A commander may disdain the enemy, and believe his own invincibility, leading his troops to disaster. That commander may employ
strategies that, if effective in earlier combats or maneuvers, prove catastrophic against a new or smarter enemy. The commander afflicted by "victory disease" may also fail to anticipate that a new enemy may use tactics different from those of old enemies. An
overconfident commander may disregard
military intelligence that would enable the commander to realize that new tactics are needed.
Though "victory disease" does not inevitably foretell defeat, it often precedes it. The term is also applied outside the military world in areas such as psychology, business, or marketing.
Much of Japan's arrogance is attributed to the performance of Admiral
Matome Ugaki. From overriding decisions to ignoring the evolving conflict in the Pacific, Ugaki's tactics incited tension and doubt in other Japanese military personnel before the Midway operation.[5]
Although the Japanese had planned to establish a perimeter and go on the defensive, victories encouraged them to continue expanding to an extent that strained
logistics and the navy. This culminated in the
Battle of Midway in 1942, a catastrophic defeat of the
Japanese navy. All four Japanese
aircraft carriers involved were sunk, and the hitherto unstoppable Japanese advance was blunted.[citation needed]
In 1415, at the
Battle of Agincourt, the English were outnumbered between three and five to one, but the disorganization of
French knights, as well as superb quality
longbows, were the underlying circumstances which led to the English overcoming the odds and annihilating the French.[6]
The calamitous decision by
Napoleon to
invade Russia in 1812 led to the return of only 10,000
Frenchsoldiers when 610,000 had initially been sent out. Napoleon's repeated victories in Central Europe led him to believe that Russia would surrender after a few won battles, and made no plans for a sustained campaign or occupation in Russia.
The first six weeks of the
Franco-Prussian War saw French armies, convinced of their superiority following French victories in the
Crimean War and the wars of
Italian unification, enter a war with
Prussia believing that their weapons and tactics would easily defeat the Prussians. However, the Prussians had better tactics and this led to catastrophic French defeats at
Sedan and
Metz.
United States victories against Mexico and
American Indians led Union forces to be overconfident going into the
Civil War. Failing to update their tactics to match new technology, such as
rifling of firearms and the use of the
Minie ball as ammunition, they assumed that superior numbers would give them rapid victories, and ignored plans for an extended war until after repeated defeats.
Confederate decisions made at and before their loss at the
Battle of Gettysburg, after their outnumbered-five-to-two victory at the
Battle of Chancellorsville and previous battles before then in the Eastern Theater of the American Civil War.
Captain and Brevet Lt. Col.
William J. Fetterman boasted during America's
Indian Wars that, given "80 men," he would "ride through the Sioux nation". He had contempt for the Sioux's fighting ability and overconfidence in his own military prowess. In 1866, during
Red Cloud's War, he and his army of exactly 80 men (including two volunteering civilians) were
massacred to the last man by a combined force of
Lakota,
Northern Cheyenne, and
Arapaho. It was possibly the worst army defeat on the
Great Plains until eclipsed by the disaster at Little Bighorn ten years later.
In the 1879
Battle of Isandlwana, during the
Anglo-Zulu War, a
Zulu army wiped out a
British army equipped with the most advanced weapons and tactics of the age. This victory at Isandlwana led a previously unengaged Zulus unit,
Undi Corps under Prince
Dabulamanzi kaMpande, to believe they would easily wipe out the British defenders in the
Battle of Rorke's Drift with ferocity and sheer numbers and so attacked the location in violation of orders from King
Cetshwayo kaMpande. Instead, the British, who used sensible tactics and concentrated their firepower as much as possible, won the battle and killed 351 confirmed Zulu men, with another 500 wounded.
The
Battle of Pingxingguan during the
Second Sino-Japanese War between Japan and China. After a series of easy victories against their opponents, the overconfident Japanese failed to take elementary precautions.
Italy's entry in WW2 (1940) followed a series of victories in Libya (1922-1932), Ethiopia (1935-1936), Spain (1936-1939), and Albania (1939), which gave the Fascist regime the illusion of being able to win a global war against Britain.[7]
The catastrophic decision by
Hitler to
invade the Soviet Union in 1941 underestimated Soviet military resilience and counted on the success of the tactics used in previous campaigns, such as the
Invasion of Poland and the
Battle of France. Confident of victory, the Germans did not count on getting caught in a
Russian winter or rasputitsa (
mud season). As a result, the German offensive in the Soviet Union was halted on December 5, 1941.
Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. This followed wins in the
First Sino-Japanese War, the
Russo-Japanese War and the
First World War, and early victories during the
Second Sino-Japanese War. As it turned out, the attack appeared tactically successful, but was strategically disastrous with the
US Pacific Fleet damaged to a relatively superficial degree, with its carrier groups out at sea while vital shore base facilities were ignored in the attack such as its fuel storage, whose destruction could have crippled fleet operations for months by itself. More significantly, with the corresponding Japanese diplomatic communication being too slow to process and present to the American government until after the attack began, the attack, intended in part to demoralize the Americans, provoked instead an infuriated retaliation that would ultimately defeat Japan.
Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of
Egypt, believed that during the
Suez Crisis, the Egyptian Armed forces had defeated the combined forces of Israel, the United Kingdom and France, when in reality it was the pressure from the United States which was the decisive factor. This gave Nasser an inflated view of the strength of his forces, so when the
Six Day War started, he believed that Egypt would be able to defend itself against Israel's advance. However, this overconfidence, as well as false "victory" reports which brought Jordan and Syria into the war, proved to be its downfall as Israel managed to defeat the Arab forces and conquered their territory as well.[8][9]
^Karcher, Timothy M. (2003). "The Victory Disease". Military Review. 83 (4): 9–17.
DTICADA512326.
^Stephan, John J. (2001). Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor. University of Hawaii Press.
ISBN978-0-8248-2550-8.[page needed]
Allen, John W. (4 June 1999). The Victory Disease and the US Army After the Cold War (Thesis).
DTICADA367594.
Karcher, Timothy M. (22 May 2003). Understanding the 'Victory Disease', From the Little Bighorn, To Mogadishu, to the Future (Thesis).
OCLC465220942.
DTICADA416034.
Karcher, Timothy M. (2003). "The Victory Disease". Military Review. 83 (4): 9–17.
DTICADA512326.
A commander may disdain the enemy, and believe his own invincibility, leading his troops to disaster. That commander may employ
strategies that, if effective in earlier combats or maneuvers, prove catastrophic against a new or smarter enemy. The commander afflicted by "victory disease" may also fail to anticipate that a new enemy may use tactics different from those of old enemies. An
overconfident commander may disregard
military intelligence that would enable the commander to realize that new tactics are needed.
Though "victory disease" does not inevitably foretell defeat, it often precedes it. The term is also applied outside the military world in areas such as psychology, business, or marketing.
Much of Japan's arrogance is attributed to the performance of Admiral
Matome Ugaki. From overriding decisions to ignoring the evolving conflict in the Pacific, Ugaki's tactics incited tension and doubt in other Japanese military personnel before the Midway operation.[5]
Although the Japanese had planned to establish a perimeter and go on the defensive, victories encouraged them to continue expanding to an extent that strained
logistics and the navy. This culminated in the
Battle of Midway in 1942, a catastrophic defeat of the
Japanese navy. All four Japanese
aircraft carriers involved were sunk, and the hitherto unstoppable Japanese advance was blunted.[citation needed]
In 1415, at the
Battle of Agincourt, the English were outnumbered between three and five to one, but the disorganization of
French knights, as well as superb quality
longbows, were the underlying circumstances which led to the English overcoming the odds and annihilating the French.[6]
The calamitous decision by
Napoleon to
invade Russia in 1812 led to the return of only 10,000
Frenchsoldiers when 610,000 had initially been sent out. Napoleon's repeated victories in Central Europe led him to believe that Russia would surrender after a few won battles, and made no plans for a sustained campaign or occupation in Russia.
The first six weeks of the
Franco-Prussian War saw French armies, convinced of their superiority following French victories in the
Crimean War and the wars of
Italian unification, enter a war with
Prussia believing that their weapons and tactics would easily defeat the Prussians. However, the Prussians had better tactics and this led to catastrophic French defeats at
Sedan and
Metz.
United States victories against Mexico and
American Indians led Union forces to be overconfident going into the
Civil War. Failing to update their tactics to match new technology, such as
rifling of firearms and the use of the
Minie ball as ammunition, they assumed that superior numbers would give them rapid victories, and ignored plans for an extended war until after repeated defeats.
Confederate decisions made at and before their loss at the
Battle of Gettysburg, after their outnumbered-five-to-two victory at the
Battle of Chancellorsville and previous battles before then in the Eastern Theater of the American Civil War.
Captain and Brevet Lt. Col.
William J. Fetterman boasted during America's
Indian Wars that, given "80 men," he would "ride through the Sioux nation". He had contempt for the Sioux's fighting ability and overconfidence in his own military prowess. In 1866, during
Red Cloud's War, he and his army of exactly 80 men (including two volunteering civilians) were
massacred to the last man by a combined force of
Lakota,
Northern Cheyenne, and
Arapaho. It was possibly the worst army defeat on the
Great Plains until eclipsed by the disaster at Little Bighorn ten years later.
In the 1879
Battle of Isandlwana, during the
Anglo-Zulu War, a
Zulu army wiped out a
British army equipped with the most advanced weapons and tactics of the age. This victory at Isandlwana led a previously unengaged Zulus unit,
Undi Corps under Prince
Dabulamanzi kaMpande, to believe they would easily wipe out the British defenders in the
Battle of Rorke's Drift with ferocity and sheer numbers and so attacked the location in violation of orders from King
Cetshwayo kaMpande. Instead, the British, who used sensible tactics and concentrated their firepower as much as possible, won the battle and killed 351 confirmed Zulu men, with another 500 wounded.
The
Battle of Pingxingguan during the
Second Sino-Japanese War between Japan and China. After a series of easy victories against their opponents, the overconfident Japanese failed to take elementary precautions.
Italy's entry in WW2 (1940) followed a series of victories in Libya (1922-1932), Ethiopia (1935-1936), Spain (1936-1939), and Albania (1939), which gave the Fascist regime the illusion of being able to win a global war against Britain.[7]
The catastrophic decision by
Hitler to
invade the Soviet Union in 1941 underestimated Soviet military resilience and counted on the success of the tactics used in previous campaigns, such as the
Invasion of Poland and the
Battle of France. Confident of victory, the Germans did not count on getting caught in a
Russian winter or rasputitsa (
mud season). As a result, the German offensive in the Soviet Union was halted on December 5, 1941.
Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. This followed wins in the
First Sino-Japanese War, the
Russo-Japanese War and the
First World War, and early victories during the
Second Sino-Japanese War. As it turned out, the attack appeared tactically successful, but was strategically disastrous with the
US Pacific Fleet damaged to a relatively superficial degree, with its carrier groups out at sea while vital shore base facilities were ignored in the attack such as its fuel storage, whose destruction could have crippled fleet operations for months by itself. More significantly, with the corresponding Japanese diplomatic communication being too slow to process and present to the American government until after the attack began, the attack, intended in part to demoralize the Americans, provoked instead an infuriated retaliation that would ultimately defeat Japan.
Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of
Egypt, believed that during the
Suez Crisis, the Egyptian Armed forces had defeated the combined forces of Israel, the United Kingdom and France, when in reality it was the pressure from the United States which was the decisive factor. This gave Nasser an inflated view of the strength of his forces, so when the
Six Day War started, he believed that Egypt would be able to defend itself against Israel's advance. However, this overconfidence, as well as false "victory" reports which brought Jordan and Syria into the war, proved to be its downfall as Israel managed to defeat the Arab forces and conquered their territory as well.[8][9]
^Karcher, Timothy M. (2003). "The Victory Disease". Military Review. 83 (4): 9–17.
DTICADA512326.
^Stephan, John J. (2001). Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor. University of Hawaii Press.
ISBN978-0-8248-2550-8.[page needed]
Allen, John W. (4 June 1999). The Victory Disease and the US Army After the Cold War (Thesis).
DTICADA367594.
Karcher, Timothy M. (22 May 2003). Understanding the 'Victory Disease', From the Little Bighorn, To Mogadishu, to the Future (Thesis).
OCLC465220942.
DTICADA416034.
Karcher, Timothy M. (2003). "The Victory Disease". Military Review. 83 (4): 9–17.
DTICADA512326.