"Medvedevisms" - Sources

• Süddeutsche Zeitung(comment) 20-Nov-2008 >> Marionette Medwedjew

Russische Zeitschriften drucken wieder Breschnew-Witze, eine Anspielung auf die endlosen Jahre geriatrischer sowjetischer Herrscher. Dabei haben auch andere Länder ihren geliebten Präsidenten längere Amtszeiten zugestanden, Weißrussland beispielsweise, Turkmenistan, Usbekistan, und, ja, der Irak. Frankreich hat die Verfassung geändert und die Amtsdauer verkürzt, aber diese Variante ist in Moskau derzeit nicht populär. Dort lässt Dmitrij Medwedjew die Amtszeit des Präsidenten gerade verlängern.

Natürlich entscheidet sich Russlands Demokratiefähigkeit nicht an der Frage, ob der Kreml alle vier oder alle sechs Jahre neu besetzt wird. Fatal ist der Gesetzentwurf trotzdem: weil Medwedjew zum ersten Mal Hand an die Verfassung legt, deren Unantastbarkeit bislang höchster politischer Wille war; weil die devote Hast, mit der die Abgeordneten seine Idee umsetzen, den Kulissencharakter des russischen Parlamentarismus entlarvt; weil die Kreml-Astrologen wieder zu den Kristallkugeln stürzen, um künftige Machtkonstellationen zu erkunden. Angesichts großer Herausforderungen, so hatte Medwedjew versprochen, solle eine längere Amtszeit dem Präsidenten Luft verschaffen und dem Land Stabilität schenken. Nichts ist weniger der Fall.

Es liegt eine große Ironie darin, dass ausgerechnet der völkerrechtsverliebte Jurist Medwedjew all jene schmutzigen Aufgaben erledigen muss, die sein Vorgänger und jetziger Premier Wladimir Putin gemieden hat: den Krieg mit Georgien, die Änderung der Verfassung, die Verlängerung der Amtszeit. Dass Putin im Hintergrund die Dinge lenkt, bezweifelt in Russland niemand. Für die Illusion einer gleichberechtigten Doppelherrschaft dürften die Tage gezählt sein.

- Elysander ( talk) 12:19, 20 November 2008 (UTC)

• Nina Chruschtschowa, Tollpatsche im Kreml (Apes in the Kremlin), Süddeutsche Zeitung, Dec-27-2008 - [2] - Elysander ( talk) 15:40, 4 January 2009 (UTC)

Putin's Georgian Background

• UK Daily Telegraph [3]
• Scotsman [4]
• Gulfnews (<TDT) [5]

• 2009-Sept: Die Presse [6]
• 2008-Aug: greenpeace magazin (dpa) [7]
• 2004-Nov: Russland-Aktuell [8]

Reviews NL-Docu

• 2004-Nov: ARTE - Hamb. Abendblatt [9]

Sources

• NG: Mikhail Kasyanov: Our Market Is Dead ~ Former Russian prime minister talking of why economic crisis in Russia will be worse than in the US and Europe - 22.10.08 - [10]

• FAZ ~ Der russische Rubel wirkt angezählt [11] - Gerüchte um Rubelabwertung machen die Runde - Fallende Währungsreserven zeigen die Gefahren

Die Kreditkrise hat auch die Währungen einiger Schwellenländer gehörig unter Druck gesetzt. Auch der russische Rubel bekommt die negativen Auswirkungen zu spüren. Wobei hier als wichtiger Belastungsfaktor auch noch der stark gefallene Ölpreis mitwirkt. Am Donnerstag mussten für einen amerikanischen Dollar erstmals seit zwei Jahren wieder mehr als 27 Rubel gezahlt werden. Im Juli benötigte man zweitweise dafür nur noch etwas mehr als 23 Rubel. Zur Begründung für den anhaltenden Kursdruck wird derzeit auf den Ölpreis verwiesen. Dieser ist am Mittwoch weiter deutlich auf weniger als 62 Dollar je Barrel (159 Liter) gefallen. Für Russland ist dies deshalb ein kritischer Wert, weil die Berechnungen für den Staatshaushalt im kommenden Jahr auf einem durchschnittlichen Ölpreis von 70 Dollar beruhen. Sollte der Ölpreis auf dem jetzigen Niveau verharren, oder vielleicht sogar weiter sinken, wäre das natürlich nicht gerade komfortabel. Außerdem hat das Land gegenwärtig auch noch mit anderen Problemen zu kämpfen. Neben der Kapitalabflüsse, die teilweise auch wegen der Georgienkrise aufgetreten sind, sorgen laut WGZ Bank auch kurzfristig fällige Fremdwährungskredite aus dem öffentlichen und privaten Sektor für Druck auf die Währung. Erheblich unter Druck stehen aber auch die Anleihen des Landes. So hat sich der Risikoaufschlag auf russische Staatsanleihen in Dollar zuletzt auf 591 Basispunkte erhöht. Verglichen mit dem Jahresanfang ist der Aufschlag damit um 419 Basispunkte gestiegen. Auf Unternehmensebene sind die Risikoaufschläge sogar noch stärker gestiegen. Und wenn selbst ein Energieriese wie Gasprom, der Assets wie die weltgrößten Gasreserven zu bieten hat, Refinanzierungsprobleme einräumt, dann lässt sich an fünf Fingern abzählen, dass auch etliche andere russische Unternehmen derzeit mit Finanzierungsproblemen zu kämpfen haben. Denis Gaevski von der Bank von Moskau kann sich jedenfalls einen Ausfall von 20 bis 30 Prozent der auf Rubel lautenden Unternehmensanleihen vorstellen. Insgesamt sind die Probleme trotz der vom Staat bereits beschlossenen Hilfsprogramme im Volumen von mehr als 200 Milliarden Dollar so gravierend, dass sie zuletzt bereits Gerüchte um eine bevorstehende Rubel-Abwertung ausgelöst haben. Auch immer mehr Bürger versuchen ihre Rubel in Dollar zu tauschen. Die Russen sind in dieser Hinsicht ohnehin sehr sensibel, weil sie erst während der Rubelkrise im August 1998 um viele ihrer Ersparnisse beraubt wurden. Der russische Präsident Medvedev hält zwar dagegen und beteuert, für die Rubel-Schwäche gebe es keine fundamentalen Gründe. Aus seiner Sicht würden vielmehr alle Spekulanten, die gegen den Rubel wetten, eine große Enttäuschung erleben. Zur Untermauerung dieser These verwies er auf die weltweit drittgrößten Währungsreserven, über die Russland verfügt. Mit aktuell 515,7 Milliarden Dollar sind die Reserven zwar in der Tat noch immer stattlich. Aber alleine in den beiden vergangenen Wochen sind sie um mehr als 30 Milliarden Dollar geschrumpft, was andeutet, wie schnell die Reserven auch wieder abnehmen können. „Der Rückgang der Reserven ist ziemlich alarmierend,“ sagt auch Vladimir Tikhomirov, Chefvolkswirt bei Ural Sib. Auch andere Marktteilnehmer zeigen sich skeptisch: „Die Zentralbank hat keine andere Wahl, als den Rubel weiter abzuwerten, glaubt Paul Biszko, Analyst bei RBC. Und auch Beat Siegenthaler, Stratege bei TD, geht davon aus, dass „mittelfristig eine gewisse Abwertung unausweichlich ist.“ Die Pessimisten dürften insbesondere dann Recht behalten, wenn der Ölpreis deutlich und für längere Zeit unter die Marke von 60 Dollar fallen sollte. Allerdings sind Preisprognosen jedweder Art im aktuell turbulenten Umfeld kaum seriös möglich. Zur Erinnerung sei in diesem Zusammenhang nur daran erinnert, dass noch vor wenigen Wochen oft ein weiter steigender Ölpreis vorhergesagt wurde, auch als der Barrel noch mehr als 140 Dollar kostete. Auch diese Fehlprognose zeigt, wie schwierig Vorhersagen derzeit sind. Eine weitere Rubel-Abwertung kann vor diesem Hintergrund aber ebenfalls nicht von vorneherein kategorisch ausgeschlossen werden. Elysander ( talk) 13:49, 23 October 2008 (UTC)

• • AP - [12]- 10 Nov 2008 Elysander ( talk) 19:14, 12 November 2008 (UTC)
  • FAZ - [13]]- Russia allows ruble to fall, stokes uncertainty - 11 Nov 2008

• Pavel Felgenhauer Articles >>
  • Novaja Gazeta
    • Politics ~ Generals Will Take Up A Defensive Position. The secret reform of the Russian Army to intend radical reduction of the officer’s staff and giving up confrontation with the West? - 16.10.2008 - [14]
    • Politics ~ Frosts due to a nervous condition ~ Sharp statements won’t lead to another cold war but leave a bitter taste in the mouth - 08.08.07 - [15]
  • Eurasia Daily Monitor
    • Officials Warn Of A Possible Russia-Georgia War In The Future - 23.10.2008 - [16]

• Sources: War Orchestrating
  • Pavel Felgenhauer, Ossetian Separatists Are Provoking Major Russian Intervention, EDM - 07.08.2008 - [17]
  • Vladimir Socor, Moscow Orchestrates War Scare In South Ossetia, EDM - 04.08.2008 - [18]
  • Vladimir Socor, Berlin Consultations On Abkhazia Derailed, EDM - 01.08.2008 - [19]
  • Vladimir Socor, “De-Recognition” Of Georgia’s Territorial Integrity Disqualifies Russia As “Peacekeeper”, EDM - 11.07.2008 - [20]

• Russian Bases in Abkhazia in Gudauta und Ochamchire>> German comment: Erstens zeigt sie, auf welche planmäßige, langfristig angelegte Weise Rußland dabei vorgeht, die alten sowjetischen Machtpositionen wieder einzurichten. Zweitens arbeitet die russische Diplomatie exakt so, wie man es aus Sowjetzeiten kennt: Man macht scheinbar Zugeständnisse, die dann nicht eingehalten werden. Es werden vage Versprechungen formuliert. Solange man schwach ist, zeigt man sich konziliant, und sobald man in einer Position der Stärke ist, ist es vorbei mit dem Entgegenkommen. Auch dumme Lügen wie die vom Sanatorium werden nicht verschmäht. Abchasien dürfte für die Russen mindestens so wichtig, wahrscheinlich wichtiger sein als Südossetien. Man hat das Tamtam in Südossetien veranstaltet und sich hinter diesem Sperrfeuer ohne großen Widerstand des Westens Abchasien unter den Nagel gerissen. Drittens ist die Geschichte des Stützpunkts Gudauta bezeichnend für das Verhalten der europäischen Gegenspieler Rußlands. Die das eben nicht sind. Die sich hinhalten, die sich einwickeln lassen und dann die vollendeten Tatsachen, die die Russen schaffen, mehr oder weniger achselzuckend hinnehmen. Und das ist vielleicht der Hauptunterschied zur Zeit des Kalten Kriegs. Damals hatten die Russen es mit einem entschlossenen Westen zu tun. Heute gibt es bei uns nicht wenige, die wohlwollend zusehen, wie die Russen ihre "berechtigten Interessen" verfolgen (zettels raum) Elysander ( talk) 21:30, 28 October 2008 (UTC)

• Rachel Denber HRW - [21]:

Rachel Denber November 13, 2008 03:43 PM

Jason Bush’s article states that Human Rights Watch estimates that there were 300-400 Ossetian civilian casualties during the war between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia. He is not the first observer to mistakenly-- though unwittingly-- attribute to Human Rights Watch estimates of civilian casualties during the August war. But Human Rights Watch has never made any such estimates, because we do not have the capacity to do so.

In his article, Mr. Bush references the BBC, citing HRW that 300-400 is a “useful starting point for assessing civilian casualties, even if some of these may be Ossetian paramilitaries.”

This came about in a discussion about lists of deaths, one compiled by the Investigative Committee of the Russian Prosecutor General’s office, which at the time of the interview had a list of 159 deaths, and the other by a South Ossetian commission working with Russia’s Public Chamber, which now has a list of 361 deaths.

Our emphasis, in this interview and others, has been not on endorsing definitive or even approximate numbers but on describing what needs to be done to make an accurate assessment: distinguishing between civilian and fighters, going from home to home, ensuring comprehnsiveness, ensuring there has been no double counting, establishing time and circumstances of death, and the like.

The Public Chamber list does not, for example, distinguish between civilian and fighter casualties. It is not clear whether the prosecutor’s list does, and if so, how.

What is not disputed by anyone, including the parties to the conflict, is that civilians bore the brunt of the fighting. The sometimes clinical and hotly disputed discussion of civilian casualty numbers should not for one instant diminish the fact that even one is a tragedy. Rachel Denber Acting Director Europe and Central Asia division, Human Rights Watch

Web brigades ~~ Article status at a certain date

The Internet brigades or Web brigades ( Russian: Веб-бригады simplified Chinese: 网特；; traditional Chinese: 網特) ^{[1] [2]} are governmental teams of on-line commentators that participate in political blogs and Internet forums to promote disinformation and prevent free discussions of undesirable subjects. Such teams are allegedly affiliated with Russian state propaganda department and security services and with Chinese internet police ^[3]. The state-sponsored "web brigades" exist along with other organized teams of information fighters that may push private political agendas, ^[4] be involved in astroturfing, ^[5] or participate in election campaigns. ^[6]

Web brigades in Russia

First publication

This alleged phenomenon in RuNet was described in 2003 by journalist Anna Polyanskaya ^[7] (a former assistant to assassinated Russian politician Galina Starovoitova ^[8]), historian Andrey Krivov and political activist Ivan Lomako, from the Center for extreme journalism.

They described organized and professional "brigades", composed of ideologically and methodologically identical personalities, who were working in practically every popular liberal and pro- democracy Internet forums and Internet newspapers of RuNet.

The activity of Internet teams appeared in 1999 and were organized by the Russian state security service, according to Polyanskaya. ^{[3] [2]} According to authors, about 70% of audience of Russian Internet were people of generally liberal views prior to 1998–1999, however sudden surge (about 60-80%) of "antidemocratic" posts suddenly occurred at many Russian forums in 2000.

Views

According to Polyanskaya and her colleagues, the behavior of people from the web brigades has distinct features, some of which are the following: ^[2]

• Any change in Moscow's agenda leads to immediate changes in the brigade's opinions.
• Boundless loyalty to Vladimir Putin and his circle.
• Respect and admiration for the KGB and FSB.
• Nostalgia for the Soviet Union and propaganda of the Communist ideology, and constant attempts to present in a positive light the entire history of Russia and the Soviet Union, minimizing the number of people who died in repressions. ^[2]
• Anti-liberal, anti-American, anti-Chechen, anti-Semitic and anti-western opinions. Xenophobia, racism, approval of skinheads and pogroms. ^[2]
• Accusation of Russophobia against everyone who disagrees with them.
• Hatred of dissidents and human rights organizations and activists, political prisoners and journalists, especially Anna Politkovskaya, Sergei Kovalev, Elena Bonner, Grigory Pasko, Victor Shenderovich, and Valeria Novodvorskaya.
• Emigrants are accused of being traitors of the motherland. Some members will claim that they live in some Western country and tell stories about how much better life is in Putin's Russia.
• Before the Iraq War, the brigade's anti-U.S. operations reached unseen scale. The original publication describes: "it sometimes seemed that the U.S. was not liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein, but at a minimum had actually launched an attack on Russia and was marching on the Kremlin." However, it fell silent suddenly after Putin announced that Russia was not opposed to the victory of the coalition forces in Iraq. ^[2]

Tactics

These brigades reportedly use a number of common tactics.

• Frequent changes of pseudonyms. ^[2]

• Round-the-clock presence on forums. At least one of the uniform members of the team can be found online at all times, always ready to repulse any “attack” by a liberal. ^[2]

• Intentional diversion of pointed discussions. For instance, the brigade may claim that Pol Pot never had any connection with Communism or that not a single person was killed in Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 by Soviet tanks.

• Individual work on opponents. "As soon as an opposition-minded liberal arrives on a forum, expressing a position that makes them a clear "ideological enemy”, he is immediately cornered and subjected to “ active measures” by the unified web-brigade. Without provocation, the opponent is piled on with abuse or vicious “arguments” of the sort that the average person cannot adequately react to. As a result, the liberal either answers sharply, causing a scandal and getting himself labeled a “boor” by the rest of the brigade, or else he starts to make arguments against the obvious absurdities, to which his opponents pay no attention, but simply ridicule him and put forth other similar arguments." ^[2]

• Accusations that opponents are working for “enemies”. The opponents are accused of taking money from Berezovskiy, the CIA, the MOSSAD, Saudi Arabia, the Zionists, or the Chechen rebels.

• Making personally offensive comments. Tendency to accuse their opponents of being insane during arguments.

• Remarkable ability to reveal personal information about their opponents and their quotes from old postings, sometimes more than a year old.

• Teamwork. "They unwaveringly support each other in discussions, ask each other leading questions, put fine points on each other’s answers, and even pretend not to know each other. If an opponent starts to be hounded, this hounding invariably becomes a team effort, involving all of the three to twenty nicknames that invariably are present on any political forum 24 hours a day." ^[2]

• Appealing to the Administration. The members of teams often "write mass collective complaints about their opponents to the editors, site administrators, or the electronic “complaints book”, demanding that one or another posting or whole discussion thread they don’t like be removed, or calling for the banning of individuals they find problematic." ^[2]

• Destruction of inconvenient forums. For example, on the site of the Moscow News, all critics of Putin and the FSB "were suddenly and without any explanation banned from all discussions, despite their having broken none of the site’s rules of conduct. All the postings of this group of readers, going back a year and a half, were erased by the site administrator." ^[2]

Criticism

Alexander Yusupovskiy, head of the analytical department of the Federation Council of Russia (Russian Parliament) asserted that web brigades are a conspiracy theory. ^[9] Yusupovskiy's points included:

• There is difference between "dislike of hegemonic policy of the United States" at Russian forums and "quite friendly attitude towards usual Americans". Aggression and xenophobia doesn't characterize one side but is a common place of polemics, well met not only among Russian patriots, but among Russian emigrants from US, Israel, or other countries as well.
• Change of attitude of virtual masses in 1998-1999 could be caused by Russian financial collapse which "crowned liberal decade", rather than "mysterious bad guys".
• Authors exclude from their interpretation of events all other hypotheses, such as internet activity of a group of some "skinheads", nazbols; or hackers able to get IP addresses of their opponents.
• Officeers of GRU or FSB have more topical problems, than "comparing virtual penises" with liberals and emigrants. ^[9]Yusupovskiy concluded that

"We would never make our country's military organizations and security services work under the rule of law and legal control, if won't learn to recognize rationally and objectively their necessity and usefulness for the country, state, society and citizens. Sweeping defamation and intentional discreditation with the help of "arguments", which are obviously false, only contribute to the extrusion of security services outside of rule of law and instigates them to chaos". ^[9]

=Support

Russian intelligence expert Andrei Soldatov made the following points when asked by Yevgenia Albats about "web brigades" ^[10]:

• Russian state security teams actively disrupt work of certain political blogs;
• One of the teams, who called themselves GRU officers, was actively involved in a disinformation campaign prior to US invasion of Iraq;
• The teams are also involved in hacker attacks, and they have probably attacked his own web site during the Moscow theater hostage crisis;
• Some of the "web brigades" are coordinated by the Russian signals intelligence, which is currently a part of the FSB and has been formerly a part of 16th KGB department;
• There are also such teams from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Paul Goble, director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, claims "the Kremlin has dispatched its own “agents of influence” to political forums on the Internet both to portray itself as having more support than it has and to suggest that its opponents who would like to see a more democratic Russia with closer ties to the West are an ever more marginal group" ^[11]

Public perception in Russia

In 2007 sociological analysis of big groups in Russian society published at Russian resource RIO-Center, it's mentioned that idea of existence of web-brigades is a widespread conspiracy theory in RuNet. Authors say "it's difficult to say whether hypothesis of existence of web-brigades corresponds to reality", "web brigades are conspiracy theory" but acknowledge that the users profess views on the existence of "web-brigades". ^[12]

"LiveJournal fighters"

A member of National Bolshevik Party Roman Sadykhov reported about " LiveJournal fighters", directed and paid from the Kremlin and instructions given to them by Vladislav Surkov, a close aide of Vladimir Putin ^[13] Surkov allegedly called Livejournal "a very important sector of work" ^[14] and said that people's brains must be " nationalized" . He instructed "LiveJournal fighters" that

"We are losing in the Internet in that respect. It is always easier to break down things than to do something positive. What you are doing are jokes and minor infractions. Not only methods, but also goals must be radical. We must blow this romantics out of them [our opponents]. It is important not only to protect the authorities - this is understood, but we need to attract young people who can work creatively in the Internet. This is an important communication place of young people. Make them interested in conversations with you." ^[14]

Internet brigades in Russian literature

The alleged FSB activities on the Internet have been described in the short story "Anastasya" by Russian writer Grigory Svirsky, who was interested in the moral aspects of their work. ^[15] He wrote: "It seems that offending, betraying, or even "murdering" people in the virtual space is easy. This is like killing an enemy in a video game: one does not see a disfigured body or the eyes of the person who is dying right in front of you. However, the human soul lives by its own basic laws that force it to pay the price for the virtual crime in his real life". ^[3]

Outside Russia

Russian brigades in the Polish Internet

Russian "Internet brigades" reportedly appeared in Poland in 2005. According to claims of anonymous "Polish experts on Russian affairs", reported by the Polish newspaper Tygodnik Powszechny, "at least a dozen active Russian agents work in Poland, also investigating the Polish Internet. They are claimed to scrutinize Polish websites (like those supporting Belarusian opposition), and also to perform such actions, as—for instance—contributing to Internet forums on large portals (like Gazeta.pl, Onet.pl, WP.pl). Labeled as Polish Internet users, they incite anti-Semitic or anti-Ukrainian discussions or disavow articles published on the web." ^[16]

Internet propaganda teams in mainland China

It has been reported ^[1] that in 2005, departments of provincial and municipal governments in mainland China began creating teams of Internet commentators from propaganda and police departments and offering them classes in Marxism, propaganda techniques, and the Internet. They are reported to guide discussion on public bulletin boards away from politically sensitive topics by posting opinions anonymously or under false names. "They are actually hiring staff to curse online", said Liu Di, a Chinese student who was arrested for posting her comments in blogs.

Netherlands

It was reported that Dutch police have set up an Internet Brigade to fight cybercrime. Among its planned actions are to infiltrate internet newsgroups and discussion forums for intelligence gathering, to make pseudo-purchase and to provide services. ^[17].

Internet brigades in Wikipedia?

A number of publications suggested that intelligence agents may have infiltrated Wikipedia to remove undesirable information ^[18] The design and application of WikiScanner technology proved such suspicions to be well founded, although it remains unknown how many agents from around the world operate in Wikipedia ^{[19] [20] [21] [22] [23]}

References

See also

• Information warfare
• Harassment by computer
• Jingjing and Chacha
• Computer crime
• Internet censorship in the People's Republic of China
• Astroturfing
• Political repression of bloggers and cyber-dissidents

External links

The original publication:

• Translation to English: Commissars of the Internet - The FSB at the Computer. By Anna Politkovskaya, Andrei Krivov, and Ivan Lomko.

Discussions of existence of web-brigades in RuNet:

• Russophone LiveJournal community FSB Brigade for Smothering Democracy
• Discussion of the article Red Web Brigades at Nnov.Ru (in Russian)
• Discussion of control over internet and personal security with Yevgeniya Albats at Moscow-based radio channel Echo Moskvy. (in Russian)

[[Category:Internet forum terminology]] [[Category:Internet culture]] [[Category:Internet censorship]] [[Category:Technology in society]] [[Category:Cyberspace]] [[Category:Political weblogs]] [[Category:Propaganda techniques]] [[Category:Public relations techniques]] [[Category:Psychological warfare techniques]] [[Category:Soviet and Russian intelligence agencies]] [[Category:Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation]] [[Category:Human rights in Russia]] [[Category:Internet in Russia]] [[Category:Conspiracy theories]]

Additional Sources

TAZ [22] Activities of Russian Web Brigades in foreign countries/ Attacks on German author Boris Reitschuster / ""Putins Demokratur" MELANIE ZERAHN - "Der virtuelle Arm des Kreml" - 15 Jan 2007