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An unsourced claim of $4.4 bln was just removed. Here's this:
TOTAL COST PER APOLLO MISSION:
Apollo 7 1968 $145 $575
Apollo 8 1968 $310 $1 230
Apollo 9 1969 $340 $1 303
Apollo 10 1969 $350 $1 341
Apollo 11 1969 $355 $1 360
Apollo 12 1970 $375 $1 389
Apollo 13 1970 $375 $1 389
Apollo 14 1971 $400 $1 421
Apollo 15 1971 $445 $1 581
Apollo 16 1972 $445 $1 519
Apollo 17 1972 $450 $1 536
TOTAL $3,990 $14,644
And this: "Apollo 13 cost NASA approximately $4.4 billion, a mission that was subsequently completed as Apollo 14."
Yopienso (
talk) 22:31, 11 February 2011 (UTC)
The second paragraph states that the Apollo 13 liftoff took place at "13:13 CST." I do believe that Florida is in the Eastern Time Zone. This is significant because of the "13" unlucky number mythos involved. Was Apollo 13 actually launched at 14:13 EST? — Preceding unsigned comment added by JamesMadison ( talk • contribs) 05:59, 10 April 2011 (UTC)
The following is a narrative I'm working on, that I hope to later include in whole or in part in our article. Cool Nerd ( talk) 18:51, 16 November 2010 (UTC)
REPORT OF APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD ("Cortright Report"), Chair Edgar M. Cortright, CHAPTER 5, FINDINGS, DETERMINATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS, see pages 5-1 through 5-3.
Lost Moon: The Perilous Voyage of Apollo 13, Jim Lovell & Jeffrey Kluger, Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, New York, 1994:
"[page 344] . . . The Cortright Commission quickly fell to work, and while none of the men on the panel knew what they would find when they began to look for the cause of the Apollo 13 explosion, they pretty much knew what they wouldn’t find: a single smoking gun. As aviators and test pilots had discovered since the days of cloth and wood biplanes, cataclysmic accidents in any kind of craft are almost never caused by one catastrophic equipment failure; rather, they are inevitably the result of a series of separate, far smaller failures, none of which could do any real harm by themselves, but all of which, taken together, can be more than enough to slap even the most experienced pilot out of the sky. Apollo 13, the panel members guessed, was almost certainly the victim of a such a string of mini-breakdowns. . . "
"[Page 346] . . . Although 28-volt switches in a 65-volt tank would not necessarily be enough to cause damage to a tank—-any more than, say, bad wiring in a house would necessarily cause a fire the very first time a light switch was thrown—-the mistake was still considerable. What was necessary to turn it into a catastrophe were other, equally mundane oversights. . . "
"[page 347] . . . One of the most important milestones in the weeks leading up to an Apollo launch was the exercise known as the countdown demonstration. It was during this hours-long drill that the men in the spacecraft and the men on the ground would first rehearse all of the steps leading up to the actual ignition of the booster on launch day. To make the dress rehearsal as complete as possible, the cryogenic tanks would be fully pressurized, the astronauts would be fully suited, and the cabin would be filled with circulating air at the same pressure used at liftoff. . . "
"[pages 349-50] . . . Unfortunately, the readout on the instrument panel wasn’t able to climb above 80 degrees. With so little chance that the temperature [page 350:] inside the tank would ever rise that far, and with 80 degrees representing the bottom of the danger zone, the men who designed the instrument panel saw no reason to peg the gauge any higher, designating 80 as its upper limit. What the engineer on duty that night didn’t know—-couldn’t know—-was that with the thermostat fused shut, the temperature inside this particular tank was climbing indeed, up to a kiln-like 1,000 degrees. . . "
http://books.google.com/books?id=WJOYlUz6TG0C&printsec=frontcover&dq=Lost+Moon&sig=YbOm9LAeMvZPIA8p9C64y6tVKTc#PPA350,M1
Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar Exploration Missions, William David Compton, NASA, 1989, Appendix 8, page 386. http://books.google.com/books?id=nSisnCa2NcIC&pg=PA386&dq=%22Apollo+13%22+%22Countdown+Demonstration%22&hl=en&ei=SXrUTMrnEIet8AaE4OH_DA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=%22Apollo%2013%22%20%22Countdown%20Demonstration%22&f=false
"n. The rapid expulsion of high-pressure oxygen which followed, possibly augmented by combustion of insulation in the space surrounding the tank, blew off the outer panel to bay 4 [Emphasis added] of the SM, caused a leak in the high-pressure system of oxygen tank no. 1, damaged the high-gain antenna, caused other miscellaneous damage, and aborted the mission."
The third paragraph under "Popular Culture" says "Lowell" when I assume it should be "Lovell" Johnnytucf ( talk) 06:42, 2 July 2011 (UTC)
I have refrained from editing the article for one year. I'm glad to see that people have been reading the source documents to see for themselves how so many NASA officials did NOT use the word 'explosion'. From this wealth of evidence, it is clear to me that it is wholly inappropriate for this article to state as fact that the incident was an explosion. Throughout past years I have posted detailed information which points to the conclusion that the tank rupture was not an explosion. Sy Liebergot's own official report never calls it an explosion. Hundreds of other pages of official report, written by dozens of extremely knowledgeable authors do not call it an explosion. The weight of the evidence is overwhelming.
...yet when the article was fixed to reflect the facts of the official report, it subsequently got changed back to the overwhelmingly popular misconception, entrenched by Ron Howard & Tom Hanks' Hollywood dramatization of what happened. Why does the non-factual version of the story persist? I can offer my own understanding. But delving into the psychology behind the reasons for this historical inaccuracy is probably not the most productive way to proceed. Instead, I think it would be best for us to simply fix the article to reflect the established facts from the official report, and when people who don't have all the facts attempt to revert the article, we remain vigilant in pointing those people to those facts so that they can see for themselves that there was never any factual conclusion that the O2 tank exploded.
But there are those who DO know the facts, and yet persist in the inaccurate version of the story. The most compelling reason given was that the official report was written with a mindset of technical precision, and that a word like 'explosion' was too untechnical for all of those authors to use. Such a rebuttal holds no water, as I see it. All it takes is a cursory examination of these reports to see how plain the language is. The term 'explosion' is both technical and colloquial. It would fit perfectly in a report that was written to either level of technical precision. Yet the word is NOT used. A year ago I provided a complete accounting of how the word was not used, and cited the exact words that were used instead of "explosion".
My efforts were adamantly reverted at the time. It became clear to me that the resistance against accuracy was primarily due to emotional inertia, so I decided to give it a whole year before returning to editing the article. I am back now. Again I am glad to see the solid evidence that there has been progress toward understanding what the official reports said, and what they didn't say. And at no point do any of those provide a factual conclusion that there was an explosion.
I myself am open to the notion that official reports are not always the ultimate in providing factual accuracy. However the analysis provided in the case of Apollo 13, for anyone who has examined it, shows that the investigators were EXTREMELY thorough. And what they concluded does not match the story told (at present) by this Wikipedia article. It is high time that we fix that for good.-- Tdadamemd ( talk) 17:13, 12 April 2011 (UTC)
How about an explosion of references? [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
This part of the transcript Jim Lovell (CDR) refers to an explosion. There are other matches when search the word. I'm not sure if he's talking about the same explosion. If that's Jim Lovell's original research, it's not bad. Anna Frodesiak ( talk) 07:53, 27 April 2011 (UTC)
This shows all matches. Seems like an explosion to me. Anna Frodesiak ( talk) 07:54, 27 April 2011 (UTC)
Perhaps say something like "an event that Lovell perceived as an explosion" or words to that effect, with some nearby reference to how it is referred to in the investigation report?-- Wehwalt ( talk) 02:41, 30 April 2011 (UTC)
Tdadamemd, there has been no response to my request for comment, so I asked User:Slim Virgin about it. I don't have time to go to that page and figure out all those directions. Do you? Best, Yopienso ( talk) 03:01, 6 June 2011 (UTC)
If there continues to be complete disagreement, I would think the only way to resolve the situation is by using the words quoted by the NASA officials. The terminology is close enough to where the words mean almost the same thing, like the case of disintegrate and explosion which by Merriam-Webster definitions are basically the same thing. Also without definitions, we use perception and the way each of you perceive it could be correct for each of your own understanding of the word explosion. The best way to resolve this matter with you both being happy is either a mixture of the terminology used with a statement allowing for the mentioning of the disagreement, or a new mutually agreed upon word that is different from the words you are both trying to use. I hope mine and the others suggestions help and I wish you both luck in respectfully resolving this matter. Dallas Eddington ( talk) 22:02, 17 June 2011 (UTC)
{{
cite book}}
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has extra text (
help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1=
(
help) and Gene Kranz's book on the subject Failure is not an option : mission control from Mercury to Apollo 13 and beyond. Simon & Schuster. 2009.
ISBN
1439148813.. Popular Mechanics ran several stories around that time detailing what happened and each calls it an explosion. The astronauts themselves used the word
4 times during the mission. The only description of the "incident" that doesn't use the word "explosion" are the
Cortright and
mission reports. The Wikipedia guidelines we need to keep in mind here is
WP:V The threshold for inclusion in Wikipedia is verifiability, not truth—whether readers can check that material in Wikipedia has already been published by a reliable source, not whether editors think it is true. Given that there are numerous verifiable, reliable sources which refer to the "incident" as an "explosion", that threshold has been met and it should be described as an explosion in this article.--
RadioFan (
talk) 12:43, 18 June 2011 (UTC)"The crew's status as farthest distance traveled is despite the mission occurring at a point where the moon was near apogee, the closest point in its orbit around the Earth." It should be ", the farthest point in its orbit around th earth" 88.69.144.123 ( talk) 21:00, 12 July 2011 (UTC)
The article says this (aka pericynthion) occurred at 00:21:00 UTC (7:21 PM EST), which apparently comes from Guinness WR. According to the NASA timeline, this was 35 seconds before "lunar occultation entered" (start of spacecraft hidden by the Moon) at 00:21:35, and the occultaion ended at 00:46:10. I would have expected (from the way we draw the trajectory as a nice, symmetrical figure 8, which admittedly may be inaccurate) that PC would be somewhere close to the halfway point of the "occultation" (also known as LOS), which would be around 00:33:37. The timeline does give the time of the "PC+2 (hours)" burn as 02:40:49-02:45:02, but we don't know how literally "PC+2" was meant (probably not very.)
Point is, do we have verification of a NASA source to confirm exact time of pericynthion? (Not saying I don't trust Guinness, but ...) (Also, is it possible that the Guinness time is only to the nearest minute and doesn't include the seconds?) It would also be good to have distance from Earth (and Moon) at the various mission times, to verify exactly at what distance from Earth the oxygen tank failure, pericynthion, and the apogee record (which also doesn't have to be same as pericynthion) occurred? JustinTime55 ( talk) 17:28, 26 August 2011 (UTC)
Can anyone find a verification of this (other than Tom Hanks at the end of Apollo 13 (film)?) I seem to remember Gene Kranz saying it, but maybe I'm confusing it with "failure is not an option". JustinTime55 ( talk) 17:33, 26 August 2011 (UTC)
Thanks JustinTime55 for figuring that one out. The movie was the only source I knew of as well, which is why I added the tag. If we can find a few more references for that quote, I'd go so far as to say the "successful failure" phrase should be included in the header of the article. It really sums up the events nicely.-- Grapplequip (formerly LAR) ( talk) 21:04, 26 August 2011 (UTC)
This
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Please change "However, Deke Slayton never intended to rotate Cooper and Eisele to another mission" to "However, Deke Slayton, NASA's Director of Flight Crew Operations, never intended to rotate Cooper and Eisele to another mission" because this is the first mention of Deke Slayton and the reader may not know who he is. Thanks! 76.121.48.149 ( talk) 04:08, 17 September 2011 (UTC)
Done Yopienso ( talk) 23:41, 17 September 2011 (UTC)
"The mural was later purchased by actor Tom Hanks, who portrayed Lovell in the movie Apollo 13, and now is on the wall of a restaurant in Chicago owned by Lovell's son." The restaurant is actually in Lake Forest, IL, which is about 30/40 miles north of Chicago. Minor nitpick, but a nitpick nontheless. -- 76.16.85.100 ( talk) 19:59, 19 January 2012 (UTC)
Done I changed it to "near" Chicago and cited the restaurant's web page. Yopienso ( talk) 20:13, 19 January 2012 (UTC)
The Pop Culture section of this article claims that, in the film, Jim Lovell is credited with saying "Houston, we have a problem", when it was in fact Jack Swigert who said this, and that this line was changed for dramatic purposes. This is not entirely the case.
If one reviews the actual audio tape from the flight (and this is depicted in the film) Jack Swigert does in fact say "O.K., Houston, we've had a problem here." The capcom asks them to repeat what Swigert said, to which Lovell replies: "Uh, Houston, we've had a problem-We've had a main B bus under-volt."
Both these statements from Swigert and Lovell are depicted in the film. Swigert's line is unchanged. However, Lovell's line is changed to "Houston we have a problem." The film didn't change who said what. The film changed what was said by Lovell, not Swigert. Though Swigert did say "We've had a problem," this is not the quote that has become so famous. The most commonly repeated line (the most famous one, which was changed for the movie) was said by Jim Lovell, not Jack Swigert.
I would suggest the article be changed to remove Jack Swigert's credit as saying the famous quote, because the famous radio transmission was in fact Lovell's dialogue, not Swigert's.
24.15.168.162 ( talk) 20:07, 6 January 2012 (UTC)
Ok, I just posted a quote from Chris Kraft where he emphatically states that he wanted to do a Direct Abort as soon as possible. Kranz was in the "driver's seat" as Flight Director. He did not go with what Kraft saw clearly as the smartest option. Instead, Kranz decided to do the long circumlunar abort that nearly killed off the crew by exhausting their consumables. If you click through to the YouTube reference, you'll see Kraft's quote followed immediately by Kranz's explanation why he did not do the Direct Abort. Kranz says that he had "gut feeling" that he didn't trust using the SPS engine.
This is why the lengthy discussion over past years here regarding the O2 tank failure mode is so critical. (Arch1: "O2 Tank Rupture Was Not An Explosion", etc.) There's a wealth of info in the archives that clearly shows how no one in the post-mission reports refers to the incident as an explosion. The design was well thought out in order to prevent an explosion by dispersing excess pressure through safety mechanisms like rupture discs and relief valves. These safeties were there in order to ensure that critical systems like the SPS engine would be usable even if a pressure vessel failed.
The current state of the article is grossly inaccurate. Anyone who has read the official reports can easily see that that there was no determination of explosion, only rupture. Even the list of items given in the article as to why Kranz decided not to do a Direct Abort are given with no supporting factual references. In the video link I posted, he clearly stated it was his gut feeling. If you dig further and read his post-mission report, he never states that he determined that there was "an explosion" and he thought that the SPS engine got damaged.
Direct Abort was a totally viable option. A person of Chris Kraft's caliber saw this as the best option. There was probably no person in Mission Control with more experience on matters like this than Kraft. He just was not in the seat of power at the time the decision was made.
There is an abundance of erroneous information about the facts of this mission. It is the job of Wikipedians to weed through the garbage to present the best information that is available. This article fails in its current state. The official reports never say that there was any explosion. It's high time that the official NASA position gets presented to the public via this article.-- Tdadamemd ( talk) 11:36, 17 January 2012 (UTC)
pB-5: 12. "The first aborts to be looked at were SPS direct aborts...because SPS capability was still assumed to exist at this time." (after shift change) "Direct aborts were not discussed because GET was at/or near sphere crossing time and we apparently did not have the SPS."
"Immediately after the accident, the following trajectory options were computed." ... "The [delta-]V capability of the docked DPS with the SM was 1994 fps and 4830 fps without the SM. The LM RCS capability with the SM was 44 fps."
Copy/paste from Archive 2:
That was the final comment from the previous discussion on this topic last year. I returned here earlier than I expected immediately after I saw that interview with Chris Kraft last night. That is the biggest significance to the distinction between explosion versus rupture. If it exploded, then there would be a huge question mark as to whether you could use the SPS engine for a Direct Abort to get the crew home quickly. If you understand the systems as being designed specifically to not explode, then you expect damage to be well contained and the SPS engine to be usable, as Chris Kraft expressed that he was clear on.
This is not some trivial semantics debate. Knowing that the tank rupture was not an explosion leads to the understanding that Direct Abort was a perfectly viable option. The article now documents this fact as Chris Kraft's emphatic best choice - which Kranz chose to reject. Kranz maintains that he had a "gut feeling" to not use that engine. This view he has continued to express through the decades gets very curious when you look into his real-time attitude toward the the other pressure vessel that ruptured during this mission. Monitored even before launch, a Supercritical Helium (SHe) tank in the LM's descent stage was known to be overpressured. It was soundly predicted that this tank would rupture some time during the mission, particularly if not used for the landing (which it obviously was not). Kranz could have prevented this tank failure by doing a simple "burp" burn. He chose to simply let the tank pressure continue to rise to the point of rupture. Why is one tank failure, the O2-Tank2 presented as some kind of catastrophic event while the LM SHe tank is treated as so benign that no one chooses an easy procedure that would prevent it from rupturing? It would be excellent to have people like Kranz and Kraft directly asked this. What is perfectly clear from references we do have available is that the Flight Director post-mission report from April 1970, signed by Kranz which Kraft would have given input to and reviewed as well, never stated a single time that there was any explosion of any kind throughout the entire mission. Not the O2-Tank2. Not the LM-SHe tank. There was no conclusion of an explosion, and now there is an excellent reference where Kraft makes it explicitly clear that Direct Abort was perfectly viable.-- Tdadamemd ( talk) 20:16, 17 January 2012 (UTC)
Actually, I think we've flogged this dead horse enough. The official NASA site calls the incident an explosion and a rupture; my bolding and underlining here:
Tdadamemd is correct that the reasons given in our article for not choosing direct abort needed revision. I've done this based on what was said in the mission ops report of April 1970, with page references. -- agr ( talk) 19:47, 19 January 2012 (UTC)
Hello all. Excellent discussion here. I'm going to reply down here, and then later go back up to other replies to clean up stuff I missed.
To recap the basic issues here... Was the incident an explosion? Then... How does the answer to that first question impact the abort options available?
Thanks, Yop, for that Cortright Oral History. I found it fascinating (for many topics outside of A13 as well). So Cortright in the late 90's is unequivocally calling the incident an explosion (as you said, 3 times he calls it that). Is this reference changing the picture at all? What it does is it puts Cortright firmly in the ranks of people like Kranz, Kraft, Liebergot, etc. People who all wrote detailed official reports in 1970 after the mission where they never call the incident an explosion. Then for whatever reason, years later they are near-ubiquitous in their use of describing it as an explosion.
How freakin strange. Ed Cortright signs off on the official investigation report. That document never describes the O2 Tank 2 failure as an explosion in any of its hundreds of pages (that I've yet been able to find). Then he sits down years later for this oral thing, the topic comes up and within TWO pages of transcript he calls it an explosion. Then within the next page or two he calls it an explosion two more times! Edgar had the opportunity to say this, if that's what he really believes, way back in 1970. It is very strange to know how people's stories have changed. These are people who know (or knew) in exacting detail how these tanks had been designed with multiple safety mechanisms to not explode.
Almost two years ago here, I went through one of the reports with a fine tooth comb to ferret out exactly the terminology that was used in describing the event. I picked the Mission Operations Report for a very specific reason: It was authored by many different experts who were closely involved with the mission. Their signatures were right there, scanned into the pdf. Gene Kranz, Glynn Lunney, Seymour Liebergot, John Aaron, Jim McDivitt, and many more.
Not a single one of them called the incident an "explosion". I'll repost here the exact words they did use (cut&paste from Archive 1):
__________
Ok, in case there is any lingering question regarding the persistent notion that the O2 tank exploded, I just scoured the entire Mission Operations Report that was published at the end of April 1970 (separate from the Cortright Report). This is a 345-page document that is a compilation of different reports submitted by various groups within Mission Control, from the Flight Directors on down. I read through the entire report and found these totals for how the O2 tank 2 event was described:
Now it is certainly possible that my count is off. Anyone can check it for themselves. But the pattern is clear.
__________
In the past week, I looked through that document again and noticed that I had missed this:
If any of the authors of this section (signed by 4 GNCs) believed that the incident was an explosion, and that the explosion gave them concern that the SPS might not be reliable, they NEVER communicate that in their report.
I've now taken the further step of scrubbing through the entire Apollo 13 Mission Report (not to be confused with the Mission Operations Report above). The first thing I'd like to say about it is that it gives the best description of the event that I've ever read anywhere. It's in Section 14, the Anomaly Summary. That description starts at the bottom of pg110of168 in that pdf file, then continues into the beginning of the next page (p14-2).
As you all might guess, nowhere in that entire description is the event described as an explosion. I've gone through every single page of that report and not one single place that I could find was it ever described as an explosion. I'll share the results here:
______
______
The publication date on that Mission Report is September 1970. The Mission Ops Report has a much fresher publication date of April 28, 1970 - the very same month of the "explosion".
There is nothing new in this angle I'm presenting. It's now just at a more thorough level. Someone might want to do this with the entire Cortright Report to quantify precisely what I know from having read it. None of these official reports call the O2 Tank 2 failure an "explosion".
It is clear to me that what we have here is a case of the story being told one way at this particular frame of time, 1970, by many of the people involved. Then after 1970, the story changes!
The most substantial rebuttal I have gotten to date has been Yopienso's view that for some reason these official reports wanted to avoid using the term 'explosion' as being too colloquial, or something to that effect. (The exact rebuttal should still be available in the archives.)
...but in reading through that Mission Report, it became clear to me that this rebuttal doesn't hold water because the report DOES use the word 'explosion' specifically, more than once. Here's where:
This last mention is describing a failure mode of a LM descent battery when electrolyte leaks causing oxygen and hydrogen gas to accumulate under the battery lid and then combusting. The crew had "reported a thumping noise and snowflakes venting" from the LM. This report identified the phenomenon, explaining the cause. The electrolyte gas combustion caused the "explosion" thump as well as the "snowflakes". This report put both of those terms in quotes, meaning that the phenomenon was not exactly an explosion nor did it exactly produce snowflakes, but something similar enough to associate the event with those words.
With the O2 Tank 2 failure, the crew reported hearing a thump (on par with Haise's depress valve pranking) and they see something venting overboard. This report (and the others) describe the failure mode in detail, never once using the word 'explosion' (not even in "quotes"). But in explaining the LM battery thump, the report specifically uses the word "explosion" (albeit in quotes).
With no further facts presented here, I suggest that we work toward a consensus that it would be proper for the article to reflect the original story (not an explosion) and then also cover how the incident is now commonly referred to as an explosion. This had been suggested years ago, and now that there appear to be a core of editors who are thoroughly knowledgeable on the incident, we can now have a meaningful vote for consensus.-- Tdadamemd ( talk) 06:07, 24 January 2012 (UTC)
Cortright's report is crystal clear on the distinction between what an explosion is and what an explosion isn't. It provides a wealth of detail regarding the failure mode of the tank system. Board members were eye-witnesses to tank failure tests that were done at MSC. It's all documented. Here are selected excerpts:
Cortright-AppendixD, pD-78: "The pressure vessels are of concern in that they represent large energy sources in the event of their catastrophic failure. Qualification records were reviewed and analyzed to determine the actual factors of safety demonstrated by burst test, as well as the characteristics of the failure modes. The failure modes of the pressure vessels have been categorized as explosive, uncertain, and benign. With these data, an assessment was made of those components that might be damaged by the explosion of a tank and the effect of this explosion on the vehicle systems and the crew."
pD-83: "The explosive failure of a pressure vessel on the spacecraft, depending upon the energy stored in the vessel, could result in effects ranging from localized damage to loss of spacecraft and crew. The following approaches were considered to provide protection to the spacecraft and crew from the catastrophic explosion of a major pressure vessel: ..."
-Clearly the authors are well aware of what an explosion is. Then contrast that above language with the stark absence of the term when describing the O2 Tank 2 failure.
pD-21 - Summarizing the results of the O2 tank overpressure burst testing done four times: "All ruptures were similar... In no case was there violent fragmentation."
pF-48 - Full-Scale Simulated Oxygen Tank Fire (1g) The tank itself never fails. It is the conduit that ruptures. No explosion whatsoever. Just two-phase (liquid & gaseous O2) venting flow through an area in the broken conduit line of about one-half inch in diameter.
Look at the post-test photo on pF-50 and decide if that's the remnants of a violent explosion. It looks near-pristine.
The photos on pF-52 and F-53 are closeups of the failed conduit.
pF-61: Various combinations of calculations based on the expected conduit breach hole size "do not predict pressures in excess of 20 psia". This would lead to a conclusion that the pressure that caused the SM panel to blow off was far less than the pressure inside your average car tire.
It goes on to speculate that there may have been other factors that possibly could have caused a higher peak pressure, or that liquid O2 "flashing to vapor might produce a strong pressure pulse".
(Panel separation test on pF70-F82.)
pF-100: "Fracture Test on Oxygen Tank" - "Test shows that the failure mode of the tank would have probably been leaking and not a rupture."
pF-102: "...Panel Separation Test" - "Peak pressures that occur in the oxygen shelf space are near 50 psia, 25 psia in fuel cell shelf, and somewhat less than 10 psia in tunnel volume." --These pressures, peak or even steady, if pumped into your car tire are not strong enough to blow it off the rim.
pF-120 Fault Tree Analysis: "chemical reaction damage" > "hole occurs in conduit" > "O2 leakage thru connector conduit" > "loss of O2 due to failure of ancillary lines"
These are smart people who wrote the report. They know what an explosion is. They thoroughly analyzed the situation, put together theories, then verified with numerous experiments. The reason why the report never calls the event an explosion is because their analysis and testing determined that the most likely scenario was that the spherical tank itself never cracked. It was the conduit coming out of it that sprung a small hole and the contents of the tank spewed out. I've stated this clearly here before (see archives) in comparing a firecracker that explodes to a firecracker that is split in half before lighting it. The expanding combustible gases can now easily escape and the firecracker does not explode. It just fizzles. What happened on Apollo 13 is that the O2 System 2 overpressurized, the conduit ruptured, and the contents "fizzled" (my word).
A very similar thing happened in the LM DPS Supercritical He tank. It overpressurized, the designed in safeties worked as planned, and those contents "fizzled" as well. The primary difference between the two is that the O2 system failure had additional energy from the combustion (but there was very little with regards to combustible material inside that tank).
The third anomaly that was reported on was the 'thump' that the crew heard with the associated battery spike. It was determined that the LM battery electrolytes had leaked, the O2 gas reacted with the H2 gas, and this combustion blew off the battery lid. This is the ONLY one of the three incidents that any of the reports describe as an explosion. And when that word is used, it is put in "quotes".-- Tdadamemd ( talk) 09:08, 26 January 2012 (UTC)
EUREKA! I found the one place that Cortright's report calls the incident an explosion! It comes from the mouth of Ed Cortright himself. He is giving a press conference on April 24, one week after splashdown, just three days after the board's first meeting.
pH-10: Ed Cortright - "...the short period of time in which the apparent explosion took place..."
He is totally fresh on the subject, and he is careful to caveat the term as "apparent". He never calls it that ever again in the report (that I have yet found) as he obviously becomes far more informed on exactly what happened. In that same section I also found a few cases of where the reporters ask questions that refer to the event as an explosion. But this is only coming from the reporter side of the discussion. I found these three cases - on pH-23, H-35 and H-37. One could argue that it was the Board's duty to correct the reporters, but the exact failure mode was still in the process of being determined.-- Tdadamemd ( talk) 18:35, 26 January 2012 (UTC)
-
Kranz's book talks about how "after considerable debate" they "did not reset the alarm". This alarm would have alerted Liebergot that the O2 Tank 2 pressure was rising and that he could have taken action to mitigate or prevent the subsequent overpressure rupture. This was simple checklist procedure that had been exercised in training simulations.
- Knowing that they had made that decision to not reset the Master Alarm, the EECOMs in the front room as well as the back room should have been extra vigilant in monitoring their parameters. They all missed it.
- Then there is the abort mode decision. The strongest argument against the Direct Abort was concern whether the SPS was reliable. But the RCS system has far more plumbing, and if that system was working then it would point toward the internal aspects of the SPS being ok (along with direct sensor readings). As for the external aspects of the SPS, the best indicator there is that the High Gain antenna ended up working ok. Being far more delicate and exposed than the SPS external components, this would point toward the entire SPS being ok. Deciding to take the longer route around the Moon painted them tightly into the consumables corner.
Here's a quote from Henry Cooper's 1972 book, 13: THE FLIGHT THAT FAILED (p21, emphasis by Cooper):
That author put together a better-researched book than almost any that have been published in the decades after.-- Tdadamemd ( talk) 16:05, 1 February 2012 (UTC)
This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 1 | Archive 2 | Archive 3 |
An unsourced claim of $4.4 bln was just removed. Here's this:
TOTAL COST PER APOLLO MISSION:
Apollo 7 1968 $145 $575
Apollo 8 1968 $310 $1 230
Apollo 9 1969 $340 $1 303
Apollo 10 1969 $350 $1 341
Apollo 11 1969 $355 $1 360
Apollo 12 1970 $375 $1 389
Apollo 13 1970 $375 $1 389
Apollo 14 1971 $400 $1 421
Apollo 15 1971 $445 $1 581
Apollo 16 1972 $445 $1 519
Apollo 17 1972 $450 $1 536
TOTAL $3,990 $14,644
And this: "Apollo 13 cost NASA approximately $4.4 billion, a mission that was subsequently completed as Apollo 14."
Yopienso (
talk) 22:31, 11 February 2011 (UTC)
The second paragraph states that the Apollo 13 liftoff took place at "13:13 CST." I do believe that Florida is in the Eastern Time Zone. This is significant because of the "13" unlucky number mythos involved. Was Apollo 13 actually launched at 14:13 EST? — Preceding unsigned comment added by JamesMadison ( talk • contribs) 05:59, 10 April 2011 (UTC)
The following is a narrative I'm working on, that I hope to later include in whole or in part in our article. Cool Nerd ( talk) 18:51, 16 November 2010 (UTC)
REPORT OF APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD ("Cortright Report"), Chair Edgar M. Cortright, CHAPTER 5, FINDINGS, DETERMINATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS, see pages 5-1 through 5-3.
Lost Moon: The Perilous Voyage of Apollo 13, Jim Lovell & Jeffrey Kluger, Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, New York, 1994:
"[page 344] . . . The Cortright Commission quickly fell to work, and while none of the men on the panel knew what they would find when they began to look for the cause of the Apollo 13 explosion, they pretty much knew what they wouldn’t find: a single smoking gun. As aviators and test pilots had discovered since the days of cloth and wood biplanes, cataclysmic accidents in any kind of craft are almost never caused by one catastrophic equipment failure; rather, they are inevitably the result of a series of separate, far smaller failures, none of which could do any real harm by themselves, but all of which, taken together, can be more than enough to slap even the most experienced pilot out of the sky. Apollo 13, the panel members guessed, was almost certainly the victim of a such a string of mini-breakdowns. . . "
"[Page 346] . . . Although 28-volt switches in a 65-volt tank would not necessarily be enough to cause damage to a tank—-any more than, say, bad wiring in a house would necessarily cause a fire the very first time a light switch was thrown—-the mistake was still considerable. What was necessary to turn it into a catastrophe were other, equally mundane oversights. . . "
"[page 347] . . . One of the most important milestones in the weeks leading up to an Apollo launch was the exercise known as the countdown demonstration. It was during this hours-long drill that the men in the spacecraft and the men on the ground would first rehearse all of the steps leading up to the actual ignition of the booster on launch day. To make the dress rehearsal as complete as possible, the cryogenic tanks would be fully pressurized, the astronauts would be fully suited, and the cabin would be filled with circulating air at the same pressure used at liftoff. . . "
"[pages 349-50] . . . Unfortunately, the readout on the instrument panel wasn’t able to climb above 80 degrees. With so little chance that the temperature [page 350:] inside the tank would ever rise that far, and with 80 degrees representing the bottom of the danger zone, the men who designed the instrument panel saw no reason to peg the gauge any higher, designating 80 as its upper limit. What the engineer on duty that night didn’t know—-couldn’t know—-was that with the thermostat fused shut, the temperature inside this particular tank was climbing indeed, up to a kiln-like 1,000 degrees. . . "
http://books.google.com/books?id=WJOYlUz6TG0C&printsec=frontcover&dq=Lost+Moon&sig=YbOm9LAeMvZPIA8p9C64y6tVKTc#PPA350,M1
Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar Exploration Missions, William David Compton, NASA, 1989, Appendix 8, page 386. http://books.google.com/books?id=nSisnCa2NcIC&pg=PA386&dq=%22Apollo+13%22+%22Countdown+Demonstration%22&hl=en&ei=SXrUTMrnEIet8AaE4OH_DA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=%22Apollo%2013%22%20%22Countdown%20Demonstration%22&f=false
"n. The rapid expulsion of high-pressure oxygen which followed, possibly augmented by combustion of insulation in the space surrounding the tank, blew off the outer panel to bay 4 [Emphasis added] of the SM, caused a leak in the high-pressure system of oxygen tank no. 1, damaged the high-gain antenna, caused other miscellaneous damage, and aborted the mission."
The third paragraph under "Popular Culture" says "Lowell" when I assume it should be "Lovell" Johnnytucf ( talk) 06:42, 2 July 2011 (UTC)
I have refrained from editing the article for one year. I'm glad to see that people have been reading the source documents to see for themselves how so many NASA officials did NOT use the word 'explosion'. From this wealth of evidence, it is clear to me that it is wholly inappropriate for this article to state as fact that the incident was an explosion. Throughout past years I have posted detailed information which points to the conclusion that the tank rupture was not an explosion. Sy Liebergot's own official report never calls it an explosion. Hundreds of other pages of official report, written by dozens of extremely knowledgeable authors do not call it an explosion. The weight of the evidence is overwhelming.
...yet when the article was fixed to reflect the facts of the official report, it subsequently got changed back to the overwhelmingly popular misconception, entrenched by Ron Howard & Tom Hanks' Hollywood dramatization of what happened. Why does the non-factual version of the story persist? I can offer my own understanding. But delving into the psychology behind the reasons for this historical inaccuracy is probably not the most productive way to proceed. Instead, I think it would be best for us to simply fix the article to reflect the established facts from the official report, and when people who don't have all the facts attempt to revert the article, we remain vigilant in pointing those people to those facts so that they can see for themselves that there was never any factual conclusion that the O2 tank exploded.
But there are those who DO know the facts, and yet persist in the inaccurate version of the story. The most compelling reason given was that the official report was written with a mindset of technical precision, and that a word like 'explosion' was too untechnical for all of those authors to use. Such a rebuttal holds no water, as I see it. All it takes is a cursory examination of these reports to see how plain the language is. The term 'explosion' is both technical and colloquial. It would fit perfectly in a report that was written to either level of technical precision. Yet the word is NOT used. A year ago I provided a complete accounting of how the word was not used, and cited the exact words that were used instead of "explosion".
My efforts were adamantly reverted at the time. It became clear to me that the resistance against accuracy was primarily due to emotional inertia, so I decided to give it a whole year before returning to editing the article. I am back now. Again I am glad to see the solid evidence that there has been progress toward understanding what the official reports said, and what they didn't say. And at no point do any of those provide a factual conclusion that there was an explosion.
I myself am open to the notion that official reports are not always the ultimate in providing factual accuracy. However the analysis provided in the case of Apollo 13, for anyone who has examined it, shows that the investigators were EXTREMELY thorough. And what they concluded does not match the story told (at present) by this Wikipedia article. It is high time that we fix that for good.-- Tdadamemd ( talk) 17:13, 12 April 2011 (UTC)
How about an explosion of references? [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
This part of the transcript Jim Lovell (CDR) refers to an explosion. There are other matches when search the word. I'm not sure if he's talking about the same explosion. If that's Jim Lovell's original research, it's not bad. Anna Frodesiak ( talk) 07:53, 27 April 2011 (UTC)
This shows all matches. Seems like an explosion to me. Anna Frodesiak ( talk) 07:54, 27 April 2011 (UTC)
Perhaps say something like "an event that Lovell perceived as an explosion" or words to that effect, with some nearby reference to how it is referred to in the investigation report?-- Wehwalt ( talk) 02:41, 30 April 2011 (UTC)
Tdadamemd, there has been no response to my request for comment, so I asked User:Slim Virgin about it. I don't have time to go to that page and figure out all those directions. Do you? Best, Yopienso ( talk) 03:01, 6 June 2011 (UTC)
If there continues to be complete disagreement, I would think the only way to resolve the situation is by using the words quoted by the NASA officials. The terminology is close enough to where the words mean almost the same thing, like the case of disintegrate and explosion which by Merriam-Webster definitions are basically the same thing. Also without definitions, we use perception and the way each of you perceive it could be correct for each of your own understanding of the word explosion. The best way to resolve this matter with you both being happy is either a mixture of the terminology used with a statement allowing for the mentioning of the disagreement, or a new mutually agreed upon word that is different from the words you are both trying to use. I hope mine and the others suggestions help and I wish you both luck in respectfully resolving this matter. Dallas Eddington ( talk) 22:02, 17 June 2011 (UTC)
{{
cite book}}
: |edition=
has extra text (
help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1=
(
help) and Gene Kranz's book on the subject Failure is not an option : mission control from Mercury to Apollo 13 and beyond. Simon & Schuster. 2009.
ISBN
1439148813.. Popular Mechanics ran several stories around that time detailing what happened and each calls it an explosion. The astronauts themselves used the word
4 times during the mission. The only description of the "incident" that doesn't use the word "explosion" are the
Cortright and
mission reports. The Wikipedia guidelines we need to keep in mind here is
WP:V The threshold for inclusion in Wikipedia is verifiability, not truth—whether readers can check that material in Wikipedia has already been published by a reliable source, not whether editors think it is true. Given that there are numerous verifiable, reliable sources which refer to the "incident" as an "explosion", that threshold has been met and it should be described as an explosion in this article.--
RadioFan (
talk) 12:43, 18 June 2011 (UTC)"The crew's status as farthest distance traveled is despite the mission occurring at a point where the moon was near apogee, the closest point in its orbit around the Earth." It should be ", the farthest point in its orbit around th earth" 88.69.144.123 ( talk) 21:00, 12 July 2011 (UTC)
The article says this (aka pericynthion) occurred at 00:21:00 UTC (7:21 PM EST), which apparently comes from Guinness WR. According to the NASA timeline, this was 35 seconds before "lunar occultation entered" (start of spacecraft hidden by the Moon) at 00:21:35, and the occultaion ended at 00:46:10. I would have expected (from the way we draw the trajectory as a nice, symmetrical figure 8, which admittedly may be inaccurate) that PC would be somewhere close to the halfway point of the "occultation" (also known as LOS), which would be around 00:33:37. The timeline does give the time of the "PC+2 (hours)" burn as 02:40:49-02:45:02, but we don't know how literally "PC+2" was meant (probably not very.)
Point is, do we have verification of a NASA source to confirm exact time of pericynthion? (Not saying I don't trust Guinness, but ...) (Also, is it possible that the Guinness time is only to the nearest minute and doesn't include the seconds?) It would also be good to have distance from Earth (and Moon) at the various mission times, to verify exactly at what distance from Earth the oxygen tank failure, pericynthion, and the apogee record (which also doesn't have to be same as pericynthion) occurred? JustinTime55 ( talk) 17:28, 26 August 2011 (UTC)
Can anyone find a verification of this (other than Tom Hanks at the end of Apollo 13 (film)?) I seem to remember Gene Kranz saying it, but maybe I'm confusing it with "failure is not an option". JustinTime55 ( talk) 17:33, 26 August 2011 (UTC)
Thanks JustinTime55 for figuring that one out. The movie was the only source I knew of as well, which is why I added the tag. If we can find a few more references for that quote, I'd go so far as to say the "successful failure" phrase should be included in the header of the article. It really sums up the events nicely.-- Grapplequip (formerly LAR) ( talk) 21:04, 26 August 2011 (UTC)
This
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Please change "However, Deke Slayton never intended to rotate Cooper and Eisele to another mission" to "However, Deke Slayton, NASA's Director of Flight Crew Operations, never intended to rotate Cooper and Eisele to another mission" because this is the first mention of Deke Slayton and the reader may not know who he is. Thanks! 76.121.48.149 ( talk) 04:08, 17 September 2011 (UTC)
Done Yopienso ( talk) 23:41, 17 September 2011 (UTC)
"The mural was later purchased by actor Tom Hanks, who portrayed Lovell in the movie Apollo 13, and now is on the wall of a restaurant in Chicago owned by Lovell's son." The restaurant is actually in Lake Forest, IL, which is about 30/40 miles north of Chicago. Minor nitpick, but a nitpick nontheless. -- 76.16.85.100 ( talk) 19:59, 19 January 2012 (UTC)
Done I changed it to "near" Chicago and cited the restaurant's web page. Yopienso ( talk) 20:13, 19 January 2012 (UTC)
The Pop Culture section of this article claims that, in the film, Jim Lovell is credited with saying "Houston, we have a problem", when it was in fact Jack Swigert who said this, and that this line was changed for dramatic purposes. This is not entirely the case.
If one reviews the actual audio tape from the flight (and this is depicted in the film) Jack Swigert does in fact say "O.K., Houston, we've had a problem here." The capcom asks them to repeat what Swigert said, to which Lovell replies: "Uh, Houston, we've had a problem-We've had a main B bus under-volt."
Both these statements from Swigert and Lovell are depicted in the film. Swigert's line is unchanged. However, Lovell's line is changed to "Houston we have a problem." The film didn't change who said what. The film changed what was said by Lovell, not Swigert. Though Swigert did say "We've had a problem," this is not the quote that has become so famous. The most commonly repeated line (the most famous one, which was changed for the movie) was said by Jim Lovell, not Jack Swigert.
I would suggest the article be changed to remove Jack Swigert's credit as saying the famous quote, because the famous radio transmission was in fact Lovell's dialogue, not Swigert's.
24.15.168.162 ( talk) 20:07, 6 January 2012 (UTC)
Ok, I just posted a quote from Chris Kraft where he emphatically states that he wanted to do a Direct Abort as soon as possible. Kranz was in the "driver's seat" as Flight Director. He did not go with what Kraft saw clearly as the smartest option. Instead, Kranz decided to do the long circumlunar abort that nearly killed off the crew by exhausting their consumables. If you click through to the YouTube reference, you'll see Kraft's quote followed immediately by Kranz's explanation why he did not do the Direct Abort. Kranz says that he had "gut feeling" that he didn't trust using the SPS engine.
This is why the lengthy discussion over past years here regarding the O2 tank failure mode is so critical. (Arch1: "O2 Tank Rupture Was Not An Explosion", etc.) There's a wealth of info in the archives that clearly shows how no one in the post-mission reports refers to the incident as an explosion. The design was well thought out in order to prevent an explosion by dispersing excess pressure through safety mechanisms like rupture discs and relief valves. These safeties were there in order to ensure that critical systems like the SPS engine would be usable even if a pressure vessel failed.
The current state of the article is grossly inaccurate. Anyone who has read the official reports can easily see that that there was no determination of explosion, only rupture. Even the list of items given in the article as to why Kranz decided not to do a Direct Abort are given with no supporting factual references. In the video link I posted, he clearly stated it was his gut feeling. If you dig further and read his post-mission report, he never states that he determined that there was "an explosion" and he thought that the SPS engine got damaged.
Direct Abort was a totally viable option. A person of Chris Kraft's caliber saw this as the best option. There was probably no person in Mission Control with more experience on matters like this than Kraft. He just was not in the seat of power at the time the decision was made.
There is an abundance of erroneous information about the facts of this mission. It is the job of Wikipedians to weed through the garbage to present the best information that is available. This article fails in its current state. The official reports never say that there was any explosion. It's high time that the official NASA position gets presented to the public via this article.-- Tdadamemd ( talk) 11:36, 17 January 2012 (UTC)
pB-5: 12. "The first aborts to be looked at were SPS direct aborts...because SPS capability was still assumed to exist at this time." (after shift change) "Direct aborts were not discussed because GET was at/or near sphere crossing time and we apparently did not have the SPS."
"Immediately after the accident, the following trajectory options were computed." ... "The [delta-]V capability of the docked DPS with the SM was 1994 fps and 4830 fps without the SM. The LM RCS capability with the SM was 44 fps."
Copy/paste from Archive 2:
That was the final comment from the previous discussion on this topic last year. I returned here earlier than I expected immediately after I saw that interview with Chris Kraft last night. That is the biggest significance to the distinction between explosion versus rupture. If it exploded, then there would be a huge question mark as to whether you could use the SPS engine for a Direct Abort to get the crew home quickly. If you understand the systems as being designed specifically to not explode, then you expect damage to be well contained and the SPS engine to be usable, as Chris Kraft expressed that he was clear on.
This is not some trivial semantics debate. Knowing that the tank rupture was not an explosion leads to the understanding that Direct Abort was a perfectly viable option. The article now documents this fact as Chris Kraft's emphatic best choice - which Kranz chose to reject. Kranz maintains that he had a "gut feeling" to not use that engine. This view he has continued to express through the decades gets very curious when you look into his real-time attitude toward the the other pressure vessel that ruptured during this mission. Monitored even before launch, a Supercritical Helium (SHe) tank in the LM's descent stage was known to be overpressured. It was soundly predicted that this tank would rupture some time during the mission, particularly if not used for the landing (which it obviously was not). Kranz could have prevented this tank failure by doing a simple "burp" burn. He chose to simply let the tank pressure continue to rise to the point of rupture. Why is one tank failure, the O2-Tank2 presented as some kind of catastrophic event while the LM SHe tank is treated as so benign that no one chooses an easy procedure that would prevent it from rupturing? It would be excellent to have people like Kranz and Kraft directly asked this. What is perfectly clear from references we do have available is that the Flight Director post-mission report from April 1970, signed by Kranz which Kraft would have given input to and reviewed as well, never stated a single time that there was any explosion of any kind throughout the entire mission. Not the O2-Tank2. Not the LM-SHe tank. There was no conclusion of an explosion, and now there is an excellent reference where Kraft makes it explicitly clear that Direct Abort was perfectly viable.-- Tdadamemd ( talk) 20:16, 17 January 2012 (UTC)
Actually, I think we've flogged this dead horse enough. The official NASA site calls the incident an explosion and a rupture; my bolding and underlining here:
Tdadamemd is correct that the reasons given in our article for not choosing direct abort needed revision. I've done this based on what was said in the mission ops report of April 1970, with page references. -- agr ( talk) 19:47, 19 January 2012 (UTC)
Hello all. Excellent discussion here. I'm going to reply down here, and then later go back up to other replies to clean up stuff I missed.
To recap the basic issues here... Was the incident an explosion? Then... How does the answer to that first question impact the abort options available?
Thanks, Yop, for that Cortright Oral History. I found it fascinating (for many topics outside of A13 as well). So Cortright in the late 90's is unequivocally calling the incident an explosion (as you said, 3 times he calls it that). Is this reference changing the picture at all? What it does is it puts Cortright firmly in the ranks of people like Kranz, Kraft, Liebergot, etc. People who all wrote detailed official reports in 1970 after the mission where they never call the incident an explosion. Then for whatever reason, years later they are near-ubiquitous in their use of describing it as an explosion.
How freakin strange. Ed Cortright signs off on the official investigation report. That document never describes the O2 Tank 2 failure as an explosion in any of its hundreds of pages (that I've yet been able to find). Then he sits down years later for this oral thing, the topic comes up and within TWO pages of transcript he calls it an explosion. Then within the next page or two he calls it an explosion two more times! Edgar had the opportunity to say this, if that's what he really believes, way back in 1970. It is very strange to know how people's stories have changed. These are people who know (or knew) in exacting detail how these tanks had been designed with multiple safety mechanisms to not explode.
Almost two years ago here, I went through one of the reports with a fine tooth comb to ferret out exactly the terminology that was used in describing the event. I picked the Mission Operations Report for a very specific reason: It was authored by many different experts who were closely involved with the mission. Their signatures were right there, scanned into the pdf. Gene Kranz, Glynn Lunney, Seymour Liebergot, John Aaron, Jim McDivitt, and many more.
Not a single one of them called the incident an "explosion". I'll repost here the exact words they did use (cut&paste from Archive 1):
__________
Ok, in case there is any lingering question regarding the persistent notion that the O2 tank exploded, I just scoured the entire Mission Operations Report that was published at the end of April 1970 (separate from the Cortright Report). This is a 345-page document that is a compilation of different reports submitted by various groups within Mission Control, from the Flight Directors on down. I read through the entire report and found these totals for how the O2 tank 2 event was described:
Now it is certainly possible that my count is off. Anyone can check it for themselves. But the pattern is clear.
__________
In the past week, I looked through that document again and noticed that I had missed this:
If any of the authors of this section (signed by 4 GNCs) believed that the incident was an explosion, and that the explosion gave them concern that the SPS might not be reliable, they NEVER communicate that in their report.
I've now taken the further step of scrubbing through the entire Apollo 13 Mission Report (not to be confused with the Mission Operations Report above). The first thing I'd like to say about it is that it gives the best description of the event that I've ever read anywhere. It's in Section 14, the Anomaly Summary. That description starts at the bottom of pg110of168 in that pdf file, then continues into the beginning of the next page (p14-2).
As you all might guess, nowhere in that entire description is the event described as an explosion. I've gone through every single page of that report and not one single place that I could find was it ever described as an explosion. I'll share the results here:
______
______
The publication date on that Mission Report is September 1970. The Mission Ops Report has a much fresher publication date of April 28, 1970 - the very same month of the "explosion".
There is nothing new in this angle I'm presenting. It's now just at a more thorough level. Someone might want to do this with the entire Cortright Report to quantify precisely what I know from having read it. None of these official reports call the O2 Tank 2 failure an "explosion".
It is clear to me that what we have here is a case of the story being told one way at this particular frame of time, 1970, by many of the people involved. Then after 1970, the story changes!
The most substantial rebuttal I have gotten to date has been Yopienso's view that for some reason these official reports wanted to avoid using the term 'explosion' as being too colloquial, or something to that effect. (The exact rebuttal should still be available in the archives.)
...but in reading through that Mission Report, it became clear to me that this rebuttal doesn't hold water because the report DOES use the word 'explosion' specifically, more than once. Here's where:
This last mention is describing a failure mode of a LM descent battery when electrolyte leaks causing oxygen and hydrogen gas to accumulate under the battery lid and then combusting. The crew had "reported a thumping noise and snowflakes venting" from the LM. This report identified the phenomenon, explaining the cause. The electrolyte gas combustion caused the "explosion" thump as well as the "snowflakes". This report put both of those terms in quotes, meaning that the phenomenon was not exactly an explosion nor did it exactly produce snowflakes, but something similar enough to associate the event with those words.
With the O2 Tank 2 failure, the crew reported hearing a thump (on par with Haise's depress valve pranking) and they see something venting overboard. This report (and the others) describe the failure mode in detail, never once using the word 'explosion' (not even in "quotes"). But in explaining the LM battery thump, the report specifically uses the word "explosion" (albeit in quotes).
With no further facts presented here, I suggest that we work toward a consensus that it would be proper for the article to reflect the original story (not an explosion) and then also cover how the incident is now commonly referred to as an explosion. This had been suggested years ago, and now that there appear to be a core of editors who are thoroughly knowledgeable on the incident, we can now have a meaningful vote for consensus.-- Tdadamemd ( talk) 06:07, 24 January 2012 (UTC)
Cortright's report is crystal clear on the distinction between what an explosion is and what an explosion isn't. It provides a wealth of detail regarding the failure mode of the tank system. Board members were eye-witnesses to tank failure tests that were done at MSC. It's all documented. Here are selected excerpts:
Cortright-AppendixD, pD-78: "The pressure vessels are of concern in that they represent large energy sources in the event of their catastrophic failure. Qualification records were reviewed and analyzed to determine the actual factors of safety demonstrated by burst test, as well as the characteristics of the failure modes. The failure modes of the pressure vessels have been categorized as explosive, uncertain, and benign. With these data, an assessment was made of those components that might be damaged by the explosion of a tank and the effect of this explosion on the vehicle systems and the crew."
pD-83: "The explosive failure of a pressure vessel on the spacecraft, depending upon the energy stored in the vessel, could result in effects ranging from localized damage to loss of spacecraft and crew. The following approaches were considered to provide protection to the spacecraft and crew from the catastrophic explosion of a major pressure vessel: ..."
-Clearly the authors are well aware of what an explosion is. Then contrast that above language with the stark absence of the term when describing the O2 Tank 2 failure.
pD-21 - Summarizing the results of the O2 tank overpressure burst testing done four times: "All ruptures were similar... In no case was there violent fragmentation."
pF-48 - Full-Scale Simulated Oxygen Tank Fire (1g) The tank itself never fails. It is the conduit that ruptures. No explosion whatsoever. Just two-phase (liquid & gaseous O2) venting flow through an area in the broken conduit line of about one-half inch in diameter.
Look at the post-test photo on pF-50 and decide if that's the remnants of a violent explosion. It looks near-pristine.
The photos on pF-52 and F-53 are closeups of the failed conduit.
pF-61: Various combinations of calculations based on the expected conduit breach hole size "do not predict pressures in excess of 20 psia". This would lead to a conclusion that the pressure that caused the SM panel to blow off was far less than the pressure inside your average car tire.
It goes on to speculate that there may have been other factors that possibly could have caused a higher peak pressure, or that liquid O2 "flashing to vapor might produce a strong pressure pulse".
(Panel separation test on pF70-F82.)
pF-100: "Fracture Test on Oxygen Tank" - "Test shows that the failure mode of the tank would have probably been leaking and not a rupture."
pF-102: "...Panel Separation Test" - "Peak pressures that occur in the oxygen shelf space are near 50 psia, 25 psia in fuel cell shelf, and somewhat less than 10 psia in tunnel volume." --These pressures, peak or even steady, if pumped into your car tire are not strong enough to blow it off the rim.
pF-120 Fault Tree Analysis: "chemical reaction damage" > "hole occurs in conduit" > "O2 leakage thru connector conduit" > "loss of O2 due to failure of ancillary lines"
These are smart people who wrote the report. They know what an explosion is. They thoroughly analyzed the situation, put together theories, then verified with numerous experiments. The reason why the report never calls the event an explosion is because their analysis and testing determined that the most likely scenario was that the spherical tank itself never cracked. It was the conduit coming out of it that sprung a small hole and the contents of the tank spewed out. I've stated this clearly here before (see archives) in comparing a firecracker that explodes to a firecracker that is split in half before lighting it. The expanding combustible gases can now easily escape and the firecracker does not explode. It just fizzles. What happened on Apollo 13 is that the O2 System 2 overpressurized, the conduit ruptured, and the contents "fizzled" (my word).
A very similar thing happened in the LM DPS Supercritical He tank. It overpressurized, the designed in safeties worked as planned, and those contents "fizzled" as well. The primary difference between the two is that the O2 system failure had additional energy from the combustion (but there was very little with regards to combustible material inside that tank).
The third anomaly that was reported on was the 'thump' that the crew heard with the associated battery spike. It was determined that the LM battery electrolytes had leaked, the O2 gas reacted with the H2 gas, and this combustion blew off the battery lid. This is the ONLY one of the three incidents that any of the reports describe as an explosion. And when that word is used, it is put in "quotes".-- Tdadamemd ( talk) 09:08, 26 January 2012 (UTC)
EUREKA! I found the one place that Cortright's report calls the incident an explosion! It comes from the mouth of Ed Cortright himself. He is giving a press conference on April 24, one week after splashdown, just three days after the board's first meeting.
pH-10: Ed Cortright - "...the short period of time in which the apparent explosion took place..."
He is totally fresh on the subject, and he is careful to caveat the term as "apparent". He never calls it that ever again in the report (that I have yet found) as he obviously becomes far more informed on exactly what happened. In that same section I also found a few cases of where the reporters ask questions that refer to the event as an explosion. But this is only coming from the reporter side of the discussion. I found these three cases - on pH-23, H-35 and H-37. One could argue that it was the Board's duty to correct the reporters, but the exact failure mode was still in the process of being determined.-- Tdadamemd ( talk) 18:35, 26 January 2012 (UTC)
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Kranz's book talks about how "after considerable debate" they "did not reset the alarm". This alarm would have alerted Liebergot that the O2 Tank 2 pressure was rising and that he could have taken action to mitigate or prevent the subsequent overpressure rupture. This was simple checklist procedure that had been exercised in training simulations.
- Knowing that they had made that decision to not reset the Master Alarm, the EECOMs in the front room as well as the back room should have been extra vigilant in monitoring their parameters. They all missed it.
- Then there is the abort mode decision. The strongest argument against the Direct Abort was concern whether the SPS was reliable. But the RCS system has far more plumbing, and if that system was working then it would point toward the internal aspects of the SPS being ok (along with direct sensor readings). As for the external aspects of the SPS, the best indicator there is that the High Gain antenna ended up working ok. Being far more delicate and exposed than the SPS external components, this would point toward the entire SPS being ok. Deciding to take the longer route around the Moon painted them tightly into the consumables corner.
Here's a quote from Henry Cooper's 1972 book, 13: THE FLIGHT THAT FAILED (p21, emphasis by Cooper):
That author put together a better-researched book than almost any that have been published in the decades after.-- Tdadamemd ( talk) 16:05, 1 February 2012 (UTC)