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"Complementary to the sociology of knowledge is the sociology of ignorance [1] including the study of nescience, ignorance, knowledge gaps or non-knowledge as inherent features of knowledge making." [2] [3] [4]
References
The result was: promoted by
Bruxton (
talk)
17:29, 14 March 2023 (UTC)
Since believing is something a person does, beliefs have customarily been treated as analogous to acts, so beliefs are good in the sense in which acts are right. Right believing has traditionally been identified with justified believing. So knowledge is justified true belief (JTB ). Sometimes, but not always, this has been understood to mean true belief for the right reasons. For several decades the concept of justification has received an enormous amount of attention since it was assumed that the JTB definition of knowledge was more or less accurate and that the concept of justification was the weak link in the definition. For the most part these discussions proceeded under the assumption that the aim was to arrive at a necessary truth and that the method to be used in doing so was that of truth condition analysis. An important set of counterexamples to the JTB definition of knowledge were proposed by Edmund Gettier (1963) and led to many attempts at refining the definition without questioning either the purpose or the method of definition. ... Gettier's examples are cases in which a belief is true and justified, but it is not an instance of knowledge because it is only by chance that the belief is true.
In its more modern forms epistemology has taken the analysis of meaning and the status of claims to knowledge as its quarry. Consequently, writers such as Bertrand Arthur William Russell (also known as the third Earl Russell, 1872-1970), George Edward Moore (1873-1958), and Ludwig Joseph Johann Wittgenstein (1889-1951) have attempted to delineate three kinds of knowledge: 1. Knowledge that, or 'factual knowledge' ... 2. Knowledge how, or 'practical knowledge' ... 3. Knowledge of people, places, and things, or 'knowledge by acquaintance'
Improved to Good Article status by Phlsph7 ( talk). Self-nominated at 13:31, 10 March 2023 (UTC). Post-promotion hook changes for this nom will be logged at Template talk:Did you know nominations/Knowledge; consider watching this nomination, if it is successful, until the hook appears on the Main Page.
General: Article is new enough and long enough |
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Policy: Article is sourced, neutral, and free of copyright problems |
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Hook: Hook has been verified by provided inline citation |
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QPQ: Done. |
I share this again here because the FAC review is quite long and more folks will see this here than will read anything in the archives there. I cite only myself. If for any reason this is not appropriate, please revert on your own authority and explain on my talk page. I'm only sharing what I think might help improve the article.
At this stage, I am mostly (if not completely) satisfied that the article does everything that it accepts as within its scope at the FA level. I am entirely unsatisfied, however, with respect to what I take to be the arbitrary and artificial restriction of this scope to (for the most part) the concerns of analytic epistemology. To elaborate:
In my first post to this discussion, I expressed considerable reservations (or, if you prefer, outright confusion) over what might constitute a "comprehensive" treatment of such a general issue. It has come to my attention, however, that there is an emerging consensus to replace this language with what is already policy elsewhere in terms of being unlikely to benefit from further additions.
I believe, however, that this article would benefit a great deal from the attention of editors approaching it from the perspectives of developmental psychology, speech or physical therapy, or pedagogy—among, I am sure, many other relevant disciplines. This is actually what I would most like to see.
Don't be shy about pinging me about any of the above that you would like to work on, but upon which you would be interested in further context from me. By default, however, I would encourage everyone to just be WP:BOLD!
Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh ( talk) 00:14, 6 April 2024 (UTC)
something from pragmatism and hermeneutics, consider adding it to Definitions of knowledge; the "Other definitions" section there starts with a short paragraph on pragmatism. That article is linked in a couple of places in this article.
knowledge of norms/ethics/morality/right, you said:
Someone writing an overview of analytic epistemology can excuse themselves from addressing such issues on the ground that these issues are better discussed under the separate heading of metaethics. A general article on knowledge, however, cannot take recourse to such an artificial excuse.I don't understand why this would be an artificial excuse. I think it's perfectly reasonable to cover this subject in the Moral epistemology section of Metaethics. I would want to see some overview sources that treat moral knowledge as an important category of knowledge to justify including such a section in this article.
Something that
PatrickJWelsh said in the FAC review text above may point to an important distinction not yet covered in this article. Patrick said: the Definitions section should have as its first subsection something about the "knowledge-how" to, for instance, walk and converse in a natural language. Way more people (basically everyone who has had a baby) care way more about this
.
In cognitive load theory, the abilities that you mention here are called "biologically primary knowledge", e.g.: "We deal quite differently with biologically primary and biologically secondary information. Recognising faces, recognising speech, using general problem-solving strategies, and engaging in basic social relations provide examples of biologically primary knowledge that we have evolved to acquire." [1] I'm not so sure that people "care way more" about this kind of knowledge as opposed to what cognitive load theory calls biologically secondary knowledge. I imagine that most people are concerned with the latter unless their kids are failing to acquire the former. But your comment raises the very apposite issue that it may be worth mentioning the biologically primary/secondary distinction in this article, in Knowledge § Others. Biogeographist ( talk) 18:42, 7 April 2024 (UTC)
References
Hi @ Ceoil, would you mind elaborating your justification for this [1] revert? I dropped the matter during the FAC review, but as written it misrepresents Foucault's basic position (especially when juxtaposed with the preceding sentence). For instance, from the SEP article:
On Foucault’s account, the relation of power and knowledge is far closer than in the familiar Baconian engineering model, for which “knowledge is power” means that knowledge is an instrument of power, although the two exist quite independently. Foucault’s point is rather that, at least for the study of human beings, the goals of power and the goals of knowledge cannot be separated: in knowing we control and in controlling we know.
Thanks! Patrick J. Welsh ( talk) 23:33, 6 April 2024 (UTC)
the extent to which knowledge is powerwith
whether knowledge is poweror
the extent to which knowledge and power are intertwinedor something similar. I assume this would solve Patrick's concern while also addressing the prose concern. Phlsph7 ( talk) 07:54, 7 April 2024 (UTC)
This is the
talk page for discussing improvements to the
Knowledge article. This is not a forum for general discussion of the article's subject. |
Article policies
|
Find sources: Google ( books · news · scholar · free images · WP refs) · FENS · JSTOR · TWL |
Archives:
Index,
1,
2Auto-archiving period: 90 days
![]() |
![]() | Knowledge is a former featured article candidate. Please view the links under Article milestones below to see why the nomination failed. For older candidates, please check the archive. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
![]() | Knowledge has been listed as one of the Philosophy and religion good articles under the good article criteria. If you can improve it further, please do so. If it no longer meets these criteria, you can reassess it. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
![]() | This ![]() It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
"Complementary to the sociology of knowledge is the sociology of ignorance [1] including the study of nescience, ignorance, knowledge gaps or non-knowledge as inherent features of knowledge making." [2] [3] [4]
References
The result was: promoted by
Bruxton (
talk)
17:29, 14 March 2023 (UTC)
Since believing is something a person does, beliefs have customarily been treated as analogous to acts, so beliefs are good in the sense in which acts are right. Right believing has traditionally been identified with justified believing. So knowledge is justified true belief (JTB ). Sometimes, but not always, this has been understood to mean true belief for the right reasons. For several decades the concept of justification has received an enormous amount of attention since it was assumed that the JTB definition of knowledge was more or less accurate and that the concept of justification was the weak link in the definition. For the most part these discussions proceeded under the assumption that the aim was to arrive at a necessary truth and that the method to be used in doing so was that of truth condition analysis. An important set of counterexamples to the JTB definition of knowledge were proposed by Edmund Gettier (1963) and led to many attempts at refining the definition without questioning either the purpose or the method of definition. ... Gettier's examples are cases in which a belief is true and justified, but it is not an instance of knowledge because it is only by chance that the belief is true.
In its more modern forms epistemology has taken the analysis of meaning and the status of claims to knowledge as its quarry. Consequently, writers such as Bertrand Arthur William Russell (also known as the third Earl Russell, 1872-1970), George Edward Moore (1873-1958), and Ludwig Joseph Johann Wittgenstein (1889-1951) have attempted to delineate three kinds of knowledge: 1. Knowledge that, or 'factual knowledge' ... 2. Knowledge how, or 'practical knowledge' ... 3. Knowledge of people, places, and things, or 'knowledge by acquaintance'
Improved to Good Article status by Phlsph7 ( talk). Self-nominated at 13:31, 10 March 2023 (UTC). Post-promotion hook changes for this nom will be logged at Template talk:Did you know nominations/Knowledge; consider watching this nomination, if it is successful, until the hook appears on the Main Page.
General: Article is new enough and long enough |
---|
Policy: Article is sourced, neutral, and free of copyright problems |
---|
|
Hook: Hook has been verified by provided inline citation |
---|
|
QPQ: Done. |
I share this again here because the FAC review is quite long and more folks will see this here than will read anything in the archives there. I cite only myself. If for any reason this is not appropriate, please revert on your own authority and explain on my talk page. I'm only sharing what I think might help improve the article.
At this stage, I am mostly (if not completely) satisfied that the article does everything that it accepts as within its scope at the FA level. I am entirely unsatisfied, however, with respect to what I take to be the arbitrary and artificial restriction of this scope to (for the most part) the concerns of analytic epistemology. To elaborate:
In my first post to this discussion, I expressed considerable reservations (or, if you prefer, outright confusion) over what might constitute a "comprehensive" treatment of such a general issue. It has come to my attention, however, that there is an emerging consensus to replace this language with what is already policy elsewhere in terms of being unlikely to benefit from further additions.
I believe, however, that this article would benefit a great deal from the attention of editors approaching it from the perspectives of developmental psychology, speech or physical therapy, or pedagogy—among, I am sure, many other relevant disciplines. This is actually what I would most like to see.
Don't be shy about pinging me about any of the above that you would like to work on, but upon which you would be interested in further context from me. By default, however, I would encourage everyone to just be WP:BOLD!
Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh ( talk) 00:14, 6 April 2024 (UTC)
something from pragmatism and hermeneutics, consider adding it to Definitions of knowledge; the "Other definitions" section there starts with a short paragraph on pragmatism. That article is linked in a couple of places in this article.
knowledge of norms/ethics/morality/right, you said:
Someone writing an overview of analytic epistemology can excuse themselves from addressing such issues on the ground that these issues are better discussed under the separate heading of metaethics. A general article on knowledge, however, cannot take recourse to such an artificial excuse.I don't understand why this would be an artificial excuse. I think it's perfectly reasonable to cover this subject in the Moral epistemology section of Metaethics. I would want to see some overview sources that treat moral knowledge as an important category of knowledge to justify including such a section in this article.
Something that
PatrickJWelsh said in the FAC review text above may point to an important distinction not yet covered in this article. Patrick said: the Definitions section should have as its first subsection something about the "knowledge-how" to, for instance, walk and converse in a natural language. Way more people (basically everyone who has had a baby) care way more about this
.
In cognitive load theory, the abilities that you mention here are called "biologically primary knowledge", e.g.: "We deal quite differently with biologically primary and biologically secondary information. Recognising faces, recognising speech, using general problem-solving strategies, and engaging in basic social relations provide examples of biologically primary knowledge that we have evolved to acquire." [1] I'm not so sure that people "care way more" about this kind of knowledge as opposed to what cognitive load theory calls biologically secondary knowledge. I imagine that most people are concerned with the latter unless their kids are failing to acquire the former. But your comment raises the very apposite issue that it may be worth mentioning the biologically primary/secondary distinction in this article, in Knowledge § Others. Biogeographist ( talk) 18:42, 7 April 2024 (UTC)
References
Hi @ Ceoil, would you mind elaborating your justification for this [1] revert? I dropped the matter during the FAC review, but as written it misrepresents Foucault's basic position (especially when juxtaposed with the preceding sentence). For instance, from the SEP article:
On Foucault’s account, the relation of power and knowledge is far closer than in the familiar Baconian engineering model, for which “knowledge is power” means that knowledge is an instrument of power, although the two exist quite independently. Foucault’s point is rather that, at least for the study of human beings, the goals of power and the goals of knowledge cannot be separated: in knowing we control and in controlling we know.
Thanks! Patrick J. Welsh ( talk) 23:33, 6 April 2024 (UTC)
the extent to which knowledge is powerwith
whether knowledge is poweror
the extent to which knowledge and power are intertwinedor something similar. I assume this would solve Patrick's concern while also addressing the prose concern. Phlsph7 ( talk) 07:54, 7 April 2024 (UTC)