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The History of Garrisons in Jamaica is A garrison is a situation in which any means necessary is used to facilitate the full compliance of a particular population to the ideals of a political party/leader. A garrison is not just a place; it is a means of socialization and of control. Other writers argued, “A garrison, as the name suggests, is a political stronghold, a veritable fortress completely controlled by a party. At one level a garrison community can be described as one in which anyone who seeks to oppose, raise opposition to or organize against the dominant party would definitely be in danger of suffering serious damage to their possessions or person thus making continued residence in the area extremely difficult if not impossible. Any significant social, political, economic or cultural development within the garrison can only take place with the tacit approval of the leadership (whether local or national) of the dominant party. (Figueroa, 1996).
Circumstances leading to its development. Kerr, 1997, identified patronage/clientelism as one of the primary causes of the development of garrisons. (Kerr, 1997) The patron-client network evolved as its popularity grew significantly. “What began as mild clientelism in the decades of the '50s, developed into a blatant display of favouritism including preferential treatment for the supporters and discrimination against others.” (Kerr, 1997) Other writers argued that “From the 1960s onwards, a pattern of political violence developed in Jamaica wherein political parties armed gang leaders to ensure the allegiance of local communities. This pattern delineated what are widely known as ‘garrison’ communities, marked by allegiance to one party and armed social control exerted by gang leaders known as ‘Dons’. (Martínez, 2007)
The partisan allotment of housing benefits was used as a form of constructing the garrison phenomenon. “The practice of the party in power allocating houses to supporters in order to establish a homogeneous voting community resulted in recent proliferation of garrison communities seven in Kingston and St. Andrew and one in St. Catherine.” (Kerr, 1997) “Over time, public housing estates and land resettlement schemes have turned into a patchwork of reliably partisan constituencies. Regrettably, many also became armed garrison communities that are breeding grounds for political gangs.
Chevannes [1992] as cited in Figueroa [1996] describes two other ways garrisons developed. He believes “persons opposing a particular political party were pushed out from their communities from persons within or invasion of a community from outside.” Figueroa [1996] claimed, “Garrison communities may also be formed if politically homogeneous groups establish squatter communities as alternate form of living. For example Sufferers Heights or White Marl, St. Catherine”
Kerr identified unemployment as another major cause of the development of garrisons. “The Jamaican economy has not performed well over the past 35 years and therefore the country has not been able to provide enough jobs to meet the needs of a growing population.” (Kerr, 1997) He also identified poverty and scarce benefits as main contributors to the development of garrisons. “It is clear that poverty and illiteracy provide the opportunity for politicians to create and nurture political tribalism.” (Kerr, 1997) The need to maintain power was another factor that contributed to the development of garrisons. The power hungry bosses [or bourgeois party leaders (Stone, 1986)] of early development, used garrison activities as a means of gaining and maintaining power. Amnesty International suggested that “long-term political violence required the empowerment of strong (and violent) armed leaders who would enforce the political agenda in each community and help create garrison communities through violence and intimidation.” (Amnesty International, 2008) “Party Leaders and officials attempt to gain and keep political power by utilizing violent support from hardcore party supporters. These hardcore supporters would also ensure that is area is kept free from opposition [in the form of contenders] or independent political initiative.” (Stone, 1986) The “licky-licky” mentality of some Jamaicans was another reason for the rise of garrison communities. Some persons are motivated by monetary gains and “warm up” to politicians in order to be favored for contracts or financial rewards. This was evident in the 1980’s as Stone stated “some businessmen, educators, journalists, administrators, sportsmen etc were drawn into the patron broker client network because it offers material inducements, information, skill, money, organizational resources and contracts with politically useful clients.” (Stone, 1986)
References
{{Amnesty International. (2008). Jamaica‘Let them kill each other’: Public security in Jamaica’s inner cities. Amnesty International. Baker, P.-A. (2006). Community Developement: Breaking the cycle of poverty. (E. Clarke, Ed.) South Africa: Juta and Co Ltd. Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Goldsmith, A. A. (2002). Clientelism, Patrimonialism and Democratic Governance:An Overview and Framework for Assessment and Programming. Bethesda, MD: Abt Associates Inc. Cumper, G. (1972). Survey of Social Legislation in Jamaica. Kingston: Institute of Social Research. Dasgupta, Partha and Ismail Serageldin. 1999. “ Social Capital: A multifaceted Perspective.” Washington DC: The World Bank. Figueroa, M. (1996). Garrison Communities in Jamaica 1962-1993 thier growth on impact on political culture. Gallego, J. A., & Raciborski, R. (2008). Clientelism, Income Inequality, and Social Preferences:an Evolutionary Approach to Poverty Traps. Girvan, N. (1993). Working together for developement. Kingston: Institue of Jamaica Publications Limited. Haid, C. J. (2009). Gunmen and Graft in Jamaican Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago. Kerr, J. (1997). July 1997 Report of the National Committee on Political Tribal-ism. Kingston. Martínez, A. D. (2007). Jamaica. FRIDE. Moser, Caroline and Jeremy Holland. 1997. “Urban Poverty and Violence in Jamaica.” World Bank Latin America and the Caribbean studies. Washington DC: The World Bank. Portes, Alejandro and Patricia Landolt. “The Downside of Social Capital.” The American Prospect no. 26 (May-June 1996): 18-21, 94 ( http://epn.org/prospect/26/26-cnt2). Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: google Books. Stone, C. (1986). Democracy and Clientism in Jamaica. New Jersey: New Brunswick. The Carter Center. (2003). Observing the 2002 Jamaica Parliamentary Elections. Atlanta: The Carter Center. Woolcock, Michael and Deepa Narayan. 2000. “Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and policy.” World Bank Research Observer, vol. 15. The World Bank. }}
External links
| This is not a Wikipedia article: It is an individual user's work-in-progress page, and may be incomplete and/or unreliable. For guidance on developing this draft, see
Wikipedia:So you made a userspace draft. Find sources:
Google (
books ·
news ·
scholar ·
free images ·
WP refs) ·
FENS ·
JSTOR ·
TWL |
The History of Garrisons in Jamaica is A garrison is a situation in which any means necessary is used to facilitate the full compliance of a particular population to the ideals of a political party/leader. A garrison is not just a place; it is a means of socialization and of control. Other writers argued, “A garrison, as the name suggests, is a political stronghold, a veritable fortress completely controlled by a party. At one level a garrison community can be described as one in which anyone who seeks to oppose, raise opposition to or organize against the dominant party would definitely be in danger of suffering serious damage to their possessions or person thus making continued residence in the area extremely difficult if not impossible. Any significant social, political, economic or cultural development within the garrison can only take place with the tacit approval of the leadership (whether local or national) of the dominant party. (Figueroa, 1996).
Circumstances leading to its development. Kerr, 1997, identified patronage/clientelism as one of the primary causes of the development of garrisons. (Kerr, 1997) The patron-client network evolved as its popularity grew significantly. “What began as mild clientelism in the decades of the '50s, developed into a blatant display of favouritism including preferential treatment for the supporters and discrimination against others.” (Kerr, 1997) Other writers argued that “From the 1960s onwards, a pattern of political violence developed in Jamaica wherein political parties armed gang leaders to ensure the allegiance of local communities. This pattern delineated what are widely known as ‘garrison’ communities, marked by allegiance to one party and armed social control exerted by gang leaders known as ‘Dons’. (Martínez, 2007)
The partisan allotment of housing benefits was used as a form of constructing the garrison phenomenon. “The practice of the party in power allocating houses to supporters in order to establish a homogeneous voting community resulted in recent proliferation of garrison communities seven in Kingston and St. Andrew and one in St. Catherine.” (Kerr, 1997) “Over time, public housing estates and land resettlement schemes have turned into a patchwork of reliably partisan constituencies. Regrettably, many also became armed garrison communities that are breeding grounds for political gangs.
Chevannes [1992] as cited in Figueroa [1996] describes two other ways garrisons developed. He believes “persons opposing a particular political party were pushed out from their communities from persons within or invasion of a community from outside.” Figueroa [1996] claimed, “Garrison communities may also be formed if politically homogeneous groups establish squatter communities as alternate form of living. For example Sufferers Heights or White Marl, St. Catherine”
Kerr identified unemployment as another major cause of the development of garrisons. “The Jamaican economy has not performed well over the past 35 years and therefore the country has not been able to provide enough jobs to meet the needs of a growing population.” (Kerr, 1997) He also identified poverty and scarce benefits as main contributors to the development of garrisons. “It is clear that poverty and illiteracy provide the opportunity for politicians to create and nurture political tribalism.” (Kerr, 1997) The need to maintain power was another factor that contributed to the development of garrisons. The power hungry bosses [or bourgeois party leaders (Stone, 1986)] of early development, used garrison activities as a means of gaining and maintaining power. Amnesty International suggested that “long-term political violence required the empowerment of strong (and violent) armed leaders who would enforce the political agenda in each community and help create garrison communities through violence and intimidation.” (Amnesty International, 2008) “Party Leaders and officials attempt to gain and keep political power by utilizing violent support from hardcore party supporters. These hardcore supporters would also ensure that is area is kept free from opposition [in the form of contenders] or independent political initiative.” (Stone, 1986) The “licky-licky” mentality of some Jamaicans was another reason for the rise of garrison communities. Some persons are motivated by monetary gains and “warm up” to politicians in order to be favored for contracts or financial rewards. This was evident in the 1980’s as Stone stated “some businessmen, educators, journalists, administrators, sportsmen etc were drawn into the patron broker client network because it offers material inducements, information, skill, money, organizational resources and contracts with politically useful clients.” (Stone, 1986)
References
{{Amnesty International. (2008). Jamaica‘Let them kill each other’: Public security in Jamaica’s inner cities. Amnesty International. Baker, P.-A. (2006). Community Developement: Breaking the cycle of poverty. (E. Clarke, Ed.) South Africa: Juta and Co Ltd. Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Goldsmith, A. A. (2002). Clientelism, Patrimonialism and Democratic Governance:An Overview and Framework for Assessment and Programming. Bethesda, MD: Abt Associates Inc. Cumper, G. (1972). Survey of Social Legislation in Jamaica. Kingston: Institute of Social Research. Dasgupta, Partha and Ismail Serageldin. 1999. “ Social Capital: A multifaceted Perspective.” Washington DC: The World Bank. Figueroa, M. (1996). Garrison Communities in Jamaica 1962-1993 thier growth on impact on political culture. Gallego, J. A., & Raciborski, R. (2008). Clientelism, Income Inequality, and Social Preferences:an Evolutionary Approach to Poverty Traps. Girvan, N. (1993). Working together for developement. Kingston: Institue of Jamaica Publications Limited. Haid, C. J. (2009). Gunmen and Graft in Jamaican Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago. Kerr, J. (1997). July 1997 Report of the National Committee on Political Tribal-ism. Kingston. Martínez, A. D. (2007). Jamaica. FRIDE. Moser, Caroline and Jeremy Holland. 1997. “Urban Poverty and Violence in Jamaica.” World Bank Latin America and the Caribbean studies. Washington DC: The World Bank. Portes, Alejandro and Patricia Landolt. “The Downside of Social Capital.” The American Prospect no. 26 (May-June 1996): 18-21, 94 ( http://epn.org/prospect/26/26-cnt2). Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: google Books. Stone, C. (1986). Democracy and Clientism in Jamaica. New Jersey: New Brunswick. The Carter Center. (2003). Observing the 2002 Jamaica Parliamentary Elections. Atlanta: The Carter Center. Woolcock, Michael and Deepa Narayan. 2000. “Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and policy.” World Bank Research Observer, vol. 15. The World Bank. }}
External links