EOKA ( /eɪˈoʊkə/; Greek: ΕΟΚΑ), acronym for Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston ^[a] was a Greek Cypriot nationalist guerrilla organisation that fought a campaign for the end of British rule in Cyprus, for the island's self-determination and for eventual union with Greece. ^[3]

Background

Cyprus, an island in eastern Mediterranean, inhabited mostly by Greek and Turkish populations, was part of the Ottoman empire until 4 June 1878, when in the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War, it was handed to the British empire. ^[4] As nationalistic tendencies were growing in both communities of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots were leaning towards Enosis (Union with Greece) which was a part of Megali idea. The origins of Enosis date back to 1821, the year when the Greek War of Independence commenced, and the archbishop of Cyprus, his archdeacon, and three bishops were beheaded, amongst other atrocities. In 1828, Count Ioannis Kapodistrias, the first governor of Greece, asked for the union of Cyprus with Greece, while small-scale uprisings also occurred. ^[5] In 1878, when British general Wolsely came to Cyprus to formally establish British rule, he was met by the archbishop of Kition who, after welcoming him, requested that Britain cede Cyprus to Greece. ^[5] Initially, the Greek Cypriots welcomed British rule because they were aware that the British had returned the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864, and they were also hoping for British investment in Cyprus. ^[6] In 1912 the British government offered Greece to exchange Cyprus for a naval base in Argostoli, Kefalonia, in order to gain control of the Ionian sea an offer which was repeated in 1913. In 1915, the British offered several times Cyprus to Greece, in exchange for Greece's participation in World War I. But while Greece was undecided whether it should enter the War, the British government withdrew its offer. ^[7] By 1915, the Greek Cypriots seeing that neither the British investment, nor Enosis, had materialised, increased their opposition to British rule. ^[6] In the beginning, the Enosis movement had only few supporters mainly from the upper classes. ^{[8] [9] [10] [11]} But that was about to change as two groups of disappointed with the new ruler began to form: the Church and the Usurers. In the following years a growing number of Cypriots were studying in Greece, and upon their return, they became strong advocates of Enosis. ^{[11] [12]} On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot community started to develop its own nationalism in the early 20th century, as news arrived in the island about the persecutions faced by Muslims in the countries that formed after the collapse of Ottoman Empire. ^{[13] [14]}

In the 1950s, EOKA was established with the specific aim of mounting a military campaign to end the status of Cyprus as a British crown colony and achieving the island's unification with Greece. The leadership of AKEL at the time, the island's communist party, opposed EOKA's military action, advocating a " Gandhiesque approach" of civil disobedience, such as workers' strikes and demonstrations. ^[15]

Initially, the struggle was political, as opposed to military. EOKA, in Grivas' words, wanted to attract the attention of the world through high-profile operations that would make headlines. ^[16]

Characteristics of EOKA

Ideology

The ideology of EOKA was nationalistic, conservative, anti-communist and religious. ^{[17] [18]} Grivas's ideas resonated because they were compatible with the ideas cultivated by Greek Cypriots through education, Church action, the press, and the political elites. EOKA was characterized by religiosity. OXEN, PEON and ThOI ^[b] were sources of fighters. ^{[19] [20]} The Church recruited and funded the struggle. The priests of the villages blessed the weapons. Essential elements among the letters of the convicted-to-death fighters, were the invocation of God, Christ, faith and prayer. ^[21] Grivas and the Church transmitted their anticommunism to EOKA members. There was a widespread impression that leftists were national traitors and should not have a say on national matters. Moreover, it was thought that the communist ideology leads to slavery. ^[22]

According to Andrew R. Novo, the similarities with the X organization in Greece were more than obvious. According to Novo, Grivas was an advocate of the Great Idea and transferred to EOKA this notion. Emphasis on the ethnic identity was implemented. Novo states that EOKA’s quasi-fascist pedigree reinforced the rhetorical ideals of the virtues of Greek civilisation, the heroes of 1821, and the superiority of Greek blood. According to Novo, these were not the only fascist echoes. According to Novo, EOKA portrayed violence as a cathartic obligation, and its leaders, particularly Grivas, valued absolute ruthlessness especially towards members who betrayed it. ^[23]

In sharp difference with other anticolonial insurgencies in Africa or Asia, where marxist movements led the struggle, in Cyprus it was the right-wing EOKA that carried the armed campaign, while the communist party of AKEL kept a neutral stance. ^{[24] [25]}

Tactics

EOKA divided its military campaign into a rural and an urban one. ^[26] At the high of the campaign in 1956, EOKA consisted of no more than 350 armed men, operating in groups of 5-15 men in the mountain of Troodos and 50 urban groups of 4-5 persons in urban areas. Another 750 passive members of EOKA were organised in village groups while youth and children were carrying arms ^[27] Initially, the EOKA's mode of action was sabotage. EOKA was attacking security forces, police stations, barracks, military cars, governmental buildings, power stations, cafes, bars, cinemas and restaurants that British personnel used to relax ^[28] Within 1955 there were 405 bomb attacks in various police, military buildings, public building or houses. In 1956 the number raised to 972. ^[29]

EOKA also used intimidation towards local population. A number of scholars characterize EOKA as a terrorist organization due attack on public utilities, assassination of members of the security forces, civil servants or civilians suspected of collaborating with the government ^[30]

Personnel

Estimates of the number of people who joined EOKA vary considerably. ^[31] At the beginning of the armed struggle, EOKA numbered about 80 members. It grew over time, but in 1960 a British army report suggested that at any one moment EOKA never had more than 200-300 hard-core members. Grivas's own figures suggest that by early 1956 EOKA had about 270 hardcore members in the mountain gangs and town groups, and about 750 members of village groups. Averoff-Tossizza broadly agreed with British estimates for hard-core fighters, putting the figure at no more than 300 at any one time. In their own history the EOKA veterans association, which had good reason to inflate active membership in order to justify its claim that EOKA enjoyed the support of the united Greek Cypriot community, claimed that 340 men were members of guerrilla bands but considering associate organizations such as PEKA, and ANE the number could rise to as many as 25,000. ^[32]

According to Kraemer, at the peak of the conflict, EOKA' paramilitary numbered 1,250 members (250 regulars plus 1,000 active underground). They faced British security forces totaling 40,000 (32,000 regulars plus 8,000 auxiliaries) ^[1] EOKA was allegedly clandestinely supported by the Greek Government in the form of arms, money and propaganda on radio stations broadcast from Athens. The total cost of running the campaign was reported to be GBP £50,000 (US $140,000) for the whole 4 years. ^[33]

People did not join EOKA out of a sense of economic grievance. Attempts to link the cause of Enosis with economic issues were viewed by EOKA's members with disdain. The outstanding feature of EOKA’s rank and file was their youth. The most active members of EOKA were aged between 16 and 25. More than 87 percent of all those brought to trial for offenses ranging from possession of firearms, throwing bombs or murder, were below the age of 25. Thirty-two percent of them were high school students. According to British historian David French, the median age of the nine executed men, charged by the British colonial administration with terrorist offenses, was only 22.185 Of the 1118 men in detention in June 1957, 65 per cent were below the age of 26, and nearly one in five was 19 or younger. Most had finished their elementary education, and many had migrated from their home villages to nearby towns. ^[34]

The organization was headed by Georgios Grivas. A graduate of the Hellenic Military Academy, Grivas had served as an officer in the Greek Army. He had fought in both World Wars. During the German occupation of Greece in World War II, he led a small, anti-communist resistance ^[c] group, named Organization X. ^{[35] [36]} Grivas assumed the nom de guerre Digenis in direct reference to the legendary Byzantine Digenis Akritas who repelled invaders from the Byzantine Empire.^{[ citation needed]} Second in command in EOKA was Grigoris Afxentiou, also a former officer of the Greek army. Afxentiou had graduated from the reserves Officers Academy in 1950 with no prior experience in military operations.^{[ citation needed]}

Armed Struggle

The start of the armed struggle. (April 1955 to Octomber 1956)

The armed struggle started 30 minutes after midnight on 31 March to 1 April 1955 with explosions in Nicosia, Limassol and Larnaca. In general, the greatest success was the team of Markos Drakos in Nicosia, where he managed to damage the radio transmitter of value 150 thousand US dollars. British forces were not expecting any attacks and had minimal security at the time of the attack. Barracks were not yet ready as military personnel was moving from Canal Zone to Cyprus. Modestos Panteli was the first casualty of the insurgency. ^{[37] [38]} Next day, Grivas published a pamphlet where he explained his objective, using histrionic and hyperbolic language in order to stoke up the courage of Greek-cypriots. ^[38] The first wave of attacks ended on 9 April. ^[39]

The following wave began the evening of 19– 20 June and endured until the 28th of June. This time, aside from military and government structures, assaulted police stations and individual policemen and soldiers, both in their homes and in bars. ^[39] By then the initial focus of the EOKA killer groups was the Special Branch. Assaults on individual policemen and their homes additionally duplicated. They were not always deadly, but on 10 August a Greek Cypriot special constable was killed in Nicosia, an assassination that was intended to tell the Greek Cypriot community not to side with the police. ^[40]By September, the morale of the low paid police officers had collapsed. ^[41]

Operation Forward to Victory (phase I, Octomber 1955 to March 1956)

The Trilatet London Conference among Britain, Turkey and Greece was held from 29 August to 7 September without reaching an agreement. Turkey held a tough stance, as Zorlou was insisted that Turkey will never accept Cyprus to fell in Greek hands. ^{[42] [43]} Meanwhile, the Istanbul pogrom against the Greeks in Istanbul had taken place during the night of 6 and 7 September 1955. The previous weeks, rumors had mounted that greek Cypriots were about to attack Turkish-Cypriots, rumors were proven wrong- there was no such plan. ^[44] This failure led Grivas to increased its efforts and on 9 October, EOKA embarked on the ‘Operation Forward to Victory’ which lasted until the deportation of Makarios, in March 1956. ^{[45] [46]} During that time, there had been 520 security incidence (54 House bombings, 116 riots, 87 sabotage, 133 ambushes, 31 attacks on police, 57 attacks on soldiers 42 raids on police stations) ^[47]

Meanwhile, the British Empire changed the governor of Cyprus, Armitage's place took Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, a move seen by some as handing the problem to the military. Harding knew though he was appointed as a civilian governor ^[48] Soon after his arrival, Harding seeked to meet Archbishop Makarios, starting what is known as Harding-Makarios negotiations. ^[49]

But it was school children, who were in the forefront of rioting in the autumn and winter of 1955–6 in an uprising, riots that escalated to the Battle of Flags. ^{[50] [51]} The youth was train to throw bombs and carry assasinations ^[52]The photos of children rioting against the British soldier became a powerful propaganda weapon for EOKA ^{[50] [53]} Riots were aggravated by the trial of a twenty-two-year-old Greek-Cypriot, Michael Karaolis, for the murder of Constable Poullis, a policeman shot in Ledra Street, Nicosia. Karaolis's trial drew publicity and amid tensions, was found guilty, and sentenced to death. ^{[54] [55]}

House bombing continued at the autumn and winter of 1955. Mostly, British personnel living in rented accommodation within towns and villages. In December an army chaplain, his wife and four-year-old daughter were ‘moderately injured’ when a grenade landed in their dining room. Another child was injured in early January when a bomb exploded at his father’s home in Nicosia. The most serious injury was inflicted on the wife of an army sergeant whose foot was blown off when a bomb was thrown through a bedroom window. ^{[56] [57]}The only fatality was Georgios Charalambous, killed when his own bomb exploded prematurely. ^[57]

Most of the raids on police statistion were fire shots and bombing over the walls. Aut at a few instances, EOKA's guerillas managed to steal some weaponry. Such attackes occured at Lefkoniko, Rizokarpasso, Yialousa, and Ayios Therapon. But in January of 1956, army secured the most valnurable police stations and EOKA resumed bomb-throwing attacks at police stations. Same pattern of attack was followed at army camps. ^[58]

In November EOKA members constructed a network of seven hideouts,near and overlooking Spilia and Kourdhai in the Troodos mountains. They used the hideout to unleash several ambushes, leaving a soldier dead and three wounded. But in mid-December's Grivas's gang faced a setback when they were forced to relocate when they ambushed a a 45 men strong Commando group. ^{[59] [60]}In another ambush two days later, a guerilla died and two others were arrested. Because of these drawbacks and with the harsh weather condition, the activity of EOKA eased during winter. ^{[59] [59] [61]}I Telephone lines and post offices were also targets. ^[62]

Operation Forward to Victory (phase II, March 1956 to March 1957)

Makarios was sent to exile ( Seychelles) on 9th of March 1956. His capability of controlling Grivas violence was reduced. ^[63] Deportition of Makarios drew criticism in Britain, stanned the Cypriots and hostility arose in Greece ^[64] The next phase of the campaign on Cyprus lasted from March 1956 until March 1957 ^[63], when Grivas declared a unilateral truce. During this period there had been 104 Date House bombings, 53 riots, 136 acts of Sabotage, 403 ambushes, 35 attacks on police, 38 attacks on soldiers and 43 raids on police stations. The pattern of EOKA operations also changed significantly. Most house bombings and riots were ordered by EOKA as a way of forcing the army to commit more troops to the towns and so relieve pressure on the mountain gangs. Most house bombers and rioters had been school boys. ^[65] The pattern of sabotage operations remained the same. ^[66]

Individual members of security forces were targets. In September 1956, an army doctor was killed in his car, at a stop sign. ^[67] Greekcypriot Assistant Superintendent Kyriacos Aristotelous was assassinated on 15 April 1956 while leaving the maternity clinic in Nicosia after visiting his wife and four-day-old son. ^{[68] [69]} In total, there had been 77 dead men in Security Forces, 70 Greek Cypriot- mostly by the hand of EOKA after they have been listed as traitors, 2 Turkish Cypriots and 5 British civilians. ^[70] Other acts of terrorism occurred such as the killing of the son of a soldier in a beach near Dekelia base ^[71] A Maltese shop owner (fiance of a greek Cypriot woman) was killed by shooting in the back. ^[71]The photo of his fiance looking at his dead body went viral. Another couple, a British customs officer and his wife, was murdered while picnicked. ^[71]On 16 June 1956, the bombing of a restaurant by EOKA led to the death of William P. Boteler, a CIA officer working under diplomatic cover. Grivas immediately issued a statement denying a deliberate attempt to target American citizens. ^{[72] [73]}

Governor Harding carried out a series of operation from April until July ^[d] that failed to eradicate EOKA but they were nonetheless a severe blow to EOKA as it was never again as effective as the first half of 1956. ^[75] New techniques, better intelligence and more troops, led to a decrease in EOKA's activity between November 1956 and 14 March 1957, when Grivas declared a unilateral ceasefire. ^[76]

The security forces had also run a counter-gang organization (named X-platoon), probably since September 1956. It has been estimated that in a six-month period the X-platoon killed, captured, or obtained information leading to the identification and capture of thirty-five hard-core EOKA terrorists, forty-seven village group members, five policemen, and twenty priests who were actively helping EOKA, together with considerable quantities of weapons and explosives ^[77]

Feeling the pressure of Harding's rigid grip on the mountains of Troodos, Grivas embarked upon the far more dangerous strategy of ordering town groups to attack Turkish Cypriot members of the police force in the expectation that doing so was bound to provoke intercommunal violence, which the government could only contain by withdrawing troops from the mountains. ^[78] Insurgents throw two bombs at a group of Turkish Cypriot policemen killing one of them. This incidence sparked inter-communal riots in Nicosia the next day, and a series of strikes as Greek Cypriot workers protested at Turkish violence in Nicosia ^{[78] [79]}

By March 1957 neither EOKA or the security forces could claim victory. The very best of Grivas guerillas have been captured or killed, the Limassol arm smuggling network had been eliminated. The security forces were on top but did not eradicate EOKA, they had only contained its campaign of agitational terrorism. ^[80] Grivas declared truce on the 14th of March 1957. ^[81]

From March 1957 to November 1957

Despite Grivas declaring truce, Harding continued to chase him. False intelligence, led security forces to Milikouri, a village in Troodos mountains, where they impose night curfew. The operation provided EOKA propagandists with opportunities to portray the security forces as imposing starvation to the villagers, something that was not true, but news and halftruths spread nonetheless. In terms of psycological war, Milikouri was a definete defeat ^{[82] [83] [84]} Nevertheless, the truce was kept by EOKA until the 28th of Octomber 1957 (Oxi day, a greek national fest) when Harold Macmillan (then minister of foreign affairs) declined a Makarios proposal for a settlement. ^[85]

Meanwhile, EOKA was trying to recrue new members. Priests and schoolteachers were the scouting for young men aged 14-24. By the end of Summer 1957, EOKA's ranks were filled once more. ^[86]Grivas had appointed new district commands, established a new courier system and mountain gangs had constructed new hides ^[87] So the situation in Autumn of 1957 was Grivas following his own line more and more, while he had unleash an attack on the Left and was preparing for an attack to the turkish Cypriot community. ^[88]

Detention Camp and claims of torture

The first Detention camp was Kyrenia Castle and had started running since 1955. According to Detention of Persons Law, passed in 15th June 1955, the Government could enclose a suspect in a detention camp without a trial. Later, two more detention camps opened, one in Kokkinotrimithia and another one in Pyla village. ^[89] EOKA tried to link them with the Nazi concentration camps. ^{[e] [90] [92]} Nevertheless, the food was adequate, detainees were not forced to work, and have their family to visit them. Detainees could read, talk, rest and have some exercise. But due to the aluminum roofs of the buildings, it got extremely cold in winter and hot in the summer. ^[92] International Committee of the Red Cross visited the camps in December 1955 and again in March 1957, and reported that ‘treatment of the detainees is satisfactory and in conformity with general humane principles’. During his second visit the detainees ‘stated that they had suffered no harsh treatment since their arrival in camp’ ^[93] Harding didn't like the camps as the public opinion was sympathetic to the detainees, but he thought a lot of detainees were "undoubtedly guilty of murder, attempted murder, incitement or conspiracy to murder", but who had not been able to be convicted "for the deplorable reason that witnesses had been intimidated by the terrorists into refusing to give evidence" ^{[94] [95]}

Torture allegations have been an issue since 1956. Greek government urged Council of Europe to examine the case and a humans Right committee was formed led by Ioannis Clerides ^[f]. Accusations peaked during the Winter 1956-57 and Averoff handed 237 signed solemn declarations to the general secretary of United Nation but where later withdrawn. ^[96] In June 1957, Harding publish a book, denying the allegation of turtures(Allegations of Brutality in Cyprus). ^[97] Even though he admitted some wrongdoing by security forces, he declined the torture allegations, describing it as propaganda by EOKA terrorists, who were intimidating the greek populations. Few days later, Makarios held a press conference in Athens, where he doubled down the allegations, but failed to provide hard evidence and fall into some fallacies. ^[98] Accusation of torture had an impact to the public opinion. Liberal and left wing public opinion was worried and 5 Labor MPs asked questions in the parliament, but Lennox Boyd rejected the claims. ^[99] There was another heated debate on tortures in the Parliament where shadow minister of Colonies, James Callaghan raised the issue once more in 15 July 1957. ^[100]

As Ricther describe, when a suspect was arrested by the police or the army, he was generally safe. After that, he was given to an interrogation group, where, as Ricther estimates there was some use of force. Interrogators were using a carro and stick method as suspects were threatened with heavy sentence if they dont speak, and a reward if the do speak. ^[101] Another aspect is EOKA's own death threats upon those who had speak to the interrogation. Because those who had spoken were fearful of their lifes, they used to claim that they were subject to brutal torture. ^{[102] [103]}As Richer remarks, allegations for tortures where a continuation of EOKA's struggles by other means, used mostly during the truce, destroying their opponent's high moral ground ^[104] According to prof. David French, torture allegations were another staple of EOKA propaganda. ^[105] French points out to the fact that EOKA was instructing detainees on how to faint, to practise shamming fits, and internal injuries. ^[103] Nevertheless, according to French "But not all accusations levelled against the security forces were EOKA fabrications. There were accusations which, on the balance of probability, were probably true, not least because the truth of the accusations was supported either by the authorities, by members of the security forces, or by independent witnesses who had no reason to lie"' ^[106]

The campaign against traitors

Initially, EOKA was intimidating the population not to co-operate with the security forces. By late 1956, as the security forces were succeeding against EOKA, the definition of "traitor" was widened to include anyone who did not give active assistance to the organization. ^[107] The median age of victim was 35 years old, their occupation would mostly be government employees, particularly policemen, bus and taxi drivers, or the owners of coffee-houses. ^[108] Attackers were artisans and senior school boys. ^[108]

Three separate times, the attacks against traitors peaked: a)summer and autumn of 1956, b)August 1957, and c) April to October 1958. ^{[109] [110]} The first peak was due to Grivas not wanting Greek Cypriots to step out of line during negotiation with the British and the growing pressure from security forces made him inward to protect his own security. Grivas gave orders so the murders should be performed in a way that would look non-political. The other two peaks were directly against the left wing party of AKEL. AKEL was critical of EOKA's methods and had gained more support during the 1955-57 period. The breaking point between EOKA and AKEL was reached in 1957, when AKEL insisted that Makarios does not speak on behalf of all Cypriots and the British should negotiate with AKEL's elected members as well. Grivas was afraid that this could lead to communists taking over the rule of Cyprus, if EOKA finally win the right to self-determination, as AKEL had a broad base. So he ordered EOKA members to reject any offer for co-operation from AKEL. AKEL threatened that if they were not allowed to take part to negotiations, they would reveal EOKA's secrets to the security forces. Grivas retaliated with violence, and left-wing supporters were beaten. The war of words between EOKA and AKEL continued until the arrival of Sir Hugh Foot. Grivas was suspicious of a settlement being close, so he intensified his struggle aiming not to let AKEL to rival Makarios as the spokesman of Greek Cypriots. EOKA replied with demonstrations against EOKA. Ziartides, though asked members of AKEL not to take revenge, but later added."I cannot object to anything you may do in self-defence" and ‘We shall do everything we can to avoid civil war but this does not mean that we shall succumb to the masked men. Greek government and Makarios was afraid of opening a second front in Cyprus that would ultimately benefit the British but Grivas refuse to listen. In February a a left-wing newspaper reported the existence of a secret anti-communist organization within EOKA (YAKA -Service for Countering Communist Reaction). Some days later a fake bomb was found in the house of the editor. Others leftish were shot or beaten with particular brutality. ^{[111] [112] [113]}

AKEL held more demonstrations and there were secrets talks for arm smuggling and organizing a counter-insurgency. But revenge was taken from some members of AKEL who gave information to the police on the people who had attacked them. EOKA since has branded communists synonymous to traitors. ^[114]

The Governorship of Hugh Foot and the Descent into Intercommunal violence, December 1957–August 1958

Sir Hugh Foot arrived in Cyprus December 1956, when a stalemate was obvious. ^[115] As John Harding, commented in an to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, "the Politicians had failed in the first place and had handed the matter to the Military who in turn had failed and the "buck" was now back with the Politicians" ^[116]

Grivas has set up a two-stage plan by October. The first stage would involve attacks in nonliving targets and while at the second stage, EOKA would target security force personnel. ^[117]Indeed Grivas had success as he attacked half a dozen attacks against high-value targets but in mid-december he called for a pause to let Hugh Foot time to assess the situation and until the UN had completed its deliberations. The pause was extended, to end at 4th March 1958, when Grivas ordered re-initiation of the sabotage campaign. On 8 April Grivas called for a general strike on 10 April, demanding the release of all detainees and convicted prisoners. ^[118]

EOKA and Turkish-cypriots

Turkish Cypriot community objected Enosis long before the 1950's. ^{[119] [120]} The recent history (Greek Revolution of 1921, Greek-turkish was of 1897, Balkan Wars and most importantly the Cretan Syndrome ie the annexation of Crete to Greece and the consequential deportation of turkish-cretes) had shaped an existential fear among Turkish-Cypriots ^{[121] [119]} By the end of the 1940's turkish-cypriot succeeded in turning indifferent by then Turkey to get involve in their plight. ^{[119] [122]} British administration was determined not to let turkish cypriot community created an armed militia as it would worsen the fragile intercommunal relations. ^[123] By May 1955, two turkish underground organizations, Kitemb ^[g] and KaraYilan ^[h] had been established. By August 1955, Volkan, another turkish cypriot organization appeared that was more popular and seemingly more educated people were involved. Volkan used the same methods as EOKA, using schoolboys as couriers, and used intimidation towards their own community. ^[124] In November 1957, a new organization emerged, which absorbed all minor turkish cypriot fight groups, its name was TMT (Turk Mudya Teskilat/Turkish Resistance Organization). ^{[125] [126]}

EOKA had no plan attacking turkish cypriots at the beginning of the insurgency as long as they were neutral, Holland suggests that the reasons might be practical. ^{[127] [128]} Grivas was convinced that Turkish Cypriots would not object to the Enosis movement as their opposition was not genuine, even on the eve of the assassination of turkish police officers in 1956. However, that changed in January 1957 as Grivas guerrillas were under pressure. ^[127] According to French, Grivas decided to attack turkish cypriot so to spark intercommunal tensions and rioting in the towns of Cyprus, forcing the British withdraw their troops from hunting EOKA up in the mountains and restore order in urban areas. ^[127] On 19 January 1957, EOKA's guerillas assassinated a turkish cypriot police officer and were followed by 3 days of rioting forcing indeed troops to retreat from the mountains. ^[129] EOKA attacks on Turkish Cypriot policemen continued in February and March. ^{[130] [131]}

But it was not only EOKA that was eager to incite intercommunal violence. In September 1955 the Turkish government had incited anti-Greek riots in Istanbul. In January 1958 it incited riots on Cyprus to wreck the Foot plan. ^[130] Like EOKA, TMT intimidated and use violence against its own community. Like EOKA, it regarded left-wingers as traitors, ^{[132] [133]} and ordered TC to abandon AKEL's syndicate (PEO). ^[134] The violence employed by TMT intended to show to the world that the two communities could not live together, and that partition was the only practicable solution. ^[135]

Violence between the two communities escalated in the summer of 1958. Between 7 June and 7 August, there were fifty-five assassinations and twenty-six attempted assassinations by Turks on Greeks, and fifty-nine assassinations and forty-one attempted assassinations by Greeks on Turks. ^{[136] [137]} Turkish cypriots used to attack greek cypriots in urban areas, while greek cypriots attacked turkish cypriots in rural areas ^{[138] [139]} Due to the intercommunal violence and because of pressure by TMT, turkish cypriots from the southern parts of Cyprus fleed to the northern side. ^[140]

In order to tackle the intercommunal clash, Foot mounted Operations "Matchbox" and "Table Lighter". In doing so he ordered the detention without trial of more people in the space of a week than Harding had detained in the whole of his time on the island. ^{[141] [142]} A truce was called after an appeal from the British Prime Minister that was backed by Greek and Turkish Governments. ^[143]

From August 1958 to the Zurich and London Agreements

By December 1958, security forces had cornered insurgents for a second time. But it was still far from securing the population from EOKA and TMT intimidation. As a general election was approaching, British government sought to reach a solution that would safeguard Britain’s minimum strategic requirements and did not look too much like an undignified scuttle from yet another Middle Eastern country. ^[144] On 7 September Grivas ended the truce because of British efforts to impose the Macmillan Plan. Operations peaked in the final week of September, prior to the arrival of a Turkish government representative, and from then until about the middle of October the organization maintained a higher tempo of activity than at any time. ^[145] Two features had changed in the modus operandi of EOKA: engaging at close distance with the security forces and increasingly targeting British civilians. ^[i] 8 British citizens, expatriates, were assassinated until November 1958. ^[146]

Meanwhile, EOKA was losing popular support. Makarios told Barbara Castle that he was willing to accept independence rather than Enosis. Some senior EOKA members, such as Kyriakos Matsis, the left wing AKEL and the Greek Cypriot mayors of all of the major towns and many greek Cypriots who were against the economic boycott of British goods backed this swift of archbishop. ^[147] Another strike ordered by Grivas met less support and the continuation of violence cause an immigration wave for greek cypriots going to Britain. ^[148]

During the last months of 1958, all parties had reasons to favor a compromise. Makarios had lost at the United Nations’ General Assembly when it adopted the Mexican resolution on 5 December. The fear of partition was growing. The Greek government feared the possibility of a war between Greece and Turkey, a conflict that they might not win, and which might even lead to their expulsion from NATO. The British were anxious as a war between Greece and Turkey would destabilize NATO and cause widespread bloodshed in the island. Turks also had a reason for compromise as the crises in Lebanon and Iraq in the summer of 1958 meant that two of their frontiers were at risk. On 5 December, Zorlu had a friendly conversation with Averoff-Tossizza ^[j] in the UN building and agreed there was a common danger. A series of meetings was arranged. They finally met at 5 and 11 February 1959 and achieved a compromise solution, agreeing on the constitution of an independent Cyprus Republic, a tripartite treaty. After that, they flew to London where British government joined the discussions and agreed that Cyprus would become an independent and sovereign country. ^[150]

Makarios was hesitant to accept the deal as it fell short of Enosis. But he realised that he had no other option and he was pressured by Constantinos Karamanlis who threatened to withdraw Greece's support to EOKA. Grivas had no intention to block the agreement and on 9th of March issued a leaflet declaring his acceptance to London agreements. Turkish cypriots leaders were enthusiastic about the agreement even though some turkish cypriots held protests against them as they did not secure partition ^[151]

Death Toll

According to prof David French, British armed forces suffered 104 dead and 601 injured men while the police (one-tenth of the size of the army) 51 dead and 187 wounded. Among Turkish-Cypriot civilians, 62 died and 150 were wounded. Heaviest loss was among Greek Cypriot civilian: 263 were killed and 252 injured, the majority of which died in the hands of EOKA. ^[152]Similar figures are reported be Ricther: British armed forces: 104 dead, 601 wounded, Police force: 12 British, 15 Greek Cypriots, 22 turkish cypriots dead and 2 others, among civilians 26 British, 203 Greek Cypriots, and 7 Turkish Cypriots and 2 others, and due to intercommunal clash 60 dead greekcypriots and 55 turkish cypriots. ^[153]

Perseption of EOKA and continual controversies

EOKA veterans file a lawsuit against the British government

In 2011, EOKA veterans announced that lawsuits were being planned against British authorities. This was re-iterated in 2012. ^[154] The veterans association alleged that at least 14 Cypriots died and hundreds more could have been "tortured during interrogations" by the British during the 1955–1959 campaign. Two of those who allegedly died during interrogation were aged 17. The legal action comes on the back of the uncovering of secret documents released in 2011 which present similar practices during the Mau Mau Uprising in Kenya, during the same period. ^{[155] [156]}

In 2018, Cypriot veterans won the right to claim damages over UK torture claims at court. The presiding judge dismissed arguments by the British government that the case should be judged under Cypriot law, which, if true, would have meant that the statute of limitations applied in the case. The judge commented that "It seems to me that, in this case at any rate, where a state stands to be held to account for acts of violence against its citizens, it should be held to account in its own courts, by its own law and should not escape liability by reference to a colonial law it has itself made." The Greek Cypriots also said that the International Red Cross archives containing eyewitness accounts from officials then working for the organization provide additional evidence of their claims. ^[157]

EOKA in educational system

In Greek cypriot community and educational system, EOKA is praised as a heroic organization. According to Heinz A. Richter, who cites Makarios Drousiotes, the greek Cypriot community still lacks the maturity to face the negative aspects of EOKA. Richters points out that EOKA divided the greek cypriots to patriots and traitors and fueled the division between greek and turkish cypriots. That helped turkish nationalists to establish the likewise terrorist organization TMT. EOKA's influence on the cypriot community has been negative (apart from the patriotism of some members). Grivas impose an ideology that critical thinking and free speech was forbidden. A political party was stigmatized with no evidence that was collaborating with the British. ^{[158] [159]}

In Turkish cypriot community, pupils are taught that the Enosis struggle was barbaric and illegal and EOKA was a terrorist organization. ^[160]

Monuments

There are various monuments dedicated to the members of EOKA who died during the years of combat who are largely regarded as war-time heroes by Greek-Cypriots.

Part of the central jail of Nicosia established by British governor Harding functions after the Cypriot independence as a museum. This includes the prisons cells, the gallows and the Incarcerated Graves of 13 EOKA fighters who were either executed or killed by the colonial authorities. ^[161] A memorial museum dedicated to the EOKA campaign was created in 1960. It is located in the centre of Nicosia. ^[162] In Larnaka, there are monuments dedicated to Michalakis Paridis, Grigoris Afxentiou, and on King Paul Square to Petrakis Kiprianou, a 17-year-old member of EOKA who was killed in the village of Ora on 21 March 1957.^{[ citation needed]}

Death Toll v2

David Carter has published the most comprehensive list of the death toll due to EOKA's action.

On the other hand, 85-91 EOKA's guerillas were killed by the British forces. 17 more died when self-made bombs exploded in their hands. ^[152]

See also

• EOKA B
• Grigoris Afxentiou
• Evagoras Pallikarides
• Markos Drakos
• Michalis Karaolis
• Nikos Sampson
• Battle of Spilia
• Field Marshal Harding
• Migrated archives

Notes

References

Sources

Books

In Greek

• Βαρνάβα, Αντρέας (2000) Η νεολαία στον απελευθερωτικό αγώνα της ΕΟΚΑ, Λευκωσία, Συμβούλιο Ιστορικής Μνήμης ΕΟΚΑ
• Ρίχτερ, Χάιντς Α. (2007). Ιστορία της Κύπρου, τόμος πρώτος (1878-1949). Αθήνα: Εστία. ISBN  9789600512946. translated from the original Heinz Richter (2006). Geschichte der Insel Zypern. Harrassowitz Verlag. ISBN  978-3-447-05975-6.
• Kizilyurek, Niyazi (1990). Ολική Κύπρος. Λευκωσία: Κασουλίδη.
• Κτωρής, Σώτος (2013). Τουρκοκύπριοι: από το περιθώριο στο συνεταιρισμό, 1923-196. Αθήνα: Παπαζήσης. ISBN  9789600228984.
• Θρασυβούλου, Μάριος (2016). Ο εθνικισμός των Ελληνοκυπρίων, από την αποικιοκρατία στην Ανεξαρτησία. Θεσσαλονίκη: επίκεντρο. ISBN  978-960-458-686-8.

In English

• Ganser, Daniele (2005). Nato's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe. Routledge. p. 213. ISBN  978-0-7146-5607-6.
• Foleÿ, Charles; Scobie, W. I. (1975). The struggle for Cyprus. Hoover Institution Press. ISBN  978-0-8179-1371-7.
• French, David (2015). Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959. Oxford University Press. ISBN  978-0-19-872934-1.
• Holland, Robert (26 November 1998). Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959. Clarendon Press. ISBN  978-0-19-820538-8.
• Mallinson, William; Bill Mallinson (22 July 2005). Cyprus: A Modern History. I.B.Tauris. ISBN  978-1-85043-580-8.
• Robert Tynes (20 August 2018). Tools of War, Tools of State: When Children Become Soldiers. SUNY Press. ISBN  978-1-4384-7200-3.
• Beckett, Ian Frederick William (2001). Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents Since 1750. Psychology Press. ISBN  978-0-415-23934-9.
• Keith Emerick (2014). Conserving and Managing Ancient Monuments: Heritage, Democracy, and Inclusion. Boydell & Brewer Ltd. ISBN  978-1-84383-909-5.
• Matthew Lange (12 December 2011). Educations in Ethnic Violence: Identity, Educational Bubbles, and Resource Mobilization. Cambridge University Press. ISBN  9781139505444.
• Giampiero Bellingeri; T. Kappler (2005). Cipro oggi. Casa editrice il Ponte. ISBN  978-88-89465-07-3.
• Daria Isachenko (20 March 2012). The Making of Informal States: Statebuilding in Northern Cyprus and Transdniestria. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN  9780230360594.
• Simpson, Alfred William Brian (2001). Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention. Oxford University Press. p. 893. ISBN  978-0-19-926789-7.
• Arthur Mark Weisburd (25 April 1997). Use of Force: The Practice of States Since World War II. Penn State Press. ISBN  0271043016.
• Ted Gup (2000). Book of Honor: Covert Lives and Classified Deaths at the CIA. Doubleday. ISBN  978-0-385-49293-5.

Journals

• Karyos, Andreas (2009). "EOKA and Enosis in 1955-59: Motive and Aspiration Reconsidered" (PDF). London School of Economics. {{ cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= ( help)
• Kraemer, Joseph S. (Winter 1971). "Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare & the Decolonization Movement". Polity. 4 (2): 137–158. doi: 10.2307/3234160. JSTOR  3234160. S2CID  155657462.
• Novo, Andrew R. (2012). "Friend or foe? The Cyprus Police Force and the EOKA insurgency". Small Wars & Insurgencies. 23 (3). Informa UK Limited: 414–431. doi: 10.1080/09592318.2012.661609. ISSN  0959-2318. S2CID  144663807.
• Markides, Kyriakos C. (1974). "social change and the rise and decline of social movements: the case of Cyprus1". American Ethnologist. 1 (2). Wiley: 309–330. doi: 10.1525/ae.1974.1.2.02a00070. ISSN  0094-0496.
• Kizilyürek, Niyazi. "National Memory and Turkish-Cypriot Textbooks". Internationale Schulbuchforschung, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1999: 387–395.

Encyclopedias

• The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica (2015). "EOKA". Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. {{ cite encyclopedia}}: |last= has generic name ( help)
• Martha Crenshaw; John Pimlott (22 April 2015). "Terrorism in Cyprus". International Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Routledge. ISBN  978-1-135-91966-5.

Thesis

• Αργυρού, Σοφία (2014). The national movement of Greek Cypriots during the last period of British colonial rule 1945-1960 (PhD). Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο Κοινωνικών και Πολιτικών Επιστημών. Τμήμα Πολιτικής Επιστήμης και Ιστορίας. hdl: 10442/hedi/36383.
• Novo, A. R. (2010). On all fronts: EOKA and the Cyprus insurgency, 1955-1959 (PhD thesis). Oxford University, UK.

Web

• Dewhurst, Patrick (14 April 2011). "EOKA fighters to sue Brits over torture". Cyprus Mail. Archived from the original on 18 May 2011. Retrieved 2011-05-09.

• Drousiotis, Makarios (2005-04-25). "Our Haunted Country". Politis Newspaper. Retrieved 2009-05-03.

• Δρουσιώτης, Μακάριος. "Μια αποτίμηση του αγώνα της ΕΟΚΑ". Makarios Drousiotis (in Greek). Retrieved October 2, 2018.

• Hadjistylianou, Michalis; Giorgos Ploutarhos (2005). "Οι δύο όψεις της ιστορίας για τους εκτελεσθέντες (The two views on the assassinations)". Simerini (in Greek). Archived from the original on 2008-02-25. Retrieved 2008-08-15.

• Hazou, Elias (April 12, 2005). "Christofias comments spark EOKA storm". Cyprus Mail. Retrieved 2008-08-15.

• Smith, Helena (2018-01-12). "Cypriot veterans win right to claim damages over UK torture claims". The Guardian. Retrieved 2018-10-19.

• S. Corum, James (2006). "Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies" (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. Retrieved 2009-05-03.

• Theodoulou, Michael (13 April 2011). "Greek Cypriots intend to sue Britain over torture in 1950s uprising". The Times. Retrieved 2011-05-09.

Further reading

Primary Sources

• Grivas, George; Charles Foley (1964). The Memoirs of General Grivas. London: Longmans.
• Makarios (Kypros, Archiepiskopos, III.) (1991). Hapanta Archiepiskopou Kyprou Makariou 3. Hidryma Archiepiskopou Makariou 3. ISBN  978-9963-556-44-1.{{ cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( link)