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It has now been nearly three weeks without any references added to the completely unreferenced and in some cases incorrect Lead Maury had written, and without correction of the significant errors in the under-referenced Concepts section. There also has been no discussion on the Talk page about the many errors and omissions that have been pointed out in these sections, errors that were specifically listed in order to allow the contributing editor the opportunity to add references and fix the major errors that had been introduced. I have thus today replaced those sections with candidate new text which is fully referenced, and as far as I can tell from the references, also correct in its statements.
The candidate lead is four paragraphs that summarize the total article content. The form Newzild had edited it into was very brief “news format”, whereas policy specifies encyclopedic format of typically four paragraphs or less. It summarizes and weights the major issues as it is supposed to do. I left Maury’s major contention that some modern “light fighters” are modified trainers, but as this assertion is unreferenced I would assume we must find appropriate references or else take that out. I don’t know of any references on that point other than sales literature.
The Concept section, in addition to now being sound and referenced, is also considerably shorter than the “incorrect point” followed by “referenced counter-point” form that it has been in for several weeks while waiting for corrective edits. I did leave it in Maury’s preferred Advantages and Disadvantages form, just with the true and referenceable advantages and disadvantages presented. In the interest of encyclopedic compactness, I also reduce historical content and focused more on the general light fighter concept, with most discussion focused on the more important modern era. The historical thinking is adequately covered in the History sections.
My hope would be that these edits would be allowed to stand as a blueprint and plan, a sound foundation suitable for building upon. If so, they can then edited into final form by a team effort. If we do that I believe we will have an article worthy of promotion well above the current “Start Class” level. The material is strategically important and very militarily interesting, and could allow this article to proceed all the way to Feature Article status.
Maury, I made these edits with only two insertions. You can revert them both without violating 3RR. However, if you do then we should enter into the Discussion part of the BRD cycle. Even if you don’t revert, we are overdue for discussion and team effort in improving this article for promotion. I'm not trying to do unilateral editing here. But, in the absence of necessary error correction and referencing that I have been waiting several weeks for, I'm trying to put a sound foundation in place that can be edited from here into an excellent article. We can't get there without discussion and attracting strong editors to work on the article, people like Graeme, who in my opinion are limiting their input because they don't want to do the work only to have it unilaterally written over without discussion and teamwork. PhaseAcer ( talk) 17:48, 25 October 2016 (UTC)
NOTE ON LENGTH:
The article is now 8,281 words to cover all of light fighter concepts and history.
The article on the Northrop F-5 light fighter is 14,024 words, for just one plane. PhaseAcer ( talk) 00:24, 26 October 2016 (UTC)
I have removed most of the text added by PhaseAcer because of big problems with WP:WEIGHT (irony acknowledged) and WP:SYNTH. PhaseAcer is insisting that the P-51 was America's first light fighter but it was never given that label until Sprey came along to argue his minor viewpoint about modern air warfare. Sprey wants to validate his views and he changes history to do so. By far the majority of sources talking about the P-51 Mustang establish it as a standard pursuit fighter which was designed to be somewhat lighter and faster than its opponents. Binksternet ( talk) 01:22, 22 December 2019 (UTC)
Ok, Without using a wall of text, provide references with page numbers that unequivocally describe specific world war 2 fighters as "light or lightweight fighters" (per the context of this article), without any additional commentary from you on how to interpret the source. ( Hohum @) 00:14, 24 December 2019 (UTC)
Hohum: Here is a little more detail for you on your request for specific references on efficient single engine WWII fighters being lightweight fighters. In "Messerschmitt Bf 109 Versions B-E, Cross and Scarborough, on pages 8 and 56 are direct statements that it was conceived and designed as a lightweight fighter. The rest of chapter 5 from pages 56 to 73 is devoted to the design trade-offs and methods used to achieve the lightweight fighter design requirement. They were just as extreme as the designers of the Zero were, for example avoiding self sealing tanks and using centrally mounted weapons and the minimum necessary quantity of weapons to allow the lightest structure and highest agility. Though the fighter effectiveness criteria was not formalized until the 1960's, the designers of the P-51, Bf-109, Zero, and F8F Bearcat were all intentionally designing lightweight fighters (other direct references above) and had an intuitive understanding of lightweight fighter virtues. From "The Pentagon Paradox", page 63: "The arguments for lightweight fighters --lower cost, greater performance, and increased numbers, were as relevant in World War II as they are today. Consequently, on the eve of World War II both the Army and the Navy were actively investigating the benefits of lightweight fighters." Author James Stevenson then quotes and even reprints primary WWII documentation showing this.
PhaseAcer (
talk)
05:46, 28 December 2019 (UTC)
I believe we have quite a credibility problem in some Wikipedia fighter aircraft articles, where in some cases important facts and authoritative references are being strongly suppressed, and in others fundamentally important false statements are allowed with no references at all. This occurs because of the power of local consensus, where it seems well referenced truth is swept under the rug if a few editors say so. Let me lay the history of this issue clearly on the table, and then ask my questions about this situation as it pertains to Wikipedia policy. I apologize for the length it takes to explain the full issues, but the pattern here has been many years in the making.
I have found the literature of fighter effectiveness to be an interesting area. This interest has led to me writing most of the material in the Light fighter article and also the fighter weapons section in the main Fighter aircraft article.
The fighter effectiveness criteria first formalized in the 1960’s is a way of evaluating likely fighter aircraft combat performance, and maximizing that performance in the design process. It was developed from military operations research as a professional way to architect fighters to deliver maximum kill ratios and combat return on budget investment. It contends that the design of fighters should emphasize (in order of importance) advantages in surprise (in 70% or more of shootdowns surprise is the dominant factor), numbers at the point of combat (lower cost, higher reliability, higher endurance), maneuverability (for that fraction of the time that surprise does not settle the issue), and weapons (meaning ability to reliably get split second kills when in position). This was the deliberate strategy of the F-16, now the world’s most popular fighter. It is also the reason the P-51 had such superior combat performance compared to the P-47 and P-38. The record shows it is a quite successful strategy, as might be expected when fundamental science and engineering are correctly applied.
As a design or engineering guide, this criteria tends to lead to smaller and more efficient fighter designs, though there can be specialized exceptions. In particular small size gives a strong advantage in that the fighter has a lower visual and radar profile, and statistically achieves surprise more often (this has been scientifically studied and reported on by both Navy Top Gun and the Air Force Fighter Weapons School, as well as many other advanced references). Smaller fighters also consume less of critical resources, and cost less (fighter cost is directly proportional to weight), so that the same budget buys more of them and increases the numbers advantage.
This has been reported extensively in the more professional fighter aircraft literature from the early 1980’s to now, with effectively zero literature that disagrees. In this literature the term “lightweight fighter” has come to be a synonym for lower cost / more efficient fighters that conform to the criteria. This actually started just before and during WWII, when the literature that discusses the issue reports that the designers of the P-51, Zero, Bf 109, and Bearcat all had the goal of designing specifically lightweight and efficient fighters that in a strategic sense satisfy the criteria. The fighter effectiveness criteria was not formalized then, but its basic features were understood before WWII. It was the foundation philosophy of Edgar Schmued, who was the design leader of the P-51, F-86, and F-5, and also of Willy Messerschmitt for the BF 109, and of Zero lead designer Jiro Horikoshi. Leroy Grumman, the founder of Grumman, then adopted this philosophy of fighter design for the F8F Bearcat. It continued through the USAF Lightweight Fighter Program that resulted in the F-16 and F-18, after which a large body of modern literature emphasizing it was published.
As an engineer, there is nothing mysterious or contentious about this to me. It is simply a useful design technique to optimize performance and return on investment, philosophically identical to the design optimization strategies of many other types of products. In an engineering and operations research sense here, it means putting guns and missiles in just the right place to score maximum kills for minimum resource expenditure. But, for some reason it is a very contentious subject to many Wikipedia military aviation editors. The struggles I had getting the facts and literature on this into the light fighter article four years ago were almost unbelievable. At that time the light fighter article had the false and unreferenced point of view that light fighters (the same thing as lightweight fighters in the modern literature) were rejected by military leaders, not successful in combat, and had fundamental weaknesses in performance, armament, and range (though the F-16 and P-51 had the longest range of any American fighters at the time they were introduced, and the lightest of the WWII bunch, the Zero, had longer range than the P-51). A large body of literature reported the opposite of what the light fighter article originally stated, so after bringing those references by the dozens I was finally able to tell the truth. Despite massive complaints about the material, no editor was ever able to bring a single counter-reference.
Part of that truth is that the references report light fighters to be efficient, almost always single engine fighters (the F-5 being the only significant exception) that by example tend to average about half the weight and cost of heavy usually twin-engine fighters (the P-47, F-105, and F-35 being large single engine exceptions). The literature does not define light fighters as being only at the very lowest weight of their era (like the Zero and the Folland Gnat), nor does it define “standard” fighters as strategically distinct from lightweight fighters. These are both the strong opinions of some editors, but those opinions are not based on any references that they are able to bring. I have over a hundred references on this subject, and I find no such statements.
Now we get to the current issue and how it bears on policy. I have been attempting to bring two paragraphs about the P-51 to the P-51 and Light fighter articles. One paragraph reports its design genesis as a specifically lightweight fighter in the strategic sense, which the references which deal with the issue directly report as its fundamental design strategy. Its design team considered it to be a conceptually lightweight fighter just as reported above, and throughout the program worked to bring out still lighter versions. The other paragraph was to report its combat results compared to the [P-47]] and P-38, which it excelled in kills per sortie, and far excelled in kills per dollar. Typically for a well-designed lightweight fighter, it was barely half the cost of its heavyweight escort fighter competitors, and achieved superior per plane combat results.
I have been blocked on doing this by several other editors, in particular Binksternet. The claim has been made that the P-51 is not a lightweight fighter in a strategic sense, and is instead a “standard fighter” (an undefined term), though this is the opposite of what the references that classify the P-51 directly say. The claim is also made that there are references that report this, but in my repeated requests to show those references, not a single such reference has been identified. In comparison, I have brought 5 strong references on P-51 classification as a lightweight (2 of them being design history references totally focused on the P-51), and several others that casually discuss it, along with a much larger body of literature about efficient fighters in general with the same defining features as the P-51. It is of course true that many references do not address the classification of the P-51, but references that do not address the issue at all are not references on the issue. As to the opposition to reporting the combat statistics, I can see no reason other than it makes the P-47 and the P-38 look bad. Unfortunately for their place in history, in comparison to the P-51, they were bad. The P-51 scored 5X the kills per dollar of the P-38, and if you take into account its superior bomber protection all the way to the target and back, its combat effect per dollar had to be more than 10X greater. As reported in the references, it saved the air war over Germany.
In comparison to this reference suppression, the Heavy fighter article, of which Binksternet is an active editor, makes false and completely unreferenced statements about the fundamental nature of heavy fighters. For example, it says “Although numerous modern fighters could be called "heavy", with regard to their weight, the term is generally no longer used. As missiles became the standard weapons for air combat any fighter of any size could be successful in combat against almost any target, making the distinction between heavy and light fighters less relevant.” This is the complete opposite of what a large body of literature, which is not referenced in the heavy fighter article, reports on the issue of light vs heavy. I have not seen a single counter-reference to this literature. And as for whether this distinction matters, the lightweight F-16 has gotten the better of the twice the cost heavy F-15 in every trial that has been made public. The references report the F-15 as excellent, but the F-16 as even better, for half the price. When you can buy a better air force for half the price, that certainly does matter a LOT to the people who sign the checks. Whole books, ignored in the heavy fighter article, are devoted to this subject. This is an issue where hundreds of billions of dollars and national security are actively at stake, so this unreferenced false statement that has been in place for years and is at complete odds with the literature could be considered as propaganda. In allowing this, it is clear there is a very non-neutral double standard in place.
That brings me to my questions.
1. Why is this highly non-neutral view in place among many editors on the issue of light vs. heavy? Why is it actively supported among the editors, as opposed to honestly reporting the references? The way the references are suppressed and false statements supported on this subject rises to the level of Wikipedia:Vandalism and is completely at odds with normal Wikipedia policy. The virulent hostility is so intense on the issue it is as if many of the editors lost their jobs on the F-15 program when the F-16 was procured. For example, despite a mountain of references and no counter-references, I am not allowed to mention weight or effectiveness in the main Fighter aircraft article, or even provide a pointer to the Light fighter article to explain these critically important issues.
2. Is it the policy of Wikipedia senior leadership that the requirements for neutrality and references are completely overwhelmed by local consensus? Is vandalism of the encyclopedia no longer vandalism if a set of editors support it? I am not seeking to be sarcastic in that question, but to get to the bottom of if that is the way it really is. If the leadership does support consensus over all else, I might as well stop spending time and money on fighter plane references to report in Wikipedia, since consensus without references will be used to block truthful and well referenced reporting on important issues when some editors dislike that truth.
I note that on this particular P-51 issue I am bringing a stack of strong references, and the opposing editors are bringing no references at all. According to the definition of consensus, it is based not on pure numbers but also references and the strength of the argument. When the opposing editors can bring no references but only opinion that is at complete odds with the references, then according to policy the weight of that argument is supposed to be zero.
This is quite a fundamental issue to Wikipedia, and it needs to be settled, by high level arbitration if necessary (in my opinion, the higher the better). If local consensus refuses to acknowledge the references on points some editors dislike, and substitutes unreferenced and false statements on points they support, then the credibility of Wikipedia on a very important military subject is destroyed. At that point, Wikipedia will have become a propaganda organ on the fighter aircraft subject. PhaseAcer ( talk) 17:14, 1 January 2020 (UTC)
As much as I really like Ludwig's book that you referenced above, he's talking nonsense when claiming that Schmued "led America and perhaps the world during World War Two in creating the concept of the lightweight fighter". Lightweight in comparison to the Corsair, Thunderbolt, and Hellcat, certainly, but there were plenty of American fighters of the period that had a far better claim to being "lightweight". So let's list most of the American fighters in service or under development in 39–42, shall we? P-51A, 6433lb; XF4U-1, 7460lb; XP-47B, 9189; P-43A, 5996; P-66, 5237; P-39C, 5070; P-40, 5367; F2A-1, 2785; XF4F-2, 4036; F6F-3, 9101. Aside from the three that I mentioned first, every single one of these fighters is lighter than the Mustang.
Part of the problem here is that most aviation writers will talk about lightweight in comparison to their contemporaries, but our category of Lightweight fighters includes aircraft from the 1930s and 1940s that were purposely designed to maximize speed and time to climb regardless of the consequent penalties to range, armament and general flexibility; in other words, interceptors. This definition starts to breakdown with the development of jets, radar and AAMs, but let's keep it simple for now by restricting the discussion to piston-engined aircraft. Both the Bf 109 and the Spitfire were designed as interceptors and both airframes struggled to accommodate the weight growth needed to satisfy the increases in range and armament desired by their operators over the course of the war. So I think that you're placing far too much weight on Ludwig's words, see WP:UNDUE, and confusing the concept/category of Lightweight fighters, with the relative comparison used by most writers.-- Sturmvogel 66 ( talk) 15:02, 2 January 2020 (UTC)
I don't think this debate is appropriate here, maybe it could be moved to Talk:Light fighter? And I'm not sure anyone could decide your argument with the continuous WP:Wall of texts, not even the most constructive admin. Oh, and to grow up, use reliable refs, not your personal experience. If you're experienced, finding supporting refs should be easy. If not, then you can draw your own conclusions.-- Marc Lacoste ( talk) 07:41, 3 January 2020 (UTC)
Discussion moved here as it is actually a content dispute and this is the primary topic. — Cheers, Steelpillow ( Talk) 17:59, 3 January 2020 (UTC)
MOS:CITELEAD essentially says that the summary nature of the lead means that the only cites in the lead should be to superlatives like best, heaviest, etc. as the text in the main body, with the appropriate cites, should support the statements made in the lead.-- Sturmvogel 66 ( talk) 16:38, 5 January 2020 (UTC)
I post this on both the light fighter and heavy fighter talk pages as the issues involved are deeply intertwined.
It was previously claimed by several editors that the set of a half dozen references I brought (with zero counter-references) reporting highly efficient single engine WWII prop fighters as generally being “lightweight fighters” was inadequate to accept that designation. These references included clear reports that the designers of the Zero, Bf 109, P-51, and Bearcat considered them to be lightweight fighters (that was their design goal). They also included professional level later interpretation of them being lightweight fighters in the modern strategic sense of seeking to meet the fighter effectiveness criteria’s top three goals of surprise (small and hard to see), numbers (low cost enabled by small size), and maneuverability (also enhanced by small size).
I therefore bring a much larger set of references below on this topic. I apologize for the long post, but it is necessary to show these references, briefly mention what they say, and to outline a key technical point below in the definition of lightweight over time. The resistance among some editors to key issues of light vs heavy is such that it seems the point can only be made with these truckloads of references. The non-neutrality and hostility on the issue are so severe that I have several times been threatened with blockage as an editor for bringing the references on the subject that disagree with previous unreferenced and generally incorrect opinion. Since neutrality by definition means impartial presentation of references (which takes precedence even over consensus), here are the references to do so. Take the trouble to impartially read the below, and it will be clear that the overwhelming majority view of the literature is that the efficient single engine fighters of WWII are all lightweight fighters by definition. (To the editors who will immediately complain “Wall of words!”, if you don’t want the words, don’t refuse 6 references so that I have to come back with 23 and explain them).
This particular truckload is the result of surveying at least 100 references covering WWII fighters. Most references do not clearly address the weight and fighter effectiveness issues, so they are not references on the issue. These over 20 references do, and they are thus valid references. Some are technical and go into detail, written by career professionals, while others provide colloquial description to show that the equivalent terms “light fighter” and “lightweight fighter” are commonly applied to this class of fighters.
Direct references as light fighters or lightweight fighters (the same thing in the literature, for which I will stack up references if demanded) are reported on the Zero, Hurricane, Spitfire, Bf 109, Fw 190, Yak-3, P-40, F8F Bearcat, and P-51. This covers such a wide range of “work horse” fighters built in high volume from before the war to the end of the war and beyond that no other conclusion can be drawn than except that in the eyes of the literature the entire class of efficient single engine fighters optimized for the air to air role are lightweight fighters. The only exceptions as single engine fighters would be those at the high end of the single engine weight range, such as the Hellcat, P-47, and Corsair (which should logically be called middleweights, but which the literature neglects to do). Even the P-47 started life as an intentionally lightweight fighter according to its initial development contract, and the Hellcat was later redesigned into the lightweight Bearcat.
There is a technical point to mention here that strongly affects the definition and understanding of “lightweight”. Generally, the references describe lightweight fighters by example and by rather long descriptions of the fighter effectiveness criteria that leads to smaller fighters being more effective. It can be simplified down to mean no heavier (and thus no more expensive) than needed to perform the mission. The practical fighters described as light or lightweight (not impractical very light interceptors) by the references have about a two to one weight range over the course of the war. That raises the question of why such a large range for one class of WWII fighters. The answer is the mission expansion and the continual upward speed of fighters during WWII. At the beginning of the war, the top speed of fighters was about 330-360 mph. At the end of the war, it was about 400 to 450 mph. The drag and required engine power are going up with the square of the speed ratio, so the structural weight to withstand the drag (and maneuver without tearing the wings off) and the engine weight (to provide the power) are basically also going up with square of fractional speed increase. For example, using the range of top speeds, note (450/330)^2 = 1.86. This by itself explains most of the difference, with the remainder being the armor protection for the pilot, self-sealing gas tanks, extra structure for high fuel fraction for escort duty (P-51), and heavier armament that came to be considered as “mission essential” as the war progressed (such armor and self-sealing tanks were not present in the early versions of the Zero, Spitfire, and Bf 109). There is also variation with technology. For example, the P-51H got faster and lighter than the P-51D, which was due to simultaneous reduction of load factors (changing the definition of the mission) and water/alcohol injection jumping its power from 1380HP to temporarily 2200HP where its new top speed of 487mph was measured (and not requiring an increase in engine weight). But, except for such technology jumps, what is “lightweight” changes over time basically in proportion to the square of speed increase and then linearly with pounds added or subtracted with mission change.
Now the references showing that efficient single engine WWII fighters really are lightweights in the eyes of their designers and the literature may be given. First literature favoring this position (over 20 references) is presented, followed by the only 2 (very brief) references I could find that use the term “standard” fighter in reference to efficient single engine WWII fighters. Both of these references can only be interpreted to indicate that standard IS lightweight rather than being any different. I find only one reference that indicates that any of the efficient single engine fighters are anything other than lightweight, and it is a self-published on-line article that colloquially describes the Fw 190 as a small fighter but not exactly a lightweight.
1. “Development of the P-51 Long Range Escort Fighter”, Paul Ludwig, Classic Publications, 2003. The author, a former U.S. Navy pilot, does a tremendous research job, performing interviews with many of the surviving designers, and tracking down key documents. This research is so detailed as to include phone transcripts of general officer conversations on this subject.
P. 34: “Breaking away from large and heavy designs, Edgar Schmued led America and perhaps the world during WWII in creating the concept of the lightweight fighter”.
P. 34-35: “Schmued’s XP-51 was one of the first aircraft designed from the start to making light weight a modern goal in fighter design”.
Schmued is probably given excessive innovator credit in the above two quotes, since many other designers of the WWII timeframe clearly understood and designed to achieve lightweight fighter virtues. But, the quotes do show that Schmued, among many others, did understand the lightweight fighter concept, and applied it to the P-51. He so much applied it that further weight reductions were a theme throughout the entire P-51 program, and he then continued it as chief designer of the F-86 and F-5.
P. 54: The USAAF was committed to the heavy P-38 and P-47, as the senior leadership did not believe small fighters could perform long range bomber escort. “The slim little Mustang eventually took over the job only after all other possible fighter alternative were first given a chance.”
P. 133: The issue of a lightweight making better use of critical resources was well understood by USAAF leadership and key decision makers. For example, here Col. (later Maj. Gen) Benjamin Chidlaw, chief of the experimental engineering branch, in evaluating production priority of the lightweight P-51 and the heavyweight P-38, reports in June 1943 to his commanders as follows: “...at first glance from a comparison of dollars, man-hours, fuel used, materials, versus performance, it might seem uneconomical to go on building P-38’s as against P-51’s on a STRICTLY FIGHTER BASIS.” But, knowing the generals loved the P-38, he continued “On the other hand, from a fighter-bomber-torpedo-photographic reconnaissance general utility stand point, the P-38 comes close to being the best all-around airplane we have.” Interestingly, Chidlaw thought the P-51 needed to be even lighter, which would come in a later model.
This shows that the P-51 was understood in 1943 by USAAC LEADERSHIP to deliver the key lightweight fighter STRATEGIC advantage of best (minimum) RESOURCE USAGE for the fighter mission, but the USAAF was stuck in Groupthink in believing that a larger, more general-purpose plane was justified in consuming twice the resources. This was a terrible error for the ETO bomber campaign, only corrected when the United States was on the verge of stopping the bomber campaign due to unsustainable losses. The lightweight P-51 then saved the day (if this is further disputed, I will provide a larger stack of references directly on that point).
P. 162: The P-38 could not meet production demands, and there were no P-38’s in the ETO until Oct. 1943. Production was then starting to approach demand, but earlier fielding of the Mustang consuming half the resources could have met demand much faster. By Dec 1943, the P-51 and P-38 were together performing bomber escort.
P. 155: At 56% power (bomber escort cruise), the light and efficient Mustang burned only 51 gallons per hour. The P-38 burned 120 gallons per hour (p. 186).
2. “Mustang Designer: Edgar Schmued and the P-51”, by Ray Wagner, Orion Books, 1990.
P. 127: “Another advantage of the P-51 was its relatively low cost. Air Force data indicates an average unit cost in 1945 of $50,985, compared to $83,000 for the P-47, and $97,147 for the P-38”. After surprise value, the next key advantage for lightweight fighters is low cost allowing higher numbers. The classic and key number comes to the top here: Efficient single engine lightweights do the job better plane for plane, at HALF the cost. This is of GIGANTIC strategic significance, the weightiest issue there is in the subject of light and heavy fighters.
P. 133: “It is clear the Mustang enabled the air battle over Germany to be won.” You want more, you’ll get a wall of words on this also.
P. 133: “Flying 213,872 sorties and losing 2520 planes in combat, Mustangs claimed 4950 aircraft destroyed in the air and 4131 on the ground. Thunderbolts flew 423,435 sorties, lost 3077 in combat, and claimed 3082 destroyed in the air and 3202 on the ground. Lightnings flew 129,849 sorties, lost 1758 in combat, and claimed 1771 destroyed in the air and 749 on the ground.”
The P-51 scored 0.023 kills per sortie, the P-38 scored 0.014 kills per sortie, and the P-47 scored 0.0073 kills per sortie. The Mustang enemy aircraft destroyed to loss ratio was 3.6 to 1. The P-47 achieved 2.0 to 1, and the P-38 scored 1.4 to 1. The P-51 scored 61% more kills in the air and 34% more kills on the ground than the P-47, while flying only 51% of the total sorties. The P-51 scored 180% more kills in the air and 552% more kills on the ground than the P-38, while flying only 65% more sorties. On a kills per budget basis the P-51 greatly exceeded these heavier fighters, as it was 60% the cost per plane of the P-47 and 53% the cost of the P-38. The per dollar efficiency of the Mustang against German fighters was 4.9X that of the P-38, and if you count in the value of protecting the bombers much better, it had to exceed 10X. Greater effectiveness for half the price is THE key issue of light vs heavy, both in WWII and ever since.
Note also that the P-51 was basically in service in the ETO for almost the same time as the P-38. Yet, if flew 65% more sorties, reflecting the lower cost and higher reliability and thus higher sortie generation rates of a lightweight single engine fighter.
That the light weight advantages of the P-51 were understood and valued resulted in a weight reduction program for it that is described in detail in Chapter 6 pp. 138-147. P. 140: General Hap Arnold saw chief P-51 designer Ed Schmued’s report on how British aircraft were lighter (they had lighter load factors). He then approved a program to further lighten the P-51. The direct quote from chief engineer Ed Schmued: “That was our go-ahead to build the P-51F. It was a marvelous exercise for us because we already had an airplane that was VERY, VERY LIGHT. Now by using some the British load factors and design requirements and our design improvements, we actually whittled 600 lbs off the empty weight of the airplane, and what an airplane would possibly have built.” (the P-51F did not enter production).
P. 143: The production lighter weight Mustang became the P-51H. Its empty weight was a very light 6586 lbs. Contracted production was for 1000, and 500 had been built when the war ended and production was terminated.
The point of explaining the weight reduction program on the Mustang is how clearly it illustrates that the virtues of light weight here dominated over the almost universal trend for fighters to gain weight in later versions. They knew they had a great lightweight fighter, and they wanted to make it even lighter. That the USAAF leadership understood this clearly is shown by the fact that they funded the development program, and then issued a large contract for production on the strategic plan that the P-51H was to supplement the P-51D as the bomber escort fighter for the final defeat of Japan. Not the P-38, even though it was doing well against the obsolete Zero late in the war, but the P-51D and the P-51H.
3. “The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet”, James Stevenson, Naval Institute Press, 1993. This book is devoted to the issue of light vs heavy, both in the modern age and with considerable background going back to WWII, and is deeply researched. The author is a career military aviation journalist, and knows everyone in the business. This authoritative and very detailed book is the summary of his lifework through 1993.
P. 33: “American fighter pilots have a saying, “first sight wins the fight”. History shows that 65% to 85% of the pilots never saw the aircraft that shot them down. As the former editor of the “Topgun Journal”, the author asked hundreds of pilots over a six-year period what single advantage they would like to have, that is, longer-range missile, more guns, better maneuverability, etc. To a pilot they all said, “the first sighting”.” This illustrates the extreme importance of being small, which cuts visual detection range approximately in half. This has been true throughout the history of air combat.
P. 44: The actual exchange ratio of the USAAF in the Pacific against Japan was 1.96 to 1.
P. 62: “Fighter aircraft like the P-51 Mustang, F8F Bearcat, and F-16 Falcon are examples of fighters that are lighter than their contemporaries (for the mission), are less expensive, and have greater performance. Because fighter aircraft of lower weight can have increased performance, can cost less, and can create a larger force (per budget), these three benefits are embodied in the term “lightweight fighter”.”
P. 63: “The arguments for lightweight fighters—lower cost, greater performance, and increased numbers, were as relevant in World War II as they are today. Consequently, on the eve of World War II both the Army and the Navy were actively investigating the benefits of lightweight fighters.”
P. 66: “The benefits of the lightweight fighter concept were not lost on the designer of the P-51, Ed Schmued.”
P. 66-67: “Another lightweight fighter success story belongs to the U.S. Navy with the development during WWII of the Grumman Bearcat, which was designed to fly from the evolving smaller aircraft carriers.”
P. 68: Leroy Grumman, founder of Grumman Aircraft Engineering, understood the benefits of lightweight fighters. “He penned his thoughts (July 18, 1943) to his chief designer, W.T. Schwendler. Grumman wanted to see if his idea for putting an F4F Wildcat-sized body around the F6F’s Hellcat’s engine was feasible (which also makes the direct argument for the Wildcat as another lightweight fighter). He assumed that the new airplane would have greater performance than the F6F (the Hellcat). Grumman’s memo to Schwendler is the genesis of the F8F Bearcat. His memo records both the Navy’s and Grumman’s rationale for building a lightweight fighter.” This memo is reprinted in its entirety on pages 68-70.
P. 70: “The Bearcat (about the same weight and speed as the Mustang) represented the quintessential lightweight fighter concept. It was a lighter airframe around an existing engine, resulting in improvements in almost all performance parameters”.
P. 70: “The U.S. Navy resorted to lightweight fighter design under the pressures of war, yet resisted lightweight fighters in peacetime.” This is a common theme in fighter procurement. The pressure of war is often the factor that forces acceptance of lightweight fighter virtues. This happened with the initial failure of the American bomber campaign in the ETO, and happened again due to Vietnam, which forced enough acceptance of the need for lightweight fighters that the F-16 was eventually procured after a hard fight.
4. “Bf 109: Versions B-E”, by Roy Cross and Gerald Scarborough, Patrick Stephens London, 1972. This book is a very detailed study of the design and combat history of the Bf 109.
Pages 7-8: “The 109 apparently was not designed to accept wing armament at all, and it seems fair to say that despite wing strengthening this omission proved to be a limiting factor late in the life of the aircraft, although no criticism of the firm is implied since the armament (two synchronized machine guns, plus the possibility of a third in unit with the engine) was specified by the RLM. This modest firepower was consistent with their requirement for a LIGHTWEIGHT high-speed interceptor with a ceiling of nearly 33,000 ft.” Just enough armament and no more is a classic lightweight fighter design criterion. This page goes further in explaining the manufacturing virtues of the Bf 109, another typical lightweight fighter feature.
P. 56: “Its simplicity and economy of construction was a by-product of its original inception as a LIGHTWEIGHT fighter, but it certainly made possible the MANUFACTURE of the various models in total NUMBERS of one type unprecedented to this day...” This further confirms the Bf 109 as a light fighter not only by direct statement, but by capturing the STRATEGIC lightweight fighter concept of simple and low-cost construction that makes best use of resources and generates a NUMBERS advantage. The Bf 109 was produced in greater numbers than any fighter in history, and this was due to its pure light fighter design. It did a terrific job for minimum cost and resource consumption.
P. 56: “Starting with the engine cowling, Messerchmitt made a special point thoughout 109 developement to provide total and easy access to the power plant and fuselage guns for rapid maintenance in the field”. Further details are then provided on this additional key point of a lightweight fighter—low cost maintenance and high sortie rate.
5. “Zero: Combat & Development History of Japan’s Legendary Mitsubishi A6M Zero Fighter”, Robert C. Mikesh, Motor Books International, 1994, Foreword by Zero Ace Saburo Sakai (leading surviving Japanese Ace).
The Zero chief designer was Jiro Horikoshi, a man of similar talent and lightweight fighter understanding to the chief designers of the Spitfire, Bf 109, and P-51.
P. 15: “EVERY weight-saving measure was taken. Engineers concluded that even 90-110 lbs saved could affect the ultimate success in an air engagement. Horikoshi said, “The margin of 100lbs between two opposing fighters was considered comparable to the difference between a veteran pilot and an unskilled novice. The fighter pilots compared themselves to the old Kendo (Japanese fencing) champions, and asked for fighters with the quality of the Japanese master craftsman’s Japanese sword. As a result of our pilots’ figurative demand for the blades and arts of the old masters, the Japanese fighter planes were the LIGHTEST IN WEIGHT and amongst the most maneuverable in the world.”
There is no other way to interpret the above than the Zero being an extreme example of a lightweight fighter. It was in fact the lightest major fighter of the war, even lighter than the similar very minimalist Bf 109.
P. 16: Extreme requirements were placed on the Zero in terms of maneuverability and endurance.
P. 17: The initially available engines were the 875HP Zuisei 13, and the 1200HP Kinsei 46. The Kinsei engine would result in a fighter about 400 lbs lighter than the small American F4F Wildcat, but even this was “considered to be far to heavy, so the Kensei 46 was dropped from consideration”. The 950 HP Sakae 12, almost identical in weight to the 875HP Zuisei 13, would soon get the job.
Pages. 18-19: These pages go into detail on the extreme design measures taken to save structural weight. These included new materials and structural methods, along with lightweight armament, the classic lightweight fighter design choice to get maximum combat value per plane and per budget.
P. 21: “With regards to the aforementioned twin-engine and interceptor-type fighters, it is interesting to note that that a year later (1938) Nakajima was charged by the Navy to develop a 13-Shi twin engine twin-barette escort fighter with long range, which became the J1N1 Irving. It was Horikoshi, after finishing the design of the 12-Shi Zero Fighter, who was tasked to design the J2M1 Jack as a high speed interceptor. Interestingly, the design requirements for both these fighters were initially met by the Zero.”
It is more than just “interesting”. Here we note that Japan with these twin-engine fighters fell into the same mistake that the United States made with the P-38 and that Germany made with the Bf 110. In each case a heavy fighter was developed consuming two of the same engines that could be used to power a superior lightweight single engine fighter. How gigantic this mistake was became crystal clear once the aircraft entered combat.
P. 21: “Japanese aircraft engine development was usually one generation behind that of the Western world. Japanese designers became accustomed to trying to a achieve a performance comparable to Western designs utilizing less powerful engines. This meant HAVING TO DISPENSE WITH ALL BUT ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE DESIGN AND RELATED ACCESSORIES, while designing to the limit of the aircraft capacity.” This is the core of the lightweight fighter concept. “The Zero, more than any other airplane, epitomized this philosophy and is the best example of how successful it could be when all the conditions were right.”
“Designer Jiro Horikoshi maximized the Zero’s performance by reducing airframe weight to an unprecedented degree by cutting armor protection and employing an “extra super” duralumin alloy. Combined with an 840-horsepower Sakae 12 radial engine, the A6M2 Type Zero could attain speeds of 346 miles per hour, while exhibiting extraordinary maneuverability and high rates of climb.”
7. “Fighter Facts and Fallacies”, John Lee (Assistant Director of Research, United Aircraft Corporation), William Morrow and Company, 1942. This early WWII reference is a technical professional summary of the key fighter design issues and trade-offs, with all of Chapter 3 extolling low weight and high efficiency pages 30-35. Page 33 notes the effect of weight on cost. Smallest size for the specialized mission is noted several times as a key design goal. The issues were fully understood before and during WWII.
8. “Flying Legends: A Photographic Study of the Great Piston Combat Aircraft of WWII”, by John M. Dibbs, 1998, MBI Publishing, Foreward by Wg Cdr Geoffey Page DSO OBE DFC, Intro by Stephen Grey & Cmdr Alex Vraciu USN. Though this book would at first glance look like a picture book due to its extensive photography, its text is surprisingly strategy and design oriented, with detailed discussions of configuration issues like weight, range, armament, and agility.
P. III Introduction: The Spitfire was “a viceless LITTLE fighter”.
P. 15: The Spitfire had a “light weight airframe” that was from its original design “a pilot’s airplane” and “receptive to the pilots touch” despite later growth in weight, power, and mission.
P. 55: The P-40 was derived from the P-36A lightweight fighter.
P. 55: The P-40N final version was “a drastically lightened” sub-type. (like the P-51, it was recognized that these lightweight fighters would benefit from getting even lighter).
P. 145: The lower power of the Zero engine led to engineers’ straining to design the aircraft to be “as light as possible”. There is no other interpretation possible than the Zero being a lightweight fighter.
P. 145: Even after 1943, “The Zero remained a feared and worthy opponent DUE TO ITS LIGHT WEIGHT—its main rival, the Hellcat, was twice as heavy!” It was actually 2.5X as heavy.
P. 147 on the P-47: “That the Jug, as it soon came to be called, proved such a weighty aircraft is rather ironic, for the original P-47, designed by Alexander Kartveli, was build to meet a 1040 AAC requirement for a LIGHTWEIGHT interceptor, similar in SIZE and stature to the SPITFIRE and Bf 109. The USAAF leadership considered the Spitfire and Bf 109 to be lightweight fighters.
P. 171 on the Bf 109, it was a “small fighter”, and on P181, so small it had “a claustrophobic cockpit”. That tiny plane with a tiny cockpit well served the by far highest scoring aces in history, several with over 300 kills each, and many over 200 kills.
9. “Luffwaffe Fighters and Bombers in the Battle of Britain”, Chris Goss, Stackpole Books, 2000.
P. 9: Just before the Battle of Britain, “The Luftwaffe had already seen shortfalls in the EFFECTIVENESS of their twin-engine fighter (the Bf 110). They were soon to see how much harder it would be facing an opponent with far superior (single engine) fighters.”
10. “Comparing the Effectiveness of Air-to-Air Fighters: F-16 to F-18”, Pierre Sprey, 1982.
P. 15: “The P-38 was the least successful of these escort fighters; due to high losses and a poor kill record, by the spring of 1944 General Doolittle had decided to begin replacing them with P-51’s. The 17,500 lb P-38, despite its excellent 360 mph cruise speed and 400 mph top speed, was too large and too visible, too inferior in maximum g, and had both poor roll rate and poor dive acceleration. In addition, its two engines proved to be mostly a survivability handicap; if either one was hit over Germany, the aircraft was likely to be lost due to either fire or enemy fighters downing the straggler.”
P. 17: The WWII German single engine fighters were high performance LIGHT fighters.
P. 17: “The 10,100 pound P-51D (loaded) was the most successful of the long range fighters: it was not much larger than the Focke-Wulf 190A and Messerschmitt 109G, had a much better 360 mph cruise and 437 mph top speed, had better dive acceleration, could equal or out-turn the German fighters, and could match their roll performance.”
11. http://pogoarchives.org/labyrinth/11/03.pdf
“Reversing the Decay of American Air Power”, by Pierre Sprey and USAF Col. Robert Dilger, 2008.
P. 14: “The European war was fought by the United States primarily with three fighters, the P-38, P47 and the P-51. All three were developed after the World War II build-up started in late 1937. The P-38 and the P-47 failed as high-altitude dogfighters. Eventually the P-38 was withdrawn from Europe as a fighter, while it did continue in other roles. The P-47 was pulled from the bomber-escort role and then employed on close support and interdiction ground-attack missions. It failed as a high altitude, long-range dogfighter but became pre-eminent in the close support and interdiction ground-attack missions.”
P. 14: “The P-51 was initially developed as a private venture independent of the Army Air Force’s development bureaucracy. They favored the larger, less maneuverable and more expensive P-47 and P-38. After the P-51 was mated with the Rolls-Royce Merlin engine, license-built in the United States (a modification strongly opposed by the Army Air Force leadership), it became perhaps the best fighter aircraft in any World War II theater. Over 15,000 P-51s were ultimately procured, most of them with the Merlin engine. Interestingly, it was also the SMALLEST and least expensive U.S. fighter (escort fighter) – yet it had the longest range: 600 miles, compared to only 375 miles for the larger P-47.”
P. 15: “The P-51 changed the equation. The bombers acted as a sacrificial goat that attracted the Luftwaffe day fighters. The escort P-51s engaged the Luftwaffe fighters and with their numerical advantage, a superb performing aircraft, and pilots with far more training hours, they prevailed. It was P-51s that won air superiority over Germany just shortly before D-Day, which was the critical precursor necessary for a successful D-Day invasion.”
P. 6-9: The presentation of why Germany lost the Battle of Britain is very enlightening to why the United States was initially losing the air war over Germany 3 years later. England lost about 0.5 fighter pilots for each of their own fighters shot down (half the shoot down victims survived to fight again, now wiser in the ways of combat). The Germans lost all theirs. But even far more important was that England was trading low cost single engine lightweight fighters for expensive German bombers. Each bomber was over twice as expensive as a fighter, with a large crew. When the United States began its bomber campaign over Germany, each heavy bomber lost was about 6X as expensive as a low-cost German light fighter, with a 10-man crew. When bomber losses exceed even 5% per sortie, this loss becomes unbearable.
12. https://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/thunderjet-307269/ “Air and Space Magazine”, Aug. 2013. Directly states that Spitfires and Hurricanes are lightweight fighters.
13. https://apnews.com/c33c551582be4b479161257208e96812 , also at
https://www.koin.com/news/international/restored-world-war-ii-spitfire-begins-round-the-world-trip/
This Aug. 2019 Spitfire article says: “The lightweight fighter plane helped defeat the German air force in the Battle of Britain and the Spitfire has become an icon of World War II.”
Nov. 2018 article: Spitfires used for reconnaissance described as “ultra-lightweight fighters”.
15. https://www.chuckhawks.com/best_fighter_planes.htm
Bf 109 and Yak-3 were as small and lightweight as possible with powerful V-12 engines similar to the Allison and the Merlin.
16. https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=1949
Curtiss XP-53 lightweight fighter proposal was for an upgrade to the P-40. There were two prototypes. Indicates the USAAF leadership and U.S. manufacturer Curtiss considered the P-40 as a lightweight, and were simply seeking a better lightweight. It would be North American Aviation that achieved this key goal in the form of the P-51.
“Daily Mail”, Oct. 14, 2016, English newspaper article reporting the Fw 190 as a lightweight fighter. “The FW-190 was an advanced LIGHTWEIGHT fighter, which was more than a match for the early versions of the legendary Spitfire.”
18- 20. https://www.avgeekery.com/the-ultimate-mustang-north-americans-advanced-lightweight-p-51h/ http://www.mustangsmustangs.com/p-51/variants/prototype http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_fighters/p51_13.html Lightweight P-51H. The USAAF leadership and North American were so locked in to the P-51 being a lightweight fighter that they energetically pursued making it even lighter.
21. https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=790
Light fighters like the XP-57 and XP-77 are defined here as “VERY LIGHT” fighters, not the definition of “light fighters” that many editors have wanted to assume without references. There is NO literature to support only these very light fighters being defined as “light fighters” in the sense used in the references and thus in Wikipedia articles, while there is a large body of literature that efficient single engine WWII fighters are all lightweight fighters.
22. https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/03/f-35-replacement-f-45-mustang-ii-fighter-simple-lightweight/
Proposal for a 21st century light fighter that is the modern-day strategic equivalent of the P-51. It would be called the “Mustang II”. To be even smaller and cheaper than the Gripen.
“To keep down costs and improve agility, our modern Mustang will be a single-engine warplane. Of course, the F-45 will have all the air-to-air capabilities that the Gripen features in addition to what the F-35 is supposed to sport, including sensor fusion, networked sensors, helmet-cued missile launching, and lock-on-after-launch missiles.”
Just another data point to show how the modern literature views the P-51 as a lightweight fighter. This is a consistent theme.
23. “Military Reform: The High-Tech Debate in Tactical Air Forces”, Col. (later 4-star general) Walter Kross, National Defense University Press, 1985. This book is basically the general’s master degree thesis in book form. Kross tries to present both sides of the light vs heavy debate, ultimately coming down on the heavy side, while almost accidentally making a checkmate argument in favor of lightweights (see below final quote).
P. 47: P-51 as a cheap winner, vs. P-38 as an expensive loser, is a military reformer position.
P. 94: “Reformer cite the P-38 as an expensive loser and the P-51 as a cheap winner in WWII. In fact, both planes were winners. The leading US air aces of all time achieved their kills in the P-38 in the Pacific Theater.” True, but misleading. The general neglects to mention the P-38’s terrible performance in Europe, where it almost lost the air war by being unable to prevent Germany trading cheap lightweight fighters for expensive heavy bombers. He also fails to note that the even longer-range P-51 could and did do all that the P-38 did in the Pacific, for half the price. The only reason P-51 aces in the Pacific did not achieve as high a kill count as the P-38 aces is that they were there for much less time, since the P-51 was utilized almost totally over Germany. Only after the fall of Germany were they moved to the Pacific, where they got only a few months in action before the war ended. The USAAC final leadership position of the relative value of the P-38 and P-51 is ultimately to strongly favor the P-51, since the main escort plan was to use the P-51D and the new and even lighter P-51H for the B-29 escort mission to finally defeat Japan. Only the atomic bomb prevented that from happening.
P. 96: “In Europe, the P-51 did not appear in sufficient numbers until 1944, when the newer technology of the Merlin engine gave the P-51D the performance and range to escort Allied bombers to the heart of Germany. By contrast, the P-38’s engines were never upgraded because the Army recognized that superior performance in the European air-land theater be achieved MORE CHEAPLY by applying the newer engine technology to large numbers of single engine P-51’s.” Partly false, partly true, with the true part being of critical importance. The Merlin was not newer than the Allison, just better. And the reason the P-51 was late to the party was that USAAC leadership was initially prejudiced against the P-51 for being small, for being initially kicked-off by the British, and for having a British engine, and deliberately held it back (multiple sources, Paul Ludwig in particular). But, the general here completely makes the point favoring lightweight fighters, which is don’t waste good engines in expensive twin engine fighters when a single engine lightweight fighter will do the job better plane for plane, and you can have twice as many of them. THAT IS THE MAIN ISSUE, proven with both the P-38 and the Bf 110.
Binkster has made the claim that efficient WWII single engine fighters are not lightweight fighters, and are instead “standard” fighters that are distinct from lightweight fighters. There is no literature to support Binker’s claim, even as a minority view. Instead, the term “standard” is occasionally (though rarely) used in the literature to mean “standardized”, as in adopted in volume. Such fighters are almost always lightweight fighters. The only two references located to use the term “standard” are given below.
1. https://www.thoughtco.com/p-51-mustang-2361528
“Following the war, the P-51 was retained as the USAAF's standard, piston-engine fighter.” Here standard means it was the ONLY prop fighter retained in wide service after the war, not that it is different than “lightweight”.
2. “Conquerors of the Air: The Evolution of Aircraft 1903-1945”, Carlo Demand and Heiner Emde, Random House, 1968.
P. 164: “But Japan’s best known combat planes were produced by the Mitsubishi Company, and their A6M “Zeroes” were standard fighters of exceptional performance.”
Here “standard” is used to describe the very lightest major fighter of the war, which cannot be taken any other way than equating these terms.
The only one located is:
1. https://www.fighter-planes.com/info/fw190.htm
“The small Fw 190 was one of the greatest fighters of WWII. Designed by Dr. Kurt Tank, the Fw 190 was built as a sturdy all-round fighter, rather than a lightweight interceptor.” This is a Joe Baugher self-published on-line article. “Small” but “rather than lightweight” would seem to be clumsy wording for Joe meaning to say “Small, but sturdy enough to carry a bit heavier weapons that other lightweight fighters”. This brief statement is the only such one located that would directly contradict any of these efficient single engine fighters being anything but lightweight fighters.
This is a pretty slim reed to say the Fw 190 is not a lightweight, given the other direct references that it is, and the truckload of references above that similar fighters are also lightweights. It is also self-published, though by a reputable guy. I have no objection to noting it in order to provide at least one alternative reference to the clear majority view that efficient single engine WWII fighters are all lightweight fighters.
It is unfortunate that the term “Lightweight fighter” became the industry norm for “low cost, efficient, and effective fighters”. This term arose because of political struggle over money. Fighter manufacturers are like any other company—their primary goal is to make profit. When fighter manufacturers are told to propose a fighter design for a certain number of planes, then because fighters are sold by the pound (like all mechanical equipment), they often propose heavier fighters allowing more profit per plane. The more politically connected a company is, the more likely it is to try selling that kind of high profit fighter. Competitors then may try to win business with fighters that can perform the same mission for lower cost, which then must be lighter. Hence the term “lightweight fighter” was used to contrast these efficient fighters with heavier, more expensive, and generally less effective fighters. Better terms sometimes used in an engineering and military sense are “efficient” fighters or “effective” fighters, but those is not as marketable (though “effective” is used quite a bit), and are not the dominant terms in the literature. So, we are stuck with “lightweight” to describe highly efficient and effective fighters that are generally better war winners than heavy fighters. They win better because of the fighter effectiveness criteria that statistically, smaller fighters with superior surprise (harder to see), numbers (lower cost), and maneuverability (smaller size allows higher agility) will more often come out on top.
The common theme running through the literature, both of the WWII time frame and through later analysis of WWII fighters, is that the more efficient single engine fighters of WWII are ALL lightweight fighters (the only exceptions being the heaviest singles that should logically be called middleweights, but which the literature neglects to do). The designers of the efficient single engine WWII fighters, and the senior officers ordering them, considered them lightweights, and understood the key issue of getting maximum resource efficiency. The literature does not report that only “very light” fighters like the XP-77 experiment are light fighters, and instead reports that practical and efficient singles like the Zero, Spitfire, Bf 109, Yak 3, P-40, and P-51 are all lightweights. As the literature survey given above shows, that is by FAR the dominant majority view of the literature that addresses the issue. There is effectively zero literature that says otherwise. PhaseAcer ( talk) 23:30, 18 January 2020 (UTC)
the literature uses the terms "light fighter" and "lightweight fighter" interchangeably.
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It has now been nearly three weeks without any references added to the completely unreferenced and in some cases incorrect Lead Maury had written, and without correction of the significant errors in the under-referenced Concepts section. There also has been no discussion on the Talk page about the many errors and omissions that have been pointed out in these sections, errors that were specifically listed in order to allow the contributing editor the opportunity to add references and fix the major errors that had been introduced. I have thus today replaced those sections with candidate new text which is fully referenced, and as far as I can tell from the references, also correct in its statements.
The candidate lead is four paragraphs that summarize the total article content. The form Newzild had edited it into was very brief “news format”, whereas policy specifies encyclopedic format of typically four paragraphs or less. It summarizes and weights the major issues as it is supposed to do. I left Maury’s major contention that some modern “light fighters” are modified trainers, but as this assertion is unreferenced I would assume we must find appropriate references or else take that out. I don’t know of any references on that point other than sales literature.
The Concept section, in addition to now being sound and referenced, is also considerably shorter than the “incorrect point” followed by “referenced counter-point” form that it has been in for several weeks while waiting for corrective edits. I did leave it in Maury’s preferred Advantages and Disadvantages form, just with the true and referenceable advantages and disadvantages presented. In the interest of encyclopedic compactness, I also reduce historical content and focused more on the general light fighter concept, with most discussion focused on the more important modern era. The historical thinking is adequately covered in the History sections.
My hope would be that these edits would be allowed to stand as a blueprint and plan, a sound foundation suitable for building upon. If so, they can then edited into final form by a team effort. If we do that I believe we will have an article worthy of promotion well above the current “Start Class” level. The material is strategically important and very militarily interesting, and could allow this article to proceed all the way to Feature Article status.
Maury, I made these edits with only two insertions. You can revert them both without violating 3RR. However, if you do then we should enter into the Discussion part of the BRD cycle. Even if you don’t revert, we are overdue for discussion and team effort in improving this article for promotion. I'm not trying to do unilateral editing here. But, in the absence of necessary error correction and referencing that I have been waiting several weeks for, I'm trying to put a sound foundation in place that can be edited from here into an excellent article. We can't get there without discussion and attracting strong editors to work on the article, people like Graeme, who in my opinion are limiting their input because they don't want to do the work only to have it unilaterally written over without discussion and teamwork. PhaseAcer ( talk) 17:48, 25 October 2016 (UTC)
NOTE ON LENGTH:
The article is now 8,281 words to cover all of light fighter concepts and history.
The article on the Northrop F-5 light fighter is 14,024 words, for just one plane. PhaseAcer ( talk) 00:24, 26 October 2016 (UTC)
I have removed most of the text added by PhaseAcer because of big problems with WP:WEIGHT (irony acknowledged) and WP:SYNTH. PhaseAcer is insisting that the P-51 was America's first light fighter but it was never given that label until Sprey came along to argue his minor viewpoint about modern air warfare. Sprey wants to validate his views and he changes history to do so. By far the majority of sources talking about the P-51 Mustang establish it as a standard pursuit fighter which was designed to be somewhat lighter and faster than its opponents. Binksternet ( talk) 01:22, 22 December 2019 (UTC)
Ok, Without using a wall of text, provide references with page numbers that unequivocally describe specific world war 2 fighters as "light or lightweight fighters" (per the context of this article), without any additional commentary from you on how to interpret the source. ( Hohum @) 00:14, 24 December 2019 (UTC)
Hohum: Here is a little more detail for you on your request for specific references on efficient single engine WWII fighters being lightweight fighters. In "Messerschmitt Bf 109 Versions B-E, Cross and Scarborough, on pages 8 and 56 are direct statements that it was conceived and designed as a lightweight fighter. The rest of chapter 5 from pages 56 to 73 is devoted to the design trade-offs and methods used to achieve the lightweight fighter design requirement. They were just as extreme as the designers of the Zero were, for example avoiding self sealing tanks and using centrally mounted weapons and the minimum necessary quantity of weapons to allow the lightest structure and highest agility. Though the fighter effectiveness criteria was not formalized until the 1960's, the designers of the P-51, Bf-109, Zero, and F8F Bearcat were all intentionally designing lightweight fighters (other direct references above) and had an intuitive understanding of lightweight fighter virtues. From "The Pentagon Paradox", page 63: "The arguments for lightweight fighters --lower cost, greater performance, and increased numbers, were as relevant in World War II as they are today. Consequently, on the eve of World War II both the Army and the Navy were actively investigating the benefits of lightweight fighters." Author James Stevenson then quotes and even reprints primary WWII documentation showing this.
PhaseAcer (
talk)
05:46, 28 December 2019 (UTC)
I believe we have quite a credibility problem in some Wikipedia fighter aircraft articles, where in some cases important facts and authoritative references are being strongly suppressed, and in others fundamentally important false statements are allowed with no references at all. This occurs because of the power of local consensus, where it seems well referenced truth is swept under the rug if a few editors say so. Let me lay the history of this issue clearly on the table, and then ask my questions about this situation as it pertains to Wikipedia policy. I apologize for the length it takes to explain the full issues, but the pattern here has been many years in the making.
I have found the literature of fighter effectiveness to be an interesting area. This interest has led to me writing most of the material in the Light fighter article and also the fighter weapons section in the main Fighter aircraft article.
The fighter effectiveness criteria first formalized in the 1960’s is a way of evaluating likely fighter aircraft combat performance, and maximizing that performance in the design process. It was developed from military operations research as a professional way to architect fighters to deliver maximum kill ratios and combat return on budget investment. It contends that the design of fighters should emphasize (in order of importance) advantages in surprise (in 70% or more of shootdowns surprise is the dominant factor), numbers at the point of combat (lower cost, higher reliability, higher endurance), maneuverability (for that fraction of the time that surprise does not settle the issue), and weapons (meaning ability to reliably get split second kills when in position). This was the deliberate strategy of the F-16, now the world’s most popular fighter. It is also the reason the P-51 had such superior combat performance compared to the P-47 and P-38. The record shows it is a quite successful strategy, as might be expected when fundamental science and engineering are correctly applied.
As a design or engineering guide, this criteria tends to lead to smaller and more efficient fighter designs, though there can be specialized exceptions. In particular small size gives a strong advantage in that the fighter has a lower visual and radar profile, and statistically achieves surprise more often (this has been scientifically studied and reported on by both Navy Top Gun and the Air Force Fighter Weapons School, as well as many other advanced references). Smaller fighters also consume less of critical resources, and cost less (fighter cost is directly proportional to weight), so that the same budget buys more of them and increases the numbers advantage.
This has been reported extensively in the more professional fighter aircraft literature from the early 1980’s to now, with effectively zero literature that disagrees. In this literature the term “lightweight fighter” has come to be a synonym for lower cost / more efficient fighters that conform to the criteria. This actually started just before and during WWII, when the literature that discusses the issue reports that the designers of the P-51, Zero, Bf 109, and Bearcat all had the goal of designing specifically lightweight and efficient fighters that in a strategic sense satisfy the criteria. The fighter effectiveness criteria was not formalized then, but its basic features were understood before WWII. It was the foundation philosophy of Edgar Schmued, who was the design leader of the P-51, F-86, and F-5, and also of Willy Messerschmitt for the BF 109, and of Zero lead designer Jiro Horikoshi. Leroy Grumman, the founder of Grumman, then adopted this philosophy of fighter design for the F8F Bearcat. It continued through the USAF Lightweight Fighter Program that resulted in the F-16 and F-18, after which a large body of modern literature emphasizing it was published.
As an engineer, there is nothing mysterious or contentious about this to me. It is simply a useful design technique to optimize performance and return on investment, philosophically identical to the design optimization strategies of many other types of products. In an engineering and operations research sense here, it means putting guns and missiles in just the right place to score maximum kills for minimum resource expenditure. But, for some reason it is a very contentious subject to many Wikipedia military aviation editors. The struggles I had getting the facts and literature on this into the light fighter article four years ago were almost unbelievable. At that time the light fighter article had the false and unreferenced point of view that light fighters (the same thing as lightweight fighters in the modern literature) were rejected by military leaders, not successful in combat, and had fundamental weaknesses in performance, armament, and range (though the F-16 and P-51 had the longest range of any American fighters at the time they were introduced, and the lightest of the WWII bunch, the Zero, had longer range than the P-51). A large body of literature reported the opposite of what the light fighter article originally stated, so after bringing those references by the dozens I was finally able to tell the truth. Despite massive complaints about the material, no editor was ever able to bring a single counter-reference.
Part of that truth is that the references report light fighters to be efficient, almost always single engine fighters (the F-5 being the only significant exception) that by example tend to average about half the weight and cost of heavy usually twin-engine fighters (the P-47, F-105, and F-35 being large single engine exceptions). The literature does not define light fighters as being only at the very lowest weight of their era (like the Zero and the Folland Gnat), nor does it define “standard” fighters as strategically distinct from lightweight fighters. These are both the strong opinions of some editors, but those opinions are not based on any references that they are able to bring. I have over a hundred references on this subject, and I find no such statements.
Now we get to the current issue and how it bears on policy. I have been attempting to bring two paragraphs about the P-51 to the P-51 and Light fighter articles. One paragraph reports its design genesis as a specifically lightweight fighter in the strategic sense, which the references which deal with the issue directly report as its fundamental design strategy. Its design team considered it to be a conceptually lightweight fighter just as reported above, and throughout the program worked to bring out still lighter versions. The other paragraph was to report its combat results compared to the [P-47]] and P-38, which it excelled in kills per sortie, and far excelled in kills per dollar. Typically for a well-designed lightweight fighter, it was barely half the cost of its heavyweight escort fighter competitors, and achieved superior per plane combat results.
I have been blocked on doing this by several other editors, in particular Binksternet. The claim has been made that the P-51 is not a lightweight fighter in a strategic sense, and is instead a “standard fighter” (an undefined term), though this is the opposite of what the references that classify the P-51 directly say. The claim is also made that there are references that report this, but in my repeated requests to show those references, not a single such reference has been identified. In comparison, I have brought 5 strong references on P-51 classification as a lightweight (2 of them being design history references totally focused on the P-51), and several others that casually discuss it, along with a much larger body of literature about efficient fighters in general with the same defining features as the P-51. It is of course true that many references do not address the classification of the P-51, but references that do not address the issue at all are not references on the issue. As to the opposition to reporting the combat statistics, I can see no reason other than it makes the P-47 and the P-38 look bad. Unfortunately for their place in history, in comparison to the P-51, they were bad. The P-51 scored 5X the kills per dollar of the P-38, and if you take into account its superior bomber protection all the way to the target and back, its combat effect per dollar had to be more than 10X greater. As reported in the references, it saved the air war over Germany.
In comparison to this reference suppression, the Heavy fighter article, of which Binksternet is an active editor, makes false and completely unreferenced statements about the fundamental nature of heavy fighters. For example, it says “Although numerous modern fighters could be called "heavy", with regard to their weight, the term is generally no longer used. As missiles became the standard weapons for air combat any fighter of any size could be successful in combat against almost any target, making the distinction between heavy and light fighters less relevant.” This is the complete opposite of what a large body of literature, which is not referenced in the heavy fighter article, reports on the issue of light vs heavy. I have not seen a single counter-reference to this literature. And as for whether this distinction matters, the lightweight F-16 has gotten the better of the twice the cost heavy F-15 in every trial that has been made public. The references report the F-15 as excellent, but the F-16 as even better, for half the price. When you can buy a better air force for half the price, that certainly does matter a LOT to the people who sign the checks. Whole books, ignored in the heavy fighter article, are devoted to this subject. This is an issue where hundreds of billions of dollars and national security are actively at stake, so this unreferenced false statement that has been in place for years and is at complete odds with the literature could be considered as propaganda. In allowing this, it is clear there is a very non-neutral double standard in place.
That brings me to my questions.
1. Why is this highly non-neutral view in place among many editors on the issue of light vs. heavy? Why is it actively supported among the editors, as opposed to honestly reporting the references? The way the references are suppressed and false statements supported on this subject rises to the level of Wikipedia:Vandalism and is completely at odds with normal Wikipedia policy. The virulent hostility is so intense on the issue it is as if many of the editors lost their jobs on the F-15 program when the F-16 was procured. For example, despite a mountain of references and no counter-references, I am not allowed to mention weight or effectiveness in the main Fighter aircraft article, or even provide a pointer to the Light fighter article to explain these critically important issues.
2. Is it the policy of Wikipedia senior leadership that the requirements for neutrality and references are completely overwhelmed by local consensus? Is vandalism of the encyclopedia no longer vandalism if a set of editors support it? I am not seeking to be sarcastic in that question, but to get to the bottom of if that is the way it really is. If the leadership does support consensus over all else, I might as well stop spending time and money on fighter plane references to report in Wikipedia, since consensus without references will be used to block truthful and well referenced reporting on important issues when some editors dislike that truth.
I note that on this particular P-51 issue I am bringing a stack of strong references, and the opposing editors are bringing no references at all. According to the definition of consensus, it is based not on pure numbers but also references and the strength of the argument. When the opposing editors can bring no references but only opinion that is at complete odds with the references, then according to policy the weight of that argument is supposed to be zero.
This is quite a fundamental issue to Wikipedia, and it needs to be settled, by high level arbitration if necessary (in my opinion, the higher the better). If local consensus refuses to acknowledge the references on points some editors dislike, and substitutes unreferenced and false statements on points they support, then the credibility of Wikipedia on a very important military subject is destroyed. At that point, Wikipedia will have become a propaganda organ on the fighter aircraft subject. PhaseAcer ( talk) 17:14, 1 January 2020 (UTC)
As much as I really like Ludwig's book that you referenced above, he's talking nonsense when claiming that Schmued "led America and perhaps the world during World War Two in creating the concept of the lightweight fighter". Lightweight in comparison to the Corsair, Thunderbolt, and Hellcat, certainly, but there were plenty of American fighters of the period that had a far better claim to being "lightweight". So let's list most of the American fighters in service or under development in 39–42, shall we? P-51A, 6433lb; XF4U-1, 7460lb; XP-47B, 9189; P-43A, 5996; P-66, 5237; P-39C, 5070; P-40, 5367; F2A-1, 2785; XF4F-2, 4036; F6F-3, 9101. Aside from the three that I mentioned first, every single one of these fighters is lighter than the Mustang.
Part of the problem here is that most aviation writers will talk about lightweight in comparison to their contemporaries, but our category of Lightweight fighters includes aircraft from the 1930s and 1940s that were purposely designed to maximize speed and time to climb regardless of the consequent penalties to range, armament and general flexibility; in other words, interceptors. This definition starts to breakdown with the development of jets, radar and AAMs, but let's keep it simple for now by restricting the discussion to piston-engined aircraft. Both the Bf 109 and the Spitfire were designed as interceptors and both airframes struggled to accommodate the weight growth needed to satisfy the increases in range and armament desired by their operators over the course of the war. So I think that you're placing far too much weight on Ludwig's words, see WP:UNDUE, and confusing the concept/category of Lightweight fighters, with the relative comparison used by most writers.-- Sturmvogel 66 ( talk) 15:02, 2 January 2020 (UTC)
I don't think this debate is appropriate here, maybe it could be moved to Talk:Light fighter? And I'm not sure anyone could decide your argument with the continuous WP:Wall of texts, not even the most constructive admin. Oh, and to grow up, use reliable refs, not your personal experience. If you're experienced, finding supporting refs should be easy. If not, then you can draw your own conclusions.-- Marc Lacoste ( talk) 07:41, 3 January 2020 (UTC)
Discussion moved here as it is actually a content dispute and this is the primary topic. — Cheers, Steelpillow ( Talk) 17:59, 3 January 2020 (UTC)
MOS:CITELEAD essentially says that the summary nature of the lead means that the only cites in the lead should be to superlatives like best, heaviest, etc. as the text in the main body, with the appropriate cites, should support the statements made in the lead.-- Sturmvogel 66 ( talk) 16:38, 5 January 2020 (UTC)
I post this on both the light fighter and heavy fighter talk pages as the issues involved are deeply intertwined.
It was previously claimed by several editors that the set of a half dozen references I brought (with zero counter-references) reporting highly efficient single engine WWII prop fighters as generally being “lightweight fighters” was inadequate to accept that designation. These references included clear reports that the designers of the Zero, Bf 109, P-51, and Bearcat considered them to be lightweight fighters (that was their design goal). They also included professional level later interpretation of them being lightweight fighters in the modern strategic sense of seeking to meet the fighter effectiveness criteria’s top three goals of surprise (small and hard to see), numbers (low cost enabled by small size), and maneuverability (also enhanced by small size).
I therefore bring a much larger set of references below on this topic. I apologize for the long post, but it is necessary to show these references, briefly mention what they say, and to outline a key technical point below in the definition of lightweight over time. The resistance among some editors to key issues of light vs heavy is such that it seems the point can only be made with these truckloads of references. The non-neutrality and hostility on the issue are so severe that I have several times been threatened with blockage as an editor for bringing the references on the subject that disagree with previous unreferenced and generally incorrect opinion. Since neutrality by definition means impartial presentation of references (which takes precedence even over consensus), here are the references to do so. Take the trouble to impartially read the below, and it will be clear that the overwhelming majority view of the literature is that the efficient single engine fighters of WWII are all lightweight fighters by definition. (To the editors who will immediately complain “Wall of words!”, if you don’t want the words, don’t refuse 6 references so that I have to come back with 23 and explain them).
This particular truckload is the result of surveying at least 100 references covering WWII fighters. Most references do not clearly address the weight and fighter effectiveness issues, so they are not references on the issue. These over 20 references do, and they are thus valid references. Some are technical and go into detail, written by career professionals, while others provide colloquial description to show that the equivalent terms “light fighter” and “lightweight fighter” are commonly applied to this class of fighters.
Direct references as light fighters or lightweight fighters (the same thing in the literature, for which I will stack up references if demanded) are reported on the Zero, Hurricane, Spitfire, Bf 109, Fw 190, Yak-3, P-40, F8F Bearcat, and P-51. This covers such a wide range of “work horse” fighters built in high volume from before the war to the end of the war and beyond that no other conclusion can be drawn than except that in the eyes of the literature the entire class of efficient single engine fighters optimized for the air to air role are lightweight fighters. The only exceptions as single engine fighters would be those at the high end of the single engine weight range, such as the Hellcat, P-47, and Corsair (which should logically be called middleweights, but which the literature neglects to do). Even the P-47 started life as an intentionally lightweight fighter according to its initial development contract, and the Hellcat was later redesigned into the lightweight Bearcat.
There is a technical point to mention here that strongly affects the definition and understanding of “lightweight”. Generally, the references describe lightweight fighters by example and by rather long descriptions of the fighter effectiveness criteria that leads to smaller fighters being more effective. It can be simplified down to mean no heavier (and thus no more expensive) than needed to perform the mission. The practical fighters described as light or lightweight (not impractical very light interceptors) by the references have about a two to one weight range over the course of the war. That raises the question of why such a large range for one class of WWII fighters. The answer is the mission expansion and the continual upward speed of fighters during WWII. At the beginning of the war, the top speed of fighters was about 330-360 mph. At the end of the war, it was about 400 to 450 mph. The drag and required engine power are going up with the square of the speed ratio, so the structural weight to withstand the drag (and maneuver without tearing the wings off) and the engine weight (to provide the power) are basically also going up with square of fractional speed increase. For example, using the range of top speeds, note (450/330)^2 = 1.86. This by itself explains most of the difference, with the remainder being the armor protection for the pilot, self-sealing gas tanks, extra structure for high fuel fraction for escort duty (P-51), and heavier armament that came to be considered as “mission essential” as the war progressed (such armor and self-sealing tanks were not present in the early versions of the Zero, Spitfire, and Bf 109). There is also variation with technology. For example, the P-51H got faster and lighter than the P-51D, which was due to simultaneous reduction of load factors (changing the definition of the mission) and water/alcohol injection jumping its power from 1380HP to temporarily 2200HP where its new top speed of 487mph was measured (and not requiring an increase in engine weight). But, except for such technology jumps, what is “lightweight” changes over time basically in proportion to the square of speed increase and then linearly with pounds added or subtracted with mission change.
Now the references showing that efficient single engine WWII fighters really are lightweights in the eyes of their designers and the literature may be given. First literature favoring this position (over 20 references) is presented, followed by the only 2 (very brief) references I could find that use the term “standard” fighter in reference to efficient single engine WWII fighters. Both of these references can only be interpreted to indicate that standard IS lightweight rather than being any different. I find only one reference that indicates that any of the efficient single engine fighters are anything other than lightweight, and it is a self-published on-line article that colloquially describes the Fw 190 as a small fighter but not exactly a lightweight.
1. “Development of the P-51 Long Range Escort Fighter”, Paul Ludwig, Classic Publications, 2003. The author, a former U.S. Navy pilot, does a tremendous research job, performing interviews with many of the surviving designers, and tracking down key documents. This research is so detailed as to include phone transcripts of general officer conversations on this subject.
P. 34: “Breaking away from large and heavy designs, Edgar Schmued led America and perhaps the world during WWII in creating the concept of the lightweight fighter”.
P. 34-35: “Schmued’s XP-51 was one of the first aircraft designed from the start to making light weight a modern goal in fighter design”.
Schmued is probably given excessive innovator credit in the above two quotes, since many other designers of the WWII timeframe clearly understood and designed to achieve lightweight fighter virtues. But, the quotes do show that Schmued, among many others, did understand the lightweight fighter concept, and applied it to the P-51. He so much applied it that further weight reductions were a theme throughout the entire P-51 program, and he then continued it as chief designer of the F-86 and F-5.
P. 54: The USAAF was committed to the heavy P-38 and P-47, as the senior leadership did not believe small fighters could perform long range bomber escort. “The slim little Mustang eventually took over the job only after all other possible fighter alternative were first given a chance.”
P. 133: The issue of a lightweight making better use of critical resources was well understood by USAAF leadership and key decision makers. For example, here Col. (later Maj. Gen) Benjamin Chidlaw, chief of the experimental engineering branch, in evaluating production priority of the lightweight P-51 and the heavyweight P-38, reports in June 1943 to his commanders as follows: “...at first glance from a comparison of dollars, man-hours, fuel used, materials, versus performance, it might seem uneconomical to go on building P-38’s as against P-51’s on a STRICTLY FIGHTER BASIS.” But, knowing the generals loved the P-38, he continued “On the other hand, from a fighter-bomber-torpedo-photographic reconnaissance general utility stand point, the P-38 comes close to being the best all-around airplane we have.” Interestingly, Chidlaw thought the P-51 needed to be even lighter, which would come in a later model.
This shows that the P-51 was understood in 1943 by USAAC LEADERSHIP to deliver the key lightweight fighter STRATEGIC advantage of best (minimum) RESOURCE USAGE for the fighter mission, but the USAAF was stuck in Groupthink in believing that a larger, more general-purpose plane was justified in consuming twice the resources. This was a terrible error for the ETO bomber campaign, only corrected when the United States was on the verge of stopping the bomber campaign due to unsustainable losses. The lightweight P-51 then saved the day (if this is further disputed, I will provide a larger stack of references directly on that point).
P. 162: The P-38 could not meet production demands, and there were no P-38’s in the ETO until Oct. 1943. Production was then starting to approach demand, but earlier fielding of the Mustang consuming half the resources could have met demand much faster. By Dec 1943, the P-51 and P-38 were together performing bomber escort.
P. 155: At 56% power (bomber escort cruise), the light and efficient Mustang burned only 51 gallons per hour. The P-38 burned 120 gallons per hour (p. 186).
2. “Mustang Designer: Edgar Schmued and the P-51”, by Ray Wagner, Orion Books, 1990.
P. 127: “Another advantage of the P-51 was its relatively low cost. Air Force data indicates an average unit cost in 1945 of $50,985, compared to $83,000 for the P-47, and $97,147 for the P-38”. After surprise value, the next key advantage for lightweight fighters is low cost allowing higher numbers. The classic and key number comes to the top here: Efficient single engine lightweights do the job better plane for plane, at HALF the cost. This is of GIGANTIC strategic significance, the weightiest issue there is in the subject of light and heavy fighters.
P. 133: “It is clear the Mustang enabled the air battle over Germany to be won.” You want more, you’ll get a wall of words on this also.
P. 133: “Flying 213,872 sorties and losing 2520 planes in combat, Mustangs claimed 4950 aircraft destroyed in the air and 4131 on the ground. Thunderbolts flew 423,435 sorties, lost 3077 in combat, and claimed 3082 destroyed in the air and 3202 on the ground. Lightnings flew 129,849 sorties, lost 1758 in combat, and claimed 1771 destroyed in the air and 749 on the ground.”
The P-51 scored 0.023 kills per sortie, the P-38 scored 0.014 kills per sortie, and the P-47 scored 0.0073 kills per sortie. The Mustang enemy aircraft destroyed to loss ratio was 3.6 to 1. The P-47 achieved 2.0 to 1, and the P-38 scored 1.4 to 1. The P-51 scored 61% more kills in the air and 34% more kills on the ground than the P-47, while flying only 51% of the total sorties. The P-51 scored 180% more kills in the air and 552% more kills on the ground than the P-38, while flying only 65% more sorties. On a kills per budget basis the P-51 greatly exceeded these heavier fighters, as it was 60% the cost per plane of the P-47 and 53% the cost of the P-38. The per dollar efficiency of the Mustang against German fighters was 4.9X that of the P-38, and if you count in the value of protecting the bombers much better, it had to exceed 10X. Greater effectiveness for half the price is THE key issue of light vs heavy, both in WWII and ever since.
Note also that the P-51 was basically in service in the ETO for almost the same time as the P-38. Yet, if flew 65% more sorties, reflecting the lower cost and higher reliability and thus higher sortie generation rates of a lightweight single engine fighter.
That the light weight advantages of the P-51 were understood and valued resulted in a weight reduction program for it that is described in detail in Chapter 6 pp. 138-147. P. 140: General Hap Arnold saw chief P-51 designer Ed Schmued’s report on how British aircraft were lighter (they had lighter load factors). He then approved a program to further lighten the P-51. The direct quote from chief engineer Ed Schmued: “That was our go-ahead to build the P-51F. It was a marvelous exercise for us because we already had an airplane that was VERY, VERY LIGHT. Now by using some the British load factors and design requirements and our design improvements, we actually whittled 600 lbs off the empty weight of the airplane, and what an airplane would possibly have built.” (the P-51F did not enter production).
P. 143: The production lighter weight Mustang became the P-51H. Its empty weight was a very light 6586 lbs. Contracted production was for 1000, and 500 had been built when the war ended and production was terminated.
The point of explaining the weight reduction program on the Mustang is how clearly it illustrates that the virtues of light weight here dominated over the almost universal trend for fighters to gain weight in later versions. They knew they had a great lightweight fighter, and they wanted to make it even lighter. That the USAAF leadership understood this clearly is shown by the fact that they funded the development program, and then issued a large contract for production on the strategic plan that the P-51H was to supplement the P-51D as the bomber escort fighter for the final defeat of Japan. Not the P-38, even though it was doing well against the obsolete Zero late in the war, but the P-51D and the P-51H.
3. “The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet”, James Stevenson, Naval Institute Press, 1993. This book is devoted to the issue of light vs heavy, both in the modern age and with considerable background going back to WWII, and is deeply researched. The author is a career military aviation journalist, and knows everyone in the business. This authoritative and very detailed book is the summary of his lifework through 1993.
P. 33: “American fighter pilots have a saying, “first sight wins the fight”. History shows that 65% to 85% of the pilots never saw the aircraft that shot them down. As the former editor of the “Topgun Journal”, the author asked hundreds of pilots over a six-year period what single advantage they would like to have, that is, longer-range missile, more guns, better maneuverability, etc. To a pilot they all said, “the first sighting”.” This illustrates the extreme importance of being small, which cuts visual detection range approximately in half. This has been true throughout the history of air combat.
P. 44: The actual exchange ratio of the USAAF in the Pacific against Japan was 1.96 to 1.
P. 62: “Fighter aircraft like the P-51 Mustang, F8F Bearcat, and F-16 Falcon are examples of fighters that are lighter than their contemporaries (for the mission), are less expensive, and have greater performance. Because fighter aircraft of lower weight can have increased performance, can cost less, and can create a larger force (per budget), these three benefits are embodied in the term “lightweight fighter”.”
P. 63: “The arguments for lightweight fighters—lower cost, greater performance, and increased numbers, were as relevant in World War II as they are today. Consequently, on the eve of World War II both the Army and the Navy were actively investigating the benefits of lightweight fighters.”
P. 66: “The benefits of the lightweight fighter concept were not lost on the designer of the P-51, Ed Schmued.”
P. 66-67: “Another lightweight fighter success story belongs to the U.S. Navy with the development during WWII of the Grumman Bearcat, which was designed to fly from the evolving smaller aircraft carriers.”
P. 68: Leroy Grumman, founder of Grumman Aircraft Engineering, understood the benefits of lightweight fighters. “He penned his thoughts (July 18, 1943) to his chief designer, W.T. Schwendler. Grumman wanted to see if his idea for putting an F4F Wildcat-sized body around the F6F’s Hellcat’s engine was feasible (which also makes the direct argument for the Wildcat as another lightweight fighter). He assumed that the new airplane would have greater performance than the F6F (the Hellcat). Grumman’s memo to Schwendler is the genesis of the F8F Bearcat. His memo records both the Navy’s and Grumman’s rationale for building a lightweight fighter.” This memo is reprinted in its entirety on pages 68-70.
P. 70: “The Bearcat (about the same weight and speed as the Mustang) represented the quintessential lightweight fighter concept. It was a lighter airframe around an existing engine, resulting in improvements in almost all performance parameters”.
P. 70: “The U.S. Navy resorted to lightweight fighter design under the pressures of war, yet resisted lightweight fighters in peacetime.” This is a common theme in fighter procurement. The pressure of war is often the factor that forces acceptance of lightweight fighter virtues. This happened with the initial failure of the American bomber campaign in the ETO, and happened again due to Vietnam, which forced enough acceptance of the need for lightweight fighters that the F-16 was eventually procured after a hard fight.
4. “Bf 109: Versions B-E”, by Roy Cross and Gerald Scarborough, Patrick Stephens London, 1972. This book is a very detailed study of the design and combat history of the Bf 109.
Pages 7-8: “The 109 apparently was not designed to accept wing armament at all, and it seems fair to say that despite wing strengthening this omission proved to be a limiting factor late in the life of the aircraft, although no criticism of the firm is implied since the armament (two synchronized machine guns, plus the possibility of a third in unit with the engine) was specified by the RLM. This modest firepower was consistent with their requirement for a LIGHTWEIGHT high-speed interceptor with a ceiling of nearly 33,000 ft.” Just enough armament and no more is a classic lightweight fighter design criterion. This page goes further in explaining the manufacturing virtues of the Bf 109, another typical lightweight fighter feature.
P. 56: “Its simplicity and economy of construction was a by-product of its original inception as a LIGHTWEIGHT fighter, but it certainly made possible the MANUFACTURE of the various models in total NUMBERS of one type unprecedented to this day...” This further confirms the Bf 109 as a light fighter not only by direct statement, but by capturing the STRATEGIC lightweight fighter concept of simple and low-cost construction that makes best use of resources and generates a NUMBERS advantage. The Bf 109 was produced in greater numbers than any fighter in history, and this was due to its pure light fighter design. It did a terrific job for minimum cost and resource consumption.
P. 56: “Starting with the engine cowling, Messerchmitt made a special point thoughout 109 developement to provide total and easy access to the power plant and fuselage guns for rapid maintenance in the field”. Further details are then provided on this additional key point of a lightweight fighter—low cost maintenance and high sortie rate.
5. “Zero: Combat & Development History of Japan’s Legendary Mitsubishi A6M Zero Fighter”, Robert C. Mikesh, Motor Books International, 1994, Foreword by Zero Ace Saburo Sakai (leading surviving Japanese Ace).
The Zero chief designer was Jiro Horikoshi, a man of similar talent and lightweight fighter understanding to the chief designers of the Spitfire, Bf 109, and P-51.
P. 15: “EVERY weight-saving measure was taken. Engineers concluded that even 90-110 lbs saved could affect the ultimate success in an air engagement. Horikoshi said, “The margin of 100lbs between two opposing fighters was considered comparable to the difference between a veteran pilot and an unskilled novice. The fighter pilots compared themselves to the old Kendo (Japanese fencing) champions, and asked for fighters with the quality of the Japanese master craftsman’s Japanese sword. As a result of our pilots’ figurative demand for the blades and arts of the old masters, the Japanese fighter planes were the LIGHTEST IN WEIGHT and amongst the most maneuverable in the world.”
There is no other way to interpret the above than the Zero being an extreme example of a lightweight fighter. It was in fact the lightest major fighter of the war, even lighter than the similar very minimalist Bf 109.
P. 16: Extreme requirements were placed on the Zero in terms of maneuverability and endurance.
P. 17: The initially available engines were the 875HP Zuisei 13, and the 1200HP Kinsei 46. The Kinsei engine would result in a fighter about 400 lbs lighter than the small American F4F Wildcat, but even this was “considered to be far to heavy, so the Kensei 46 was dropped from consideration”. The 950 HP Sakae 12, almost identical in weight to the 875HP Zuisei 13, would soon get the job.
Pages. 18-19: These pages go into detail on the extreme design measures taken to save structural weight. These included new materials and structural methods, along with lightweight armament, the classic lightweight fighter design choice to get maximum combat value per plane and per budget.
P. 21: “With regards to the aforementioned twin-engine and interceptor-type fighters, it is interesting to note that that a year later (1938) Nakajima was charged by the Navy to develop a 13-Shi twin engine twin-barette escort fighter with long range, which became the J1N1 Irving. It was Horikoshi, after finishing the design of the 12-Shi Zero Fighter, who was tasked to design the J2M1 Jack as a high speed interceptor. Interestingly, the design requirements for both these fighters were initially met by the Zero.”
It is more than just “interesting”. Here we note that Japan with these twin-engine fighters fell into the same mistake that the United States made with the P-38 and that Germany made with the Bf 110. In each case a heavy fighter was developed consuming two of the same engines that could be used to power a superior lightweight single engine fighter. How gigantic this mistake was became crystal clear once the aircraft entered combat.
P. 21: “Japanese aircraft engine development was usually one generation behind that of the Western world. Japanese designers became accustomed to trying to a achieve a performance comparable to Western designs utilizing less powerful engines. This meant HAVING TO DISPENSE WITH ALL BUT ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE DESIGN AND RELATED ACCESSORIES, while designing to the limit of the aircraft capacity.” This is the core of the lightweight fighter concept. “The Zero, more than any other airplane, epitomized this philosophy and is the best example of how successful it could be when all the conditions were right.”
“Designer Jiro Horikoshi maximized the Zero’s performance by reducing airframe weight to an unprecedented degree by cutting armor protection and employing an “extra super” duralumin alloy. Combined with an 840-horsepower Sakae 12 radial engine, the A6M2 Type Zero could attain speeds of 346 miles per hour, while exhibiting extraordinary maneuverability and high rates of climb.”
7. “Fighter Facts and Fallacies”, John Lee (Assistant Director of Research, United Aircraft Corporation), William Morrow and Company, 1942. This early WWII reference is a technical professional summary of the key fighter design issues and trade-offs, with all of Chapter 3 extolling low weight and high efficiency pages 30-35. Page 33 notes the effect of weight on cost. Smallest size for the specialized mission is noted several times as a key design goal. The issues were fully understood before and during WWII.
8. “Flying Legends: A Photographic Study of the Great Piston Combat Aircraft of WWII”, by John M. Dibbs, 1998, MBI Publishing, Foreward by Wg Cdr Geoffey Page DSO OBE DFC, Intro by Stephen Grey & Cmdr Alex Vraciu USN. Though this book would at first glance look like a picture book due to its extensive photography, its text is surprisingly strategy and design oriented, with detailed discussions of configuration issues like weight, range, armament, and agility.
P. III Introduction: The Spitfire was “a viceless LITTLE fighter”.
P. 15: The Spitfire had a “light weight airframe” that was from its original design “a pilot’s airplane” and “receptive to the pilots touch” despite later growth in weight, power, and mission.
P. 55: The P-40 was derived from the P-36A lightweight fighter.
P. 55: The P-40N final version was “a drastically lightened” sub-type. (like the P-51, it was recognized that these lightweight fighters would benefit from getting even lighter).
P. 145: The lower power of the Zero engine led to engineers’ straining to design the aircraft to be “as light as possible”. There is no other interpretation possible than the Zero being a lightweight fighter.
P. 145: Even after 1943, “The Zero remained a feared and worthy opponent DUE TO ITS LIGHT WEIGHT—its main rival, the Hellcat, was twice as heavy!” It was actually 2.5X as heavy.
P. 147 on the P-47: “That the Jug, as it soon came to be called, proved such a weighty aircraft is rather ironic, for the original P-47, designed by Alexander Kartveli, was build to meet a 1040 AAC requirement for a LIGHTWEIGHT interceptor, similar in SIZE and stature to the SPITFIRE and Bf 109. The USAAF leadership considered the Spitfire and Bf 109 to be lightweight fighters.
P. 171 on the Bf 109, it was a “small fighter”, and on P181, so small it had “a claustrophobic cockpit”. That tiny plane with a tiny cockpit well served the by far highest scoring aces in history, several with over 300 kills each, and many over 200 kills.
9. “Luffwaffe Fighters and Bombers in the Battle of Britain”, Chris Goss, Stackpole Books, 2000.
P. 9: Just before the Battle of Britain, “The Luftwaffe had already seen shortfalls in the EFFECTIVENESS of their twin-engine fighter (the Bf 110). They were soon to see how much harder it would be facing an opponent with far superior (single engine) fighters.”
10. “Comparing the Effectiveness of Air-to-Air Fighters: F-16 to F-18”, Pierre Sprey, 1982.
P. 15: “The P-38 was the least successful of these escort fighters; due to high losses and a poor kill record, by the spring of 1944 General Doolittle had decided to begin replacing them with P-51’s. The 17,500 lb P-38, despite its excellent 360 mph cruise speed and 400 mph top speed, was too large and too visible, too inferior in maximum g, and had both poor roll rate and poor dive acceleration. In addition, its two engines proved to be mostly a survivability handicap; if either one was hit over Germany, the aircraft was likely to be lost due to either fire or enemy fighters downing the straggler.”
P. 17: The WWII German single engine fighters were high performance LIGHT fighters.
P. 17: “The 10,100 pound P-51D (loaded) was the most successful of the long range fighters: it was not much larger than the Focke-Wulf 190A and Messerschmitt 109G, had a much better 360 mph cruise and 437 mph top speed, had better dive acceleration, could equal or out-turn the German fighters, and could match their roll performance.”
11. http://pogoarchives.org/labyrinth/11/03.pdf
“Reversing the Decay of American Air Power”, by Pierre Sprey and USAF Col. Robert Dilger, 2008.
P. 14: “The European war was fought by the United States primarily with three fighters, the P-38, P47 and the P-51. All three were developed after the World War II build-up started in late 1937. The P-38 and the P-47 failed as high-altitude dogfighters. Eventually the P-38 was withdrawn from Europe as a fighter, while it did continue in other roles. The P-47 was pulled from the bomber-escort role and then employed on close support and interdiction ground-attack missions. It failed as a high altitude, long-range dogfighter but became pre-eminent in the close support and interdiction ground-attack missions.”
P. 14: “The P-51 was initially developed as a private venture independent of the Army Air Force’s development bureaucracy. They favored the larger, less maneuverable and more expensive P-47 and P-38. After the P-51 was mated with the Rolls-Royce Merlin engine, license-built in the United States (a modification strongly opposed by the Army Air Force leadership), it became perhaps the best fighter aircraft in any World War II theater. Over 15,000 P-51s were ultimately procured, most of them with the Merlin engine. Interestingly, it was also the SMALLEST and least expensive U.S. fighter (escort fighter) – yet it had the longest range: 600 miles, compared to only 375 miles for the larger P-47.”
P. 15: “The P-51 changed the equation. The bombers acted as a sacrificial goat that attracted the Luftwaffe day fighters. The escort P-51s engaged the Luftwaffe fighters and with their numerical advantage, a superb performing aircraft, and pilots with far more training hours, they prevailed. It was P-51s that won air superiority over Germany just shortly before D-Day, which was the critical precursor necessary for a successful D-Day invasion.”
P. 6-9: The presentation of why Germany lost the Battle of Britain is very enlightening to why the United States was initially losing the air war over Germany 3 years later. England lost about 0.5 fighter pilots for each of their own fighters shot down (half the shoot down victims survived to fight again, now wiser in the ways of combat). The Germans lost all theirs. But even far more important was that England was trading low cost single engine lightweight fighters for expensive German bombers. Each bomber was over twice as expensive as a fighter, with a large crew. When the United States began its bomber campaign over Germany, each heavy bomber lost was about 6X as expensive as a low-cost German light fighter, with a 10-man crew. When bomber losses exceed even 5% per sortie, this loss becomes unbearable.
12. https://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/thunderjet-307269/ “Air and Space Magazine”, Aug. 2013. Directly states that Spitfires and Hurricanes are lightweight fighters.
13. https://apnews.com/c33c551582be4b479161257208e96812 , also at
https://www.koin.com/news/international/restored-world-war-ii-spitfire-begins-round-the-world-trip/
This Aug. 2019 Spitfire article says: “The lightweight fighter plane helped defeat the German air force in the Battle of Britain and the Spitfire has become an icon of World War II.”
Nov. 2018 article: Spitfires used for reconnaissance described as “ultra-lightweight fighters”.
15. https://www.chuckhawks.com/best_fighter_planes.htm
Bf 109 and Yak-3 were as small and lightweight as possible with powerful V-12 engines similar to the Allison and the Merlin.
16. https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=1949
Curtiss XP-53 lightweight fighter proposal was for an upgrade to the P-40. There were two prototypes. Indicates the USAAF leadership and U.S. manufacturer Curtiss considered the P-40 as a lightweight, and were simply seeking a better lightweight. It would be North American Aviation that achieved this key goal in the form of the P-51.
“Daily Mail”, Oct. 14, 2016, English newspaper article reporting the Fw 190 as a lightweight fighter. “The FW-190 was an advanced LIGHTWEIGHT fighter, which was more than a match for the early versions of the legendary Spitfire.”
18- 20. https://www.avgeekery.com/the-ultimate-mustang-north-americans-advanced-lightweight-p-51h/ http://www.mustangsmustangs.com/p-51/variants/prototype http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_fighters/p51_13.html Lightweight P-51H. The USAAF leadership and North American were so locked in to the P-51 being a lightweight fighter that they energetically pursued making it even lighter.
21. https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=790
Light fighters like the XP-57 and XP-77 are defined here as “VERY LIGHT” fighters, not the definition of “light fighters” that many editors have wanted to assume without references. There is NO literature to support only these very light fighters being defined as “light fighters” in the sense used in the references and thus in Wikipedia articles, while there is a large body of literature that efficient single engine WWII fighters are all lightweight fighters.
22. https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/03/f-35-replacement-f-45-mustang-ii-fighter-simple-lightweight/
Proposal for a 21st century light fighter that is the modern-day strategic equivalent of the P-51. It would be called the “Mustang II”. To be even smaller and cheaper than the Gripen.
“To keep down costs and improve agility, our modern Mustang will be a single-engine warplane. Of course, the F-45 will have all the air-to-air capabilities that the Gripen features in addition to what the F-35 is supposed to sport, including sensor fusion, networked sensors, helmet-cued missile launching, and lock-on-after-launch missiles.”
Just another data point to show how the modern literature views the P-51 as a lightweight fighter. This is a consistent theme.
23. “Military Reform: The High-Tech Debate in Tactical Air Forces”, Col. (later 4-star general) Walter Kross, National Defense University Press, 1985. This book is basically the general’s master degree thesis in book form. Kross tries to present both sides of the light vs heavy debate, ultimately coming down on the heavy side, while almost accidentally making a checkmate argument in favor of lightweights (see below final quote).
P. 47: P-51 as a cheap winner, vs. P-38 as an expensive loser, is a military reformer position.
P. 94: “Reformer cite the P-38 as an expensive loser and the P-51 as a cheap winner in WWII. In fact, both planes were winners. The leading US air aces of all time achieved their kills in the P-38 in the Pacific Theater.” True, but misleading. The general neglects to mention the P-38’s terrible performance in Europe, where it almost lost the air war by being unable to prevent Germany trading cheap lightweight fighters for expensive heavy bombers. He also fails to note that the even longer-range P-51 could and did do all that the P-38 did in the Pacific, for half the price. The only reason P-51 aces in the Pacific did not achieve as high a kill count as the P-38 aces is that they were there for much less time, since the P-51 was utilized almost totally over Germany. Only after the fall of Germany were they moved to the Pacific, where they got only a few months in action before the war ended. The USAAC final leadership position of the relative value of the P-38 and P-51 is ultimately to strongly favor the P-51, since the main escort plan was to use the P-51D and the new and even lighter P-51H for the B-29 escort mission to finally defeat Japan. Only the atomic bomb prevented that from happening.
P. 96: “In Europe, the P-51 did not appear in sufficient numbers until 1944, when the newer technology of the Merlin engine gave the P-51D the performance and range to escort Allied bombers to the heart of Germany. By contrast, the P-38’s engines were never upgraded because the Army recognized that superior performance in the European air-land theater be achieved MORE CHEAPLY by applying the newer engine technology to large numbers of single engine P-51’s.” Partly false, partly true, with the true part being of critical importance. The Merlin was not newer than the Allison, just better. And the reason the P-51 was late to the party was that USAAC leadership was initially prejudiced against the P-51 for being small, for being initially kicked-off by the British, and for having a British engine, and deliberately held it back (multiple sources, Paul Ludwig in particular). But, the general here completely makes the point favoring lightweight fighters, which is don’t waste good engines in expensive twin engine fighters when a single engine lightweight fighter will do the job better plane for plane, and you can have twice as many of them. THAT IS THE MAIN ISSUE, proven with both the P-38 and the Bf 110.
Binkster has made the claim that efficient WWII single engine fighters are not lightweight fighters, and are instead “standard” fighters that are distinct from lightweight fighters. There is no literature to support Binker’s claim, even as a minority view. Instead, the term “standard” is occasionally (though rarely) used in the literature to mean “standardized”, as in adopted in volume. Such fighters are almost always lightweight fighters. The only two references located to use the term “standard” are given below.
1. https://www.thoughtco.com/p-51-mustang-2361528
“Following the war, the P-51 was retained as the USAAF's standard, piston-engine fighter.” Here standard means it was the ONLY prop fighter retained in wide service after the war, not that it is different than “lightweight”.
2. “Conquerors of the Air: The Evolution of Aircraft 1903-1945”, Carlo Demand and Heiner Emde, Random House, 1968.
P. 164: “But Japan’s best known combat planes were produced by the Mitsubishi Company, and their A6M “Zeroes” were standard fighters of exceptional performance.”
Here “standard” is used to describe the very lightest major fighter of the war, which cannot be taken any other way than equating these terms.
The only one located is:
1. https://www.fighter-planes.com/info/fw190.htm
“The small Fw 190 was one of the greatest fighters of WWII. Designed by Dr. Kurt Tank, the Fw 190 was built as a sturdy all-round fighter, rather than a lightweight interceptor.” This is a Joe Baugher self-published on-line article. “Small” but “rather than lightweight” would seem to be clumsy wording for Joe meaning to say “Small, but sturdy enough to carry a bit heavier weapons that other lightweight fighters”. This brief statement is the only such one located that would directly contradict any of these efficient single engine fighters being anything but lightweight fighters.
This is a pretty slim reed to say the Fw 190 is not a lightweight, given the other direct references that it is, and the truckload of references above that similar fighters are also lightweights. It is also self-published, though by a reputable guy. I have no objection to noting it in order to provide at least one alternative reference to the clear majority view that efficient single engine WWII fighters are all lightweight fighters.
It is unfortunate that the term “Lightweight fighter” became the industry norm for “low cost, efficient, and effective fighters”. This term arose because of political struggle over money. Fighter manufacturers are like any other company—their primary goal is to make profit. When fighter manufacturers are told to propose a fighter design for a certain number of planes, then because fighters are sold by the pound (like all mechanical equipment), they often propose heavier fighters allowing more profit per plane. The more politically connected a company is, the more likely it is to try selling that kind of high profit fighter. Competitors then may try to win business with fighters that can perform the same mission for lower cost, which then must be lighter. Hence the term “lightweight fighter” was used to contrast these efficient fighters with heavier, more expensive, and generally less effective fighters. Better terms sometimes used in an engineering and military sense are “efficient” fighters or “effective” fighters, but those is not as marketable (though “effective” is used quite a bit), and are not the dominant terms in the literature. So, we are stuck with “lightweight” to describe highly efficient and effective fighters that are generally better war winners than heavy fighters. They win better because of the fighter effectiveness criteria that statistically, smaller fighters with superior surprise (harder to see), numbers (lower cost), and maneuverability (smaller size allows higher agility) will more often come out on top.
The common theme running through the literature, both of the WWII time frame and through later analysis of WWII fighters, is that the more efficient single engine fighters of WWII are ALL lightweight fighters (the only exceptions being the heaviest singles that should logically be called middleweights, but which the literature neglects to do). The designers of the efficient single engine WWII fighters, and the senior officers ordering them, considered them lightweights, and understood the key issue of getting maximum resource efficiency. The literature does not report that only “very light” fighters like the XP-77 experiment are light fighters, and instead reports that practical and efficient singles like the Zero, Spitfire, Bf 109, Yak 3, P-40, and P-51 are all lightweights. As the literature survey given above shows, that is by FAR the dominant majority view of the literature that addresses the issue. There is effectively zero literature that says otherwise. PhaseAcer ( talk) 23:30, 18 January 2020 (UTC)
the literature uses the terms "light fighter" and "lightweight fighter" interchangeably.