| Battle of Khem Karan | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 | |||||
| |||||
| Belligerents | |||||
| Indian Army | Pakistan Army | ||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||
| Major General Gurbaksh Singh |
Major General Nasir Ahmed Major General Abdul Hamid Khan | ||||
| Units involved | |||||
|
4th Mountain Division 7th Mountain Brigade 62nd Mountain Brigade 2nd Armored Brigade 41st Mountain Brigade 29th Infantry Brigade |
1st Armored Division 3rd Armored Brigade 4th Armored Brigade 5th Armored Brigade 11th Infantry Division 21st Infantry Brigade 52nd Infantry Brigade 106th Infantry Brigade 15 Lancers 32 TDU | ||||
The Battle of Khem Karan was part of the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. The battle took place on the border between Indian town of Khem Karan and Pakistani town of Kasur. Pakistan launched its 1st Armored Division along with 11 Infantry Division on an offensive mission, while on the Indian side 4th Infantry Division, 2nd Armored and 41st Mountain Brigades fought in the battle. The battle started on 6 September and ended with a UN mandated ceasefire on 23rd September 1965.
Background
Location
Khem Karan is town located in the Indian state of Punjab, about five kilometers away from the India-Pakistan border and sixty kilometers southwest of Amritsar. [1] Located opposite to it on Pakistani side is the town of Kasur, about ten kilometers away from Khem Karan. [2]
Force deployment
On the Indian side the XI Corps overlooking the Khem Karan sector deployed 4 Mountain Division under Major General Gurbaksh Singh's command. The 4th Mountain Division comprised of 7th and 62nd Brigades which were tasked to secure the Pakistani territory southwest of Khem Karan and east bank of Ichhogil canal [2] (from Ganda Singh Wala to Waigal) [3] respectively. Each brigade consisted of three infantry battalions. [2] 33rd Brigade that was part of the division didn't participate in the war and was deployed along the India-China border. [4] Besides securing Ichogil canal, the division was also planned to destroy the bridges over the canal. [3] [5] Along 4th Division the 2nd Independent Armored Brigade also participated in the battle and was joined by 41st Mountain Brigade at later stage of the battle. [4] The 2nd Armored Brigade comprised of two armored battalions having Centurian ( 3rd Cavalry) and AMX-13 ( 8th Light Cavalry) tanks. [1]
Initially, Pakistan's 11th Infantry Division commanded by Major General Abdul Hamid Khan was deployed in the Khem Karan-Kasur sector. The 1st Armored Division commanded by Major General Nasir Ahmad Khan gathered near Changa Manga Forest in hiding [5] comprised of 3rd, 4th and 5th Armored Brigades, [1] of which 3rd and 4th Brigades proceeded to Sialkot sector on 11th and 16th September respectively. [6] The Pakistani force's objective was to establish a bridgehead at Khem Karan, and proceed further North to capture the bridge (Beas bridge) over River Beas, on Amritsar-Jalandhar Highway and Harike bridge over River Sutlej on NH 15 [3] surrounding the Eleventh Corps of India that was fighting in the Lahore and Kasur sectors and seizure of Amritsar. The task of securing the Harike and Beas bridges was assigned to 4th Armored Brigade of the 1st Armored Division. [5] The 11th Division was to assist the 1st Armored Division by setting up bridgeheads and bridges over the water courses in the battlefield. [7]
Battle
First phase
The 4th Division of India started its offensive towards Ichhogil canal at 0500 on 6 September. [5] While approaching its objective, the 7th Brigade mistakenly took a small water stream for the Ichhogil canal and encamped there. Pakistan attacked the Indian defenses with the 1st Armored Division in the cover of artillery fire. The brunt of the attack was faced by the 13th Dogra battalion. The Pakistani attack led to desertions in the 4th Mountain division, reducing its strength to three and half battalions that initially included six, resulting in Indian forces to fall back to Asal Uttar. [2] During the retreat the division utilized its artillery to destroy bridges over the Ichhogil canal and Rohi Nullah further east. This delayed Pakistani advance and gave Indian forces some time to gather and organize their force. [5] On 7 September after the Indian division's strength further reduced to two battalions, the commander XI corps Lieutenant General Joginder Singh suggested to Commander Western Command Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh disbanding of 18th Rajputana, 7th Grenadier, 9th Jammu & Kashmir and 13th Dogra battalions [1] and replacing the complete force in the sector. [2] While the then Chief of Indian Army Staff General Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri suggested retreating to Beas river to which Joginder didn't agree. [8] Further delay in the forward movement of Pakistan's forces was caused when a tank got stuck on a bridge over Rohi Nullah. By then only ten tanks had crossed Rohi. [1]
Second phase
After the initial retreat the Indian forces were reorganized with 1/9 Gurkha Rifles deployed to defend Khem Karan-Bhikwind road, 18 Rajputana Rifles at the South of Asal Uttar, 4 Grenadiers were located at the rear of the earlier mentioned battlions at the South of Chima. The reduced strength 9 J and K Rifles were tasked to assist the 18 Rajputanas. [9] From 8th September the battle took place at Asal Uttar where Indian forces had set up their defenses. [1] The 4th Mountain Division was armed with 106 mm recoil-less rifles, bazookas and other anti-tank weaponry. [10] The 5th Brigade of Pakistan commanded by Brigadier Bashir fought this battle, where the 24 Cavalry attacked Khem Karan-Bhikwind axis and 6 Lancers advanced to Valtoha Railway Station. The 24 Cavalry failed to break the defenses of 3rd Cavalry and allied infantry battalions [1] while 6 Lancers that earlier requested Infantry liaison but was denied, [11] achieved their objective but was called back by the Brigade commander before the night fell on the first day. [1] A Pakistani ammunition train that was loaded with ammunition for the Patton tanks was hit at Kasur [10] in an air raid by the Indian Air Force Hawker Hunters of 7th Squadron.[ citation needed]
9th September:
10th September:On 10 September an offensive was again launched by Pakistan, lead by 5th Brigade's armor. The infantry few in numbers that was supporting the offensive was taken first by the Indian defending forces and were pushed back. [10] 11th September:On 11 September, India employed a near by canal to flood the battle field, that resulted in about hundred Pakistani tanks trapped. [12] Following failure of 1st Armored Division to move further from the bridgehead at Khem Karan and fall of its leadership during the battle the earlier day, the charge of command was given to Major General Sahabzada Yaqub Khan. [13]
Third phase
After suffering heavy losses at Asal Uttar, Pakistani forces took defensive position at Khem Karan. The 4th Sikh Battalion of India was tasked to infiltrate the Pakistani defenses from the eastern side of Khem Karan and back 7th Brigades offensive by attacking opposing froced from behind, for capturing Khem Karan. The night of 11th/12th September was chosen for the offensive considering the Saragarhi Day on 12th September. Saragarhi day is historically observed by the Sikh regiment in the memory of their men killed in the Battle of Saragarhi. According to R. D. Pradhan, the 4th Sikh and the 2nd Mahar Battalions that were assigned the offensive, were both fatigued because of the continuous fighting in the previous days. For the reason the 7th Brigade's commander asked for postponing the operation but his request was turned down. [2] On 12 September while continuing with the offensive plan the 4th Sikh with a strength of three hundred approached its objective but were apprehended by the Pakistani forces after losing twenty of their men. The 2nd Mahar battalion was attacked by the Pakistan Air Force's jets as soon as they reached near Khem Karan, resulting in the loss of eleven tanks and fifty of their men. The commander of the 7th Brigade Brigadier Sidhu was demoted on the failure of this operation. [2] Another attempt was made by the Indian forces to recapture the lost territory on the night of 21/22 September. This time 41st Mountain and 29th Infantry Brigades were tasked for the offensive. Lack of preparation lead to failure again as the Indian troops encountered minefields, air and artillery attacks. [3] [5]
Analysis
A number of analysts have described the Pakistani offensive as an "ambitious" plan.[ citation needed] Stephen Cohen opines that had Pakistan managed to reach the Grand Trunk road bridge over Beas river, it could have reached Delhi in a day's time. According to Cohen India did not capitalize on the collapse of Pakistani offensive at Asal Uttar. [14]
Aftermath
The war ended with a ceasefire made possible through the intervention of United Nations on 23 September 1965. With the ceasefire in effect the battle at Khem Karan also came to a halt.[ citation needed] After a truce was mediated between India and Pakistan by Russia at Tashkent, Pakistan returned the fifty square kilometer territory captured in the Khem Karan sector, in early 1966. [12]
Battle honours
India
Pakistan
- Lieutenant Colonel Sahibzad Gul - Commanding Officer 6 Lancers - Sitara e Jurat [1]
See also
References
- ^
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i Agha H Amin (2001).
Sehgal, Ikram (ed.).
"The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965". Defence Journal. Pathfinder. Retrieved 5 September 2013.
{{ cite journal}}: Unknown parameter|month=ignored ( help) - ^
a
b
c
d
e
f
g Yashwantrao Balwantrao Chavan (2007). 1965 War: The Inside Story. Atlantic Publishers. pp. 42–50.
ISBN
978-8126907625.
{{ cite book}}: Unknown parameter|coauthors=ignored (|author=suggested) ( help) - ^ a b c d Jogindar Singh (1 March 1998). Behind the Scene: An Analysis of India's Military Operations 1947-71. Spantech and Lancer. pp. 151–160. ISBN 978-1897829202. Retrieved 4 September 2013.
- ^ a b Mandeep Singh Bajwa (28 January 2004). A. Rinaldi, Richard (ed.). "A Brief History of 4th Indian Division and Its Brigades 1940—2003" (Format). Orbat Web Magazine. 2 (25). Orbat.com. Retrieved 3 September 2013.
- ^ a b c d e f Pradeep P. Barua (1 May 2005). The State at War in South Asia. University of Nebraska Press. pp. 188–190. ISBN 978-0803213449. Retrieved 4 September 2013.
-
^
Hussain, Abrar (2005). Men of steel: 6 Armoured Division in the 1965 war. Army Education Publishing House, Oxford University Press. pp. 31, 46.
ISBN
969-8125-19-1.
{{ cite book}}: Unknown parameter|coauthors=ignored (|author=suggested) ( help) -
^ Ahmad Gilani, Mukhtar (2003). Sehgal, Ikram (ed.).
"Panoramic Analysis —Senior and Junior Leaders —Aug 1947 to Dec 1971". Defence Journal. Pathfinder. Retrieved 9 September 2013.
{{ cite journal}}: Unknown parameter|month=ignored ( help) - ^ "History indicts Army for role in 1965 war". India Abroad Publications – via HighBeam (subscription required) . 15 September 2000. Retrieved 4 September 2013.
- ^ Farooq Bajwa (2013). From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965. Hurst Publishers. pp. 192–218. ISBN 978-1-84904-230-7.
- ^
a
b
c Steven J. Zaloga (1999).
The M47 and M48 Patton Tanks. Osprey Publishing. pp. 23–33.
ISBN
978-1855328259. Retrieved 10 September 2013.
{{ cite book}}: Unknown parameter|coauthors=ignored (|author=suggested) ( help); Unknown parameter|month=ignored ( help) -
^ Humayun Amin, Agha (2000). Sehgal, Ikram (ed.).
"Pakistan Armoured Corps as a Case Study". Defence Journal. Pathfinder. Retrieved 9 September 2013.
{{ cite journal}}: Unknown parameter|month=ignored ( help) - ^ a b Praveen Swami. India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004. Taylor & Francis. pp. 62, 79–80. ISBN 978-0203968406.
-
^ Zafar, Muhammad (2000). Sehgal, Ikram (ed.).
"Sahabzada Yaqub Khan". Defence Journal. Pathfinder. Retrieved 9 September 2013.
{{ cite journal}}: Unknown parameter|month=ignored ( help) -
^ Stephen P. Cohen (2010). Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization. Brookings Institution Press. p. 8.
ISBN
978-0815724926.
{{ cite book}}: Unknown parameter|coauthors=ignored (|author=suggested) ( help)
Sources
| Battle of Khem Karan | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 | |||||
| |||||
| Belligerents | |||||
| Indian Army | Pakistan Army | ||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||
| Major General Gurbaksh Singh |
Major General Nasir Ahmed Major General Abdul Hamid Khan | ||||
| Units involved | |||||
|
4th Mountain Division 7th Mountain Brigade 62nd Mountain Brigade 2nd Armored Brigade 41st Mountain Brigade 29th Infantry Brigade |
1st Armored Division 3rd Armored Brigade 4th Armored Brigade 5th Armored Brigade 11th Infantry Division 21st Infantry Brigade 52nd Infantry Brigade 106th Infantry Brigade 15 Lancers 32 TDU | ||||
The Battle of Khem Karan was part of the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. The battle took place on the border between Indian town of Khem Karan and Pakistani town of Kasur. Pakistan launched its 1st Armored Division along with 11 Infantry Division on an offensive mission, while on the Indian side 4th Infantry Division, 2nd Armored and 41st Mountain Brigades fought in the battle. The battle started on 6 September and ended with a UN mandated ceasefire on 23rd September 1965.
Background
Location
Khem Karan is town located in the Indian state of Punjab, about five kilometers away from the India-Pakistan border and sixty kilometers southwest of Amritsar. [1] Located opposite to it on Pakistani side is the town of Kasur, about ten kilometers away from Khem Karan. [2]
Force deployment
On the Indian side the XI Corps overlooking the Khem Karan sector deployed 4 Mountain Division under Major General Gurbaksh Singh's command. The 4th Mountain Division comprised of 7th and 62nd Brigades which were tasked to secure the Pakistani territory southwest of Khem Karan and east bank of Ichhogil canal [2] (from Ganda Singh Wala to Waigal) [3] respectively. Each brigade consisted of three infantry battalions. [2] 33rd Brigade that was part of the division didn't participate in the war and was deployed along the India-China border. [4] Besides securing Ichogil canal, the division was also planned to destroy the bridges over the canal. [3] [5] Along 4th Division the 2nd Independent Armored Brigade also participated in the battle and was joined by 41st Mountain Brigade at later stage of the battle. [4] The 2nd Armored Brigade comprised of two armored battalions having Centurian ( 3rd Cavalry) and AMX-13 ( 8th Light Cavalry) tanks. [1]
Initially, Pakistan's 11th Infantry Division commanded by Major General Abdul Hamid Khan was deployed in the Khem Karan-Kasur sector. The 1st Armored Division commanded by Major General Nasir Ahmad Khan gathered near Changa Manga Forest in hiding [5] comprised of 3rd, 4th and 5th Armored Brigades, [1] of which 3rd and 4th Brigades proceeded to Sialkot sector on 11th and 16th September respectively. [6] The Pakistani force's objective was to establish a bridgehead at Khem Karan, and proceed further North to capture the bridge (Beas bridge) over River Beas, on Amritsar-Jalandhar Highway and Harike bridge over River Sutlej on NH 15 [3] surrounding the Eleventh Corps of India that was fighting in the Lahore and Kasur sectors and seizure of Amritsar. The task of securing the Harike and Beas bridges was assigned to 4th Armored Brigade of the 1st Armored Division. [5] The 11th Division was to assist the 1st Armored Division by setting up bridgeheads and bridges over the water courses in the battlefield. [7]
Battle
First phase
The 4th Division of India started its offensive towards Ichhogil canal at 0500 on 6 September. [5] While approaching its objective, the 7th Brigade mistakenly took a small water stream for the Ichhogil canal and encamped there. Pakistan attacked the Indian defenses with the 1st Armored Division in the cover of artillery fire. The brunt of the attack was faced by the 13th Dogra battalion. The Pakistani attack led to desertions in the 4th Mountain division, reducing its strength to three and half battalions that initially included six, resulting in Indian forces to fall back to Asal Uttar. [2] During the retreat the division utilized its artillery to destroy bridges over the Ichhogil canal and Rohi Nullah further east. This delayed Pakistani advance and gave Indian forces some time to gather and organize their force. [5] On 7 September after the Indian division's strength further reduced to two battalions, the commander XI corps Lieutenant General Joginder Singh suggested to Commander Western Command Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh disbanding of 18th Rajputana, 7th Grenadier, 9th Jammu & Kashmir and 13th Dogra battalions [1] and replacing the complete force in the sector. [2] While the then Chief of Indian Army Staff General Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri suggested retreating to Beas river to which Joginder didn't agree. [8] Further delay in the forward movement of Pakistan's forces was caused when a tank got stuck on a bridge over Rohi Nullah. By then only ten tanks had crossed Rohi. [1]
Second phase
After the initial retreat the Indian forces were reorganized with 1/9 Gurkha Rifles deployed to defend Khem Karan-Bhikwind road, 18 Rajputana Rifles at the South of Asal Uttar, 4 Grenadiers were located at the rear of the earlier mentioned battlions at the South of Chima. The reduced strength 9 J and K Rifles were tasked to assist the 18 Rajputanas. [9] From 8th September the battle took place at Asal Uttar where Indian forces had set up their defenses. [1] The 4th Mountain Division was armed with 106 mm recoil-less rifles, bazookas and other anti-tank weaponry. [10] The 5th Brigade of Pakistan commanded by Brigadier Bashir fought this battle, where the 24 Cavalry attacked Khem Karan-Bhikwind axis and 6 Lancers advanced to Valtoha Railway Station. The 24 Cavalry failed to break the defenses of 3rd Cavalry and allied infantry battalions [1] while 6 Lancers that earlier requested Infantry liaison but was denied, [11] achieved their objective but was called back by the Brigade commander before the night fell on the first day. [1] A Pakistani ammunition train that was loaded with ammunition for the Patton tanks was hit at Kasur [10] in an air raid by the Indian Air Force Hawker Hunters of 7th Squadron.[ citation needed]
9th September:
10th September:On 10 September an offensive was again launched by Pakistan, lead by 5th Brigade's armor. The infantry few in numbers that was supporting the offensive was taken first by the Indian defending forces and were pushed back. [10] 11th September:On 11 September, India employed a near by canal to flood the battle field, that resulted in about hundred Pakistani tanks trapped. [12] Following failure of 1st Armored Division to move further from the bridgehead at Khem Karan and fall of its leadership during the battle the earlier day, the charge of command was given to Major General Sahabzada Yaqub Khan. [13]
Third phase
After suffering heavy losses at Asal Uttar, Pakistani forces took defensive position at Khem Karan. The 4th Sikh Battalion of India was tasked to infiltrate the Pakistani defenses from the eastern side of Khem Karan and back 7th Brigades offensive by attacking opposing froced from behind, for capturing Khem Karan. The night of 11th/12th September was chosen for the offensive considering the Saragarhi Day on 12th September. Saragarhi day is historically observed by the Sikh regiment in the memory of their men killed in the Battle of Saragarhi. According to R. D. Pradhan, the 4th Sikh and the 2nd Mahar Battalions that were assigned the offensive, were both fatigued because of the continuous fighting in the previous days. For the reason the 7th Brigade's commander asked for postponing the operation but his request was turned down. [2] On 12 September while continuing with the offensive plan the 4th Sikh with a strength of three hundred approached its objective but were apprehended by the Pakistani forces after losing twenty of their men. The 2nd Mahar battalion was attacked by the Pakistan Air Force's jets as soon as they reached near Khem Karan, resulting in the loss of eleven tanks and fifty of their men. The commander of the 7th Brigade Brigadier Sidhu was demoted on the failure of this operation. [2] Another attempt was made by the Indian forces to recapture the lost territory on the night of 21/22 September. This time 41st Mountain and 29th Infantry Brigades were tasked for the offensive. Lack of preparation lead to failure again as the Indian troops encountered minefields, air and artillery attacks. [3] [5]
Analysis
A number of analysts have described the Pakistani offensive as an "ambitious" plan.[ citation needed] Stephen Cohen opines that had Pakistan managed to reach the Grand Trunk road bridge over Beas river, it could have reached Delhi in a day's time. According to Cohen India did not capitalize on the collapse of Pakistani offensive at Asal Uttar. [14]
Aftermath
The war ended with a ceasefire made possible through the intervention of United Nations on 23 September 1965. With the ceasefire in effect the battle at Khem Karan also came to a halt.[ citation needed] After a truce was mediated between India and Pakistan by Russia at Tashkent, Pakistan returned the fifty square kilometer territory captured in the Khem Karan sector, in early 1966. [12]
Battle honours
India
Pakistan
- Lieutenant Colonel Sahibzad Gul - Commanding Officer 6 Lancers - Sitara e Jurat [1]
See also
References
- ^
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i Agha H Amin (2001).
Sehgal, Ikram (ed.).
"The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965". Defence Journal. Pathfinder. Retrieved 5 September 2013.
{{ cite journal}}: Unknown parameter|month=ignored ( help) - ^
a
b
c
d
e
f
g Yashwantrao Balwantrao Chavan (2007). 1965 War: The Inside Story. Atlantic Publishers. pp. 42–50.
ISBN
978-8126907625.
{{ cite book}}: Unknown parameter|coauthors=ignored (|author=suggested) ( help) - ^ a b c d Jogindar Singh (1 March 1998). Behind the Scene: An Analysis of India's Military Operations 1947-71. Spantech and Lancer. pp. 151–160. ISBN 978-1897829202. Retrieved 4 September 2013.
- ^ a b Mandeep Singh Bajwa (28 January 2004). A. Rinaldi, Richard (ed.). "A Brief History of 4th Indian Division and Its Brigades 1940—2003" (Format). Orbat Web Magazine. 2 (25). Orbat.com. Retrieved 3 September 2013.
- ^ a b c d e f Pradeep P. Barua (1 May 2005). The State at War in South Asia. University of Nebraska Press. pp. 188–190. ISBN 978-0803213449. Retrieved 4 September 2013.
-
^
Hussain, Abrar (2005). Men of steel: 6 Armoured Division in the 1965 war. Army Education Publishing House, Oxford University Press. pp. 31, 46.
ISBN
969-8125-19-1.
{{ cite book}}: Unknown parameter|coauthors=ignored (|author=suggested) ( help) -
^ Ahmad Gilani, Mukhtar (2003). Sehgal, Ikram (ed.).
"Panoramic Analysis —Senior and Junior Leaders —Aug 1947 to Dec 1971". Defence Journal. Pathfinder. Retrieved 9 September 2013.
{{ cite journal}}: Unknown parameter|month=ignored ( help) - ^ "History indicts Army for role in 1965 war". India Abroad Publications – via HighBeam (subscription required) . 15 September 2000. Retrieved 4 September 2013.
- ^ Farooq Bajwa (2013). From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965. Hurst Publishers. pp. 192–218. ISBN 978-1-84904-230-7.
- ^
a
b
c Steven J. Zaloga (1999).
The M47 and M48 Patton Tanks. Osprey Publishing. pp. 23–33.
ISBN
978-1855328259. Retrieved 10 September 2013.
{{ cite book}}: Unknown parameter|coauthors=ignored (|author=suggested) ( help); Unknown parameter|month=ignored ( help) -
^ Humayun Amin, Agha (2000). Sehgal, Ikram (ed.).
"Pakistan Armoured Corps as a Case Study". Defence Journal. Pathfinder. Retrieved 9 September 2013.
{{ cite journal}}: Unknown parameter|month=ignored ( help) - ^ a b Praveen Swami. India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004. Taylor & Francis. pp. 62, 79–80. ISBN 978-0203968406.
-
^ Zafar, Muhammad (2000). Sehgal, Ikram (ed.).
"Sahabzada Yaqub Khan". Defence Journal. Pathfinder. Retrieved 9 September 2013.
{{ cite journal}}: Unknown parameter|month=ignored ( help) -
^ Stephen P. Cohen (2010). Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization. Brookings Institution Press. p. 8.
ISBN
978-0815724926.
{{ cite book}}: Unknown parameter|coauthors=ignored (|author=suggested) ( help)