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12 hours to emplace?? Removing it because it seems an extreme claim. Half a day with a crew of 6+ well fed R.A gunners and the additional labour of the towing vehicle crew? Were they union members? Please cite source. Just sounds wrong. The 17 pdr was not THAT big :) Irondome ( talk) 04:36, 13 May 2012 (UTC)
Actually that may not be that far from the truth. There is a very real tactical difference between setting up a gun and emplacing a gun. Not only was the 17 pdr heavy it was large and a great deal of preparation went into its effective emplacement and concealment. It had a substantial recoil so it did have to be literally 'dug in' to operate effectively. The crew were most likely conscripts; eager but by no means muscular (Spike Milligan was a conscript gunner who discribes himself as a skinny individual looking like a sack of potatos tied in the middle with string!). The prime mover, usually a Morris 'Quad', occasionally an older tank with the turret removed, was simply that; the vehicle used to tow it to where it was to be emplaced.
Emplacing a gun the size and weight of the towed 17 pdr was a back breaking job. It required digging out the ground so the split trail could be safely secured against recoil (ie making sure the gun didn't 'jump' or roll back during firing), a clear line of sight had to be secured which often meant hacking back foliage, then that same foliage used to camouflage the gun to make spotting by the enemy as diffcult as possible. All this time sufficient ammunition had to be placed by the gun, and (assuming a stay of more than 24 hours) bivouac and foxholes for each gun crew established along with clear routes for resupply of the gun and crew and (if necessary) the ability to get the gun out of trouble if an enemy assault looked like breaching the line.
All this is the real reason why towed anti-tank guns went the way of the horse; not the capability (or lack thereof) of the ordnance but the amount of time taken in preparation for the battle.
Loates Jr ( talk) 10:22, 17 April 2014 (UTC)Andy Loates Loates Jr ( talk) 10:22, 17 April 2014 (UTC)
I do wonder whether ATG crews were a "tougher" lot, due to their rather perilious role and positioning, and very very frequent moves. Maybe they got more compo :).
Milligan memorably recalls the units' vain attempts to look smart for leave in Tunis, but reflected that they looked like "sacks of s**t tied up in the middle". He uses the sack metaphor a couple of times. A great post, and I fully support a revert. Cheers! Irondome ( talk) 01:49, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
This article is rated C-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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12 hours to emplace?? Removing it because it seems an extreme claim. Half a day with a crew of 6+ well fed R.A gunners and the additional labour of the towing vehicle crew? Were they union members? Please cite source. Just sounds wrong. The 17 pdr was not THAT big :) Irondome ( talk) 04:36, 13 May 2012 (UTC)
Actually that may not be that far from the truth. There is a very real tactical difference between setting up a gun and emplacing a gun. Not only was the 17 pdr heavy it was large and a great deal of preparation went into its effective emplacement and concealment. It had a substantial recoil so it did have to be literally 'dug in' to operate effectively. The crew were most likely conscripts; eager but by no means muscular (Spike Milligan was a conscript gunner who discribes himself as a skinny individual looking like a sack of potatos tied in the middle with string!). The prime mover, usually a Morris 'Quad', occasionally an older tank with the turret removed, was simply that; the vehicle used to tow it to where it was to be emplaced.
Emplacing a gun the size and weight of the towed 17 pdr was a back breaking job. It required digging out the ground so the split trail could be safely secured against recoil (ie making sure the gun didn't 'jump' or roll back during firing), a clear line of sight had to be secured which often meant hacking back foliage, then that same foliage used to camouflage the gun to make spotting by the enemy as diffcult as possible. All this time sufficient ammunition had to be placed by the gun, and (assuming a stay of more than 24 hours) bivouac and foxholes for each gun crew established along with clear routes for resupply of the gun and crew and (if necessary) the ability to get the gun out of trouble if an enemy assault looked like breaching the line.
All this is the real reason why towed anti-tank guns went the way of the horse; not the capability (or lack thereof) of the ordnance but the amount of time taken in preparation for the battle.
Loates Jr ( talk) 10:22, 17 April 2014 (UTC)Andy Loates Loates Jr ( talk) 10:22, 17 April 2014 (UTC)
I do wonder whether ATG crews were a "tougher" lot, due to their rather perilious role and positioning, and very very frequent moves. Maybe they got more compo :).
Milligan memorably recalls the units' vain attempts to look smart for leave in Tunis, but reflected that they looked like "sacks of s**t tied up in the middle". He uses the sack metaphor a couple of times. A great post, and I fully support a revert. Cheers! Irondome ( talk) 01:49, 19 April 2014 (UTC)