Frank J. Yurco wrote in 1990: "When you talk about Egypt, it's just not right to talk about black or white, ... That's all just American terminology and it serves American purposes. I can understand and sympathize with the desires of Afro-Americans to affiliate themselves with Egypt. But it isn't that simple [..] To take the terminology here {in the United States} and graft it onto Africa is anthropologically inaccurate". [note 1]
A number of scientific papers have reported, based on both maternal and paternal genetic evidence, that a substantial back-flow of people took place from Eurasia into North-east Africa, including Egypt, long before the start of the Dynastic period. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] Some authors have offered a competing theory which holds that the M haplogroup may have developed in Africa before the 'Out of Africa' event around 50,000 years ago. [17]: 85–88 [18] [19] [20]
The Desert War (Western Desert campaign) took place in the deserts of Egypt and Libya and was the main theatre in the North African campaign of the Second World War. Military operations began in June 1940 with the Italian declaration of war and the Italian invasion of Egypt in September.
In Operation Torch (November 1942) an Anglo-American force invaded Morocco and Algeria, threatening the Axis armies in North Africa from the west. The Axis forces surrendered in Tunisia on 13 May 1943, ending The Desert War.
Rello, Jordi; Afessa, Bekele; Anzueto, Antonio; Arroliga, Alejandro C.; Olson, Merle E.; Restrepo, Marcos I.; Talsma, Silke S.; Bracken, Ronald L.; Kollef, Marin H. (2010). "Activity of a silver-coated endotracheal tube in preclinical models of ventilator-associated pneumonia and a study after extubation". Critical Care Medicine. 38 (4): 1135–1140. doi: 10.1097/CCM.0b013e3181cd12b8. PMID 20081533. S2CID 205539044.
Rello, Jordi; Afessa, Bekele; Anzueto, Antonio; Arroliga, Alejandro C.; Olson, Merle E.; Restrepo, Marcos I.; Talsma, Silke S.; Bracken, Ronald L.; Kollef, Marin H. (2010). "Activity of a silver-coated endotracheal tube in preclinical models of ventilator-associated pneumonia and a study after extubation". Critical Care Medicine. 38 (4): 1135–1140. doi: 10.1097/CCM.0b013e3181cd12b8. PMID 20081533. S2CID 205539044.
"Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews". 1996.
doi:
10.1002/14651858.
hdl:
2328/35732. {{
cite journal}}
: Cite journal requires |journal=
(
help)
[21]
There is currently a discussion at Wikipedia:Neutral point of view/Noticeboard regarding an issue with which you may have been involved. Thank you.
We have a serious situation at Battle for Caen where certain editors (one of them an SPA) are blatantly ignoring WP:NPOV, and repeatedly deleting relevant material that has been sourced from multiple reliable sources. WP:NPOV says that articles must represent fairly, proportionately, and, as far as possible, without editorial bias, all of the significant views that have been published by reliable sources on a topic. WP:NPOV also says that the principles upon which this policy is based cannot be superseded by other policies or guidelines, nor by editor consensus. However WP:NPOV is being completely ignored here, and material which contradicts their POV is being reverted at will. Their excuses range from WP:UNDUE (for single sentences with multiple citations) up to claiming that they are reverting vandalism. Other well-cited facts are buried in footnotes, and the editors refuse to allow these facts to be actual sentences in the text. I have been debating this on the talk page since May, to no avail. Discussions on the talk page are promptly derailed as soon as I present reliable sources to support my edits, and when all else fails they resort to accusations and insults. An attempt at DRN failed due to lack of consensus. Third party inputs from uninvolved editors which go against their POV have been simply ignored. Talk page comments and edit summaries are replete with accusations of vandalism, and various other crimes, but no supporting evidence is ever presented.
This behaviour has been consistent for months, but some recent diffs include the following: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
They also repeatedly revert my attempts to add a neutrality tag to the article, for example:
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
Controversy still lingers over Montgomery’s original intentions during the Battle for Caen, compared to what he subsequently claimed his intentions to have been, [22] [23] [24] [23] [25] [26] and this has been the source of an immense historiographical dispute with sometimes-bitter national overtones. [27] In his memoirs, as well as in other post-war talks and publications, Montgomery claimed that the battle of Normandy had gone exactly according to his pre-invasion "master plan", [28] [29] which he claimed was purely for the Anglo-Canadian operations around Caen to be a "holding operation" intended to attract the bulk of the German forces towards the Caen sector, so as to facilitate an American "break out operation" at the western end of the lodgement. [30] This assertion is accepted by the so-called "British school", which includes historians such as Keegan, Lamb and Hamilton. The assertion was also supported by figures such as General Bradley, and Brigadier David Belchem, who was part of Montgomery's Operations and Planning Staff.
The so-called "American school" argues that Montgomery's initial "master plan" was actually for the Second British Army to take Caen on D-Day, then advance rapidly inland to capture the Caen-Falaise Plain for the construction of airfields, and then to stage a break-out further inland (as far south as Alencon). They state that it was only after failing in this objective that Montgomery "evolved" a new "master plan" of having the Second British Army hold the bulk of the German forces in the east, thus allowing the Americans to achieve the break out in the west. [31] [32] This view is supported by historians such as Powers, Axelrod, D'Este, Carafano, Weigley and Blumenson. The assertion was also supported by figures such as General Eisenhower, the British Air Chief Marshall Tedder (Deputy Supreme Commander), General Walter Bedell Smith (Eisenhower's Chief of Staff), Sir James Grigg (British Secretary of State for War) and Brigadier Bill Williams, Montgomery’s own chief of intelligence. [33] [34] [35] [36]
From The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, First Edition, The World Publishing Company - Cleveland And New York; Copyright 1958, pg 229 "There was never at any time any intention of making the break-out from the bridgehead on the eastern flank. Misunderstandings about this simple and basic conception were responsible for much trouble between British and American personalities." (page 229 in my edition) "All through the fierce fighting which took place in Normandy, there was never any intention of breaking out on the eastern flank towards the Seine; reference to all the orders and instructions which I issued makes that abundantly clear. This false conception existed only at Supreme Headquarters, and none of the senior officers responsible for the conduct of the actual fighting in Normandy, Bradley included, had any doubt about the true plan. The misconception led to much controversy and those at Supreme Headquarters who were not very fond of me took advantage of it to create trouble as the campaign developed.
Closing the Ring, By Winston Churchill, pg 524: "It was hoped to reach the line Falaise-Avranches three weeks after the landing, and, with the strong reinforcements by that time ashore, to break out eastwards toward Paris, north-eastwards towards the Seine, and westwards to capture the Brittany ports." [12]
Crusade in Europe, by Dwight D Eisenhower, pg 266: "In his more detailed presentation of April 7, Montgomery stated that the second great phase of the operation, estimated to begin shortly after D plus 20, would require the British Army to pivot on its left at Falaise, to "swing with its right towards Argentan-Alencon". This meant that Falaise would be in our possession before the great wheel began. The line that we actually held when the breakout began on D plus 50 was approximately that planned for D plus 5." [13]
Victory in the West: The Battle of Normandy, by Ellis, Major L. F.; with Allen, Captain G. R. G.; Warhurst, Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. & Robb, Air Chief-Marshal Sir James (2004) pg 81: - "The Overlord plan called for the Second Army (Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey) to secure the city and then form a front line from Caumont-l'Éventé to the south-east of Caen, acquiring airfields and protecting the left flank of the US First Army while it moved on Cherbourg. Possession of Caen and its surroundings would give the Second Army a suitable staging area for a push south to capture Falaise, which could be used as the pivot for a swing left of the Allied front to advance on Argentan and then towards the Touques River." [14])
Bradley: A Biography, by Alan Axelrod, pg 126: "Tasked with taking Caen, Monty had airily promised that he would do so very rapidly; then would hold the town as the centre of a great eastward wheeling movement by the rest of the invasion force. Pivoting on Caen, the First Canadian Army was to turn sharply east-northeast to the Seine, near Rouen. At the same time, the Second British Army would sweep south-southwest of this, through the German strongpoints of Falaise and Argentan, also driving towards the Seine. First US Army was to provide the major momentum for the breakout, wheeling south past Avranches, …." [15].
United States Army in WWII - Europe - Cross-Channel Attack: 2014, by Gordon A. Harrison : In both the original COSSAC plan and the "Montgomery" plan, the securing of the Caen country for airfield development was a critical early objective for the assaulting forces. British troops were to take Bayeux and Caen on D Day, and push the bridgehead gradually south and southeast. They would then secure airfield sites and protect the east flank of U.S. forces whose primary mission, in both plans, was the capture of Cherbourg. … In all the planning the vital importance of the "capture and retention" of Caen and neighboring open country was underlined. On the other land no pre-D-Day plans called for exploiting the favorable tank terrain at any phase of the operation for a direct thrust southeast toward Paris. Instead, the British army would push gradually south and east of Caen until its left rested approximately on the Touques River and its right, pivoting on Falaise, swung toward Argentan-Alençon. at and at [16] and at [17]
Montgomery: Lessons in Leadership from the Soldier's General, by Trevor Royle - pg 113-114, "In Montgomery's view the battle would run through three phases lasting up to 80 days. The first would run for 20 days and would see the US First Army capturing it's objectives in the Cotentin Peninsula, while the British Second Army (led by Lieutenant-General Sir Miles Dempsey) assaulted west of the Orne River, pivoting on Caen to shield the US offensive. Phase Two would be the beginning of the breakout, with the British forces pushing south through Falaise toward Argentan, while the Americans moved toward the Loire and Quiberon Bay. Phase Three would take the Allies to the Seine, with the US First Army heading to Paris, while the British and Canadians would operate to the north between Rouen and the Channel." [18]
Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944, By Max Hastings, (2015), pg 26: The Second British Army was to "assault to the west of the River Orne and to develop operations to the south and south-east, in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the eastern flank of the US First Army while the latter is capturing Cherbourg. In its subsequent operations the Second Army will pivot on its left (Caen) and offer a strong front against enemy movement towards the lodgement area from the east". At
[19]
{{
cite journal}}
: CS1 maint: unflagged free DOI (
link)
{{
cite journal}}
: CS1 maint: unflagged free DOI (
link)
{{
cite journal}}
: CS1 maint: unflagged free DOI (
link)
{{
cite journal}}
: CS1 maint: unflagged free DOI (
link)
{{
cite journal}}
: Cite journal requires |journal=
(
help)
<ref group=note>
tags on this page, but the references will not show without a {{reflist|group=note}}
template (see the
help page).Frank J. Yurco wrote in 1990: "When you talk about Egypt, it's just not right to talk about black or white, ... That's all just American terminology and it serves American purposes. I can understand and sympathize with the desires of Afro-Americans to affiliate themselves with Egypt. But it isn't that simple [..] To take the terminology here {in the United States} and graft it onto Africa is anthropologically inaccurate". [note 1]
A number of scientific papers have reported, based on both maternal and paternal genetic evidence, that a substantial back-flow of people took place from Eurasia into North-east Africa, including Egypt, long before the start of the Dynastic period. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] Some authors have offered a competing theory which holds that the M haplogroup may have developed in Africa before the 'Out of Africa' event around 50,000 years ago. [17]: 85–88 [18] [19] [20]
The Desert War (Western Desert campaign) took place in the deserts of Egypt and Libya and was the main theatre in the North African campaign of the Second World War. Military operations began in June 1940 with the Italian declaration of war and the Italian invasion of Egypt in September.
In Operation Torch (November 1942) an Anglo-American force invaded Morocco and Algeria, threatening the Axis armies in North Africa from the west. The Axis forces surrendered in Tunisia on 13 May 1943, ending The Desert War.
Rello, Jordi; Afessa, Bekele; Anzueto, Antonio; Arroliga, Alejandro C.; Olson, Merle E.; Restrepo, Marcos I.; Talsma, Silke S.; Bracken, Ronald L.; Kollef, Marin H. (2010). "Activity of a silver-coated endotracheal tube in preclinical models of ventilator-associated pneumonia and a study after extubation". Critical Care Medicine. 38 (4): 1135–1140. doi: 10.1097/CCM.0b013e3181cd12b8. PMID 20081533. S2CID 205539044.
Rello, Jordi; Afessa, Bekele; Anzueto, Antonio; Arroliga, Alejandro C.; Olson, Merle E.; Restrepo, Marcos I.; Talsma, Silke S.; Bracken, Ronald L.; Kollef, Marin H. (2010). "Activity of a silver-coated endotracheal tube in preclinical models of ventilator-associated pneumonia and a study after extubation". Critical Care Medicine. 38 (4): 1135–1140. doi: 10.1097/CCM.0b013e3181cd12b8. PMID 20081533. S2CID 205539044.
"Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews". 1996.
doi:
10.1002/14651858.
hdl:
2328/35732. {{
cite journal}}
: Cite journal requires |journal=
(
help)
[21]
There is currently a discussion at Wikipedia:Neutral point of view/Noticeboard regarding an issue with which you may have been involved. Thank you.
We have a serious situation at Battle for Caen where certain editors (one of them an SPA) are blatantly ignoring WP:NPOV, and repeatedly deleting relevant material that has been sourced from multiple reliable sources. WP:NPOV says that articles must represent fairly, proportionately, and, as far as possible, without editorial bias, all of the significant views that have been published by reliable sources on a topic. WP:NPOV also says that the principles upon which this policy is based cannot be superseded by other policies or guidelines, nor by editor consensus. However WP:NPOV is being completely ignored here, and material which contradicts their POV is being reverted at will. Their excuses range from WP:UNDUE (for single sentences with multiple citations) up to claiming that they are reverting vandalism. Other well-cited facts are buried in footnotes, and the editors refuse to allow these facts to be actual sentences in the text. I have been debating this on the talk page since May, to no avail. Discussions on the talk page are promptly derailed as soon as I present reliable sources to support my edits, and when all else fails they resort to accusations and insults. An attempt at DRN failed due to lack of consensus. Third party inputs from uninvolved editors which go against their POV have been simply ignored. Talk page comments and edit summaries are replete with accusations of vandalism, and various other crimes, but no supporting evidence is ever presented.
This behaviour has been consistent for months, but some recent diffs include the following: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
They also repeatedly revert my attempts to add a neutrality tag to the article, for example:
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
Controversy still lingers over Montgomery’s original intentions during the Battle for Caen, compared to what he subsequently claimed his intentions to have been, [22] [23] [24] [23] [25] [26] and this has been the source of an immense historiographical dispute with sometimes-bitter national overtones. [27] In his memoirs, as well as in other post-war talks and publications, Montgomery claimed that the battle of Normandy had gone exactly according to his pre-invasion "master plan", [28] [29] which he claimed was purely for the Anglo-Canadian operations around Caen to be a "holding operation" intended to attract the bulk of the German forces towards the Caen sector, so as to facilitate an American "break out operation" at the western end of the lodgement. [30] This assertion is accepted by the so-called "British school", which includes historians such as Keegan, Lamb and Hamilton. The assertion was also supported by figures such as General Bradley, and Brigadier David Belchem, who was part of Montgomery's Operations and Planning Staff.
The so-called "American school" argues that Montgomery's initial "master plan" was actually for the Second British Army to take Caen on D-Day, then advance rapidly inland to capture the Caen-Falaise Plain for the construction of airfields, and then to stage a break-out further inland (as far south as Alencon). They state that it was only after failing in this objective that Montgomery "evolved" a new "master plan" of having the Second British Army hold the bulk of the German forces in the east, thus allowing the Americans to achieve the break out in the west. [31] [32] This view is supported by historians such as Powers, Axelrod, D'Este, Carafano, Weigley and Blumenson. The assertion was also supported by figures such as General Eisenhower, the British Air Chief Marshall Tedder (Deputy Supreme Commander), General Walter Bedell Smith (Eisenhower's Chief of Staff), Sir James Grigg (British Secretary of State for War) and Brigadier Bill Williams, Montgomery’s own chief of intelligence. [33] [34] [35] [36]
From The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, First Edition, The World Publishing Company - Cleveland And New York; Copyright 1958, pg 229 "There was never at any time any intention of making the break-out from the bridgehead on the eastern flank. Misunderstandings about this simple and basic conception were responsible for much trouble between British and American personalities." (page 229 in my edition) "All through the fierce fighting which took place in Normandy, there was never any intention of breaking out on the eastern flank towards the Seine; reference to all the orders and instructions which I issued makes that abundantly clear. This false conception existed only at Supreme Headquarters, and none of the senior officers responsible for the conduct of the actual fighting in Normandy, Bradley included, had any doubt about the true plan. The misconception led to much controversy and those at Supreme Headquarters who were not very fond of me took advantage of it to create trouble as the campaign developed.
Closing the Ring, By Winston Churchill, pg 524: "It was hoped to reach the line Falaise-Avranches three weeks after the landing, and, with the strong reinforcements by that time ashore, to break out eastwards toward Paris, north-eastwards towards the Seine, and westwards to capture the Brittany ports." [12]
Crusade in Europe, by Dwight D Eisenhower, pg 266: "In his more detailed presentation of April 7, Montgomery stated that the second great phase of the operation, estimated to begin shortly after D plus 20, would require the British Army to pivot on its left at Falaise, to "swing with its right towards Argentan-Alencon". This meant that Falaise would be in our possession before the great wheel began. The line that we actually held when the breakout began on D plus 50 was approximately that planned for D plus 5." [13]
Victory in the West: The Battle of Normandy, by Ellis, Major L. F.; with Allen, Captain G. R. G.; Warhurst, Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. & Robb, Air Chief-Marshal Sir James (2004) pg 81: - "The Overlord plan called for the Second Army (Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey) to secure the city and then form a front line from Caumont-l'Éventé to the south-east of Caen, acquiring airfields and protecting the left flank of the US First Army while it moved on Cherbourg. Possession of Caen and its surroundings would give the Second Army a suitable staging area for a push south to capture Falaise, which could be used as the pivot for a swing left of the Allied front to advance on Argentan and then towards the Touques River." [14])
Bradley: A Biography, by Alan Axelrod, pg 126: "Tasked with taking Caen, Monty had airily promised that he would do so very rapidly; then would hold the town as the centre of a great eastward wheeling movement by the rest of the invasion force. Pivoting on Caen, the First Canadian Army was to turn sharply east-northeast to the Seine, near Rouen. At the same time, the Second British Army would sweep south-southwest of this, through the German strongpoints of Falaise and Argentan, also driving towards the Seine. First US Army was to provide the major momentum for the breakout, wheeling south past Avranches, …." [15].
United States Army in WWII - Europe - Cross-Channel Attack: 2014, by Gordon A. Harrison : In both the original COSSAC plan and the "Montgomery" plan, the securing of the Caen country for airfield development was a critical early objective for the assaulting forces. British troops were to take Bayeux and Caen on D Day, and push the bridgehead gradually south and southeast. They would then secure airfield sites and protect the east flank of U.S. forces whose primary mission, in both plans, was the capture of Cherbourg. … In all the planning the vital importance of the "capture and retention" of Caen and neighboring open country was underlined. On the other land no pre-D-Day plans called for exploiting the favorable tank terrain at any phase of the operation for a direct thrust southeast toward Paris. Instead, the British army would push gradually south and east of Caen until its left rested approximately on the Touques River and its right, pivoting on Falaise, swung toward Argentan-Alençon. at and at [16] and at [17]
Montgomery: Lessons in Leadership from the Soldier's General, by Trevor Royle - pg 113-114, "In Montgomery's view the battle would run through three phases lasting up to 80 days. The first would run for 20 days and would see the US First Army capturing it's objectives in the Cotentin Peninsula, while the British Second Army (led by Lieutenant-General Sir Miles Dempsey) assaulted west of the Orne River, pivoting on Caen to shield the US offensive. Phase Two would be the beginning of the breakout, with the British forces pushing south through Falaise toward Argentan, while the Americans moved toward the Loire and Quiberon Bay. Phase Three would take the Allies to the Seine, with the US First Army heading to Paris, while the British and Canadians would operate to the north between Rouen and the Channel." [18]
Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944, By Max Hastings, (2015), pg 26: The Second British Army was to "assault to the west of the River Orne and to develop operations to the south and south-east, in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the eastern flank of the US First Army while the latter is capturing Cherbourg. In its subsequent operations the Second Army will pivot on its left (Caen) and offer a strong front against enemy movement towards the lodgement area from the east". At
[19]
{{
cite journal}}
: CS1 maint: unflagged free DOI (
link)
{{
cite journal}}
: CS1 maint: unflagged free DOI (
link)
{{
cite journal}}
: CS1 maint: unflagged free DOI (
link)
{{
cite journal}}
: CS1 maint: unflagged free DOI (
link)
{{
cite journal}}
: Cite journal requires |journal=
(
help)
<ref group=note>
tags on this page, but the references will not show without a {{reflist|group=note}}
template (see the
help page).