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I corrected the formal section on equilibrium which was badly done. (The dependence of the receiver's action on the sender's was not expressed, leading to a wrong formalisation.) Some minor edits too. The section is not as clear as it could be, but at least not wrong now. I added the possibility of mixed strategies (necessary for equilibrium sometimes), and take credit for the joke about mixed messages!
One point: I am not sure the message/action wording is the best: it seems to imply costless signalling (that different messages are equally costly). CSMR 03:46, 21 November 2005 (UTC)
I think the formal section is still wrong for the following reasons:
As far as I know, according to Dawkins, A. Zahavi was the first to propose the handicap principle in regards to Birds of Paradise and Thompson's Gazelles. Even if future biologists have expanded upon the theory, Zahavi deserves initial credit for the ideas. (q.v. handicap principle)
If nobody objects, I will update the article accordingly. — MSchmahl … 11:57, 25 December 2007 (UTC)
Shouldn't we use either British English OR American English? Signalling vs. signaling etc.? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 132.231.54.1 ( talk) 14:58, 10 February 2009 (UTC)
I'd love to see some explanation for the extensive form diagram, either in the caption or the main text, or both. What are X, Y, N and q? There are no S and R in the diagram, though we'd expect that from the main text. How do we read these diagrams? Sender says something, receiver reacts, from left to right... or something? Also, how do the various symbols and formalism in the main text relate to the diagram (actions, messages, types)? What are the horizontal lines, solid vs. dotted? I have been googling around trying to figure out how these diagrams work, to no avail. Someone help! Jyoshimi ( talk) 16:45, 30 September 2015 (UTC)
I rewrote the introduction to add more qualitative features of signalling. I removed the notation, which isn't needed in an introduction. Also, signalling games are not restricted to two players, discrete types, no signal by the receiver, etc., so I rephrased the description as being an example of a simple signalling game. I fixed the spelling of Rubinstein and made other stylistic changes. -- editeur24 ( talk) 22:47, 7 December 2020 (UTC)
In section Signaling game#Reputation game the payoff matrix entry is P1+P1 for the preying sane sender and D1+D1, both when the receiver stays. But it seems P1 and D1 only refer to the signal costs for the sender -which are a priori not related to the payoff summand depending on the receiver's action. Then why is there a particular M1 summand in case of monopoly -thus fixed regardless of the sender's signal- and not some fixed payoff, say C1, in case the receiver of competition -that is the receiver staying ? In other words the payoff for the sender should be the sum "signal cost [a negative number]"+"state payoff only depending on the receiver choice [positive]", which would imply P1=D1 -which is not reasonable.
I would therefore see (P1+C1, D2) in the upper left entry and (D1+C1, D2) in the middle left entry -modulo choices of notation. Please anyone correct me -i will also try to check literature for usual such game models later. Thank you. Plm203 ( talk) 13:53, 24 November 2023 (UTC)
![]() | This article is rated Start-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | ||||||||||
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I corrected the formal section on equilibrium which was badly done. (The dependence of the receiver's action on the sender's was not expressed, leading to a wrong formalisation.) Some minor edits too. The section is not as clear as it could be, but at least not wrong now. I added the possibility of mixed strategies (necessary for equilibrium sometimes), and take credit for the joke about mixed messages!
One point: I am not sure the message/action wording is the best: it seems to imply costless signalling (that different messages are equally costly). CSMR 03:46, 21 November 2005 (UTC)
I think the formal section is still wrong for the following reasons:
As far as I know, according to Dawkins, A. Zahavi was the first to propose the handicap principle in regards to Birds of Paradise and Thompson's Gazelles. Even if future biologists have expanded upon the theory, Zahavi deserves initial credit for the ideas. (q.v. handicap principle)
If nobody objects, I will update the article accordingly. — MSchmahl … 11:57, 25 December 2007 (UTC)
Shouldn't we use either British English OR American English? Signalling vs. signaling etc.? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 132.231.54.1 ( talk) 14:58, 10 February 2009 (UTC)
I'd love to see some explanation for the extensive form diagram, either in the caption or the main text, or both. What are X, Y, N and q? There are no S and R in the diagram, though we'd expect that from the main text. How do we read these diagrams? Sender says something, receiver reacts, from left to right... or something? Also, how do the various symbols and formalism in the main text relate to the diagram (actions, messages, types)? What are the horizontal lines, solid vs. dotted? I have been googling around trying to figure out how these diagrams work, to no avail. Someone help! Jyoshimi ( talk) 16:45, 30 September 2015 (UTC)
I rewrote the introduction to add more qualitative features of signalling. I removed the notation, which isn't needed in an introduction. Also, signalling games are not restricted to two players, discrete types, no signal by the receiver, etc., so I rephrased the description as being an example of a simple signalling game. I fixed the spelling of Rubinstein and made other stylistic changes. -- editeur24 ( talk) 22:47, 7 December 2020 (UTC)
In section Signaling game#Reputation game the payoff matrix entry is P1+P1 for the preying sane sender and D1+D1, both when the receiver stays. But it seems P1 and D1 only refer to the signal costs for the sender -which are a priori not related to the payoff summand depending on the receiver's action. Then why is there a particular M1 summand in case of monopoly -thus fixed regardless of the sender's signal- and not some fixed payoff, say C1, in case the receiver of competition -that is the receiver staying ? In other words the payoff for the sender should be the sum "signal cost [a negative number]"+"state payoff only depending on the receiver choice [positive]", which would imply P1=D1 -which is not reasonable.
I would therefore see (P1+C1, D2) in the upper left entry and (D1+C1, D2) in the middle left entry -modulo choices of notation. Please anyone correct me -i will also try to check literature for usual such game models later. Thank you. Plm203 ( talk) 13:53, 24 November 2023 (UTC)