Home • Search • Translate
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This page is for proposals related to the Battle of Tali-Ihantala MedCab case. Users should:

  • Add their proposed wording to a new section
  • Not sign their section with the standard ~~~~
  • Not comment on other sections; this will be done at the discussion page
  • Not change the wording of proposals; they should add a new proposal with the changed wording

Draft 0

(current version)

On June 22, during Ribbentrop's visit in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and accompanying Soviet conditions. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of capitulation before any conditions could be presented. This created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called; and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontai), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms, [1] [2]the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written: [3] [4] a demand for unconditional surrender [1] [5]. It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. [6] This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional. [7] The Soviet authorities denied this interpretation in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944. [8] [9] Furthermore, it is also known that Stalin even told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. [10] In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. [11] However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944. [12]

References

  1. ^ a b Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 58-59, 66-67
  2. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 259-260
  3. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 66, 134
  4. ^ Mannerheim, G. (1952). Muistelmat, II [Memoirs, II] (in Finnish). Helsinki, Finland: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava. p. 450.
  5. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 302
  6. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 270
  7. ^ Jowett, P., Snodgrass, B. Finland at War 1939-45 Osprey Publishing. 2006.
  8. ^ Dagens Nyheter, July 3, 1944
  9. ^ Svenska Dagbladet, July 3, 1944
  10. ^ Maude, George (2010). Aspects of the Governing of the Finns. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. pp. 149–50. ISBN  978-1-4539-0061-1.
  11. ^ Vankka, Eero (1999). Pion P 14: IV AK:n pioneeripataljoona 1941 - 1944 [Engineer Battalion 14: Engineer battaltion of IV Corps 1941 - 1944]. ISBN  952-91-0762-5.
  12. ^ Baryshnikov (2006)

Draft 1

To the Battle of Tali-Ihantala:

On June 21, the Finnish government asked about the peace conditions from Soviet Union. When the Soviet reply demanded surrender without any conditions, Finns decided to continue fight.

References

To the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Offensive, section Diplomatic Interlude:

On June 21, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and accompanying Soviet conditions through Swedish Government. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of capitulation before any conditions could be presented. This prompted Swedish secretary of state, Erik Boheman, to contact Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontai and asked her either to remove this demand or present it in more neutral way. This demand of capitulation was similar like the one presented to Italy which led to signing of Italy's unconditoional surrender at September 29 [1]. Although the unconditionality of the surrender of Italy was removed at November 9 [2], there was no guarantee about similar amendment to Finland. When Soviets refused to alter their response, Boheman and Swedish Foreign Minister Christian Günther announced that Sweden withdraws from meditation. The Soviet response created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called; and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by Mrs. Kollontai), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms, [3] [4]the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written: [5] [6] a demand for unconditional surrender [3] [7]. It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. [8] This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional. [9] In public the Soviet authorities denied this interpretation after Finnish decline in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944 [10] [11], and on June 27 Stalin told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. [12] The only published documentation about Soviet intentions was found in October 1993 in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944 , when a draft document for unconditional surrender of Finland surfaced. [13] However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944. [14] No other documents or minutes were published about the decisionmaking of Stalin and his government regarding this issue.

References

  1. ^ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/italy03.asp
  2. ^ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/italy05.asp
  3. ^ a b Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 58-59, 66-67
  4. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 259-260
  5. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 66, 134
  6. ^ Mannerheim, G. (1952). Muistelmat, II [Memoirs, II] (in Finnish). Helsinki, Finland: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava. p. 450.
  7. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 302
  8. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 270
  9. ^ Jowett, P., Snodgrass, B. Finland at War 1939-45 Osprey Publishing. 2006.
  10. ^ Dagens Nyheter, July 3, 1944
  11. ^ Svenska Dagbladet, July 3, 1944
  12. ^ Maude, George (2010). Aspects of the Governing of the Finns. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. pp. 149–50. ISBN  978-1-4539-0061-1.
  13. ^ Vankka, Eero (1999). Pion P 14: IV AK:n pioneeripataljoona 1941 - 1944 [Engineer Battalion 14: Engineer battaltion of IV Corps 1941 - 1944]. ISBN  952-91-0762-5.
  14. ^ Baryshnikov (2006)

Draft 2

On June 22, during Ribbentrop's visit in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and the accompanying Soviet conditions. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of a willingness to capitulate before any conditions could be discussed. This created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called, and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. The Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as a demand for unconditional surrender. [1] [2] It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. [3] The Soviet authorities denied this interpretation in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944. [4] [5] Furthermore, it is also known that Stalin even told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. [6] In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. [7] However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944. [8]

References

  1. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 58-59, 66-67
  2. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 302
  3. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 270
  4. ^ Dagens Nyheter, July 3, 1944
  5. ^ Svenska Dagbladet, July 3, 1944
  6. ^ Maude, George (2010). Aspects of the Governing of the Finns. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. pp. 149–50. ISBN  978-1-4539-0061-1.
  7. ^ Vankka, Eero (1999). Pion P 14: IV AK:n pioneeripataljoona 1941 - 1944 [Engineer Battalion 14: Engineer battaltion of IV Corps 1941 - 1944]. ISBN  952-91-0762-5.
  8. ^ Baryshnikov (2006)


Removed statements:

This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional.

How is Churchill relevant here?

When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontai), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms...

This is original research as the sources provided don't make this interpretation. [1]

...the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written: a demand for unconditional surrender.

A claim is presented as a fact. Again, the word "unconditional" does not appear in the text of the response.

- YMB29 ( talk) 17:24, 9 December 2011 (UTC) reply

Draft 3

On June 22, right before Ribbentrop arrived in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and the accompanying Soviet conditions. [1] [2] The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of a willingness to capitulate before any conditions could be discussed. [1] [2] This created confusion in the Finnish government. [1] President Ryti and Tanner, the leader of the Social-Democrats, were willing to continue negotiations with the Soviets, while others, including Marshal Mannerheim and Prime Minister Linkomies, opposed this. [2] The Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as a demand for unconditional surrender. [3] [4] It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. [5] However, it is known that, after not receiving a response from the Finns, Stalin told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. [6] In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. [7] However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944. [1]

References

  1. ^ a b c d Baryshnikov (2006)
  2. ^ a b c Vehvilainen (2002) p. 139-140
  3. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 58-59, 66-67
  4. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 302
  5. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 270
  6. ^ Maude, George (2010). Aspects of the Governing of the Finns. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. pp. 149–50. ISBN  978-1-4539-0061-1.
  7. ^ Vankka, Eero (1999). Pion P 14: IV AK:n pioneeripataljoona 1941 - 1944 [Engineer Battalion 14: Engineer battaltion of IV Corps 1941 - 1944]. ISBN  952-91-0762-5.

Draft 4

On June 22, right before Ribbentrop arrived in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and the accompanying Soviet conditions. [1] [2] The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of capitulation from the Finnish government without conditions before delegation could be sent to Moscow to hear Soviet terms. [3] [1] [2] This created confusion in the Finnish government. [1] President Ryti and Tanner, the leader of the Social-Democrats, were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet terms, while others, including Marshal Mannerheim and Prime Minister Linkomies, opposed this. [2] When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by Mrs. Kollontai), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms, [4] [5] the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written: [6] [7] a demand for unconditional surrender [4] [3]. It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. [8] This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional. [9] However, it is known that, after not receiving a response from the Finns, Stalin told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. [10] In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. [11] However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944. [1]

References

  1. ^ a b c d Baryshnikov (2006)
  2. ^ a b c Vehvilainen (2002) p. 139-140
  3. ^ a b Lunde (2011) p. 302
  4. ^ a b Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 58-59, 66-67
  5. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 259-260
  6. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 66, 134
  7. ^ Mannerheim, G. (1952). Muistelmat, II [Memoirs, II] (in Finnish). Helsinki, Finland: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava. p. 450.
  8. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 270
  9. ^ Jowett, P., Snodgrass, B. Finland at War 1939-45 Osprey Publishing. 2006.
  10. ^ Maude, George (2010). Aspects of the Governing of the Finns. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. pp. 149–50. ISBN  978-1-4539-0061-1.
  11. ^ Vankka, Eero (1999). Pion P 14: IV AK:n pioneeripataljoona 1941 - 1944 [Engineer Battalion 14: Engineer battaltion of IV Corps 1941 - 1944]. ISBN  952-91-0762-5.

Draft 5

On June 21, the Finnish government decided to ask about the possibility for peace and accompanying Soviet conditions through Swedish Government [1], and the request was delivered to Finnish ambassador Gripenberg in Stockholm late in the same evening [2]. He delivered it to Swedish secretary of state, Erik Boheman, who forwarded it to Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontai next morning [2]. The Soviet response, which arrived June 23, demanded a signed statement of capitulation before any conditions could be presented [3] [4] [5]. This prompted Boheman to contact Mrs. Kollontai and asked her either to remove this demand or present it in more neutral way [6]. This demand of capitulation was similar like the one presented to Italy which led to signing of Italy's unconditoional surrender at September 29 [7] [6]. When Soviets refused to alter their response, Boheman and Swedish Foreign Minister Christian Günther announced that Sweden withdraws from mediation [6].

The Soviet response created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called; and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by Mrs. Kollontai's promises [8]), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms [9] [10] so heavily, that even Swedes felt betrayed [11], the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written: [12] [13] a demand for capitulation, unconditional surrender [9] [3]. It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. [14] This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional. [15]

After Finnish decline the Soviet authorities denied this interpretation in public in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944 [16] [17], and on June 27 Stalin told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. [18]

At October 1993 in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, a draft document for unconditional surrender of Finland surfaced. [19] According to Baryshnikov this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944. [4] A comission lead by Marshall Voroshilov had delivered at June 26, 1944 to the Comissariat of the Foreign Affairs a 56-section document for Finnish unconditional surrender [6].

References

  1. ^ Ryti (2006) p. 333
  2. ^ a b Apunen & Wolff (2009) p. 355
  3. ^ a b Lunde (2011) p. 302
  4. ^ a b Baryshnikov (2006)
  5. ^ Vehvilainen (2002) p. 139-140
  6. ^ a b c d Apunen & Wolff (2009) p. 356
  7. ^ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/italy03.asp
  8. ^ Polvinen (1996) p. 364
  9. ^ a b Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 58-59, 66-67
  10. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 259-260
  11. ^ Polvinen (1996) p. 385-6:"Before that the leadership of Swedish Foreign Ministry had negotiated with Marcus Wallenberg about the situation. According to notes of the meeting ´Wallenberg laughed himself off the feet to those 600 millions, totally absurd demand, when taken into account Finnish export before the war and those cedings, including good forests, which now had to be done... Boheman was very pessimistic. He confess, that he has been mislead... Russian state of mind is uncomprehensible. He said that he couldn't dare in any case give advice to negotiation now. There is no limit in evilness, he said, and there is no quarantee that Russians didn't in the end target to the destruction of Finland'"
  12. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 66, 134
  13. ^ Mannerheim, G. (1952). Muistelmat, II [Memoirs, II] (in Finnish). Helsinki, Finland: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava. p. 450.
  14. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 270
  15. ^ Jowett, P., Snodgrass, B. Finland at War 1939-45 Osprey Publishing. 2006.
  16. ^ Dagens Nyheter, July 3, 1944
  17. ^ Svenska Dagbladet, July 3, 1944
  18. ^ Maude, George (2010). Aspects of the Governing of the Finns. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. pp. 149–50. ISBN  978-1-4539-0061-1.
  19. ^ Vankka, Eero (1999). Pion P 14: IV AK:n pioneeripataljoona 1941 - 1944 [Engineer Battalion 14: Engineer battaltion of IV Corps 1941 - 1944]. ISBN  952-91-0762-5.

Draft 6

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 7

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 8

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 9

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 10

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 11

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 12

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 13

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 14

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 15

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Bibliography

  • Baryshnikov, Nikolai I. (2006). "Феномен фальши: 'Победа в противостоянии'" [The Phenomenon of Lies: 'The Victory in the Confrontation']. St. Petersburg and the Countries of Northern Europe (in Russian). St. Petersburg: Russian Christian Humanitarian Academy. Retrieved 15 September 2011.
  • Baryshnikov, Nikolai I. (2002). Блокада Ленинграда и Финляндия 1941-1944 [Finland and the Siege of Leningrad, 1941-1944] (in Russian). St. Petersburg: Johan Beckman Institute. ISBN  952-5412-10-5.
  • Erickson, John (1993). The Road to Berlin: Stalin's War with Germany. New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN  0-300-07813-7.
  • Glantz, David; House, Jonathan (1998). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence: Kansas University Press. ISBN  978-0-7006-0899-7.
  • Jowett, Philip; Snodgrass, Brent (2006). Finland at War 1939-45. Botley: Osprey Publishing. ISBN  978-1-84176-969-1.
  • Lunde, Henrik, O. (March 19, 2011). Finland's War of Choice. Casemate Pub. ISBN  978-1935149484.{{ cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( link)
  • Moisala, U.E.; Alanen, Pertti (1988). Kun hyökkääjän tie pysäytettiin (When the attacker was stopped) (in Finnish). Keuruu: Otava. ISBN  951-1-10386-5.
  • Shigin, Grigoriy (2004). Битва за Ленинград: крупные операции, белые пятна, потери [Battle for Leningrad: Large-scale Operations, White Spots, Casualties] (in Russian). St. Petersburg: Poligon. ISBN  5-89173-261-0.
  • Vehviläinen, Olli (2002). Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia. New York: Palgrave. ISBN  0-333-80149-0.
  • Zolotarev, V. A., ed. (1999). Русский архив: Великая Отечественная. Ставка ВКГ: Документы и материалы 1944–1945 [Russian Archive. The Great Patriotic War. STAVKA. Documents and Materials 1944–45] (in Russian). Moscow: Terra. ISBN  5-300-01162-2.
Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/?title=Wikipedia:Mediation_Cabal/Cases/24_October_2011/Battle_of_Tali-Ihantala/Proposals&oldid=813108251"
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This page is for proposals related to the Battle of Tali-Ihantala MedCab case. Users should:

  • Add their proposed wording to a new section
  • Not sign their section with the standard ~~~~
  • Not comment on other sections; this will be done at the discussion page
  • Not change the wording of proposals; they should add a new proposal with the changed wording

Draft 0

(current version)

On June 22, during Ribbentrop's visit in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and accompanying Soviet conditions. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of capitulation before any conditions could be presented. This created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called; and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontai), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms, [1] [2]the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written: [3] [4] a demand for unconditional surrender [1] [5]. It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. [6] This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional. [7] The Soviet authorities denied this interpretation in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944. [8] [9] Furthermore, it is also known that Stalin even told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. [10] In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. [11] However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944. [12]

References

  1. ^ a b Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 58-59, 66-67
  2. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 259-260
  3. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 66, 134
  4. ^ Mannerheim, G. (1952). Muistelmat, II [Memoirs, II] (in Finnish). Helsinki, Finland: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava. p. 450.
  5. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 302
  6. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 270
  7. ^ Jowett, P., Snodgrass, B. Finland at War 1939-45 Osprey Publishing. 2006.
  8. ^ Dagens Nyheter, July 3, 1944
  9. ^ Svenska Dagbladet, July 3, 1944
  10. ^ Maude, George (2010). Aspects of the Governing of the Finns. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. pp. 149–50. ISBN  978-1-4539-0061-1.
  11. ^ Vankka, Eero (1999). Pion P 14: IV AK:n pioneeripataljoona 1941 - 1944 [Engineer Battalion 14: Engineer battaltion of IV Corps 1941 - 1944]. ISBN  952-91-0762-5.
  12. ^ Baryshnikov (2006)

Draft 1

To the Battle of Tali-Ihantala:

On June 21, the Finnish government asked about the peace conditions from Soviet Union. When the Soviet reply demanded surrender without any conditions, Finns decided to continue fight.

References

To the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Offensive, section Diplomatic Interlude:

On June 21, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and accompanying Soviet conditions through Swedish Government. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of capitulation before any conditions could be presented. This prompted Swedish secretary of state, Erik Boheman, to contact Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontai and asked her either to remove this demand or present it in more neutral way. This demand of capitulation was similar like the one presented to Italy which led to signing of Italy's unconditoional surrender at September 29 [1]. Although the unconditionality of the surrender of Italy was removed at November 9 [2], there was no guarantee about similar amendment to Finland. When Soviets refused to alter their response, Boheman and Swedish Foreign Minister Christian Günther announced that Sweden withdraws from meditation. The Soviet response created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called; and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by Mrs. Kollontai), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms, [3] [4]the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written: [5] [6] a demand for unconditional surrender [3] [7]. It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. [8] This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional. [9] In public the Soviet authorities denied this interpretation after Finnish decline in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944 [10] [11], and on June 27 Stalin told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. [12] The only published documentation about Soviet intentions was found in October 1993 in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944 , when a draft document for unconditional surrender of Finland surfaced. [13] However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944. [14] No other documents or minutes were published about the decisionmaking of Stalin and his government regarding this issue.

References

  1. ^ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/italy03.asp
  2. ^ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/italy05.asp
  3. ^ a b Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 58-59, 66-67
  4. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 259-260
  5. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 66, 134
  6. ^ Mannerheim, G. (1952). Muistelmat, II [Memoirs, II] (in Finnish). Helsinki, Finland: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava. p. 450.
  7. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 302
  8. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 270
  9. ^ Jowett, P., Snodgrass, B. Finland at War 1939-45 Osprey Publishing. 2006.
  10. ^ Dagens Nyheter, July 3, 1944
  11. ^ Svenska Dagbladet, July 3, 1944
  12. ^ Maude, George (2010). Aspects of the Governing of the Finns. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. pp. 149–50. ISBN  978-1-4539-0061-1.
  13. ^ Vankka, Eero (1999). Pion P 14: IV AK:n pioneeripataljoona 1941 - 1944 [Engineer Battalion 14: Engineer battaltion of IV Corps 1941 - 1944]. ISBN  952-91-0762-5.
  14. ^ Baryshnikov (2006)

Draft 2

On June 22, during Ribbentrop's visit in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and the accompanying Soviet conditions. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of a willingness to capitulate before any conditions could be discussed. This created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called, and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. The Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as a demand for unconditional surrender. [1] [2] It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. [3] The Soviet authorities denied this interpretation in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944. [4] [5] Furthermore, it is also known that Stalin even told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. [6] In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. [7] However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944. [8]

References

  1. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 58-59, 66-67
  2. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 302
  3. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 270
  4. ^ Dagens Nyheter, July 3, 1944
  5. ^ Svenska Dagbladet, July 3, 1944
  6. ^ Maude, George (2010). Aspects of the Governing of the Finns. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. pp. 149–50. ISBN  978-1-4539-0061-1.
  7. ^ Vankka, Eero (1999). Pion P 14: IV AK:n pioneeripataljoona 1941 - 1944 [Engineer Battalion 14: Engineer battaltion of IV Corps 1941 - 1944]. ISBN  952-91-0762-5.
  8. ^ Baryshnikov (2006)


Removed statements:

This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional.

How is Churchill relevant here?

When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontai), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms...

This is original research as the sources provided don't make this interpretation. [1]

...the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written: a demand for unconditional surrender.

A claim is presented as a fact. Again, the word "unconditional" does not appear in the text of the response.

- YMB29 ( talk) 17:24, 9 December 2011 (UTC) reply

Draft 3

On June 22, right before Ribbentrop arrived in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and the accompanying Soviet conditions. [1] [2] The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of a willingness to capitulate before any conditions could be discussed. [1] [2] This created confusion in the Finnish government. [1] President Ryti and Tanner, the leader of the Social-Democrats, were willing to continue negotiations with the Soviets, while others, including Marshal Mannerheim and Prime Minister Linkomies, opposed this. [2] The Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as a demand for unconditional surrender. [3] [4] It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. [5] However, it is known that, after not receiving a response from the Finns, Stalin told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. [6] In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. [7] However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944. [1]

References

  1. ^ a b c d Baryshnikov (2006)
  2. ^ a b c Vehvilainen (2002) p. 139-140
  3. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 58-59, 66-67
  4. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 302
  5. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 270
  6. ^ Maude, George (2010). Aspects of the Governing of the Finns. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. pp. 149–50. ISBN  978-1-4539-0061-1.
  7. ^ Vankka, Eero (1999). Pion P 14: IV AK:n pioneeripataljoona 1941 - 1944 [Engineer Battalion 14: Engineer battaltion of IV Corps 1941 - 1944]. ISBN  952-91-0762-5.

Draft 4

On June 22, right before Ribbentrop arrived in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and the accompanying Soviet conditions. [1] [2] The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of capitulation from the Finnish government without conditions before delegation could be sent to Moscow to hear Soviet terms. [3] [1] [2] This created confusion in the Finnish government. [1] President Ryti and Tanner, the leader of the Social-Democrats, were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet terms, while others, including Marshal Mannerheim and Prime Minister Linkomies, opposed this. [2] When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by Mrs. Kollontai), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms, [4] [5] the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written: [6] [7] a demand for unconditional surrender [4] [3]. It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. [8] This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional. [9] However, it is known that, after not receiving a response from the Finns, Stalin told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. [10] In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. [11] However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944. [1]

References

  1. ^ a b c d Baryshnikov (2006)
  2. ^ a b c Vehvilainen (2002) p. 139-140
  3. ^ a b Lunde (2011) p. 302
  4. ^ a b Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 58-59, 66-67
  5. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 259-260
  6. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 66, 134
  7. ^ Mannerheim, G. (1952). Muistelmat, II [Memoirs, II] (in Finnish). Helsinki, Finland: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava. p. 450.
  8. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 270
  9. ^ Jowett, P., Snodgrass, B. Finland at War 1939-45 Osprey Publishing. 2006.
  10. ^ Maude, George (2010). Aspects of the Governing of the Finns. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. pp. 149–50. ISBN  978-1-4539-0061-1.
  11. ^ Vankka, Eero (1999). Pion P 14: IV AK:n pioneeripataljoona 1941 - 1944 [Engineer Battalion 14: Engineer battaltion of IV Corps 1941 - 1944]. ISBN  952-91-0762-5.

Draft 5

On June 21, the Finnish government decided to ask about the possibility for peace and accompanying Soviet conditions through Swedish Government [1], and the request was delivered to Finnish ambassador Gripenberg in Stockholm late in the same evening [2]. He delivered it to Swedish secretary of state, Erik Boheman, who forwarded it to Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontai next morning [2]. The Soviet response, which arrived June 23, demanded a signed statement of capitulation before any conditions could be presented [3] [4] [5]. This prompted Boheman to contact Mrs. Kollontai and asked her either to remove this demand or present it in more neutral way [6]. This demand of capitulation was similar like the one presented to Italy which led to signing of Italy's unconditoional surrender at September 29 [7] [6]. When Soviets refused to alter their response, Boheman and Swedish Foreign Minister Christian Günther announced that Sweden withdraws from mediation [6].

The Soviet response created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called; and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by Mrs. Kollontai's promises [8]), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms [9] [10] so heavily, that even Swedes felt betrayed [11], the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written: [12] [13] a demand for capitulation, unconditional surrender [9] [3]. It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. [14] This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional. [15]

After Finnish decline the Soviet authorities denied this interpretation in public in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944 [16] [17], and on June 27 Stalin told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. [18]

At October 1993 in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, a draft document for unconditional surrender of Finland surfaced. [19] According to Baryshnikov this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944. [4] A comission lead by Marshall Voroshilov had delivered at June 26, 1944 to the Comissariat of the Foreign Affairs a 56-section document for Finnish unconditional surrender [6].

References

  1. ^ Ryti (2006) p. 333
  2. ^ a b Apunen & Wolff (2009) p. 355
  3. ^ a b Lunde (2011) p. 302
  4. ^ a b Baryshnikov (2006)
  5. ^ Vehvilainen (2002) p. 139-140
  6. ^ a b c d Apunen & Wolff (2009) p. 356
  7. ^ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/italy03.asp
  8. ^ Polvinen (1996) p. 364
  9. ^ a b Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 58-59, 66-67
  10. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 259-260
  11. ^ Polvinen (1996) p. 385-6:"Before that the leadership of Swedish Foreign Ministry had negotiated with Marcus Wallenberg about the situation. According to notes of the meeting ´Wallenberg laughed himself off the feet to those 600 millions, totally absurd demand, when taken into account Finnish export before the war and those cedings, including good forests, which now had to be done... Boheman was very pessimistic. He confess, that he has been mislead... Russian state of mind is uncomprehensible. He said that he couldn't dare in any case give advice to negotiation now. There is no limit in evilness, he said, and there is no quarantee that Russians didn't in the end target to the destruction of Finland'"
  12. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 66, 134
  13. ^ Mannerheim, G. (1952). Muistelmat, II [Memoirs, II] (in Finnish). Helsinki, Finland: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava. p. 450.
  14. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 270
  15. ^ Jowett, P., Snodgrass, B. Finland at War 1939-45 Osprey Publishing. 2006.
  16. ^ Dagens Nyheter, July 3, 1944
  17. ^ Svenska Dagbladet, July 3, 1944
  18. ^ Maude, George (2010). Aspects of the Governing of the Finns. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. pp. 149–50. ISBN  978-1-4539-0061-1.
  19. ^ Vankka, Eero (1999). Pion P 14: IV AK:n pioneeripataljoona 1941 - 1944 [Engineer Battalion 14: Engineer battaltion of IV Corps 1941 - 1944]. ISBN  952-91-0762-5.

Draft 6

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 7

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 8

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 9

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 10

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 11

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 12

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 13

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 14

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Draft 15

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

References

Bibliography

  • Baryshnikov, Nikolai I. (2006). "Феномен фальши: 'Победа в противостоянии'" [The Phenomenon of Lies: 'The Victory in the Confrontation']. St. Petersburg and the Countries of Northern Europe (in Russian). St. Petersburg: Russian Christian Humanitarian Academy. Retrieved 15 September 2011.
  • Baryshnikov, Nikolai I. (2002). Блокада Ленинграда и Финляндия 1941-1944 [Finland and the Siege of Leningrad, 1941-1944] (in Russian). St. Petersburg: Johan Beckman Institute. ISBN  952-5412-10-5.
  • Erickson, John (1993). The Road to Berlin: Stalin's War with Germany. New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN  0-300-07813-7.
  • Glantz, David; House, Jonathan (1998). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence: Kansas University Press. ISBN  978-0-7006-0899-7.
  • Jowett, Philip; Snodgrass, Brent (2006). Finland at War 1939-45. Botley: Osprey Publishing. ISBN  978-1-84176-969-1.
  • Lunde, Henrik, O. (March 19, 2011). Finland's War of Choice. Casemate Pub. ISBN  978-1935149484.{{ cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( link)
  • Moisala, U.E.; Alanen, Pertti (1988). Kun hyökkääjän tie pysäytettiin (When the attacker was stopped) (in Finnish). Keuruu: Otava. ISBN  951-1-10386-5.
  • Shigin, Grigoriy (2004). Битва за Ленинград: крупные операции, белые пятна, потери [Battle for Leningrad: Large-scale Operations, White Spots, Casualties] (in Russian). St. Petersburg: Poligon. ISBN  5-89173-261-0.
  • Vehviläinen, Olli (2002). Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia. New York: Palgrave. ISBN  0-333-80149-0.
  • Zolotarev, V. A., ed. (1999). Русский архив: Великая Отечественная. Ставка ВКГ: Документы и материалы 1944–1945 [Russian Archive. The Great Patriotic War. STAVKA. Documents and Materials 1944–45] (in Russian). Moscow: Terra. ISBN  5-300-01162-2.
Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/?title=Wikipedia:Mediation_Cabal/Cases/24_October_2011/Battle_of_Tali-Ihantala/Proposals&oldid=813108251"

Videos

Youtube | Vimeo | Bing

Websites

Google | Yahoo | Bing

Encyclopedia

Google | Yahoo | Bing

Facebook




Top Of Page

Home • Search • Translate

© CSE