Phenomenology (psychiatry)
Our philosophising can be summarised thus within these three questions: What can we know in the sciences? How shall we realize the most profound communication? How can truth become accessible to us? http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/jaspers.htm Karl Jaspers (1941) On My Philosophy ret 260608
this is awesome: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/jaspers/
a set of philosophical doctrines loosley sharing: (a) assumptions as to what the world is like (metaphysical) and how it canbe known(epistemological), and more importantly, (b) strategies for the descriptive management of the mental entities relating to such a world. phenomenologists have never been interested in the obtainment of tame, and (let alone) theory-neutral descriptions. Greek stems 'Phainomenon' (to appear), and 'logia' (discourse)1. At least four meanings can be distinguished: ordinary clinical usage hinted at above, as a synonym for 'signs and symptoms'; quasi-technical sense in which the word is dealt with in dictionaries and encyclopaedias-- spurious unity; idiosyncratic usage started by Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) who dedicated his early writings to the description of mental states in a manner which (according to him) was empathic and theory-neutral; meandering philosophical system developed by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938),and continued by the work of a motley group of writers collectively called the 'Phenomenological Movement'6. Phenomenology has sought to answer at least three questions: how do consciousness and its contents relate to the external world? How is it possible to differentiate mental from physical phenomena? And how can mental phenomena be individuated, ie distinguished from each other? F Brentano (1838–1917) and WDilthey (1833–1911). According to 'psychologism' (a popular philosophical position during the 19th century) there only could be individual minds and ideas but not universally shared meanings. Husserl's phenomenology is a reaction to this. Descriptions in phenomenology are not meant to collect itemized information on the world or to form the basis for empirical statements of the kind that might be considered as relevant to science or scientific psychopathology". phenomenological descriptions apply only to subjective experiences; thus, objective clinical changes such as psychomotor retardation, tremor, catatonia or soft neurological signs, fall beyond its epistemological and methodological scope. the phenomenological method of description relies on the exercise of special human faculties such as intuition and empathy; indeed, observational strategies based on the sense modalities (and measurement techniques) tend to be discouraged. it is difficult to accept the claim that phenomenology was, is (or ever will be) just a sophisticated method of description http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1292211&blobtype=pdf G E Berrios 1989 What is phenomenology? A review Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 82 425-8
http://www.szasz.com/schizophrenia1.pdf ret 260608
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/4860434 F. KRÄUPL TAYLOR The Role of Phenomenology in Psychiatry The British Journal of Psychiatry (1967) 113: 765-770. In the 17th century, the term "phenomenon" was used to denote physical facts. Through the influence of Kant, at the end of the 18th century, it came to mean conscious mental manifestations. Its sense was further modified by the work of Franz Brentano towards the end of the last century, and of his pupil Husserl at the beginning of this century. In his early writings, Husserl developed the concept of descriptive phenomenology which was introduced into psychiatry by Karl Jaspers as a tool for psychopathological research. As such, it consists exclusively of descriptions of their conscious experiences by patients. The evaluation or explanation of these phenomenological self-descriptions lies outside the province of phenomenology. It is the task of the various psychological schools to assess the causal associations of the conscious experiences phenomenologically described, to establish their justifications, their deviations from normality and their possible psychopathology. Two kinds of criteria are used today to appraise their psychopathological significance: dynamic and descriptive criteria. Dynamic criteria are derived from the various psycho-analytic metapsychologies which have much in common with philosophical speculations about metaphysical realities. Descriptive criteria of psychopathology are twofold: the experiences in question must be abnormal in the sense of unusual, and they must cause suffering and concern to the patient and/or his social environment. The descriptive diagnosis of the psychopathology of certain conscious experiences has to be supplemented by their nosological evaluation as symptoms of a disease. This evaluation cannot be carried out by lay people because it needs medical or psychiatric expertise.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1476517?ordinalpos=1&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ResultsPanel.Pubmed_DiscoveryPanel.Pubmed_Discovery_RA&linkpos=1&log$=relatedarticles&logdbfrom=pubmed Beumont PJ. Phenomenology and the history of psychiatry. Aust N Z J Psychiatry. 1992 Dec;26(4):532-45. (not on JCU) Phenomenology is a word much abused in psychiatry. It has come to mean the objective description of the symptoms and signs of psychiatric illness, a synonym for clinical psychopathology as opposed to that other psychopathology which derives from psychoanalytic theory. Thus it is sometimes stated that the phenomenology of a condition is remarkably consistent although its psychopathology is varied. In truth, phenomenology is a technical term in psychiatry with a specific meaning quite distinct from and in a way opposite to that of objective psychopathology. The inappropriate use of the word is unfortunate not only for semantic reasons but also because there is a real danger that the concept to which it refers will be forgotten PMID 1476517
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8348798?ordinalpos=1&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ResultsPanel.Pubmed_DiscoveryPanel.Pubmed_Discovery_RA&linkpos=1&log$=relatedarticles&logdbfrom=pubmed Phenomenology and psychopathology: Was there ever a relationship? G. E. Berrios Comprehensive Psychiatry Volume 34, Issue 4, July–August 1993, Pages 213-220 doi:10.1016/0010-440X(93)90001-K The philosophical doctrine known as phenomenology is believed by many to have provided during the early 20th century the conceptual basis of the new descriptive language of psychiatry, the very language that made possible the development of systems such as the DSM-III-R. To ascertain whether this is in fact the case is essential to the solution of technical problems affecting current psychopathological descriptions. This report argues against the above-mentioned belief, and suggests that the alliance between phenomenology and descriptive psychopathology was just a marriage of convenience, and that it was Karl Jaspers who made it appear as if his own views were based on Husserlian phenomenology. Indeed, a comparison of the clinical meaning and usage of mental symptoms before and after 1913 shows that Jaspers borrowed a great deal from 19th-century alienists, and that calling his views phenomenological added little to their meaning.
M Shepherd, Karl Jaspers: General psychopathology. Br J Psychiatry 141 (1982), pp. 310–312
C Walker, Philosophical concepts and practice: the legacy of Karl Jaspers' psychopathology. Curr Opin Psychiatry 1 (1988), pp. 624–629.
M Rotov, Phenomenology or physicalism?. Schizophr Bull 17 (1991), pp. 183–186.
H Stierlin, Karl Jaspers' psychiatry in the light of his basic philosophical position. J His Behav Sci 10 (1974), pp. 213–226 Jaspers as an existentialist in the tradition of Nitszche and Kierkegaard; also heavily influened by Max Weber and Kant. Jaspers ... a proponent of clarity and probity in scientific matters. He upheld that each scientific field, along with its special viewpoints and problems, required its special methods, principles, and validating criteria. He elaborated such differences especially with regard to the Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften-the natural sciences and the humanities. He maintained that each of these fields (and their respective subfields) contains its own specific measure of objective truth-the kind of truth available to us within the realm of objective, categorical thought ... brought this truth under the spell of the “encompassing.,’ In so doing, he qualified, limited, and transcended the realm of such scientific and objective truth. He wanted, first, to establish the scope, methods and principles of psychiatry as a science and, second, in so doing, he wanted to illuminate that which philosophically “encompasses” this science. In an earlier paper (25), I have dealt critically n-ith the, for Jaspers, crucial difference between Verstehen and Erklaeren-between understanding and explaining-which, along with underpinning Jaspers’ notions about a “Verstehende Psychologie,” also appears to have sealed his views on schizophrenia. The pathologic psychic life of the second type we grasp in this way unsufficiently. In this case, there occur changes of a most general kind. With these changes we cannot empathize, we cannot make them immediately understandable, although we try to grasp them somehow from the o~tsid. Here we have Jaspers’ central axiom of the “abyss” which, according to him, separates the schizophrenic from the normal and neurotic experience. R. Laing, for one, has reflected on this difference in positions. He contrasted Jaspers’ view of a given schizophrenic experience with his (Laing’s) own view, as obtained from the position of an empathic participant observer. This distant observer cannot possibly understand and evaluate his own contribution as to what the schizophrenic expresses and reveals to him. Jaspers attacked ever more sharply most major aspects of psychoanalytic theory and practice, and only rarely granted it qualified, though condescending, praise. The main base for his critique remained his transcendental Kantian position outlined earlier. Because Freud and his followers could not, according to Jaspers, approach Man from such a position, their “Verstehende Psychologie” could not respect the limits inherent in all human understanding. he never tired of pointing out-such as the simplistic, reductionistic bent of the theory, the dogmatism and drive for power of its proponents, the latter’s skill at “uncovering” and character assassinations, and the perversion of psychoanalysis into a Weltanschaung and Ersatz religion. he construed abysses and final realities that supposedly delimit our understanding and research; here as there, he ended up proffering foreclosing conceptual dichotomies which, far from reflecting given realities, reflected only his biased convictions. reason, Jaspers argued, will serve our primary biases and partialities-unless we can transcend reason in our genuine will to communicate. This will to communicate, apart from revealing an existential paradox, implies that we become able and ready to enter into a genuine dialogue-a positive mutuality as I have called it elsewhere (27, 28), wherein we can share a focus of attention with the partner, wherein we imaginatively try to partake in the latter’s position, and wherein we try to respond to it-in an ongoing loving struggle.
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/557763
http://www.answers.com/topic/phenomenology-and-psychoanalysis?cat=health
http://www.springerlink.com/content/j361149205667521/
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4208974.stm ret 260608
http://criticalinquiry.uchicago.edu/issues/v30/30n1.Lanzoni.html
Phenomenology (psychiatry)
Our philosophising can be summarised thus within these three questions: What can we know in the sciences? How shall we realize the most profound communication? How can truth become accessible to us? http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/jaspers.htm Karl Jaspers (1941) On My Philosophy ret 260608
this is awesome: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/jaspers/
a set of philosophical doctrines loosley sharing: (a) assumptions as to what the world is like (metaphysical) and how it canbe known(epistemological), and more importantly, (b) strategies for the descriptive management of the mental entities relating to such a world. phenomenologists have never been interested in the obtainment of tame, and (let alone) theory-neutral descriptions. Greek stems 'Phainomenon' (to appear), and 'logia' (discourse)1. At least four meanings can be distinguished: ordinary clinical usage hinted at above, as a synonym for 'signs and symptoms'; quasi-technical sense in which the word is dealt with in dictionaries and encyclopaedias-- spurious unity; idiosyncratic usage started by Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) who dedicated his early writings to the description of mental states in a manner which (according to him) was empathic and theory-neutral; meandering philosophical system developed by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938),and continued by the work of a motley group of writers collectively called the 'Phenomenological Movement'6. Phenomenology has sought to answer at least three questions: how do consciousness and its contents relate to the external world? How is it possible to differentiate mental from physical phenomena? And how can mental phenomena be individuated, ie distinguished from each other? F Brentano (1838–1917) and WDilthey (1833–1911). According to 'psychologism' (a popular philosophical position during the 19th century) there only could be individual minds and ideas but not universally shared meanings. Husserl's phenomenology is a reaction to this. Descriptions in phenomenology are not meant to collect itemized information on the world or to form the basis for empirical statements of the kind that might be considered as relevant to science or scientific psychopathology". phenomenological descriptions apply only to subjective experiences; thus, objective clinical changes such as psychomotor retardation, tremor, catatonia or soft neurological signs, fall beyond its epistemological and methodological scope. the phenomenological method of description relies on the exercise of special human faculties such as intuition and empathy; indeed, observational strategies based on the sense modalities (and measurement techniques) tend to be discouraged. it is difficult to accept the claim that phenomenology was, is (or ever will be) just a sophisticated method of description http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1292211&blobtype=pdf G E Berrios 1989 What is phenomenology? A review Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 82 425-8
http://www.szasz.com/schizophrenia1.pdf ret 260608
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/4860434 F. KRÄUPL TAYLOR The Role of Phenomenology in Psychiatry The British Journal of Psychiatry (1967) 113: 765-770. In the 17th century, the term "phenomenon" was used to denote physical facts. Through the influence of Kant, at the end of the 18th century, it came to mean conscious mental manifestations. Its sense was further modified by the work of Franz Brentano towards the end of the last century, and of his pupil Husserl at the beginning of this century. In his early writings, Husserl developed the concept of descriptive phenomenology which was introduced into psychiatry by Karl Jaspers as a tool for psychopathological research. As such, it consists exclusively of descriptions of their conscious experiences by patients. The evaluation or explanation of these phenomenological self-descriptions lies outside the province of phenomenology. It is the task of the various psychological schools to assess the causal associations of the conscious experiences phenomenologically described, to establish their justifications, their deviations from normality and their possible psychopathology. Two kinds of criteria are used today to appraise their psychopathological significance: dynamic and descriptive criteria. Dynamic criteria are derived from the various psycho-analytic metapsychologies which have much in common with philosophical speculations about metaphysical realities. Descriptive criteria of psychopathology are twofold: the experiences in question must be abnormal in the sense of unusual, and they must cause suffering and concern to the patient and/or his social environment. The descriptive diagnosis of the psychopathology of certain conscious experiences has to be supplemented by their nosological evaluation as symptoms of a disease. This evaluation cannot be carried out by lay people because it needs medical or psychiatric expertise.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1476517?ordinalpos=1&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ResultsPanel.Pubmed_DiscoveryPanel.Pubmed_Discovery_RA&linkpos=1&log$=relatedarticles&logdbfrom=pubmed Beumont PJ. Phenomenology and the history of psychiatry. Aust N Z J Psychiatry. 1992 Dec;26(4):532-45. (not on JCU) Phenomenology is a word much abused in psychiatry. It has come to mean the objective description of the symptoms and signs of psychiatric illness, a synonym for clinical psychopathology as opposed to that other psychopathology which derives from psychoanalytic theory. Thus it is sometimes stated that the phenomenology of a condition is remarkably consistent although its psychopathology is varied. In truth, phenomenology is a technical term in psychiatry with a specific meaning quite distinct from and in a way opposite to that of objective psychopathology. The inappropriate use of the word is unfortunate not only for semantic reasons but also because there is a real danger that the concept to which it refers will be forgotten PMID 1476517
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8348798?ordinalpos=1&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ResultsPanel.Pubmed_DiscoveryPanel.Pubmed_Discovery_RA&linkpos=1&log$=relatedarticles&logdbfrom=pubmed Phenomenology and psychopathology: Was there ever a relationship? G. E. Berrios Comprehensive Psychiatry Volume 34, Issue 4, July–August 1993, Pages 213-220 doi:10.1016/0010-440X(93)90001-K The philosophical doctrine known as phenomenology is believed by many to have provided during the early 20th century the conceptual basis of the new descriptive language of psychiatry, the very language that made possible the development of systems such as the DSM-III-R. To ascertain whether this is in fact the case is essential to the solution of technical problems affecting current psychopathological descriptions. This report argues against the above-mentioned belief, and suggests that the alliance between phenomenology and descriptive psychopathology was just a marriage of convenience, and that it was Karl Jaspers who made it appear as if his own views were based on Husserlian phenomenology. Indeed, a comparison of the clinical meaning and usage of mental symptoms before and after 1913 shows that Jaspers borrowed a great deal from 19th-century alienists, and that calling his views phenomenological added little to their meaning.
M Shepherd, Karl Jaspers: General psychopathology. Br J Psychiatry 141 (1982), pp. 310–312
C Walker, Philosophical concepts and practice: the legacy of Karl Jaspers' psychopathology. Curr Opin Psychiatry 1 (1988), pp. 624–629.
M Rotov, Phenomenology or physicalism?. Schizophr Bull 17 (1991), pp. 183–186.
H Stierlin, Karl Jaspers' psychiatry in the light of his basic philosophical position. J His Behav Sci 10 (1974), pp. 213–226 Jaspers as an existentialist in the tradition of Nitszche and Kierkegaard; also heavily influened by Max Weber and Kant. Jaspers ... a proponent of clarity and probity in scientific matters. He upheld that each scientific field, along with its special viewpoints and problems, required its special methods, principles, and validating criteria. He elaborated such differences especially with regard to the Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften-the natural sciences and the humanities. He maintained that each of these fields (and their respective subfields) contains its own specific measure of objective truth-the kind of truth available to us within the realm of objective, categorical thought ... brought this truth under the spell of the “encompassing.,’ In so doing, he qualified, limited, and transcended the realm of such scientific and objective truth. He wanted, first, to establish the scope, methods and principles of psychiatry as a science and, second, in so doing, he wanted to illuminate that which philosophically “encompasses” this science. In an earlier paper (25), I have dealt critically n-ith the, for Jaspers, crucial difference between Verstehen and Erklaeren-between understanding and explaining-which, along with underpinning Jaspers’ notions about a “Verstehende Psychologie,” also appears to have sealed his views on schizophrenia. The pathologic psychic life of the second type we grasp in this way unsufficiently. In this case, there occur changes of a most general kind. With these changes we cannot empathize, we cannot make them immediately understandable, although we try to grasp them somehow from the o~tsid. Here we have Jaspers’ central axiom of the “abyss” which, according to him, separates the schizophrenic from the normal and neurotic experience. R. Laing, for one, has reflected on this difference in positions. He contrasted Jaspers’ view of a given schizophrenic experience with his (Laing’s) own view, as obtained from the position of an empathic participant observer. This distant observer cannot possibly understand and evaluate his own contribution as to what the schizophrenic expresses and reveals to him. Jaspers attacked ever more sharply most major aspects of psychoanalytic theory and practice, and only rarely granted it qualified, though condescending, praise. The main base for his critique remained his transcendental Kantian position outlined earlier. Because Freud and his followers could not, according to Jaspers, approach Man from such a position, their “Verstehende Psychologie” could not respect the limits inherent in all human understanding. he never tired of pointing out-such as the simplistic, reductionistic bent of the theory, the dogmatism and drive for power of its proponents, the latter’s skill at “uncovering” and character assassinations, and the perversion of psychoanalysis into a Weltanschaung and Ersatz religion. he construed abysses and final realities that supposedly delimit our understanding and research; here as there, he ended up proffering foreclosing conceptual dichotomies which, far from reflecting given realities, reflected only his biased convictions. reason, Jaspers argued, will serve our primary biases and partialities-unless we can transcend reason in our genuine will to communicate. This will to communicate, apart from revealing an existential paradox, implies that we become able and ready to enter into a genuine dialogue-a positive mutuality as I have called it elsewhere (27, 28), wherein we can share a focus of attention with the partner, wherein we imaginatively try to partake in the latter’s position, and wherein we try to respond to it-in an ongoing loving struggle.
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/557763
http://www.answers.com/topic/phenomenology-and-psychoanalysis?cat=health
http://www.springerlink.com/content/j361149205667521/
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4208974.stm ret 260608
http://criticalinquiry.uchicago.edu/issues/v30/30n1.Lanzoni.html