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1940 British war cabinet crisis was a good articles nominee, but did not meet the good article criteria at the time. There may be suggestions below for improving the article. Once these issues have been addressed, the article can be renominated. Editors may also seek a reassessment of the decision if they believe there was a mistake. | |||||||||||||
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Current status: Former good article nominee |
On 23 August 2022, it was proposed that this article be moved from War cabinet crisis, May 1940 to 1940 British war cabinet crisis. The result of the discussion was moved. |
The article doesn't explain what an "outer cabinet" is. 148.75.173.19 ( talk) 02:51, 28 November 2023 (UTC)
The implication is that Attlee consulted the Labour conference at Bournemouth in order to get their authority to go into coalition. But the conference wasn't in session as currently stated; it didn't start till 13th May. Elsewhere I read that Attlee spoke only to some leading Labour figures at Bournemouth, who had presumably come down early. I think this needs clarifying but am not sure whether there's a mistake in the Roy Jenkins biography of Churchill, which is the cited reference for all this. The article on Lord Halifax has the same issue. asnac ( talk) 09:46, 31 May 2018 (UTC)
Bits and pieces. Complete lack of co-ordination and of thorough research. I suspect it has been "hit" by people who have picked up the aforesaid bits and pieces from the Gary Oldman film. Needs a complete rewrite. No Great Shaker ( talk) 22:52, 16 June 2019 (UTC)
I think the main problem is misuse of the Roberts book used in isolation for the whole period of 25 to 28 May. Other sources need to be consulted and the narrative re-written in these sections. No Great Shaker ( talk) 19:59, 7 July 2019 (UTC)
In response to a request on my talk page, I'd like to offer some comments on this article.
Hello, Nick-D, and thank you for your comments above. I should have more time for the site now so I'll start looking at these points in detail and see if I can knock this difficult, but interesting, article into shape. Thanks again. No Great Shaker ( talk) 15:32, 28 October 2019 (UTC)
This review, as with the PR review just concluded was done with an WP:FAC application in mind but I think that a GA review would also be useful so I am placing the article at GA for the time being. No Great Shaker ( talk) 18:59, 15 December 2019 (UTC)
OK, I’m still computerless and in the public library, so I apologise for the slightly scrappy and disorderly nature of these comments, which I did indeed write out longhand first. I’ve tried to discuss both books which I am happy to help incorporate and themes which ought to be at least touched on. I’m also a bit mindful of the fact that – in my experience – when people start banging on about “scholarship” and “primary sources” on talk pages they usually either don’t know what they are talking about or are out-and-out cranks. So bear with me, please. Besides, I find the “process” of history, and the vagaries of human memory and eyewitness accounts, absolutely fascinating.
It’s going to be a long and detailed article, with a lot of detail about “who said what” in any event. Nothing wrong with that, although I take the point that summaries need to be included for the general reader.
There is enough material in the 2017 Shakespeare book to pull out the change of premier on 8-10 May into a separate article. More on that anon.
At the moment the article relies heavily on the work of pop historians (Roy Jenkins, Beevor, Hastings, David Owen) which are fine as far as they go, but I mention below some more heavyweight historians whose analysis could take the article up a notch or two. The article is also relying a bit too much on the official minutes. There is nothing wrong with mentioning these, quoting them and including the links – they are interesting to read – but a lot of historians stress that the official minutes simply can’t be taken at face value and construct their narrative from a wider range of sources. Halifax’s and Cadogan’s diaries are uncontroversial and were made available to Churchill’s ghostwriting team as long ago as the late 1940s. However, we also have Neville Chamberlain’s colourful diary, diplomatic records which make clear what would have been on the table in talks with Italy, and Paul Reynaud’s memoirs (don’t think he left a contemporary diary but I’m happy to be corrected). One of NGS’s few errors, incidentally, was to remove as a “false quote” Churchill’s comment to Reynaud that they WOULD be approaching Italy – I think it’s actually in Reynaud’s account, and if not there in one of the others.
David Reynolds “In Command of History”, his celebrated analysis of Churchill “History of the Second World War” is well worth reading, and a few months ago I noted the relevant chapter with a view to incorporating into this article. He discussed how Churchill and his ghostwriting team laundered the historical record (but left a smoking gun in the documentary appendices, as with all the best coverups) but how some of the whitewashing of Halifax was done with some reluctance on Churchill’s part. He discusses how Churchill’s public rhetoric, like that of any politician, cannot be taken at face value and highly confidential documents (and notes for unrecorded secret sessions of the House) indicate that the door was kept open to peace talks with a future German military junta if Hitler was overthrown (a democratic Germany would have been nice but was perhaps a bit much to wish for) – remember Unconditional Surrender was not an Allied War Aim until Jan 1943. He also discusses how Churchill spent far more time on the invasion scare in his postwar memoirs than he did at the time, and downplayed the degree to which he was hoping, even in 1940, to bring about German economic collapse through strategic bombing and SOE (economic sabotage). The latter point cropped up throughout the late May talks - “if we can hang on for 3-6 months Nazi Germany will implode” – and is not quite as silly as it sounds: the recent work of Adam Tooze stresses how the Nazi economy was a lot more rickety than people used to think when I was younger.
David Reynolds also wrote a celebrated essay on May 1940 called “Right Decision, Wrong Reasons”. I haven’t managed to get hold of a copy. Maybe it’s on JSTOR or something.
Roberts (1991 – The Holy Fox, his biography of Halifax) is well worth reading and comprehensively researched into a range of sources. He is pushing two lines very hard. The first is that Halifax was “only” wanting to make inquiries about possible terms, and later turned staunchly against peace talks. Roberts overdoes this and in his more recent books has moved back to a more orthodox position that Halifax wanted to make peace, and continued to want to do so until Churchill exiled him to Washington. The second – which I confess I “didn’t like” when I first read it – was that Churchill was nowhere near the bulldog of public myth and public rhetoric, and really was only ruling out peace talks “at that time”. Roberts is right about that, as is confirmed by David Reynolds research. In his 2018 biog of Churchill, also well worth reading, Roberts takes a more orthodox view of Halifax but – I think a little to his discredit – glosses over the second point, perhaps because he wanted to make sure his book was a non-controversial bestseller.
Just as the Watergate Tapes had their mysterious gap of just over quarter of an hour, which has been the subject of every conspiracy theory in every Watergate film ever made (Nixon wiped it because “It was the real truth about the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Exiles and JFK’s assassination” etc etc), so there is a mysterious 15 minute gap in our story here, while they were waiting for Edward Bridges and Archie Sinclair (or maybe it was Greenwood) to get to a meeting. It’s probably innocent – Neville Chamberlain’s diary says something like “we briefed him when he got there”, however, some non-silly historians have commented “yeah, well, that’s the official explanation anyway”. For what it’s worth, the recent Gary Oldman film contains a scene in which Churchill sends the bespectacled young secretary “Edward” out of the room so that he can have his climactic shouting match with Halifax, unrecorded by the official typewriter. Partly, I guess, inspired by the 15 minute gap and also making the point in a fictionalised, dramatic licency sort of way that historians only know what the incomplete historical record tells us – not the whole story.
Some historians have pointed out that the expert reports (“Certain Eventuality” etc) may well have been slanted to nudge the War Cabinet to the answer Churchill wanted.
Some non-silly historians have posited that there might have been some kind of discreet peace plot going on in mid-June, based on some redactions in the official record and a mysterious comment “No reply from the Germans” in Cadogan’s diary. Probably nothing much – he may well have been referring to the French peace talks going on at the time – but you never know, and this was when the mysterious Prytz Affair was going on (covered in the article on Rab Butler in the 1930s, written by me). (There was also Hitler’s public peace offer in July 1940, which was rejected with contempt by the British Government).
Ian Kershaw’s essay on May 1940 in “Fateful Choices” is absolutely superb and covers all the bases and sources. If you just read one thing on this topic, that essay should be it.
John Charmley “The End of Glory” (1993) remains one of the best biographies of Churchill ever written – scholarly but (deliberately) mildly critical. Plenty of good analysis in there.
Robin Prior’s recent book on 1940 (Saving the West or something) has some useful analysis
I read Lucaks (?sp) years ago but don’t have a copy to hand.
Graham Stewart Burying Caesar (1999) has one or two interesting observations.
John Kelly – No Surrender – is worth looking at. Ostensibly a work of pop history, it goes into Reynaud’s changing position in quite a bit of detail.
I have Martin Gilbert on Churchill (Vol VI is the relevant volume).
I have Cadogan’s Diary
Somebody, and I can’t for the life of me remember who, commented that Churchill used every dirty trick of a ruthless new chairman (inviting random cronies like Sinclair to attend committee meetings on dubious pretexts, refusing to allow a formal decision until he had won the argument, swaying the argument with biased “expert reports”, throwing the decision open to a wider group who were dead chuffed to be involved with decisions above their pay grade and were easily swayed by rhetoric and a desire to “do the right thing”) that it is a bit surprising that a politician of Halifax’s guile and experience allowed himself to be outplayed so comprehensively.
Now, I've exhausted my 2 hour time slot at the library ... Paulturtle ( talk) 15:16, 21 December 2019 (UTC)
The result of the move request was: moved. ( closed by non-admin page mover) – robertsky ( talk) 09:55, 30 August 2022 (UTC)
War cabinet crisis, May 1940 → 1940 British war cabinet crisis – Follows typical naming convention of Wikipedia articles as per WP:MOS, as per almost every other event and government crisis, constitutional crisis and other articles. Could also go with 1940 British cabinet crisis, 1940 United Kingdom cabinet crisis or 1940 United Kingdom war cabinet crisis. Arcahaeoindris ( talk) 09:26, 23 August 2022 (UTC)
This is the
talk page for discussing improvements to the
1940 British war cabinet crisis article. This is not a forum for general discussion of the article's subject. |
Article policies
|
Find sources: Google ( books · news · scholar · free images · WP refs) · FENS · JSTOR · TWL |
Archives: 1 |
This article is rated B-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
1940 British war cabinet crisis was a good articles nominee, but did not meet the good article criteria at the time. There may be suggestions below for improving the article. Once these issues have been addressed, the article can be renominated. Editors may also seek a reassessment of the decision if they believe there was a mistake. | |||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||
Current status: Former good article nominee |
On 23 August 2022, it was proposed that this article be moved from War cabinet crisis, May 1940 to 1940 British war cabinet crisis. The result of the discussion was moved. |
The article doesn't explain what an "outer cabinet" is. 148.75.173.19 ( talk) 02:51, 28 November 2023 (UTC)
The implication is that Attlee consulted the Labour conference at Bournemouth in order to get their authority to go into coalition. But the conference wasn't in session as currently stated; it didn't start till 13th May. Elsewhere I read that Attlee spoke only to some leading Labour figures at Bournemouth, who had presumably come down early. I think this needs clarifying but am not sure whether there's a mistake in the Roy Jenkins biography of Churchill, which is the cited reference for all this. The article on Lord Halifax has the same issue. asnac ( talk) 09:46, 31 May 2018 (UTC)
Bits and pieces. Complete lack of co-ordination and of thorough research. I suspect it has been "hit" by people who have picked up the aforesaid bits and pieces from the Gary Oldman film. Needs a complete rewrite. No Great Shaker ( talk) 22:52, 16 June 2019 (UTC)
I think the main problem is misuse of the Roberts book used in isolation for the whole period of 25 to 28 May. Other sources need to be consulted and the narrative re-written in these sections. No Great Shaker ( talk) 19:59, 7 July 2019 (UTC)
In response to a request on my talk page, I'd like to offer some comments on this article.
Hello, Nick-D, and thank you for your comments above. I should have more time for the site now so I'll start looking at these points in detail and see if I can knock this difficult, but interesting, article into shape. Thanks again. No Great Shaker ( talk) 15:32, 28 October 2019 (UTC)
This review, as with the PR review just concluded was done with an WP:FAC application in mind but I think that a GA review would also be useful so I am placing the article at GA for the time being. No Great Shaker ( talk) 18:59, 15 December 2019 (UTC)
OK, I’m still computerless and in the public library, so I apologise for the slightly scrappy and disorderly nature of these comments, which I did indeed write out longhand first. I’ve tried to discuss both books which I am happy to help incorporate and themes which ought to be at least touched on. I’m also a bit mindful of the fact that – in my experience – when people start banging on about “scholarship” and “primary sources” on talk pages they usually either don’t know what they are talking about or are out-and-out cranks. So bear with me, please. Besides, I find the “process” of history, and the vagaries of human memory and eyewitness accounts, absolutely fascinating.
It’s going to be a long and detailed article, with a lot of detail about “who said what” in any event. Nothing wrong with that, although I take the point that summaries need to be included for the general reader.
There is enough material in the 2017 Shakespeare book to pull out the change of premier on 8-10 May into a separate article. More on that anon.
At the moment the article relies heavily on the work of pop historians (Roy Jenkins, Beevor, Hastings, David Owen) which are fine as far as they go, but I mention below some more heavyweight historians whose analysis could take the article up a notch or two. The article is also relying a bit too much on the official minutes. There is nothing wrong with mentioning these, quoting them and including the links – they are interesting to read – but a lot of historians stress that the official minutes simply can’t be taken at face value and construct their narrative from a wider range of sources. Halifax’s and Cadogan’s diaries are uncontroversial and were made available to Churchill’s ghostwriting team as long ago as the late 1940s. However, we also have Neville Chamberlain’s colourful diary, diplomatic records which make clear what would have been on the table in talks with Italy, and Paul Reynaud’s memoirs (don’t think he left a contemporary diary but I’m happy to be corrected). One of NGS’s few errors, incidentally, was to remove as a “false quote” Churchill’s comment to Reynaud that they WOULD be approaching Italy – I think it’s actually in Reynaud’s account, and if not there in one of the others.
David Reynolds “In Command of History”, his celebrated analysis of Churchill “History of the Second World War” is well worth reading, and a few months ago I noted the relevant chapter with a view to incorporating into this article. He discussed how Churchill and his ghostwriting team laundered the historical record (but left a smoking gun in the documentary appendices, as with all the best coverups) but how some of the whitewashing of Halifax was done with some reluctance on Churchill’s part. He discusses how Churchill’s public rhetoric, like that of any politician, cannot be taken at face value and highly confidential documents (and notes for unrecorded secret sessions of the House) indicate that the door was kept open to peace talks with a future German military junta if Hitler was overthrown (a democratic Germany would have been nice but was perhaps a bit much to wish for) – remember Unconditional Surrender was not an Allied War Aim until Jan 1943. He also discusses how Churchill spent far more time on the invasion scare in his postwar memoirs than he did at the time, and downplayed the degree to which he was hoping, even in 1940, to bring about German economic collapse through strategic bombing and SOE (economic sabotage). The latter point cropped up throughout the late May talks - “if we can hang on for 3-6 months Nazi Germany will implode” – and is not quite as silly as it sounds: the recent work of Adam Tooze stresses how the Nazi economy was a lot more rickety than people used to think when I was younger.
David Reynolds also wrote a celebrated essay on May 1940 called “Right Decision, Wrong Reasons”. I haven’t managed to get hold of a copy. Maybe it’s on JSTOR or something.
Roberts (1991 – The Holy Fox, his biography of Halifax) is well worth reading and comprehensively researched into a range of sources. He is pushing two lines very hard. The first is that Halifax was “only” wanting to make inquiries about possible terms, and later turned staunchly against peace talks. Roberts overdoes this and in his more recent books has moved back to a more orthodox position that Halifax wanted to make peace, and continued to want to do so until Churchill exiled him to Washington. The second – which I confess I “didn’t like” when I first read it – was that Churchill was nowhere near the bulldog of public myth and public rhetoric, and really was only ruling out peace talks “at that time”. Roberts is right about that, as is confirmed by David Reynolds research. In his 2018 biog of Churchill, also well worth reading, Roberts takes a more orthodox view of Halifax but – I think a little to his discredit – glosses over the second point, perhaps because he wanted to make sure his book was a non-controversial bestseller.
Just as the Watergate Tapes had their mysterious gap of just over quarter of an hour, which has been the subject of every conspiracy theory in every Watergate film ever made (Nixon wiped it because “It was the real truth about the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Exiles and JFK’s assassination” etc etc), so there is a mysterious 15 minute gap in our story here, while they were waiting for Edward Bridges and Archie Sinclair (or maybe it was Greenwood) to get to a meeting. It’s probably innocent – Neville Chamberlain’s diary says something like “we briefed him when he got there”, however, some non-silly historians have commented “yeah, well, that’s the official explanation anyway”. For what it’s worth, the recent Gary Oldman film contains a scene in which Churchill sends the bespectacled young secretary “Edward” out of the room so that he can have his climactic shouting match with Halifax, unrecorded by the official typewriter. Partly, I guess, inspired by the 15 minute gap and also making the point in a fictionalised, dramatic licency sort of way that historians only know what the incomplete historical record tells us – not the whole story.
Some historians have pointed out that the expert reports (“Certain Eventuality” etc) may well have been slanted to nudge the War Cabinet to the answer Churchill wanted.
Some non-silly historians have posited that there might have been some kind of discreet peace plot going on in mid-June, based on some redactions in the official record and a mysterious comment “No reply from the Germans” in Cadogan’s diary. Probably nothing much – he may well have been referring to the French peace talks going on at the time – but you never know, and this was when the mysterious Prytz Affair was going on (covered in the article on Rab Butler in the 1930s, written by me). (There was also Hitler’s public peace offer in July 1940, which was rejected with contempt by the British Government).
Ian Kershaw’s essay on May 1940 in “Fateful Choices” is absolutely superb and covers all the bases and sources. If you just read one thing on this topic, that essay should be it.
John Charmley “The End of Glory” (1993) remains one of the best biographies of Churchill ever written – scholarly but (deliberately) mildly critical. Plenty of good analysis in there.
Robin Prior’s recent book on 1940 (Saving the West or something) has some useful analysis
I read Lucaks (?sp) years ago but don’t have a copy to hand.
Graham Stewart Burying Caesar (1999) has one or two interesting observations.
John Kelly – No Surrender – is worth looking at. Ostensibly a work of pop history, it goes into Reynaud’s changing position in quite a bit of detail.
I have Martin Gilbert on Churchill (Vol VI is the relevant volume).
I have Cadogan’s Diary
Somebody, and I can’t for the life of me remember who, commented that Churchill used every dirty trick of a ruthless new chairman (inviting random cronies like Sinclair to attend committee meetings on dubious pretexts, refusing to allow a formal decision until he had won the argument, swaying the argument with biased “expert reports”, throwing the decision open to a wider group who were dead chuffed to be involved with decisions above their pay grade and were easily swayed by rhetoric and a desire to “do the right thing”) that it is a bit surprising that a politician of Halifax’s guile and experience allowed himself to be outplayed so comprehensively.
Now, I've exhausted my 2 hour time slot at the library ... Paulturtle ( talk) 15:16, 21 December 2019 (UTC)
The result of the move request was: moved. ( closed by non-admin page mover) – robertsky ( talk) 09:55, 30 August 2022 (UTC)
War cabinet crisis, May 1940 → 1940 British war cabinet crisis – Follows typical naming convention of Wikipedia articles as per WP:MOS, as per almost every other event and government crisis, constitutional crisis and other articles. Could also go with 1940 British cabinet crisis, 1940 United Kingdom cabinet crisis or 1940 United Kingdom war cabinet crisis. Arcahaeoindris ( talk) 09:26, 23 August 2022 (UTC)