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I added "(because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March)" and "(thanks in part to Yamamoto's haste)". I question the accuracy of "This information was in the hands of both Nagumo and Yamamoto prior". Willmott's Barrier and the Javelin suggests Nagumo had not picked up the signals from Tokyo, & Yamamoto would not re-radiate it for fear of giving away the position of his Covering Force. Trekphiler 19:50, 19 November 2006 (UTC)
Actually, if you read the Japanese carrier air group reports, it's clear that Nagumo *did* have this information in his hands *before* the battle. Akagi's summary report makes that very clear. See Shattered Sword pp. 99-104 for a discussion of this topic. The bottom line is that the Japanese communications network was disseminating current intel information to *all* the Japanese formations (including Nagumo's), and that that information was in Nagumo's hands. The issue, then, is more one of interpretation on Nagumo's part--it seems clear he chose not to alter his scouting dispositions in response to current intel.
-jon parshall- —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jparshall ( talk • contribs) 18:15, 18 January 2009 (UTC)
After "California Here I Come", I'm inclined to add "(probably a deception, in case Japan still had active spies on Oahu.)" It's speculation, tho.
I deleted "By any analysis, a loss of that magnitude would have prolonged the war in the Pacific." This is by no means certain. It might have forced Nimitz to change focus, increasing emphasis on submarines, thus compelling a cure to the problems with the Mark XIV torpedo (historically not cured until September 1943), which would have increased damage to Japanese trade and thus shortened the war. This would almost certainly have put paid to "guerrilla submarine" missions. In addition, it's likely to have undercut MacArthur's operations in the South West Pacific Area and his mania for return to the Philippines. (Unfortunately, this falls into "original research"...) The whole "impact" section smells of speculation; I'm inclined to delete.
Also, "Halsey himself was stricken with psoriasis". Was he? I've read it was shingles, & the sources I've seen can't seem to agree.
Finally, I added, "At least part of this was a product of fatigue; Japanese carriers had been constantly on operations since 7 December 1941, including pinprick raids on Darwin and Colombo." This is based on Willmott's B&J. Trekphiler 15:59, 6 December 2006 (UTC)
The sites:
http://www.psoriasis.org/about/psoriasis/
and
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/shingles/shingles.htm
point out that the first is chronic and itchy and some palliative anti-malarials were available at the time, the second is episodic, painfull (think 50 to 100 recurring cigarette burns) and untreatable at that time since there were no anti-viral meds. It is unlikely that Adm. Halsey would have been incapacitated by the first, but quite likely by the second.
68.100.243.51 16:28, 14 April 2007 (UTC) Uveges 12:25, 14 April 2007 (DST)
I just noticed that the sidebar on this page states that the Japanese had 264 Carrier aircraft and 16 float planes at the battle. It also states that 332 of their carrier aircraft were destroyed in the course of the battle. I know that Midway was a stunning victory, but that is 68 more planes than they supposedly had! I understand that sources may differ on such detalis but logic dictates that either or the other can be correct, but not both. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.54.62.114 ( talk) 00:39, 22 July 2008 (UTC)
I'm sorry, I'm a novice at Wikipedia. I would like for someone to add this to the "initial attacks" section: Although most sources say 108 aircraft attacked Midway, the Japanese after-action report says 107. The HIRYU only put up 17 (not 18) attack planes. [See ref: The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway] The Japanese attack on Midway resulted in the loss of 9 aircraft, 5 due to fighter action, and 4 due to anti-aircraft fire. Two Zeros may have been scrapped upon return to the HIRYU. [See ref: The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.161.61.35 ( talk) 16:44, 1 March 2009 (UTC)
"the second wave's torpedo bombers mistook her for an intact carrier." It's fact-tagged, but I've read it somewhere, too.
"Even more important was the irredeemable loss of four of Japan's fleet carriers." It's sourced, but I call that POV; carriers without aircrews are expensive toys, not fighting units. Trekphiler ( talk) 17:23, 6 February 2008 (UTC)
Yeah, but as I explain in Shattered Sword, the aircraft the Japanese lost at Midway could be replaced in a matter of weeks, even at the relatively anemic aircraft production rates the Japanese were putting out in 1942. The carriers, on the other hand, could not be replaced for *years*. There's no question that had the Japanese carriers survived Midway, their airgroups could have been reconstituted. The carriers were, therefore, by *far* the most precious assets the Japanese lost that day.
-jon parshall- —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jparshall ( talk • contribs) 19:52, 18 January 2009 (UTC)
It was the pilots. By the time of The battle of Coral Sea the IJN had carriers and planes but no qualified pilots. You are right - they were just expensive decoys.
In Isom's "Midway Inquest" the facts seem less certain than this article. Should the article identify disputes? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.152.242.65 ( talk) 02:25, 21 April 2009 (UTC)
Gene McPhail Sirgorpster ( talk) 02:09, 21 April 2009 (UTC)
I see that one Trekphiler has deleted my couple of sentences about the consequence of a Japanese victory at Midway for the "Germany First" strategy, despite their being sourced to a speech by former SecNav Schlesinger.
Exactly how does one evaluate the "impact" of a battle -- Marathon? Waterloo? Stalingrad? -- without considering the results had it gone the other way? That is not "fiction."
I don't see why a narrow notion of history's permissible scope should be an excuse for deleting valid analysis of why a battle was important. -- Andersonblog ( talk) 17:40, 6 July 2008 (UTC)
The "Impact" section states that the loss of four carriers was a heavier blow than the loss of experienced pilots at Midway. I am not sure it is objectively possible to say that one of these had greater impact than the other. My own feeling is that the loss of pilots was the greater blow to the Japanese than the loss of carriers. In 1942, the Japanese still had capability to build carriers and also convert other ships to carriers. Building (i.e. training) an experienced pilot is something else; this takes time. As Saburo Sakai showed, the Zero in experienced hands was still a very formidable weapon in 1942. But in inexperienced hands, the Zero's lack of armor and self-sealing fuel tanks were much more exposed. Pilots like Sakai were good enough to evade being shot, thus making the Zero's weak defense a minor point. At Midway, the Japanese lost many irreplacable Sakai's. -- Westwind273 ( talk) 09:21, 1 August 2008 (UTC)
Speculation about the consequences of alternate outcomes to the battle should only be included if they are quotes from published historians, with appropriate citations and references. Speculation by Wikipedians is
original research and has no place in Wikipedia articles. -
Aprogressivist (
talk) 13:16, 20 February 2009 (UTC)
The TV mini-series "War and Remembrance", which starred Robert Mitchum and MANY other famous actors and actresses is not included in the "in film" credits for this historical battle. The 'Battle of Midway' episode in that series is FAR more historically accurate than the movie: "Battle of Midway" which starred Charlto Heston (and many others), so I think it should at least be mentioned under the "in film" category. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 96.13.254.157 ( talk) 17:46, 2 January 2009 (UTC)
The Japanese losses exceed their initial strength. How can this be? Dapi89 ( talk) 00:17, 17 January 2009 (UTC)
I'm wondering whether some thought should be given to following Japanese convention - Family name followed by given name(s) when listing Japanese names in these articles eg; Yamamoto Isoroku instead of Isoroku Yamamoto. Surely this would be more accurate and more encyclopaedic than using Western convention? Minorhistorian ( talk) 22:35, 22 January 2009 (UTC)
Hi! I don't have a time to check all statements in this article but just in infobox I have found 2 statements without citations. I added one (but I'm not sure if it's true because I have seen other numbers too) but the 2nd is evidently wrong. Do you realy thing that article without citations and unverified (and wrong) statesments IS FEATURED article? Even in the "featured" article the statement about losses wasn't supported by citation. -- Sceadugenga ( talk) 14:31, 21 April 2009 (UTC)
It's a minor point, but is there really consensus to have the date of the battle 4 June 1942? This has been swapped within the past year, and will be mildly disconcerting to many of the readers about this battle, who will be Americans, not British or Australians. Septentrionalis PMAnderson 18:05, 23 April 2009 (UTC)
"4 June 1942" is fine, since that's how the US military writes dates and this article covers a major US military event. Battleax86 ( talk) 22:55, 24 April 2009 (UTC)
It's confusing..Ive never noticed them writing it like that.. —Preceding
unsigned comment added by
75.179.163.66 (
talk) 01:24, 17 May 2009 (UTC)
I think this has been raised before, but I see it's not changed, so let me reiterate. I'm troubled by use of the USN (modern?) term to refer to IJN deployment. I can't think of a better term, tho... TREKphiler hit me ♠ 12:33, 16 October 2009 (UTC)
The number of CVs ( carriers) are inaccurate for Japan. They had 6 CVs present at the battle of Midway, the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Zuiho, Hosho. The carriers Ryujo and Junyo ( battle group North) attacked the Northern islands of Aleutian as a diversion.
Currently, the article says Japan only had 4 carriers at the battle, I'm going to change it to 6, and ask if it should be changed to 8 to account for the Ryujo and Junyo. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.179.163.66 ( talk) 01:32, 17 May 2009 (UTC)
I find the strengths the JIN to be incomplete, and wrong.
The Japanese deployed 7 BBs during the battle ( 9 if you count escorts) , 16 SS, 6 heavy cruisers, and a number of DDs.
http://www.2worldwar2.com/battle-of-midway.htm —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.179.163.66 ( talk) 01:55, 17 May 2009 (UTC)
A new editor added a bit about Samuel E. Morison theorizing about how Spruance could have shortened the war by going after the Japanese surface fleet. This bit has now been countered by Blair's analysis that Spruance would have been slaughtered in a night battle with Yamato and company. I went to the new editor to ask for a page number in the Morison book, but he says no, and asks about Herman Wouk instead. Can somebody else find this material in Morison? Is a fiction work by Wouk good enough? (ri-i-ight.) If Morison doesn't work, and Wouk doesn't fly, we should delete both the conjecture and Blair's rebuttal. Binksternet ( talk) 16:43, 25 May 2009 (UTC)
Morison wrote that Spruance was criticized for not following up his victory at Midway, however Morison does defend Spruance. The old section title implies that Morison did not agree with Spruance, I believe my section heading more accurately reflects Morison’s position. Cgersten ( talk) 17:22, 17 October 2009 (UTC)
<--"his aircraft caught up with two Japanese cruisers, sinking one and seriously damaging the other." In daylight. Conceded, notice. Even if the SBDs had been numerous, a) the Mk13 was a joke (Blair says "It had all the defects of the Mk14, plus others." [!!]) & b) many, many weaps had been depleted from CV stocks, which weren't replenished. How many would it take? 30 for no hits, if experience of VT-6 & VT-8 is any indication. Did Fletcher even have the weaps to do the job? Also, Mogami & Mikuma were all by their lonesome (spotted by Murphy & mistaken for the Main Body), which Yamamoto wouldn't be: & he had air cover. Not a lot, but Fletcher was on a comparative shoestring, so it's not going to be a turkey shoot, which the CAs were. And it risks both Fletcher's CVs (something he can't afford to do) & his aircrews (which, as IJN would learn after Midway, are even harder to replace). Never mind all that, tho. What you are ignoring is, it isn't daylight ops that are the issue. It's what happens after Fletcher (not Spruance) claims a couple of cruisers of Main Body: namely, Yamamoto mops the floor with Fletcher's CAs & sinks 2 CVs, & Midway is a disaster, not a victory. Recall, also, Fletcher had to account for the possibility of invasion (which is why Spruance moved back 100nm on Murphy's mistaken report). And don't forget, even Nimitz (with complete info) wasn't entirely sure where all the disparate IJN TFs were, nor was Fletcher, so he risked the very blundering into Yamato, in the dark, Minor mentions. The fact Spruance is unknown proves exactly nothing. (Well, it proves he doesn't have Patton's press agent. Or MacArthur's press corps.) It may say more to who Spruance was than how big a gaffe not pursuing was; notice, Spruance gave away credit for the victory to Fletcher, who was SOPA, as a matter of personal honor. I have a sense Spruance didn't care if he was famous. The people who counted knew who he was & what he'd done. And the historiographers know, which I think would suit him fine. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 17:06, 18 October 2009 (UTC)
Reargun tried to put in a quote by Jack Waldron but it was spelled wrong, it was incomplete and it broke the flow of the paragraph. Here is what the torpedo squadron leader wrote out and mimeographed to hand to each of his men before they were all knocked out of the sky:
Anybody think some or all of this is worthy of being worked into the article? Binksternet ( talk) 16:45, 2 December 2009 (UTC)
Please read this book
http://www.amazon.com/Battle-Midway-Destruction-American-Squadrons/dp/0300122640/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1259838149&sr=8-1
much of which is available here and make your own mind up.
I will respect what you guys decide Reargun ( talk) 11:15, 3 December 2009 (UTC)
<==Looks like a consensus exists for not quoting Waldron. Binksternet ( talk) 22:31, 3 December 2009 (UTC)
I accept that decision, what I decided to do is create a page for Jack Waldron which quite surprised me when I found out he did not have one considering his importance to the battle. 122.107.221.110 ( talk) 11:55, 5 December 2009 (UTC) 122.107.221.110 ( talk)
"seizing the strategic initiative"? I'll accept Japan lost it; my impression is, it wasn't until Watchtower was launched the U.S. actually "seized" anything. (I could be persuaded, tho.) Also, I changed to "perceived", since the sub threat was very under-appreciated by IJN (& most historiographers since! :/) TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 15:23 & 15:25, 7 December 2009 (UTC)
While I don't disagree with "crippling" entirely, it went beyond merely severe (which that suggests) into something Japan was simply incapable of replacing, even absent any other losses for the duration. "Shattering losses"? TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 04:48, 20 February 2010 (UTC)
Robert J. Mrazek's book "A Dawn Like Thunder" brings to light some interesting evidence by Bowen Weisheit. Weisheit interviewed surviving members of Air Group Eight and discovered that they were sent on an incorrect heading. According to several eyewitnesses, the Air Group Commander, Stanhope C. Ring, told Mitscher that he would head out on a 263 heading, even though the contact report put the Japanese fleet at a heading of 240. Waldron (commander, Torpedo Eight) was present at the time and argued for a 240 heading, adjusted for the enemy's course and speed. Mitscher supported Ring rather than Waldron, and as a result, the balance of Hornet 's air group went the wrong way. There is considerable navigational evidence (from mementos and saved paperwork) to support this.
The new evidence is interesting because it not only explains how Waldron managed to find the Japanese fleet (he had the correct contact report) but it also opens up a few cans of worms concerning Ring and Mitscher, i. e. that they deliberately sent the Air Group in the wrong direction (Mrazek speculates that Mitscher suspected the Japanese force was more dispersed than it was and he sent them off to try and find a trailing group) and that they falsified their After Action reports in order to cover their mistake (both give a different heading than 263, making it appear that Ring's group barely missed the Japanese fleet). It's surprising just how much more information comes to light after so long. Dallan007 ( talk) 07:24, 27 February 2010 (UTC)
"Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear Admiral Yamaguchi Tamon, leading Carrier Division 2 (Hiryū and Sōryū), recommended Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand: 18 Aichi D3A2 dive bombers each on Sōryū and Hiryū, and half the ready cover patrol aircraft.[56]"
It is not at all clear from this excerpt or anything that precedes or follows it what target(s) Admiral Tamon was recommending an immediate attack against and under what conditions. Was he recommending an immediate second attack against Midway Island or an attack against the American fleet? Well, we can find out if we read elsewhere that Tamon recommended an immediate air strike against the American fleet without taking time to rearm the aircraft for anti-ship operations. According to the article, none of this would have made any difference as Admiral Fletcher had already launched the aircraft that were to be victorious against the Japanese, but it is a bit confusing to read. Why even mention Tamon and his recommendation without specifying exactly what the recommendation was and what apparent advantages and disadvantages it might have for the Japanese? In other words, why did this recommendation put Nagumo in a quandary? 74.177.135.142 ( talk) 05:56, 27 March 2010 (UTC)
Website with contributions by Battle of Midway veterans and others: The Battle of Midway Roundtable. Jmrasor ( talk) 02:36, 31 March 2010 (UTC)
I'm currently reading this book, which has been described as one of the best single volume accounts of the second world war. It contains a thirty page chapter devoted to the Battle of Midway. I'm planning on including a couple of refs from it, but am slightly reluctant to interfere with a FA. Anyway I'll post the refs here first. Jprw ( talk) 17:24, 30 March 2010 (UTC)
Otherwise, it's meaningless to most readers. Lockesdonkey ( talk) 18:06, 9 April 2010 (UTC)
I'm simply eliminating the old chatter on this subject. This is precisely known information, and not open to speculation. Please see Shattered Sword, p. 91 for an *exact* roster of the Japanese carrier aircraft in the battle. There were 248 carrier aircraft aboard Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu. That includes 227 in the organic air groups of the vessels themselves (including spares) and the 21 aircraft of 6th Air Group being ferried to Midway (which were also carrier capable Zeros, and three of which actually fought during the battle). 248. No more. No less. And that's how many were lost. 248.
Same with the aviator casualties. See Shattered Sword p. 476 for that. 110 carrier aviators total (that's pilots, navigators, radio operators) were lost. No more. No less. We know every one of their *names*, as derived from the kodochoshos (the Japanese air group records) of the battle. So, again, this point isn't really open to debate or speculation.
Likewise, the number of Japanese fatalities in the battle as a whole is *precisely* known: 3,057. This is taken from a Japanese volume called Midowei Kaisen: Kiroku, wherein the Japanese author (Sawachi Hisae) went through Japanese prefectural records to discover the identity of each and every man. Her book contains the name, date and prefecture of birth, age and rank at time of death, and marital status of *every single one* of the Japanese fatalities, as well as the Americans for that matter. It is a truly stunning piece of research, and it *absolutely trumps any other source* regarding the casualties for this battle.
I'm sorry; I feel like I'm coming across like a jerk, but it's depressing to have gotten an article into shape to get it's star awarded, and then you go away for a year and all this cruft and heresay has crept back in. Regarding the Japanese figures I think I can safely say that I know what I'm talking about...
-jon parshall-
There is an edit war underway regarding some factoids related to games and music about the Battle of Midway. Editors in favor have been returning the text without discussion. Editors not in favor have noted the total lack of references and the text's precarious status relative to the guideline at WP:MILPOP. What are the arguments for keeping the material? Binksternet ( talk) 22:02, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
Why are you all saying this section is unreferenced/unsourced when it contains links to Wiki articles on the subjects mentioned? Is Wikipedia suddenly not a credible source? I don't have a problem with a films and games section in the article personally, but if you all feel it should be removed, I think you need better reasons than the ones cited. Based on that, I have restored the section for now, but have no interest in really getting involved in this "war." I just don't think it does any harm having it. Fred8615 ( talk) 13:18, 7 July 2010 (UTC)
Minorhistorian ( talk) 21:55, 7 July 2010 (UTC)
This article is now semi-protected to prevent the dynamic IP user from continuing to add the disputed section without entering in to any discussion. Minorhistorian ( talk) 23:58, 8 July 2010 (UTC)
Although 25% losses of aircrew was significant this was not enough in itself to stop the Japanses carrier fleet operating, nor was it enough to stop Japanese attempts at expansion. The attrition during the Solomons Campaign was far more damaging because it there that most of the remaining Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea and Midway veterans were lost. The loss of mechanics, fitters and organizational knowledge etc at Midway was more damaging because without the experience of these people, who were able to keep the aircraft serviced and operating at a high rate of efficiency, the aircrew, no matter how good, would have been unable to do their own jobs so effectively. See "Shattered Sword pp.417-418. Minorhistorian ( talk) 04:20, 7 September 2010 (UTC)
Parshall's book made it clear that Akagi's report notes "increased patrolling by American aircraft out of Midway" and "increased presense of enemy submarines". (p. 101) Nagumo should have known it. This conflicts with the current page. Any ideas? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Yulu854 ( talk • contribs) 20:35, 28 September 2010 (UTC)
So, it is compulsory for this article to have their surnames first and not in other articles like Pearl Harbor or Guadalcanal? I mean is this traditional style really necessary? Then again, there are dozens of articles involving Japanese commanders whose surnames are last in the infoboxes. Should they all undergo the same style as this article? Wolcott ( talk) 19:45, 10 November 2010 (UTC)
Just want to say that this note seems like an awfully big thing to say just based off of one reference... the sentence is about what Yamamoto perceived, not what was actually the case if I'm reading it right. Nomader ( Talk) 18:24, 4 February 2011 (UTC)
I know OSS may have considered Nimitz something of a naval prince, but perhaps the article should mention the disastrous historic effect of the Navy winning the Pacific War with a single cataclysmic victory based on a suicide mission carried out by torpedo bomber pilots.
68.84.26.229 ( talk) 19:00, 25 February 2011 (UTC) Arkhamite
Worth it?
68.84.26.229 ( talk) 00:22, 4 March 2011 (UTC) Admiral Electric
The section on "Casualties" only lists Japanese casualties. While losses on both sides are listed in the infobox, it's not clear why the US casualties aren't included in the relevant section. Any ideas? Will Beback talk 08:43, 2 March 2011 (UTC)
Chūichi Nagumo wrote this report following the battle. In the first section he summerizes what he thought going into the battle, and then provides evidence to support this assumption from after the battle. It is found in the section titled
Part I: EXISTING CONDITIONS AND TRENDS
3. Mobile Force Commander's Estimate of the Situation
It can be found here: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/rep/Midway/Nagumo/#I-3
It is quite interesting to actually read Naguma's battle report. Gunbirddriver ( talk) 22:33, 12 April 2011 (UTC)
Seriously, it's a major hassle. Lockesdonkey ( talk) 11:11, 13 April 2011 (UTC)
In the section Yamamoto's Plan it says "suggesting USS Enterprise and Hornet." That should be "suggesting USS Enterprise and USS Hornet," with a second "USS." When I open to edit, that is in fact what seems to be coded, but Wiki doesn't present it that way. I'm not smart enough to know why not. JMOprof ( talk) 20:10, 3 June 2011 (UTC)
Viewing this page in Google Chrome 11 and one part of the article is oddly placed. See the picture: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/773166/midway.png -- SkyHiRider ( talk) 20:35, 4 June 2011 (UTC)
The section showing the Japanese naval forces describes there being 4 carriers, 2 battleships, etc. This only describes Nagumo's fleet. There were two more small aircraft carriers, Hosho and Junyo, and other battleships including Yamato, Mutsu, and Nagato.-- R-41 ( talk) 21:48, 20 June 2011 (UTC)
You can slice this many different ways, because the Japanese order of battle was very complex. As Minorhistorian points out, it is valid to only use Nagumo's formations, as they were the only ones that actually fought. Alternately, you could use just the formations slated for Midway, including Yamamoto's Main Body, the Invasion Force, Kondo's covering formations, etc. etc. Or, you can throw in the whole enchilada, including the forces slated for the Aleutians operation. In my opinion, the OB is just so hideously complex that no normal human being would want to see it all in the info box for this article. It's not concise. Indeed, the question is further complicated by the fact that the OB was actually not fixed--during the course of the operation, various Japanese formations were supposed to be transferred from one formation to another. It's really eye-glazing stuff. So, I'd vote for keeping it narrowed down just to Nagumo's formation. Jparshall ( talk) 16:27, 26 March 2012 (UTC)
In ref this:
That it has been considered a blunder, I think, is clear already, & Nagumo's decisions to switch back & forth are at the core of that, not the timing of his launch. "Recent access" has nothing to do with it; a simple examination of the launch times & time of flight is enough. The need for evasion is already established as making Nagumo's early launch impossible. Saying Yamamoto "failed to appreciate the complexities and time-sensitivity inherent" is nonsense, & so is "strike doctrine employed by US carriers". What is at issue at bottom is, none of it made any difference. Nagumo had to hit Fletcher before Fletcher ever launched. The only way he could do that was to know Fletcher was there beforehand. He could only do that with more VSs than he had. He didn't have them because Yamamoto's dispositions were screwed up. This is the point. This was clear in 1983, when Willmott wrote Barrier and the Javelin (& around the time I first read it). Adding so much needless verbiage & outright error is a very bad idea. If clarification is needed on the need for better recce, perhaps it should be added; I thought it was pretty clear in the description of events. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 23:28, 1 August 2011 (UTC)
This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 1 | Archive 2 | Archive 3 | Archive 4 |
I added "(because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March)" and "(thanks in part to Yamamoto's haste)". I question the accuracy of "This information was in the hands of both Nagumo and Yamamoto prior". Willmott's Barrier and the Javelin suggests Nagumo had not picked up the signals from Tokyo, & Yamamoto would not re-radiate it for fear of giving away the position of his Covering Force. Trekphiler 19:50, 19 November 2006 (UTC)
Actually, if you read the Japanese carrier air group reports, it's clear that Nagumo *did* have this information in his hands *before* the battle. Akagi's summary report makes that very clear. See Shattered Sword pp. 99-104 for a discussion of this topic. The bottom line is that the Japanese communications network was disseminating current intel information to *all* the Japanese formations (including Nagumo's), and that that information was in Nagumo's hands. The issue, then, is more one of interpretation on Nagumo's part--it seems clear he chose not to alter his scouting dispositions in response to current intel.
-jon parshall- —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jparshall ( talk • contribs) 18:15, 18 January 2009 (UTC)
After "California Here I Come", I'm inclined to add "(probably a deception, in case Japan still had active spies on Oahu.)" It's speculation, tho.
I deleted "By any analysis, a loss of that magnitude would have prolonged the war in the Pacific." This is by no means certain. It might have forced Nimitz to change focus, increasing emphasis on submarines, thus compelling a cure to the problems with the Mark XIV torpedo (historically not cured until September 1943), which would have increased damage to Japanese trade and thus shortened the war. This would almost certainly have put paid to "guerrilla submarine" missions. In addition, it's likely to have undercut MacArthur's operations in the South West Pacific Area and his mania for return to the Philippines. (Unfortunately, this falls into "original research"...) The whole "impact" section smells of speculation; I'm inclined to delete.
Also, "Halsey himself was stricken with psoriasis". Was he? I've read it was shingles, & the sources I've seen can't seem to agree.
Finally, I added, "At least part of this was a product of fatigue; Japanese carriers had been constantly on operations since 7 December 1941, including pinprick raids on Darwin and Colombo." This is based on Willmott's B&J. Trekphiler 15:59, 6 December 2006 (UTC)
The sites:
http://www.psoriasis.org/about/psoriasis/
and
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/shingles/shingles.htm
point out that the first is chronic and itchy and some palliative anti-malarials were available at the time, the second is episodic, painfull (think 50 to 100 recurring cigarette burns) and untreatable at that time since there were no anti-viral meds. It is unlikely that Adm. Halsey would have been incapacitated by the first, but quite likely by the second.
68.100.243.51 16:28, 14 April 2007 (UTC) Uveges 12:25, 14 April 2007 (DST)
I just noticed that the sidebar on this page states that the Japanese had 264 Carrier aircraft and 16 float planes at the battle. It also states that 332 of their carrier aircraft were destroyed in the course of the battle. I know that Midway was a stunning victory, but that is 68 more planes than they supposedly had! I understand that sources may differ on such detalis but logic dictates that either or the other can be correct, but not both. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.54.62.114 ( talk) 00:39, 22 July 2008 (UTC)
I'm sorry, I'm a novice at Wikipedia. I would like for someone to add this to the "initial attacks" section: Although most sources say 108 aircraft attacked Midway, the Japanese after-action report says 107. The HIRYU only put up 17 (not 18) attack planes. [See ref: The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway] The Japanese attack on Midway resulted in the loss of 9 aircraft, 5 due to fighter action, and 4 due to anti-aircraft fire. Two Zeros may have been scrapped upon return to the HIRYU. [See ref: The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.161.61.35 ( talk) 16:44, 1 March 2009 (UTC)
"the second wave's torpedo bombers mistook her for an intact carrier." It's fact-tagged, but I've read it somewhere, too.
"Even more important was the irredeemable loss of four of Japan's fleet carriers." It's sourced, but I call that POV; carriers without aircrews are expensive toys, not fighting units. Trekphiler ( talk) 17:23, 6 February 2008 (UTC)
Yeah, but as I explain in Shattered Sword, the aircraft the Japanese lost at Midway could be replaced in a matter of weeks, even at the relatively anemic aircraft production rates the Japanese were putting out in 1942. The carriers, on the other hand, could not be replaced for *years*. There's no question that had the Japanese carriers survived Midway, their airgroups could have been reconstituted. The carriers were, therefore, by *far* the most precious assets the Japanese lost that day.
-jon parshall- —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jparshall ( talk • contribs) 19:52, 18 January 2009 (UTC)
It was the pilots. By the time of The battle of Coral Sea the IJN had carriers and planes but no qualified pilots. You are right - they were just expensive decoys.
In Isom's "Midway Inquest" the facts seem less certain than this article. Should the article identify disputes? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.152.242.65 ( talk) 02:25, 21 April 2009 (UTC)
Gene McPhail Sirgorpster ( talk) 02:09, 21 April 2009 (UTC)
I see that one Trekphiler has deleted my couple of sentences about the consequence of a Japanese victory at Midway for the "Germany First" strategy, despite their being sourced to a speech by former SecNav Schlesinger.
Exactly how does one evaluate the "impact" of a battle -- Marathon? Waterloo? Stalingrad? -- without considering the results had it gone the other way? That is not "fiction."
I don't see why a narrow notion of history's permissible scope should be an excuse for deleting valid analysis of why a battle was important. -- Andersonblog ( talk) 17:40, 6 July 2008 (UTC)
The "Impact" section states that the loss of four carriers was a heavier blow than the loss of experienced pilots at Midway. I am not sure it is objectively possible to say that one of these had greater impact than the other. My own feeling is that the loss of pilots was the greater blow to the Japanese than the loss of carriers. In 1942, the Japanese still had capability to build carriers and also convert other ships to carriers. Building (i.e. training) an experienced pilot is something else; this takes time. As Saburo Sakai showed, the Zero in experienced hands was still a very formidable weapon in 1942. But in inexperienced hands, the Zero's lack of armor and self-sealing fuel tanks were much more exposed. Pilots like Sakai were good enough to evade being shot, thus making the Zero's weak defense a minor point. At Midway, the Japanese lost many irreplacable Sakai's. -- Westwind273 ( talk) 09:21, 1 August 2008 (UTC)
Speculation about the consequences of alternate outcomes to the battle should only be included if they are quotes from published historians, with appropriate citations and references. Speculation by Wikipedians is
original research and has no place in Wikipedia articles. -
Aprogressivist (
talk) 13:16, 20 February 2009 (UTC)
The TV mini-series "War and Remembrance", which starred Robert Mitchum and MANY other famous actors and actresses is not included in the "in film" credits for this historical battle. The 'Battle of Midway' episode in that series is FAR more historically accurate than the movie: "Battle of Midway" which starred Charlto Heston (and many others), so I think it should at least be mentioned under the "in film" category. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 96.13.254.157 ( talk) 17:46, 2 January 2009 (UTC)
The Japanese losses exceed their initial strength. How can this be? Dapi89 ( talk) 00:17, 17 January 2009 (UTC)
I'm wondering whether some thought should be given to following Japanese convention - Family name followed by given name(s) when listing Japanese names in these articles eg; Yamamoto Isoroku instead of Isoroku Yamamoto. Surely this would be more accurate and more encyclopaedic than using Western convention? Minorhistorian ( talk) 22:35, 22 January 2009 (UTC)
Hi! I don't have a time to check all statements in this article but just in infobox I have found 2 statements without citations. I added one (but I'm not sure if it's true because I have seen other numbers too) but the 2nd is evidently wrong. Do you realy thing that article without citations and unverified (and wrong) statesments IS FEATURED article? Even in the "featured" article the statement about losses wasn't supported by citation. -- Sceadugenga ( talk) 14:31, 21 April 2009 (UTC)
It's a minor point, but is there really consensus to have the date of the battle 4 June 1942? This has been swapped within the past year, and will be mildly disconcerting to many of the readers about this battle, who will be Americans, not British or Australians. Septentrionalis PMAnderson 18:05, 23 April 2009 (UTC)
"4 June 1942" is fine, since that's how the US military writes dates and this article covers a major US military event. Battleax86 ( talk) 22:55, 24 April 2009 (UTC)
It's confusing..Ive never noticed them writing it like that.. —Preceding
unsigned comment added by
75.179.163.66 (
talk) 01:24, 17 May 2009 (UTC)
I think this has been raised before, but I see it's not changed, so let me reiterate. I'm troubled by use of the USN (modern?) term to refer to IJN deployment. I can't think of a better term, tho... TREKphiler hit me ♠ 12:33, 16 October 2009 (UTC)
The number of CVs ( carriers) are inaccurate for Japan. They had 6 CVs present at the battle of Midway, the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Zuiho, Hosho. The carriers Ryujo and Junyo ( battle group North) attacked the Northern islands of Aleutian as a diversion.
Currently, the article says Japan only had 4 carriers at the battle, I'm going to change it to 6, and ask if it should be changed to 8 to account for the Ryujo and Junyo. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.179.163.66 ( talk) 01:32, 17 May 2009 (UTC)
I find the strengths the JIN to be incomplete, and wrong.
The Japanese deployed 7 BBs during the battle ( 9 if you count escorts) , 16 SS, 6 heavy cruisers, and a number of DDs.
http://www.2worldwar2.com/battle-of-midway.htm —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.179.163.66 ( talk) 01:55, 17 May 2009 (UTC)
A new editor added a bit about Samuel E. Morison theorizing about how Spruance could have shortened the war by going after the Japanese surface fleet. This bit has now been countered by Blair's analysis that Spruance would have been slaughtered in a night battle with Yamato and company. I went to the new editor to ask for a page number in the Morison book, but he says no, and asks about Herman Wouk instead. Can somebody else find this material in Morison? Is a fiction work by Wouk good enough? (ri-i-ight.) If Morison doesn't work, and Wouk doesn't fly, we should delete both the conjecture and Blair's rebuttal. Binksternet ( talk) 16:43, 25 May 2009 (UTC)
Morison wrote that Spruance was criticized for not following up his victory at Midway, however Morison does defend Spruance. The old section title implies that Morison did not agree with Spruance, I believe my section heading more accurately reflects Morison’s position. Cgersten ( talk) 17:22, 17 October 2009 (UTC)
<--"his aircraft caught up with two Japanese cruisers, sinking one and seriously damaging the other." In daylight. Conceded, notice. Even if the SBDs had been numerous, a) the Mk13 was a joke (Blair says "It had all the defects of the Mk14, plus others." [!!]) & b) many, many weaps had been depleted from CV stocks, which weren't replenished. How many would it take? 30 for no hits, if experience of VT-6 & VT-8 is any indication. Did Fletcher even have the weaps to do the job? Also, Mogami & Mikuma were all by their lonesome (spotted by Murphy & mistaken for the Main Body), which Yamamoto wouldn't be: & he had air cover. Not a lot, but Fletcher was on a comparative shoestring, so it's not going to be a turkey shoot, which the CAs were. And it risks both Fletcher's CVs (something he can't afford to do) & his aircrews (which, as IJN would learn after Midway, are even harder to replace). Never mind all that, tho. What you are ignoring is, it isn't daylight ops that are the issue. It's what happens after Fletcher (not Spruance) claims a couple of cruisers of Main Body: namely, Yamamoto mops the floor with Fletcher's CAs & sinks 2 CVs, & Midway is a disaster, not a victory. Recall, also, Fletcher had to account for the possibility of invasion (which is why Spruance moved back 100nm on Murphy's mistaken report). And don't forget, even Nimitz (with complete info) wasn't entirely sure where all the disparate IJN TFs were, nor was Fletcher, so he risked the very blundering into Yamato, in the dark, Minor mentions. The fact Spruance is unknown proves exactly nothing. (Well, it proves he doesn't have Patton's press agent. Or MacArthur's press corps.) It may say more to who Spruance was than how big a gaffe not pursuing was; notice, Spruance gave away credit for the victory to Fletcher, who was SOPA, as a matter of personal honor. I have a sense Spruance didn't care if he was famous. The people who counted knew who he was & what he'd done. And the historiographers know, which I think would suit him fine. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 17:06, 18 October 2009 (UTC)
Reargun tried to put in a quote by Jack Waldron but it was spelled wrong, it was incomplete and it broke the flow of the paragraph. Here is what the torpedo squadron leader wrote out and mimeographed to hand to each of his men before they were all knocked out of the sky:
Anybody think some or all of this is worthy of being worked into the article? Binksternet ( talk) 16:45, 2 December 2009 (UTC)
Please read this book
http://www.amazon.com/Battle-Midway-Destruction-American-Squadrons/dp/0300122640/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1259838149&sr=8-1
much of which is available here and make your own mind up.
I will respect what you guys decide Reargun ( talk) 11:15, 3 December 2009 (UTC)
<==Looks like a consensus exists for not quoting Waldron. Binksternet ( talk) 22:31, 3 December 2009 (UTC)
I accept that decision, what I decided to do is create a page for Jack Waldron which quite surprised me when I found out he did not have one considering his importance to the battle. 122.107.221.110 ( talk) 11:55, 5 December 2009 (UTC) 122.107.221.110 ( talk)
"seizing the strategic initiative"? I'll accept Japan lost it; my impression is, it wasn't until Watchtower was launched the U.S. actually "seized" anything. (I could be persuaded, tho.) Also, I changed to "perceived", since the sub threat was very under-appreciated by IJN (& most historiographers since! :/) TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 15:23 & 15:25, 7 December 2009 (UTC)
While I don't disagree with "crippling" entirely, it went beyond merely severe (which that suggests) into something Japan was simply incapable of replacing, even absent any other losses for the duration. "Shattering losses"? TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 04:48, 20 February 2010 (UTC)
Robert J. Mrazek's book "A Dawn Like Thunder" brings to light some interesting evidence by Bowen Weisheit. Weisheit interviewed surviving members of Air Group Eight and discovered that they were sent on an incorrect heading. According to several eyewitnesses, the Air Group Commander, Stanhope C. Ring, told Mitscher that he would head out on a 263 heading, even though the contact report put the Japanese fleet at a heading of 240. Waldron (commander, Torpedo Eight) was present at the time and argued for a 240 heading, adjusted for the enemy's course and speed. Mitscher supported Ring rather than Waldron, and as a result, the balance of Hornet 's air group went the wrong way. There is considerable navigational evidence (from mementos and saved paperwork) to support this.
The new evidence is interesting because it not only explains how Waldron managed to find the Japanese fleet (he had the correct contact report) but it also opens up a few cans of worms concerning Ring and Mitscher, i. e. that they deliberately sent the Air Group in the wrong direction (Mrazek speculates that Mitscher suspected the Japanese force was more dispersed than it was and he sent them off to try and find a trailing group) and that they falsified their After Action reports in order to cover their mistake (both give a different heading than 263, making it appear that Ring's group barely missed the Japanese fleet). It's surprising just how much more information comes to light after so long. Dallan007 ( talk) 07:24, 27 February 2010 (UTC)
"Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear Admiral Yamaguchi Tamon, leading Carrier Division 2 (Hiryū and Sōryū), recommended Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand: 18 Aichi D3A2 dive bombers each on Sōryū and Hiryū, and half the ready cover patrol aircraft.[56]"
It is not at all clear from this excerpt or anything that precedes or follows it what target(s) Admiral Tamon was recommending an immediate attack against and under what conditions. Was he recommending an immediate second attack against Midway Island or an attack against the American fleet? Well, we can find out if we read elsewhere that Tamon recommended an immediate air strike against the American fleet without taking time to rearm the aircraft for anti-ship operations. According to the article, none of this would have made any difference as Admiral Fletcher had already launched the aircraft that were to be victorious against the Japanese, but it is a bit confusing to read. Why even mention Tamon and his recommendation without specifying exactly what the recommendation was and what apparent advantages and disadvantages it might have for the Japanese? In other words, why did this recommendation put Nagumo in a quandary? 74.177.135.142 ( talk) 05:56, 27 March 2010 (UTC)
Website with contributions by Battle of Midway veterans and others: The Battle of Midway Roundtable. Jmrasor ( talk) 02:36, 31 March 2010 (UTC)
I'm currently reading this book, which has been described as one of the best single volume accounts of the second world war. It contains a thirty page chapter devoted to the Battle of Midway. I'm planning on including a couple of refs from it, but am slightly reluctant to interfere with a FA. Anyway I'll post the refs here first. Jprw ( talk) 17:24, 30 March 2010 (UTC)
Otherwise, it's meaningless to most readers. Lockesdonkey ( talk) 18:06, 9 April 2010 (UTC)
I'm simply eliminating the old chatter on this subject. This is precisely known information, and not open to speculation. Please see Shattered Sword, p. 91 for an *exact* roster of the Japanese carrier aircraft in the battle. There were 248 carrier aircraft aboard Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu. That includes 227 in the organic air groups of the vessels themselves (including spares) and the 21 aircraft of 6th Air Group being ferried to Midway (which were also carrier capable Zeros, and three of which actually fought during the battle). 248. No more. No less. And that's how many were lost. 248.
Same with the aviator casualties. See Shattered Sword p. 476 for that. 110 carrier aviators total (that's pilots, navigators, radio operators) were lost. No more. No less. We know every one of their *names*, as derived from the kodochoshos (the Japanese air group records) of the battle. So, again, this point isn't really open to debate or speculation.
Likewise, the number of Japanese fatalities in the battle as a whole is *precisely* known: 3,057. This is taken from a Japanese volume called Midowei Kaisen: Kiroku, wherein the Japanese author (Sawachi Hisae) went through Japanese prefectural records to discover the identity of each and every man. Her book contains the name, date and prefecture of birth, age and rank at time of death, and marital status of *every single one* of the Japanese fatalities, as well as the Americans for that matter. It is a truly stunning piece of research, and it *absolutely trumps any other source* regarding the casualties for this battle.
I'm sorry; I feel like I'm coming across like a jerk, but it's depressing to have gotten an article into shape to get it's star awarded, and then you go away for a year and all this cruft and heresay has crept back in. Regarding the Japanese figures I think I can safely say that I know what I'm talking about...
-jon parshall-
There is an edit war underway regarding some factoids related to games and music about the Battle of Midway. Editors in favor have been returning the text without discussion. Editors not in favor have noted the total lack of references and the text's precarious status relative to the guideline at WP:MILPOP. What are the arguments for keeping the material? Binksternet ( talk) 22:02, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
Why are you all saying this section is unreferenced/unsourced when it contains links to Wiki articles on the subjects mentioned? Is Wikipedia suddenly not a credible source? I don't have a problem with a films and games section in the article personally, but if you all feel it should be removed, I think you need better reasons than the ones cited. Based on that, I have restored the section for now, but have no interest in really getting involved in this "war." I just don't think it does any harm having it. Fred8615 ( talk) 13:18, 7 July 2010 (UTC)
Minorhistorian ( talk) 21:55, 7 July 2010 (UTC)
This article is now semi-protected to prevent the dynamic IP user from continuing to add the disputed section without entering in to any discussion. Minorhistorian ( talk) 23:58, 8 July 2010 (UTC)
Although 25% losses of aircrew was significant this was not enough in itself to stop the Japanses carrier fleet operating, nor was it enough to stop Japanese attempts at expansion. The attrition during the Solomons Campaign was far more damaging because it there that most of the remaining Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea and Midway veterans were lost. The loss of mechanics, fitters and organizational knowledge etc at Midway was more damaging because without the experience of these people, who were able to keep the aircraft serviced and operating at a high rate of efficiency, the aircrew, no matter how good, would have been unable to do their own jobs so effectively. See "Shattered Sword pp.417-418. Minorhistorian ( talk) 04:20, 7 September 2010 (UTC)
Parshall's book made it clear that Akagi's report notes "increased patrolling by American aircraft out of Midway" and "increased presense of enemy submarines". (p. 101) Nagumo should have known it. This conflicts with the current page. Any ideas? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Yulu854 ( talk • contribs) 20:35, 28 September 2010 (UTC)
So, it is compulsory for this article to have their surnames first and not in other articles like Pearl Harbor or Guadalcanal? I mean is this traditional style really necessary? Then again, there are dozens of articles involving Japanese commanders whose surnames are last in the infoboxes. Should they all undergo the same style as this article? Wolcott ( talk) 19:45, 10 November 2010 (UTC)
Just want to say that this note seems like an awfully big thing to say just based off of one reference... the sentence is about what Yamamoto perceived, not what was actually the case if I'm reading it right. Nomader ( Talk) 18:24, 4 February 2011 (UTC)
I know OSS may have considered Nimitz something of a naval prince, but perhaps the article should mention the disastrous historic effect of the Navy winning the Pacific War with a single cataclysmic victory based on a suicide mission carried out by torpedo bomber pilots.
68.84.26.229 ( talk) 19:00, 25 February 2011 (UTC) Arkhamite
Worth it?
68.84.26.229 ( talk) 00:22, 4 March 2011 (UTC) Admiral Electric
The section on "Casualties" only lists Japanese casualties. While losses on both sides are listed in the infobox, it's not clear why the US casualties aren't included in the relevant section. Any ideas? Will Beback talk 08:43, 2 March 2011 (UTC)
Chūichi Nagumo wrote this report following the battle. In the first section he summerizes what he thought going into the battle, and then provides evidence to support this assumption from after the battle. It is found in the section titled
Part I: EXISTING CONDITIONS AND TRENDS
3. Mobile Force Commander's Estimate of the Situation
It can be found here: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/rep/Midway/Nagumo/#I-3
It is quite interesting to actually read Naguma's battle report. Gunbirddriver ( talk) 22:33, 12 April 2011 (UTC)
Seriously, it's a major hassle. Lockesdonkey ( talk) 11:11, 13 April 2011 (UTC)
In the section Yamamoto's Plan it says "suggesting USS Enterprise and Hornet." That should be "suggesting USS Enterprise and USS Hornet," with a second "USS." When I open to edit, that is in fact what seems to be coded, but Wiki doesn't present it that way. I'm not smart enough to know why not. JMOprof ( talk) 20:10, 3 June 2011 (UTC)
Viewing this page in Google Chrome 11 and one part of the article is oddly placed. See the picture: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/773166/midway.png -- SkyHiRider ( talk) 20:35, 4 June 2011 (UTC)
The section showing the Japanese naval forces describes there being 4 carriers, 2 battleships, etc. This only describes Nagumo's fleet. There were two more small aircraft carriers, Hosho and Junyo, and other battleships including Yamato, Mutsu, and Nagato.-- R-41 ( talk) 21:48, 20 June 2011 (UTC)
You can slice this many different ways, because the Japanese order of battle was very complex. As Minorhistorian points out, it is valid to only use Nagumo's formations, as they were the only ones that actually fought. Alternately, you could use just the formations slated for Midway, including Yamamoto's Main Body, the Invasion Force, Kondo's covering formations, etc. etc. Or, you can throw in the whole enchilada, including the forces slated for the Aleutians operation. In my opinion, the OB is just so hideously complex that no normal human being would want to see it all in the info box for this article. It's not concise. Indeed, the question is further complicated by the fact that the OB was actually not fixed--during the course of the operation, various Japanese formations were supposed to be transferred from one formation to another. It's really eye-glazing stuff. So, I'd vote for keeping it narrowed down just to Nagumo's formation. Jparshall ( talk) 16:27, 26 March 2012 (UTC)
In ref this:
That it has been considered a blunder, I think, is clear already, & Nagumo's decisions to switch back & forth are at the core of that, not the timing of his launch. "Recent access" has nothing to do with it; a simple examination of the launch times & time of flight is enough. The need for evasion is already established as making Nagumo's early launch impossible. Saying Yamamoto "failed to appreciate the complexities and time-sensitivity inherent" is nonsense, & so is "strike doctrine employed by US carriers". What is at issue at bottom is, none of it made any difference. Nagumo had to hit Fletcher before Fletcher ever launched. The only way he could do that was to know Fletcher was there beforehand. He could only do that with more VSs than he had. He didn't have them because Yamamoto's dispositions were screwed up. This is the point. This was clear in 1983, when Willmott wrote Barrier and the Javelin (& around the time I first read it). Adding so much needless verbiage & outright error is a very bad idea. If clarification is needed on the need for better recce, perhaps it should be added; I thought it was pretty clear in the description of events. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 23:28, 1 August 2011 (UTC)