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"Thousands wounded" do we have a precise figure or a source for this?
By 10 August, Anglo-Canadian forces had reached Hill 195, north of Falaise; however, they had been unable to capture the town itself.[36]
Falaise was not the objective of Totalize so the fact the operation didnt capture the town is a moot point-- EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 16:08, 15 March 2009 (UTC)
It's Hastings, sorry. I'll check in a minute. --
Eurocopter (
talk)
17:11, 16 March 2009 (UTC)
I have practically the entire set of orders for the operation as reproduced by Brian Reid in No Holding Back. I can type them up here if you like although i do think i posted them in the totalize talk page.-- EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 17:13, 16 March 2009 (UTC)
Ok additional sources for German strength and losses:
D'Este, pp. 430-431:
80,000 Germans trapped in pocket
10,000 German KIA
50,000 German POW
20,000 Germans escaped the pocket - source credtied as James Lucas and James Barker, The Killing Ground, p. 160
Shulman, p. 180:
remnants of 14 German Divisions totaling almost 80,000 men
Ibid, p. 184:
45,000 POW at least
10-15,000 KIA
Wilmot, p. 422:
remnants of 15 divisions - 100,000 men trapped
Wilmot, p. 424:
50,000 POWs
10,000 KIA
Ellis, p. 440:
14 divisions trapped (3rd Para, 84th, 243rd, 275th, 331st, 353rd, 363rd infantry, 1st SS, 2nd SS, 2nd Panzer, 9th SS, 10th SS, 17th SS, 116th Panzer)
Beyond the Touques river a further 3 divisions (331st, 344th and 17th Luftwaffe) were moved up under the command of LXXI Corps, Pnz Group West to help and try and cover Paris.
Reynolds (II SS Panzer book), p. 88:
3,043 German vehicles found in the pocket:
187 tanks
252 artillery pieces
157 light armoured vehicles
1,1778 trucks
669 cars
Ibid, p. 89:
a further 300 tanks and assault guns had been lost during the retreat across Normandy
States that it is impossible to give accurate figures for German manpower losses however the best caculations are by Herman Jung (Die Ardennen Offensive 1944-45) and Chester Wilmot (The Struggle for Europe) who both state 10,000 KIA and 50,000 POW.
What exactlly does Hasting say on page 313 as none of the above sources agree with German strength being 150,000 men inside the pocket.-- EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 18:36, 16 March 2009 (UTC)
On a situation map provided by Ellis, p. 448: The Falaise Pocket 16th to 20th August 1944 - it shows the forces surrounding the pocket but doesnt actually state they were committed to the fight to close or squish the pocket.
First Canadian Army II Corps 1st Polish Armoured Division 2nd Infantry Division 3rd Infantry Division 4th Armoured Division
First US Army VII Corps 9th Infantry Division 3rd Armoured Division
XIX Corps 1st Infantry Division 28th Infantry Division 30th Infantry Division
Second British Army VIII Corps 3rd Infantry Division 11th Armoured Division
XII Corps 53rd Infantry Division 59th Infantry Division
XXX Corps 43rd Infantry Division 50th Infantry Division
Third US Army - relieved by First Army's V Corps on 17th August XI Corps 2nd French Armoured Division 90th Infantry Division
Total: ~17 divisions
In light of the somewhat contridctory evidence provided above i think the section should be adjusted to provide as many viewpoints on figures as possible.-- EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 19:07, 16 March 2009 (UTC)
Comments, questions etc below as usual ;)
OK, bar the lead and a more detailed look at the casualties per the above, I think that's done. I'll do the lead tomorrow - enjoyed working on this one ;) EyeSerene talk 13:41, 18 March 2009 (UTC)
So, here's an interesting little footnote, though I'm not sure if it strictly applies to the Falaise pocket or to " Totalize".
In his memoirs of the war, Independent Member (1950), the MP A. P. Herbert describes a few days he spent, during the early stages of Falaise, visiting Montgomery's HQ - the general was an old friend of his. (An odd time to be having houseguests, if you ask me...)
He discusses briefly "a notorious war-book by an American, whom I will not name ... certainly charged with malice against Monty", which contained a story about an American officer who had proposed an airborne operation, using "the two airborne divisions training in Scotland" to close the pocket; this had, so the book ran, been enthusiastically commended by the US army command, then by the British headquarters staff, but was sharply quashed by Montgomery.
He then contradicts this story, detailing a staff meeting he sat in on in the evening of August 9th, where Montgomery was expecting the north-bound American force to push up through Alencon and Argentan "that night" (it's not clear if he means to take them on the night of the 9th, or to start the advance) and then drop an airborne force somewhere to the east of the mouth.
Of course, whether Montgomery intended to use it or whether he was opposed, it never materialised. Which leaves a few questions:
I've been meaning to post this for a while, but I've never spotted any corroboration for it. Shimgray | talk | 14:27, 19 March 2009 (UTC)
I'm going to get pedantic here as this is a proper name so both Falaise and Pocket/Gap should be capitalized. And it might be nice to set up some sort of OB infobox listing the divisions involved. I know that they're listed in the text, but get that at a glance would be nice. Sturmvogel 66 ( talk) 16:34, 19 March 2009 (UTC)
'Hastings speculates that if Montgomery, having seen the poor Canadian performance during Totalize....' Contrast this verdict with BA Reid 'No Holding Back: Operation Totalize, Normandy, August 1944' (let us know if you need references). I rather think that the 'delay' in closing the pocket is the stuff of armchair generalship. German theorists may have made Cannae an ideal victory but the Romans still won the Second Punic War, after all. Closing the gap wasn't compatible with casualty conservation as the Poles at Mont Ormel found out. Keith-264 ( talk) 00:35, 27 March 2009 (UTC) Oh and doesn't the British OH consider that the battle of Normandy ended with the crossing of the Seine? Keith-264 ( talk) 00:38, 27 March 2009 (UTC)
I'll have to go and fetch it but Reid writes in the vein of the 'apres-post-revisionists' who study what the Allies achieved in Normandy (destroying two German armies in 76 days and liberating France, Germany's greatest conquest) rather than carping about ideal cases. He doesn't spare Canadian failings - he outs Brigadier Booth as a boozer who was sleeping one off when he was supposed to be gripping a battle and the inexperience of some of the principal units involved but he also points out the difficulty of the task - the Germans obviously knew that if they failed in the north by the time of Totalise they failed everywhere, hence rapid advances by Allied units everywhere else - losing ground in the south and east was less important than holding along the Caen-Falaise road. Nonetheless the Canadian, British and Polish units bashed their way to Falaise and Chambois against the best the Germans had left.
Your sources may be limited but I think you have drawn on them to great effect.[;-) Keith-264 ( talk) 09:37, 27 March 2009 (UTC)
"By evening of 21 August, tanks of the Canadian 4th Armoured Division had linked with Polish forces at Coudehard, while the Canadian 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions had secured St. Lambert and the northern passage to Chambois.[10] The Falaise pocket had been closed.[10]"
Surely the pocket was closed when the 12th and 21st Army Groups joined hands? regards, DMorpheus ( talk) 15:38, 31 March 2009 (UTC)
While the article uses the correct-for-the-time Canadian Red Ensign (see infobox in particular), the two coloured maps both use the Maple Leaf which would not be designed until 1965. If anyone is able to reach the map designer, or can update this themselves, that would help correct the one oversight I could find in this otherwise excellent and informative FA. Radagast ( talk) 23:41, 6 April 2009 (UTC)
Congratulations on you all getting FA!
I don't know quite how I wandered into this, but I have been translating a few articles about Normandy and stuff. Initally I am doing pretty much literal translations of the French articles, many of which are minimal. But if there are any particularly that you would like me to translate, please leave a message on my user talk page. Of course they will not be perfect but I am not bad at making a good first draft, including and changin all the links and all that gnomework, and then someone else can come along and proof or add more information.
Congratulations again! SimonTrew ( talk) 23:29, 12 April 2009 (UTC)
Can captured enemy soldiers, prisoners of war, be counted as casualties in English language? -- Ukas ( talk) 17:53, 26 April 2009 (UTC)
Which should we be using here (see [1]) EyeSerene talk 16:14, 8 May 2009 (UTC)
Just to note the same sorta issue was raised in regards to the French in Tunisia. Apparently the Free French (an organisation established in London by De Gaulle) is not the correct term to apply to all French forces fighting on the Allied side following the fall of France and prior to mid '43. So in that repesct and in this case i think we should use the most approbirate article and rename it in the infobox Poland i.e. Poland etc-- EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 18:52, 9 May 2009 (UTC)
Please take into consideration also, that Poland had a long history of foreign occupation, fighting on the side of whomever promised the return of Polish independence including Napoleon as well as WWII Allies. In that sense, it remained politically alive on international stage always. The issue of adequate nomenclature is important here. Polish armies were present all over Europe precisely because the Polish lands were occupied, however, both Polish military and Polish government retreated through Romania in 1939 with its official structure practically intact. That century old tradition, unparalleled by any other nation, is the reason why to include Poland as such would be most appropriate I think. -- Poeticbent talk 14:48, 10 May 2009 (UTC)
It looks like the consensus above, and on the milhist talk page, is to use 'Poland' and to pipe the link to an appropriate article. Thanks everyone for the comments ;) EyeSerene talk 14:29, 11 May 2009 (UTC)
"Disappointed that a significant portion of Seventh Army had eluded them, many in the Allied higher echelons—particularly among the Americans—were bitterly critical of what they perceived as Montgomery's lack of urgency in closing the pocket"
My understanding was Montgomery had a genuine reluctance to close the gap because he was worried about the allied forces inflicting large scale casualties on themselves. I don't have a source though, possibly world at war or an exhibit on Montgomery at the imperial war museum, london, but I wouldn't swear to it.
Could anyone help out? The section is already well balanced though so I don't think it is a big problem.
BTW, Well done the the contributors to this article, it makes for an interesting read. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 78.147.138.99 ( talk) 20:09, 3 June 2009 (UTC)
The 'Falaise Controversy' disappears up its backside when you stop looking on WWII as a war of manoeuvre and treat it as a war of exhaustion (ermattungskrieg) like the Great War but with a few superficial knobs on. Why risk heavy infantry losses at Falaise when Allied methods were based on infantry conservation, which hadn't stopped the rate of loss in Normandy causing serious shortages? the crossings of the Seine were the barrier that mattered but sadly Monty's writ didn't run there just as it didn't in the narrows between Sicily and Italy in 1943 or in the air around Caen in June or Arnhem in September. Bradley's apparent lack of grip over Patton meant that the US force south of Falaise was weaker than it need have been, the French armoured division was a political token meant for other things and the Allies had the firepower to cash in on the German rout. This wasn't a defeat - it was a crushing victory which deprived Germany of its most valuable colony. Keith-264 ( talk) 21:02, 3 June 2009 (UTC)
I see it as a spectrum. The economic capacity to assemble a war machine bigger than that of the opposition is the most significant factor in industrial warfare after all. The grand manoeuvres of WWII didn't amount to much in the end. Keith-264 ( talk) 22:21, 3 June 2009 (UTC)
Refactored to untangle from the above (we don't usually thread comments in with other comments; it's fine to just post at the bottom of the section) EyeSerene talk 14:59, 4 March 2010 (UTC)
McGilvray, p. 54. What book? -- Totalserg ( talk) 06:55, 23 September 2009 (UTC)
Michael Reynolds in his work 'Sons of the Reich', p.89, quotes the Canadian OH, by Stacey, p. 271 and claims that for the entire period of 1 - 23 August the Poles suffered only 1,374 casualties.
Additionally, although not entirely helpful for this article, he quotes from the same page in Stacey's work the casualties for the First Canadian Army, during this period, was 12,659 casualties: 7,415 Canadians, 3,870 British and the above figure for the Poles.-- EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 18:56, 25 September 2009 (UTC)
Sorry for my bad english. I translate this article into russian and I have two questions:
This view, although widely held, had no basis in fact. In reality Montgomery had specifically ordered that army boundaries be disregarded for the purposes of sealing the pocket. The order to halt Patton came from Bradley himself, in contravention of Montgomery's instructions, as confirmed by Bradley in his own memoirs.
Possible item to investigate-- EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 00:18, 28 January 2010 (UTC)
Dwight D. Eisenhower said of the Typhoons "The chief credit in smashing the enemy's spearhead, however, must go to the rocket-firing Typhoon aircraft of the Second Tactical Air Force. The result of the strafing was that the enemy attack was effectively brought to a halt, and a threat was turned into a great victory."
From: Peter Grey and Sebastian Cox. Air Power: Turning Points from Kittyhawk to Kosovo. London: Frank Class Publishers, 2002. ISBN 0-7146-8257-8. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.86.52 ( talk) 11:18, 16 February 2010 (UTC)
Recently posted on the article itself: Ranger Steve ( talk) 19:36, 25 February 2010 (UTC)
-The Allied ground forces commander, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery . . .” is in error. Throughout the Normandy campaign Montgomery was a general, not a Field Marshal; he was not promoted to Field Marshal until 1 September 1944. This is common knowledge and should need no source, but use [Nigel Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield, Monty’s War Years, 1942-1944, [New York, McGraw-Hill, 1983], 832, 833.]
-“The Allied ground forces commander, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, had envisaged a theatre strategy of drawing German forces away from the US front to the British Canadian sector, this preparing the way for the US breakout.[22]” – Is not entirely correct. It would be more correct to say that, “By June 30th the British Army had not captured Caen, and now Montgomery issued his first directive that showed an intention of holding on the left and breaking through on the right. He directed the British forces to contain the greatest possible part of the enemy forces. This was a correct evaluation, brought about by the German reaction at Caen.” [Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Editor, the Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The War Years, Volume III, [Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970], 1969. This appreciation of Montgomery’s intensions is confirmed by British Secretary of State for War, P.G. Grigg, “Of course his [Montgomery’s] original idea was to break out of the bocage country around Caen into the open in the first few days after landing – it would be idle to deny that. . . . At Caen I am sure that he soon came to the conclusion that to break out would cost more casualties than with his shrinking British manpower he could afford and I know that he adjusted his plans [to protect British lives] . . . .” P.G. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgment, [London, Jonathan Cape, 1948], 373.
-“The First United States Army successfully ruptured the thin German lines screening Brittany . . .” suggests that the US Army simply walked out of the Carentan, and this was not true. It would be true to say that the bulk of German armor was in front of the British and Canadians at Caen. But to suggest that the German front at St. Lo was thinly held is to denigrate the performance of American officers and the infantrymen who had bled their way through some of the worse bocage country in France. Casualty figures just getting to St. Lo were brutal. Five excellent German divisions had appeared on the western flank in front of the Americans since the invasion: Panzer Lehr Division, 2d SS Panzer Division, 17th SS Panzer Grenadiers, the 5th Parachute Jager Division and the 353d Infantry Division. [Paul Hausser, General of Waffen-SS, Seventh Army in Normandy (25 Jul – 20 Aug 44), Historical Division, Headquarters, US Army, Europe], 1.
- “. . . Montgomery had for some time been planning a “long envelopment”, by which the British and Canadians would pivot left from Falaise towards the River Seine while the US Third Army blocked the escape route between the Seine and Loire rivers.” The original northern boundary for the Americans was the line Domfort – Alencon. [Sir Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1947], 407. On August 3 Montgomery moved this line north into the British sector about 12 miles to a line generally Ranes – Sees. [Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, Westport CN, Greenwood Press, 1972], See map facing p. 417. By August 8, Montgomery and Bradley had mutually agreed to again move the line north into the British sector about 8 miles to just south of Argentan – Gace, giving the Americans more room to close on the southern German flank. [See Wilmot’s map facing page 417] The meaning of these boundary changes is that the pre-invasion through August 3 British pivot out of Normandy was in the Sees –Alencon area. On August 3 the British pivot would have been changed to between Sees and Argentan. It was not until August 16th that the British pivot was moved to the Falaise –Argentan area, and then the southern most British road axis would have been through Argentan – Evreux. [See De Guingand, 408] The phrase “Montgomery had for some time been planning a . . . pivot left from Falaise towards the Seine. . .” is misleading.
-“Concerned that American troops would clash with the British, who were advancing from the north-west, Bradley over-rode Patton’s orders for a further push north towards Falaise and halted Haislip’s corps.” This statement is in error. Bradley did not halt Haislip’s corps, Montgomery did. Preeminent US military historian Dr. Forrest C. Pogue interviewed General Montgomery’s intelligence officer, Brigadier E.T. ‘Bill’ Williams in 1947. Dr. Pogue wrote, in part, “Remember (he) was in Freddie’s (De Guingand) truck near Bayeux when 2nd French Armored made its swing up and crossed the road toward Falaise. Monty said tell Bradley they ought to get back. Bradley was indignant. We were indignant on Bradley’s behalf. . . . Bradley couldn’t understand. Thought we were missing our opportunities over inter-Army rights.” Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, Interviews, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. From Carlo D’Este, Decision in Normandy, (New York, Harper-Collins, 1991), 451, 452. Also see Major General Richard Rohmer, Patton’s Gap, (New York, Beaufort Books, 1981), 226, 227 and William Weidner, Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap, (New Jersey, Xlibris, 2010), 334. Supporting documentation comes from Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, General Francis De Guingand, who wrote, “My impressions at the time were that he (Montgomery) had been a little too optimistic about the probable progress of 21st Army Group. . . . It is just possible that the gap might have been closed a little earlier if no restrictions had been imposed upon the 12th Army Group commander as to the limit of his northward movement.” Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory, 407. Bradley denied he his northward movement was restricted, but De Guingand’s reputation for veracity is excellent. Further supporting documentation is supplied by the War Diary of Air Vice Marshal Stephen C. Strafford. Strafford wrote about a meeting he attended with General Bradley on 14 August, “General Bradley explained on the map his general intentions. . . . He states that the American forces had little opposition between Alencon and Argentan and had started toward Falaise, but had been instructed by the C-in-C, 21 Army Group (Montgomery) to halt on the inter-army group boundary. There had been few German troops in the area when the Third Army forward elements had arrived there . . . .” The War Diary of Air Vice Marshal Stephen C. Strafford, AEAF, 14 August 1944, from D’Este, Decision in Normandy, 440, 441.
Bradley has put forward numerous excuses for his failure to close the trap from the south. None of them stand up to historical scrutiny. The excuse provided here, that Bradley was, “Concerned that American troops would clash with the British . . .” is one of his weakest arguments. One day after Bradley’s meeting with Air Vice Marshal Strafford, Eisenhower held a press conference. He told the assembled newsmen, “One of the duties of a general is to determine the best investment of human lives. If he thinks expenditure of 10,000 lives in the current battle will save 20,000 later, it is up to him to do it.” Captain Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1946), 645. Also see William Weidner, Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap, 343. Bradley’s self-described ‘chance of a lifetime’ gone because a few men may get killed or wounded during the battle. It does not make any sense. British historian H. Essame was right, “He (Bradley) would have done well not to make this excuse.” H. Essame, Patton: A Study in Command, (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 169.
A few days later, General George S. Patton, Jr. wrote, “I believe that the [halt] order . . . emanated from the 21st Army Group, and was either due to [British] jealousy of the Americans or to utter ignorance of the situation or to a combination of the two. It is very regrettable that the XV Corps was ordered to halt, because it could have gone on to Falaise and made contact with the Canadians northwest of that point and definitely and positively closed the escape gap.” Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940-1945, (Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1974), 508, 509.
I was under the impression that this had been dealt with in Bradley's memoirs, that he originated the stop because of lack of troops. What was it, hard shoulders rather than broken necks? I think the Patton jibe is all right but I'd want something calling it that. As for Falaise being a failure, come back Quintus Fabius Maximus, all is forgiven. Keith-264 ( talk) 16:51, 26 February 2010 (UTC)
Zetterling disputes the fate of the 12th SS Pz Div. "In many publications it has been said that the 12. SS-Pz.Div. only had a few hundred men left after the end of the Falaise battle on 22 August. This is completely wrong. According to the very thorough research in the records of casualties suffered by 12. SS-Pz.Div. presented by Meyer it is clear that the division lost about 8 000 officers and men, killed, wounded and missing.37 The casualty reports are almost complete for the divisions units, but those few exceptions warrant the round figure of 8 000. Given the fact that the Werfer-Abt., parts of the Pz.Jäg.Abt. and parts of the Ersatz-Btl. joined the division while it was in Normandy, it is clear that it had around 12 000 men on 22 August 1944. Even though most of its infantry were casualties, the division was far from destroyed. Certainly its combat power was diminished drastically, but its rear services seem to have been almost intact." http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/gerob/gerob.html Keith-264 ( talk) 11:58, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
Zetterling isn't a perfect source but he has at least trawled contemporary documents. Some parts of other Normandy articles reflect his findings, particularly the distinction between 'destroyed' and U/S or 'knocked out' as it applies to tanks. Mostly his revisions are a matter of the difference between front-line units and the formation or the mistakes of other writers treating detachments from formations (like kampfgruppen) as losses. On the whole I think he adds detail and nuance rather than a drastic rewriting. Keith-264 ( talk) 14:16, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
I wonder if that reflects an inability to write proper records in August? Could the discrepancy be reflected in September and October records? Keith-264 ( talk) 08:10, 28 July 2010 (UTC)
I moved the following here because it's unsourced and in places the tone is not appropriate for a current featured article. If reliable sources can be provided we can discuss working the text into the article where possible. Thanks, EyeSerene talk 07:22, 27 July 2010 (UTC)
Moved from article:
Saint-Lambert-sur-Dives was the last village in the narrowing gap between the Canadians and Polish forces advancing southwards from Trun, and the American and Free French forces pushing northwards from Argentan and Chambois. The capture of Saint-Lambert would finally close the "Gap", and trap tens of thousands of German troops in the Falaise pocket
On August 18, 1944 Major David Vivian Currie, commanding the Sherman tanks of C Squadron of the 29th Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (The South Alberta Regiment), with attached infantry from "B" and "C" companies of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada and the Lincoln and Welland Regiment (all of the Canadian 4th Armoured Division), was ordered to move from Trun to capture and hold the village, and to attempt to link up with the American forces understood to be advancing towards the village from Chambois. Events in and around St. Lambert over the next three days would eventually be recognized by the awarding of the Victoria Cross to Major Currie.
During the early hours of the action, four personal (((should be personnel/FW))) from the Canadian Army Film and Photo Unit arrived in St. Lambert in two jeeps. They were able to record the events as they unfolded in black and white photographs (taken by photographer Lt. Donald I. Grant) and on cine film (taken by cameraman Sgt. Jack Stollery). The cine film captures the moment when Major Currie sees a German convoy coming towards the Canadian position, pulls his pistol and steps out to take the officer commanding the convoy by surprise, forcing him to surrender his troops. Lt. Grant's still photo captures the German officer in the seconds after his surrender, his arms still in the air, and also captures Sgt. Stollery at the far left of the photo, his cine camera clearly visible in his hands as he films the events as they unfolded. The series of black and white still photographs taken on August 18th by Lt. Grant are readily available through the Library and Archives of Canada. Unfortunately the original cine film was destroyed in a fire during the 1960's while under the care of the National Film Board of Canada. Fortunately, pieces of the original footage were picked up by newsreel companies and can be seen in several newsreels released shortly after the battle.
Your take on the Falaise Gap is all wrong. Please, someone do some research on that thing. All of these gentlemen have an excellant reputation for veracity, you should carefully consider what they have to say.
"My impressions at the time were that he [Montgomery] had been a little too optimistic about the probable progress of 21st Army Group.... It is just possible that the gap might have been closed a little earlier if no restrictions had been imposed upon the 12th Army Group Commander as to the limit of his northward movement." Major General Sir Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory, [London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1947], p. 407.
At air conference at General Bradley's headquarters: "He [Bradley] states that the American forces had little opposition between ALENCON and ARGENTAN and had started toward FALAISE, but had been instruction by the C-in-C , 21 Army Group [Montgomery] to halt on the inter-Army Group boundary. There had been few German troops in the area when the Third Army forward elements arrived there...." Air Vice Marshal Stephen C. Strafford, War Diary, Chief of Operations and Plans, AEAF, 14 August 1944, PRO (AIR 37/574). From Carlo D'Este, Decision in Normandy, [New York, HarperPerennial, 1994], p. 441.
"It was some time later that Patton's bitter remarks to Bradley about Montgomery were allowed to be known, but even at the time there were some question being asked in London as to why Patton could not try and close the gap from the south?" F.W. Winterbotham, The ULTRA Secret, [New York, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1974], p. 158. Also see p. 148-158 for an interesting take on the Battle at the Falaise Gap.
U.S. VII Corps had closed the western gap on XV Corps's open flank at 10:00 AM on 13 August 1944: "At 10, General Collins called asking for more 'territory to take.' The Div was, in some places, on the very boundary itself, and General Collins felt sure that he could take Falaise and Argentan, close the gap, and 'do the job' before the British even started to move. General Hodges immediately called General Bradley, to ask officially for a change in boundaries, but the sad news came back that Fiurst Army was to go no further that at first designated, except that a small salient around Ranes would become ours." Major William Sylvan's Diary, First Army War Diary, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Sunday, August 13th: p.57 Since the halt order was not delivered to George Patton until 1130 hours, Haisip's open left flank could not have been a factor in Bradley's decision to halt Third Army, as Bradley later claimed.
Dr. Forrest C. Pogue's notes on an interview with Montgomery's staff officer, Brigadier E.T. "Bill" Williams: "Remember [he] was in Freddie's [de Guingand] truck near Bayeaux when the 2nd French Armored made its swing up and crossed the road toward Falaise. Monty said tell Bradley they ought to get back. Bradley was indignant. We were indignant on Bradley's behalf. De Guingand said 'Monty is too tidy.'" Dr. Forrest C. Pogue interviews, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Barracks, PA from Carlo D'Este, Decision in Normandy, p. 451, 452. Also see Richard Rohmer, Patton's Gap, [New York, Beaufort Books, 1981], p. 192, 193. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Falaisegap ( talk • contribs)
You haven't quoted Bradley. Keith-264 ( talk) 15:38, 22 November 2010 (UTC)
As it's about something that only ocurred once in its context (WW2), shouldn't this article's title be "Falaise Pocket" rather than "Falaise pocket" (which suggests e.g. a tailoring design potentially realized many many times)...? 213.246.99.215 ( talk) 19:50, 10 October 2011 (UTC)
I have undone the following addition to the article;
Although tragic, this seems too minor an incident to deserve mention in such a large operation. Certainly, details of the casualties is going too far for summary style. Also, the place where it is inserted could lead readers to believe that this incident was responsible for halting the Canadian assault, which I assume is not the case. The incident is not mentioned at all in the main article Operation Totalize. That article does, however, state that the commander of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, Rod Keller was seriously wounded on the same date by a US bombing attack, a more significant event (was this during the same attack?). Spinning Spark 10:39, 5 April 2012 (UTC)
In the aftermatch section, it said 12thSSPanzerDivision is reduce to 300men and 10 tanks. I read a book written by Kurt Meyer "12thSS" according to the German, the division return to Germany with 12,000men not 300. It has suffered around 8000 casualities during the Normandy campaign. The tank part seems about right.
That's similar to the conclusions of Zetterling. The 300-10 figure may be for a battlegroup formed from the most operational remnants of the front-line troops and the number who escaped may refer to the non-combat elements of the division. Keith-264 ( talk) 06:39, 3 July 2014 (UTC)
Spring-cleaned the page, removed duplicated citations from the infobox, added a few headings, tidied prose and references. Keith-264 ( talk) 10:48, 16 June 2014 (UTC)
Per the recent rollback. The Operation Tractable article, from which this article appears to draw its casualty information from, places the Canadian losses for the period at around 5,500. With it's source being: Jarymowycz, Roman (2001). Tank Tactics; from Normandy to Lorraine. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. ISBN 1-55587-950-0
Further up the talkpage, I note i mentioned the Canadian Official History places Canadian losses for the period at 7,415. That source is available online and can be double checked for accuracy.
The website linked to, while a good site, does not provide a source for the 18,000 figure and that contradicts information further up in the very same article.
It would seem some additional research may be in order to find a more solid figure (and figures for the other nations). EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 23:27, 12 September 2015 (UTC)
I wasn't aware they contradicted eachother, being under the impression that one (the 5,500) was for a single operation only, while the 18,000 one was for the entire Falaise pocket period. I think we should insert the 7,415 figure then until further notice, if that's the most reliable one thus far for all Falaise operations.
Also, we should definitely change it back to the more clear layout I made in my last edit. 80.61.189.47 ( talk) 11:41, 13 September 2015 (UTC)
Very well. Some more sources on the Polish casualties could be welcome too to avoid confusion: your source tells less than 1,400; the summary on this wikipage tells 1,700 if I understand it right, and most sites I came across say 2,300 for the 1st Armoured Div. while another says 5,150 in total (of which 2,300 for that division). 80.61.189.47 ( talk) 22:48, 13 September 2015 (UTC)
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This early version of the page seems to have been written in British English. Was there a reason it was changed to American? -- John ( talk) 10:32, 9 August 2017 (UTC)
Why does it say that Günther von Kluge was "killed in action", when he committed suicide after the failed plot to kill Hitler? He certainly doesn't seem to have been killed in action during the battle, which is what that is supposed to mean. -- Hibernian ( talk) 23:56, 12 August 2017 (UTC)
An anon user recently removed a sourced section of the article with the rationale that it was a "lie". I have just done a source review: "The Battle of Nrmandy was over and the Germans had been decisively defeated. ... More than forty German divisions had been destroyed, 450,000 men lost - 240,000 of these were killed or wounded." (Williams, p 204-205; with the latter part of the quote coming from p. 205). It doesn't look like the best source out there, but the article matches what the book states. The casualty rate also appears to be well within the the range provided by most sources (not as low as Zetterling's figure, and not as high as the 530,000 stated in some sources). Perhaps if the anon, if they come back, could elaborate on what the issue is and provide sources so the article can be amended or evolved?
Hello, I am looking to edit this article to improve sentence and paragraph structure. When reading certain paragraphs I found some sentences included too much information unrelated to the topic. I think re-structuring some paragraphs would give the reader an easy time understanding the material. I have to make edit suggestions as a part of my assignment in my college course. I will most likely just remove my edits after I complete my assignment because I don't think I could possibly make this article better. Thank you! — Preceding unsigned comment added by ME109262 ( talk • contribs) 00:01, 26 September 2020 (UTC)
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Archive 1 | Archive 2 |
"Thousands wounded" do we have a precise figure or a source for this?
By 10 August, Anglo-Canadian forces had reached Hill 195, north of Falaise; however, they had been unable to capture the town itself.[36]
Falaise was not the objective of Totalize so the fact the operation didnt capture the town is a moot point-- EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 16:08, 15 March 2009 (UTC)
It's Hastings, sorry. I'll check in a minute. --
Eurocopter (
talk)
17:11, 16 March 2009 (UTC)
I have practically the entire set of orders for the operation as reproduced by Brian Reid in No Holding Back. I can type them up here if you like although i do think i posted them in the totalize talk page.-- EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 17:13, 16 March 2009 (UTC)
Ok additional sources for German strength and losses:
D'Este, pp. 430-431:
80,000 Germans trapped in pocket
10,000 German KIA
50,000 German POW
20,000 Germans escaped the pocket - source credtied as James Lucas and James Barker, The Killing Ground, p. 160
Shulman, p. 180:
remnants of 14 German Divisions totaling almost 80,000 men
Ibid, p. 184:
45,000 POW at least
10-15,000 KIA
Wilmot, p. 422:
remnants of 15 divisions - 100,000 men trapped
Wilmot, p. 424:
50,000 POWs
10,000 KIA
Ellis, p. 440:
14 divisions trapped (3rd Para, 84th, 243rd, 275th, 331st, 353rd, 363rd infantry, 1st SS, 2nd SS, 2nd Panzer, 9th SS, 10th SS, 17th SS, 116th Panzer)
Beyond the Touques river a further 3 divisions (331st, 344th and 17th Luftwaffe) were moved up under the command of LXXI Corps, Pnz Group West to help and try and cover Paris.
Reynolds (II SS Panzer book), p. 88:
3,043 German vehicles found in the pocket:
187 tanks
252 artillery pieces
157 light armoured vehicles
1,1778 trucks
669 cars
Ibid, p. 89:
a further 300 tanks and assault guns had been lost during the retreat across Normandy
States that it is impossible to give accurate figures for German manpower losses however the best caculations are by Herman Jung (Die Ardennen Offensive 1944-45) and Chester Wilmot (The Struggle for Europe) who both state 10,000 KIA and 50,000 POW.
What exactlly does Hasting say on page 313 as none of the above sources agree with German strength being 150,000 men inside the pocket.-- EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 18:36, 16 March 2009 (UTC)
On a situation map provided by Ellis, p. 448: The Falaise Pocket 16th to 20th August 1944 - it shows the forces surrounding the pocket but doesnt actually state they were committed to the fight to close or squish the pocket.
First Canadian Army II Corps 1st Polish Armoured Division 2nd Infantry Division 3rd Infantry Division 4th Armoured Division
First US Army VII Corps 9th Infantry Division 3rd Armoured Division
XIX Corps 1st Infantry Division 28th Infantry Division 30th Infantry Division
Second British Army VIII Corps 3rd Infantry Division 11th Armoured Division
XII Corps 53rd Infantry Division 59th Infantry Division
XXX Corps 43rd Infantry Division 50th Infantry Division
Third US Army - relieved by First Army's V Corps on 17th August XI Corps 2nd French Armoured Division 90th Infantry Division
Total: ~17 divisions
In light of the somewhat contridctory evidence provided above i think the section should be adjusted to provide as many viewpoints on figures as possible.-- EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 19:07, 16 March 2009 (UTC)
Comments, questions etc below as usual ;)
OK, bar the lead and a more detailed look at the casualties per the above, I think that's done. I'll do the lead tomorrow - enjoyed working on this one ;) EyeSerene talk 13:41, 18 March 2009 (UTC)
So, here's an interesting little footnote, though I'm not sure if it strictly applies to the Falaise pocket or to " Totalize".
In his memoirs of the war, Independent Member (1950), the MP A. P. Herbert describes a few days he spent, during the early stages of Falaise, visiting Montgomery's HQ - the general was an old friend of his. (An odd time to be having houseguests, if you ask me...)
He discusses briefly "a notorious war-book by an American, whom I will not name ... certainly charged with malice against Monty", which contained a story about an American officer who had proposed an airborne operation, using "the two airborne divisions training in Scotland" to close the pocket; this had, so the book ran, been enthusiastically commended by the US army command, then by the British headquarters staff, but was sharply quashed by Montgomery.
He then contradicts this story, detailing a staff meeting he sat in on in the evening of August 9th, where Montgomery was expecting the north-bound American force to push up through Alencon and Argentan "that night" (it's not clear if he means to take them on the night of the 9th, or to start the advance) and then drop an airborne force somewhere to the east of the mouth.
Of course, whether Montgomery intended to use it or whether he was opposed, it never materialised. Which leaves a few questions:
I've been meaning to post this for a while, but I've never spotted any corroboration for it. Shimgray | talk | 14:27, 19 March 2009 (UTC)
I'm going to get pedantic here as this is a proper name so both Falaise and Pocket/Gap should be capitalized. And it might be nice to set up some sort of OB infobox listing the divisions involved. I know that they're listed in the text, but get that at a glance would be nice. Sturmvogel 66 ( talk) 16:34, 19 March 2009 (UTC)
'Hastings speculates that if Montgomery, having seen the poor Canadian performance during Totalize....' Contrast this verdict with BA Reid 'No Holding Back: Operation Totalize, Normandy, August 1944' (let us know if you need references). I rather think that the 'delay' in closing the pocket is the stuff of armchair generalship. German theorists may have made Cannae an ideal victory but the Romans still won the Second Punic War, after all. Closing the gap wasn't compatible with casualty conservation as the Poles at Mont Ormel found out. Keith-264 ( talk) 00:35, 27 March 2009 (UTC) Oh and doesn't the British OH consider that the battle of Normandy ended with the crossing of the Seine? Keith-264 ( talk) 00:38, 27 March 2009 (UTC)
I'll have to go and fetch it but Reid writes in the vein of the 'apres-post-revisionists' who study what the Allies achieved in Normandy (destroying two German armies in 76 days and liberating France, Germany's greatest conquest) rather than carping about ideal cases. He doesn't spare Canadian failings - he outs Brigadier Booth as a boozer who was sleeping one off when he was supposed to be gripping a battle and the inexperience of some of the principal units involved but he also points out the difficulty of the task - the Germans obviously knew that if they failed in the north by the time of Totalise they failed everywhere, hence rapid advances by Allied units everywhere else - losing ground in the south and east was less important than holding along the Caen-Falaise road. Nonetheless the Canadian, British and Polish units bashed their way to Falaise and Chambois against the best the Germans had left.
Your sources may be limited but I think you have drawn on them to great effect.[;-) Keith-264 ( talk) 09:37, 27 March 2009 (UTC)
"By evening of 21 August, tanks of the Canadian 4th Armoured Division had linked with Polish forces at Coudehard, while the Canadian 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions had secured St. Lambert and the northern passage to Chambois.[10] The Falaise pocket had been closed.[10]"
Surely the pocket was closed when the 12th and 21st Army Groups joined hands? regards, DMorpheus ( talk) 15:38, 31 March 2009 (UTC)
While the article uses the correct-for-the-time Canadian Red Ensign (see infobox in particular), the two coloured maps both use the Maple Leaf which would not be designed until 1965. If anyone is able to reach the map designer, or can update this themselves, that would help correct the one oversight I could find in this otherwise excellent and informative FA. Radagast ( talk) 23:41, 6 April 2009 (UTC)
Congratulations on you all getting FA!
I don't know quite how I wandered into this, but I have been translating a few articles about Normandy and stuff. Initally I am doing pretty much literal translations of the French articles, many of which are minimal. But if there are any particularly that you would like me to translate, please leave a message on my user talk page. Of course they will not be perfect but I am not bad at making a good first draft, including and changin all the links and all that gnomework, and then someone else can come along and proof or add more information.
Congratulations again! SimonTrew ( talk) 23:29, 12 April 2009 (UTC)
Can captured enemy soldiers, prisoners of war, be counted as casualties in English language? -- Ukas ( talk) 17:53, 26 April 2009 (UTC)
Which should we be using here (see [1]) EyeSerene talk 16:14, 8 May 2009 (UTC)
Just to note the same sorta issue was raised in regards to the French in Tunisia. Apparently the Free French (an organisation established in London by De Gaulle) is not the correct term to apply to all French forces fighting on the Allied side following the fall of France and prior to mid '43. So in that repesct and in this case i think we should use the most approbirate article and rename it in the infobox Poland i.e. Poland etc-- EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 18:52, 9 May 2009 (UTC)
Please take into consideration also, that Poland had a long history of foreign occupation, fighting on the side of whomever promised the return of Polish independence including Napoleon as well as WWII Allies. In that sense, it remained politically alive on international stage always. The issue of adequate nomenclature is important here. Polish armies were present all over Europe precisely because the Polish lands were occupied, however, both Polish military and Polish government retreated through Romania in 1939 with its official structure practically intact. That century old tradition, unparalleled by any other nation, is the reason why to include Poland as such would be most appropriate I think. -- Poeticbent talk 14:48, 10 May 2009 (UTC)
It looks like the consensus above, and on the milhist talk page, is to use 'Poland' and to pipe the link to an appropriate article. Thanks everyone for the comments ;) EyeSerene talk 14:29, 11 May 2009 (UTC)
"Disappointed that a significant portion of Seventh Army had eluded them, many in the Allied higher echelons—particularly among the Americans—were bitterly critical of what they perceived as Montgomery's lack of urgency in closing the pocket"
My understanding was Montgomery had a genuine reluctance to close the gap because he was worried about the allied forces inflicting large scale casualties on themselves. I don't have a source though, possibly world at war or an exhibit on Montgomery at the imperial war museum, london, but I wouldn't swear to it.
Could anyone help out? The section is already well balanced though so I don't think it is a big problem.
BTW, Well done the the contributors to this article, it makes for an interesting read. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 78.147.138.99 ( talk) 20:09, 3 June 2009 (UTC)
The 'Falaise Controversy' disappears up its backside when you stop looking on WWII as a war of manoeuvre and treat it as a war of exhaustion (ermattungskrieg) like the Great War but with a few superficial knobs on. Why risk heavy infantry losses at Falaise when Allied methods were based on infantry conservation, which hadn't stopped the rate of loss in Normandy causing serious shortages? the crossings of the Seine were the barrier that mattered but sadly Monty's writ didn't run there just as it didn't in the narrows between Sicily and Italy in 1943 or in the air around Caen in June or Arnhem in September. Bradley's apparent lack of grip over Patton meant that the US force south of Falaise was weaker than it need have been, the French armoured division was a political token meant for other things and the Allies had the firepower to cash in on the German rout. This wasn't a defeat - it was a crushing victory which deprived Germany of its most valuable colony. Keith-264 ( talk) 21:02, 3 June 2009 (UTC)
I see it as a spectrum. The economic capacity to assemble a war machine bigger than that of the opposition is the most significant factor in industrial warfare after all. The grand manoeuvres of WWII didn't amount to much in the end. Keith-264 ( talk) 22:21, 3 June 2009 (UTC)
Refactored to untangle from the above (we don't usually thread comments in with other comments; it's fine to just post at the bottom of the section) EyeSerene talk 14:59, 4 March 2010 (UTC)
McGilvray, p. 54. What book? -- Totalserg ( talk) 06:55, 23 September 2009 (UTC)
Michael Reynolds in his work 'Sons of the Reich', p.89, quotes the Canadian OH, by Stacey, p. 271 and claims that for the entire period of 1 - 23 August the Poles suffered only 1,374 casualties.
Additionally, although not entirely helpful for this article, he quotes from the same page in Stacey's work the casualties for the First Canadian Army, during this period, was 12,659 casualties: 7,415 Canadians, 3,870 British and the above figure for the Poles.-- EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 18:56, 25 September 2009 (UTC)
Sorry for my bad english. I translate this article into russian and I have two questions:
This view, although widely held, had no basis in fact. In reality Montgomery had specifically ordered that army boundaries be disregarded for the purposes of sealing the pocket. The order to halt Patton came from Bradley himself, in contravention of Montgomery's instructions, as confirmed by Bradley in his own memoirs.
Possible item to investigate-- EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 00:18, 28 January 2010 (UTC)
Dwight D. Eisenhower said of the Typhoons "The chief credit in smashing the enemy's spearhead, however, must go to the rocket-firing Typhoon aircraft of the Second Tactical Air Force. The result of the strafing was that the enemy attack was effectively brought to a halt, and a threat was turned into a great victory."
From: Peter Grey and Sebastian Cox. Air Power: Turning Points from Kittyhawk to Kosovo. London: Frank Class Publishers, 2002. ISBN 0-7146-8257-8. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.86.52 ( talk) 11:18, 16 February 2010 (UTC)
Recently posted on the article itself: Ranger Steve ( talk) 19:36, 25 February 2010 (UTC)
-The Allied ground forces commander, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery . . .” is in error. Throughout the Normandy campaign Montgomery was a general, not a Field Marshal; he was not promoted to Field Marshal until 1 September 1944. This is common knowledge and should need no source, but use [Nigel Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield, Monty’s War Years, 1942-1944, [New York, McGraw-Hill, 1983], 832, 833.]
-“The Allied ground forces commander, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, had envisaged a theatre strategy of drawing German forces away from the US front to the British Canadian sector, this preparing the way for the US breakout.[22]” – Is not entirely correct. It would be more correct to say that, “By June 30th the British Army had not captured Caen, and now Montgomery issued his first directive that showed an intention of holding on the left and breaking through on the right. He directed the British forces to contain the greatest possible part of the enemy forces. This was a correct evaluation, brought about by the German reaction at Caen.” [Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Editor, the Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The War Years, Volume III, [Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970], 1969. This appreciation of Montgomery’s intensions is confirmed by British Secretary of State for War, P.G. Grigg, “Of course his [Montgomery’s] original idea was to break out of the bocage country around Caen into the open in the first few days after landing – it would be idle to deny that. . . . At Caen I am sure that he soon came to the conclusion that to break out would cost more casualties than with his shrinking British manpower he could afford and I know that he adjusted his plans [to protect British lives] . . . .” P.G. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgment, [London, Jonathan Cape, 1948], 373.
-“The First United States Army successfully ruptured the thin German lines screening Brittany . . .” suggests that the US Army simply walked out of the Carentan, and this was not true. It would be true to say that the bulk of German armor was in front of the British and Canadians at Caen. But to suggest that the German front at St. Lo was thinly held is to denigrate the performance of American officers and the infantrymen who had bled their way through some of the worse bocage country in France. Casualty figures just getting to St. Lo were brutal. Five excellent German divisions had appeared on the western flank in front of the Americans since the invasion: Panzer Lehr Division, 2d SS Panzer Division, 17th SS Panzer Grenadiers, the 5th Parachute Jager Division and the 353d Infantry Division. [Paul Hausser, General of Waffen-SS, Seventh Army in Normandy (25 Jul – 20 Aug 44), Historical Division, Headquarters, US Army, Europe], 1.
- “. . . Montgomery had for some time been planning a “long envelopment”, by which the British and Canadians would pivot left from Falaise towards the River Seine while the US Third Army blocked the escape route between the Seine and Loire rivers.” The original northern boundary for the Americans was the line Domfort – Alencon. [Sir Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1947], 407. On August 3 Montgomery moved this line north into the British sector about 12 miles to a line generally Ranes – Sees. [Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, Westport CN, Greenwood Press, 1972], See map facing p. 417. By August 8, Montgomery and Bradley had mutually agreed to again move the line north into the British sector about 8 miles to just south of Argentan – Gace, giving the Americans more room to close on the southern German flank. [See Wilmot’s map facing page 417] The meaning of these boundary changes is that the pre-invasion through August 3 British pivot out of Normandy was in the Sees –Alencon area. On August 3 the British pivot would have been changed to between Sees and Argentan. It was not until August 16th that the British pivot was moved to the Falaise –Argentan area, and then the southern most British road axis would have been through Argentan – Evreux. [See De Guingand, 408] The phrase “Montgomery had for some time been planning a . . . pivot left from Falaise towards the Seine. . .” is misleading.
-“Concerned that American troops would clash with the British, who were advancing from the north-west, Bradley over-rode Patton’s orders for a further push north towards Falaise and halted Haislip’s corps.” This statement is in error. Bradley did not halt Haislip’s corps, Montgomery did. Preeminent US military historian Dr. Forrest C. Pogue interviewed General Montgomery’s intelligence officer, Brigadier E.T. ‘Bill’ Williams in 1947. Dr. Pogue wrote, in part, “Remember (he) was in Freddie’s (De Guingand) truck near Bayeux when 2nd French Armored made its swing up and crossed the road toward Falaise. Monty said tell Bradley they ought to get back. Bradley was indignant. We were indignant on Bradley’s behalf. . . . Bradley couldn’t understand. Thought we were missing our opportunities over inter-Army rights.” Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, Interviews, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. From Carlo D’Este, Decision in Normandy, (New York, Harper-Collins, 1991), 451, 452. Also see Major General Richard Rohmer, Patton’s Gap, (New York, Beaufort Books, 1981), 226, 227 and William Weidner, Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap, (New Jersey, Xlibris, 2010), 334. Supporting documentation comes from Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, General Francis De Guingand, who wrote, “My impressions at the time were that he (Montgomery) had been a little too optimistic about the probable progress of 21st Army Group. . . . It is just possible that the gap might have been closed a little earlier if no restrictions had been imposed upon the 12th Army Group commander as to the limit of his northward movement.” Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory, 407. Bradley denied he his northward movement was restricted, but De Guingand’s reputation for veracity is excellent. Further supporting documentation is supplied by the War Diary of Air Vice Marshal Stephen C. Strafford. Strafford wrote about a meeting he attended with General Bradley on 14 August, “General Bradley explained on the map his general intentions. . . . He states that the American forces had little opposition between Alencon and Argentan and had started toward Falaise, but had been instructed by the C-in-C, 21 Army Group (Montgomery) to halt on the inter-army group boundary. There had been few German troops in the area when the Third Army forward elements had arrived there . . . .” The War Diary of Air Vice Marshal Stephen C. Strafford, AEAF, 14 August 1944, from D’Este, Decision in Normandy, 440, 441.
Bradley has put forward numerous excuses for his failure to close the trap from the south. None of them stand up to historical scrutiny. The excuse provided here, that Bradley was, “Concerned that American troops would clash with the British . . .” is one of his weakest arguments. One day after Bradley’s meeting with Air Vice Marshal Strafford, Eisenhower held a press conference. He told the assembled newsmen, “One of the duties of a general is to determine the best investment of human lives. If he thinks expenditure of 10,000 lives in the current battle will save 20,000 later, it is up to him to do it.” Captain Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1946), 645. Also see William Weidner, Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap, 343. Bradley’s self-described ‘chance of a lifetime’ gone because a few men may get killed or wounded during the battle. It does not make any sense. British historian H. Essame was right, “He (Bradley) would have done well not to make this excuse.” H. Essame, Patton: A Study in Command, (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 169.
A few days later, General George S. Patton, Jr. wrote, “I believe that the [halt] order . . . emanated from the 21st Army Group, and was either due to [British] jealousy of the Americans or to utter ignorance of the situation or to a combination of the two. It is very regrettable that the XV Corps was ordered to halt, because it could have gone on to Falaise and made contact with the Canadians northwest of that point and definitely and positively closed the escape gap.” Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940-1945, (Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1974), 508, 509.
I was under the impression that this had been dealt with in Bradley's memoirs, that he originated the stop because of lack of troops. What was it, hard shoulders rather than broken necks? I think the Patton jibe is all right but I'd want something calling it that. As for Falaise being a failure, come back Quintus Fabius Maximus, all is forgiven. Keith-264 ( talk) 16:51, 26 February 2010 (UTC)
Zetterling disputes the fate of the 12th SS Pz Div. "In many publications it has been said that the 12. SS-Pz.Div. only had a few hundred men left after the end of the Falaise battle on 22 August. This is completely wrong. According to the very thorough research in the records of casualties suffered by 12. SS-Pz.Div. presented by Meyer it is clear that the division lost about 8 000 officers and men, killed, wounded and missing.37 The casualty reports are almost complete for the divisions units, but those few exceptions warrant the round figure of 8 000. Given the fact that the Werfer-Abt., parts of the Pz.Jäg.Abt. and parts of the Ersatz-Btl. joined the division while it was in Normandy, it is clear that it had around 12 000 men on 22 August 1944. Even though most of its infantry were casualties, the division was far from destroyed. Certainly its combat power was diminished drastically, but its rear services seem to have been almost intact." http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/gerob/gerob.html Keith-264 ( talk) 11:58, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
Zetterling isn't a perfect source but he has at least trawled contemporary documents. Some parts of other Normandy articles reflect his findings, particularly the distinction between 'destroyed' and U/S or 'knocked out' as it applies to tanks. Mostly his revisions are a matter of the difference between front-line units and the formation or the mistakes of other writers treating detachments from formations (like kampfgruppen) as losses. On the whole I think he adds detail and nuance rather than a drastic rewriting. Keith-264 ( talk) 14:16, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
I wonder if that reflects an inability to write proper records in August? Could the discrepancy be reflected in September and October records? Keith-264 ( talk) 08:10, 28 July 2010 (UTC)
I moved the following here because it's unsourced and in places the tone is not appropriate for a current featured article. If reliable sources can be provided we can discuss working the text into the article where possible. Thanks, EyeSerene talk 07:22, 27 July 2010 (UTC)
Moved from article:
Saint-Lambert-sur-Dives was the last village in the narrowing gap between the Canadians and Polish forces advancing southwards from Trun, and the American and Free French forces pushing northwards from Argentan and Chambois. The capture of Saint-Lambert would finally close the "Gap", and trap tens of thousands of German troops in the Falaise pocket
On August 18, 1944 Major David Vivian Currie, commanding the Sherman tanks of C Squadron of the 29th Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (The South Alberta Regiment), with attached infantry from "B" and "C" companies of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada and the Lincoln and Welland Regiment (all of the Canadian 4th Armoured Division), was ordered to move from Trun to capture and hold the village, and to attempt to link up with the American forces understood to be advancing towards the village from Chambois. Events in and around St. Lambert over the next three days would eventually be recognized by the awarding of the Victoria Cross to Major Currie.
During the early hours of the action, four personal (((should be personnel/FW))) from the Canadian Army Film and Photo Unit arrived in St. Lambert in two jeeps. They were able to record the events as they unfolded in black and white photographs (taken by photographer Lt. Donald I. Grant) and on cine film (taken by cameraman Sgt. Jack Stollery). The cine film captures the moment when Major Currie sees a German convoy coming towards the Canadian position, pulls his pistol and steps out to take the officer commanding the convoy by surprise, forcing him to surrender his troops. Lt. Grant's still photo captures the German officer in the seconds after his surrender, his arms still in the air, and also captures Sgt. Stollery at the far left of the photo, his cine camera clearly visible in his hands as he films the events as they unfolded. The series of black and white still photographs taken on August 18th by Lt. Grant are readily available through the Library and Archives of Canada. Unfortunately the original cine film was destroyed in a fire during the 1960's while under the care of the National Film Board of Canada. Fortunately, pieces of the original footage were picked up by newsreel companies and can be seen in several newsreels released shortly after the battle.
Your take on the Falaise Gap is all wrong. Please, someone do some research on that thing. All of these gentlemen have an excellant reputation for veracity, you should carefully consider what they have to say.
"My impressions at the time were that he [Montgomery] had been a little too optimistic about the probable progress of 21st Army Group.... It is just possible that the gap might have been closed a little earlier if no restrictions had been imposed upon the 12th Army Group Commander as to the limit of his northward movement." Major General Sir Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory, [London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1947], p. 407.
At air conference at General Bradley's headquarters: "He [Bradley] states that the American forces had little opposition between ALENCON and ARGENTAN and had started toward FALAISE, but had been instruction by the C-in-C , 21 Army Group [Montgomery] to halt on the inter-Army Group boundary. There had been few German troops in the area when the Third Army forward elements arrived there...." Air Vice Marshal Stephen C. Strafford, War Diary, Chief of Operations and Plans, AEAF, 14 August 1944, PRO (AIR 37/574). From Carlo D'Este, Decision in Normandy, [New York, HarperPerennial, 1994], p. 441.
"It was some time later that Patton's bitter remarks to Bradley about Montgomery were allowed to be known, but even at the time there were some question being asked in London as to why Patton could not try and close the gap from the south?" F.W. Winterbotham, The ULTRA Secret, [New York, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1974], p. 158. Also see p. 148-158 for an interesting take on the Battle at the Falaise Gap.
U.S. VII Corps had closed the western gap on XV Corps's open flank at 10:00 AM on 13 August 1944: "At 10, General Collins called asking for more 'territory to take.' The Div was, in some places, on the very boundary itself, and General Collins felt sure that he could take Falaise and Argentan, close the gap, and 'do the job' before the British even started to move. General Hodges immediately called General Bradley, to ask officially for a change in boundaries, but the sad news came back that Fiurst Army was to go no further that at first designated, except that a small salient around Ranes would become ours." Major William Sylvan's Diary, First Army War Diary, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Sunday, August 13th: p.57 Since the halt order was not delivered to George Patton until 1130 hours, Haisip's open left flank could not have been a factor in Bradley's decision to halt Third Army, as Bradley later claimed.
Dr. Forrest C. Pogue's notes on an interview with Montgomery's staff officer, Brigadier E.T. "Bill" Williams: "Remember [he] was in Freddie's [de Guingand] truck near Bayeaux when the 2nd French Armored made its swing up and crossed the road toward Falaise. Monty said tell Bradley they ought to get back. Bradley was indignant. We were indignant on Bradley's behalf. De Guingand said 'Monty is too tidy.'" Dr. Forrest C. Pogue interviews, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Barracks, PA from Carlo D'Este, Decision in Normandy, p. 451, 452. Also see Richard Rohmer, Patton's Gap, [New York, Beaufort Books, 1981], p. 192, 193. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Falaisegap ( talk • contribs)
You haven't quoted Bradley. Keith-264 ( talk) 15:38, 22 November 2010 (UTC)
As it's about something that only ocurred once in its context (WW2), shouldn't this article's title be "Falaise Pocket" rather than "Falaise pocket" (which suggests e.g. a tailoring design potentially realized many many times)...? 213.246.99.215 ( talk) 19:50, 10 October 2011 (UTC)
I have undone the following addition to the article;
Although tragic, this seems too minor an incident to deserve mention in such a large operation. Certainly, details of the casualties is going too far for summary style. Also, the place where it is inserted could lead readers to believe that this incident was responsible for halting the Canadian assault, which I assume is not the case. The incident is not mentioned at all in the main article Operation Totalize. That article does, however, state that the commander of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, Rod Keller was seriously wounded on the same date by a US bombing attack, a more significant event (was this during the same attack?). Spinning Spark 10:39, 5 April 2012 (UTC)
In the aftermatch section, it said 12thSSPanzerDivision is reduce to 300men and 10 tanks. I read a book written by Kurt Meyer "12thSS" according to the German, the division return to Germany with 12,000men not 300. It has suffered around 8000 casualities during the Normandy campaign. The tank part seems about right.
That's similar to the conclusions of Zetterling. The 300-10 figure may be for a battlegroup formed from the most operational remnants of the front-line troops and the number who escaped may refer to the non-combat elements of the division. Keith-264 ( talk) 06:39, 3 July 2014 (UTC)
Spring-cleaned the page, removed duplicated citations from the infobox, added a few headings, tidied prose and references. Keith-264 ( talk) 10:48, 16 June 2014 (UTC)
Per the recent rollback. The Operation Tractable article, from which this article appears to draw its casualty information from, places the Canadian losses for the period at around 5,500. With it's source being: Jarymowycz, Roman (2001). Tank Tactics; from Normandy to Lorraine. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. ISBN 1-55587-950-0
Further up the talkpage, I note i mentioned the Canadian Official History places Canadian losses for the period at 7,415. That source is available online and can be double checked for accuracy.
The website linked to, while a good site, does not provide a source for the 18,000 figure and that contradicts information further up in the very same article.
It would seem some additional research may be in order to find a more solid figure (and figures for the other nations). EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 23:27, 12 September 2015 (UTC)
I wasn't aware they contradicted eachother, being under the impression that one (the 5,500) was for a single operation only, while the 18,000 one was for the entire Falaise pocket period. I think we should insert the 7,415 figure then until further notice, if that's the most reliable one thus far for all Falaise operations.
Also, we should definitely change it back to the more clear layout I made in my last edit. 80.61.189.47 ( talk) 11:41, 13 September 2015 (UTC)
Very well. Some more sources on the Polish casualties could be welcome too to avoid confusion: your source tells less than 1,400; the summary on this wikipage tells 1,700 if I understand it right, and most sites I came across say 2,300 for the 1st Armoured Div. while another says 5,150 in total (of which 2,300 for that division). 80.61.189.47 ( talk) 22:48, 13 September 2015 (UTC)
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This early version of the page seems to have been written in British English. Was there a reason it was changed to American? -- John ( talk) 10:32, 9 August 2017 (UTC)
Why does it say that Günther von Kluge was "killed in action", when he committed suicide after the failed plot to kill Hitler? He certainly doesn't seem to have been killed in action during the battle, which is what that is supposed to mean. -- Hibernian ( talk) 23:56, 12 August 2017 (UTC)
An anon user recently removed a sourced section of the article with the rationale that it was a "lie". I have just done a source review: "The Battle of Nrmandy was over and the Germans had been decisively defeated. ... More than forty German divisions had been destroyed, 450,000 men lost - 240,000 of these were killed or wounded." (Williams, p 204-205; with the latter part of the quote coming from p. 205). It doesn't look like the best source out there, but the article matches what the book states. The casualty rate also appears to be well within the the range provided by most sources (not as low as Zetterling's figure, and not as high as the 530,000 stated in some sources). Perhaps if the anon, if they come back, could elaborate on what the issue is and provide sources so the article can be amended or evolved?
Hello, I am looking to edit this article to improve sentence and paragraph structure. When reading certain paragraphs I found some sentences included too much information unrelated to the topic. I think re-structuring some paragraphs would give the reader an easy time understanding the material. I have to make edit suggestions as a part of my assignment in my college course. I will most likely just remove my edits after I complete my assignment because I don't think I could possibly make this article better. Thank you! — Preceding unsigned comment added by ME109262 ( talk • contribs) 00:01, 26 September 2020 (UTC)