Total Package Procurement (TPP or alternatively TPPC) was a major systems acquisition policy introduced in the United States Department of Defense in the mid-1960s by Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara. [1] It was conceived by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, Robert H. Charles. [2]
TPP involves combining as a single package for the procurement a number of related requirements including the design, development, production and support of major systems. [3] This concept was a "pendulum reaction" to the prior cost reimbursement policies in major weapon systems. [4]
Total Package Procurement was not successful and was abandoned shortly after MacNamara left office. [5] [6]
TPP is a method of procuring at the outset of the acquisition phase under a single contract containing price, performance and schedule commitments, the maximum practical amount of design, development, production and support needed to introduce and sustain a system or component in the inventory. [3]
The purpose of TPP was to procure under the influence of competition as much of the total design, development, production and support requirements for a system or component as may be practicable thereby:
Total Package Procurement did not succeed. [5] The unique complexity of shipbuilding made Total Package Procurement particularly inappropriate for these programs. [5]
Notable programs that encountered major problems with the TPP approach were the Air Force's Lockheed C-5 Galaxy [1] and AGM-69 SRAM, [7] the Army's Lockheed AH-56 Cheyenne, [7] the Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships (LHA), [5] and the Spruance-class destroyers. [5]
Upon taking office as Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1970, David Packard issued a May 28, 1970 memorandum that contained a number of major reforms designed to address "the real mess we have on our hands." A key reform was elimination of TPP except in rare situations. [6]
Total Package Procurement (TPP or alternatively TPPC) was a major systems acquisition policy introduced in the United States Department of Defense in the mid-1960s by Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara. [1] It was conceived by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, Robert H. Charles. [2]
TPP involves combining as a single package for the procurement a number of related requirements including the design, development, production and support of major systems. [3] This concept was a "pendulum reaction" to the prior cost reimbursement policies in major weapon systems. [4]
Total Package Procurement was not successful and was abandoned shortly after MacNamara left office. [5] [6]
TPP is a method of procuring at the outset of the acquisition phase under a single contract containing price, performance and schedule commitments, the maximum practical amount of design, development, production and support needed to introduce and sustain a system or component in the inventory. [3]
The purpose of TPP was to procure under the influence of competition as much of the total design, development, production and support requirements for a system or component as may be practicable thereby:
Total Package Procurement did not succeed. [5] The unique complexity of shipbuilding made Total Package Procurement particularly inappropriate for these programs. [5]
Notable programs that encountered major problems with the TPP approach were the Air Force's Lockheed C-5 Galaxy [1] and AGM-69 SRAM, [7] the Army's Lockheed AH-56 Cheyenne, [7] the Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships (LHA), [5] and the Spruance-class destroyers. [5]
Upon taking office as Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1970, David Packard issued a May 28, 1970 memorandum that contained a number of major reforms designed to address "the real mess we have on our hands." A key reform was elimination of TPP except in rare situations. [6]