the sole authority on the subject. He was a journalist that reported publicly available information, padded it with his own interpretations. Scholars who have done archival research state that K. M. Panikkar, who was India's ambassador to China, was instructed to raise the border issue with Zhou En-lai, but he found Zhou reluctant to discuss it. After Panikkar returned to India, he briefed Nehru and gave him his view that India had to wait until Zhou was ready to discuss, and this view was accepted (at least by Nehru). [3] During the 1954 negotations, Zhou made it a point to underscore that only "matters that were ripe for settlement" would be negotiated, thereby implying that border would not to be discussed, and indeed it wasn't. [4] [5] [6]
Regarding the 1956 discussions, what is claimed in the text is not in the source. Chung says:
According to Nehru’s subsequent account, Zhou Enlai informed him at their summit in 1956 that China was prepared to accept the McMahon Line.[6] As Zhou was to repudiate this position in a later correspondence with Nehru, it seems clear that his offer was forthcoming only in the context of comprehensive boundary negotiations between the governments. [2]
Maxwell has explained that Zhou's 1956 observation was in the context of the border with Burma (Myanmar), when, in Nehru's account of this conversation, Chou En-lai told him that China had accepted the McMahon Line as the boundary with Burma because, although 'this line, established by the British imperialists, was not fair... it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of the opinion that they should give recognition to this McMahon Line.'
[7]
This is all that we know. The rest is all scholars' interpreations.
As is clear, this was not an "offer", but rather a statement of policy, and Nehru honsestly believed that China would stick to it. -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 20:07, 7 March 2022 (UTC)
References
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This article depicts the McMahon Line primarily as a territorial dispute between China and India and the cause of the 1962 war, a view I can't agree with. Mao is on record as saying that the disputed territory was worthless [Auhtor: Could you point out a source for your strange claim?] If the Chinese had really thought the territory they occupied in 1962 was their's, they would not have withdrawn so quickly. I am sure they logistical problems and so forth, but I assume such problems were anticipated by Chinese military planners.
[The following is entirely personal biased view] The purpose of the invasion of 1962 was to enhance the prestige of China and the Maoists by giving some foreigners a beating. It kicked off a propaganda campaign which glorified the Chinese army and Lin Biao, at that time China's defense minister and Mao's intended successor.
Why did Mao picked India and not some other country? Aside from the obvious (military opportunity), India was a prominent Soviet ally and China had recently broken with the Soviets.
The only historically Tibetan town south of the line is Tawang. Chinese maps show a large swath of Indian territory as "South Tibet" and therefore belonging to China, but this is sheer mapsmanship.
The McMahon Line is also significant for a reason not mentioned in the article: It was establish through a bilateral treaty between Britain and Tibet. Recognition of the line by Britain and India implies recognition of Tibet's power to concluded treaties at the time of the Simla Convention (1914).
Kauffner 14:02, 23 February 2006 (UTC)Kauffner
Its funny China doesnot recognize the already demarcated boundaries of countries it occupied i.e, Tibet and East Turkestan(Xinjiang), boundaries which these countries agreed to, as a result it squeezed thousands of square kilometeres out of land out of Pakistan, Nepal and soon to Bhutan. On the other side after the fall of soviet union it forced Kyrgyzstan and Kazkhstan to cede territory to China. India is the only country resisting so far, but china occupies Askai Chin as a result of 1962 war anyways, Aksai Chin has been a part of Ladakh for centuries. March 21, 2006 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.117.79.209 ( talk • contribs) 08:09, 22 March 2007
I have a few issues with recent edit by 219.79.122.73. First off, the gist seems to be that not only was China always right, but everyone else knew it. By the end of the article, you're wondering if there is any real dispute.
This article is written from an extremely Sino centric point of view and needs to be cleaned up
--> "cleaned up"? In my opinion we can offer the two points of view, saying that are two points of view (from India and from China). The things about which all people agree, we can write them in the first part. Why always "clean up" things?
Several editors of this page seem to have relied on unreliable sources of modern Chinese history, most notably Jung Chang (see Mao: the Unknown Story for details for problems with her works). While some of these views are commonly espoused, it is a grave WP:NPOV error to present them as facts. For example, Mao starting a war to groom his successor is almost purely speculation, and should be presented as such. -- PalaceGuard008 ( Talk) 06:34, 12 November 2007 (UTC)
I have restored a suppresed text citing Jung Chang. -- Rédacteur Tibet ( talk) —Preceding comment was added at 11:18, 12 April 2008 (UTC)
does anyone have a map of exactly here the line is? an indian map has all the borders, how am one suppose to know which part is part is covered by the line? Akinkhoo ( talk) 10:32, 2 April 2008 (UTC)
New section called "British Discards the McMahon Line" has started under History section. Due to British's policy change in Oct 2008, this entry has to be updated to reflect the change. The section includes British's policy change, and some of its implications. If anyone wants to change it, please bring the change up here for discussion first. Thanks. Xingdong ( talk) 04:31, 24 March 2009 (UTC)
The phrase
Line of Actual Control comes from a 1959 diplomatic message by Zhou Enlai to Nehru. Zhou defined the LAC as "the so-called McMahon Line in the east and the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west."
[1] The LAC therefore pre-dates the 1962 war and is at a fixed location. If India goes north of the line or China south, the line stays where it is.
Many authors more prominent than Robert Barnett have commented on this subject over the years. To put his comments in the lede is both
WP:UNDUE and
WP:RECENTISM.
Kauffner (
talk)
04:29, 6 June 2009 (UTC)
Do you have a reference for this claim? "LAC" was just Zhou's name for the McMahon Line. Kauffner ( talk) 04:16, 12 June 2009 (UTC)
The article seems to echo the Chinese contention. SDas ( talk) 07:25, 2 October 2009 (UTC)
From one extreme we falled into another extreme. Some edits made earlier are nothing but typical Indian side's wishful thinking. For example, I replaced "...1962, when Indian and Chinese forces struggled to control the state of Arunachal Pradesh" because AP didn't exist until 1972.
Political motivation shall have no place here. MainBody ( talk) 09:00, 2 November 2009 (UTC)
It did exist, and it had a different name "North-Eastern Frontier Angency" But we are supposed to use the current names. Like Mumbai and not Bombay. -- HFret ( talk) 13:35, 2 November 2009 (UTC)
I see zero credibility on the above "answere", AP is the institutional name for a political establishment which has no pre-1971 historical root, as you said it is the "State of AP". And no evidence shows it existed before 1971, neither geographic nor political. (Or you can show us any pre-1972 document which uses this name.)
FYI, the name of AP is nothing but Indian unilateral invention. I believe the Chinese side still officially regarded it as South Tibet. Charles Bell even call the Simla Convention invalid becasue of non-existence of Chinese and Russian signatures. (Goldstein, 1989)
We want professional editorship instead of baseless original research. MainBody ( talk) 01:10, 3 November 2009 (UTC)
Me too! (I totally agree with you for once) -- HFret ( talk) 01:28, 3 November 2009 (UTC)
Therefore, per WP policy I with no doubts revert the Oct 2009 edits including the undiscussed/no-consensus wordings of "international boundary"[etc] and recovering the original term "Line".
Undiscussed edits include:
User:HFret is once again urged to provide third-party sources claiming the existence of the "State of Arunachal Pradesh" in the 1960s. Indian propaganda does't count.
For the definition of "vandalism", read WP:VANDAL. - MainBody ( talk) 10:11, 3 November 2009 (UTC)
OK.. as I have no evidence... all hail Main-Body! Haha! roflol XD -- HFret ( talk) 12:17, 4 November 2009 (UTC)
Various changes by an IP here, but no additional sources or discussion to justify them. This was added: "However, the Chinese delegate also signed the McMahon line map part of the treaty, hence making it legal from even this point of view " Says who? This was removed: "Simla (along with the McMahon Line) was initially rejected by the British-run Government of India as incompatible with the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention." This convention was renounced in 1921. After Simla, the McMahon Line was forgotten until 1935, when British civil service officer Olaf Caroe convinced the government to publish the Simla Convention and use the McMahon Line on official maps." Some cruft was added to the top of the article: "The Chinese eventually withdrew." (no context) Kauffner ( talk) 04:43, 17 June 2011 (UTC)
Practical significance of the McMahon Line—— McMahon Line is neither "official boundary" nor "effective boundary" and even the line of actual control not. It is roughly the same line of actual control, India's unilateral claim of the border.-- 天下第一菜 ( talk) 02:23, 28 January 2012 (UTC)
The main article and the sub-heading "Drawing the Line" is almost surreal. The main article in the first line states "Tibet which was not the official representative of the Peoples Republic of China". Of course Tibet was not then "the representative of the PRC", because the PRC did not exist before October 1949!! Then the second paragraph states that Sir Henry McMahon wad the Foreign Secretary - he was not. Then it is stated the McMahon Line was found contrary to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and in 1921 it was "renounced". Does this refer to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 or the Simla Convention of 1914? Renounced by whom and on what authority? The three parties to the Simla Confernce in 1913-14 were Britain, China and Tibet (yes, Tibet!) and they were represented by their Ambassadors Plenipotentiaries (that is, authorised to enter into negotiations on soverign basis and to conclude agreements). The credentials were checked by each and were accepted and the Conference began. After about 8 moths of negotiations, the draft agreement was tabled on 22nd April 1914 and was signed/initialled by the three Plenipotentiaries on 25th April 1914. The Simla Convention was repudiated by China on 27th April 1914. Thereupon, with the full knowledge of the Chinese Ambassador, Mr. Ivan Chen, the bi-partite Anglo-Tibetan Agreement including the provision on the McMahon Line was signed on 3rd July 1914. At no stage during the deliberations on the Simla Agreement of April 1914 or the Anglo-Tibetan Agreement of July 1914 or the even in the months and years that followed did Mr. Chen or the Chiense Foreign Office raise any objections to the Mcmahon Line. These are matters of record, supported by official documents. For authentication, one may refer to Dr. Alastair Lamb's volumes on the McMahon Line, Dorothy Woodman's "Himalayan Frontiers", Margaret Fisher & Robert Huttenback's "Himanlayan Battleground" and Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh's "Himalayan Triangle". For those seriously interested, further references may be furnished as to what the then Chinese President and the Chinese Foreign Ministry said or did (or failed to say or do)with respect to the Sino-Indian border and specifically about the McMahon Line in the following months and years. It is high time that the main article was thoroughly reviwed on the basis of published documents about the Simla Conference of 1913-14 and the McMahon Line that emerged from it. Pidiji ( talk) 02:47, 6 September 2012 (UTC)
Thanks for the PRC correction. To help improve the authenticity and therefore the credibility of the article, further corrections would be useful and I suggest a few for the section "Drawing the Line" - (1) Tawang is not "Tibetan territory" but is the site of an important Tibetan Lamaist monastery around which some estates of the landed gentry of Tibet came up. This was admitted by the Tibetan Plenipotentiary to the Simla Convention in 1913-14; (2) The point about the "Outer Line" along the Himalayan foothills is entirely erroneous as the Bengal Frontier Regulations of 1873 had an "Inner Line" more or less along the foothills (depending on the sector)as there were frequent clashes between the tribals of that area and the local cultivators, with looting and burning, and the Inner Line was an administrative measure to prevent any such clashes. The "Outer Line" was more or less according to the alignment given in the McMahon Line, as may be seen from the surveys conducted around that time and incorporated in the Survey of India map of 1874 that roughly covers the area between Longitudes 87 Deg. 50 mins. East to 96 Deg. East and Latitudes 34 deg. 20 mins North to 28 deg. 20 mins North;Tawang is shown at approx. 92 deg. 30 mins.Longitude, 27 deg. 30 mins. North.(3) It is true that Tibet refused to accept the Sikkim boundary drawn up between Britain and China and that really shows up that as sovereign or suzerain China could not make Tibet agree (irrespective of the merit or demerit of that boundary). (4) Younghusband did have a Treaty in 1904 with Tibetan officials with all the necessary seals (the Dalai Lama had escaped to Mongolia at that time, but that is a different story)and this Treaty was recognised in the subsequent Treaty between China and Britain with respect to the trading posts within Tibet and facilities for British officials manning the Trading posts (incidentally these facilities continued up to 1954, when independent India relinquished these posts in a fresh Treaty with PRC), (5) the pillage, looting and burning by the Chinese forces under Chou-Erh-feng in the eastern boundary areas on Tibet between 1910-12 was enough to make Tibet realise the usefulness of having peace and stability in that area and she now possibly felt that Britiain could play a moderating/mediating role - hence the Simla Conference in 1913. The principal aim of the Simla Conference was to settle the eastern boundary of Tibet with China in the middle of claims and counter-claims over that border. The rest is history. One could go on and on but it is requested that reliance may be made at least on Dr. Alastair Lamb, Dorothy Woodman and Margaret Fisher's books to give some solid credibility to the article and sections. Pidiji ( talk) 02:20, 7 September 2012 (UTC)
As far as records indicate, the people in and around Tawang used to give donations for the upkeep of the Tawang monastery and this was admitted as such in course of the Simla Conference of 1913-14 by Lochen Satra, Ambassador Plenipotentiary of Tibet, and again later by the Tibetan authorities (prior to 1950. There are several books by scholars on the deliberations at Simla and later British-Tibetan exchanges. Such donations and gifts may be distinguished from taxes and tributes - Pidiji ( talk) 02:44, 12 September 2012 (UTC)
Usually when there are such claims and counter-claims being made, the balance of evidence has to be examined as also any understandings or clarifications accepted by both sides, here British India and later India, and Tibet, up to 1950. There are two aspects, one the donations, contributions, gifts etc. made by the local people for the upkeep of the Tawang monastery and education and training of the lamas, and the other, some agricultural holdings by Tibetans near and around Tawang (it would be appreciated that apart from traditional and customary acceptance of the frontier, it had not been specifically designated or delineated - far less demarcated - in 1908) and the taxes if any imposed on them. That may have been the situation in 1908 when Capt. Lightfoot visited the area. However, in 1914 at the Simla Conference, this aspect of status of Tibetan landholders in Tawang was discussed and sorted out between Sir Henry McMahon and Lonchen Satra, the Tibetan Ambassador, by exchange of notes (as any authoritative account of the Simla Conference will show up) and this understanding was also accepted later by the Tsona Dzongpon of Tibet. Pidiji ( talk) 01:27, 13 September 2012 (UTC)
It was signed by Sir Henry McMahon and Lonchen Satra on behalf of the Tibetan Government and was clearly accepted by the Tibetian government as per references. 171.76.52.67 ( talk) 21:59, 26 May 2017 (UTC)
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There is an RfC about the definition of the McMahon Line here. — MarkH21 talk 09:28, 21 July 2020 (UTC)
Here is the Survey of India map of 1888, which counts as an official map of India. Where is the "Outer Line"? -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 22:52, 10 August 2021 (UTC)
Ok, even granting that the line shown here is the "Outer Line", the map says "Boundary undefined" in 1888, whereas the sources claim that it was fully laid out in 1873 or 1875. So something still doesn't fit. -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 21:59, 11 August 2021 (UTC)
It is important to note that just to the east of Bhutan was the Tawang tract. Tawang was a part of Tibet but the people who lived there were Bhutanese who were influenced by Tawang Buddhism and not tribal people. The foot of the hill was a trading zone, called Kariapar duar, that was not wholly part of the Ahom kingdom. So this tract did not become a part of British India till about the 1840s. The main point is that not all those who lived north of the outer line were tribal people. Chaipau ( talk) 16:30, 12 August 2021 (UTC)
Chaipau, I am afraid the edits you have been making to the lead bit by bit [13] are not satisfactory and do not follow what the sources state. For example,
I should also say that you are also exhibiting a WP:Lead fixation on this page. -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 05:12, 21 August 2021 (UTC)
The long and short of it was that by 25 March the 'Red Line' on McMahon's map had been settled), but the major point is that the McMahon line is defined as the "red line" settled on 25 March 1914. The lead that I used
The McMahon Line is the demarcation between British India and Tibet settled between the respective plenipotentiaries Henry McMahon and Lonchen Shatra on 24 March 1914 in Delhi amidst the 1914 Simla Convention.is in alignment with both RfC as well as Mehra p.233. Your preference,
The McMahon Line is the demarcation line agreed between Tibet and British Raj as part of the 1914 Simla Convention, separating their respective spheres of influence in the eastern Himalayan region along northeast India and northern Burma (Myanmar).OTOH has a number of problems. It specifies "spheres of influence" (leave contentious matters to later) and "northeast India" and "northern Myanmar" (these are post colonial formations---there was no northeast India then, just Assam).
The Republic of China was not a party to the agreement,[3] but its representative had agreed the overall boundary of Tibet, which included the McMahon Linein the lead seems to suggest that China had accepted the McMahon line—which is not true because even though the Chinese plenipotentiary had initialed the map including the McMahon line, the Chinese government did not accept it. When McMahon drew the line on the map the war was still a half century away and the bigger concerns were Russia, China and Tea from the British perspectives and in this context the British tried to use Tibet as a buffer. The McMahon line was essentially a British line on a map, and it was the product of these British perspectives. Finally, it was the product of a series of discussions between Charles Bell and Lonchem Shatra, in which Tibet intriguingly gave up its claim to Tawang but continued to collect taxes. Unlike what you suggest, it is the Sino-Indian War which is giving this article the "tunnel vision".
I was to try to induce him (the Amir) to stand back behind a certain line: that is to say, he was to agree that he would not interfere beyond a certain line. It by no means followed that we were to advance up to that line. We were, however, free to do so if we saw fit; he was not to interfere with us. [1]
It is necessary to underline that the [Chinese] Minister's protest did not concern itself with the ML boundary: a graphic representation[8] bears out clearly that its preoccupation was with the contours which the Chinese wanted etched as between Inner and Outer Tibet. [2]
References
@ Kautilya3: you moved back the "sphere of influence" sentence to the first paragraph, without giving a proper edit summary. If you object to my reason for moving it to the second paragraph please say so explicitly. I stated clearly why it should not be in the lead. Chaipau ( talk) 21:30, 22 August 2021 (UTC)
In this phrase from the sentence—"The line was intended to delimit the respective spheres of influence of the two countries
in the eastern Himalayan region along northeast India and northern Burma (Myanmar)"—the impression is that we are dealing with the two independent countries. British India and Tibet. But did the British at that point consider Tibet to be independent? It obviously did not (Mehra 1974, p29-30ff).
Chaipau (
talk)
11:48, 23 August 2021 (UTC)
Somewhere in the middle of 1913, the Army Department in India submitted a ‘ Note on the Military Frontier on the North-east ’ wherein it endorsed, for most part, the Chief of the General Staff’s earlier recommendations. Opportunity, however, was taken to stress, inter alia, the maxim that a mountain-barrier is a ‘satisfactory’ military frontier, that owing to the Chinese disposition to expand in the direction of Burma and Assam, the frontier to the east of Bhutan was more important than to its west. Again, the ‘ideal’ to be aimed at in determining a frontier in mountainous country, was that
the line chosen should follow some prominent geographical feature, preferably the main watershed of the mountain system and...to facilitate effective occupation if necessary, the communications upto the frontier should be such as to afford reasonable access to the line selected. A lateral communication running parallel to and a short distance to the rear of the frontier is also a considerable asset.
Kautilya3 when you inserted the citation Mehra 1974, p225, the quote you cited had ellipses [15] The text you had omitted is crucial and it changed the entire meaning of the cite. This is the entire quote, with the part you left out highlighted:
there was no intention of 'administering' the country 'within the proposed frontier line' much less of undertaking 'military operations' in the area in question. And yet,
as Chinese incursions at Hpimaw had demonstrated,it was 'desirable' to maintain some semblance of authority that could be backed by force, 'if necessary'.
As you can see, the entire meaning of this citation changes when we quote fully. I have changed the text to bring it in alignment with the full quote [16].
This is also a request to you not to cite selectively and misrepresent sources.
Chaipau ( talk) 14:26, 23 August 2021 (UTC)
yet it was felt that they fell within the sphere of British influence. So the British felt they had a sphere of influence? I can see that you are struggling to get a citation to support the "sphere of influence" claim, from Crewe to Mehra to Lamb, and have not found a satisfactory one yet. Chaipau ( talk) 17:35, 24 August 2021 (UTC) (edited) Chaipau ( talk) 17:47, 24 August 2021 (UTC)
understands the Government of India to mean an agreement as to the spheres, at present undefined. On 23 October 1913, Lord Crewe considered the spheres to be undefined. You cannot have undefined spheres of influences. Chaipau ( talk) 23:23, 24 August 2021 (UTC)
The term may refer to a political claim to exclusive control, which other nations may or may not recognize as a matter of fact, or it may refer to a legal agreement by which another state or states pledge themselves to refrain from interference within the sphere of influence. It is in the latter, legal significance that the term first gained currency in the 1880s when the colonial expansion of the European powers in Africa and Asia was nearing its completion. The last stage of that expansion was characterized by the endeavour of all major colonial powers to carry on the mutual competition for colonies peacefully through agreed-upon procedures. Agreements on spheres of influence served this purpose.So if you are using sphere of influence, then you will need to have a boundary. BTW, the British did not have any influence in the Tawang Tract before 1914 (or even after for a while). That was why the boundary was important. Chaipau ( talk) 01:57, 25 August 2021 (UTC) (edited) 02:21, 25 August 2021 (UTC)
I have added "hitherto undefined" to bring the sentence in alignment with Crewe's quote, where he says "at present undefined". Chaipau ( talk) 11:12, 25 August 2021 (UTC)
@ Kautilya3: if you disagree with the change I have made here we will go the DR route. Chaipau ( talk) 13:33, 25 August 2021 (UTC)
@ Kautilya3: This part is problematic: "along northeast India and northern Burma (Myanmar)". This is because there was nothing called Northeast India in 1914. In fact the definition of Northeast India, as we understand it now, depends on the McMahon line. In time, McMahon line came first and then Northeast India. Furthermore none of the citations mention this either. So I propose,the following sentence should be: "The line was intended to delimit the respective spheres of influence of the two countries, hitherto undefined, in the eastern Himalayan region." Do you have an objection to this? I have already made the changes [18]. Do you have a problem with that? Chaipau ( talk) 16:15, 25 August 2021 (UTC)
This entire article needs a rewrite but I am keen to hear what issues Chaipau take with the current version — arguably, the busiest page on my watchlist for last few days. TrangaBellam ( talk) 21:17, 26 August 2021 (UTC)
An editor called Kauffner (long gone) added this sentence:
In the 1950s, India-China relations were cordial and the boundary dispute quiet. Indian Prime Minister Nehru promoted the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (India and China are brothers).
The citation was given was Maxwell's India's China War, which says only "But in the middle 1950s, when resentment and alarm at the assertion of Chinese authority in Tibet had died down, the policy and slogan of Hindee Chinee bhai-bhai, or India-China brotherhood, became popular in India.
." There is no mention of who promoted it. Moreover, the context makes clear that the slogan arose during Zhou En-lai's visit to India in 1954, after signing the
Sino-Indian Agreement 1954.
The current text says:
In the 1950s, when India-China relations were cordial and the boundary dispute quiet, the Indian government under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru promoted the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai.
and the citation is gone. I suppose the weakening of Nehru as the originator of the slogan to "Indian government under Nehru" as the originator, is in the right direction. But the alleged involvement of Nehru in the slogan is still unsourced. A book review of Maxwell's book says:
He [Maxwell] has seriously and with significant data questioned the popular view that Prime Minister Nehru was taken in by the slogan of Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai [Indians and Chinese are brothers] and did not wake up to the Chinese danger until it was too late. [1]
This implies that Nehru was not a party to the slogan. We need more clarity on this issue. -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 18:10, 7 March 2022 (UTC)
References
An editor Rigley added in 2010:
Zhou Enlai offered to accept the McMahon Line in 1956, but only in the context of border negotiations as equals, because simply accepting the British boundary would leave the stigma of the unequal treaty and hurt Chinese pride. But Nehru maintained his 1950 statement that he would not accept negotiations if China brought the boundary dispute up, hoping that "China would accept the fait accompli. [1]
The term "fait accompli" appears in the source on page 100:
Upon further consultations with defense minister Krishna Menon and K. M. Pannikkar, Indian ambassador to China, Nehru decided that India would refuse to subject the border question to serious negotiation even if the Chinese did raise it,[4: Maxwell, "Un-negotiated Dispute", 50] in the hope that China would have no recourse but to accept the fait accompli. Preoccupied with consolidating their rule and socializing the economy, the Chinese Communist leadership did not pursue the boundary question until Premier Zhou Enlai raised that issue on his first visit to New Delhi in 1956. [2]
The italised text following the citation to Maxwell is clearly the scholar's personal interpretation. I can't see how it can be attributed to Nehru's supposed intention, as if it were a fact. Did Nehru write anything or say anything that he was "hoping for a fait accompli"?
Secondly, Maxwell cannot be taken as the sole authority on the subject. He was a journalist that reported publicly available information, padded it with his own interpretations. Scholars who have done archival research state that K. M. Panikkar, who was India's ambassador to China, was instructed to raise the border issue with Zhou En-lai, but he found Zhou reluctant to discuss it. After Panikkar returned to India, he briefed Nehru and gave him his view that India had to wait until Zhou was ready to discuss, and this view was accepted (at least by Nehru). [3] During the 1954 negotations, Zhou made it a point to underscore that only "matters that were ripe for settlement" would be negotiated, thereby implying that border would not to be discussed, and indeed it wasn't. [4] [5] [6]
Regarding the 1956 discussions, what is claimed in the text is not in the source. Chung says:
According to Nehru’s subsequent account, Zhou Enlai informed him at their summit in 1956 that China was prepared to accept the McMahon Line.[6] As Zhou was to repudiate this position in a later correspondence with Nehru, it seems clear that his offer was forthcoming only in the context of comprehensive boundary negotiations between the governments. [2]
Maxwell has explained that Zhou's 1956 observation was in the context of the border with Burma (Myanmar), when, in Nehru's account of this conversation, Chou En-lai told him that China had accepted the McMahon Line as the boundary with Burma because, although 'this line, established by the British imperialists, was not fair... it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of the opinion that they should give recognition to this McMahon Line.'
[7]
This is all that we know. The rest is all scholars' interpreations.
As is clear, this was not an "offer", but rather a statement of policy, and Nehru honsestly believed that China would stick to it. -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 20:07, 7 March 2022 (UTC)
References