The contents of the Novum Organum page were merged into Baconian method. For the contribution history and old versions of the redirected page, please see its history; for the discussion at that location, see its talk page. |
This article is rated C-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
I can't find the exact wording and stuff, but isn't this missing the most important part of Bacon's method? ie, the thing that actually makes it a form of the scienfic method? Specifically, the step I believe he called "return the hypothesis to nature." (ie, make a prediction from your hypothesis and then observe to see if it's actually consistent with nature... if not, revise your hypothesis and try again. Maybe I'm missing something, but isn't that the single most important part of the thing?)
introduced “radical skepticism” - a rejection of probability derived from past experience as predicting the future.
“Your appeal to past experience decides nothing in the present case; and at the utmost can only prove, that that very object, which produced any other, was at that very instant endowed with such a power; but can never prove, that the same power must continuein the same object or collection of sensible qualities; much less, that a like power is always conjoined with like sensible qualities. Should it be said, that we have experience, that the same power continues united with the same object,and that like objects are endowed with like powers, I would renew my question, why from this experience we form any conclusion beyond those past instances, of which we have had experience.”
Thus rejecting Inductive reasoning. In contrast, Bacon advocated the opposite - that one should use the inductive method.
See also my peer reviewed published articles on this:
Cell. 2008 Aug 8;134(3):378-81. A brief history of the hypothesis. Glass DJ, Hall N.
and
Clin Chem. 2010 Jul;56(7):1080-5. Epub 2010 May 28. A critique of the hypothesis, and a defense of the question, as a framework for experimentation. Glass DJ.
Can you please provide a citation supporting your claim that Hume voiced support of Bacon??
Thanks, David Gacggt ( talk) 22:49, 27 November 2011 (UTC) (David Glass)
There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz’d in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security. |
Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. SECTION IV.: sceptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding |
---|
It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants—nay infants, nay even brute beasts—improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination, I may justly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a demand. You cannot say that the argument is abstruse, and may possibly escape your enquiry; since you confess that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hesitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the question, and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to appearance, similar. This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cradle. |
Induction The cornerstone of Hume's epistemology is the so-called Problem of Induction. This may be the area of Hume's thought where his skepticism about human powers of reason is most pronounced.[36] Understanding the problem of induction is central to grasping Hume's philosophical system. The problem concerns the explanation of how we are able to make inductive inferences. Inductive inference is reasoning from the observed behaviour of objects to their behaviour when unobserved; as Hume says, it is a question of how things behave when they go "beyond the present testimony of the senses, and the records of our memory".[37] Hume notices that we tend to believe that things behave in a regular manner; i.e., that patterns in the behaviour of objects will persist into the future, and throughout the unobserved present. This persistence of regularities is sometimes called Uniformitarianism or the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature. Hume's argument is that we cannot rationally justify the claim that nature will continue to be uniform, as justification comes in only two varieties, and both of these are inadequate. The two sorts are: (1) demonstrative reasoning, and (2) probable reasoning.[38] With regard to (1), Hume argues that the uniformity principle cannot be demonstrated, as it is "consistent and conceivable" that nature might stop being regular.[39] Turning to (2), Hume argues that we cannot hold that nature will continue to be uniform because it has been in the past, as this is using the very sort of reasoning (induction) that is under question: it would be circular reasoning.[40] Thus no form of justification will rationally warrant our inductive inferences. Hume's solution to this problem is to argue that, rather than reason, natural instinct explains the human ability to make inductive inferences. He asserts that "Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable [sic] necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel". Although many modern commentators have demurred from Hume's solution,[41] some have notably concurred with it, seeing his analysis of our epistemic predicament as a major contribution to the theory of knowledge. For example, the Oxford Professor John D. Kenyon writes: Reason might manage to raise a doubt about the truth of a conclusion of natural inductive inference just for a moment in the study, but the forces of nature will soon overcome that artificial skepticism, and the sheer agreeableness of animal faith will protect us from excessive caution and sterile suspension of belief.[42]
Now that article also prefaces this with what you said, that Hume didn't reject inductive reasoning. This is then contradicted by all the text I just copied and pasted. So maybe this is what you call a more nuanced way of phrasing this? But I'm in agreement with what is written in that article. Gacggt ( talk) 15:58, 5 December 2011 (UTC)
I suggest we merge this article with Novum Organum. It seems like this article will be incomplete without a full discussion of the contents of the Novum Organum, and if that is the case, it might just as well be the Novum Organum article. -- Chris 00:37, 21 January 2007 (UTC)
Note that the discussion petered out in 2011, and the last comment looking at both talk pages was: "This proposal makes sense if we look at the current state of both articles, but in the longer term of course one is about a well-known particular book, and one is about a method which discussed in more than one book. So I think on reflection it is better to aim to improve both articles by expanding them." That does not seem like a good point to then jump to merging?-- Andrew Lancaster ( talk) 08:38, 8 August 2018 (UTC) Trying to set-up a discussion, or at least get some points on record.
I have studied science my whole life (i.e. I am a scientist). This is the first time I heard of von Humboldt or whatever. Are there more than 3 references for this claim? 101.110.53.90 ( talk) 21:59, 10 January 2017 (UTC)
This sentence (below) appears under the heading Baconian Method and is either a mistake or it requires elaboration or clarification, thank you.MH
'able to reveal the injustice of effective procedures' — Preceding unsigned comment added by 37.126.173.27 ( talk) 08:18, 27 January 2019 (UTC)
The contents of the Novum Organum page were merged into Baconian method. For the contribution history and old versions of the redirected page, please see its history; for the discussion at that location, see its talk page. |
This article is rated C-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
I can't find the exact wording and stuff, but isn't this missing the most important part of Bacon's method? ie, the thing that actually makes it a form of the scienfic method? Specifically, the step I believe he called "return the hypothesis to nature." (ie, make a prediction from your hypothesis and then observe to see if it's actually consistent with nature... if not, revise your hypothesis and try again. Maybe I'm missing something, but isn't that the single most important part of the thing?)
introduced “radical skepticism” - a rejection of probability derived from past experience as predicting the future.
“Your appeal to past experience decides nothing in the present case; and at the utmost can only prove, that that very object, which produced any other, was at that very instant endowed with such a power; but can never prove, that the same power must continuein the same object or collection of sensible qualities; much less, that a like power is always conjoined with like sensible qualities. Should it be said, that we have experience, that the same power continues united with the same object,and that like objects are endowed with like powers, I would renew my question, why from this experience we form any conclusion beyond those past instances, of which we have had experience.”
Thus rejecting Inductive reasoning. In contrast, Bacon advocated the opposite - that one should use the inductive method.
See also my peer reviewed published articles on this:
Cell. 2008 Aug 8;134(3):378-81. A brief history of the hypothesis. Glass DJ, Hall N.
and
Clin Chem. 2010 Jul;56(7):1080-5. Epub 2010 May 28. A critique of the hypothesis, and a defense of the question, as a framework for experimentation. Glass DJ.
Can you please provide a citation supporting your claim that Hume voiced support of Bacon??
Thanks, David Gacggt ( talk) 22:49, 27 November 2011 (UTC) (David Glass)
There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz’d in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security. |
Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. SECTION IV.: sceptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding |
---|
It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants—nay infants, nay even brute beasts—improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination, I may justly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a demand. You cannot say that the argument is abstruse, and may possibly escape your enquiry; since you confess that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hesitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the question, and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to appearance, similar. This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cradle. |
Induction The cornerstone of Hume's epistemology is the so-called Problem of Induction. This may be the area of Hume's thought where his skepticism about human powers of reason is most pronounced.[36] Understanding the problem of induction is central to grasping Hume's philosophical system. The problem concerns the explanation of how we are able to make inductive inferences. Inductive inference is reasoning from the observed behaviour of objects to their behaviour when unobserved; as Hume says, it is a question of how things behave when they go "beyond the present testimony of the senses, and the records of our memory".[37] Hume notices that we tend to believe that things behave in a regular manner; i.e., that patterns in the behaviour of objects will persist into the future, and throughout the unobserved present. This persistence of regularities is sometimes called Uniformitarianism or the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature. Hume's argument is that we cannot rationally justify the claim that nature will continue to be uniform, as justification comes in only two varieties, and both of these are inadequate. The two sorts are: (1) demonstrative reasoning, and (2) probable reasoning.[38] With regard to (1), Hume argues that the uniformity principle cannot be demonstrated, as it is "consistent and conceivable" that nature might stop being regular.[39] Turning to (2), Hume argues that we cannot hold that nature will continue to be uniform because it has been in the past, as this is using the very sort of reasoning (induction) that is under question: it would be circular reasoning.[40] Thus no form of justification will rationally warrant our inductive inferences. Hume's solution to this problem is to argue that, rather than reason, natural instinct explains the human ability to make inductive inferences. He asserts that "Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable [sic] necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel". Although many modern commentators have demurred from Hume's solution,[41] some have notably concurred with it, seeing his analysis of our epistemic predicament as a major contribution to the theory of knowledge. For example, the Oxford Professor John D. Kenyon writes: Reason might manage to raise a doubt about the truth of a conclusion of natural inductive inference just for a moment in the study, but the forces of nature will soon overcome that artificial skepticism, and the sheer agreeableness of animal faith will protect us from excessive caution and sterile suspension of belief.[42]
Now that article also prefaces this with what you said, that Hume didn't reject inductive reasoning. This is then contradicted by all the text I just copied and pasted. So maybe this is what you call a more nuanced way of phrasing this? But I'm in agreement with what is written in that article. Gacggt ( talk) 15:58, 5 December 2011 (UTC)
I suggest we merge this article with Novum Organum. It seems like this article will be incomplete without a full discussion of the contents of the Novum Organum, and if that is the case, it might just as well be the Novum Organum article. -- Chris 00:37, 21 January 2007 (UTC)
Note that the discussion petered out in 2011, and the last comment looking at both talk pages was: "This proposal makes sense if we look at the current state of both articles, but in the longer term of course one is about a well-known particular book, and one is about a method which discussed in more than one book. So I think on reflection it is better to aim to improve both articles by expanding them." That does not seem like a good point to then jump to merging?-- Andrew Lancaster ( talk) 08:38, 8 August 2018 (UTC) Trying to set-up a discussion, or at least get some points on record.
I have studied science my whole life (i.e. I am a scientist). This is the first time I heard of von Humboldt or whatever. Are there more than 3 references for this claim? 101.110.53.90 ( talk) 21:59, 10 January 2017 (UTC)
This sentence (below) appears under the heading Baconian Method and is either a mistake or it requires elaboration or clarification, thank you.MH
'able to reveal the injustice of effective procedures' — Preceding unsigned comment added by 37.126.173.27 ( talk) 08:18, 27 January 2019 (UTC)