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I am working toward a Masters Degree in International Relations, Conflict Resolution. This is my first semester. I mention this because in my conflict resolution class, we had the choice of studying:

• Sudan,
• Kashmir, or
• Columbia.

Guess which country I choose?

By the end of the semester I have to come up with a viable peace plan for Columbia as a group, and present it to our class.

Going into this project I knew nothing about Colombia. Now, a week later, I wish I would have picked Kashmir or Sudan for a project. The problems with Colombia seem insurmountable.

I am impressed with this wikiarticle. I learn best when I interact with others and bounce off ideas. I wanted to introduce myself before I start to tinker with this article, so as not to offend any wikipedians who feel this is their creation, particularly user:Juancarlos2004, who has contributed by far the most to this article.

I have 6 books on the conflict, and I hope to read all 6 by the end of the semester. I have already started the book: Inside Colombia.

I also have:

• Walking Ghosts,
• Columbia: Inside the Labryinth,
• The Profits of Extermination: How U.S. Corporate Power is Destroying Colombia,
• Comparitive Peace Processes in Latin America (which has two chapters on the failed peace processes)
• More Terrible Than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and America's War in Colombia

I was thinking of also buying:

• America's Other War : Terrorizing Colombia and
• Killing Peace: Colombia's Conflict and the Failure of U.S. Intervention. Travb 09:31, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

Hello there. I must state that I certainly do not feel offended. Any modifications, additions or simply further discussion of the subject matter would be welcome in order to improve the article. I am fully aware that it is far from complete or perfect.

To mention but one example, the section labelled "Late 1990s / Early 2000s" still contains some information originally copied "as is" from another source at some earlier date by one of the other Wikipedians, and until now I haven't really tried to make many serious additions and/or corrections to that section.

Logically, I might not always agree with everything that you may contribute, and that might lead to a bit of conflict, but precisely, I believe that's what these talk pages are for: constructive debate.

On a different note, if you don't mind, may I suggest that you try and check out the following UN study at some point, which contains plenty of details and information about the conflict not usually available in English? Most (though not all, certainly not) of the books I use are in Spanish and I've noticed that many of the complexities of the conflict aren't properly reflected in foreign works (whether they are left or right leaning). It also directly deals with conflict resolution. See here: [1] Juancarlos2004 19:37, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

What I want to contribute to this article

Contribution one: The poverty factor

Several magazine articles that I have read thus far, have emphasized without solving the human misery of the Colombian people, there will never be a solution to the conflict. This emphasis on class conflict is currently almost completly absent in the article. Travb 09:48, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

Yes, it hasn't been really addressed in the article. I think I've also read similar statements in the past, so some sort of mention of it might well make sense, especially as one of the necessary (if not sufficient, not by itself) structural factors which have made the conflict possible. Still, other articles and authors have also stated that the continuing progression of the conflict itself makes "solving the human misery of the Colombian people" an increasingly difficult affair, to say the least, as long as the current violence continues. On that note, some authors and analysts defend the theory of focusing on reducing the intensity of the conflict and making it more "humane" first and foremost, for as long as it lasts. This position is defended in the UN study I've linked to above. Juancarlos2004 19:37, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

Contribution two: A Timeline

I would also like to create a timeline which I could use in my presentation, similar to the plagerized timelines that I created for the

• Timeline of Labor unions in the United States,
• Timeline of Philippine-American War, and
• Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad. Travb 09:48, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

Seems like a fair idea at first sight. Juancarlos2004 19:37, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

Contribution three: America's possible role in the violence?

I would also like to mention more about America's role in this conflict. Two authors I have read thus far mentioned that America "hijacked" the Plan Colombia program. (Pearce in Inside Colombia: The US...effectively hijacked...Plan Columbia; Humble Pie The American Prospect June 18, 2001: But what started out as a homegrown socioeconomic development effort was quickly hijacked by the United States)

Maybe this is something to be discussed in the Plan Colombia page instead of here?

Is it possible that America could be the broker for peace in my hypothetical peace plan?

From my readings thus far, the US seems very slanted toward the right, and so they would probably be rejected immediately by FARC and ELN. (although the US is slanted toward Israel, and that didn't stop several US sponsored peace plans) In fact, some authors argue that America has become an active participant in the violence, albeit a secondary actor.

The author of America's Other War : Terrorizing Colombia, in an article, brought up a really excellent point:

Clearly the FARC are bit players in comparison to the paramilitary networks and the cocaine barons that these paramilitaries protect. So, with both the U.S. and the UN anti-drug agencies consistently reporting over a number of years that the paramilitaries are far more heavily involved than the FARC in drug cultivation, refinement and transhipment to the U.S., why has Plan Colombia emphasized the FARC's alleged links to international drug trafficking?

Is this a correct statement? This statement seems to ignore the real threat of extradition to the US that many of this paramilitary leaders face.

There was a review of this book (the only review I could find) by a conservative organization, and the reviewer surprisingly gave the book good reviews. The review can be found on my web blog here.

From a cursory look at these books I have, I am surprised at how many of these authors seem to give America part of the blame for the disaster of Colombia. Maybe I unconsciously gravitated to leftist bash-America books. I don't know.

Pearce in the forward to the Livingstone book, Inside Colombia, states:

"The complex violence of Colombia today are not easily reducible to particular causes. Such analysis is challenging for those who want to attribute blame, and it is of course true that there is greater and lesser responsibility in terms of the Columbian war."

So a "blame America" attitude, as Stokes argues in America's Other War : Terrorizing Colombia, appears naive. That is why I haven't gotten this book, and probably won't get this book. I have learned way to often not to trust partisans with agendas, no matter what politic persuasion. Partisans tend to cherry pick facts to suit their own biases. Travb 09:30, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

I believe that the "hijacking" aspect definitely has some merit behind it, as I've read and heard about it before, though I wouldn't know if that's exactly the most appropiate term to use here.

America's role hasn't been entirely positive nor entirely negative, in my opinion. I agree that America could definitely be a peace broker if it wanted to be one, but that would mean that its priorities would have to change quite a bit. Still...during the early days of the FARC-Pastrana talks, there were even some limited direct contacts between the U.S. government and the FARC, but the murder of three U.S. indigenous rights activists (see the FARC article for a brief mention) and the ensuing complications brought those efforts to a complete halt and, it could be argued, helped make official U.S. support of the peace process and of Plan Colombia much less comprehensive than it may originally have been meant to be.

In general, my sympathies tend to be with the left, on a personal level. But I tend to have a lot of disagreements with some left-leaning authors (including a couple of those whose books you possess and may arguably be guilty of "bashing America" a bit more than necessary. They do make some reasonable points sometimes...the thing is, they tend to forget plenty of other details). I especially have problems with those texts that attempt, consciously or not, to either ignore or justify (to an extent) the FARC's actions as "ugly, but logical/necessary". On that note, I tend to have more things in common with the likes of Livingstone and Dudley, for example.

Therefore, initially the FARC might not have been as involved in the drug trade as the paramilitaries were, but their own relationship with the drug trade has never been simply static or innocent. Some FARC fronts are more closely linked to the drug trade than others, they are not all equally involved, and their involvement has been gradually increasing. It has not been limited to what they officially argue (imposing a simple "tax"), at least not for the last decade or so. It can also be pointed out that the full extent of the FARC's current links to the drug trade has only begun to emerge in recent years, in light of law enforcement operations both inside Colombia and in the region at large (in Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, Central America, etc).

For a long time there was plenty of speculation and plenty of unknowns which made the matter very murky and led to all kinds of conflicting claims among U.S, Colombian and UN sources, but in light of recent events I don't believe it's fair to say that they are "bit players" in the business any longer. Of course, it must also be pointed out that the FARC formally supports the legalization of the drug trade as an alternative solution to the issue, at least in theory. This position has also been shared by some paramilitaries/drug lords, it must be said (or at least they've all given it lip service).

While I also agree that Stokes might be a bit naive...I wouldn't necessarily say that you shouldn't get the book. Just that, in any event, you should try to diversify your other sources a little bit in order to get a better sense of the ambiguity of Colombia's conflict. Perhaps that may mean not reading his book and finding another source, but that depends on your own decision. Juancarlos2004 19:37, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

Wow I love wikipedia! I came to the right place! Thank you so much Juancarlos2004 for your comments and the UN article. I am very ignorant of the Columbia conflict, and I came here to learn, and maybe, in time, teach others what I have learned.

What books on the list do you not recommend? This is important because I have limited time with my studies and dont want to waste my time with superficial books. Have you read any of the books that I listed? If so, which would you recommend?

I felt like the "bit player" argument with the FARC did not seem legitamate. The FARC seem to have an interest in perpetuating the rural drug trade, and I have read that their involvement, as you mention, is much more than simply passivley taxing the trade.

Are you personally from Colombia, and if not have you been there? thanks a million Juan. Travb 23:21, 11 February 2006 (UTC)

Sorry for the late response, I've been a bit busy lately. I must state that I am Colombian and am currently living in the country itself. Which, as you might imagine, means that I spend quite a lot of time brainstorming about these subjects both in my free time and as part of my current studies. As I've already mentioned, I wouldn't really like to create a "black list" or "Index" of forbidden publications or authors, since a degree of useful content can usually be found even in otherwise flawed or incomplete works.

From that perspective, none of the books you've mentioned are totally useless, not at all. Still, taking that into consideration, I personally would recommend Kirk's, Livingstone's and Dudley's books over Leech's and Cuellar's/Chomsky's. I haven't read what Stokes has to say, but from the looks of it he isn't really saying anything new either. I say this not due to the presumed ideological inclinations of these authors, no, but mainly because the later tend to simplify too many aspects of the situation, to the point that all the blame for the conflict's many ills lies solely at the feet of U.S. imperialism and the Colombian oligarchy, with little or no discernment for the finer details. There's a lot ambiguity involved, on all sides of the conflict, and much of that tends to get lost. Btw, I mostly support your recent contributions to the article. I would also like to add a few more quotes and statistics, especially the earlier, since there are plenty of other positions (or significant variants) on the subjects being discussed. Juancarlos2004 16:57, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

Ideologues, Deepth, Breadth, and Commitment

Amen Juancarlos2004, you are preaching to the choir!

I love what you wrote:

If only more people saw things this way, I just argued almost the exact same thing to a conservative ideologue today. I have argued repeatedly here and web blogs, that only presenting one side of an argument actually weakens a persons argument.

I came up with this a few weeks ago. Here is a heirarchy of information and reasearch, most Americans never go beyond the first step, few ever get to the last, deepest step of study (excuse me in advance if you are not familar with these personalities):

Right now in my study of Colombia I am probably at Stage 4-6.

You are probably at stage 7, the deepest and highest stage of learning about a subject.

I have reached stage 7 in some respects with the Philippine-American War, and hope to get at least to stage 6 with my study of Colombia. (There is a language barrier for me to reach stage 7, and my interest in the subject does not that deep.)

Once I got to stage 7 of the Philippine-American War, my interest waned.

Every stage requires more commitment than the last stage.

Thanks for your insight. Travb 20:22, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

If this article gets to big and cumbersome, I could always make a Colombian armed conflict statistics page. My fear is that if I do, my work is more susceptible to speedy deletion, a vote for deletion, or the copyright police (I have had bad experiences with both).

The quotes section can also be moved to wikiquote.

Let me know what you think.

Right now I am just adding surface material, as my research deepens and widens, I may edit and add to the article itself, the real "meat" of this article. Travb 20:22, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

This is for my International Conflict Resolution Class.

Assumptions:

DRUGS

• Colombia's violence is not because of drugs. Violence in Colombia existed long before drugs. Drugs only exacerbate the violence, but drugs are not the major root cause of the violence.

POVERTY

• Colombia's violence is rooted in poverty.
• If Colombia's poverty is not reduced, Colombia will never be peaceful.

US

• America's current role in Colombia is far more detrimental then beneficial to peace in Colombia an d the prospects of long-term peace.

FARC and AUC (paramilitaries)

• Instead of attacking the FARC directly, the AUC (paramilitary) are attempting to destroy the support for the FARC and the ELN by massacring and killing the peasant population.
• The right-wing paramilitaries are as culpable (guilty) of drug dealing as much (or more) than the left wing FARC.
• Both the FARC and the paramilitaries are responsible for the high murder rate. Both have committed war crimes.
• The FARC and AUC are the major players in Colombia. The ELN and other smaller groups are minor bit players. The ELN may have a role in the peace process, but others can be dealt with separately.

PRESIDENT AND MILITARY

• The current president's aggressive actions against the FARC, supported by the US, although hurting the FARC, will not lead to long-term peace.
• The FARC will never be completely destroyed with the current military size.
• The government and military actively condones and even supports the right-wing paramilitaries actions in the massacre of peasants and other undesirables in Colombia.

HYPOTHETICAL PEACE PLAN:

1st: Give the FARC a semi-autonomous region of the country (the lowlands), similar to:

• the Kurds in Iraq and
• the Kosovians in Bosnia Herzegovina,
• Palestinians in Israel.

This would be similar to what was given to the FARC in the failed peace process in 2002.

2nd: America's role in the region would change dramatically:

A. Support for the military would be conditional only on the disbanding of the paramilitaries and a drastic lowering of human rights violations—the military would be trained only in police work, not in "counter-insurgency" any longer.

B. Much of the military aid would be diverted to support the rule of law—police training, judicial training, etc.

C. Drug eradication programs would end, the money used on this program would be replaced by financial aid to poor farmers and financial incentives to stop the drug trade on a micro level (similar to successful micro-bank programs in India—the money would be given to the woman, etc.)

D. America would recognize the FARCs status to exist, conditional on the renouncing of kidnapping, similar to the PLO in Palestine.

3rd: A general amnesty would be given to both the FARC and paramilitaries. A truth commission would be set up, similar to what has been established in East Timor (although stronger) and Cambodia.

4th: Send UN (regional South Americans) or NATO troops into the region to act as peace keepers and to guard the borders of the new autonomous regions.

5th: After the general amnesty, any massacre or incursion by either side will be dealt with harshly by ???? (big question)

A. Involvement of US in punishing the groups would be considered "Yankee imperialism"—in addition, America's historical role in the region makes it an unlikely impartial defender of justice

B. UN? Too weak?

C. NATO? Would the US accept NATO troops in its "backyard"

Tell me what you think fellow students in this project and Colombia expert here, Juancarlos2004. Signed: Travb 02:39, 16 February 2006 (UTC)

I plan to read your comments in depth this weekend.

Juancarlos2004 does this statment sound correct? One student brought it to my attention:

"The conflict is not a civil war, where the major competitor to state authority represents a coherent political program and a substantial base of popular support.50 In fact, the FARC, the largest force making war against the state and society, forcibly recruits and enjoys, at best, only 2 to 4 percent of popular support, the ELN about the same, and the AUC slightly more at 6 percent. The FARC does not have a large base, unlike the AUC which has a higher level of support in some areas."

This is from a US military site: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB10.pdf

Thanks in advance! Travb 09:42, 19 February 2006 (UTC)

There are actually at least two separate issues being addressed in that statement. The first is whether Colombia's armed conflict is a civil war, and the second deals with the size and nature of the suppor that the FARC/ELN/AUC would enjoy.

The first issue is addressed more extensively in another .PDF file, as you may possibly know already: [2]. Basically, the term civil war is correct as far as it describes an internal war among opposing armed factions within a nation-state, but many of the implications of a classical civil war (ie: according to models such as the American Civil War or the Spanish Civil War) don't strictly apply here. Whether that makes the term more or less useful is still up to debate.

The second issue is a different matter, so to speak. I believe the statement is correct in that neither the FARC, ELN or AUC currently enjoy substantial levels of popular support (ie: most of the population of the country isn't split into two or three distinct "warring support bases" over the conflict). But whether the support that each of them may enjoy is 2,4 or 6 percent is practically a matter of complete speculation, IMHO (though some of those figures might come from polls, most polls fundamentally reflect the opinion of Colombians in the largest and most populated cities, underrepresenting that of small, isolated and underpopulated areas...which, truth be told, won't radically change the mathematical result because it doesn't have the statistical potential to do so, but it still would alter the numbers to an extent).

Another thing worth mentioning is that the FARC and ELN do still have a "coherent political program"...but whether it is actually one that fully, coherently and accurately justifies all of their actions, especially in the eyes of most of the population, is another matter. It currently doesn't seem to work that way.

This doesn't mean that the government has a huge level of support, of course, in absolute terms. It may be significantly higher in relative terms (say, 25% to 45% or more, depending on exactly what you want to measure...one can well support the state without supporting the government, and maybe even vice versa), but probably still a plurality, not necessarily a majority. Personally, I'd say that most of the population, especially the urban poor, is undecided and uninterested, and doesn't really want/need to take a stand until they are individually forced to do so, on a case by case basis.

The war has become part of the status quo, especially for the later generations, so it's not really seen as an ever-present "contest for power" whose result will determine the fate of Colombia, but more like an ever-present "risk of death or injury" that needs to be avoided as much as possible. This may change depending on how circumstances develop from now on...

Never apologize for the length of the info you provide, you are a godsend. Travb 22:54, 19 February 2006 (UTC)

Btw, I am truly sorry for the length, but sometimes it's necessary to be more explicit rather than less. I've also replied to your other message on my talk page. Juancarlos2004 19:12, 19 February 2006 (UTC)

• DRUGS

I fundamentally agree. The importance of the drugs trade in the conflict has been increasing every passing decade, but it definitely is not the main cause of the problem.

• POVERTY

I'd say that poverty is very important as a prerequisite that allowed the conflict to flourish. But it was not the only catalyst, nor a sufficient one. Without the existence of political intolerance and the resulting political violence (initially a Conservative Party vs. Liberal Party affair, but later more openly revealed as an Establishment vs. Anti-establishment one, after the Conservative and Liberal elites formed the National Front in 1958), poverty alone would not have led to the current conflict. See the rest of the region for examples of that.

I'd also add to your assumptions that poverty cannot be effectively reduced in the middle of the conflict. A political solution to the conflict, or at least a negotiation that seeks to gradually reduce its violence and intensity, is necessary in order for poverty to be even begin to be properly addressed.

• US

I'd agree with its being more detrimental than beneficial in its current form.

• FARC and AUC (paramilitaries)

I agree with most of the above. I'd specify that the paramilitaries have been seeking to kill what they identify as real or assumed supporters of the guerrillas (they even make lists of who needs to be eliminated, in their views), which makes sense as part of their perverse logic. They usually don't try to kill the peasant population at large for no apparent reason (again, from their point of view).

• PRESIDENT AND MILITARY

The last point can be seen as superficially correct in most situations, but would need a couple of additional details for it to be more realistic: Local power brokers (politicians, businessmen, large landowners, local military commanders etc.) are the ones that are the main driving force behind the paramilitaries, not the central government as a whole or even uniformly.

The government itself has traditionally been weak and isolated, and thus has been both historically incapable and unwilling to actually rein in local powers (including those that are formally part of the government itself, but have quite a lot of freedom in practice). The military itself, given the individualistic nature of its command structure in practice, would actually have more direct responsibility (the security forces have often been discriminated in one sense or another, and haven't always maintained good relations with the successive central administrations. The military establishment has had more reasons and opportunities to covertly support the paramilitaries than anyone else in the government at large).

• HYPOTHETICAL PEACE PLAN:

• 1st: Give the FARC a semi-autonomous region of the country (the lowlands)

Two things should be said here: First off, this proposal would actually be rather different, since the FARC wasn't "given" the land, strictly speaking. In practice they did act as if that had been the case, but the conditions and terms under which the demilitarized zone was created were not those of, say, a secession (not everybody in the area was pro-FARC, especially in the urban counties. Their support has often been much more rural than urban, even in the lowlands). Perhaps implementing some sort of representative mechanism in order to decide which areas should be assigned to the FARC, such as through local referendums for example, would actually be a more reasonable alternative that simply unilaterally deciding on the size and shape of the newly created semi-autonomous regions.

And the other point to keep in mind is that the current members of FARC are not fighting for local autonomy or independence, like the Kurds or the Palestinians, but rather in order to force social change by their obtaining political power over the entire country if adequate reforms are not agreed and acted upon, at least that's how the theory goes. Some of their leaders might be willing to compromise and accept autonomy alone, but the most ambitious and orthodox ones might not. It would take quite a lot of convincing in order for them to accept such a proposal, as is. However, if this proposal was only meant to be a semi-temporary stage, not a permanent resolution, it might work within the framework of a wider agreement between the parties (such as, but not limited to, the rest of the details of the plan being discussed here).

2nd: America's role in the region would change dramatically:

Point A sounds reasonable, but "disbanding" the paramilitaries per se, at this point in time, is not within the military's capabilities, since they have taken on a life of their own and actually act like yet another of the local powers, rather than merely an extension of the military that can be "disbanded". The military should cut off all existing links with them and actively pursue and dismantle those that are still active (which will be many, in the context of this plan, though the number may vary in real life).

Expanding a bit on points B and C, the reasoning is that U.S. aid shouldn't be merely cut off or conditioned to a severe human rights certification without any other modifications, IMO, but rather fundamentally restructured as a whole. Yes, large amounts would have to be removed from counter-narcotics and military aid per se (especially the earlier), and instead used for the other purposes already mentioned. Point D is a logical conclusion, though the FARC would have to be willing to reject or at least discuss the status of several past wrongs and unfortunate incidents that have worsened its relationship with the U.S. government (ie: the three U.S. citizens murdered in 1999, and the three U.S. contractors currently in FARC custody, so to speak).

3rd: A general amnesty would be given to both the FARC and paramilitaries. A truth commission would be set up, similar to what has been established in East Timor (although stronger) and Cambodia.

I'd stress the creation of a truth commission, and especially one that, directly or indirectly, also helps to provide the necessary reparations to at least a representative amount of the victims of the conflict.

4th: Send UN (regional South Americans) or NATO troops into the region to act as peace keepers and to guard the borders of the new autonomous regions.

The idea seems ok, but some sort of financing scheme would have to be developed in order to maintain such an expensive peacekeeper system, even within a UN framework. The U.S. itself and other countries would have to be involved in the financing and in the logistics, even if they won't assign any peacekeepers at all.

5th: After the general amnesty, any massacre or incursion by either side will be dealt with harshly by ???? (big question)

The UN might be too weak, but it seems like a better alternative than any of the other two options. The most effective way for massacres or incursions to be prevented, in theory at least, would be for a gradual yet massive demobilization and/or disarming process to take place, and the installation of a sizable corps of international observers in specially vulnerable areas (in addition to the peacekeepers themselves). Obviously, the thing is that all of this is going to be rather a expensive and bureaucratic affair. Juancarlos2004 05:16, 16 February 2006 (UTC)

The map link I added are pretty poor maps. If you have a better site that you know of, with better maps, please add them. Travb 23:22, 19 February 2006 (UTC)

I know this place should be just for discusions regarding the article contents, but I just want to say that this is a very good work. Good job guys! (and sorry for the off-topic)