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I do not understand the system: are national percentages used in determining the overhang at the state level? I suggest that

1) the following sentence from /info/en/?search=Overhang_seat be added: Small number of constituencies — The higher the absolute number of constituencies, the more likely it is that different reasons for overhang seats will balance out between parties. E.g., in Germany the almost sole reason for overhang seats is the fact that compensation happens at the state level instead of the federal level.

2) Both here and in the overhang article several specific examples from the 2009 German election should be added which show exactly where some of the overhang seats came from. — Preceding unsigned comment added by G. Blaine ( talk • contribs) 21:16, 25 January 2014 (UTC) reply

I cannot find the data in the source website provided, if someone could show me, I would be appreciative. Alex 204.101.241.2 05:19, 13 August 2007 (UTC) reply

The section on Voter Understanding. I have a problem with this. Voters tend to not understand any new system, not just MMP. I am going to delete it unless given a decent explanation as to why it should be on the page. A page on the Electoral system of Scotland would be the right place to have (cf. Electoral system of New Zealand. -- GeLuxe 21:21, 7 February 2006 (UTC) reply

MMP is difficult to understand for many voters - harder than FPTP or STV, and to this is not just about dumb Scots. And being new is not a convincing argument since understanding in Scotland is getting worse as time goes on. If you can find quotable evidence from other countries that it is better understood there, then include it in the section too. -- Henrygb 21:57, 7 February 2006 (UTC) reply

• • • It's hardly any harder to understand than the excruciating STV (and their 74 rounds of counting), much simpler, in fact. If I were to choose a PR system, then MMP would get my vote. Voting is simple, as is the allocation of proportional seats, and the link between the elector and their representatives is retained. ( RM21 04:26, 28 June 2006 (UTC)) reply

MMP is not a difficult system to understand. I would suggest that it is well understood in Germany where it has been in use since 1949. It is the newness' (is that a word?) of the system in Scotland, alongside it being one of two systems used in Scotland (the other being, of course, first-past-the-post to the UK Parliament). This page should focus on the electoral system itself, not on the ability to understand it. No other system page has the understanding at such detail. I think an idea might be to have an advantages and disadvantages section (both Plurality voting system and Parallel voting have them) and mention that there is a lack of understanding in some countries with it -- GeLuxe 22:10, 7 February 2006 (UTC) reply

You can suggest anything you like. But it would be helpful to have evidence. And the fact that many people do not understand the implication of having two votes is relevant to MMP (and to parallel voting)

I would like to see an advantages and disadvantages section also, but please don't delete this relevant concept before that section is in place. (Alex) 204.101.241.2 05:18, 13 August 2007 (UTC) reply

From what I can see the issue of voter understanding is mainly complicated by a) whether or not other voting systems are in use, especially at the same time, and b) whether or not parties make things clear.

In the case of a) there is a lot of annecdotal evidence in the Greater London Assembly that many voters assume the top-up list vote is a second preference and must be used for a different party. Confusing matters the Assembly constituencies are elected by first past the post, but the Mayor of London is direct elected on a two preference system. Similar evidence of voter confusion with multiple systems has been found in other jurisdictions such as Australia (voters casting a Senate style "above the line" vote on the House ballot paper) or UK local councils with directly elected Mayors (where voters are required to make up to three equal preferences for the council but ordered first & second preferences for Mayor).

In b), some parties are either as confused as the voters or deliberately taking advantage of things, particularly those that only stand for the list - some of whom talk about a "second vote".

It also doesn't help that the media often don't grasp how the systems work - the coverage of the recent Scottish elections contain numerous reports of details that anyone who knew anything about the system in question would recognise as just plain wrong. Timrollpickering 09:54, 27 June 2007 (UTC) reply

I do feel there needs to be a distinction between systems which recognise overhang as an issue and those which dont. If the total number of seats a party is entitled to is calculated from the list vote as a proportion of the total number of seats then overhang is an issue which may need to be dealt with when the number of constituncies won are considered; by contrast the constituencies are counted first and then taken into account in the denominators of a highest averages PR allocation of the list vote then overhang is not something the system needs to consider (even if it still happens). -- Henrygb 12:07, 9 February 2006 (UTC) reply

I don't see this as an important distinction, since the results will be the same. FYI, the German system explicitly addresses the possibility of overhang seats. -- Roentgenium111 ( talk) 19:42, 6 May 2010 (UTC) reply

I have (I thought) clarified the opening words of this section. As originally worded, it suggested that "overhang seats" occur whenever a party wins more seats than it would be entitled to, on a strictly proportional basis. I have clarified that, in the way the term is initially used in this article, and in the article on overhang seats, they are a possible response to this, not the seats which cause the disproportionality. There does still, however, seem to be a fundamental ambiguity (both here and in the article Overhang seat) as to what phenomenon the term "overhang seat" actually describes. In the second paragraph of this section, the phrase "won 5 constituency seats, leaving an overhang of 2 seats" is referring to the initial disproportionality, not the response to it. Is anyone able to point to a consensus of authoritative authors here, as to whether the term refers (a) to the initial disproportionality which can occur in most MMPR systems (it could, for example, occur in the Scottish Parliament, and has occurred in Senedd Cymru) or (b) to the response to that which is made in the German and NZ systems. Perhaps it properly refers to both: in that case it needs to be clear in what sense the term "overhang seat" is being used at any point. Ntmr ( talk) 17:32, 25 April 2021 (UTC) reply

There is a proposed merger of Additional Member System into this article. Have your say at Talk:Additional Member System. -- Midnight tonight 00:46, 28 May 2006 (UTC) reply

As per proposed merger, the last merger proposal failed. Why is it nominated again? I oppose any such merger -- Midnight tonight 05:38, 28 June 2006 (UTC) reply

I nominated them, mainly because they are one, and the same thing. The only derivative of MMP, or SUP, could easily be accommodated within the article. Unless it can be proved that they contain distinctive differences, then they ought to be merged. Also, having separate articles based on separate names/nomenclature can be confusing for folks who are unaccustomed to voting systems, and wanting to learn more about them. ( RM21 18:41, 28 June 2006 (UTC)) reply

They are not one in the same thing though. AMS is used to refer to both SM and MMP, although not to both together, and thus AMS works as a form of disambig page. At the last discussion, I proposed to move the AMS article to Mixed Electoral Systems, which is a term used to refer to both and having AMS redirect to it. AMS and MMP are not the same thing. Furthermore, for people wanting to learn more, the current article serves quite well in providing for that. It shows that there is a difference, and then provides clear links for more info.

If you haven't already, have a look at the previous discussion Talk:Additional Member System#proposed merger. -- Midnight tonight 22:16, 28 June 2006 (UTC) reply

Furthermore, SM and MMP are completely different systems. MMP is a proportional system, SM is a semi-proportional system. Very different results. The NZ Royal Commission on the Electoral System treated them very differently. -- Midnighttonight please tell me off for procrastinating on my essay! 02:19, 30 June 2006 (UTC) reply

No replies. I will remove the tags in a few days if nothing happens. Second time that this debate has 'pettered' out. But if those wanting them merged don't make replies, then one can only infer that they have been convinced. -- Midnighttonight please tell me off for procrastinating on my essay! 08:11, 6 July 2006 (UTC) reply

I propose that the Additional Member System article be merged with Mixed-member proportional representation. AMS is really just a minor variation on MMP with a limited number of seats and a different name, and doesn't really warrant a separate article. By merging them, I think there would be less duplication, because the advantages and criticisms of both systems are basically the same. AJF ( talk) 11:22, 12 May 2014 (UTC) reply

Do not merge articles! I suggest that "Additional Member System (AMS)" shall be retained as an article on the specific UK approach, and thus be ripped of other countries' examples, while "mixed-member proportional representation" should become/remain the more general article about such election systems. Also take care of redundancies with mixed-member system Meerwind7 ( talk) 17:12, 7 November 2016 (UTC) reply

I agree with you now, my opinion has changed somewhat in the last 2.5 years. AMS is essentially a variant of MMP, but combining the two articles confuses things, because AMS has additional restrictions that MMP systems don't have. — ajf ( talk) 00:05, 8 November 2016 (UTC) reply

Does any jurisdiction have an MMP electoral system where the top-up seats go not to the individuals on a "party list", but to the party's candidates who garnered the most votes without winning their own seat? For example, suppose there are 100 electoral districts and some party gets a plurality in 30 of them, while receiving 30.7% of the popular vote nationwide. Then that party would receive one additional seat (for a total of 31 out of 101). The additional seat would go to the losing candidate for the party who received the highest fraction of the votes in his/her electoral district. This way, the individuals filling the top-up seats would be chosen by the electorate, not by the party leadership. -- Citefixer1965 16:18, 27 January 2007 (UTC) reply

I think at least one of the Italian elections (Senate or Deputies) in 2001 had this - hence the problem with decoy lists where Forza Italia did not have enough runners-up. But they still had two votes, while the logic of your suggestion would be a single vote for candidate and party.-- Henrygb 17:09, 27 January 2007 (UTC) reply

If the Swedish and Norwegian systems really are examples of MMP, then the answer is Yes (with these two examples). In both cases, the " levelling seats" that a party receives is distributed to the original, geographically smaller units (by different rules in the two countries), and thus could be said simply to increase the smaller constituency representation for the party. There is no distinction between seats alloted in the first (small unit) or second (whole assembly) round.

However, note that the constituencies are not single seat electorates, and that also within each of these smaller unit there is a degree of proportionality in the seat distribution (no ' first past the post', as mandated by the description in Mixed member proportional representation#Procedures). Also, the "lesser-used variant" is employed, where just one vote is cast. I've simply not found this system described, neither here nor in the article Additional Member System. JoergenB 18:08, 3 April 2007 (UTC) reply

This is an interesting suggestion, which I have seen canvassed before. It avoids the need for a party to put forward a separate list of supplementary members. It may have the desirable result that the supplemental members will have shown that they have some popular support, rather than being the candidates favoured by the party machine. So it lessens the party influence that goes along with a "list". I have, however, come across the objection to it that, if a constituency election was very close (say, for example Belfast South in 2015), it would have the curious result that not only the winner, but also perhaps two or even three runners-up, would all appear to have been elected by the same constituency. This is not necessarily an unacceptable outcome, but it would appear rather strange. Ntmr ( talk) 15:34, 11 May 2021 (UTC) reply

I got an interesting flyer in the mail today. The Ontario provincial elections are upcoming, and until I got the flier I was unaware that there is going to be a referendum as well.

The referendum is whether or not Ontario should switch to a MPP type election system. I had heard of this proposal, but had no idea it had progressed to the point where they were ready to have a referendum on it. I thought this was all years off, and as a result I really hadn't put much effort into learning about it. I figured this is something I needed to learn about, quickly.

So I turned to the wiki. Wow. I feel fairly confident that I have a really good understanding of the system now, both its pros and its potential cons. I still don't know how I'll vote, but at least now I understand the questions I need to ask.

This is am amazing article, and I just thought you all should know that. Thanks to everyone involved!

Maury 23:33, 15 August 2007 (UTC) reply

The criticism added (now that Ontario will vote on MMP?) is mainly directed at the party-leaders power to choose which candidates to nominate on the list of their party. It is not specific for MMP but for List-PR in general. And while we're talking: can the same criticism not be directed against FPTP: isn't it the same party-leadership who selects the local candidate in a particular constituency? In OPEN list-PR, people can choose between many candidates of the same party, in FPTP, there's only one candidate for each party on the ballot...-- Bancki 14:24, 29 August 2007 (UTC) reply

I don't know about other places, but the proposed system in Ontario will force the parties to make their list available to the public as well as providing details on how the list was created well before the election takes place. So since most parties will want to elect their list by some democratic process, won't this somewhat resolve the problem of the 'list maker' having a lot of undeserved power? -- emd 03:31, 30 August 2007 (UTC) reply

I moved the criticisms in the criticism section to their appropriate locations in the Proportional representation, Closed list, and Additional Member System pages, as appropriate. They were not specific to MMP. Wikisteff 03:15, 4 September 2007 (UTC) reply

There should be mmp-specific pro's and con's in this article. I came to the article to find those. What are the benefits of this kind of system, and what are the disadvantages?-- CoincidentalBystander ( talk) 11:25, 5 August 2010 (UTC) HELLO — Preceding unsigned comment added by UnicornGuy67 ( talk • contribs) 16:32, 25 November 2018 (UTC) reply

I believe that the references to the the south african parliament are incorrect. South africa currently uses a PR system with both national and provincial lists which is nonetheless a native PR system not an MMP system. Correct? 213.186.171.3 ( talk) 07:55, 23 May 2009 (UTC) reply

That's correct. The South African system is not MMP. It's just PR conducted at two different levels. I don't know why they bother, since it makes no difference to the outcome. Intelligent Mr Toad ( talk) 13:42, 19 June 2009 (UTC) reply

Correct that South Africa uses PR for national parliament, and provincial legislature, but it uses MMPR for Local and Metro Councils. Source: [1] [2] Gary van der Merwe ^{( Talk)} 08:36, 2 August 2016 (UTC) reply

The article needs some discussion on how to fill vacancies arising from the resignation (or death or disqualification) of members elected under the MMP system. If a "list" member resigns, does the next available member on that party's list automatically elected? More importantly, if a "constituency" member resigns and a special election is held, are the list allocations recalculated? (A change in the share of votes in a single constituency might be enough to alter the number of list seats allocated to each party. I believe this issue arose a few years ago in the Scottish Parliament.) Obviously the answers to these questions will vary from place to place, but the article should discuss them. I don't really know enough about the topic myself. KarenSutherland ( talk) 12:01, 30 April 2010 (UTC) reply

I can answer this only in the case of Germany: If a "list" member resigns, the next available member on that party's list is automatically elected. If a "constituency" member resigns, there is no by-election, but the seat also goes to the party-list's next member (except when it's an overhang seat: these seats are just dropped when becoming empty, decreasing parliament's size). -- Roentgenium111 ( talk) 19:40, 6 May 2010 (UTC) reply

In NZ, if a list MP resigns, the next available member on the party's list is automatically elected (unless they are unwilling or unable to take on that role, sometimes a party may convince a member to give up their place if there is someone they now consider more important they want to take on that role). If a constituency MP resigns, a byelection is held and the winner takes the seat even if that distorts the previous balance. Similarly, if someone quits their party to join another, they keep their seat even if they were elected from the list (for a while if an MP resigned from their party they would be required to resign from parliament, see waka-jumping which suggests it only applied to list MPs but it was my impression it would have applied to constituency MPs too albeit they would have the chance to stand for re-election). Note that AFAIK, it's always the list of the party which the list MP resigned from, even if the balance has been changed by constituency MP changes or waka-jumping. Nil Einne ( talk) 00:29, 7 May 2010 (UTC) reply

In all the UK jurisdictions using AMS (introduced roughly at the same time) list vacancies are filled by the next available person on the list the outgoing member was elected from. I think there's a provision that requires the party's nominating officer to approve the new member - this is mainly to handle situations where an unsuccessful list candidate has left the party in the interim - but I don't think they can nominate someone who wasn't on the list at the election. Certainly when the Scottish National Party elected a non-Member of the Scottish Parliament as their leader in 2004 I don't remember any suggestion that he could enter the Parliament immediately by filling a(n engineered) list vacancy.

A change in the party holding a constituency seat, whether because of a by-election or defection, has no effect on the list allocations whatsoever. Back in 2000 the Ayr by-election saw the Conservatives take a constituency from Labour. Had this been the result in the 1999 election (Ayr had been the most marginal constituency in the whole of Scotland so the calculation was easy to make) then the overall effect would have been the Conservatives had one less list seat in that region, but as Labour still had an overhang (with no compensation mechanism) the list seat would have gone to the SNP. Timrollpickering ( talk) 00:17, 23 May 2011 (UTC) reply

I should clarify my answer above that where I said 'it's always the list of the party which the list MP resigned from', I meant the list they were elected from. In other words, if person A elected from the list of party X switches from party X to party Y and then later resigns, the next person will come from party X's list. And in such a case presuming there were no other changes the balance will come back to the original balance. Unlike in a case where if person B elected from the list of party X switches from party X to party Y and then person A from party Y and elected from their list resigns, the list of party Y is still used even though it means party Y continues to have more seats than they were entitled to, again presuming no other changes, which I was thinking of when I replied. Nil Einne ( talk) 06:21, 7 May 2013 (UTC) reply

In Germany the Mixed member proportional representation is used for all levels of elections, such as Federal-, State-, District- and Community-Elections. In some states this system is widened in district- and community-elections, so you can upgrade or downgrade specific candidates on a list ( Panaschieren = Panachage ). Michael Belzer -- MBelzer ( talk) 14:07, 2 July 2010 (UTC) reply

It's not used for all state elections (e.g. Saarland uses pure prop. rep.) and I doubt it's generally (if at all) used for district- and community-elections. Thus I would prefer the original wording of the article. -- Roentgenium111 ( talk) 15:44, 2 July 2010 (UTC) reply

It is used at all levels because it is the only way to represent the vote of the people in a fair and local way. This is the basic idea of this voting system! To my knowledge all parliamentary elections use two lists, the first list for the Representive Vote and the second list for the Party Vote. Any deflection from this principle is not consistent with the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic of Germany. Michael Belzer -- MBelzer ( talk) 15:56, 20 February 2011 (UTC) reply

This includes the städtischen Bundesländer (town-sized federal states) Hamburg, Berlin. -- MBelzer ( talk) 17:09, 20 February 2011 (UTC) reply

Then your knowledge is incomplete, as I said in my above post (Saarland doesn't use it, neither does Bremen AFAIK). And your interpretation of the Basic Law is vastly incorrect: it would allow both a pure proportional representation and probably also a plurality voting system (as was discussed in the 1960s). In fact, the current MMP voting system for the Bundestag has been judged unconstitutional by the German Supreme Court (because of "negatives Stimmgewicht"). MMP is not the only democratic system... -- Roentgenium111 ( talk) 20:09, 20 February 2011 (UTC) reply

The threshold is not a necessary part of the Mixed member proportional representation (= Personalized Proportional Representation). -- MBelzer ( talk) 16:00, 20 February 2011 (UTC) reply

Right, but this is already said in the article.-- Roentgenium111 ( talk) 15:10, 23 May 2011 (UTC) reply

Overhang seats are not a necessary part of the Personalized Proportional Voting System.-- MBelzer ( talk) 17:46, 20 February 2011 (UTC) reply

Yes, they are. The MMP system always leads to overhang seats for some (sufficiently "bad") election results, AFAIK. -- Roentgenium111 ( talk) 15:16, 23 May 2011 (UTC) reply

The template of the infobox Electoral methods is in need of a revision. In my mind the advantages and disadvantages of the diverse voting systems should discussed much more. -- MBelzer ( talk) 17:43, 20 February 2011 (UTC) reply

Maybe I am being dim, but I cannot understand the Italian example. Can someone with a little knowledge on this please give thought to a re-write ? Thanks--jrleighton 03:45, 7 March 2006 (UTC)

I've added an intro before the example. Is that better? I don't know enough about Italy to really re-write that section. -- Midnighttonight 08:04, 7 March 2006 (UTC) reply

A complicated story.

In those general elections (the systems has changed since then), for the lower chamber (Camera dei Deputati) each voter had to cast two votes: one for a constituency candidate and the other one for a party; 75% of the seats have been assigned to the winners at the constituency level, while 25% have been assigned on national scale on the basis of the proportional results of the party lists in the second vote.

Each constituency candidate had to declare a link with at least one party list of the proportional section of the ballot. If a candidate is elected in its constituency, the party list he belongs to gets a handicap in the sharing of the 25% proportional seats: the votes needed to win that place (eg the votes taken by the second-placed + 1) must be subtracted to the total party votes.

If the linked party list gets less votes than the 4% threshold, the party simply cannot participate in the proportional seat sharing, therefore there's a clear interest for both coalitions to link its candidates to fake parties that are predicted to take less than 4%.

What happened? Many candidates of both coalitions have been linked to the fake left-wing party ("Paese Nuovo") or the fake right-wing party ("Lista Abolizione Scorporo") that did not reach 4% (of course) and therefore the real parties the candidates belonged to received no handicap in the sharing of the proportional quarter of the seats. This led Forza Italia to win such a high number of seats that they had no enough proportional candidates to fill all the slots earned.

Funny story but also a very sad proof of the low ethical level of the mainstream politicians in my country. -- MauroVan 13:46, 4 May 2007 (UTC) reply

Can this information be worked into the article? It's very unclear as it is. -- Doradus 02:51, 8 August 2007 (UTC) reply

I removed the paragraph about the so-called "decoy lists" which have not relations with a MMP (which is a form of PR). They were used in Italy during 1996 and 2001 elections, after the referendum of 1993 which abolished the PR in the country. We should not confuse the AMS used in Britain, which is a form of semi-proportional representation, with the MMP used in Germany, which is a proportional representation. Despite German electors have two ballots, the second one is the sole to determine the political result of the election. This is not the case of the AMS used in Britain, where the FPTP ballot has influence over the final result of the election. We must remark that AMS was seen as a majoritarian system in Italy when it was used between 1993 and 2005.-- Cusio ( talk) 21:48, 1 January 2012 (UTC) reply

I'm restoring your deletion. Decoy Lists can be used in mixed systems - it is the fact that they are mixed systems that allows them to work. The PR component of MMP is not the sole determinator, it is dependent on constituency seat, and the methods used to allocate those constituency seats. In a Parliament of 100 members (50 constituency & 50 list), if the Grape Party and the Orange Party both gain 40% of the party vote they will have the same number of elected members - 40 each, while the Lime Party on 20% gains 20 seats. If the Orange Party wins 20 constituency seats it will gain an additional 20 list members. If Grape Party gains 30 constituency seats it will get 10 list seats, but if the Grape Party creates a Plum Party that doesn't contest any constituency seat and instructs it's supporters to split their vote and elect Grape Party candidates in the constituency seats and Plum Party on the list they can theoretically increase their faction's (Grape/Plum) elected members (30 + 40 seats, in a Parliament of 130 against the citrus faction's 40 + 20 seats, including overhang seats) - or reconfigure the list seats in systems that do not allow for overhangs. Your claim that MMP is a form of PR is only partially correct - it is also a form of FPTP; and it is "breakable" if the two systems are treated separately by running "Decoy Lists". FanN | talk 07:02, 2 March 2012 (UTC) reply

Unless I'm mistaken, this would only be possible for systems without balance seats. In your example, the result would simply be an enormous parliament, while the combined seats of the Grape and Plum parties would still equal 40%, giving them no advantage. (Additionally, this would not be an issue if there are election thresholds, or if the party list votes in votes for candidates running only for constituency seats are not counted, as is done in some places, I think.) Are systems that have non-proportional results even considered really MMP? -- Yair rand ( talk) 06:45, 2 May 2012 (UTC) reply

The German Bundestag, which is used as the standard example in the introduction of the article, does have overhang seats, but no balance seats. In the current legislative period, the CDU/CSU got 24 additional seats, and thus had 38.4% of the seats, although in proportional representation they would have got 36.0%.

Additionally, constituency seats are not dependent on the threshold. Thus, splitting a party into a constituency-party (that only gets constituency-votes) and a proportional-party (that only gets proportional-votes) like in the example above, is a possible manipulation of the election system to the German Bundestag (if the party can instruct their voters properly). But this "optimization" does not take place in reality (the parties just don't try it). In fact, one hoax from April Fool's Day 2012 presented this plan (technically absolutely correct) of the second biggest party to easily raise their seats fraction from 32.2% to 44.6%. -- Arno Nymus ( talk) 17:33, 2 May 2012 (UTC) reply

This section on Decoy votes is potentially misleading, because it gives the impression that MMP is rife with potential for abuse. (Indeed, if you add up the long section on Decoy Votes and the one on Strategic voting above - both of which seem like minor issues to me - you end up with an article in which about 40% of the content is taken up with minor issues pretending to be important. I may be wrong in this assessment, but if I am right, this is an important issue.) My sense is that the danger of decoy voting is probably just a quirk that needs to be addressed. Like others, I don't really understand the Italian example discussed earlier. However, as I try to work the logic of decoy voting for myself, it seems that the problem arises if parties can register for one ballot but not the other. In Canada's case that could mean that the Conservatives would split again into Conservatives and Reform (they are now a single party). Then the Conservatives would run at the constituency level but not at the list level, while Reform would do the opposite. The solution seems obvious. Make this illegal, although I do note that in the Venezuelan case that was considered unconstitutional and they had to move to Parallel voting - too bad!.I fear that by having this long section on Decoy voting without an adequate explanation of how unusual it might be (?) or of how easily (?) it can be addressed is dangerous as it biases readers away from a system that otherwise has a lot to recommend it. People need to have some sense of how serious an issue this is (or not). I'm a bit worried about playing around too much with this myself, but will give it a try at some point with some help if no-one else steps up to the plate.

For now, I have boldly added the following sentence: "The solution is simple and obvious: parties that contest constituency seats must be required to participate in the list seat competition, as well." Someone more expert than me may wish to reword this in a more nuanced way, but I do feel that this article is heavily biased against MMP the way it is currently designed. -- Reallavergne ( talk) 13:56, 26 April 2014 (UTC) reply

OK - I have now dealt with this to my satisfaction. The section formerly called Decoy Lists is now part of a section called "Collusion" because the Albania example from the previous section was very similar to the "decoy list" examples for Lesotho, Venezuela and Italy, and I thought they should go together. The various examples now tell a more coherent story, and the section ends with a conclusion (which could use a citation from a more reputable source than me, though!). I removed some of the material from the Italian example, because I could not figure it out, but regardless, having studied the results of the Italian election in 2001, I was able to determine that the example fit the pattern and deserved to be included without the unnecessary and confusing part that I removed. I also beefed up both the Lesotho and Venezuela examples, with additional text and references. Both are interesting stories. -- Reallavergne ( talk) 20:13, 26 April 2014 (UTC) reply

A number of sources I've noticed seem to describe AMS as a form of MMP and I'm not sure that the distinction made in our article is sane or supported. AMS seems to be at best a variation of MMP but more accurately simply a different name for MMP. While most or all systems which call it AMS may not have overhang seats (well more accurately a party which wins an overhang keeps their extra seats but the number of list seats is reduce to compensate), it not clear to me that this is sufficiently different to make the system different. Our article says because AMS doesn't have overhang seats, it's not guaranteed to be perfectly proportional which while true doesn't seem to be a clear cut difference as MMP is generally not guaranteed to be proportional either. As overhang seats explains, under a lot of systems including the German system until recently, an overhang is allow but simply in the form of assigning the designated number of list seats. It's still easily possible therefore for a party to have more seats than they are entilted to, or if you want, other parties to have less seats compared to that party (if the system is properly designed they should still be proportional to each other as much as possible with the reduced seast available). And such systems are definitely called MMP, after all while the German system changed recently, it has always been the traditional model for MMP. On the otherhand, overhang seats may not always be needed (and ideally they should not be) and when they are not there's no difference between AMS and any form of MMP at least according to the explanations given in our articles. (And let's not forget the threshold which most systems have means there will often be wasted votes for parties who have enough votes to theoretically need a representative for proportionality but not enough to be entitled to list seats which effectively mean the system is not proportional.) Note that for systems which are really different, e.g. supplementary member system, this isn't the case as even if by some miracle you end up with a perfectly proportional body, there are obvious differences in how and what you vote for, how and for what people are assigned etc. (On that note and I myself was confused by this, is it even clear that AMS always refers to the UK like system? I initially thought AMS referred to a supplementary member system and see some comments on the AMS talk page expressing similar concerns.) Nil Einne ( talk) 00:54, 23 September 2013 (UTC) reply

In Hungary, Fidesz won with 53% of the vote 68% of the seats. That would be possible only with overhang mandates. For overhang mandates, there is no allocation of list seats. But Fidesz won 90 list seats.

This clearly shows the independence of direct mandate and mandate list.

Please remove the references to Hungary. Akademischer Hinweisgeber ( talk) 02:15, 3 February 2014 (UTC) reply

As there are several methods of counting votes under MMP, paras on MMP in particular countries should say what one is used. (ew Zealand uses the Sainte-Laguë (or modified Sainte-Laguë?) method. It appears that the largest remainder method is little used and most use some form of highest averages method, ie D'Hondt method, the Sainte-Laguë method, the Modified Sainte-Laguë method (Nepal, Norway & Sweden) or the Danish method. How about a table? Hugo999 ( talk) 07:18, 1 March 2014 (UTC) reply

Does MMP always have to go with FPTP?

Does the district component always have to be based on plurality voting, and not preferential voting / ranked voting?

Indeed. It could be a ranked ballot: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOyHLwYq6Nk -- jlam ( talk) 17:23, 17 May 2016 (UTC) reply

Does the district component always have to be single-member, and not multi-member? Kjk2.1 ( talk)

It could be, but it would be an increased challenge to explain the difference. I think Ukraine uses a combination of single and multi member districts. -- jlam ( talk) 17:23, 17 May 2016 (UTC) reply

Here is the sourced and updated list of nations which use or have used MMP:

Use

Current usage

MMP is currently in use in:

• Germany
  • Bundestag, the federal parliament (see Electoral system of Germany)
  • all state parliaments except Saarland, Bremen and Hamburg, but it is being introduced in Hamburg, see Hamburg Voting System.
• New Zealand adopted the system for its unicameral House of Representatives in 1994 following a long electoral reform process, beginning with the Royal Commission on the Electoral System in 1985 and ending with the 1993 referendum on the voting system. It was first used in an election in 1996. The system's use was reviewed by referendum in November 2011, with the majority (56.17%) voting to keep it.

See also: Electoral system of New Zealand

• Lesotho adopted MMP in 2002.
• Hungary has used MMP since 1990. ^[1]
• Venezuela has utilized MMP since 1993. ^[2]
• Bolivia adopted MMP in 1994. ^[3]
• Russia changed to MMP in 2014. ^{[4] [5]}

Former usage

* Romania used MMP at the 2008 and 2012 legislative elections. Nevertheless, at the next legislative elections the closed list party-list proportional representation will be used. ^[6]

See also: Elections in Romania

• Italy used MMP from 1994 to 2006. ^[1]

Does anyone disagree with this list? If so, please provide sources which contradict any of this sourced information PRIOR to reverting. This should not be controversial content as it is simply a sourced list of nations which use or have used MMP. Ontario Teacher BFA BEd ( talk) 21:48, 1 February 2016 (UTC) reply

The sources for venezuela and russia don't mention that the countries use an MMP system at all. While the hungarian system has some connection between the party list and single member parts, I don't see how it can be argued that it's very proportional after the latest changes leading up to the 2014 election, it also doesn't have any system for overhang seats (see ^[7]). Bolivia seems to be using something similar to the system used in Scotland/Wales, so it's probably better described as an "additional member system" (see ^[8]. (One could argue that MMP and AMS should be covered by the same article since many sources mix these terms but that is a different discussion.) Øln ( talk) 17:33, 16 February 2016 (UTC) reply

Hello User:Øln,

Firstly, AMS is the term used only in the United Kingdom for MMP. MMP is the term used everywhere else. These are synonyms. "Mixed-member proportional representation goes by a variety of other names, including "the additional member system," "compensatory PR," the "two vote system," and "the German system." ^[9] "Additional Member System (AMS) can also be known as Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)." ^[10] "The Additional Member System (AMS, or Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) as it is known in much of the world) has been used since 1999 in elections for the devolved Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales." ^[11] Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) System: This is a kind of Mixed Electoral system that tends to combine features of the majoritarian(ie First Past The Post, Two round systems) and the Proportional Representation systems. It is also referred to as Additional Member System (AMS)or Top Up System. ^[10]

You are correct in pointing out that the version of MMP used in Hungary was only semi-proportional. The source you provided confirms this. You are also correct in pointing out that the Russian source is unclear. I will remove Russia from the list until a more reliable source can be found. Your source for Bolivia is in Spanish. Here is an English one: "In 1994, Bolivia undertook a major constitutional and electoral reform, in which a closed‐list proportional representation (PR) system for the Lower House of the Congress was replaced by a mixed‐member proportional (MMP) system." ^[12] The same source confirms that Venezuela uses MMP. ^[13] Also, the ACE project source DOES list Venezuela as MMP. There is a table on it under the MMP section. I have fixed the link to reflect the correct location.

I have added Albania to the list of nations which have used MMP in the past (from 1996-2005). ^{[14] [15] [16]} Like I said before, please provide SOURCES if you believe one of these nations should be removed, and we can remove it. User:Ajfweb, don't remove several nations from the list all at once; especially when they are well sourced. I find it odd that the only nations you left on the list were: Germany, New Zealand, and Lesotho, as these were the only ones which DON'T have sources. Ontario Teacher BFA BEd ( talk) 03:30, 25 March 2016 (UTC) reply

I've edited the list now, moving Hungary and Venezuela to the "former" section, as MMP has been abandoned in both countries. Sources are included in the article, the sources that were provided to verify that MMP was used were outdated. The case of whether AMS equals MMP can be discussed in a separate section.-- Øln ( talk) 12:37, 31 March 2016 (UTC) reply

I think my earlier merge proposal was a mistake and I undid the merge. - AJF ( talk) 13:19, 22 May 2014 (UTC) reply

—Preceding 
undated comment added 16:01, 5 November 2015 (UTC) 

On New Zealand's government website, it states: " What are other names for Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)? In the United Kingdom, MMP is sometimes known as AMS (which stands for Additional Member System)." ^[17]

A prominent British newspaper also states: "AMS is a hybrid voting system, part First Past The Post and part closed party list, the party list element added on to make the result more proportional. Outside the UK it is more commonly referred to as Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)." ^[18]

I will add these two sources to the growing list of sources which state that MMP is known as AMS in the UK. User:Ajfweb, do you feel the sources have been misrepresented? Do you feel the sources are unreliable? Please answer these two questions prior to reverting. Ontario Teacher BFA BEd ( talk) 12:16, 25 March 2016 (UTC) reply

I'm not User:Ajfweb, but I can't seem to find any sources that specify AMS and MMP as separate systems. (The only one I could fine was just a copy of text from the Wikipedia page.) I've also seen the German system been described as AMS (e.g ^{[19] [20]}, Based on this I think it would make sense to merge the two articles. However, let's discuss the details before doing anything drastic. If there happen to be sources making a distinction between the terms, that should be noted in the article, but I don't see having a whole separate article for it makes sense. Øln ( talk) 13:01, 31 March 2016 (UTC) reply

South Africa's local government elections use MMP or a very similar system. You vote for a ward candidate and a party. Ward candidate is chosen FPTP, party votes are used for a proportional system (I'm only familiar with metro-municipalities, it seems like district municipalities might have a different system). See question 3 here (municipalities come in 3 types - local, which are under a district municipality, district (several local municipalities) and metro, where no district municipalities are involved) MoHaG ( talk) 13:39, 20 March 2017 (UTC) reply

The article would benefit from a clear explanation of the differences between MMP and AMS and seat-allocation example. At present there is nothing in the article that would support the claim that AMS is so different from MMP that it warrants a separate article. The fact that the system is called AMS in the UK and MMP elsewhere by itself is not a significant difference. 90.253.29.22 ( talk) 12:51, 17 November 2019 (UTC) reply

Can anyone (add a section to) explain the difference between MMP and Party-list proportional representation? I tried to read both articles, and I couldn't see any major differences. The later system has been used much longer than since 1945. At least I know Denmark has been using it since 1915.

"Mixed member proportional representation" hindi very is not available. Please translate this page in hindi language Shakilsayed ( talk) 17:18, 28 August 2022 (UTC) reply