After Munich
After Munich, Halifax (successfully) advised Chamberlain against capitalising on his popularity by calling a snap general election; instead he urged (in vain) that Chamberlain widen the National Coalition by offering jobs not just to Churchill and Eden but also to Labour and Liberal figures. Halifax was also disgusted by the anti-Jewish pogrom of Kristallnacht (10 November). He advocated British financial aid to the countries of central and eastern Europe to discourage them from coming under Germany's influence.
With Hitler's lack of commitment regarding the Munich Agreement becoming clearer, Halifax worked steadily to assemble a stronger British position, pushing Chamberlain to take economic steps to underpin British interests in Eastern Europe and prevent additional military supplies from reaching Germany, such as tungsten.
In January 1939, Halifax accompanied Chamberlain to Rome for talks with Mussolini. That month Halifax pushed for staff talks with France, in view of the danger of war with both Germany and Italy simultaneously. After Hitler broke the Munich agreement and occupied the rump of "Czecho-slovakia" (the hyphen had been added after Munich), Chamberlain gave a speech in Birmingham on 17 March 1939, pledging that Britain would go to war to defend Poland. Halifax had been one of the drivers in this change of policy. By March 1939, Eden, then out of office, observed that thanks to Halifax the government are "now doing what we would wish".
Halifax granted a guarantee to Poland on 31 March 1939, triggered by alarming intelligence of German preparations, in hopes of sending clear signals to Germany that, in Halifax's words, there would be "no more Munichs".
The Foreign Office received intelligence in early April 1939 that Italy was about to invade Albania. At a Cabinet meeting on 5 April 1939, Halifax rejected these reports. Two days later, Italy invaded Albania; Halifax met Sir Alexander Cadogan and "decided we can't do anything to stop it". [1]
Although he disliked the Soviet regime, not least because of its atheism, Halifax was quicker than Chamberlain to realise that Britain should attempt to ally with the USSR. He told the Foreign Affairs committee: "Soviet Russia is something between that of the unconquerable steamroller and looking on her as entirely useless militarily. We cannot ignore a country with a population of 180,000,000 people." [2] [3]
The negotiations (in summer 1939) failed, and the USSR allied with Germany instead on 23 August. It has been suggested that Halifax should have led the negotiations himself, [4] but this would not have suited Halifax's purpose because his government were not carrying out the negotiations in good faith. [5] The Foreign Office confirmed to the US chargé d'affaires on 8 August 1939 that "the military mission, which had now left Moscow, had been told to make every effort to prolong discussions until 1 October 1939". [6] Halifax disclosed to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 10 July 1939: "Although the French were in favour of the military conversations commencing, the French Government thought that the military conversations would be spun out over a long time and as long as they were taking place we should be preventing Soviet Russia from entering the German camp."
While H Roberts has spoken of Halifax's fellow Foreign Minister (of the Soviet Union), Litvinov, as having acute perceptive skills and an ability "to detect major trends in the 1930s and to anticipate the course of events indicates his tremendous understanding of the decade" [7], Halifax had completely misunderstood Hitler. [5] Halifax said: "Hitler had a very low opinion of the Soviet Union, and our action [in aligning with the USSR] would confirm to him the idea that we were a weak and feeble folk." [8] On the contrary what made Hitler worried was the thought of a joint pact between France, Britain and the Soviet Union, in order to prevent a pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. [5] Halifax was not to know that during April 1939 Hitler told von Weizsäcker that he was contemplating a reconciliation with the Soviet Union; [9] on 2 August 1939 Hitler asked von Neurath, former Foreign Minister and career diplomat at the time of the Weimar Republic, whether the German people would accept such an ideological shift from anti-communism to signing a pact with the Soviet Union. Neurath assured Hitler he "could do what he liked with the [National Socialist] Party". [10]
With Poland now looking likely to be carved up between Germany and the USSR (as indeed soon took place), the diarist "Chips" Channon, PPS to Halifax's junior minister Rab Butler, recorded (25 August 1939) that "the barometer of war kept shifting" and that "the Polish guarantee was [Halifax]'s pet scheme and favourite god-child" (Butler opposed the guarantee).
When Germany invaded Poland, Halifax refused any negotiations while German troops remained on Polish soil. However, he stood solid with Chamberlain, who delayed in giving a commitment to go to war until the French also committed. The two of them were the objects of the Cabinet revolt which insisted that Britain honour the guarantee to Poland. Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939.
- ^ Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), p. 208.
- ^ Taylor, A. J. P., ed. (1971). Lloyd George: Twelve Essays. London: Hamish Hamilton. p. 336. ISBN 0-24-101905-2.
- ^ Aster, Sidney (1973). 1939: The Making of the Second World War. Andre Deutsch. p. 156. ISBN 978-0-23-396369-3.
-
^ Cite error: The named reference
matthew86was invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ a b c Holroyd-Doveton, John (2013). Maxim Litvinov: A Biography. Woodland Publications. p. 372.
- ^ FRUS, Volume I, General. 1939. p. 294.
- ^ Roberts, Henry (1994), "Maxim Litvinov", in Craig, Gordon; Gilbert, Felix (eds.), The Diplomats, 1919-1939, Princeton University Press, p. 376
- ^ Records of the Cabinet Office, CAB 27/625. p. 295.
- ^ von Weizsäcker, Ernst (1950). Erinnerungen [Recollections] (in German). Munich: List. p. 186.
- ^ Heineman, John L. (1979). Hitler's First Foreign Minister: Constantin Freiherr Von Neurath. University of California Press. p. 200. ISBN 978-0-52-003442-6.
After Munich
After Munich, Halifax (successfully) advised Chamberlain against capitalising on his popularity by calling a snap general election; instead he urged (in vain) that Chamberlain widen the National Coalition by offering jobs not just to Churchill and Eden but also to Labour and Liberal figures. Halifax was also disgusted by the anti-Jewish pogrom of Kristallnacht (10 November). He advocated British financial aid to the countries of central and eastern Europe to discourage them from coming under Germany's influence.
With Hitler's lack of commitment regarding the Munich Agreement becoming clearer, Halifax worked steadily to assemble a stronger British position, pushing Chamberlain to take economic steps to underpin British interests in Eastern Europe and prevent additional military supplies from reaching Germany, such as tungsten.
In January 1939, Halifax accompanied Chamberlain to Rome for talks with Mussolini. That month Halifax pushed for staff talks with France, in view of the danger of war with both Germany and Italy simultaneously. After Hitler broke the Munich agreement and occupied the rump of "Czecho-slovakia" (the hyphen had been added after Munich), Chamberlain gave a speech in Birmingham on 17 March 1939, pledging that Britain would go to war to defend Poland. Halifax had been one of the drivers in this change of policy. By March 1939, Eden, then out of office, observed that thanks to Halifax the government are "now doing what we would wish".
Halifax granted a guarantee to Poland on 31 March 1939, triggered by alarming intelligence of German preparations, in hopes of sending clear signals to Germany that, in Halifax's words, there would be "no more Munichs".
The Foreign Office received intelligence in early April 1939 that Italy was about to invade Albania. At a Cabinet meeting on 5 April 1939, Halifax rejected these reports. Two days later, Italy invaded Albania; Halifax met Sir Alexander Cadogan and "decided we can't do anything to stop it". [1]
Although he disliked the Soviet regime, not least because of its atheism, Halifax was quicker than Chamberlain to realise that Britain should attempt to ally with the USSR. He told the Foreign Affairs committee: "Soviet Russia is something between that of the unconquerable steamroller and looking on her as entirely useless militarily. We cannot ignore a country with a population of 180,000,000 people." [2] [3]
The negotiations (in summer 1939) failed, and the USSR allied with Germany instead on 23 August. It has been suggested that Halifax should have led the negotiations himself, [4] but this would not have suited Halifax's purpose because his government were not carrying out the negotiations in good faith. [5] The Foreign Office confirmed to the US chargé d'affaires on 8 August 1939 that "the military mission, which had now left Moscow, had been told to make every effort to prolong discussions until 1 October 1939". [6] Halifax disclosed to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 10 July 1939: "Although the French were in favour of the military conversations commencing, the French Government thought that the military conversations would be spun out over a long time and as long as they were taking place we should be preventing Soviet Russia from entering the German camp."
While H Roberts has spoken of Halifax's fellow Foreign Minister (of the Soviet Union), Litvinov, as having acute perceptive skills and an ability "to detect major trends in the 1930s and to anticipate the course of events indicates his tremendous understanding of the decade" [7], Halifax had completely misunderstood Hitler. [5] Halifax said: "Hitler had a very low opinion of the Soviet Union, and our action [in aligning with the USSR] would confirm to him the idea that we were a weak and feeble folk." [8] On the contrary what made Hitler worried was the thought of a joint pact between France, Britain and the Soviet Union, in order to prevent a pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. [5] Halifax was not to know that during April 1939 Hitler told von Weizsäcker that he was contemplating a reconciliation with the Soviet Union; [9] on 2 August 1939 Hitler asked von Neurath, former Foreign Minister and career diplomat at the time of the Weimar Republic, whether the German people would accept such an ideological shift from anti-communism to signing a pact with the Soviet Union. Neurath assured Hitler he "could do what he liked with the [National Socialist] Party". [10]
With Poland now looking likely to be carved up between Germany and the USSR (as indeed soon took place), the diarist "Chips" Channon, PPS to Halifax's junior minister Rab Butler, recorded (25 August 1939) that "the barometer of war kept shifting" and that "the Polish guarantee was [Halifax]'s pet scheme and favourite god-child" (Butler opposed the guarantee).
When Germany invaded Poland, Halifax refused any negotiations while German troops remained on Polish soil. However, he stood solid with Chamberlain, who delayed in giving a commitment to go to war until the French also committed. The two of them were the objects of the Cabinet revolt which insisted that Britain honour the guarantee to Poland. Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939.
- ^ Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), p. 208.
- ^ Taylor, A. J. P., ed. (1971). Lloyd George: Twelve Essays. London: Hamish Hamilton. p. 336. ISBN 0-24-101905-2.
- ^ Aster, Sidney (1973). 1939: The Making of the Second World War. Andre Deutsch. p. 156. ISBN 978-0-23-396369-3.
-
^ Cite error: The named reference
matthew86was invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ a b c Holroyd-Doveton, John (2013). Maxim Litvinov: A Biography. Woodland Publications. p. 372.
- ^ FRUS, Volume I, General. 1939. p. 294.
- ^ Roberts, Henry (1994), "Maxim Litvinov", in Craig, Gordon; Gilbert, Felix (eds.), The Diplomats, 1919-1939, Princeton University Press, p. 376
- ^ Records of the Cabinet Office, CAB 27/625. p. 295.
- ^ von Weizsäcker, Ernst (1950). Erinnerungen [Recollections] (in German). Munich: List. p. 186.
- ^ Heineman, John L. (1979). Hitler's First Foreign Minister: Constantin Freiherr Von Neurath. University of California Press. p. 200. ISBN 978-0-52-003442-6.