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In 1772, many of the thirteen British colonies, in response to the Gaspee Affair and other unpopular British actions, elected to form Committees of Correspondence. These allowed communities to formally communicate with each other, raise awareness of incidents occurring elsewhere, and coordinate actions;[1] as such, they became instrumental in enforcing the colonial response to enforcement of the Tea Act, the Intolerable Acts, and other unpopular legislation.
Seeking to prevent the outbreak of war and to keep the peace between the American Patriot (Whig) majority and the Loyalist (Tory) minority, he believed that the best way to accomplish this was by secretly removing military stores from storehouses and arsenals in New England.[3][4]
On August 31, Gage sent Middlesex County sheriff David Phips to Brattle with orders to remove the provincial powder, so Brattle gave the key to the powderhouse to him. He also gave orders to ready a force of troops for action the next day, something that did not go unnoticed by the local population.[6] At some point on the 31st, General Gage, whether by his intent, accident, or theft by a messenger, lost possession of William Brattle's letter; the widely held story was that it was dropped. News of its content would spread rapidly, and it was widely held to be a warning to Gage to remove the provincial powder.[7]
From there, they marched about a mile to the Powder House, a gunpowder magazine that still stands at the present-day Powder House Square, Somerville, where the largest supply of gunpowder in Massachusetts was kept.
Colonel David Phips, the county sheriff and a Loyalist sympathizer, gave the King's Troops the keys to the building, and after sunrise they removed all the gunpowder.
The regulars were marching; Provincial powder had been seized; war was at hand; people had been killed; Boston was being bombarded by His Majesty's warships.
Eventually the air was cleared, and militia units (some of which were still heading toward Boston) returned home.[12]
Gage, surprised by the reaction, delayed, and eventually cancelled, a second planned expedition to the storehouse in Worcester.[13]
Gage's request was somewhat ridiculous, as there were only 12,000 troops in Britain at the time.
He later began planning and executing seizures again.[15]
He rode from Boston to Portsmouth on the 13th to notify the local Patriots, and on the 14th the fort was raided, and its supplies removed by the Patriots.
There are notable comparisons and differences between these events and those leading to the battles of Lexington and Concord. The British had a similar goal in each case: the secret seizure of military supplies.
There are notable comparisons and differences between these events and those leading to the battles of Lexington and Concord. The British had a similar goal in each case: the secret seizure of military supplies. The march on the powder house was done in secret, and executed successfully by the British; the march on Concord was done with timely intelligence of its execution being transmitted to the militias. The action in Portsmouth was based on faulty intelligence, and ended with Patriot success, as they surprised the garrison there; the intelligence on the night of April 18, 1775 was, to all intents, sufficiently accurate to warrant Patriot action. The timeliness of intelligence enabled the Patriots to assemble their militias; its accuracy may have contributed to the standoff that led to the "shot heard 'round the world".[24]
There are notable comparisons and differences between these events and those leading to the battles of Lexington and Concord. The British had a similar goal in each case: the secret seizure of military supplies. The march on the powder house was done in secret, and executed successfully by the British; the march on Concord was done in spite of the fact that the British knew the secrecy of the mission had been compromised. The action in Portsmouth was based on faulty intelligence, and ended with Patriot success, as they surprised the garrison there; the intelligence on the night of April 18, 1775 was sufficiently accurate to warrant Patriot action. The timeliness of intelligence enabled the Patriots to assemble their militias; its accuracy may have contributed to the standoff that led to the "shot heard 'round the world".[25]
Is this really needed? Why don't you just start a stub on Brattle
here and put that in there?
I'm putting the nomination on hold; as long as you are working on it, it won't be closed. Cheers! — Ed 17 (Talk / Contribs) 07:17, 7 December 2008 (UTC)
Article (
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visual edit |
history) ·
Article talk (
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history) ·
Watch
GA review – see WP:WIAGA for criteria
In 1772, many of the thirteen British colonies, in response to the Gaspee Affair and other unpopular British actions, elected to form Committees of Correspondence. These allowed communities to formally communicate with each other, raise awareness of incidents occurring elsewhere, and coordinate actions;[1] as such, they became instrumental in enforcing the colonial response to enforcement of the Tea Act, the Intolerable Acts, and other unpopular legislation.
Seeking to prevent the outbreak of war and to keep the peace between the American Patriot (Whig) majority and the Loyalist (Tory) minority, he believed that the best way to accomplish this was by secretly removing military stores from storehouses and arsenals in New England.[3][4]
On August 31, Gage sent Middlesex County sheriff David Phips to Brattle with orders to remove the provincial powder, so Brattle gave the key to the powderhouse to him. He also gave orders to ready a force of troops for action the next day, something that did not go unnoticed by the local population.[6] At some point on the 31st, General Gage, whether by his intent, accident, or theft by a messenger, lost possession of William Brattle's letter; the widely held story was that it was dropped. News of its content would spread rapidly, and it was widely held to be a warning to Gage to remove the provincial powder.[7]
From there, they marched about a mile to the Powder House, a gunpowder magazine that still stands at the present-day Powder House Square, Somerville, where the largest supply of gunpowder in Massachusetts was kept.
Colonel David Phips, the county sheriff and a Loyalist sympathizer, gave the King's Troops the keys to the building, and after sunrise they removed all the gunpowder.
The regulars were marching; Provincial powder had been seized; war was at hand; people had been killed; Boston was being bombarded by His Majesty's warships.
Eventually the air was cleared, and militia units (some of which were still heading toward Boston) returned home.[12]
Gage, surprised by the reaction, delayed, and eventually cancelled, a second planned expedition to the storehouse in Worcester.[13]
Gage's request was somewhat ridiculous, as there were only 12,000 troops in Britain at the time.
He later began planning and executing seizures again.[15]
He rode from Boston to Portsmouth on the 13th to notify the local Patriots, and on the 14th the fort was raided, and its supplies removed by the Patriots.
There are notable comparisons and differences between these events and those leading to the battles of Lexington and Concord. The British had a similar goal in each case: the secret seizure of military supplies.
There are notable comparisons and differences between these events and those leading to the battles of Lexington and Concord. The British had a similar goal in each case: the secret seizure of military supplies. The march on the powder house was done in secret, and executed successfully by the British; the march on Concord was done with timely intelligence of its execution being transmitted to the militias. The action in Portsmouth was based on faulty intelligence, and ended with Patriot success, as they surprised the garrison there; the intelligence on the night of April 18, 1775 was, to all intents, sufficiently accurate to warrant Patriot action. The timeliness of intelligence enabled the Patriots to assemble their militias; its accuracy may have contributed to the standoff that led to the "shot heard 'round the world".[24]
There are notable comparisons and differences between these events and those leading to the battles of Lexington and Concord. The British had a similar goal in each case: the secret seizure of military supplies. The march on the powder house was done in secret, and executed successfully by the British; the march on Concord was done in spite of the fact that the British knew the secrecy of the mission had been compromised. The action in Portsmouth was based on faulty intelligence, and ended with Patriot success, as they surprised the garrison there; the intelligence on the night of April 18, 1775 was sufficiently accurate to warrant Patriot action. The timeliness of intelligence enabled the Patriots to assemble their militias; its accuracy may have contributed to the standoff that led to the "shot heard 'round the world".[25]
Is this really needed? Why don't you just start a stub on Brattle
here and put that in there?
I'm putting the nomination on hold; as long as you are working on it, it won't be closed. Cheers! — Ed 17 (Talk / Contribs) 07:17, 7 December 2008 (UTC)