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The subject of "standard type battleship" is mentioned in several WP entries on US battleships. The writeups all have minor differences but do point out that the Nevada through Colorado classes represented a deliberate uniform standard in top speed (~21 knots), tactical turn radius (~700 yards), cruising range at economical speed (~8,000+ miles) intended to avoid the problems of other navies (particularly the British and Japanese) who had fast and slow battleships that could not operate together as a unit (or if they did would be limited by the ship with slowest speed, shortest range and widest turn radius). A single article (well-written) on the subject would be better than the same subject treated differently in several scattered battleship articles. Naaman Brown ( talk) 19:16, 22 July 2009 (UTC)
The key to the Standard type battleship is the common tactical operating characteristics (armor, range, top speed, turning) that allowed any combination to be deployed as a single unit. There are a number of co-incidental facts about the Standard type battleship classes:
These are interesting factoids about the Standard type, but they are co-incidental and not relevant to the purpose of the Standard: shared tactical operating characteristics. For that reason, I am leaving this in Talk to avoid cluttering the entry. Naaman Brown ( talk) 12:05, 14 August 2009 (UTC)
I am bothered that the article doesn't even attempt to address the drawbacks with the standard battleship concept - most notably the problem of block obsolesence which was a major headache for the USN in the 30's. Basically this means because the ships all have virtually identical characteristics, they will all become obsolete at the same time and all need to be replaced at the same time. This is a bad thing. Getztashida ( talk) 18:33, 21 January 2011 (UTC)
The prior version (and another talk thread) cited block obsolescence with the standard type as a problem specifically related to their uniform speeds of 21 knots. It claimed the low speed was a major handicap and that interim vessels with a speed of 25 knots remained useful.
The fact is 25 knot classes did not and were unable to operate with the fast carrier task forces that became the focal point of WWII pacific operations. Even the North Carolina and South Dakota classes were marginal in this respect and it was their speed which became one of the principal reasons they were not retained in Reserve Status like the Iowas. Secondly the Standards were not all identical and they did not all become obsolete as a group. In fact the 3 of the Big 5 which were extensively modernized were considered to be nearly equivalent to new construction (Friedman page 389) in every respect except speed and were scrapped only a year before the North Carolinas and South Dakotas. The only reasons the Standards could all be considered obsolete at the same time where as a result of the advent of carrier warfare and their lack of speed. But in this respect only the US Iowa class was fast enough the properly operate with modern carrier task forces and post war except as a gunfire support ship even they were considered obsolete.
Secondly the Yamato class was developed not to obsolete the Standards at one fell swoop but to overcome guaranteed US numerical superiority with a ship that would be an order of magnitude more powerful than anything the US might be expected to field.
The other problem in the original article is the statement that "Their low speed was a liability to their deployment in the vast expanses of the Pacific, for instance they could not accompany the fleet carriers that had become the dominant combatant. By contrast, the contemporary Queen Elizabeth were fast enough and saw more front line action in the confines of the Mediterranean."
Their low speed did not present special issues in the Pacific because of the distances involved. The edit correctly recognizes that their speed prevented them from operating with the fast carrier task forces and it was that inability which relegated them to second line duties. The Queen Elizabeth’s were more active in the Med but that was a very different conflict than the Pacific. Furthermore the majority of the US Battleline was undergoing repairs or fitting out early in the war and the remaining ships were held back in part again because they couldn't operate with fast carrier task forces. A 25 knot type (Or 23 which was what the QE's actually were) would not have been used any differently.
An additional comment on the edit. The revised version (using the cited source paper on the standard types) properly addresses the impact of their speed and the speed of their contemporaries upon their operations. It also notes (again from the paper cited as a source in the original) that the standards demonstrated superior resistance to battle damage and greater staying power than their contemporaries. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.255.141.221 ( talk) 19:38, 16 March 2013 (UTC)
I'm going to take issue with a lot of what was said here. That being said I think the entire article needs a new look. It tends to treat the standards as a homogeneous whole which is not the case.
First with respect to block obsolescence, which seems from the history to be at the heart of your concerns with the standards, you fail to cite any sources to support your views. To my way of thinking without supporting evidence its little more than personal opinion. By contrast the unsigned edit cited sources (Friedman) in support of his contention that the Standards did in fact not become obsolete as a group. In support of that (and I think official USN opinion as cited by Friedman is pretty strong) I would add that the Standards were in fact several distinct classes of ships and each class incorporated evolutionary improvements on the others. One only has to compare the Nevada class to the Colorado class to see just how different the ships ultimately became.
Second I don't think the edit proffered represented an attack on the QE class. It correctly noted that at least during WWI the British fleet found that it could not in fact operate the QE class as a separate fast wing. Whether the QE class was in general a 23 or 24 knot ship is really irrelevant to the discussion at hand. The point was that other Navies which operated BB's of differing speed capabilities were forced to operate those ships at the speed at the speed of the slowest ship in the squadron. A 23 knot ship enjoys too small a speed margin over a 21 knot ship (especially when variations in trial versus service speeds are considered) to offer a major increase in tactical utility. The Nagato’s at 26 knots were much closer as you noted to the 28-30 knot speeds enjoyed by modern fast battleships but when you look at ships built during the same period as the standards they stand out as an exception. All of the British ships built during that era were 21 knot ships except for the QEs at 23-24 and the Fuso’s and Is’se at 23 knots as built. The two knot difference between the standards and the vast majority of their contemporaries (including Nelson and Rodney) is tactically insignificant.
With respect to the mission of a battleship you can't ignore the fact that changed over time. The RN did not attempt to operate carriers on the US model until late in the war and by then only the KGV class was used as an escort. That the QE's had a more active war than the R class was due to inherent design problems with the R class that made it all but impossible to modernize the class. See Burt's British Battleships 1919-1945 as a good reference. It should also be noted that the R class was very successful at driving off powerful German Surface units by their mere presence early in the war. There is simply no evidence to support the assertion that a 21 knot battleship was incapable of engaging a faster ship. Now obviously if the faster ships want to run away you can't run them down but US doctrine was to advance on, attack, and seize targets that would force their enemy to come out and fight. If your being forced to fight then the ability to run away doesn’t matter for much.
So if the US standards weren't used as actively as the QE's during WWII why was that? And would a service speed of 24 or 25 knots have changed that? The answer is no for two reasons. First the war in the Pacific centered on fast carrier task forces. A speed of 21 knots was too slow for carrier operations and even the 28knot North Carolina and South Dakota classes were considered marginal. Had the later standards been built to a 24 or 25 knot speed standard it’s highly unlikely that it would have changed how they were employed in WWII. Secondly is Pearl Harbor. Those ships that weren't damaged at Pearl were held in reserve and it took years to reconstruct the ships that were raised. By the time the US battle line was back to full strength the carrier was the dominant force and it was clear that the pre-war vision of the battle line advancing across the Pacific was no longer relevant. Consequently the slower ships were relegated to second line duties providing naval gunfire support. WWII showed that a 28 knot ship was the bare minimum to operate with the carrier task forces and the postwar evaluation that only the Iowa's really had the speed to do so shows that even that really wasn't enough.
With respect to damage resistance have you read the cited source? It does a pretty thorough job of looking at the whole picture and that picture I think justifies the comment. The performance of Resolution and Ramillies was especially poor considering they were struck by a single torpedo. Finally you ask “so what” if the QE’s couldn’t accompany Fast Carrier task forces. The reason that’s relevant is that the original article cited their low speed as a liability in Pacific Operations and the usefulness of the QE’s in the med. You can’t have it both ways. Either operation with carriers had become the new speed standard (Pacific) or 23 knots (RN Med) was perfectly acceptable. There is simply no evidence that the RN operated the QE’s in a significantly different manner because they had a 2-3 knot speed advantage over the R class. The QE’s bore the brunt of that fighting because the truly modern ships were in the Home Fleet guarding against Tirpitz and the R class hadn’t been at all modernized. Thus the RN deployed the best ships it had forward. The speed difference was nice but not a game changer. If you can show that credible contemporary sources were concerned about block obsolescence solely on the basis of the 21 knot maximum speeds then I’d love to see them. But I’m not aware of any evaluations from the period that thought the 21 knot speeds of the standards had rendered them obsolete en mass. Had that been the case then the USN certainly could have and likely would have re-engined the ships to improve their maximum speeds. That there was no serious thought ever given to such a program is further proof that the USN did not consider a 25 knot a vast improvement on a 21 knot ship. Even the aborted South Dakota class of 1920 was only designed to a 23 knot standard. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Ski206 ( talk • contribs) 20:59, 1 April 2013 (UTC)
OK, here's an outside opinion on this, from someone who's been reading and rereading Friedman's US Battleships pretty much constantly for the last three years or so. Block obsolescence presumably was not something on Secretary Daniels's mind when he approved the Standards. However, given that every year excepting FY14 (the Arizona), the General Board submitted a set of characteristics to the Secretary that would be a significant upgrade over the previous year's class of ships, it's pretty clear that to the General Board (if not to Bureau of Construction & Repair, who seemingly never wanted to make any changes at ALL and almost always proposed repeating the previous ship) felt that not only was block obsolescence a serious issue (note their concern about the Washington Treaty giving the British superiority from about 1952-1956 due to the Colorados having reached end-of-life, but the Nelsons still being within their lifespans), but that the Pennsylvanias were already obsolete/less than fully adequate by FY15. All that Daniels seemed to care about was keeping construction costs down; from the Pennsylvania (FY14) to the California (FY17), the changes made were exceedingly minor, basically increasing deck armor and main battery elevation. The Colorados of FY18 differed from the Tennessees (FY17) in the main battery, rendering them "unbalanced" by the standards of the day, and actually conformed to the C&R alternative design for a 16" battleship that was the General Board's least favored option, for that very reason. In other words, given that the General Board had basically been requesting the eventual BB-49 design every year from FY16 on until they finally got them approved just in time for the Washington Treaty to kill them, I'd say that block obsolescence definitely played into their decisions.
As a note, the entire "Standard-type battleship" concept wasn't referred to as such by the Navy at the time; it seems to be a term created by later historians, looking at the nearly homogenous battle line it resulted in with the benefit of hindsight. Indeed, Friedman directly repudiates the idea that the General Board was trying to create a homogenous battle line on page 113, regarding the Pennsylvanias vice the Nevadas: "As usual, C&R tried to duplicate its latest design, objecting that it was the General Board's own policy to build in squadrons of four.... The General Board was unimpressed. The new ships would still be able to combine tactically with the Nevadas, even though they were 55-feet longer. There was no point in repeating inferior ships if better ones could be had." There was no desire to create a "standard" design by the General Board, only by the Secretary of the Navy, looking to minimize how much he had to fight on Capitol Hill to get the construction projects funded. rdfox 76 ( talk) 00:12, 4 April 2013 (UTC)
FYI, I've protected the article until this dispute has been resolved. Ed [talk] [majestic titan] 19:54, 4 April 2013 (UTC)
these qualify as standards insofar as they have the same guns in type and number as the Nevadas , similar speed, and the only exception being the lack of an all or nothing armor scheme which was one of the progressive changes. But functionally they were used as and sailed with the other standards. 74.193.44.32 ( talk) 22:27, 24 December 2022 (UTC)
As part of OMT, I am working on this article, if you wish you may check the References section I just added (I renamed the previous References to Footnotes) and order them, I will be adding a section per class and a subsection per ship.
SEKDIS ( talk) 09:18, 5 May 2023 (UTC)
![]() | This article is rated Start-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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The subject of "standard type battleship" is mentioned in several WP entries on US battleships. The writeups all have minor differences but do point out that the Nevada through Colorado classes represented a deliberate uniform standard in top speed (~21 knots), tactical turn radius (~700 yards), cruising range at economical speed (~8,000+ miles) intended to avoid the problems of other navies (particularly the British and Japanese) who had fast and slow battleships that could not operate together as a unit (or if they did would be limited by the ship with slowest speed, shortest range and widest turn radius). A single article (well-written) on the subject would be better than the same subject treated differently in several scattered battleship articles. Naaman Brown ( talk) 19:16, 22 July 2009 (UTC)
The key to the Standard type battleship is the common tactical operating characteristics (armor, range, top speed, turning) that allowed any combination to be deployed as a single unit. There are a number of co-incidental facts about the Standard type battleship classes:
These are interesting factoids about the Standard type, but they are co-incidental and not relevant to the purpose of the Standard: shared tactical operating characteristics. For that reason, I am leaving this in Talk to avoid cluttering the entry. Naaman Brown ( talk) 12:05, 14 August 2009 (UTC)
I am bothered that the article doesn't even attempt to address the drawbacks with the standard battleship concept - most notably the problem of block obsolesence which was a major headache for the USN in the 30's. Basically this means because the ships all have virtually identical characteristics, they will all become obsolete at the same time and all need to be replaced at the same time. This is a bad thing. Getztashida ( talk) 18:33, 21 January 2011 (UTC)
The prior version (and another talk thread) cited block obsolescence with the standard type as a problem specifically related to their uniform speeds of 21 knots. It claimed the low speed was a major handicap and that interim vessels with a speed of 25 knots remained useful.
The fact is 25 knot classes did not and were unable to operate with the fast carrier task forces that became the focal point of WWII pacific operations. Even the North Carolina and South Dakota classes were marginal in this respect and it was their speed which became one of the principal reasons they were not retained in Reserve Status like the Iowas. Secondly the Standards were not all identical and they did not all become obsolete as a group. In fact the 3 of the Big 5 which were extensively modernized were considered to be nearly equivalent to new construction (Friedman page 389) in every respect except speed and were scrapped only a year before the North Carolinas and South Dakotas. The only reasons the Standards could all be considered obsolete at the same time where as a result of the advent of carrier warfare and their lack of speed. But in this respect only the US Iowa class was fast enough the properly operate with modern carrier task forces and post war except as a gunfire support ship even they were considered obsolete.
Secondly the Yamato class was developed not to obsolete the Standards at one fell swoop but to overcome guaranteed US numerical superiority with a ship that would be an order of magnitude more powerful than anything the US might be expected to field.
The other problem in the original article is the statement that "Their low speed was a liability to their deployment in the vast expanses of the Pacific, for instance they could not accompany the fleet carriers that had become the dominant combatant. By contrast, the contemporary Queen Elizabeth were fast enough and saw more front line action in the confines of the Mediterranean."
Their low speed did not present special issues in the Pacific because of the distances involved. The edit correctly recognizes that their speed prevented them from operating with the fast carrier task forces and it was that inability which relegated them to second line duties. The Queen Elizabeth’s were more active in the Med but that was a very different conflict than the Pacific. Furthermore the majority of the US Battleline was undergoing repairs or fitting out early in the war and the remaining ships were held back in part again because they couldn't operate with fast carrier task forces. A 25 knot type (Or 23 which was what the QE's actually were) would not have been used any differently.
An additional comment on the edit. The revised version (using the cited source paper on the standard types) properly addresses the impact of their speed and the speed of their contemporaries upon their operations. It also notes (again from the paper cited as a source in the original) that the standards demonstrated superior resistance to battle damage and greater staying power than their contemporaries. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.255.141.221 ( talk) 19:38, 16 March 2013 (UTC)
I'm going to take issue with a lot of what was said here. That being said I think the entire article needs a new look. It tends to treat the standards as a homogeneous whole which is not the case.
First with respect to block obsolescence, which seems from the history to be at the heart of your concerns with the standards, you fail to cite any sources to support your views. To my way of thinking without supporting evidence its little more than personal opinion. By contrast the unsigned edit cited sources (Friedman) in support of his contention that the Standards did in fact not become obsolete as a group. In support of that (and I think official USN opinion as cited by Friedman is pretty strong) I would add that the Standards were in fact several distinct classes of ships and each class incorporated evolutionary improvements on the others. One only has to compare the Nevada class to the Colorado class to see just how different the ships ultimately became.
Second I don't think the edit proffered represented an attack on the QE class. It correctly noted that at least during WWI the British fleet found that it could not in fact operate the QE class as a separate fast wing. Whether the QE class was in general a 23 or 24 knot ship is really irrelevant to the discussion at hand. The point was that other Navies which operated BB's of differing speed capabilities were forced to operate those ships at the speed at the speed of the slowest ship in the squadron. A 23 knot ship enjoys too small a speed margin over a 21 knot ship (especially when variations in trial versus service speeds are considered) to offer a major increase in tactical utility. The Nagato’s at 26 knots were much closer as you noted to the 28-30 knot speeds enjoyed by modern fast battleships but when you look at ships built during the same period as the standards they stand out as an exception. All of the British ships built during that era were 21 knot ships except for the QEs at 23-24 and the Fuso’s and Is’se at 23 knots as built. The two knot difference between the standards and the vast majority of their contemporaries (including Nelson and Rodney) is tactically insignificant.
With respect to the mission of a battleship you can't ignore the fact that changed over time. The RN did not attempt to operate carriers on the US model until late in the war and by then only the KGV class was used as an escort. That the QE's had a more active war than the R class was due to inherent design problems with the R class that made it all but impossible to modernize the class. See Burt's British Battleships 1919-1945 as a good reference. It should also be noted that the R class was very successful at driving off powerful German Surface units by their mere presence early in the war. There is simply no evidence to support the assertion that a 21 knot battleship was incapable of engaging a faster ship. Now obviously if the faster ships want to run away you can't run them down but US doctrine was to advance on, attack, and seize targets that would force their enemy to come out and fight. If your being forced to fight then the ability to run away doesn’t matter for much.
So if the US standards weren't used as actively as the QE's during WWII why was that? And would a service speed of 24 or 25 knots have changed that? The answer is no for two reasons. First the war in the Pacific centered on fast carrier task forces. A speed of 21 knots was too slow for carrier operations and even the 28knot North Carolina and South Dakota classes were considered marginal. Had the later standards been built to a 24 or 25 knot speed standard it’s highly unlikely that it would have changed how they were employed in WWII. Secondly is Pearl Harbor. Those ships that weren't damaged at Pearl were held in reserve and it took years to reconstruct the ships that were raised. By the time the US battle line was back to full strength the carrier was the dominant force and it was clear that the pre-war vision of the battle line advancing across the Pacific was no longer relevant. Consequently the slower ships were relegated to second line duties providing naval gunfire support. WWII showed that a 28 knot ship was the bare minimum to operate with the carrier task forces and the postwar evaluation that only the Iowa's really had the speed to do so shows that even that really wasn't enough.
With respect to damage resistance have you read the cited source? It does a pretty thorough job of looking at the whole picture and that picture I think justifies the comment. The performance of Resolution and Ramillies was especially poor considering they were struck by a single torpedo. Finally you ask “so what” if the QE’s couldn’t accompany Fast Carrier task forces. The reason that’s relevant is that the original article cited their low speed as a liability in Pacific Operations and the usefulness of the QE’s in the med. You can’t have it both ways. Either operation with carriers had become the new speed standard (Pacific) or 23 knots (RN Med) was perfectly acceptable. There is simply no evidence that the RN operated the QE’s in a significantly different manner because they had a 2-3 knot speed advantage over the R class. The QE’s bore the brunt of that fighting because the truly modern ships were in the Home Fleet guarding against Tirpitz and the R class hadn’t been at all modernized. Thus the RN deployed the best ships it had forward. The speed difference was nice but not a game changer. If you can show that credible contemporary sources were concerned about block obsolescence solely on the basis of the 21 knot maximum speeds then I’d love to see them. But I’m not aware of any evaluations from the period that thought the 21 knot speeds of the standards had rendered them obsolete en mass. Had that been the case then the USN certainly could have and likely would have re-engined the ships to improve their maximum speeds. That there was no serious thought ever given to such a program is further proof that the USN did not consider a 25 knot a vast improvement on a 21 knot ship. Even the aborted South Dakota class of 1920 was only designed to a 23 knot standard. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Ski206 ( talk • contribs) 20:59, 1 April 2013 (UTC)
OK, here's an outside opinion on this, from someone who's been reading and rereading Friedman's US Battleships pretty much constantly for the last three years or so. Block obsolescence presumably was not something on Secretary Daniels's mind when he approved the Standards. However, given that every year excepting FY14 (the Arizona), the General Board submitted a set of characteristics to the Secretary that would be a significant upgrade over the previous year's class of ships, it's pretty clear that to the General Board (if not to Bureau of Construction & Repair, who seemingly never wanted to make any changes at ALL and almost always proposed repeating the previous ship) felt that not only was block obsolescence a serious issue (note their concern about the Washington Treaty giving the British superiority from about 1952-1956 due to the Colorados having reached end-of-life, but the Nelsons still being within their lifespans), but that the Pennsylvanias were already obsolete/less than fully adequate by FY15. All that Daniels seemed to care about was keeping construction costs down; from the Pennsylvania (FY14) to the California (FY17), the changes made were exceedingly minor, basically increasing deck armor and main battery elevation. The Colorados of FY18 differed from the Tennessees (FY17) in the main battery, rendering them "unbalanced" by the standards of the day, and actually conformed to the C&R alternative design for a 16" battleship that was the General Board's least favored option, for that very reason. In other words, given that the General Board had basically been requesting the eventual BB-49 design every year from FY16 on until they finally got them approved just in time for the Washington Treaty to kill them, I'd say that block obsolescence definitely played into their decisions.
As a note, the entire "Standard-type battleship" concept wasn't referred to as such by the Navy at the time; it seems to be a term created by later historians, looking at the nearly homogenous battle line it resulted in with the benefit of hindsight. Indeed, Friedman directly repudiates the idea that the General Board was trying to create a homogenous battle line on page 113, regarding the Pennsylvanias vice the Nevadas: "As usual, C&R tried to duplicate its latest design, objecting that it was the General Board's own policy to build in squadrons of four.... The General Board was unimpressed. The new ships would still be able to combine tactically with the Nevadas, even though they were 55-feet longer. There was no point in repeating inferior ships if better ones could be had." There was no desire to create a "standard" design by the General Board, only by the Secretary of the Navy, looking to minimize how much he had to fight on Capitol Hill to get the construction projects funded. rdfox 76 ( talk) 00:12, 4 April 2013 (UTC)
FYI, I've protected the article until this dispute has been resolved. Ed [talk] [majestic titan] 19:54, 4 April 2013 (UTC)
these qualify as standards insofar as they have the same guns in type and number as the Nevadas , similar speed, and the only exception being the lack of an all or nothing armor scheme which was one of the progressive changes. But functionally they were used as and sailed with the other standards. 74.193.44.32 ( talk) 22:27, 24 December 2022 (UTC)
As part of OMT, I am working on this article, if you wish you may check the References section I just added (I renamed the previous References to Footnotes) and order them, I will be adding a section per class and a subsection per ship.
SEKDIS ( talk) 09:18, 5 May 2023 (UTC)