From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Assimilation

Studies on programs that randomly allocate refugee immigrants across municipalities find that the assignment of neighborhood impacts immigrant crime propensity, education and earnings. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

Crime

Germany

The first comprehensive study of the social effects of the one million refugees going to Germany found that it caused "very small increases in crime in particular with respect to drug offenses and fare-dodging." [6] [7]

A report released by the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation in November 2015 found that over the period January–September 2015, the crime rate of refugees was the same as that of native Germans. [8] According to Deutsche Welle, the report "concluded that the majority of crimes committed by refugees (67 percent) consisted of theft, robbery and fraud. Sex crimes made for less than 1 percent of all crimes committed by refugees, while homicide registered the smallest fraction at 0,1 percent." [8] According to the conservative newspaper Die Welt's description of the report, the most common crime committed by refugees was not paying fares on public transportation. [9] According to Deutsche Welle's reporting in February 2016 of a report by the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation, the number of crimes committed by refugees did not rise in proportion to the number of refugees between 2014-2015. [10] According to Deutsche Welle, "between 2014 and 2015, the number of crimes committed by refugees increased by 79 percent. Over the same period, however, the number of refugees in Germany increased by 440 percent." [10]

In May 2016, Politifact deemed Donald Trump's statement that "Germany is crime-riddled right now" because of migration to Europe" as mostly false. [11] The fact-checker noted that Germany's crime rate, particularly the violent crime rate, is far lower than in the United States, and that data suggest that the crime rate of the average refugee is lower than that of the average German. [11] In April 2017, the crime figures released for 2016 showed that the number of suspected crimes by by refugees, asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants increased by 50 percent. [12] The figures showed that most of the suspected crimes were by repeat offenders, and that 1 percent of migrants accounted for 40 percent of total migrant crimes. [12]

A study in the European Economic Review found that the German government's policy of immigration of more than 3 million people of German descent to Germany after the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a significant increase in crime. [13] The effects were strongest in regions with high unemployment, high preexisting crime levels or large shares of foreigners. [13]

Sweden

Viral falsehoods have circulated in recent years that tie immigrants and refugees to an alleged surge in rapes and crime in Sweden. [14] [15] According to Jerzy Sarnecki, a criminologist at Stockholm University, "What we’re hearing is a very, very extreme exaggeration based on a few isolated events, and the claim that it’s related to immigration is more or less not true at all." [14] [16] According to Klara Selin, a sociologist at the National Council for Crime Prevention, the major reasons why Sweden has a higher rate of rape than other countries is due to the way in which Sweden documents rape ("if a woman reports being raped multiple times by her husband that’s recorded as multiple rapes, for instance, not just one report") and a culture where women are encouraged to report rapes. [14] Stina Holmberg at the National Council for Crime Prevention, noted that "there is no basis for drawing the conclusion that crime rates are soaring in Sweden and that that is related to immigration". [17]

In February 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump asserted that crime was surging in Sweden due to immigration. [18] According to FactCheck.Org, Trump's claim was an exaggeration and noted that "experts said there is no evidence of a major crime wave." [14] According to official statistics, the reported crime rate in Sweden has risen since 2005 whereas annual government surveys show that the number of Swedes experiencing crime remain steady since 2005, even as Sweden has taken in hundreds of thousands of immigrants and refugees over the same period. [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] Jerzy Sarnecki, a criminologist at the University of Stockholm, said foreign-born residents are twice as likely to be registered for a crime as native Swedes but that other factors beyond place of birth are at play, such as education level and poverty, and that similar trends occur in European countries that have not taken in a lot of immigrants in recent years. [23]

According to data gathered by Swedish police from October 2015 to January 2016, 5,000 police calls out of 537,466 involved asylum seekers and refugees. [24] According to Felipe Estrada, professor of criminology at Stockholm University, this shows how the media gives disproportionate attention to and exaggerates the alleged criminal involvement of asylum seekers and refugees. [24] Henrik Selin, head of the Department for Intercultural Dialogue at the Swedish Institute, noted that allegations of a surge in immigrant crime after the intake of more than 160,000 immigrants in 2015 have been “highly exaggerated... there is nothing to support the claim that the crime rate took off after the 160,000 came in 2015.” While it’s true that immigrants have been over-represented among those committing crimes — particularly in some suburban communities heavily populated by immigrants, he said — the issue of crime and immigration is complex. [14] Speaking in February 2017, Manne Gerell, a doctoral student in criminology at Malmo University, noted that while immigrants where disproportionately represented among crime suspects, many of the victims of immigrant crimes were other immigrants. He also opined that "Immigration will come with some cost, and we will likely have a bit more crime — but that’s in a society with low crime rates and in a society that works really well, so in my opinion, it’s something we can live with". [25]

United States

Americans dramatically overestimate the relationship between refugees and terrorism. [26]

Economic effects

Studies of refugees' impact on native welfare are scant but the existing literature shows mixed results (negative, positive and no significant effects on native welfare). [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] According to University of California, Davis, labor economist Giovanni Peri, the existing literature suggests that there are no economic reasons why the American labor market could not easily absorb 100,000 Syrian refugees in a year. [42] Refugees integrate more slowly into host countries' labor markets than labor migrants, in part due to the loss and depreciation of human capital and credentials during the asylum procedure. [43] Refugees tend to do worse in economic terms than natives, even when they have the same skills and language proficiencies of natives. For instance, a 2013 study of Germans in West-Germany who had been displaced from Eastern Europe during and after World War II showed that the forced German migrants did far worse economically than their native West-German counterparts decades later. [44] Second-generation forced German migrants also did worse in economic terms than their native counterparts. [44]

  1. ^ Damm, Anna Piil; Dustmann, Christian. "Does Growing Up in a High Crime Neighborhood Affect Youth Criminal Behavior? †". American Economic Review. 104 (6): 1806–1832. doi: 10.1257/aer.104.6.1806.
  2. ^ Åslund, Olof; Edin, Per-Anders; Fredriksson, Peter; Grönqvist, Hans. "Peers, Neighborhoods, and Immigrant Student Achievement: Evidence from a Placement Policy". American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 3 (2): 67–95. doi: 10.1257/app.3.2.67.
  3. ^ Damm, Anna Piil (1 January 2014). "Neighborhood quality and labor market outcomes: Evidence from quasi-random neighborhood assignment of immigrants". Journal of Urban Economics. Spatial Dimensions of Labor Markets. 79: 139–166. doi: 10.1016/j.jue.2013.08.004.
  4. ^ Damm, Anna Piil (1 April 2009). "Ethnic Enclaves and Immigrant Labor Market Outcomes: Quasi‐Experimental Evidence". Journal of Labor Economics. 27 (2): 281–314. doi: 10.1086/599336. ISSN  0734-306X.
  5. ^ Edin, Per-Anders; Fredriksson, Peter; Åslund, Olof (1 February 2003). "Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants—Evidence from a Natural Experiment". The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 118 (1): 329–357. doi: 10.1162/00335530360535225. ISSN  0033-5533.
  6. ^ Mohdin, Aamna. "What effect did the record influx of refugees have on jobs and crime in Germany? Not much". Quartz. Retrieved 2017-02-03.
  7. ^ Gehrsitz, Markus; Ungerer, Martin (2017-01-01). "Jobs, Crime, and Votes: A Short-Run Evaluation of the Refugee Crisis in Germany". Rochester, NY. SSRN  2903116. {{ cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= ( help)
  8. ^ a b (www.dw.com), Deutsche Welle. "Report: refugees have not increased crime rate in Germany | News | DW.COM | 13.11.2015". DW.COM. Retrieved 2016-01-26.
  9. ^ 13.11.15 Straftaten "im sehr niedrigen sechsstelligen Bereich", Die Welt, http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article148812603/Straftaten-im-sehr-niedrigen-sechsstelligen-Bereich.html
  10. ^ a b (www.dw.com), Deutsche Welle. "Report: Refugee-related crimes in Germany increase less than influx of asylum seekers | NRS-Import | DW.COM | 17.02.2016". DW.COM. Retrieved 2016-04-28.
  11. ^ a b "Donald Trump says Germany now riddled with crime thanks to refugees". @politifact. Retrieved 2016-05-12.
  12. ^ a b http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/25/migrant-crime-germany-rises-50-per-cent-new-figures-show/
  13. ^ a b Piopiunik, Marc; Ruhose, Jens. "Immigration, regional conditions, and crime: evidence from an allocation policy in Germany". European Economic Review. doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.12.004.
  14. ^ a b c d e "Trump Exaggerates Swedish Crime - FactCheck.org". FactCheck.org. 2017-02-20. Retrieved 2017-04-02.
  15. ^ "Trump again slammed Sweden's immigration policies at CPAC 2017 — here's what's really going on". Business Insider. Retrieved 2017-04-02.
  16. ^ "Sweden's rape crisis isn't what it seems". The Globe and Mail. Retrieved 2017-04-02.
  17. ^ "Sweden - not perfect, but not Trump's immigrant-crime nightmare". Reuters. 2017-02-21. Retrieved 2017-04-02.
  18. ^ a b "Trump baffles Sweden with crime comment, says it was based on TV report". Reuters. 2017-02-19. Retrieved 2017-02-20.
  19. ^ "Brottsutvecklingen". BRÅ.se.
  20. ^ "Analysis | No, Sweden isn't hiding an immigrant crime problem. This is the real story". Washington Post. Retrieved 2017-04-09.
  21. ^ Miller, Nick (2017-02-25). "The Swedish migrant crime story that Donald Trump didn't tell". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 2017-04-09.
  22. ^ "Trump's 'Last night in Sweden' comment fuels Twitter firestorm". POLITICO. Retrieved 2017-04-10.
  23. ^ "Sweden to Trump: Immigrants aren't causing a crime wave". USA TODAY. Retrieved 2017-04-02.
  24. ^ a b "Ett fåtal brott i Sverige kopplas till flyktingar - DN.SE". DN.SE (in Swedish). 2016-02-09. Retrieved 2017-04-02.
  25. ^ Baker, Peter; Chan, Sewell (2017-02-20). "From an Anchor's Lips to Trump's Ears to Sweden's Disbelief". The New York Times. ISSN  0362-4331. Retrieved 2017-04-02.
  26. ^ "America's puzzling moral ambivalence about Middle East refugees | Brookings Institution". Brookings. 2016-06-28. Retrieved 2017-01-26.
  27. ^ Foged, Mette; Peri, Giovanni. "Immigrants' Effect on Native Workers: New Analysis on Longitudinal Data †". American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 8 (2): 1–34. doi: 10.1257/app.20150114.
  28. ^ "Refugee Economies: Rethinking Popular Assumptions – Refugee Studies Centre". www.rsc.ox.ac.uk. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
  29. ^ "Economic Impact of Refugees in the Cleveland Area" (PDF).
  30. ^ Cortes, Kalena E. (1 March 2004). "Are Refugees Different from Economic Immigrants? Some Empirical Evidence on the Heterogeneity of Immigrant Groups in the United States". Rochester, NY. SSRN  524605. {{ cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= ( help)
  31. ^ "Much ado about nothing? The economic impact of refugee 'invasions'". The Brookings Institution. Retrieved 2 January 2016.
  32. ^ The Impact of Syrians Refugees on the Turkish Labor Market. Policy Research Working Papers. The World Bank. 24 August 2015. doi: 10.1596/1813-9450-7402.
  33. ^ Maystadt, Jean-François; Verwimp, Philip. "Winners and Losers among a Refugee-Hosting Population". Economic Development and Cultural Change. 62 (4): 769–809. doi: 10.1086/676458. JSTOR  10.1086/676458.
  34. ^ "Immigration and Prices: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Syrian Refugees in Turkey" (PDF).
  35. ^ Ruist, Joakim (2013). "The labor market impact of refugee immigration in Sweden 1999–2007" (PDF). SU.se (Working paper). The Stockholm University Linnaeus Center for Integration Studies. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
  36. ^ Fakih, Ali; Ibrahim, May (2 January 2016). "The impact of Syrian refugees on the labor market in neighboring countries: empirical evidence from Jordan". Defence and Peace Economics. 27 (1): 64–86. doi: 10.1080/10242694.2015.1055936. ISSN  1024-2694.
  37. ^ "What are the impacts of Syrian refugees on host community welfare in Turkey ? a subnational poverty analysis (English) | The World Bank". documents.worldbank.org. Retrieved 15 February 2016.
  38. ^ Tumen, Semih (2016-05-01). "The Economic Impact of Syrian Refugees on Host Countries: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Turkey". American Economic Review. 106 (5): 456–460. doi: 10.1257/aer.p20161065. ISSN  0002-8282.
  39. ^ Clemens, Michael A.; Hunt, Jennifer (2017-05-01). "The Labor Market Effects of Refugee Waves: Reconciling Conflicting Results". {{ cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= ( help)
  40. ^ "What the Mariel Boatlift of Cuban Refugees Can Teach Us about the Economics of Immigration: An Explainer and a Revelation". Center For Global Development. Retrieved 2017-05-22.
  41. ^ Card, David (1 January 1989). "The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market" (PDF). doi: 10.3386/w3069. {{ cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= ( help)
  42. ^ "'No reasons to reject refugees' - Giovanni Peri". SoundCloud. Retrieved 27 January 2016.
  43. ^ Bevelander, Pieter; Malmö, University of (2016-05-01). "Integrating refugees into labor markets". IZA World of Labor. doi: 10.15185/izawol.269.
  44. ^ a b Bauer, Thomas K.; Braun, Sebastian; Kvasnicka, Michael (2013-09-01). "The Economic Integration of Forced Migrants: Evidence for Post-War Germany". The Economic Journal. 123 (571): 998–1024. doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12023. ISSN  1468-0297.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Assimilation

Studies on programs that randomly allocate refugee immigrants across municipalities find that the assignment of neighborhood impacts immigrant crime propensity, education and earnings. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

Crime

Germany

The first comprehensive study of the social effects of the one million refugees going to Germany found that it caused "very small increases in crime in particular with respect to drug offenses and fare-dodging." [6] [7]

A report released by the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation in November 2015 found that over the period January–September 2015, the crime rate of refugees was the same as that of native Germans. [8] According to Deutsche Welle, the report "concluded that the majority of crimes committed by refugees (67 percent) consisted of theft, robbery and fraud. Sex crimes made for less than 1 percent of all crimes committed by refugees, while homicide registered the smallest fraction at 0,1 percent." [8] According to the conservative newspaper Die Welt's description of the report, the most common crime committed by refugees was not paying fares on public transportation. [9] According to Deutsche Welle's reporting in February 2016 of a report by the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation, the number of crimes committed by refugees did not rise in proportion to the number of refugees between 2014-2015. [10] According to Deutsche Welle, "between 2014 and 2015, the number of crimes committed by refugees increased by 79 percent. Over the same period, however, the number of refugees in Germany increased by 440 percent." [10]

In May 2016, Politifact deemed Donald Trump's statement that "Germany is crime-riddled right now" because of migration to Europe" as mostly false. [11] The fact-checker noted that Germany's crime rate, particularly the violent crime rate, is far lower than in the United States, and that data suggest that the crime rate of the average refugee is lower than that of the average German. [11] In April 2017, the crime figures released for 2016 showed that the number of suspected crimes by by refugees, asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants increased by 50 percent. [12] The figures showed that most of the suspected crimes were by repeat offenders, and that 1 percent of migrants accounted for 40 percent of total migrant crimes. [12]

A study in the European Economic Review found that the German government's policy of immigration of more than 3 million people of German descent to Germany after the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a significant increase in crime. [13] The effects were strongest in regions with high unemployment, high preexisting crime levels or large shares of foreigners. [13]

Sweden

Viral falsehoods have circulated in recent years that tie immigrants and refugees to an alleged surge in rapes and crime in Sweden. [14] [15] According to Jerzy Sarnecki, a criminologist at Stockholm University, "What we’re hearing is a very, very extreme exaggeration based on a few isolated events, and the claim that it’s related to immigration is more or less not true at all." [14] [16] According to Klara Selin, a sociologist at the National Council for Crime Prevention, the major reasons why Sweden has a higher rate of rape than other countries is due to the way in which Sweden documents rape ("if a woman reports being raped multiple times by her husband that’s recorded as multiple rapes, for instance, not just one report") and a culture where women are encouraged to report rapes. [14] Stina Holmberg at the National Council for Crime Prevention, noted that "there is no basis for drawing the conclusion that crime rates are soaring in Sweden and that that is related to immigration". [17]

In February 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump asserted that crime was surging in Sweden due to immigration. [18] According to FactCheck.Org, Trump's claim was an exaggeration and noted that "experts said there is no evidence of a major crime wave." [14] According to official statistics, the reported crime rate in Sweden has risen since 2005 whereas annual government surveys show that the number of Swedes experiencing crime remain steady since 2005, even as Sweden has taken in hundreds of thousands of immigrants and refugees over the same period. [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] Jerzy Sarnecki, a criminologist at the University of Stockholm, said foreign-born residents are twice as likely to be registered for a crime as native Swedes but that other factors beyond place of birth are at play, such as education level and poverty, and that similar trends occur in European countries that have not taken in a lot of immigrants in recent years. [23]

According to data gathered by Swedish police from October 2015 to January 2016, 5,000 police calls out of 537,466 involved asylum seekers and refugees. [24] According to Felipe Estrada, professor of criminology at Stockholm University, this shows how the media gives disproportionate attention to and exaggerates the alleged criminal involvement of asylum seekers and refugees. [24] Henrik Selin, head of the Department for Intercultural Dialogue at the Swedish Institute, noted that allegations of a surge in immigrant crime after the intake of more than 160,000 immigrants in 2015 have been “highly exaggerated... there is nothing to support the claim that the crime rate took off after the 160,000 came in 2015.” While it’s true that immigrants have been over-represented among those committing crimes — particularly in some suburban communities heavily populated by immigrants, he said — the issue of crime and immigration is complex. [14] Speaking in February 2017, Manne Gerell, a doctoral student in criminology at Malmo University, noted that while immigrants where disproportionately represented among crime suspects, many of the victims of immigrant crimes were other immigrants. He also opined that "Immigration will come with some cost, and we will likely have a bit more crime — but that’s in a society with low crime rates and in a society that works really well, so in my opinion, it’s something we can live with". [25]

United States

Americans dramatically overestimate the relationship between refugees and terrorism. [26]

Economic effects

Studies of refugees' impact on native welfare are scant but the existing literature shows mixed results (negative, positive and no significant effects on native welfare). [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] According to University of California, Davis, labor economist Giovanni Peri, the existing literature suggests that there are no economic reasons why the American labor market could not easily absorb 100,000 Syrian refugees in a year. [42] Refugees integrate more slowly into host countries' labor markets than labor migrants, in part due to the loss and depreciation of human capital and credentials during the asylum procedure. [43] Refugees tend to do worse in economic terms than natives, even when they have the same skills and language proficiencies of natives. For instance, a 2013 study of Germans in West-Germany who had been displaced from Eastern Europe during and after World War II showed that the forced German migrants did far worse economically than their native West-German counterparts decades later. [44] Second-generation forced German migrants also did worse in economic terms than their native counterparts. [44]

  1. ^ Damm, Anna Piil; Dustmann, Christian. "Does Growing Up in a High Crime Neighborhood Affect Youth Criminal Behavior? †". American Economic Review. 104 (6): 1806–1832. doi: 10.1257/aer.104.6.1806.
  2. ^ Åslund, Olof; Edin, Per-Anders; Fredriksson, Peter; Grönqvist, Hans. "Peers, Neighborhoods, and Immigrant Student Achievement: Evidence from a Placement Policy". American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 3 (2): 67–95. doi: 10.1257/app.3.2.67.
  3. ^ Damm, Anna Piil (1 January 2014). "Neighborhood quality and labor market outcomes: Evidence from quasi-random neighborhood assignment of immigrants". Journal of Urban Economics. Spatial Dimensions of Labor Markets. 79: 139–166. doi: 10.1016/j.jue.2013.08.004.
  4. ^ Damm, Anna Piil (1 April 2009). "Ethnic Enclaves and Immigrant Labor Market Outcomes: Quasi‐Experimental Evidence". Journal of Labor Economics. 27 (2): 281–314. doi: 10.1086/599336. ISSN  0734-306X.
  5. ^ Edin, Per-Anders; Fredriksson, Peter; Åslund, Olof (1 February 2003). "Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants—Evidence from a Natural Experiment". The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 118 (1): 329–357. doi: 10.1162/00335530360535225. ISSN  0033-5533.
  6. ^ Mohdin, Aamna. "What effect did the record influx of refugees have on jobs and crime in Germany? Not much". Quartz. Retrieved 2017-02-03.
  7. ^ Gehrsitz, Markus; Ungerer, Martin (2017-01-01). "Jobs, Crime, and Votes: A Short-Run Evaluation of the Refugee Crisis in Germany". Rochester, NY. SSRN  2903116. {{ cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= ( help)
  8. ^ a b (www.dw.com), Deutsche Welle. "Report: refugees have not increased crime rate in Germany | News | DW.COM | 13.11.2015". DW.COM. Retrieved 2016-01-26.
  9. ^ 13.11.15 Straftaten "im sehr niedrigen sechsstelligen Bereich", Die Welt, http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article148812603/Straftaten-im-sehr-niedrigen-sechsstelligen-Bereich.html
  10. ^ a b (www.dw.com), Deutsche Welle. "Report: Refugee-related crimes in Germany increase less than influx of asylum seekers | NRS-Import | DW.COM | 17.02.2016". DW.COM. Retrieved 2016-04-28.
  11. ^ a b "Donald Trump says Germany now riddled with crime thanks to refugees". @politifact. Retrieved 2016-05-12.
  12. ^ a b http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/25/migrant-crime-germany-rises-50-per-cent-new-figures-show/
  13. ^ a b Piopiunik, Marc; Ruhose, Jens. "Immigration, regional conditions, and crime: evidence from an allocation policy in Germany". European Economic Review. doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.12.004.
  14. ^ a b c d e "Trump Exaggerates Swedish Crime - FactCheck.org". FactCheck.org. 2017-02-20. Retrieved 2017-04-02.
  15. ^ "Trump again slammed Sweden's immigration policies at CPAC 2017 — here's what's really going on". Business Insider. Retrieved 2017-04-02.
  16. ^ "Sweden's rape crisis isn't what it seems". The Globe and Mail. Retrieved 2017-04-02.
  17. ^ "Sweden - not perfect, but not Trump's immigrant-crime nightmare". Reuters. 2017-02-21. Retrieved 2017-04-02.
  18. ^ a b "Trump baffles Sweden with crime comment, says it was based on TV report". Reuters. 2017-02-19. Retrieved 2017-02-20.
  19. ^ "Brottsutvecklingen". BRÅ.se.
  20. ^ "Analysis | No, Sweden isn't hiding an immigrant crime problem. This is the real story". Washington Post. Retrieved 2017-04-09.
  21. ^ Miller, Nick (2017-02-25). "The Swedish migrant crime story that Donald Trump didn't tell". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 2017-04-09.
  22. ^ "Trump's 'Last night in Sweden' comment fuels Twitter firestorm". POLITICO. Retrieved 2017-04-10.
  23. ^ "Sweden to Trump: Immigrants aren't causing a crime wave". USA TODAY. Retrieved 2017-04-02.
  24. ^ a b "Ett fåtal brott i Sverige kopplas till flyktingar - DN.SE". DN.SE (in Swedish). 2016-02-09. Retrieved 2017-04-02.
  25. ^ Baker, Peter; Chan, Sewell (2017-02-20). "From an Anchor's Lips to Trump's Ears to Sweden's Disbelief". The New York Times. ISSN  0362-4331. Retrieved 2017-04-02.
  26. ^ "America's puzzling moral ambivalence about Middle East refugees | Brookings Institution". Brookings. 2016-06-28. Retrieved 2017-01-26.
  27. ^ Foged, Mette; Peri, Giovanni. "Immigrants' Effect on Native Workers: New Analysis on Longitudinal Data †". American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 8 (2): 1–34. doi: 10.1257/app.20150114.
  28. ^ "Refugee Economies: Rethinking Popular Assumptions – Refugee Studies Centre". www.rsc.ox.ac.uk. Retrieved 1 January 2016.
  29. ^ "Economic Impact of Refugees in the Cleveland Area" (PDF).
  30. ^ Cortes, Kalena E. (1 March 2004). "Are Refugees Different from Economic Immigrants? Some Empirical Evidence on the Heterogeneity of Immigrant Groups in the United States". Rochester, NY. SSRN  524605. {{ cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= ( help)
  31. ^ "Much ado about nothing? The economic impact of refugee 'invasions'". The Brookings Institution. Retrieved 2 January 2016.
  32. ^ The Impact of Syrians Refugees on the Turkish Labor Market. Policy Research Working Papers. The World Bank. 24 August 2015. doi: 10.1596/1813-9450-7402.
  33. ^ Maystadt, Jean-François; Verwimp, Philip. "Winners and Losers among a Refugee-Hosting Population". Economic Development and Cultural Change. 62 (4): 769–809. doi: 10.1086/676458. JSTOR  10.1086/676458.
  34. ^ "Immigration and Prices: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Syrian Refugees in Turkey" (PDF).
  35. ^ Ruist, Joakim (2013). "The labor market impact of refugee immigration in Sweden 1999–2007" (PDF). SU.se (Working paper). The Stockholm University Linnaeus Center for Integration Studies. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
  36. ^ Fakih, Ali; Ibrahim, May (2 January 2016). "The impact of Syrian refugees on the labor market in neighboring countries: empirical evidence from Jordan". Defence and Peace Economics. 27 (1): 64–86. doi: 10.1080/10242694.2015.1055936. ISSN  1024-2694.
  37. ^ "What are the impacts of Syrian refugees on host community welfare in Turkey ? a subnational poverty analysis (English) | The World Bank". documents.worldbank.org. Retrieved 15 February 2016.
  38. ^ Tumen, Semih (2016-05-01). "The Economic Impact of Syrian Refugees on Host Countries: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Turkey". American Economic Review. 106 (5): 456–460. doi: 10.1257/aer.p20161065. ISSN  0002-8282.
  39. ^ Clemens, Michael A.; Hunt, Jennifer (2017-05-01). "The Labor Market Effects of Refugee Waves: Reconciling Conflicting Results". {{ cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= ( help)
  40. ^ "What the Mariel Boatlift of Cuban Refugees Can Teach Us about the Economics of Immigration: An Explainer and a Revelation". Center For Global Development. Retrieved 2017-05-22.
  41. ^ Card, David (1 January 1989). "The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market" (PDF). doi: 10.3386/w3069. {{ cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= ( help)
  42. ^ "'No reasons to reject refugees' - Giovanni Peri". SoundCloud. Retrieved 27 January 2016.
  43. ^ Bevelander, Pieter; Malmö, University of (2016-05-01). "Integrating refugees into labor markets". IZA World of Labor. doi: 10.15185/izawol.269.
  44. ^ a b Bauer, Thomas K.; Braun, Sebastian; Kvasnicka, Michael (2013-09-01). "The Economic Integration of Forced Migrants: Evidence for Post-War Germany". The Economic Journal. 123 (571): 998–1024. doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12023. ISSN  1468-0297.

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