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Speaking of this edit, please, explain, how does the text in the article distort the source?
The article is concluded with the following passage:
“ | "А то, что говорит Березовский об участии ФСБ во взрывах в Москве и Волгодонске, - это ложь. У меня нет доказательств по всем взрывам, но по некоторым есть. Я знаю, что эти взрывы устроили бандиты", - отметил Измайлов. | ” |
Translated into English:
“ | "But that which Berezovsky sais about FSB participation in Moscow and Volgodonsk explosions is a lie. I don't have the proof for all explosions, but I have for some. I know that the explosions were perpetrated by bandits." -- Ismailov noted. | ” |
Removing this source looks like WP:Vandalism.
Document hippo ( talk) 15:48, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
Йес, ай ду. I am not picky about whether it's "terrorists" or "bandits" (although the latter feels more natural for me), and of course if there's any controversy it's not up to WP editors to weigh in and offer their own expert opinions which would constitute OR. The reader can handle that on his own.
So, you believe the problem is in selective reading of the source. Until your recent edit we used to discuss Berezovsky and FSB counter-claims regarding each other in detail. Perhaps, we could discuss Izmailov's claims in more detail, more in the spirit of the article, and may be provide the very minimal context? Document hippo ( talk) 16:25, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
Izmailov's main argument was made in September 1999. Paul Murphy, "Wolves of Islam", p. 105:
“ | Khattab told Al-Watan Al-Arabi that the war "had shifted to all Russian cities and would be directed against all Russians." When specifically asked, he refused to condemn the Moscow bombings. Vyacheslav Izmailov, a respected news commentator on Chechnya, thought that he knew why Khattab reacted this way.
Going on Russian NTV television, Izmailov said that very reliable sources in Chechnya had told him that Khattab, just after his initial defeat in Dagestan, recruited former Russian military personnel for a terror campaign across the Russian Federation. The men were divided into four teams to carry out bombings in Dagestan, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Rostov-on-Don. Each team was given money to buy what it needed and to rent premises to hide explosives intended for the bombings. |
” |
Document hippo ( talk) 23:32, 11 September 2017 (UTC)
I made a redirect here because we have a lot of clearly duplicated materials on these two page. Another possible solution would be to move such materials from this main page to "explanation attempts" page instead of making the redirect (I do not mind), however keeping exactly same content on two pages is not a good idea. My very best wishes ( talk) 20:19, 13 September 2017 (UTC)
A lot of materials on this page (included mostly by a red-linked account) are not about these bombings, but about War in Dagestan, which is an entirely different subject. The only actual connection is that both the bombings and the War in Dagestan were used as a casus belli to start Second Chech War. These materials should be either removed or moved to proper page. My very best wishes ( talk) 13:56, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
I wonder, what was the reason for this edit?
In that interview, Kovalev said:
“ | S. Kovalev. Yes, of course. I think it would be natural to check that. Moreover, I don't want to speak about likelihood, truthworthy or even serious doubts of that material without a most thorough and very tedious analysis. FSB will check that, and we will check, to the extent of what's accessible for us. Now, about the belief in this or that version. Yes, Felshtinsky and Litvinenko claim: "FSB explodes Russia". I won't like to believe in that, but I try to be impartial, and I don't rule out that version. I don't rule out any of them, including the Chechen connection, the FSB connection, or any hybrid versions which are possible too. Experience shows it's a frequent situation. Generally, I'm not a big proponent of conspiracy theories. But Litvinenko's and Felshtinsky's theory is a pure conspiracy. But regardless of what one feels is the preferred option, I believe that an investigator should follow the golden rule of a researcher, there's a similarity. There shouldn't be a more sharp and more demanding criticist of a hypothesis, than its author. Because it's he who knows all of the details. And he should strive to kill his own hypothesis, to destroy it. But if he doesn't succeed, then he exhales with a relief and says: "Well, now it's not a hypothesis, it's a proven thing, now it's a theory at least." One simply cannot see such desire on the side of the authors of the book. I won't even mention that the very book itself, the episodes which are known very well to me as a participant, there's incredible amount of fiction. For example, Budennovsk. It's pure fiction, and not even a single link. That's not how serious books are written, which pretend to be truthworthy.
T. Pelipeyko. Thanks, Sergey Adamovich. To sum it up, the very fact of errors in something else causes you to doubt that which was claimed by Litvinenko and Felshtinsky today? S. Kovalev. I don't think such doubts should offend them. I think they have given the material to the commission so that it would be subject to impartial and fair minded analysis. |
” |
How would you summarize it?
Document hippo ( talk) 20:57, 14 September 2017 (UTC)
“ | Сергей Ковалев: Я не могу с полной уверенностью утверждать, что эти взрывы были организованы властью. Хотя понятно, что они были ей на руку, на руку будущему президенту Владимиру Владимировичу Путину, потому что он только что обещал "мочить в сортире", как он выразился, каждого, кто имеет какое-то отношение к терроризму. И напугать людей терроризмом было для него политически целесообразно. Это не доказано.
Но что можно с полной уверенностью утверждать: расследование взрывов и московских, и так называемых "учений" в Рязани – все это шито белыми нитками. Могут быть разные варианты. Мне кажется, что Рязань должна была стать очередным взрывом, но я не могу этого доказать. |
” |
“ | Sergey Kovalev: I cannot state with full confidence that the explosions were organized by the authorities. Although it's clear that the explosions were useful for them, useful for future President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, because he had just promised to "waste in the outhouse" (as he said) everyone who had any relation to terrorism. It was politically benefitial for him to scare people with terrorism. That is not proven.
But what can be stated with full confidence: the investigation of both the Moscow explosions and the so-called "exercises" in Ryazan is trumped up. There can be various possibilities. It seems to me, that Ryazan should have been the next explosion, but I cannot prove that. |
” |
This whole section looks to me as highly problematic. Why do we have this described as a separate "theory"? Was not he involved according to the official version? Yes, he was. As about the terrorist attacks being carried out not by Chechens but by other nationalities, this is simply a matter of fact (as noted by Latynina and others), and not a theory. This should be mentioned somewhere, but not as a "theory". My very best wishes ( talk) 15:44, 16 September 2017 (UTC)
The problem is, the alternative version gives undue weight to the conspiracy theory, which many of the editors who wrote at this talk page did oppose. People like Strobe Talbott, Ariel Cohen and Thomas de Waal are not less notable than Felshtinsky, Litvinenko or Berezovsky. There's no attempt to discuss, but rather than that, the lead provides indication of various attitutes towards the conspiracy theory. Document hippo ( talk) 04:24, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
Like I've previously explained at this talk page, conspiracy theories are not falsifiable. Therefore, no one could ever say that this particular explanation is wrong. No kind of an argument exists which would prove it wrong.
The only thing which can be said is that there's no evidence for it. Even David Satter wrote that there's no direct evidence of the theory of FSB involvement: [1]
“ | The circumstantial evidence that the bombings were carried out by the FSB is overwhelming. The only reason there is no direct evidence is that the Putin regime has concealed it. | ” |
And that's pretty much it. You don't need a chapter to say there's no evidence. Document hippo ( talk) 04:58, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
The title refects the fact that de Waal wrote a commentary on a Berezovsky-sponsored movie, rather than endorses or rejects the claims made in the film. In that publication, Thomas de Waal wrote:
“ | There was very little in the allegations made by Berezovsky, which had not been reported in small-circulation Russian newspapers and a book written by an ex-KGB officer over the last two years. <...> Chekulin's testimony was the nearest thing to a "smoking gun" but even he admitted that he had no direct documentary evidence directly related to the three apartment block bombings. | ” |
That's consistent with the claim made in the lead.
You might argue that he said "no direct documentary evidence", and that's not the same thing as just "evidence". Fine. If you insist, I don't mind if this particular citation is removed. The first link is his September 30, 1999 BBC article which almost word-by-word coincides with Talbott's claim. I have specifically sought de Waal's later writing to double-check his opinion didn't make an U-turn in the years since the 1999, like it happened to a certain hero of this article. You can consider it more of an internal consistency check.
Regarding your other claims, please, note that SYNTH is not summary.
Document hippo ( talk) 23:58, 11 September 2017 (UTC)
Forgot to talk about a brief mention of Khattab's invasion and threats in the lead. I have previously written about it. Now that I've changed the text to Khattab having had "links to Osama bin Laden", I could name several more sources supporting that claim -- for example, Klebnikov, Talbott, Clarke, Gerges... It's not an attempt to denigrate Khattab. It's pretty much factual description, with very strong support in the literature. -- Document hippo ( talk) 01:21, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
I checked the book by Klebnikov (published in 2000 and written soon after the events), pages 303-305. He tells about various speculations on the subject (including bombings being conducted by "mavericks of Putin's camp" as something he does not exclude!), and adds "but all of this is speculation". Basically, he has no opinion on the subject. Therefore, I do not think his opinion should be included on this page. My very best wishes ( talk) 03:33, 17 September 2017 (UTC)
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I think this is general problem here. Why people were using sources that tell very little on the subject, such as the outdated book by Klebnikov? There are books where whole chapters are dedicated specifically to these historical bombings. Consider something like Putin's Kleptocracy. It describes this subject in greatest detail, and some portions are available online: [2]. My very best wishes ( talk) 01:12, 18 September 2017 (UTC)
Real simple, in the section title "Claims, denials and confessions of responsibility for the blasts" there is mention of a Dekkushev who I believe is meant to be Adam Dekkushev. It's the first time Dekkushev is mentioned in the article and a first name should probably be included.
My first wiki-post, sorry for any breach of wiki-etiquette or protocol! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.203.249.119 ( talk) 08:02, 19 June 2018 (UTC)
There are several problems with this recent inclusion. (1) This is not really a "theory", but the official version of Russian government. (2) It is already described in other sections of the page. This is duplicate content. If you think something was missing. please include it in appropriate section. (3) It creates incorrect structure of the page: the books and films were NOT about this specific "theory", but about whole event. My very best wishes ( talk) 19:45, 10 October 2018 (UTC)
On English Wikipedia, we currently have 293 as the total number of deaths and 1000+ as the number injured. Russian Wikipedia has 307 and 1700 respectively. Despite this fact, the English Wikipedia actually has both sets of casualty numbers if you read the article. The casualty numbers without citation are actually the lower figures and not the higher figures. Here's a summary:
Date - Deaths - Injuries
31 August 1999 - 1 - 40 can be sourced to book "New Cold War" by Edward Lucas (journalist), pages 22-23.
4 September 1999 - 64 - 133; 68 - 150 [3]; Lucas: 64 killed
9 September 1999 - 106/94 - 249; 100 - 690 [4]; Lucas: 94 - 150
13 September 1999 - 119/118 - 200; 124 - 7 [5] Lucas: 118 -200
16 September 1999 - 17 - 69; 19 - 1045 [6] Lucas: 17 killed
Mathematical totals:
with higher numbers and including 31 Aug: 307 - 691
excluding 31 Aug & with lower numbers: 293 - 651
English Wiki total: 293 - 1000+
Russian Wiki total: 307 - 1700
Other sources: 367 killed [7]
Geographyinitiative ( talk) 18:38, 14 April 2019 (UTC) (modified)
Pinging User:Geographyinitiative and User:The Four Deuces. This is in reference to this diff [11] which rejected text from this article at Vladimir Putin on the grounds that the source was unreliable, and which brought about this diff [12]. (This could equally well be discussed at Talk:Vladimir Putin but this is closer to the source.) This is a clear application of WP:INTEXT and WP:NEWSORG: an op-ed by David Satter is evidence that David Satter believes that the bombings were a false flag attempt. Whether National Review is good enough is not the issue (for the record, it's a well-established source for commentary, analysis, and opinion pieces). Is the op-ed is a reliable source for what David Satter believes? (I would think yes.) Beyond that, I think we ought to discuss the best way to phrase the claim. Wikiacc ( ¶) 02:51, 29 April 2019 (UTC) (minor edits 02:55, 29 April 2019 (UTC))
as expected my edit was reverted so i re added the better source needed marker Geographyinitiative ( talk) 23:46, 29 April 2019 (UTC)
This detail (parliament's speaker announcing a bombing three days in advance by mistake) struck me as bizzare. I searched around and it seems that there was an explosion in Volgodonsk the day prior. Here is a small news item describing it. For context, it was published on the day of the second apartment bombing, among the flurry of contradictory and panicked news and reports about the bombings appearing almost every minute (here's a compilation of news flashes about the bombings, it shows that the same website published several dozen the same day, and it doesn't even include this fluff piece).
The Monday 9/13 news item itself is a sort of a digest; it says that during the preceding weekend, one unindentified bomb exploded in Volgodonsk, injuring two (according to RIA Novosti IA); one homemade bomb blew up in a country house in a town named Artyom, and one grenade in a town named Miass. Three more cities reported mock bombs found in apartment block hallways. An archived excerpt from a daily newspaper (also published before the Volgodonsk apartment bombing, on 9/15) claims that the explosion on 9/12 was a (fourth) assassination attempt on some kind of criminal boss nicknamed Admiral; initially thought as a terrorist attack.
(There are two more minor reasons the claim seemed strange. One is that the speaker's words were not broadcast anywhere and were uttered during the session of the parliament, in passing, using one sentence (judging by the way it's cited by a fellow MP whistleblower years later). The only reason these words had surfaced was because Zhirinovsky "called out" Seleznyov on them on Thursday 9/16. There seems to be no reason for Seleznyov to have broken the news of the bombing for some kind of theatrical effect, since only the MPs were going to hear it (and also fail to mention it anymore, like it's some minor occurence). If it was indeed an FSB blunder, the man would have said something else about such a major event that he believed had happened. Another reason is the source of the controversy, namely Zhirinovsky. Since the early 90s and to this day he is invariably known in Russia as a politician who relies solely on his eccentricity, showmanship, and wild, outrageous claims. This trait was especially prevalent at the time, and he enjoyed great popularity because of it, coining multiple "memes" of the time.)
Overall, as I understand, the article is mainly sourced from the exposé sources, which debunk the official Russian version. This gives the article a rather non-encyclopedic tone: the text seems to steadfastly debunk the official version, 'without' actually spelling out the official version (of the investigation, alleged timeline, etc.). Also, the personalities (e. g. Kovalyov) are only quoted as fully supporting the false flag theory, and there are no counterclaims or critique even from the liberal/opposition side (there were, inc. from Novaya Gazeta; Kovalyov himself, talking to an opposition radio station Echo of Moscow, stressed that Blowing Up Russia is a classic conspiracy theory and lacks rigor).
I don't have a definite opinion on this matter, and it is truly a murky, controversial stuff. So this comment is only about encyclopedic rigor and article quality. Seleznyov slip of the tongue is both fully described in the abstract and has its own section in the article, and is treated like a very important detail on the topic. I believe that, even if true, it doesn't merit this — and if it is, it'd be more of a bizzare trivia. AyeBraine ( talk) 02:12, 24 May 2019 (UTC)
PS: Russian wiki seems to have an extensive page specifically on the controversy about government involvement, with a sourced section dedicated to the stuff above. Reading through it, it seems rather neutrally edited, including claims and counterclaims by many different sides. AyeBraine ( talk) 02:29, 24 May 2019 (UTC)
Владимир Кара-Мурза-старший: Сергей Адамович, в Думе был такой эпизод, когда спикер Селезнев объявил "минуту молчания" в память о жертвах взрыва в Волгодонске, а взорвался дом на Каширском шоссе.
Сергей Ковалев: Еще взрыва не было, официально не было объявлено о взрыве.
Владимир Кара-Мурза-старший: Он только через три дня произошел, а в этот день был взрыв на Каширском шоссе.
Сергей Ковалев: Надо сказать, что на этом поймал его Жириновский. Ну, как-то это замяли.
Владимир Кара-Мурза-старший: Но это же очень серьезное обстоятельство.
Сергей Ковалев: Это был очень серьезный промах. Это значит, что Селезнев знал о том, что будет...
My very best wishes ( talk) 23:08, 27 May 2019 (UTC)
Over the years, the article has grown less balanced. In its present form it glosses over the significance of the conflict in Dagestan, and overlooks substantial evidence that Dagestani Wahhabis (such as those convicted of the crime) were responsible for the bombing in Buinaksk and perhaps for one or more of those in Moscow and Volgadansk. This evidence is not contrary to evidence for the culpability of the Russian security services in Ryazan. The evidence suggests an arc of copy-cat culpability from Dagestani Wahhabis (associated with the enclave in the villages of Karamachi, Chabanmachi, and Kadar) to the federal security services.
Robert Ware
Sourcing summarized in Dagestan: Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance, M. E. Sharpe, 2010. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 108.211.153.190 ( talk) 03:55, 18 August 2019 (UTC)
Prior to publishing any more personal attacks against me, I recommend that you acquaint yourself with the broad body of scholarly publications that followed from my field work in the North Caucasus and Russia during the years of the war in Dagestan and the Russian apartment bombings. The fact that I also teach philosophy has no bearing on this discussion and ad hominem attacks of the sort that you countenance above should be beneath the dignity of this publication.
As you have requested concrete suggestions for improvement of this page, I am copying below a segment from an upcoming chapter in a book on Post-Soviet Conflicts. This analysis closely follows the analysis presented in my book titled Dagestan: Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance (M. E. Sharpe, 2010); also published in my book titled The Fire Below: How the Caucasus Shaped Russia (Bloomsbury, 2013); also published in "Revisiting Russia's Apartment Block Blasts" (Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 5 January 2007); also published in Richard Sakwas edited volume, Chechnya: Past to Future You are welcome to use any of this material that you wish:
Explosions: Deadly, Controversial, Crucial, and Influential
During the night of September 4 1999, as fighting raged in Karamakhi, a truck bomb ripped through an apartment block in the nearby town of Buynaksk, killing sixty-four people. Although the building was inhabited by civilians, it had previously housed military families. The next day, on September 5, Basaev and Khattab launched their second invasion of Dagestan in a month, this time further north, in Dagestan’s Novolaksky Rayon. There is reason to suppose that this second invasion was intended to relieve the residents of Karamakhi from Russian attack. Yet there is no reason to rule out other motives including 1) the recovery of historic Chechen territory in what had briefly been the Aukovsky district but which became primarily the Novolaksky Rayon of Dagestan following the deportation of the Chechens in 1944; 2) the conquest of a corridor to the Caspian Sea; 3) the subsequent strategic division of Dagestan into northern and southern portions. Because these four potential objectives represent a linear eastward progression (from Novolaksky, to Karamakhi, to the Caspian shore) it is possible that Basaev may have entertained all four motives and aspired to achieve as many of them as he could. Yet the only real consequence of the September 5 insurgency was the creation of a new theater of military action in Dagestan. On September 9, ninety-four people died in their sleep when an explosion leveled a nine-story Moscow apartment building. Four days later, 118 died in another Moscow apartment blast. Just three days after that, seventeen people died when a bomb exploded in a truck parked near an apartment building in the city of Volgodonsk. The newly installed Prime Minister Putin saw a Chechen connection in these explosions, though this was denied by Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. Further doubts were raised after September 22 when another suspected bomb, discovered in the basement of an apartment building in the Russian city of Ryazan, turned out to be part of a “training exercise” sponsored by federal security services. The next day Russian aircraft bombed the Grozny airport, and a week later Russian troops re-entered Chechnya. The newly appointed Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, saw his reputation soar on his hardline prosecution of the conflict in the Caucasus, but there were lingering suspicions that the blasts had been the work of government authorities seeking to generate public support for an invasion of Chechnya. The Ryazan incident led to speculation that federal security services had planned an explosion there, and perhaps had planted the bombs in Moscow and Volgodonsk. Earlier questions had been raised when the speedy removal of rubble seemed to preclude a full investigation of the Moscow blast sites. Some observers noted that Chechen leaders such as Shamil Basaev and Salman Raduev were usually quick to claim responsibility for their exploits. Would not Basaev have taken credit if the apartment blasts had been his work? Indeed, why would any Chechen wish to enrage Russians by attacking civilians in their beds? And why did the explosions stop when Russian troops reentered Chechnya? If Chechens were behind the blasts then would not the blasts have continued after warfare in Chechnya resumed? In later years, two Russian legislators who were investigating the blasts died in questionable circumstances. A Russian lawyer, and former security agent, was arrested on a dubious weapons charge after inquiring about the case. Finally, in 2003, two Karachai men were convicted in the cases of the apartment block blasts. However, their closed trial answered none of the questions about the explosions, while raising new questions about the need for secrecy in a trial of great public consequence. These and other troubling ambiguities have been explored in a series of publications suggesting that Russian security services planted the bombs with the intent of blaming Chechens for the explosions and thereby mobilizing Russian society for a second war in Chechnya.2 The simplest explanation for the apartment block blasts is that they were perpetrated by Islamist extremists from the North Caucasus who were seeking retribution for federal military attacks upon the Islamist enclave in the central Dagestani villages of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar. There is much evidence for this hypothesis. In an interview published in the Prague periodical Lidove Noviny 3 on September 9, 1999, Shamil Basaev said: “The latest blast in Moscow is not our work, but the work of the Dagestanis. Russia has been openly terrorizing Dagestan . . . For the whole week, united in a single fist, the army and the Interior Ministry units have been pounding three small villages . . . And blasts and bombs—all this will go on, of course, because those whose loved ones, whose women and children are being killed for nothing will also try to use force to eliminate their adversaries. This is a natural process and it is yet more evidence of Newton’s third law, that each action generates a reaction . . . What is the difference between someone letting a bomb go off in the center of Moscow and injuring 10–20 children and the Russians dropping bombs from their aircraft over Karamakhi and killing 10–20 children? Where is the difference?” Among those whose women and children were in Karamakhi during the Russian assault was Khattab, who was married to a Karamakhi woman. On September 15, 1999, Greg Myre, an Associated Press reporter quoted Khattab as saying: “From now on, we will not only fight against Russian fighter jets (and) tanks. From now on, they will get our bombs everywhere. Let Russia await our explosions blasting through their cities. I swear we will do it.” Yet in a subsequent interview with the Interfax news agency Khattab denied that he had anything to do with the Moscow attacks. “We would not like to be akin to those who kill sleeping civilians with bombs and shells,” Khattab was quoted as saying. Khattab and other Wahhabis affiliated with the Islamic Djamaat clearly had a motive for blowing up Russian apartment buildings. In September 1999, when the Islamic Djamaat was being bombarded their motive was somewhat more crystalline and immediate than were those of other suspects, such as the Russian military and political establishments. Indeed, the last of the blasts, in Volgodonsk, occurred on September 16, the same day that fighting stopped in Dagestan. If the blasts were connected to the conflict in Dagestan, then one might expect them to conclude at the same time that the fighting did. Moreover, the Wahhabis would have had as much to gain from war as Russia’s military and political leaders since warfare would also mobilize their own supporters and spur the international fund raising upon which they depended. There was also much evidence that Dagestani Wahhabis were responsible for a long series of subsequent terrorist explosions in Dagestan. The best-publicized of these occurred at a parade in the Dagestani town of Kaspiysk on May 9, 2002, but there were many other explosions. For many of these explosions, Dagestani officials blamed Wahhabi gangs led by Rappani Khalilov and Shamil Abidov. Proponents of the view that Russian security services were responsible for the apartment blasts, such as David Sattar and Rajan Menon, have noted that the apartment block explosions involved hexogen, and have argued that hexogen is a highly controlled substance in Russia with availability tightly restricted outside of government circles. According to Menon, “the bombs used in Moscow and Volgodonsk were made with tons of hexogen, which is manufactured under tight security in very few locations in Russia; it would have been extraordinarily difficult to obtain it and transport it in such massive quantities.” However, Dagestani law enforcement officials sponsored a program for the voluntary surrender of arms from October 1, 2003 to December 1, 2003. Among the weapons that were surrendered were nearly one ton, 878 kilogram of explosives, including large quantities of hexogen and ammonite. Also surrendered were fifty-seven artillery rounds and missiles, three guided anti-tank rockets, 6,807 grenades, 1,256 detonators, 1,151,033 bullets, 962 rifles and pistols, 291 grenade launchers, and three flame throwers.4 Sizeable amounts of hexogen and large quantities of weaponry, both familiar and exotic, were readily available in Dagestan. Dagestani officials estimate that the surrender program recovered only a small fraction of the weapons, ammunition, and explosives circulating in Dagestan, since most of those wishing to dispose of these items would be better compensated on the black market. Certainly, the defenders of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar, who were heavily armed and well-fortified, had access to the full range of this ordinance. In 2001, a Dagestani court convicted five local Islamists of the Buynaksk blast. One of them, who had previously worked as a cook in a terrorist training camp that Basaev and Khattab operated in Chechnya, described the transit of the explosives used in Buynaksk from Chechnya to Dagestan beneath a truckload of watermelons. In the autumn of 1997, the Karamakhi Islamists had signed a mutual protection pact with Chechen Islamist groups. Hence, the most credible explanation for the apartment block blasts is that they were perpetrated by Wahhabis from Dagestan, and perhaps elsewhere in the region, under the leadership of Khattab, as retribution for the federal attacks on Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar. If the blasts were organized by Khattab and other Wahhabis as retribution for the federal attack on Dagestan’s Islamic Djamaat, then this would explain the timing of the attacks, and it would explain why there were no attacks after the date on which the fighting in Dagestan was concluded. It would explain why no Chechen claimed responsibility. It would account for Basaev’s reference to Dagestani responsibility, and it would be consistent with Khattab’s initial vow to set off “bombs everywhere . . . blasting through their cities.” Yet if Khattab and other Wahhabis were responsible for the blasts then this would mean that the Chechens were blamed unfairly, and this injustice would have contributed to many injustices that followed. Vladimir Putin’s suggestion that Chechens bore primary (or sole) responsibility for the apartment block blasts appears to have been poorly grounded, and to have given rise to a dangerous and inequitable mythology of Chechen culpability. At the same time, assertions that Russian security services are responsible for Russia’s apartment block blasts appear to be at least partially incomplete in so far as they do not account for the preceding evidence. Conversely, the Ryazan incident is not addressed by the evidence above. Over the years, I have concluded that the first of the four apartment-block blasts, in Bynaksk, was the work of Dagestani Wahhabis, who were supplied from training camps in Chechnya, and who were inspired to plant their truck-bomb by the Federal attack on Karamakhi. It seems likely that one or more of the blasts in Buynaksk and Moscow were the work of the same people. The bomb in Ryazan was unquestionably the work of the Russian security service. Hence, it appears that culpability shifted in the month of September 1999. Khattab and his supporters (perhaps including Basaev) clearly were responsible for the first blast in Buynaksk, and Russian security forces, recognizing the utility of the blasts for purposes of social mobilization, were then preparing to follow Khattab’s lead with a blast of their own in Ryazan. The first blast, on the 5th of September was the work of the Dagestani Wahhabis who subsequently were either killed or convicted of responsibility for the blast. The bomb in Ryazan on the 22nd, was avowedly the work of the Russian government. What of the other three bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk? Because the rubble in Moscow was hastily removed (much as it was two years later in New York), a thorough examination was never conducted. In Moscow, there was never an open trial of the alleged perpetrators – much as Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaida leaders were never brought to trial after 9/11. Hence, there will always be uncertainty about events in Moscow, as in New York. American analysts, policy makers, and incoming leaders took great interest in the four Russian apartment block blasts. I have reached the conclusion that events in Russia in September 1999 were influential for events in New York in September 2001, and were the basis in both countries for the social mobilization that swiftly occurred in support of brutal wars against Muslim populations. In any case, resistance in the vicinity of the “Islamic Djamaat” was brought to an end on September 13 when the militants departed the ruined villages. Three days later, on September 16, the same date as the explosion in Volgodonsk, fighting ended in the Novolaksky rayon. The Dagestani government counted 45,000 “victims of the war,” including those who suffered property damage; 32,000 Dagestanis lost their homes or were otherwise displaced. As the dust settled, it gradually began to appear that the conflict was nearly as cathartic for Dagestan as it was catastrophic for Chechnya. While the war led to further devastation in Chechnya, it stimulated a dramatic improvement in relations between Makhachkala and Moscow. Indeed, the war resolved the otherwise intransigent problem of a well-armed, well-fortified, militant Wahhabi djamaat, located at the strategic center of Dagestan near the main federal military base in Buynaksk. At the same time, Wahhabite insurgence in Tsumadinsky and Botlikhsky rayons, resulted in their universal condemnation. Dagestani resistance was a genuine “people’s war” that surmounted internal Dagestani ethnic tensions, and fused the interests of Dagestan’s elite with those of the general population. In the months following the war, Wahhabis were treated as pariahs, their leaders arrested or driven underground. If only temporarily, Islamist radicalism was suppressed in a manner that not only avoided internal political and religious stress, but temporarily strengthened connections between rulers and ruled, and thereby, at least momentarily, addressed that political alienation that contributed to the appeal of the Islamists. In a similar way, many complex problems that had emerged in Dagestan during the 1990s, and that had seemed to be nearly insoluble prior to the conflict, were in its aftermath, at least temporarily improved. These included problems resulting from: economic collapse, cross-border political realignment in Chechnya and Dagestan, and claims of Dagestan’s Chechen-Akkin population who had suffered Soviet deportation from their homes in the Novolaksky rayon. At the same time, it would be difficult to overstate the surprise and relief among Russian officials as the breadth and durability of Dagestani loyalty became increasingly evident. In the countryside, federal troops were received as defenders and allies by people who historically had shown them little sympathy. Indeed, the eventful year of 1999 culminated all the more climactically in Dagestan. At the stroke of midnight on the New Year’s eve, Boris Yeltsin resigned his position as Russian president, and according to the constitutional provision handed power over to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, once-obscure security official, who had suddenly catapulted to popularity and fame on the strength of his steely and aggressive response to the invasion of Dagestan. In the days immediately following Vladimir Putin’s appointment as prime minister in August 1999, he was widely dismissed by the Russian media, by the Russian public, and by other Russian leaders. Hence, it was his unexpected good fortune in Dagestan that signaled the beginning of Putin’s stunning ascent. As a result, Putin felt a sense of personal gratitude and attachment to Dagestan that could not be separated from his private aspirations. As Yeltsin announced his resignation, Vladimir Putin was in Dagestan, where he was feted at the holiday celebration by the local political elite. Celebrating the New Year (let alone the New Millennium) in Dagestan would have been entirely unprecedented for a Russian Prime Minister even if it had not turned out to be the moment Boris Yeltsin’s emotional resignation, and Putin’s startling promotion to the Russian presidency. It was extraordinarily auspicious for Putin, perhaps intentionally so, that, in this moment of highest drama, he was seated, not at Boris Yeltsin’s feet, but at the table of a people previously perceived as potential antagonists. At the stroke of the New Millennium, Putin raised his glass to toast his new-found friends: “I love the Dagestanis,” Putin said.
Robert Bruce Ware — Preceding unsigned comment added by 108.211.153.190 ( talk) 15:10, 18 August 2019 (UTC)
This page is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Speaking of this edit, please, explain, how does the text in the article distort the source?
The article is concluded with the following passage:
“ | "А то, что говорит Березовский об участии ФСБ во взрывах в Москве и Волгодонске, - это ложь. У меня нет доказательств по всем взрывам, но по некоторым есть. Я знаю, что эти взрывы устроили бандиты", - отметил Измайлов. | ” |
Translated into English:
“ | "But that which Berezovsky sais about FSB participation in Moscow and Volgodonsk explosions is a lie. I don't have the proof for all explosions, but I have for some. I know that the explosions were perpetrated by bandits." -- Ismailov noted. | ” |
Removing this source looks like WP:Vandalism.
Document hippo ( talk) 15:48, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
Йес, ай ду. I am not picky about whether it's "terrorists" or "bandits" (although the latter feels more natural for me), and of course if there's any controversy it's not up to WP editors to weigh in and offer their own expert opinions which would constitute OR. The reader can handle that on his own.
So, you believe the problem is in selective reading of the source. Until your recent edit we used to discuss Berezovsky and FSB counter-claims regarding each other in detail. Perhaps, we could discuss Izmailov's claims in more detail, more in the spirit of the article, and may be provide the very minimal context? Document hippo ( talk) 16:25, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
Izmailov's main argument was made in September 1999. Paul Murphy, "Wolves of Islam", p. 105:
“ | Khattab told Al-Watan Al-Arabi that the war "had shifted to all Russian cities and would be directed against all Russians." When specifically asked, he refused to condemn the Moscow bombings. Vyacheslav Izmailov, a respected news commentator on Chechnya, thought that he knew why Khattab reacted this way.
Going on Russian NTV television, Izmailov said that very reliable sources in Chechnya had told him that Khattab, just after his initial defeat in Dagestan, recruited former Russian military personnel for a terror campaign across the Russian Federation. The men were divided into four teams to carry out bombings in Dagestan, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Rostov-on-Don. Each team was given money to buy what it needed and to rent premises to hide explosives intended for the bombings. |
” |
Document hippo ( talk) 23:32, 11 September 2017 (UTC)
I made a redirect here because we have a lot of clearly duplicated materials on these two page. Another possible solution would be to move such materials from this main page to "explanation attempts" page instead of making the redirect (I do not mind), however keeping exactly same content on two pages is not a good idea. My very best wishes ( talk) 20:19, 13 September 2017 (UTC)
A lot of materials on this page (included mostly by a red-linked account) are not about these bombings, but about War in Dagestan, which is an entirely different subject. The only actual connection is that both the bombings and the War in Dagestan were used as a casus belli to start Second Chech War. These materials should be either removed or moved to proper page. My very best wishes ( talk) 13:56, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
I wonder, what was the reason for this edit?
In that interview, Kovalev said:
“ | S. Kovalev. Yes, of course. I think it would be natural to check that. Moreover, I don't want to speak about likelihood, truthworthy or even serious doubts of that material without a most thorough and very tedious analysis. FSB will check that, and we will check, to the extent of what's accessible for us. Now, about the belief in this or that version. Yes, Felshtinsky and Litvinenko claim: "FSB explodes Russia". I won't like to believe in that, but I try to be impartial, and I don't rule out that version. I don't rule out any of them, including the Chechen connection, the FSB connection, or any hybrid versions which are possible too. Experience shows it's a frequent situation. Generally, I'm not a big proponent of conspiracy theories. But Litvinenko's and Felshtinsky's theory is a pure conspiracy. But regardless of what one feels is the preferred option, I believe that an investigator should follow the golden rule of a researcher, there's a similarity. There shouldn't be a more sharp and more demanding criticist of a hypothesis, than its author. Because it's he who knows all of the details. And he should strive to kill his own hypothesis, to destroy it. But if he doesn't succeed, then he exhales with a relief and says: "Well, now it's not a hypothesis, it's a proven thing, now it's a theory at least." One simply cannot see such desire on the side of the authors of the book. I won't even mention that the very book itself, the episodes which are known very well to me as a participant, there's incredible amount of fiction. For example, Budennovsk. It's pure fiction, and not even a single link. That's not how serious books are written, which pretend to be truthworthy.
T. Pelipeyko. Thanks, Sergey Adamovich. To sum it up, the very fact of errors in something else causes you to doubt that which was claimed by Litvinenko and Felshtinsky today? S. Kovalev. I don't think such doubts should offend them. I think they have given the material to the commission so that it would be subject to impartial and fair minded analysis. |
” |
How would you summarize it?
Document hippo ( talk) 20:57, 14 September 2017 (UTC)
“ | Сергей Ковалев: Я не могу с полной уверенностью утверждать, что эти взрывы были организованы властью. Хотя понятно, что они были ей на руку, на руку будущему президенту Владимиру Владимировичу Путину, потому что он только что обещал "мочить в сортире", как он выразился, каждого, кто имеет какое-то отношение к терроризму. И напугать людей терроризмом было для него политически целесообразно. Это не доказано.
Но что можно с полной уверенностью утверждать: расследование взрывов и московских, и так называемых "учений" в Рязани – все это шито белыми нитками. Могут быть разные варианты. Мне кажется, что Рязань должна была стать очередным взрывом, но я не могу этого доказать. |
” |
“ | Sergey Kovalev: I cannot state with full confidence that the explosions were organized by the authorities. Although it's clear that the explosions were useful for them, useful for future President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, because he had just promised to "waste in the outhouse" (as he said) everyone who had any relation to terrorism. It was politically benefitial for him to scare people with terrorism. That is not proven.
But what can be stated with full confidence: the investigation of both the Moscow explosions and the so-called "exercises" in Ryazan is trumped up. There can be various possibilities. It seems to me, that Ryazan should have been the next explosion, but I cannot prove that. |
” |
This whole section looks to me as highly problematic. Why do we have this described as a separate "theory"? Was not he involved according to the official version? Yes, he was. As about the terrorist attacks being carried out not by Chechens but by other nationalities, this is simply a matter of fact (as noted by Latynina and others), and not a theory. This should be mentioned somewhere, but not as a "theory". My very best wishes ( talk) 15:44, 16 September 2017 (UTC)
The problem is, the alternative version gives undue weight to the conspiracy theory, which many of the editors who wrote at this talk page did oppose. People like Strobe Talbott, Ariel Cohen and Thomas de Waal are not less notable than Felshtinsky, Litvinenko or Berezovsky. There's no attempt to discuss, but rather than that, the lead provides indication of various attitutes towards the conspiracy theory. Document hippo ( talk) 04:24, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
Like I've previously explained at this talk page, conspiracy theories are not falsifiable. Therefore, no one could ever say that this particular explanation is wrong. No kind of an argument exists which would prove it wrong.
The only thing which can be said is that there's no evidence for it. Even David Satter wrote that there's no direct evidence of the theory of FSB involvement: [1]
“ | The circumstantial evidence that the bombings were carried out by the FSB is overwhelming. The only reason there is no direct evidence is that the Putin regime has concealed it. | ” |
And that's pretty much it. You don't need a chapter to say there's no evidence. Document hippo ( talk) 04:58, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
The title refects the fact that de Waal wrote a commentary on a Berezovsky-sponsored movie, rather than endorses or rejects the claims made in the film. In that publication, Thomas de Waal wrote:
“ | There was very little in the allegations made by Berezovsky, which had not been reported in small-circulation Russian newspapers and a book written by an ex-KGB officer over the last two years. <...> Chekulin's testimony was the nearest thing to a "smoking gun" but even he admitted that he had no direct documentary evidence directly related to the three apartment block bombings. | ” |
That's consistent with the claim made in the lead.
You might argue that he said "no direct documentary evidence", and that's not the same thing as just "evidence". Fine. If you insist, I don't mind if this particular citation is removed. The first link is his September 30, 1999 BBC article which almost word-by-word coincides with Talbott's claim. I have specifically sought de Waal's later writing to double-check his opinion didn't make an U-turn in the years since the 1999, like it happened to a certain hero of this article. You can consider it more of an internal consistency check.
Regarding your other claims, please, note that SYNTH is not summary.
Document hippo ( talk) 23:58, 11 September 2017 (UTC)
Forgot to talk about a brief mention of Khattab's invasion and threats in the lead. I have previously written about it. Now that I've changed the text to Khattab having had "links to Osama bin Laden", I could name several more sources supporting that claim -- for example, Klebnikov, Talbott, Clarke, Gerges... It's not an attempt to denigrate Khattab. It's pretty much factual description, with very strong support in the literature. -- Document hippo ( talk) 01:21, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
I checked the book by Klebnikov (published in 2000 and written soon after the events), pages 303-305. He tells about various speculations on the subject (including bombings being conducted by "mavericks of Putin's camp" as something he does not exclude!), and adds "but all of this is speculation". Basically, he has no opinion on the subject. Therefore, I do not think his opinion should be included on this page. My very best wishes ( talk) 03:33, 17 September 2017 (UTC)
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I think this is general problem here. Why people were using sources that tell very little on the subject, such as the outdated book by Klebnikov? There are books where whole chapters are dedicated specifically to these historical bombings. Consider something like Putin's Kleptocracy. It describes this subject in greatest detail, and some portions are available online: [2]. My very best wishes ( talk) 01:12, 18 September 2017 (UTC)
Real simple, in the section title "Claims, denials and confessions of responsibility for the blasts" there is mention of a Dekkushev who I believe is meant to be Adam Dekkushev. It's the first time Dekkushev is mentioned in the article and a first name should probably be included.
My first wiki-post, sorry for any breach of wiki-etiquette or protocol! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.203.249.119 ( talk) 08:02, 19 June 2018 (UTC)
There are several problems with this recent inclusion. (1) This is not really a "theory", but the official version of Russian government. (2) It is already described in other sections of the page. This is duplicate content. If you think something was missing. please include it in appropriate section. (3) It creates incorrect structure of the page: the books and films were NOT about this specific "theory", but about whole event. My very best wishes ( talk) 19:45, 10 October 2018 (UTC)
On English Wikipedia, we currently have 293 as the total number of deaths and 1000+ as the number injured. Russian Wikipedia has 307 and 1700 respectively. Despite this fact, the English Wikipedia actually has both sets of casualty numbers if you read the article. The casualty numbers without citation are actually the lower figures and not the higher figures. Here's a summary:
Date - Deaths - Injuries
31 August 1999 - 1 - 40 can be sourced to book "New Cold War" by Edward Lucas (journalist), pages 22-23.
4 September 1999 - 64 - 133; 68 - 150 [3]; Lucas: 64 killed
9 September 1999 - 106/94 - 249; 100 - 690 [4]; Lucas: 94 - 150
13 September 1999 - 119/118 - 200; 124 - 7 [5] Lucas: 118 -200
16 September 1999 - 17 - 69; 19 - 1045 [6] Lucas: 17 killed
Mathematical totals:
with higher numbers and including 31 Aug: 307 - 691
excluding 31 Aug & with lower numbers: 293 - 651
English Wiki total: 293 - 1000+
Russian Wiki total: 307 - 1700
Other sources: 367 killed [7]
Geographyinitiative ( talk) 18:38, 14 April 2019 (UTC) (modified)
Pinging User:Geographyinitiative and User:The Four Deuces. This is in reference to this diff [11] which rejected text from this article at Vladimir Putin on the grounds that the source was unreliable, and which brought about this diff [12]. (This could equally well be discussed at Talk:Vladimir Putin but this is closer to the source.) This is a clear application of WP:INTEXT and WP:NEWSORG: an op-ed by David Satter is evidence that David Satter believes that the bombings were a false flag attempt. Whether National Review is good enough is not the issue (for the record, it's a well-established source for commentary, analysis, and opinion pieces). Is the op-ed is a reliable source for what David Satter believes? (I would think yes.) Beyond that, I think we ought to discuss the best way to phrase the claim. Wikiacc ( ¶) 02:51, 29 April 2019 (UTC) (minor edits 02:55, 29 April 2019 (UTC))
as expected my edit was reverted so i re added the better source needed marker Geographyinitiative ( talk) 23:46, 29 April 2019 (UTC)
This detail (parliament's speaker announcing a bombing three days in advance by mistake) struck me as bizzare. I searched around and it seems that there was an explosion in Volgodonsk the day prior. Here is a small news item describing it. For context, it was published on the day of the second apartment bombing, among the flurry of contradictory and panicked news and reports about the bombings appearing almost every minute (here's a compilation of news flashes about the bombings, it shows that the same website published several dozen the same day, and it doesn't even include this fluff piece).
The Monday 9/13 news item itself is a sort of a digest; it says that during the preceding weekend, one unindentified bomb exploded in Volgodonsk, injuring two (according to RIA Novosti IA); one homemade bomb blew up in a country house in a town named Artyom, and one grenade in a town named Miass. Three more cities reported mock bombs found in apartment block hallways. An archived excerpt from a daily newspaper (also published before the Volgodonsk apartment bombing, on 9/15) claims that the explosion on 9/12 was a (fourth) assassination attempt on some kind of criminal boss nicknamed Admiral; initially thought as a terrorist attack.
(There are two more minor reasons the claim seemed strange. One is that the speaker's words were not broadcast anywhere and were uttered during the session of the parliament, in passing, using one sentence (judging by the way it's cited by a fellow MP whistleblower years later). The only reason these words had surfaced was because Zhirinovsky "called out" Seleznyov on them on Thursday 9/16. There seems to be no reason for Seleznyov to have broken the news of the bombing for some kind of theatrical effect, since only the MPs were going to hear it (and also fail to mention it anymore, like it's some minor occurence). If it was indeed an FSB blunder, the man would have said something else about such a major event that he believed had happened. Another reason is the source of the controversy, namely Zhirinovsky. Since the early 90s and to this day he is invariably known in Russia as a politician who relies solely on his eccentricity, showmanship, and wild, outrageous claims. This trait was especially prevalent at the time, and he enjoyed great popularity because of it, coining multiple "memes" of the time.)
Overall, as I understand, the article is mainly sourced from the exposé sources, which debunk the official Russian version. This gives the article a rather non-encyclopedic tone: the text seems to steadfastly debunk the official version, 'without' actually spelling out the official version (of the investigation, alleged timeline, etc.). Also, the personalities (e. g. Kovalyov) are only quoted as fully supporting the false flag theory, and there are no counterclaims or critique even from the liberal/opposition side (there were, inc. from Novaya Gazeta; Kovalyov himself, talking to an opposition radio station Echo of Moscow, stressed that Blowing Up Russia is a classic conspiracy theory and lacks rigor).
I don't have a definite opinion on this matter, and it is truly a murky, controversial stuff. So this comment is only about encyclopedic rigor and article quality. Seleznyov slip of the tongue is both fully described in the abstract and has its own section in the article, and is treated like a very important detail on the topic. I believe that, even if true, it doesn't merit this — and if it is, it'd be more of a bizzare trivia. AyeBraine ( talk) 02:12, 24 May 2019 (UTC)
PS: Russian wiki seems to have an extensive page specifically on the controversy about government involvement, with a sourced section dedicated to the stuff above. Reading through it, it seems rather neutrally edited, including claims and counterclaims by many different sides. AyeBraine ( talk) 02:29, 24 May 2019 (UTC)
Владимир Кара-Мурза-старший: Сергей Адамович, в Думе был такой эпизод, когда спикер Селезнев объявил "минуту молчания" в память о жертвах взрыва в Волгодонске, а взорвался дом на Каширском шоссе.
Сергей Ковалев: Еще взрыва не было, официально не было объявлено о взрыве.
Владимир Кара-Мурза-старший: Он только через три дня произошел, а в этот день был взрыв на Каширском шоссе.
Сергей Ковалев: Надо сказать, что на этом поймал его Жириновский. Ну, как-то это замяли.
Владимир Кара-Мурза-старший: Но это же очень серьезное обстоятельство.
Сергей Ковалев: Это был очень серьезный промах. Это значит, что Селезнев знал о том, что будет...
My very best wishes ( talk) 23:08, 27 May 2019 (UTC)
Over the years, the article has grown less balanced. In its present form it glosses over the significance of the conflict in Dagestan, and overlooks substantial evidence that Dagestani Wahhabis (such as those convicted of the crime) were responsible for the bombing in Buinaksk and perhaps for one or more of those in Moscow and Volgadansk. This evidence is not contrary to evidence for the culpability of the Russian security services in Ryazan. The evidence suggests an arc of copy-cat culpability from Dagestani Wahhabis (associated with the enclave in the villages of Karamachi, Chabanmachi, and Kadar) to the federal security services.
Robert Ware
Sourcing summarized in Dagestan: Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance, M. E. Sharpe, 2010. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 108.211.153.190 ( talk) 03:55, 18 August 2019 (UTC)
Prior to publishing any more personal attacks against me, I recommend that you acquaint yourself with the broad body of scholarly publications that followed from my field work in the North Caucasus and Russia during the years of the war in Dagestan and the Russian apartment bombings. The fact that I also teach philosophy has no bearing on this discussion and ad hominem attacks of the sort that you countenance above should be beneath the dignity of this publication.
As you have requested concrete suggestions for improvement of this page, I am copying below a segment from an upcoming chapter in a book on Post-Soviet Conflicts. This analysis closely follows the analysis presented in my book titled Dagestan: Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance (M. E. Sharpe, 2010); also published in my book titled The Fire Below: How the Caucasus Shaped Russia (Bloomsbury, 2013); also published in "Revisiting Russia's Apartment Block Blasts" (Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 5 January 2007); also published in Richard Sakwas edited volume, Chechnya: Past to Future You are welcome to use any of this material that you wish:
Explosions: Deadly, Controversial, Crucial, and Influential
During the night of September 4 1999, as fighting raged in Karamakhi, a truck bomb ripped through an apartment block in the nearby town of Buynaksk, killing sixty-four people. Although the building was inhabited by civilians, it had previously housed military families. The next day, on September 5, Basaev and Khattab launched their second invasion of Dagestan in a month, this time further north, in Dagestan’s Novolaksky Rayon. There is reason to suppose that this second invasion was intended to relieve the residents of Karamakhi from Russian attack. Yet there is no reason to rule out other motives including 1) the recovery of historic Chechen territory in what had briefly been the Aukovsky district but which became primarily the Novolaksky Rayon of Dagestan following the deportation of the Chechens in 1944; 2) the conquest of a corridor to the Caspian Sea; 3) the subsequent strategic division of Dagestan into northern and southern portions. Because these four potential objectives represent a linear eastward progression (from Novolaksky, to Karamakhi, to the Caspian shore) it is possible that Basaev may have entertained all four motives and aspired to achieve as many of them as he could. Yet the only real consequence of the September 5 insurgency was the creation of a new theater of military action in Dagestan. On September 9, ninety-four people died in their sleep when an explosion leveled a nine-story Moscow apartment building. Four days later, 118 died in another Moscow apartment blast. Just three days after that, seventeen people died when a bomb exploded in a truck parked near an apartment building in the city of Volgodonsk. The newly installed Prime Minister Putin saw a Chechen connection in these explosions, though this was denied by Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. Further doubts were raised after September 22 when another suspected bomb, discovered in the basement of an apartment building in the Russian city of Ryazan, turned out to be part of a “training exercise” sponsored by federal security services. The next day Russian aircraft bombed the Grozny airport, and a week later Russian troops re-entered Chechnya. The newly appointed Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, saw his reputation soar on his hardline prosecution of the conflict in the Caucasus, but there were lingering suspicions that the blasts had been the work of government authorities seeking to generate public support for an invasion of Chechnya. The Ryazan incident led to speculation that federal security services had planned an explosion there, and perhaps had planted the bombs in Moscow and Volgodonsk. Earlier questions had been raised when the speedy removal of rubble seemed to preclude a full investigation of the Moscow blast sites. Some observers noted that Chechen leaders such as Shamil Basaev and Salman Raduev were usually quick to claim responsibility for their exploits. Would not Basaev have taken credit if the apartment blasts had been his work? Indeed, why would any Chechen wish to enrage Russians by attacking civilians in their beds? And why did the explosions stop when Russian troops reentered Chechnya? If Chechens were behind the blasts then would not the blasts have continued after warfare in Chechnya resumed? In later years, two Russian legislators who were investigating the blasts died in questionable circumstances. A Russian lawyer, and former security agent, was arrested on a dubious weapons charge after inquiring about the case. Finally, in 2003, two Karachai men were convicted in the cases of the apartment block blasts. However, their closed trial answered none of the questions about the explosions, while raising new questions about the need for secrecy in a trial of great public consequence. These and other troubling ambiguities have been explored in a series of publications suggesting that Russian security services planted the bombs with the intent of blaming Chechens for the explosions and thereby mobilizing Russian society for a second war in Chechnya.2 The simplest explanation for the apartment block blasts is that they were perpetrated by Islamist extremists from the North Caucasus who were seeking retribution for federal military attacks upon the Islamist enclave in the central Dagestani villages of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar. There is much evidence for this hypothesis. In an interview published in the Prague periodical Lidove Noviny 3 on September 9, 1999, Shamil Basaev said: “The latest blast in Moscow is not our work, but the work of the Dagestanis. Russia has been openly terrorizing Dagestan . . . For the whole week, united in a single fist, the army and the Interior Ministry units have been pounding three small villages . . . And blasts and bombs—all this will go on, of course, because those whose loved ones, whose women and children are being killed for nothing will also try to use force to eliminate their adversaries. This is a natural process and it is yet more evidence of Newton’s third law, that each action generates a reaction . . . What is the difference between someone letting a bomb go off in the center of Moscow and injuring 10–20 children and the Russians dropping bombs from their aircraft over Karamakhi and killing 10–20 children? Where is the difference?” Among those whose women and children were in Karamakhi during the Russian assault was Khattab, who was married to a Karamakhi woman. On September 15, 1999, Greg Myre, an Associated Press reporter quoted Khattab as saying: “From now on, we will not only fight against Russian fighter jets (and) tanks. From now on, they will get our bombs everywhere. Let Russia await our explosions blasting through their cities. I swear we will do it.” Yet in a subsequent interview with the Interfax news agency Khattab denied that he had anything to do with the Moscow attacks. “We would not like to be akin to those who kill sleeping civilians with bombs and shells,” Khattab was quoted as saying. Khattab and other Wahhabis affiliated with the Islamic Djamaat clearly had a motive for blowing up Russian apartment buildings. In September 1999, when the Islamic Djamaat was being bombarded their motive was somewhat more crystalline and immediate than were those of other suspects, such as the Russian military and political establishments. Indeed, the last of the blasts, in Volgodonsk, occurred on September 16, the same day that fighting stopped in Dagestan. If the blasts were connected to the conflict in Dagestan, then one might expect them to conclude at the same time that the fighting did. Moreover, the Wahhabis would have had as much to gain from war as Russia’s military and political leaders since warfare would also mobilize their own supporters and spur the international fund raising upon which they depended. There was also much evidence that Dagestani Wahhabis were responsible for a long series of subsequent terrorist explosions in Dagestan. The best-publicized of these occurred at a parade in the Dagestani town of Kaspiysk on May 9, 2002, but there were many other explosions. For many of these explosions, Dagestani officials blamed Wahhabi gangs led by Rappani Khalilov and Shamil Abidov. Proponents of the view that Russian security services were responsible for the apartment blasts, such as David Sattar and Rajan Menon, have noted that the apartment block explosions involved hexogen, and have argued that hexogen is a highly controlled substance in Russia with availability tightly restricted outside of government circles. According to Menon, “the bombs used in Moscow and Volgodonsk were made with tons of hexogen, which is manufactured under tight security in very few locations in Russia; it would have been extraordinarily difficult to obtain it and transport it in such massive quantities.” However, Dagestani law enforcement officials sponsored a program for the voluntary surrender of arms from October 1, 2003 to December 1, 2003. Among the weapons that were surrendered were nearly one ton, 878 kilogram of explosives, including large quantities of hexogen and ammonite. Also surrendered were fifty-seven artillery rounds and missiles, three guided anti-tank rockets, 6,807 grenades, 1,256 detonators, 1,151,033 bullets, 962 rifles and pistols, 291 grenade launchers, and three flame throwers.4 Sizeable amounts of hexogen and large quantities of weaponry, both familiar and exotic, were readily available in Dagestan. Dagestani officials estimate that the surrender program recovered only a small fraction of the weapons, ammunition, and explosives circulating in Dagestan, since most of those wishing to dispose of these items would be better compensated on the black market. Certainly, the defenders of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar, who were heavily armed and well-fortified, had access to the full range of this ordinance. In 2001, a Dagestani court convicted five local Islamists of the Buynaksk blast. One of them, who had previously worked as a cook in a terrorist training camp that Basaev and Khattab operated in Chechnya, described the transit of the explosives used in Buynaksk from Chechnya to Dagestan beneath a truckload of watermelons. In the autumn of 1997, the Karamakhi Islamists had signed a mutual protection pact with Chechen Islamist groups. Hence, the most credible explanation for the apartment block blasts is that they were perpetrated by Wahhabis from Dagestan, and perhaps elsewhere in the region, under the leadership of Khattab, as retribution for the federal attacks on Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar. If the blasts were organized by Khattab and other Wahhabis as retribution for the federal attack on Dagestan’s Islamic Djamaat, then this would explain the timing of the attacks, and it would explain why there were no attacks after the date on which the fighting in Dagestan was concluded. It would explain why no Chechen claimed responsibility. It would account for Basaev’s reference to Dagestani responsibility, and it would be consistent with Khattab’s initial vow to set off “bombs everywhere . . . blasting through their cities.” Yet if Khattab and other Wahhabis were responsible for the blasts then this would mean that the Chechens were blamed unfairly, and this injustice would have contributed to many injustices that followed. Vladimir Putin’s suggestion that Chechens bore primary (or sole) responsibility for the apartment block blasts appears to have been poorly grounded, and to have given rise to a dangerous and inequitable mythology of Chechen culpability. At the same time, assertions that Russian security services are responsible for Russia’s apartment block blasts appear to be at least partially incomplete in so far as they do not account for the preceding evidence. Conversely, the Ryazan incident is not addressed by the evidence above. Over the years, I have concluded that the first of the four apartment-block blasts, in Bynaksk, was the work of Dagestani Wahhabis, who were supplied from training camps in Chechnya, and who were inspired to plant their truck-bomb by the Federal attack on Karamakhi. It seems likely that one or more of the blasts in Buynaksk and Moscow were the work of the same people. The bomb in Ryazan was unquestionably the work of the Russian security service. Hence, it appears that culpability shifted in the month of September 1999. Khattab and his supporters (perhaps including Basaev) clearly were responsible for the first blast in Buynaksk, and Russian security forces, recognizing the utility of the blasts for purposes of social mobilization, were then preparing to follow Khattab’s lead with a blast of their own in Ryazan. The first blast, on the 5th of September was the work of the Dagestani Wahhabis who subsequently were either killed or convicted of responsibility for the blast. The bomb in Ryazan on the 22nd, was avowedly the work of the Russian government. What of the other three bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk? Because the rubble in Moscow was hastily removed (much as it was two years later in New York), a thorough examination was never conducted. In Moscow, there was never an open trial of the alleged perpetrators – much as Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaida leaders were never brought to trial after 9/11. Hence, there will always be uncertainty about events in Moscow, as in New York. American analysts, policy makers, and incoming leaders took great interest in the four Russian apartment block blasts. I have reached the conclusion that events in Russia in September 1999 were influential for events in New York in September 2001, and were the basis in both countries for the social mobilization that swiftly occurred in support of brutal wars against Muslim populations. In any case, resistance in the vicinity of the “Islamic Djamaat” was brought to an end on September 13 when the militants departed the ruined villages. Three days later, on September 16, the same date as the explosion in Volgodonsk, fighting ended in the Novolaksky rayon. The Dagestani government counted 45,000 “victims of the war,” including those who suffered property damage; 32,000 Dagestanis lost their homes or were otherwise displaced. As the dust settled, it gradually began to appear that the conflict was nearly as cathartic for Dagestan as it was catastrophic for Chechnya. While the war led to further devastation in Chechnya, it stimulated a dramatic improvement in relations between Makhachkala and Moscow. Indeed, the war resolved the otherwise intransigent problem of a well-armed, well-fortified, militant Wahhabi djamaat, located at the strategic center of Dagestan near the main federal military base in Buynaksk. At the same time, Wahhabite insurgence in Tsumadinsky and Botlikhsky rayons, resulted in their universal condemnation. Dagestani resistance was a genuine “people’s war” that surmounted internal Dagestani ethnic tensions, and fused the interests of Dagestan’s elite with those of the general population. In the months following the war, Wahhabis were treated as pariahs, their leaders arrested or driven underground. If only temporarily, Islamist radicalism was suppressed in a manner that not only avoided internal political and religious stress, but temporarily strengthened connections between rulers and ruled, and thereby, at least momentarily, addressed that political alienation that contributed to the appeal of the Islamists. In a similar way, many complex problems that had emerged in Dagestan during the 1990s, and that had seemed to be nearly insoluble prior to the conflict, were in its aftermath, at least temporarily improved. These included problems resulting from: economic collapse, cross-border political realignment in Chechnya and Dagestan, and claims of Dagestan’s Chechen-Akkin population who had suffered Soviet deportation from their homes in the Novolaksky rayon. At the same time, it would be difficult to overstate the surprise and relief among Russian officials as the breadth and durability of Dagestani loyalty became increasingly evident. In the countryside, federal troops were received as defenders and allies by people who historically had shown them little sympathy. Indeed, the eventful year of 1999 culminated all the more climactically in Dagestan. At the stroke of midnight on the New Year’s eve, Boris Yeltsin resigned his position as Russian president, and according to the constitutional provision handed power over to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, once-obscure security official, who had suddenly catapulted to popularity and fame on the strength of his steely and aggressive response to the invasion of Dagestan. In the days immediately following Vladimir Putin’s appointment as prime minister in August 1999, he was widely dismissed by the Russian media, by the Russian public, and by other Russian leaders. Hence, it was his unexpected good fortune in Dagestan that signaled the beginning of Putin’s stunning ascent. As a result, Putin felt a sense of personal gratitude and attachment to Dagestan that could not be separated from his private aspirations. As Yeltsin announced his resignation, Vladimir Putin was in Dagestan, where he was feted at the holiday celebration by the local political elite. Celebrating the New Year (let alone the New Millennium) in Dagestan would have been entirely unprecedented for a Russian Prime Minister even if it had not turned out to be the moment Boris Yeltsin’s emotional resignation, and Putin’s startling promotion to the Russian presidency. It was extraordinarily auspicious for Putin, perhaps intentionally so, that, in this moment of highest drama, he was seated, not at Boris Yeltsin’s feet, but at the table of a people previously perceived as potential antagonists. At the stroke of the New Millennium, Putin raised his glass to toast his new-found friends: “I love the Dagestanis,” Putin said.
Robert Bruce Ware — Preceding unsigned comment added by 108.211.153.190 ( talk) 15:10, 18 August 2019 (UTC)