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Battle of Thorgo
Part of Kashmir Conflict and the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948
Date16-18th March 1948 [1]
Location
Thorgo near Skardu, Pakistan
Result

Ambush successful [2]

  • Relief column defeated [3]
  • Remaining forces retreat [4]
Belligerents
Pakistan Dominion of Pakistan

India Dominion of India

Commanders and leaders
Maj.Ehsan Ali
Lieu.Babar
Capt.Nek Alam		 Faqir Singh ( WIA) [5]
India Col.Cootes
Units involved

Gilgit Scouts

  • Ibex Force
  • Local Volunteers

6 J&K Infantry

  • Biscuit Column
Strength
~3 Platoons, [6] Aproximately
(100-300)		 ~1 company
(350 men) [7]
Accompanied by:
~600 coolies,200 horses [8]
Casualties and losses
Unknown Pakistani Sources:
150 killed, 75000 rounds of 303 ammo, (2-3) Mortar, rifles, Sten-guns, MMG's [9]
Indian Sources:
26 killed, 7 missing presumed killed, 18 wounded, 27 rifles, 5 Sten guns, 2 VB Machine guns, 64000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 84 Hand grenades, 51 HE bombs of 2-mch mortar, 204 HE bombs of 3-mch mortar. [10]

Battle of Thorgo, [11] Thorgo also spelled as Thurgo [12] or Thergo, [13] took place during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948 in the Skardu sector, in March 16-17th 1948, Involving Gilgit scouts and the Jammu and Kashmir forces, the Gilgit Scouts hid at the Thorgo Pari [note 1] between Gol and Skardu, [14] after being informed of the relief column which was dispatched by the Indian Headquarters at Srinagar for the reinforcement of the besieged Skardu garrison, [15] upon the Arrival of the relief column the hidden scouts would ambush the relief column and throw large rocks at them causing panic and heavy causalities among them including Brigadier Faqir Singh being injured. [16]

The remnants of the defeated relief column would retreat back to Kargil under Major Cootes and the wounded Faqir Singh would head to Srinagar Headquarters. [17] A column would be made of two feeble platoons sent by the Colonel Sher Jung Thapa to receive the relief column, After receiving information from Srinagar Headquarters regarding their arrival, but after being told by villagers the fate of the defeated relief column, the Skardu column would head back to Skardu garrison which would also be ambushed by the scouts, but would reach safely without any causalities. [18] Following the defeat of the relief Column close to Gol, the scouts intensified their efforts against the Skardu garrison. [19] Major Ehsan was now informed of further reinforcements dispatched for the Skardu garrison under the codename Z Brigade which was consolidating at Kargil which would be commanded by Lieutenant Col. Kripal Singh, Major Ehsan would split his force and send to Parkutta for countering this force. [20]

Prelude

Prelude

In the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948 during the Siege of Skardu Col. Sher Jung Thapa and his garrison had been holding out the Gilgit Scouts at Skardu during the Siege of Skardu. [21] Col. Thapa had again requested the Headquarters at Srinagar to send reinforcements, [21] which had been received before and again another relief column was dispatched under the codename "Biscuit column" [22] Led by Brigadier Faqir Singh. Major Ehsan Ali wanted to ambush the previous relief column that reached on 13th February. but couldn't do so, when informed of the further relief column Major Ehsan would at once prepare for ambushing the column of Brigadier Faqir Singh. [23] According to Mahajan there was increased fighting among both sides in the Skardu sector and an failed attack by the Skardu garrison on Point 8853, which was under scouts control. [24]

On 15th February From the Looks outs of the Skardu garrison, the besieged forces saw a small force of Gilgit scouts marching towards the direction from where the relief column were to arrive and on the next day a larger force was seen advancing in the same direction. [22] Col. Thapa understood that the scouts were heading to ambush the relief column, after he was informed of the incoming reinforcements which would reach him on 18th February, by the Srinagar Headquarters. [22] Due to the only broken W/T communication set which the relief forces had with no possibilities of repair, Col. Thapa was unable to inform the relief forces of the incoming Gilgit scouts and even after informing the Srinagar Headquarters and requesting airstrikes against the scouts but strikes were not conducted. [25] The information regarding the incoming relief column bothered Major Ehsan the most, orders were given to Brigadier Faqir to occupy Thorgo Pari and keep the Indus path open. [26] Brig. Faqir with his relief column on his way to reach Parkutta and Gol assumed that the Gilgit scouts would also be paralyzed because of the intense cold, [22] but instead the Gilgit scouts divided their troops from the Siege of Skardu and sent most of their troops with little remaining at Skardu, who would keep shelling the Skardu garrison meanwhile the forces under Major Ehsan Ali devised a plan to eliminate the relief column by preparing for an ambush. [27]

Battle

Ambush and Causalities

The Gilgit scouts choose the site of ambush at Thorgo Pari near Gol where the road pass from a lofty point from the left of the Indus river and where the Valley got constricted, only one horse could proceed at a time. [28] On the Northernmost area of the Thorgo hill Captain Nek Alam and his Platoon took spot here, Subedar Muhammad Ali [note 2] and Lieutenant Babar dispersed their two platoons, to the opposite of the Nurhbuchung village next to the river. Captain Mohammed Khan positioned one mortar and one machine gun section at the other end of the Pari, while one machine gun section was deployed at the edge, the Gilgit scouts were all set. [29]

Brig. Faqir and Major Cootes would set foot in the dark slim pass on their horses along their forces and supplies on 17th February. [28] The scouts were hidden, as soon as they advanced in the area of the shooting range, the scouts Ambushed and started to shoot the relief column and Large rocks were curled down at them. [28] The troops tried to regroup and hold on, but soon 3-inch and 2-inch mortar bombs were launched which resulted in casualties and Brig. Faqir himself also got his Face and shoulder wounded. [30] [31] The relief column prevented an further attack by scouts by returning fire and holding shorter positions, the column would not be able to escape until dusk and leaving their dead troops. [32] After facing defeat the remaining forces would retreat towards Kargil with a night stay at Totli on 18th March. [32] The column would reach Kargil back at 21 March, Brig. Faqir himself would handover his command to the Indian military advisor Col. Cootes, and return back to Srinagar for Medical treatment. [32]

Considerable confusion was caused by the ambush among the relief column and resulted in numerous deaths and some dived into water to escape the ambush and left their supplies which included 3. mortars, L.M.G, Rifles, Bren gun, Sten gun, grenades and 303 rounds and twenty wireless sets according to Ahmad Hasan, Dani. [33] As per Saraf, Muhammad Yusuf the Scouts would capture 75000 rounds of 303 including 2 or 3 mortars, M.M.Gs, rifles and Sten guns and a lot of civil supplies. 150 were identified as dead on the spot out of 350 and only 75 were believed to have survived. [9] According to S.N Prasad, the relief column suffered 18 injuries, 7 missing persons presumed dead, and 26 deaths. The scouts found 27 rifles, 5 Sten guns, 2 Vickers Berthier machine guns, 64,000 rounds of rifle ammo, 84 hand grenades, 51 HE bombs for the 2-mch mortar, and 204 HE bombs for the 3-mch mortar. [9] According to a Government of India publication, the Indian casualties in this attempt were 26 killed, seven missing, presumed dead, and 18 wounded, with ammunition and baggage looted. [34]

Col. Thapa made up a little column of two feeble platoons from his garrison on March 18th, and marched out to receive Brig. Faqir according to Srinagar Headquarters. Col. Thapa and his troops would also encounter an ambush laid by the raiders but would escape and ended it without any casualty after they had advanced a little before the locals informed them of the the defeat of the relief column. [35]

Aftermath

Following the defeat of the relief Column close to Gol, the scouts intensified their efforts against the Skardu garrison. [19] Gilgit scouts anticipated that reinforcements would be dispatched from Srinagar to reinforce Skardu if it wasn't taken swiftly. [36] After this engagement Major Ehsan recruited young locals and had enough supplies to arm them taken from the relief force, with the increase in strength the attacks on the Skardu garrison in the cantonment was increased and the shelling of the cantonment also increased. [37] Major Ehsan was now informed of further reinforcements dispatched for the Skardu garrison under the codename Z Brigade which was consolidating at Kargil which would be commanded by Lieutenant Col. Kripal Singh, Major Ehsan would split his force and send to Parkutta for countering this force. [20] Lieut. Babar Khan would be left in charge of the Skardu siege and Major Ehsan would leave on April 29th for Parkutta. [20]

After Major Ehsan left, Lieut. Babar Khan would leave for Ladakh and the Siege of Skardu would continue its siege with Col. Mataul of Chitral, The RIAF would also come in support of the besieged forces at Skardu by now. [38]

See also

Sources

Notes

  1. ^ The word Pari means Peak in Urdu spelled using Indian English.
  2. ^ Subedar is a military rank which is classed as a junior commissioned officer rank in India and Pakistan.

Citations

  1. ^ Prasad (1987), pp. 288–289 : Dani (1989), pp. 386–387
  2. ^ Dani (1989), p. 387
  3. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 289
  4. ^ Dani (1989), p. 387
  5. ^ Palit (1972), p. 233
  6. ^ Dani (1989), p. 386
  7. ^ Dani (1989), p. 386
  8. ^ Dani (1989), p. 386
  9. ^ a b c Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2 (2015), p. 280
  10. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288
  11. ^ Jaffri (2019), p. 30
  12. ^ Dani (1989), p. 369
  13. ^ Singh (2010), p. 253
  14. ^ Dani (1989), p. 386
  15. ^ Prasad (1987), pp. 287–288
  16. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288 : Dani (1989), pp. 387
  17. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288 : Singh (2010), p. 253
  18. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 289 : Singh (2010), p. 253
  19. ^ a b Singh (2010), p. 253 : Dani (1989), pp. 387
  20. ^ a b c Dani (1989), pp. 387
  21. ^ a b Palit (1972), p. 231 :
  22. ^ a b c d Prasad (1987), p. 288 :
  23. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 383–384 :
  24. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 385–386 :
  25. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288 : Singh (2010), p. 253
  26. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 386
  27. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 386–387 :
  28. ^ a b c Dani (1989), pp. 386–387 : Prasad (1987), p. 288
  29. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 386–387
  30. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 386–387 : Prasad (1987), p. 288
  31. ^ Singh (2010), p. 253 : Palit (1972), p. 233
  32. ^ a b c Singh (2010), p. 253 : Palit (1972), p. 233
  33. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 387
  34. ^ Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (1949), p. 67
  35. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288 : Singh (2010), p. 253
  36. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 289
  37. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 387
  38. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 387–388

Works Cited

  • Saraf, Muhammad Yusuf (2015) [first published 1979 by Ferozsons], Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2, Mirpur: National Institute Kashmir Studies, archived from the original on 2021-03-29
  • Jaffri, Imran Haider (Summer 2019). "Captain Hussain Khan, Fakhr-i-Kashmir, OBI, shaheed: A Forgotten Hero of Kashmir Liberation War-1947/48". Bugle and Trumpet. 1 (2). Army Institute of Military History, Pakistan. Archived from the original on 2024-02-25 – via Aimh.
  • Palit, D. K. (1972). Jammu and Kashmir Arms: History of the J & K Rifles. Palit & Dutt. ASIN  B0006C8HKM. Archived from the original on 2000-01-20.
  • Dani, Ahmad Hasan (1989). History of Northern Areas of Pakistan. National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research. ISBN  9789694150161. Archived from the original on 2022-12-15.
  • Prasad, S.N (1987). History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir, 1947-48. History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Archived from the original on 2017-01-15.
  • Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, India (1949). Defending Kashmir. Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. Archived from the original on 2014-10-26.
  • Singh, K.Brahma (1990). History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, 1820-1956 The State Force Background (Hardcover). Lancer International. ISBN  9788170620914.
    • Singh, K. Brahma (2010) [first published Lancer International 1990], History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, 1820-1956: The State Force Background (PDF), brahmasingh.co.nf, ISBN  978-81-7062-091-4, archived from the original (PDF) on 6 March 2016
Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/?title=Draft:Battle_of_Thorgo&oldid=1236022781"
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Battle of Thorgo
Part of Kashmir Conflict and the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948
Date16-18th March 1948 [1]
Location
Thorgo near Skardu, Pakistan
Result

Ambush successful [2]

  • Relief column defeated [3]
  • Remaining forces retreat [4]
Belligerents
Pakistan Dominion of Pakistan

India Dominion of India

Commanders and leaders
Maj.Ehsan Ali
Lieu.Babar
Capt.Nek Alam		 Faqir Singh ( WIA) [5]
India Col.Cootes
Units involved

Gilgit Scouts

  • Ibex Force
  • Local Volunteers

6 J&K Infantry

  • Biscuit Column
Strength
~3 Platoons, [6] Aproximately
(100-300)		 ~1 company
(350 men) [7]
Accompanied by:
~600 coolies,200 horses [8]
Casualties and losses
Unknown Pakistani Sources:
150 killed, 75000 rounds of 303 ammo, (2-3) Mortar, rifles, Sten-guns, MMG's [9]
Indian Sources:
26 killed, 7 missing presumed killed, 18 wounded, 27 rifles, 5 Sten guns, 2 VB Machine guns, 64000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 84 Hand grenades, 51 HE bombs of 2-mch mortar, 204 HE bombs of 3-mch mortar. [10]

Battle of Thorgo, [11] Thorgo also spelled as Thurgo [12] or Thergo, [13] took place during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948 in the Skardu sector, in March 16-17th 1948, Involving Gilgit scouts and the Jammu and Kashmir forces, the Gilgit Scouts hid at the Thorgo Pari [note 1] between Gol and Skardu, [14] after being informed of the relief column which was dispatched by the Indian Headquarters at Srinagar for the reinforcement of the besieged Skardu garrison, [15] upon the Arrival of the relief column the hidden scouts would ambush the relief column and throw large rocks at them causing panic and heavy causalities among them including Brigadier Faqir Singh being injured. [16]

The remnants of the defeated relief column would retreat back to Kargil under Major Cootes and the wounded Faqir Singh would head to Srinagar Headquarters. [17] A column would be made of two feeble platoons sent by the Colonel Sher Jung Thapa to receive the relief column, After receiving information from Srinagar Headquarters regarding their arrival, but after being told by villagers the fate of the defeated relief column, the Skardu column would head back to Skardu garrison which would also be ambushed by the scouts, but would reach safely without any causalities. [18] Following the defeat of the relief Column close to Gol, the scouts intensified their efforts against the Skardu garrison. [19] Major Ehsan was now informed of further reinforcements dispatched for the Skardu garrison under the codename Z Brigade which was consolidating at Kargil which would be commanded by Lieutenant Col. Kripal Singh, Major Ehsan would split his force and send to Parkutta for countering this force. [20]

Prelude

Prelude

In the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948 during the Siege of Skardu Col. Sher Jung Thapa and his garrison had been holding out the Gilgit Scouts at Skardu during the Siege of Skardu. [21] Col. Thapa had again requested the Headquarters at Srinagar to send reinforcements, [21] which had been received before and again another relief column was dispatched under the codename "Biscuit column" [22] Led by Brigadier Faqir Singh. Major Ehsan Ali wanted to ambush the previous relief column that reached on 13th February. but couldn't do so, when informed of the further relief column Major Ehsan would at once prepare for ambushing the column of Brigadier Faqir Singh. [23] According to Mahajan there was increased fighting among both sides in the Skardu sector and an failed attack by the Skardu garrison on Point 8853, which was under scouts control. [24]

On 15th February From the Looks outs of the Skardu garrison, the besieged forces saw a small force of Gilgit scouts marching towards the direction from where the relief column were to arrive and on the next day a larger force was seen advancing in the same direction. [22] Col. Thapa understood that the scouts were heading to ambush the relief column, after he was informed of the incoming reinforcements which would reach him on 18th February, by the Srinagar Headquarters. [22] Due to the only broken W/T communication set which the relief forces had with no possibilities of repair, Col. Thapa was unable to inform the relief forces of the incoming Gilgit scouts and even after informing the Srinagar Headquarters and requesting airstrikes against the scouts but strikes were not conducted. [25] The information regarding the incoming relief column bothered Major Ehsan the most, orders were given to Brigadier Faqir to occupy Thorgo Pari and keep the Indus path open. [26] Brig. Faqir with his relief column on his way to reach Parkutta and Gol assumed that the Gilgit scouts would also be paralyzed because of the intense cold, [22] but instead the Gilgit scouts divided their troops from the Siege of Skardu and sent most of their troops with little remaining at Skardu, who would keep shelling the Skardu garrison meanwhile the forces under Major Ehsan Ali devised a plan to eliminate the relief column by preparing for an ambush. [27]

Battle

Ambush and Causalities

The Gilgit scouts choose the site of ambush at Thorgo Pari near Gol where the road pass from a lofty point from the left of the Indus river and where the Valley got constricted, only one horse could proceed at a time. [28] On the Northernmost area of the Thorgo hill Captain Nek Alam and his Platoon took spot here, Subedar Muhammad Ali [note 2] and Lieutenant Babar dispersed their two platoons, to the opposite of the Nurhbuchung village next to the river. Captain Mohammed Khan positioned one mortar and one machine gun section at the other end of the Pari, while one machine gun section was deployed at the edge, the Gilgit scouts were all set. [29]

Brig. Faqir and Major Cootes would set foot in the dark slim pass on their horses along their forces and supplies on 17th February. [28] The scouts were hidden, as soon as they advanced in the area of the shooting range, the scouts Ambushed and started to shoot the relief column and Large rocks were curled down at them. [28] The troops tried to regroup and hold on, but soon 3-inch and 2-inch mortar bombs were launched which resulted in casualties and Brig. Faqir himself also got his Face and shoulder wounded. [30] [31] The relief column prevented an further attack by scouts by returning fire and holding shorter positions, the column would not be able to escape until dusk and leaving their dead troops. [32] After facing defeat the remaining forces would retreat towards Kargil with a night stay at Totli on 18th March. [32] The column would reach Kargil back at 21 March, Brig. Faqir himself would handover his command to the Indian military advisor Col. Cootes, and return back to Srinagar for Medical treatment. [32]

Considerable confusion was caused by the ambush among the relief column and resulted in numerous deaths and some dived into water to escape the ambush and left their supplies which included 3. mortars, L.M.G, Rifles, Bren gun, Sten gun, grenades and 303 rounds and twenty wireless sets according to Ahmad Hasan, Dani. [33] As per Saraf, Muhammad Yusuf the Scouts would capture 75000 rounds of 303 including 2 or 3 mortars, M.M.Gs, rifles and Sten guns and a lot of civil supplies. 150 were identified as dead on the spot out of 350 and only 75 were believed to have survived. [9] According to S.N Prasad, the relief column suffered 18 injuries, 7 missing persons presumed dead, and 26 deaths. The scouts found 27 rifles, 5 Sten guns, 2 Vickers Berthier machine guns, 64,000 rounds of rifle ammo, 84 hand grenades, 51 HE bombs for the 2-mch mortar, and 204 HE bombs for the 3-mch mortar. [9] According to a Government of India publication, the Indian casualties in this attempt were 26 killed, seven missing, presumed dead, and 18 wounded, with ammunition and baggage looted. [34]

Col. Thapa made up a little column of two feeble platoons from his garrison on March 18th, and marched out to receive Brig. Faqir according to Srinagar Headquarters. Col. Thapa and his troops would also encounter an ambush laid by the raiders but would escape and ended it without any casualty after they had advanced a little before the locals informed them of the the defeat of the relief column. [35]

Aftermath

Following the defeat of the relief Column close to Gol, the scouts intensified their efforts against the Skardu garrison. [19] Gilgit scouts anticipated that reinforcements would be dispatched from Srinagar to reinforce Skardu if it wasn't taken swiftly. [36] After this engagement Major Ehsan recruited young locals and had enough supplies to arm them taken from the relief force, with the increase in strength the attacks on the Skardu garrison in the cantonment was increased and the shelling of the cantonment also increased. [37] Major Ehsan was now informed of further reinforcements dispatched for the Skardu garrison under the codename Z Brigade which was consolidating at Kargil which would be commanded by Lieutenant Col. Kripal Singh, Major Ehsan would split his force and send to Parkutta for countering this force. [20] Lieut. Babar Khan would be left in charge of the Skardu siege and Major Ehsan would leave on April 29th for Parkutta. [20]

After Major Ehsan left, Lieut. Babar Khan would leave for Ladakh and the Siege of Skardu would continue its siege with Col. Mataul of Chitral, The RIAF would also come in support of the besieged forces at Skardu by now. [38]

See also

Sources

Notes

  1. ^ The word Pari means Peak in Urdu spelled using Indian English.
  2. ^ Subedar is a military rank which is classed as a junior commissioned officer rank in India and Pakistan.

Citations

  1. ^ Prasad (1987), pp. 288–289 : Dani (1989), pp. 386–387
  2. ^ Dani (1989), p. 387
  3. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 289
  4. ^ Dani (1989), p. 387
  5. ^ Palit (1972), p. 233
  6. ^ Dani (1989), p. 386
  7. ^ Dani (1989), p. 386
  8. ^ Dani (1989), p. 386
  9. ^ a b c Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2 (2015), p. 280
  10. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288
  11. ^ Jaffri (2019), p. 30
  12. ^ Dani (1989), p. 369
  13. ^ Singh (2010), p. 253
  14. ^ Dani (1989), p. 386
  15. ^ Prasad (1987), pp. 287–288
  16. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288 : Dani (1989), pp. 387
  17. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288 : Singh (2010), p. 253
  18. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 289 : Singh (2010), p. 253
  19. ^ a b Singh (2010), p. 253 : Dani (1989), pp. 387
  20. ^ a b c Dani (1989), pp. 387
  21. ^ a b Palit (1972), p. 231 :
  22. ^ a b c d Prasad (1987), p. 288 :
  23. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 383–384 :
  24. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 385–386 :
  25. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288 : Singh (2010), p. 253
  26. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 386
  27. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 386–387 :
  28. ^ a b c Dani (1989), pp. 386–387 : Prasad (1987), p. 288
  29. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 386–387
  30. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 386–387 : Prasad (1987), p. 288
  31. ^ Singh (2010), p. 253 : Palit (1972), p. 233
  32. ^ a b c Singh (2010), p. 253 : Palit (1972), p. 233
  33. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 387
  34. ^ Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (1949), p. 67
  35. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288 : Singh (2010), p. 253
  36. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 289
  37. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 387
  38. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 387–388

Works Cited

  • Saraf, Muhammad Yusuf (2015) [first published 1979 by Ferozsons], Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2, Mirpur: National Institute Kashmir Studies, archived from the original on 2021-03-29
  • Jaffri, Imran Haider (Summer 2019). "Captain Hussain Khan, Fakhr-i-Kashmir, OBI, shaheed: A Forgotten Hero of Kashmir Liberation War-1947/48". Bugle and Trumpet. 1 (2). Army Institute of Military History, Pakistan. Archived from the original on 2024-02-25 – via Aimh.
  • Palit, D. K. (1972). Jammu and Kashmir Arms: History of the J & K Rifles. Palit & Dutt. ASIN  B0006C8HKM. Archived from the original on 2000-01-20.
  • Dani, Ahmad Hasan (1989). History of Northern Areas of Pakistan. National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research. ISBN  9789694150161. Archived from the original on 2022-12-15.
  • Prasad, S.N (1987). History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir, 1947-48. History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Archived from the original on 2017-01-15.
  • Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, India (1949). Defending Kashmir. Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. Archived from the original on 2014-10-26.
  • Singh, K.Brahma (1990). History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, 1820-1956 The State Force Background (Hardcover). Lancer International. ISBN  9788170620914.
    • Singh, K. Brahma (2010) [first published Lancer International 1990], History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, 1820-1956: The State Force Background (PDF), brahmasingh.co.nf, ISBN  978-81-7062-091-4, archived from the original (PDF) on 6 March 2016
Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/?title=Draft:Battle_of_Thorgo&oldid=1236022781"

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