No consensus to promote at this time - Ian Rose ( talk) via MilHistBot ( talk) 09:06, 13 March 2015 (UTC)
First Battle of Passchendaele ( | talk | history | links | watch | logs)
Toolbox |
---|
I am nominating this article for A-Class as I believe it is sufficiently close, even-though there is a lack of German sources on the subject. Feedback would be very much appreciated. -- Labattblueboy ( talk) 23:19, 26 December 2014 (UTC)
and:At the moment when this order was given [on 10 October], little was known of the true experiences and results of the recent fight. But, before the coming attack was launched, there was time to ascertain what had happened, and this duty rested in particular on General Godley and the staff of I1 Anzac. Obviously, there was every reason for caution: the advance As the divisions were changed, II Anzac Headquarters was the lowest staff to participate in the two operations projected for the II Anzac divisions was now not 1,500, but from 2,000 to 2,500 yards. The interval between the attacks the time available for bombardment and other preparation of all sorts-was not six or eight days, but three. Presumably the reason for this was the supposed weakening of the enemy’s morale.
If Generals Monash and Godley had had experience on the Somme, it is unlikely that they would have agreed to this arrangement. Had Godley really known the conditions of October 9th-the thinness of the barrage, the complete absence of smoke screen, the ineffectiveness of the bombardment, the exhaustion of the troops, how could he have hoped for success with deeper objectives than any since July 31st, shorter preparation, and with the infantry asked to advance at a pace unattempted in the dry weather of September?
The Germans noted that effective counter-battery fire in the intervals between attacks had almost ceased. Actually, in spite of immense efforts by gunners and roadmakers between the 4th and 12th of October, it was found impossible for most batteries to reach by the gth, or even by the 12th, their intended positions. In I1 Anzac, for the artillery in the 3rd Division’s sector, a circuit road had been planned. the engineers to work on the northern half and the 3rd Pioneers on the southern. But the time was too short ; the plank supply almost entirely failed, and the track was impassable. Many batteries, including heavy ones, had to be stopped on the forward slope of Frezenberg ridge in positions in full view of the Germans.
Hawkeye7 ( talk) 04:22, 30 December 2014 (UTC)
Cinderella157 ( talk) 06:27, 5 January 2015 (UTC)
* {{cite book |ref={{harvid|Bean|1933}} |title=The Australian Imperial Force in France, 1917|series=[[Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918]] |volume=IV |last=Bean |first=C. E. W. |authorlink=Charles Bean |year=1933 |publisher=Australian War Memorial |location=Canberra |edition=11th, 1941 |url=http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/first_world_war/volume.asp?levelID=67890 |accessdate=23 March 2014 |isbn=0-702-21710-7}} Keith-264 ( talk) 09:52, 5 January 2015 (UTC)
By a succession of attacks with objectives of diminishing distance, with increasing numbers of infantry, behind a bigger multi-layered creeping barrage and with standing barrages on the objective lines during consolidation, German counter-attacks would be confronted by a defence in depth, with infantry in communication with its artillery and with much more local support from the Royal Flying Corps, rather than the former practice of looking to exploit success by occupying vacant ground beyond the final objective.
PS Standing barrages fell 200-300 yards beyond the objective and sometimes swept back-and-forth. Keith-264 ( talk) 09:26, 7 January 2015 (UTC)
I think what I've done is fail to make it clear that the defence in depth term I used, was referring to the tactical situation in the battle area, rather than the systematic defences all armies used on the Western Front. (I looked at the Wiki page on infantry tactics for a link but there isn't enough detail in it.) If there's a better term to use it can go. The emphasis after 31 July became the defeat of the German counter-attacks, which had forced the attackers back from captured ground considered the most important by the Germans. (The emphasis isn't great in the tertiary literature, which tends to follow an obsolete line that it was only Plumer who gave up "breakthrough attempts", in the three big successes culminating on 4 Oct. The Germans used a period from 4–12 Oct as the crisis of the campaign, which rather contradicts much British historiography.) The British got into Polygon Wood from 10 – 16 August and were thrown out again each time. British methods changed after 31 July but this is obscured by personalising it, when it was actually continuous and can be cited from the OH and some of the other sources like Simpson. Keith-264 ( talk) 10:34, 7 January 2015 (UTC)
preliminary comments by auntieruth I'm confused. First, where is the nominator in all of this discussion? The chatter here seems to involve Hawkeye, Cinderella and Keith. I know something about this battle (not a lot, but some), and I'm completely confused by the first three sections and the lead. For example, in the lead ..., based on incorrect information that during the Battle of Poelcappelle (9 October), the attacking troops had captured the first objective line. The front line near Passchendaele had hardly changed after German counter-attacks in the afternoon recaptured most of the lost ground, which meant that the final objective for the attack on 12 October was 2,000–2,500-yard (1,800–2,300 m) forward, instead of the 1,500 yards (1,400 m) expected Ummm....where should I start? Okay, so Poelcapelle was earlier. And it didn't go as far as it should have? Or So Incorrect intelligence from the Battle of Poelcappele (9 October) placed the objective at 2,000-2,500 yards forward, 1,500 yards more than the Paschendaele battle plan expected? If this is correct, it doesn't belong in the first paragraph anyway. The lead doesn't take me through, it takes me in a circle.
The First Battle of Passchendaele took place on 12 October 1917, in the Ypres Salient of the Western Front, west of Flemish village of Passchendaele. The attack was part of the x-month long Third Battle of Ypres in the First World War.
The main assault was conducted by the two Anzac corps in the Second Army against the German 4th Army, with a supporting attack by the Fifth Army between the northern boundary of the Second Army and the southern limit of the French First Army. The brigade-sized attacks of the XVIII Corps in the Fifth Army area moved the front line on either side of the Ypres-Staden railway north of Poelcappelle. The Germans defeated the attacks by XIV Corps and retained control of the high ground on Passchendaele Ridge opposite the I and II Anzac corps.
Several problems plagued the British attack. The previous Battle at Poelcappele had generated erroneous intelligence on the goal of the operation. German defenders had frustrated attempts on 9 October to establish a line deeper into the salient, which made the goal of (coords) 1500 yards further expected. Furthermore, inclement weather hampered movement and communication for both sides. British attacks were postponed until the weather improved and communications behind the front could be restored.
This was among the most costly single actions of the War. Two German divisions intended for Italy were diverted to Flanders, to replace "extraordinarily high" losses. The battle was a German defensive success but was costly for both sides. The ANZAC forces....
It would help to say what the goal was at Poelcappelle, rather than simply talk about yards of difference. Yes, I know that yards of difference made a difference, a huge one, but.... auntieruth (talk) 20:27, 28 January 2015 (UTC)
It's always worth checking to see if a higher resolution copy of the image is available. I haven't carefully checked every image, but I can tell you that, of your images, three are from the National Library of New Zealand.
Of these, the copy on Wikipedia is about 500x300px, but, if you sign up for a free login, you can get a really nice image of around 5000x3000 px. This is a much better image to use, and, with not that much work, these are probably featureable, getting your article on the main page - call it twice more, as the funeral image will probably focus on the more relevant articles.
I'll update those images for you this time, but I don't check every A-class review, so this is worth keeping in mind. Adam Cuerden ( talk) 21:22, 17 February 2015 (UTC)
No consensus to promote at this time - Ian Rose ( talk) via MilHistBot ( talk) 09:06, 13 March 2015 (UTC)
First Battle of Passchendaele ( | talk | history | links | watch | logs)
Toolbox |
---|
I am nominating this article for A-Class as I believe it is sufficiently close, even-though there is a lack of German sources on the subject. Feedback would be very much appreciated. -- Labattblueboy ( talk) 23:19, 26 December 2014 (UTC)
and:At the moment when this order was given [on 10 October], little was known of the true experiences and results of the recent fight. But, before the coming attack was launched, there was time to ascertain what had happened, and this duty rested in particular on General Godley and the staff of I1 Anzac. Obviously, there was every reason for caution: the advance As the divisions were changed, II Anzac Headquarters was the lowest staff to participate in the two operations projected for the II Anzac divisions was now not 1,500, but from 2,000 to 2,500 yards. The interval between the attacks the time available for bombardment and other preparation of all sorts-was not six or eight days, but three. Presumably the reason for this was the supposed weakening of the enemy’s morale.
If Generals Monash and Godley had had experience on the Somme, it is unlikely that they would have agreed to this arrangement. Had Godley really known the conditions of October 9th-the thinness of the barrage, the complete absence of smoke screen, the ineffectiveness of the bombardment, the exhaustion of the troops, how could he have hoped for success with deeper objectives than any since July 31st, shorter preparation, and with the infantry asked to advance at a pace unattempted in the dry weather of September?
The Germans noted that effective counter-battery fire in the intervals between attacks had almost ceased. Actually, in spite of immense efforts by gunners and roadmakers between the 4th and 12th of October, it was found impossible for most batteries to reach by the gth, or even by the 12th, their intended positions. In I1 Anzac, for the artillery in the 3rd Division’s sector, a circuit road had been planned. the engineers to work on the northern half and the 3rd Pioneers on the southern. But the time was too short ; the plank supply almost entirely failed, and the track was impassable. Many batteries, including heavy ones, had to be stopped on the forward slope of Frezenberg ridge in positions in full view of the Germans.
Hawkeye7 ( talk) 04:22, 30 December 2014 (UTC)
Cinderella157 ( talk) 06:27, 5 January 2015 (UTC)
* {{cite book |ref={{harvid|Bean|1933}} |title=The Australian Imperial Force in France, 1917|series=[[Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918]] |volume=IV |last=Bean |first=C. E. W. |authorlink=Charles Bean |year=1933 |publisher=Australian War Memorial |location=Canberra |edition=11th, 1941 |url=http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/first_world_war/volume.asp?levelID=67890 |accessdate=23 March 2014 |isbn=0-702-21710-7}} Keith-264 ( talk) 09:52, 5 January 2015 (UTC)
By a succession of attacks with objectives of diminishing distance, with increasing numbers of infantry, behind a bigger multi-layered creeping barrage and with standing barrages on the objective lines during consolidation, German counter-attacks would be confronted by a defence in depth, with infantry in communication with its artillery and with much more local support from the Royal Flying Corps, rather than the former practice of looking to exploit success by occupying vacant ground beyond the final objective.
PS Standing barrages fell 200-300 yards beyond the objective and sometimes swept back-and-forth. Keith-264 ( talk) 09:26, 7 January 2015 (UTC)
I think what I've done is fail to make it clear that the defence in depth term I used, was referring to the tactical situation in the battle area, rather than the systematic defences all armies used on the Western Front. (I looked at the Wiki page on infantry tactics for a link but there isn't enough detail in it.) If there's a better term to use it can go. The emphasis after 31 July became the defeat of the German counter-attacks, which had forced the attackers back from captured ground considered the most important by the Germans. (The emphasis isn't great in the tertiary literature, which tends to follow an obsolete line that it was only Plumer who gave up "breakthrough attempts", in the three big successes culminating on 4 Oct. The Germans used a period from 4–12 Oct as the crisis of the campaign, which rather contradicts much British historiography.) The British got into Polygon Wood from 10 – 16 August and were thrown out again each time. British methods changed after 31 July but this is obscured by personalising it, when it was actually continuous and can be cited from the OH and some of the other sources like Simpson. Keith-264 ( talk) 10:34, 7 January 2015 (UTC)
preliminary comments by auntieruth I'm confused. First, where is the nominator in all of this discussion? The chatter here seems to involve Hawkeye, Cinderella and Keith. I know something about this battle (not a lot, but some), and I'm completely confused by the first three sections and the lead. For example, in the lead ..., based on incorrect information that during the Battle of Poelcappelle (9 October), the attacking troops had captured the first objective line. The front line near Passchendaele had hardly changed after German counter-attacks in the afternoon recaptured most of the lost ground, which meant that the final objective for the attack on 12 October was 2,000–2,500-yard (1,800–2,300 m) forward, instead of the 1,500 yards (1,400 m) expected Ummm....where should I start? Okay, so Poelcapelle was earlier. And it didn't go as far as it should have? Or So Incorrect intelligence from the Battle of Poelcappele (9 October) placed the objective at 2,000-2,500 yards forward, 1,500 yards more than the Paschendaele battle plan expected? If this is correct, it doesn't belong in the first paragraph anyway. The lead doesn't take me through, it takes me in a circle.
The First Battle of Passchendaele took place on 12 October 1917, in the Ypres Salient of the Western Front, west of Flemish village of Passchendaele. The attack was part of the x-month long Third Battle of Ypres in the First World War.
The main assault was conducted by the two Anzac corps in the Second Army against the German 4th Army, with a supporting attack by the Fifth Army between the northern boundary of the Second Army and the southern limit of the French First Army. The brigade-sized attacks of the XVIII Corps in the Fifth Army area moved the front line on either side of the Ypres-Staden railway north of Poelcappelle. The Germans defeated the attacks by XIV Corps and retained control of the high ground on Passchendaele Ridge opposite the I and II Anzac corps.
Several problems plagued the British attack. The previous Battle at Poelcappele had generated erroneous intelligence on the goal of the operation. German defenders had frustrated attempts on 9 October to establish a line deeper into the salient, which made the goal of (coords) 1500 yards further expected. Furthermore, inclement weather hampered movement and communication for both sides. British attacks were postponed until the weather improved and communications behind the front could be restored.
This was among the most costly single actions of the War. Two German divisions intended for Italy were diverted to Flanders, to replace "extraordinarily high" losses. The battle was a German defensive success but was costly for both sides. The ANZAC forces....
It would help to say what the goal was at Poelcappelle, rather than simply talk about yards of difference. Yes, I know that yards of difference made a difference, a huge one, but.... auntieruth (talk) 20:27, 28 January 2015 (UTC)
It's always worth checking to see if a higher resolution copy of the image is available. I haven't carefully checked every image, but I can tell you that, of your images, three are from the National Library of New Zealand.
Of these, the copy on Wikipedia is about 500x300px, but, if you sign up for a free login, you can get a really nice image of around 5000x3000 px. This is a much better image to use, and, with not that much work, these are probably featureable, getting your article on the main page - call it twice more, as the funeral image will probably focus on the more relevant articles.
I'll update those images for you this time, but I don't check every A-class review, so this is worth keeping in mind. Adam Cuerden ( talk) 21:22, 17 February 2015 (UTC)