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We should make effort to collate some sources here to determine the most common definition of physical determinism. I am not aware of the broad definition given by the Oxford source; it appears non-standard. Richardbrucebaxter ( talk) 04:31, 6 February 2013 (UTC)
"My primary focus will be upon physical determinism, the thesis that all physical events are determined to occur according to physical laws"
— Robert C Bishop, Chaos, indeterminism and free will, Chapter 4 in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition, p. 84
"Physical determinism might be a concept only relevant to the mathematical models of physics and other physical sciences, although its relevance to the world of everyday choice and action is questionable...if thoughts, feelings, and desires are not physical events, it is unlikely that physical theories are appropriate models for thinking about such nonphysical events."
— Robert C. Bishop, Chaos, indeterminism, and free will, p. 84
"Not only are our current best physical theories remarkably unclear about the truth of determinism in the physical sciences, there is a further significant issue regarding their application to metaphysical questions about our world..."
— Robert C. Bishop, op. cit., p. 94
"The contemporary developments in determinism and physical theories surveyed in this essay indicate that the existence of pockets of determinism in physics do not imply that determinism holds sway over all domains of physics. Furthermore, our physical theories are unreliable guides to the ultimate metaphysical character of our world."
— Robert C Bishop, op. cit., p. 96
A complete description of the physical state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the physical laws of nature entail every truth as to what physical events happen after that time
— Carl Ginet, On Action, p.92
Sometimes the restrictions to physical events and physical laws are ignored, and physical determinism is used as a synonym for nomological determinism, that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws.[3] However, in this article this practice is avoided.
Richard: You say
and repeated this statement several times. I find this statement to be a refusal to understand what is written by Bishop and Ginet. It doesn't help that in your discussion you interchange the two types of determinism at will, as if they are synonyms, when their distinction is necessary for this conversation.
You also wish to discount Bishop's two articles in the Oxford Handbook of Free Will as an "ambiguous definition" despite pages-long accompanying text that removes any possibility of ambiguity: physical determinism is used as a term distinguished from nomological determinism. Period. You also wish to marginalize this difference (even though you refuse to recognize it) by suggesting the question is one of "standard usage", which is a red herring. The usage making no distinction between physical and nomological determinism does occur, and maybe a count would show it has been used that way more often than not, but there is room for a usage that distinguishes the two, as the literature shows, and the adjective physical in physical determinism usefully describes its position.
To illustrate what I consider to be a complete non-sequitor in your presentation, you cite Ginet's definition: "physical determinism holds that a complete description of the physical state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the physical laws of nature together entail every truth as to what physical events happen after that time", and include the italics he introduced to point up the stress on physical. Then you ignore entirely the fact that in the text preceding this definition he uses the same wording without the word physical to define nomological determinism and proceeds to contrast the two definitions. You then conclude:
This statement is completely opposite to the position explained at length by Ginet, and further argued by Bishop. It also makes no sense on the face of it because the italicized physical in the definition sits there unexplained by your wrong conclusion.
How can you construe these authors so far from their meaning? Perhaps you are so swayed by a belief in causal closure as to think everything falls within physical laws? And additionally that physical laws are well described by the presumptions about them assumed by nomological determinism? Those beliefs can be argued, but they are not universally held. Hence the distinction. Brews ohare ( talk) 16:04, 7 February 2013 (UTC)
Physical determinism is a position in philosophy that holds that all physical events occur as described by physical laws.[1] Nomological determinism is the notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid, all-encompassing natural laws, that every occurrence results inevitably from prior events.[2]
The two terms become synonymous only if one assumes (i) all events are physical events, including of course, acts of imagination or creation of art, science, and so forth, and (ii) makes some assumptions about the nature of physical laws that are seldom held today.
The importance of the distinction is pointed out by Bishop. These definitions leave open just what "physical" might include. So, for example, one could limit the scope of physical determinism as:
"Physical determinism might be a concept only relevant to the mathematical models of physics and other physical sciences, although its relevance to the world of everyday choice and action is questionable...if thoughts, feelings, and desires are not physical events, it is unlikely that physical theories are appropriate models for thinking about such nonphysical events."
— Robert C. Bishop, Chaos, indeterminism, and free will, p. 84
As for the nature of determinism in physical law, which differs from the assumptions of nomological determinism, we have the view of Nagel:
"a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."[3]
— Ernest Nagel, Alternative descriptions of physical state p. 292
Sources
[1] Robert C Bishop, Harald Atmanspacher (2011). "Chapter 5: The causal closure of physics and free will". In Robert Kane, ed (ed.).
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 101.
ISBN
0195399692. {{
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[2] Steven W Horst (2011). Laws, Mind, and Free Will. MIT Press. p. 98. ISBN 0262015250.
[3] Ernest Nagel (1999). "§V: Alternative descriptions of physical state". The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (2nd ed.). Hackett. pp. 285–292. ISBN 0915144719.
Richard: Your recent changes require further discussion, and appear to be patently incorrect in some respects. In particular, the notion that physical determinism implies nomological determinism is contrary to much of the literature on this subject (cited in the article and on this Talk page), and has been discussed in a section of this Talk page that you have not addressed, and apparently not read. Please make an effort to compare your views on this talk page with the literature and with the comments already presented here.
Your view that Popper's work like his three worlds should not be presented on WP appears to be a prejudice on your part. In any event, the points made in the section on Popper's work can be made using other philosopher's as well, and some such formulation could be worked out here if you were inclined to participate on the Talk page. Brews ohare ( talk) 06:53, 7 February 2013 (UTC)
You have reinstituted your beliefs in the revisions here, here, and here, which amount to cramming nomological determinism down our throats, a violation of logic and of NPOV. Brews ohare ( talk) 16:22, 7 February 2013 (UTC)
I think the dispute here is really one about points-of-view more than black-and-white issues. From that standpoint, here is a proposal to rewrite the Introduction:
Physical determinism in its broadest definition holds that physical events evolve according to physical laws. It differs from the statement that physical theories describe a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the evolution of all events, human choices and actions included. [1] There are a variety of definitions, however, another being that physical determinism holds that a complete description of the physical state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the physical laws of nature together entail every truth as to what physical events happen after that time. [2]
Physical determinism often is used synonymously with nomological determinism. Nomological determinism holds that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws. [3] [4] Although treated as synonyms by some philosophers, other philosophers distinguishes physical determinism from nomological determinism in two respects:
First, in emphasizing the qualifier physical in 'physical events', physical determinism suggests that a subset of all events is indicated. A commonly held view is that, at bottom, all events are physical events, so the descriptor physical is not necessary. Whether this position is valid is the question of reductionism, and it may be considered an open question for the purposes of definition here.
Second, in emphasizing physical laws, it may be taken that emphasis is placed upon laws used in science, which are not "all encompassing" and rigidly deterministic: rather, all physical laws are limited in scope, and are not all-encompassing. [5] Moreover, some physical laws are probabilistic, not leading rigidly to inevitable outcomes, and some others are statistical, describing macroscopic regularities consistent with a plethora of microscopically different situations. [6]
Putting the above factors together, physical determinism is narrower than nomological determinism, by virtue of referring to a subset of all events, and in restricting these events to those that the selected natural laws are properly proven to describe, and broader than nomological determinism in allowing a variety of types of natural law extending beyond the rigidly restrictive sort entertained by nomological determinism. [7]
Stronger forms of physical determinism also have been used, based strictly upon the predictability of a physical system behaving according to classical mechanics. [8]
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all physical events are determined to occur according to physical laws
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The thesis of physical determinism is often supported by an appeal to a mechanical view of the world. This mechanical view derives much of its support from an appeal to classical mechanics.
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I've dropped the lead sentence about a "greater physical system" and its nine footnotes because, to me, this subject is a diversion from defining the topic, and the nine references probably are there to make a point that requires a separate discussion. Please discuss this proposal. Brews ohare ( talk) 17:59, 7 February 2013 (UTC)
What concerns me more is Brews' implication, above and elsewhere, that physical determinism, unlike nomological determinism, somehow permits nondeterministic physical laws. That seems clearly false from Ginet's definition, and I don't know where else Brews is getting it from. I agree that most contemporary science works with probablistic or statistical laws. That just means modern science is not deterministic. Not even physically deterministic. And that's just fine, but Brews seems to want to distinguish physical determinism from nomological determinism so that he can say that the nondeterministic laws by which we understand the world today are deterministic, and I just don't see the basis for claiming physical determinism allows that. --Pfhorrest (talk) 09:58, 9 February 2013 (UTC)
Your first sentence is about a question of usage, namely, what philosophers mean by "physical determinism" and whether they intend to expand this term to include all types of physical law. That point requires an examination of the philosophical literature, and probably a key work about this subject is Nagel, who has provided a formulation of determinism applicable to a wide range of physical laws. Later, you suggest that I wish to say that "the nondeterministic laws by which we understand the world today are deterministic". That is not my view nor my purpose. My aim is to introduce physical determinism as the opinion that physical events evolve according to physical laws, and these physical laws are exactly those used in science today. I believe a corollary of this view is that physical determinism is limited to the events dealt with by physical laws, and can be extended only when physical laws themselves expand to include more of the universe. Can you comment? Brews ohare ( talk) 17:13, 9 February 2013 (UTC)
"I have not stated that physical determinism and nomological determinism are identical... If physical determinism is true, then nomological determinism is true."
Genet's definition is (italics in original text):
Generally speaking, the introduction of a limiting modifier like "physical" narrows the scope of a definition, rather than broadening it. Perhaps you wish to stress that physical laws are not restricted to the rigid all-encompassing "laws" often associated with nomological determinism, although Ginet's definition doesn't by itself suggest this until the terms "physical laws of nature" and "physical state of the world" are interpreted. A close reading of Ginet suggests he wished to separate the "physical" from the "psychological", not to broaden the definition of nomologiclal determinism. . Brews ohare ( talk) 17:19, 10 February 2013 (UTC)
A question concerning the difference between two forms of determinism has arisen: nomological determinism and physical determinism. All parties agree that the two terms often are used as synonyms. The disagreement is over usage that differentiates between the two terms, with one opinion being that such usage occurs and is significant, and the other that such usage, assuming it does occur, hardly matters. A definition is quoted for physical determinism that is claimed by both parties as supporting their opinion. Please help to clarify these different views at Talk:Physical determinism#RfC on two usages of 'physical determinism' Brews ohare ( talk) 16:50, 8 February 2013 (UTC)
According to Ginet the idea of physical determinism hods that (italics in original text):
A complete description of the physical state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the physical laws of nature entail every truth as to what physical events happen after that time
— Carl Ginet, On Action, p.92
Ginet has inserted the adjective physical deliberately into this definition, and the question arises as to why he did this and why he italicized the word 'physical'.
One opinion is based upon Ginet's explanation. He proposes that determinism itself is described as:
A complete description of the state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the laws of nature entail every truth as to what events happen after that time
— Carl Ginet, On Action, p.92
This definition, the same as the one above but without the adjective 'physical', is that of nomological determinism. Genet says he wishes to make clear that he is talking about physical determinism by inserting the word 'physical' into this definition. It would seem a reasonable interpretation of this act that Ginet considers the adjective 'physical' to mean something. He does this in response to his question: "How much of what happens in the world do the laws of nature determine? Determinism says they determine everything." Ginet has introduced the adjective 'physical' to make clear that he is not discussing everything, but only things 'physical'.
In contrast to this view of the situation, the article Physical determinism says about Ginet's position: "Such a position implies nomological determinism, which holds that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws".
Simply put, the dispute is which view of Ginet's position is closer to his meaning? More generally the dispute is over drawing a distinction between nomological and physical determinism.
Richardbrucebaxter: You might address the distinction between Ginet's definition of determinism and nomological determinism, both of which appear to have the same definition, suggesting that Ginet's determinism is actually nomological dieterminsm. It would be preferable in this exercise if you could support your arguments with sources rather than your own unsupported assertions. For example, Vihvelin says:
You can find a detailed discussion of Vihvelin's take on nomological determinism in Steven Horst, Laws, Mind and Free will §7.5.
Genet defines determinism as the position that:
After you pick apart any substantial difference you may see separating these two definitions, you can discuss Ginet's physical determinism and what he meant by introducing the italicized word "physical" throughout his definition. I think Ginet is quite clear himself, but evidently you have a different idea of what he means to say than either myself or Pfhorrest. In this latter exercise it would be helpful to use quotes from Ginet to support your opinion. Brews ohare ( talk) 15:52, 10 February 2013 (UTC)
My view, as you know, is that Ginet's use of physical in his definition of physical determinism is meant to distinguish physical determinism from nomological determinism. That is, for Ginet the two terms are not synonyms, they are different, regardless of any quarrels over what exactly is the difference between the terms. Brews ohare ( talk) 16:37, 10 February 2013 (UTC)
If you agree with the two terms indeed being different, we could continue to discuss your claim that "physical determinism implies nomological determinism", that is, I guess, that physical determinism is the more general statement and nomological determinism is a particular example of physical determinism. That claim also is debatable, though not exactly within this RfC. Generally speaking, the introduction of a limiting modifier like "physical" narrows the scope of a definition, rather than broadening it. I think it is better discussed along with Pfhorrest's comment in the thread Rewrite of Introduction. Brews ohare ( talk) 16:51, 10 February 2013 (UTC)
Just a comment here, perhaps more arguing about the material than about the article, but might be useful in this discussion anyway: upon further reflection, the statement "given the state of the world at any particular time, the laws of nature determine all future developments in the world, down to the last detail" directly states that the laws of nature govern the entire state of the world, and so seems to imply (or more likely assume) naturalism or physicalism (barring the bizarre scenario Richard argues against where physical laws govern nonphysical things, which I didn't mean to argue for before and which I agree is absurd nonsense).
So if that statement is the definition of nomological determinism, then nomological determinism tacitly assumes physicalism, under which condition (per my earlier argument) physical and nomological determinism are identical. In other words, nomological determinism is just physical determinism plus physicalism, and the only point of distinguishing physical determinism from nomological determinism would be to say "well, maybe, even if the physical world is deterministic, there might be nonphysical nondeterministic things". Nomological determinism in rebuttal to that doesn't say "those nonphysical things are determined as well", it just says "no there aren't". -- Pfhorrest ( talk) 20:25, 11 February 2013 (UTC)
Richardbrucebaxter: You have again reinstated your personal views. Here you have overridden the standard WP practice of placing the definition of a topic first, and instead have begun with a discussion of a physical universe and a string of twelve footnotes that are a mixture of related and unrelated sources. This edit replaces text that placed the definition first and your "physical universe" second and sorted your 12 footnotes according to their pertinence to the two topics. Here you reinstated your notion that physical determinism and nomological determinism are identical, and subsequently say they are "related", leaving the reader confused as to which is correct. Here you delete reference to Nagel, a key source in this matter, and once more assert your view of the nature of physical determinism, and further advance your views here.
All these changes are made despite an ongoing dispute over your views on this Talk page. So far, you have not attempted to address very specific objections to your interpretation of Ginet's discussion and that of Bishop. Instead you have proceeded to impose your POV on other pages, nomological determinism, mental causation, causal closure, subject-object problem and so forth. On those pages you have not contributed any comment on their Talk pages despite repeated invitations to do so.
Your refusal to participate on Talk pages and your insistence upon placing your views on main pages without any discussion doesn't contribute to a constructive evolution of these articles. Brews ohare ( talk) 16:10, 12 February 2013 (UTC)
Although a comparison of the terms physical and nomological determinism was made at length on this Talk page, the distinction made there is contradicted in the article physical determinism. Despite the cogency of those arguments, the article Physical determinism as of today insists: physical determinism "implies nomological determinism, which holds that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws."
The article Physical determinism uses as its chosen definition that of Ginet[1]:
The italics in this definition were introduced by Ginet to distinguish physical determinism from a broader form of determinism defined with the same wording, but without the word physical appearing. Ginet's explicitly stated purpose in introducing physical into the above definition was to separate physical determinism from psychological determinism. That is, he feared that the definition with no italics, namely:
could be construed to include psychological determinism. Inasmuch as the broader definition without the limiting adjective physical commonly is used to describe nomological determinism, it appears clear that, at least from Ginet's viewpoint, 'physical determinism' does not imply nomological determinism.
This statement of the introduction to Physical determinism is therefore wrong on three counts (i) it suggests an implication that does not exist, and (ii) it imputes that Ginet holds this position, and (iii) it is a non sequitur that does not follow from its premise.
It would not be necessary to belabor this point except that Richardbrucebaxter has forced this statement into physical determinism and into several other articles (among them nomological determinism, mental causation) in the face of clear evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in lieu of engaging in a defense of his opinions on Talk pages, he decided to achieve his ends by filing a motion [3] [4] at WP:ANI to have me banned outright from all participation on WP. This action has now been carried to ArbCom.
The introduction should be changed. Brews ohare ( talk) 01:21, 14 February 2013 (UTC)
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We should make effort to collate some sources here to determine the most common definition of physical determinism. I am not aware of the broad definition given by the Oxford source; it appears non-standard. Richardbrucebaxter ( talk) 04:31, 6 February 2013 (UTC)
"My primary focus will be upon physical determinism, the thesis that all physical events are determined to occur according to physical laws"
— Robert C Bishop, Chaos, indeterminism and free will, Chapter 4 in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition, p. 84
"Physical determinism might be a concept only relevant to the mathematical models of physics and other physical sciences, although its relevance to the world of everyday choice and action is questionable...if thoughts, feelings, and desires are not physical events, it is unlikely that physical theories are appropriate models for thinking about such nonphysical events."
— Robert C. Bishop, Chaos, indeterminism, and free will, p. 84
"Not only are our current best physical theories remarkably unclear about the truth of determinism in the physical sciences, there is a further significant issue regarding their application to metaphysical questions about our world..."
— Robert C. Bishop, op. cit., p. 94
"The contemporary developments in determinism and physical theories surveyed in this essay indicate that the existence of pockets of determinism in physics do not imply that determinism holds sway over all domains of physics. Furthermore, our physical theories are unreliable guides to the ultimate metaphysical character of our world."
— Robert C Bishop, op. cit., p. 96
A complete description of the physical state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the physical laws of nature entail every truth as to what physical events happen after that time
— Carl Ginet, On Action, p.92
Sometimes the restrictions to physical events and physical laws are ignored, and physical determinism is used as a synonym for nomological determinism, that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws.[3] However, in this article this practice is avoided.
Richard: You say
and repeated this statement several times. I find this statement to be a refusal to understand what is written by Bishop and Ginet. It doesn't help that in your discussion you interchange the two types of determinism at will, as if they are synonyms, when their distinction is necessary for this conversation.
You also wish to discount Bishop's two articles in the Oxford Handbook of Free Will as an "ambiguous definition" despite pages-long accompanying text that removes any possibility of ambiguity: physical determinism is used as a term distinguished from nomological determinism. Period. You also wish to marginalize this difference (even though you refuse to recognize it) by suggesting the question is one of "standard usage", which is a red herring. The usage making no distinction between physical and nomological determinism does occur, and maybe a count would show it has been used that way more often than not, but there is room for a usage that distinguishes the two, as the literature shows, and the adjective physical in physical determinism usefully describes its position.
To illustrate what I consider to be a complete non-sequitor in your presentation, you cite Ginet's definition: "physical determinism holds that a complete description of the physical state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the physical laws of nature together entail every truth as to what physical events happen after that time", and include the italics he introduced to point up the stress on physical. Then you ignore entirely the fact that in the text preceding this definition he uses the same wording without the word physical to define nomological determinism and proceeds to contrast the two definitions. You then conclude:
This statement is completely opposite to the position explained at length by Ginet, and further argued by Bishop. It also makes no sense on the face of it because the italicized physical in the definition sits there unexplained by your wrong conclusion.
How can you construe these authors so far from their meaning? Perhaps you are so swayed by a belief in causal closure as to think everything falls within physical laws? And additionally that physical laws are well described by the presumptions about them assumed by nomological determinism? Those beliefs can be argued, but they are not universally held. Hence the distinction. Brews ohare ( talk) 16:04, 7 February 2013 (UTC)
Physical determinism is a position in philosophy that holds that all physical events occur as described by physical laws.[1] Nomological determinism is the notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid, all-encompassing natural laws, that every occurrence results inevitably from prior events.[2]
The two terms become synonymous only if one assumes (i) all events are physical events, including of course, acts of imagination or creation of art, science, and so forth, and (ii) makes some assumptions about the nature of physical laws that are seldom held today.
The importance of the distinction is pointed out by Bishop. These definitions leave open just what "physical" might include. So, for example, one could limit the scope of physical determinism as:
"Physical determinism might be a concept only relevant to the mathematical models of physics and other physical sciences, although its relevance to the world of everyday choice and action is questionable...if thoughts, feelings, and desires are not physical events, it is unlikely that physical theories are appropriate models for thinking about such nonphysical events."
— Robert C. Bishop, Chaos, indeterminism, and free will, p. 84
As for the nature of determinism in physical law, which differs from the assumptions of nomological determinism, we have the view of Nagel:
"a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."[3]
— Ernest Nagel, Alternative descriptions of physical state p. 292
Sources
[1] Robert C Bishop, Harald Atmanspacher (2011). "Chapter 5: The causal closure of physics and free will". In Robert Kane, ed (ed.).
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 101.
ISBN
0195399692. {{
cite book}}
: |editor=
has generic name (
help)
[2] Steven W Horst (2011). Laws, Mind, and Free Will. MIT Press. p. 98. ISBN 0262015250.
[3] Ernest Nagel (1999). "§V: Alternative descriptions of physical state". The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (2nd ed.). Hackett. pp. 285–292. ISBN 0915144719.
Richard: Your recent changes require further discussion, and appear to be patently incorrect in some respects. In particular, the notion that physical determinism implies nomological determinism is contrary to much of the literature on this subject (cited in the article and on this Talk page), and has been discussed in a section of this Talk page that you have not addressed, and apparently not read. Please make an effort to compare your views on this talk page with the literature and with the comments already presented here.
Your view that Popper's work like his three worlds should not be presented on WP appears to be a prejudice on your part. In any event, the points made in the section on Popper's work can be made using other philosopher's as well, and some such formulation could be worked out here if you were inclined to participate on the Talk page. Brews ohare ( talk) 06:53, 7 February 2013 (UTC)
You have reinstituted your beliefs in the revisions here, here, and here, which amount to cramming nomological determinism down our throats, a violation of logic and of NPOV. Brews ohare ( talk) 16:22, 7 February 2013 (UTC)
I think the dispute here is really one about points-of-view more than black-and-white issues. From that standpoint, here is a proposal to rewrite the Introduction:
Physical determinism in its broadest definition holds that physical events evolve according to physical laws. It differs from the statement that physical theories describe a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the evolution of all events, human choices and actions included. [1] There are a variety of definitions, however, another being that physical determinism holds that a complete description of the physical state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the physical laws of nature together entail every truth as to what physical events happen after that time. [2]
Physical determinism often is used synonymously with nomological determinism. Nomological determinism holds that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws. [3] [4] Although treated as synonyms by some philosophers, other philosophers distinguishes physical determinism from nomological determinism in two respects:
First, in emphasizing the qualifier physical in 'physical events', physical determinism suggests that a subset of all events is indicated. A commonly held view is that, at bottom, all events are physical events, so the descriptor physical is not necessary. Whether this position is valid is the question of reductionism, and it may be considered an open question for the purposes of definition here.
Second, in emphasizing physical laws, it may be taken that emphasis is placed upon laws used in science, which are not "all encompassing" and rigidly deterministic: rather, all physical laws are limited in scope, and are not all-encompassing. [5] Moreover, some physical laws are probabilistic, not leading rigidly to inevitable outcomes, and some others are statistical, describing macroscopic regularities consistent with a plethora of microscopically different situations. [6]
Putting the above factors together, physical determinism is narrower than nomological determinism, by virtue of referring to a subset of all events, and in restricting these events to those that the selected natural laws are properly proven to describe, and broader than nomological determinism in allowing a variety of types of natural law extending beyond the rigidly restrictive sort entertained by nomological determinism. [7]
Stronger forms of physical determinism also have been used, based strictly upon the predictability of a physical system behaving according to classical mechanics. [8]
Sources
all physical events are determined to occur according to physical laws
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{{
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The thesis of physical determinism is often supported by an appeal to a mechanical view of the world. This mechanical view derives much of its support from an appeal to classical mechanics.
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cite journal}}
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help)CS1 maint: date and year (
link)
I've dropped the lead sentence about a "greater physical system" and its nine footnotes because, to me, this subject is a diversion from defining the topic, and the nine references probably are there to make a point that requires a separate discussion. Please discuss this proposal. Brews ohare ( talk) 17:59, 7 February 2013 (UTC)
What concerns me more is Brews' implication, above and elsewhere, that physical determinism, unlike nomological determinism, somehow permits nondeterministic physical laws. That seems clearly false from Ginet's definition, and I don't know where else Brews is getting it from. I agree that most contemporary science works with probablistic or statistical laws. That just means modern science is not deterministic. Not even physically deterministic. And that's just fine, but Brews seems to want to distinguish physical determinism from nomological determinism so that he can say that the nondeterministic laws by which we understand the world today are deterministic, and I just don't see the basis for claiming physical determinism allows that. --Pfhorrest (talk) 09:58, 9 February 2013 (UTC)
Your first sentence is about a question of usage, namely, what philosophers mean by "physical determinism" and whether they intend to expand this term to include all types of physical law. That point requires an examination of the philosophical literature, and probably a key work about this subject is Nagel, who has provided a formulation of determinism applicable to a wide range of physical laws. Later, you suggest that I wish to say that "the nondeterministic laws by which we understand the world today are deterministic". That is not my view nor my purpose. My aim is to introduce physical determinism as the opinion that physical events evolve according to physical laws, and these physical laws are exactly those used in science today. I believe a corollary of this view is that physical determinism is limited to the events dealt with by physical laws, and can be extended only when physical laws themselves expand to include more of the universe. Can you comment? Brews ohare ( talk) 17:13, 9 February 2013 (UTC)
"I have not stated that physical determinism and nomological determinism are identical... If physical determinism is true, then nomological determinism is true."
Genet's definition is (italics in original text):
Generally speaking, the introduction of a limiting modifier like "physical" narrows the scope of a definition, rather than broadening it. Perhaps you wish to stress that physical laws are not restricted to the rigid all-encompassing "laws" often associated with nomological determinism, although Ginet's definition doesn't by itself suggest this until the terms "physical laws of nature" and "physical state of the world" are interpreted. A close reading of Ginet suggests he wished to separate the "physical" from the "psychological", not to broaden the definition of nomologiclal determinism. . Brews ohare ( talk) 17:19, 10 February 2013 (UTC)
A question concerning the difference between two forms of determinism has arisen: nomological determinism and physical determinism. All parties agree that the two terms often are used as synonyms. The disagreement is over usage that differentiates between the two terms, with one opinion being that such usage occurs and is significant, and the other that such usage, assuming it does occur, hardly matters. A definition is quoted for physical determinism that is claimed by both parties as supporting their opinion. Please help to clarify these different views at Talk:Physical determinism#RfC on two usages of 'physical determinism' Brews ohare ( talk) 16:50, 8 February 2013 (UTC)
According to Ginet the idea of physical determinism hods that (italics in original text):
A complete description of the physical state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the physical laws of nature entail every truth as to what physical events happen after that time
— Carl Ginet, On Action, p.92
Ginet has inserted the adjective physical deliberately into this definition, and the question arises as to why he did this and why he italicized the word 'physical'.
One opinion is based upon Ginet's explanation. He proposes that determinism itself is described as:
A complete description of the state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the laws of nature entail every truth as to what events happen after that time
— Carl Ginet, On Action, p.92
This definition, the same as the one above but without the adjective 'physical', is that of nomological determinism. Genet says he wishes to make clear that he is talking about physical determinism by inserting the word 'physical' into this definition. It would seem a reasonable interpretation of this act that Ginet considers the adjective 'physical' to mean something. He does this in response to his question: "How much of what happens in the world do the laws of nature determine? Determinism says they determine everything." Ginet has introduced the adjective 'physical' to make clear that he is not discussing everything, but only things 'physical'.
In contrast to this view of the situation, the article Physical determinism says about Ginet's position: "Such a position implies nomological determinism, which holds that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws".
Simply put, the dispute is which view of Ginet's position is closer to his meaning? More generally the dispute is over drawing a distinction between nomological and physical determinism.
Richardbrucebaxter: You might address the distinction between Ginet's definition of determinism and nomological determinism, both of which appear to have the same definition, suggesting that Ginet's determinism is actually nomological dieterminsm. It would be preferable in this exercise if you could support your arguments with sources rather than your own unsupported assertions. For example, Vihvelin says:
You can find a detailed discussion of Vihvelin's take on nomological determinism in Steven Horst, Laws, Mind and Free will §7.5.
Genet defines determinism as the position that:
After you pick apart any substantial difference you may see separating these two definitions, you can discuss Ginet's physical determinism and what he meant by introducing the italicized word "physical" throughout his definition. I think Ginet is quite clear himself, but evidently you have a different idea of what he means to say than either myself or Pfhorrest. In this latter exercise it would be helpful to use quotes from Ginet to support your opinion. Brews ohare ( talk) 15:52, 10 February 2013 (UTC)
My view, as you know, is that Ginet's use of physical in his definition of physical determinism is meant to distinguish physical determinism from nomological determinism. That is, for Ginet the two terms are not synonyms, they are different, regardless of any quarrels over what exactly is the difference between the terms. Brews ohare ( talk) 16:37, 10 February 2013 (UTC)
If you agree with the two terms indeed being different, we could continue to discuss your claim that "physical determinism implies nomological determinism", that is, I guess, that physical determinism is the more general statement and nomological determinism is a particular example of physical determinism. That claim also is debatable, though not exactly within this RfC. Generally speaking, the introduction of a limiting modifier like "physical" narrows the scope of a definition, rather than broadening it. I think it is better discussed along with Pfhorrest's comment in the thread Rewrite of Introduction. Brews ohare ( talk) 16:51, 10 February 2013 (UTC)
Just a comment here, perhaps more arguing about the material than about the article, but might be useful in this discussion anyway: upon further reflection, the statement "given the state of the world at any particular time, the laws of nature determine all future developments in the world, down to the last detail" directly states that the laws of nature govern the entire state of the world, and so seems to imply (or more likely assume) naturalism or physicalism (barring the bizarre scenario Richard argues against where physical laws govern nonphysical things, which I didn't mean to argue for before and which I agree is absurd nonsense).
So if that statement is the definition of nomological determinism, then nomological determinism tacitly assumes physicalism, under which condition (per my earlier argument) physical and nomological determinism are identical. In other words, nomological determinism is just physical determinism plus physicalism, and the only point of distinguishing physical determinism from nomological determinism would be to say "well, maybe, even if the physical world is deterministic, there might be nonphysical nondeterministic things". Nomological determinism in rebuttal to that doesn't say "those nonphysical things are determined as well", it just says "no there aren't". -- Pfhorrest ( talk) 20:25, 11 February 2013 (UTC)
Richardbrucebaxter: You have again reinstated your personal views. Here you have overridden the standard WP practice of placing the definition of a topic first, and instead have begun with a discussion of a physical universe and a string of twelve footnotes that are a mixture of related and unrelated sources. This edit replaces text that placed the definition first and your "physical universe" second and sorted your 12 footnotes according to their pertinence to the two topics. Here you reinstated your notion that physical determinism and nomological determinism are identical, and subsequently say they are "related", leaving the reader confused as to which is correct. Here you delete reference to Nagel, a key source in this matter, and once more assert your view of the nature of physical determinism, and further advance your views here.
All these changes are made despite an ongoing dispute over your views on this Talk page. So far, you have not attempted to address very specific objections to your interpretation of Ginet's discussion and that of Bishop. Instead you have proceeded to impose your POV on other pages, nomological determinism, mental causation, causal closure, subject-object problem and so forth. On those pages you have not contributed any comment on their Talk pages despite repeated invitations to do so.
Your refusal to participate on Talk pages and your insistence upon placing your views on main pages without any discussion doesn't contribute to a constructive evolution of these articles. Brews ohare ( talk) 16:10, 12 February 2013 (UTC)
Although a comparison of the terms physical and nomological determinism was made at length on this Talk page, the distinction made there is contradicted in the article physical determinism. Despite the cogency of those arguments, the article Physical determinism as of today insists: physical determinism "implies nomological determinism, which holds that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws."
The article Physical determinism uses as its chosen definition that of Ginet[1]:
The italics in this definition were introduced by Ginet to distinguish physical determinism from a broader form of determinism defined with the same wording, but without the word physical appearing. Ginet's explicitly stated purpose in introducing physical into the above definition was to separate physical determinism from psychological determinism. That is, he feared that the definition with no italics, namely:
could be construed to include psychological determinism. Inasmuch as the broader definition without the limiting adjective physical commonly is used to describe nomological determinism, it appears clear that, at least from Ginet's viewpoint, 'physical determinism' does not imply nomological determinism.
This statement of the introduction to Physical determinism is therefore wrong on three counts (i) it suggests an implication that does not exist, and (ii) it imputes that Ginet holds this position, and (iii) it is a non sequitur that does not follow from its premise.
It would not be necessary to belabor this point except that Richardbrucebaxter has forced this statement into physical determinism and into several other articles (among them nomological determinism, mental causation) in the face of clear evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in lieu of engaging in a defense of his opinions on Talk pages, he decided to achieve his ends by filing a motion [3] [4] at WP:ANI to have me banned outright from all participation on WP. This action has now been carried to ArbCom.
The introduction should be changed. Brews ohare ( talk) 01:21, 14 February 2013 (UTC)