72 days after the 9/11 attacks President Bush told his Secretary of Defense to update the US plan for an invasion of Iraq, but not to tell anyone. SecDef Rumsfeld asked Bush if he could bring DCI Tenet into the loop, to which Bush agreed. ^[1] DDCI John McLaughlin was part of a of a long discussion in the CIA about equivocation. McLaughlin, who would make, among others, the "slam dunk" presentation to the President, "felt that they had to dare to be wrong to be clearer in their judgements". ^[1](197)

Feelers the CIA had put out to Iraq in the form of 8 of their best officers in Kurdish territory in Northern Iraq hit a goldmine, unprecedented in the famously closed, almost fascist Hussein government. By December 2002 the CIA had close to a dozen good networks in Iraq ^[1](242) and would advance so far that they would penetrate Iraq's SSO, and even tap the encrypted communications of the Deputy Prime Minister, even the bodyguard of Hussein's son became an agent. As time passed, the CIA would become more and more frantic about the possibility of their networks being compromised, "rolled up". To the CIA, the Invasion had to occur before the end of February 2003 if their sources inside Hussein's government were to survive. The rollup would happen as predicted, 37 CIA sources recognized by their Thuraya satellite telephones provided for them by the CIA. ^[1](337)

The case Colin Powell presented before the United Nations was wishful thinking. The Al Qaeda connection, for instance, was from a single source, extracted through torture, and was later denied. Curveball was a known liar, and the sole source for the mobile chemical weapons factories. ^[2] A postmortem of the intelligence failures in the lead up to Iraq led by former DDCI Richard Kerr would conclude that the CIA had been a casualty of the cold war, wiped out in a way "analogous to the effect of the meteor strikes on the dinosaurs." ^[3]

The opening days of the Invasion of Iraq would see successes and defeats for the CIA. With it's Iraq networks compromised, and it's strategic, and tactical information shallow, and often wrong, the intelligence side of the invasion itself would be a black eye for the Agency. The CIA would see some success with it's "Scorpion" paramilitary teams composed of CIA Special Activities Division agents, along with friendly Iraqi partisans. CIA SAD officers would also help the US 10th Special Forces. ^{[1] [4] [5]} The occupation of Iraq would be a low point in the history of the CIA. At the largest CIA station in the world agents would rotate through 1-3 month tours. In Iraq almost 500 transient agents would be trapped inside the Green Zone while Iraq Station Chiefs would rotate with only a little less frequency. ^[6]

The OSS Patti mission arrived in Vietnam near the end of World War II, and had significant interaction with the leaders of many Vietnamese factions, including Ho Chi Minh. ^[7] While the Patti mission forwarded Ho's proposals for phased independence, with the French or even the United States as the transition partner, the US policy of containment opposed forming any government that was communist in nature.

The first CIA mission to Indochina, under the code name Saigon Military Mission arrived in 1954, under Edward Lansdale. U.S.-based analysts were simultaneously trying to project the evolution of political power, both if the scheduled referendum chose merger of the North and South, or if the South, the U.S. client, stayed independent. Initially, the US focus in Southeast Asia was on Laos, not Vietnam.

The CIA Tibetan program consists of political plots, propaganda distribution, as well as paramilitary and intelligence gathering based on U.S. commitments made to the Dalai Lama in 1951 and 1956. ^[8]

During the period of U.S. combat involvement in the Vietnam War, there was considerable argument about progress among the Department of Defense under Robert McNamara, the CIA, and, to some extent, the intelligence staff of Military Assistance Command Vietnam. ^[9] In general, the military was consistently more optimistic than the CIA. Sam Adams, a junior CIA analyst with responsibilities for estimating the actual damage to the enemy, eventually resigned from the CIA, after expressing concern to Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms with estimates that were changed for interagency and White House political reasons. Adams afterward wrote the book War of Numbers.

Sometime between 1959 and 1961 the CIA started Project Tiger, a program of dropping South Vietnamese agents into North Vietnam to gather intelligence. These were a tragic failure; the Deputy Chief for Project Tiger, Captain Do Van Tien, admitted that he was an agent for Hanoi. ^[10] President Diem's brutal government violently repressed the Buddhist majority. On August 23, 1963, fter being approached by a South Vietnamese General, Kennedy ordered the newly appointed South Vietnamese Ambassador to make detailed plans for Diem's replacement. DI McCone compared Diem to a bad pitcher, McCone. Kennedy's Cabinet dubious about the coup, and JFK would come to regret it. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, a longtime political opponent of JFK was jealous that the CIA station had more money, power, and people than his staff. Lodge revealed the name of John Richardson, the CIA station chief, to a reporter, branding him an agent of the CIA, he later moved into Richardson's Saigon house, which was larger than the one Lodge had been in. The coup occurred on 1 November.

The assassination of Diem sparked a cascade of coups in Saigon, and at the same time the city was wracked with assassinations. Johnson, the new President wanted to refocus the CIA on intelligence, rather than covert action, while the Kennedy's were seen as relentless in their hounding of the CIA to produce results, Johnson would soon give them only the most minimal attention.

In the face of the failure of Project Tiger, the Pentagon wanted CIA paramilitary forces to participate in their Op Plan 64A, this resulted in the CIA's foreign paramilitaries being put under the command of the DOD, a move seen as a slippery slope inside the CIA, a slide from covert action towards militarization. ^[11] After touring vietnam in '64, DI McCone and sec def McNamara had different views of the US position. McCone believed that as long as the ho chi minh trail was active the US would struggle.

DI McCone had statutory control over all intelligence committees, but in reality, but the military had near total control of the DIA, the NRO, the NSA, and many other aspects. Importantly, President Johnson almost completely ignored the CIA. In effect, the military controlled the 2/3rds of the CIA budget laid out for covert action. McCone, the unspoken hero of the cuban missile crisis, submitted his resignation in the summer, but Johnson would not accept it until after the election.

On August 4th, SecDef McNamara gave President Johnson the raw translation of intercepted korean transmissions directly from the NSA which, ostensibly, reported to DI McCone, rather than to McNamara. It would later be determined that the transmission took place before the weapon discharges that night which leads to the conclusion that the transmission refers to the events of the attack the day before, and that, although Destroyers Maddox, and Turner Joy fired hundreds of shells at intermittent radar contacts, they were firing at false returns.

A CIA analyst's assessment of Vietnam was that the US was "becoming progressively divorced from reality... [and] proceeding with far more courage than wisdom". ^[12] The CIA had created an exhaustive report, "The Vietnamese Communist's Will to Persist". This created a key flashpoint in the US government became PAVN troop levels, was it 500k or more as the CIA believed, or 300k or less as the commanders of US forces in Vietnam believed. The argument went on for months, but Helms finally OK'd a report saying that PAVN troop levels were 299,000 or less. The DOD argument was that whatever the facts on the ground, to publicly admit any higher number could be the last nail in the coffin of the war for vietnam in the press.

The human rights abuses of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo had a history of more than 3 decades, but in August 1960 the United States severed diplomatic relations. The CIA's Special group had decided to arm Dominicans in hopes of an assassination. The CIA had dispersed three rifles, and three .38 revolvers, but things paused as Kennedy assumed office. An order approved by Kennedy resulted in the dispersal of four machine guns. Trujillo died from gunshot wounds two weeks later. In the aftermath Robert Kennedy wrote that the CIA had succeeded where it had failed many times in the past, but in the face of that success, it was caught flatfooted, having failed to plan what to do next. ^[13]

The CIA welcomed Fidel Castro on his visit to DC, and gave him a face to face briefing. The CIA hoped that Castro would bring about a friendly democratic government, and planned to curry his favor with money and guns. On December 11 1959, a memo reached the DI's desk recommending Castro's "elimination". Dulles replaced the word "elimination" with "removal", and set the wheels in motion. By mid August 1960, Dick Bissell would seek, with the blessing of the CIA, to hire the Mafia to assassinate Castro. ^[14] At the same time, his men were working on a parallel plan, recruiting a Cuban exile to assassinate him. A little while later, the FBI advised the CIA that it would be impossible to overthrow Castro with these chatty Cuban exiles. In the days before the Bay of Pigs, and during the invasion Richard M. Bissell, Jr. lied to everyone. He lied to Adlai Stevenson, he lied to the people commanding the mission, guaranteeing them air support while he lied to the President, promising success, and minimal air support.

The Taylor Board was commissioned to determine what went wrong in Cuba. The Board came to the same conclusion that the Jan '61 President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities had concluded, and many other reviews prior, and to come, that Covert Action had to be completely isolated from intelligence and analysis. The Inspector General of the CIA investigated the Bay of Pigs. His conclusion was that there was a need to drastically improve the organization and management of the CIA. The Special Group (Later renamed the 303 committee) was convened in an oversight role.

Subsequent to the shoot-downs of the may day U-2 reconnaissance plane, and a later shoot down in China, JFK ordered a 45 day cessation of U-2 flights, including flights over Cuba that had recently discovered the first Soviet high altitude Surface to Air Missile launcher site. There were fears of antagonism, and an election was around the corner. During this "photo gap" the CIA received a report from a source from Operation Mongoose, a road watcher describing covered tractor trailers moving that were shaped like large telephone poles. Control of U-2 flights was moved to the Air Force, and October 14 U-2 flights resumed. The Cuban Missile Crisis formally started the next day when American photo analysts identified R-12 1 Megaton MRBMs which could target parts of the east coast with it's 2,000 km range. R-14s which could target most of the continental US, as well as 9M21 tactical nukes had also been deployed.

In 1949 Colonel Adib Shishakli rose to power in Syria in a CIA backed coup. Four years later he would be overthrown by the military, Ba'athists, and communists. The CIA and MI6 started funding right wing members of the military, but suffered a large setback in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis. CIA Agent Rocky Stone who had played a minor role in the Iranian revolution was working at the Damascus embassy as a diplomat, but was actually the station chief. Syrian officers on the CIA dole quickly appeared on television stating that they had received money from the "corrupt and sinister Americans" "in an attempt to overthrow the legitimate government of Syria" ^[15] Syrian forces surrounded the embassy and rousted Agent Stone, who confessed and subsequently made history as the first American diplomat expelled from an Arab nation. This strengthened ties between Syria and Egypt, helping establish the United Arab Republic, and poisoning the well for the US for the foreseeable future. ^[15] The inability to deny the complicity of the US government put this operation outside the charter of the CIA.

The charismatic leader of Indonesia was President Sukarno. His declaration of neutrality in the cold war put the suspicions of the CIA on him. After Sukarno hosted Bandung Conference, promoting the Non-Aligned Movement. The Eisenhower White House responded with NSC 5518 authorizing "all feasible covert means" to move Indonesia into the Western sphere. ^[16] The CIA started funding the Masjumi Party. Sukano confounded the CIA's Jakarta station, which had few speakers of native languages, and Al Ulmer, the new head of the CIA's Far East division, knew little about the country. Spooked by the communist PKI party moving into the third spot, the CIA's alarmed response was in contrast to that of the Ambassador, who maintained that Sukarno maintained an open door to the West.

The US had no clear policy on Indonesia. Ike sent his spicial assistant for security operations F. M. Dearborn Jr to Jakarta. His report that there was great instability, and that the US lacked strong, stable allies, reinforcing the domino theory. Indonesia suffered from what he described as "subversion by democracy". ^[17] The CIA decided to attempt another military coup in Indonesia, where the Indonesian military was trained by the US, had a strong professional relationship with the US Military, had a pro-American officer corps, which had strong support for the government, and a strong belief in civilian control of the military, instilled partly by it's close association with the US Military. ^[18] Demonstrating an intolerance for dissent, the CIA instigated the transfer of the well respected Ambassador Allison, who had a strong background in Asia, to Czechoslovakia.

On September 25, 1957, Ike ordered the CIA to start a revolution in Indonesia with the goal of regime change. Three days later, Blits, a Soviet controlled weekly in India reported that the US was plotting to overthrow Sukarno. The story was picked up by the media in Indonesia. One of the first parts of the operation was an 11,500 ton US navy ship landing at Sumatra, delivering weapons for as many as 8,000 potential revolutionaries. ^[19] The delivery drew a crowd of spectators, and, again, little thought was given to plausible dependability. Counter to CIA predictions, the Indonesian military, with some planning assistance from their colleagues in the US Military, the only people the CIA had successfully kept their involvement a secret from, reacted swiftly and effectively.

CIA Agent Al Pope's bombing and strafing missions in a CIA B-26 against Indonesia were described by the CIA to the President as attacks by "dissident planes". Al Pope's B-26 was shot down over Indonesia on May 18, and he bailed out. When he was captured, the Indonesian military found his personnel records, after action reports, and his membership card for the officer's club at Clark Field. On March 9th, Foster Dulles, the secretary of state, and the brother of DI Allen Dulles, made a public statement calling for a revolt against communist despotism under Sukarno. Three days later the CIA reported to the White House that the Indonesian Army was suppressing communism. ^[20]

After Indonesia, Ike displayed mistrust of both the CIA, and it's Director, Allen Dulles. Allen Dulles too displayed mistrust of the CIA itself. Abbot Smith, a CIA analyst who would rise to the position of chief of the Office of National Estimates said "We had constructed for ourselves a picture of the USSR, and whatever happened had to be made to fit into this picture. Intelligence estimators can hardly commit a more abominable sin." Something reflected in the intelligence failure in Indonesia. On December 16, Ike received a report from his intelligence board of consultants that said that the agency was "incapable of making objective appraisals of it's own intelligence information as well as it's own operations." ^[21]

In the election of Patrice Lumumba, and his acceptance of Soviet support the CIA saw another possible Cuba. This view swayed the White House. Ike ordered that Lumumba be "eliminated". The CIA delivered a quarter of a million dollars to Joseph Mobutu, their favorite horse in the race. Mobutu delivered Lumumba to the Belgians, the former colonial masters of Congo, who executed him in short order. ^[22]

After the Bomber Gap came the Missile Gap. Eisenhower wanted to use the U-2 to disprove the missile gap, but he had banned U-2 overflights of the USSR after the successful meeting at Camp David with Khrushchev. Another reason Ike objected to the use of the U-2 was that, in the nuclear age, the intelligence he needed most was on their intentions, without which, the US would face a paralysis of intelligence. Ike was particularly worried that U-2 flights could be seen as the preparation for first strike attacks as he had high hopes for an upcoming meeting with Khrushchev in Paris. Conflicted, Ike finally gave into CIA pressure to authorize a 16 day window for flights, which, because of poor weather, was later extended for another 6 days. On May 1 1960 the USSR shot down a U-2 flying over the USSR. To Ike, the ensuing coverup destroyed one of his biggest assets, his perceived honesty, and the biggest hope he had, leaving a legacy of thawing relations with Khrushchev. It would also mark the beginning of a long downward slide in the credibility of the Office of the President of the United State. Ike later said that the U-2 coverup was the greatest regret of his Presidency.

CIA caught unaware as the US sponsored regime toppled ^[23] The new regime allowed soviet delegations to enter. Five years later the CIA would help bring the Ba'ath party into power.

As he was leaving office, Dwight "Ike" Eisenhower would say that, to his successor, John F. Kennedy, he was leaving a "legacy of ashes", referring to the CIA. Ike believed that the CIA had ignored, or had even been ignorant of the key issues of American foreign intelligence. One of the most important issues of foreign intelligence to Ike was for the CIA not to count how many missiles, or tanks the USSR had, but to determine what it's military and political leadership was going to do. What they were going to do about Berlin, about Korea, about Vietnam; and, most importantly if, or when they might start World War III. And when the CIA would undertake a covert action against a state there would be an almost total failure of intelligence on every level. The Hungarian Revolution exposed the total failure of years of CIA to build any intelligence or covert capacity in the country. And the twin failures of Cuba, and Indonesia where, as was typical from the Dulles brothers, actions were dictated by a strict anti-communist ideology, where the only context it was seen in the CIA were whatever false pretexts needed to justify the ideologically driven actions.

^[13] The great problem now... is that we don't know what to do.

Israeli intelligence would give the CIA a transcript of Khruschev's speech where he denounced Stalin as a self obsessed sadist. ^[24]

Eisenhower, recognizing the failure of the direct approach changed the strategy to harassment. ^[24] "Create and exploit troublesome problems for international communism", and to "counter any threat of a party or individuals directly or indirectly responsive to international communism", and "strengthen the orientation towards the united states of the people of the free world."

After continuous broadcast on Radio Free Europe of the speech, Polish riots would break out on June 28th.

^[25]

In 1951, Mosaddeq, a member of the National Front rose to power campaigning for khal'-e yad(Law of repossession, ie oil nationalization) ^[26]. This was against the Gass-Golsha`iyan (supplemental oil agreement), which Prime Minister Razmara supported. The supplemental oil agreement with Anglo-Iranian Oil Company got several concessions from the AIOC, including a 50/50 profit split, as well as other concessions for better Iranian representation within the company. Razmara is assassinated in March '51. Khalil Tahmassebi, a member of a terrorist group that follows the teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini is arrested, the next day over 8,000 members of the National Front, and the marxist Tudeh party protest his arrest. The protesters threaten to kill the Shah, any Iranian legislator that opposes oil nationalization, and anyone responsible for the imprisonment of Tahmassebi. Mosaddeq is elected to replace the slain PM, but conditions his acceptance on the nationalization of oil, which went through unanimously.

Nationalization of the British funded Iranian oil industry, including the largest oil refinery in the world, is disastrous. A British naval embargo successfully shutters the British oil facilities. Iran has no skilled workers to operate the British facilities, and no way of exporting the product anyway. In '52 Mosaddeq bucked against royal refusal to approve his Minister of War, aiming to take control of the military from the Shah. Mosaddeq resigned in protest, and the Shah Ahmad Qavam as PM. Again the National Front, and Tudeh took to the streets, again threatening assassinations (4 Iran Prime Ministers had been assassinated in the last few years). Five days later the military feared losing control and pulled their troops back and the Shah gave in to Mosaddeq's demands. Mosaddeq quickly replaced military leaders loyal to the Shah with those loyal to him, giving him personal control over the military. Mosaddeq would take 6 months of emergency powers, giving him the power to unilaterally pass legislation. When that expired, his powers were extended for another year.

A bitter irony was that Ayatollah Kashani, who once decried the unforgivable abuses of the British, and Mozzafar Baghai, Mosaddeq's closest political ally, and a man who personally took part in the physical takeover of the largest oil refinery in the world, now found that which they once saw in Mosaddeq in the British. Mosaddeq began manipulating the Iranian Parliment, but his supporters would quickly leave. To prevent the loss of his control of parliment, Mosaddeq dismissed parliament, and, at the same time, gave him dictatorial powers. This power grab triggered the Shah to exercise his constitutional right to dismiss Mosaddeq. Mosaddeq then started a military coup as the Shah fled the country. As was typical of CIA operations, CIA interventions were preceded by radio announcements on July 7th 1953 made by the CIA's intended victim by way of operational leaks. ^[27] On August 19th a CIA paid mob led by Ayatollahs Khomeini, and Kashani would spark what the deputy chief of mission of the US Tehran Embassy called "an almost spontaneous revolution." ^[28]... But Mosaddeq was protected by his new inner military circle, and the CIA had been unable to get any sway within the Iranian military. Their chosen man, former general Zahedi had no troops to call on. ^[27] General McClure, commander of the American military assistance advisory group would get his second star buying the loyalty of the Iranian officers he was training. An attack on Mosaddeq's house would force him to flee. He would surrender the next day, and his military coup would come to an end. ^[29] The end result would be a 60/40 oil profit split in favor of Iran (possibly similar to agreements with saudi arabia and venezuela). ^[26]

The return of the Shah to power, and the impression, cultivated by Allen Dulles that an effective CIA had been able to guide the a nation to friendly and stable relations with the west triggered planning for Operation Success, a plan to replace Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz with Carlos Armas. ^[30] As was typical of CIA operations, the plan would be exposed in major newspapers even before they started planning it in detail when the CIA agent liaison to Armas left plans for the coup in his Guatemala City hotel room. ^[31] Operation Success would be buoyed by two great strokes of luck. When Guatemalan state radio went down for scheduled antenna replacement, the CIA's "Voice of Liberation" radio broadcast would move to replace it. Speaker of the House John McCormack called a Czech shipment of weapons bypassing the US arms embargo on Guatemala an "atomic bomb planted in America's backyard." ^[32] Contrary to contemporary claims of the CIA, the shipment would reach Guatemala undetected, but the second stroke of luck would be that the shipment was mostly rusted junk from World War 2. With a list of 58 targets to kill ^[33]

Armas would strike, on June 18th. While Armas' offensive was ineffectual, Arbenz was apprehensive about the possibility of future successful attacks, and about being betrayed by his military. On June 22 Allen Dulles walked into the Oval Office certain that only drastic measures could unseat Arbenz and salvage the situation. In the meeting they said that a filibuster by the chairman of Democrats for Eisenhower, one of Ike's richest, and most generous contributors was their last ditch hope, with a 20% chance of success. A withdrawal of $150,000 from Riggs Bank would purchase three fully armed P-47 Thunderbolts. ^[34] On June 27, after days of the miniature bombing campaign, Arbenz, thinking his forces outmatched, and thinking that his grasp on the military was failing ceded power to Colonel Carlos Diaz. The CIA orchestrated several transfers of power, ending when the CIA finally placed Castillo Armas in the office of President.

Morale and efficacy problems outlined in an internal CIA report from 1953 would mirror similar problems that had haunted the Agency for years, and would be cited as a major problem repeatedly in the coming years. At the same time, a reckoning would be brewing in Iran.

Iran's history is a history of suffering. Suffering in World War 2. Suffering under a constitutional monarchy. And suffering under an Islamic Republic. Many people then, and now saw hope for Iran in it's strong Prime Minister, Mosaddeq. Before he became Prime Minister he popularly called for a 50/50 split in revenue from the British funded Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The company reluctantly agreed to this, but, when it acceded to Mosaddeq's demands, the offer was rejected. Mosaddeq's committee, governing state-corporate agreements, recommended nationalization, but Haj Razmara, Iran's Prime Minister, rejected nationalization, negotiating for a 50/50 revenue split that was attacked as being lower than the split in Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, the promotion of Iranians to management positions, and Iranian review of the company's finances. On 7 March 1951, Razmara was assassinated by a terrorist group that followed the teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini. Khalil Tahmasebi would be arrested, but the following day public demonstration attended by more than 8,000 Tudeh Party members, supporters of Mosaddeq's party, the National Front, and the terrorist group responsible for the assassination distributed leaflets carrying a threat to assassinate the Shah and other government officials if Tahmasebi was not freed.

Mosaddeq would go on to fight to take power away from the Shah, but as his political fortunes floundered along with the fortunes of the nationalized oil industry. Britain's response to the nationalization of Iran's oil industry, including the largest oil refinery in the world was to set up an embargo of skilled workers. The embargo would be a success, and Iran's oil revenues would dwindle to almost nothing.

The supporters of Mosaddeq's national front proved to be fairweather friends. Soon the the muslim leaders and Mosaddeq's one time supporters in the Majli, the lower body of Iran's national legislature would desert him. Mosaddeq would start arresting his political enemies, and take dictatorial emergency powers, giving him the power to pass legislation. He would go on to dismiss the Iranian Parliment altogether.

There was a power crisis in Iran when Mosaddeq took emergency powers and dismissed Parliment. His only support was in cronys he had installed in the military leadership, controlling the military for Mosaddeq. But the winds of fortune no longer filled Mosaddeq's sails. The shah exercised his constitutional power to dismiss Mosaddeq, the Prime Minister. Mosaddeq started a military coup, arresting the head of the Shah's guards who was delivering the letter dismissing Mosaddeq, prompting the Shah to flee the country.

Operations coordinating board

On Yong-Do island in Busan, Hans Tofte had turned over a thousand North Korean expatriates into what the National Security Council hoped would become a fifth column. They were divided into three tasking groups. Intelligence gathering through infiltration, guerrilla warfare, and pilot rescue. Tofte would be filing reports indicating success in operations long after any hope for the infiltration teams was cold in the ground. ^[35]

In '52, CIA covert action would send 1,500 more expatriate agents north. Seoul station chief, and Army Colonel Albert Haney would openly celebrate the capabilities of those agents, and the information they sent. ^[35] Some Soeul State Department intelligence officers were skeptical, but the party lasted until Haney was replaced, in September '52, by John Limond Hart, a Europe veteran with a vivid memory for bitter experiences of misinformation. ^[35] Hart was immediately suspicious of the parade of successes reported by Tofte and Haney.

After a three month investigation, Hart determined that the entirety of the station's product from Korean sources was either an opportunist's lie, or the misinformation from the enemy, including reports hailed, by American military commanders, as "one of the outstanding intelligence reports of the war." ^[36] Another part of the problem was the isolation of the Hermit Kingdom, and it's relative lack of importance compared to China, and Japan, which led to a deficiency in Korean language skills. After the war, internal reviews by the CIA would corroborate Hart's findings. The CIA's Soeul station had 200 officers, but not a single speaker of Korean. ^[36] The NSC's $400 million a year covert war was one part meat grinder, and one part delivery system for enemy misinformation.

Hart reported to Washington that Seoul station was hopeless, and could not be salvaged. Loftus Becker, Deputy Director of Intelligence, was sent personally to tell Hart that the CIA, to save face, had to keep the station open. Becker returned to Washington, pronounced the situation to be "hopeless", and that, after touring the CIA's Far East operations, the CIA's ability to gather intelligence in the far east was "almost negligible" ^[36]. He then resigned. While Allen Dulles was extolling the success of the CIA's guerrillas in Korea, AF Colonel James Kellis says Dulles had been informed that those guerrillas were under the control of the enemy. ^[37] Frank Wisner put the Korean failures down to a need "to develop the quantity and kind of people we must have if we are to successfully carry out the heavy burdens which have been placed on us." ^[37] A compounding factor was that, even at the height of the Korean war, the CIA would keep it's primary focus on Europe, and the Soviet Union, through the entire war, the Korean War would always be seen as a diversion from Europe.

With the Chinese push, the eyes of the NSC turned north. With no end to the avalanche of money, the CIA explored every option in China. From Chiang Kai-shek's promise of a million Kuomingtang ^[37], to the western Chinese Muslim Horsemen of the Hui clans who had ties to Chinese Nationalists ^[38]. The CIA ran operations from White Dog island with the nationalists for months until it was discovered that the nationalist commander's Chief of Staff was a spy for Mao. ^[38] $50 million went to Okinawa based Chinese refugees who wove tales of sizable support on the mainland. ^[39] In July '52, the CIA would send a team of expatriates in. Four months later they would radio for help. It was an ambush. Two CIA officers, Jack Downey, and Dick Fecteau. Fresh out out of Ivy League colleges they would both spend 19+ years in captivity.

Finally the CIA would turn to nationalist General Li Mi in Burma. When Li Mi's troops crossed the border into China an ambush awaited them too. The CIA would later discover that Li Mi's Bangkok radioman worked for Mao. ^[40] CIA supplies still flowed, but Li Mi's men retreated to Burma, and set up a global heroin empire in Burma's Golden Triangle.

^{[41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46]}

In July '46 Vandenberg reorganized the Central Reports staff into the larger Office of Reports and Estimates. The ORE drew it's reports from a daily take of State Department telegrams, military dispatches, and internal CIG reports that went to specialized analysts. The ORE's main products quickly became popular, they were the "Daily Summary", and the "Weekly Summary". The ORE also produced "Intelligence Highlights" for internal consumption, and "Intelligence Memorandums" for the DCI, who could distribute them at his discretion. ^[47] These reports would dominate the work of the ORE at the expense of it's work on Estimates.

Vandenberg would quickly move to the position as Commander of the newly formed Air Force that he had been waiting for. He would be replaced by Roscoe Hillenkoetter. Under Hillenkoetter the ORE(office of reports and estimates?) split into Global Survey, Current Intelligence, and Estimates ^[47] The sharp focus on the grind of Current Intelligence, with it's popular, widely distributed products would continue to dominate the ORE leaving little room for the other sections to grow, but it did lead to slow improvements, and the ORE would increase the number of products it offered, adding "Situation Reports" that would be used as handbooks for individual countries, and the monthly "Review of the World Situation". Like other organs of the CIA, the ORE would receive a regular stream of requests from the rest of the Government, including the NSC, JCS, Department of State, and branches of the military. Problems with the early ORE recognized within the CIA itself were that, of it's eleven regular publications, only one of them addressed strategic, or national intelligence questions, and that most of the sources of information relied on to produce ORE products were "open source", the CIA itself had little capability to produce intelligence on which to base it's own reports and estimates.

In the rebuilding of American intelligence capacity after the almost total loss of the OSS the CIA discovered new mistakes to make as they agency grew explosively. Bedell Smith, replacing his unsuccessful predecessor Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, would become the 4th DI, and call Sherman Kent back, rebuilding analytic capacity lost after WW2. Another significant change in personnel would be the rise of Allen Dulles, first to the new position of "Deputy Director of Plans", but, after the resignation of Bill Jackson when he saw that, of the $587 million dollar 1951 CIA budget, $400 million of it would go, shrouded in secrecy, to covert intelligence, to Deputy to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA's covert intelligence activities in the Korean War would be a repeat of their cargo cult efforts against Russia and it's European satellites. Or ritual sacrifice.