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For those who are a bit curious and clearly at the will of the moderators, they might wish review the document found at "www.fas.org/irp/nsa/safford.pdf" (approx. 635 kb).
This is a document widely known in the Pearl Harbor lore as SRH-149 (SRH - Special Research History), and is of interest to many for several reasons, for example, the manpower levels applied to IJN codes in 1941, ..., etc.
It is titled A Brief History of Communications Intelligence in the United States, the author being Laurance F(rye). Safford, Captain, US Navy (Retired). This document's sub-title is Captain Safford's version of the pre-Pearl Harbor History, prepared 21-27 March 1952, (with special reference to coordination and cooperation).
Some items to note about this version of SRH-149:
(A) Title page for this document has "Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 10-27-2005 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended." (E.O. 12958 - Executive Order No. 12958), and
(B) Within this "Declassified and approved for release by NSA ..." document, pages 14, 15, 17, 18, and 20 remain today heavily redacted.
(C) At the bottom of page 15 is a redacted message. It is an example to note - the Japanese send the same message twice, first "en clair" and then enciphered; clearly poor procedure on the Japanese part.
So, for a document written in March 1952 (nearly 56 years ago) and partially declassified and released in October 2005 - just over two years ago - those who say ALL of the Pearl Harbor documents have long been - even decades ago - declassified and released into the public domain are incorrect. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.44 ( talk) 15:25, 8 December 2007 (UTC)
Question about "Radio Silence of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force Confirmed Again: The Saga of the Secret Message Serial (SMS) Numbers" by Philip H. Jacobsen, Crytpologia Volume 31, Number 3, July 2007, pages 223-232.
What does SMS mean? —Preceding
unsigned comment added by
172.166.7.92 (
talk) 11:10, 11 December 2007 (UTC)
In the 1930s each command or ship in the Japanese Navy used a "one-up" reference system. A "one up" gave a consecutive number, 000 through 999 (and then repeated) for each successive administrative message. This reference number was called a Secret Message Serial number (SMS)
ScottS (
talk)
23:25, 11 December 2007 (UTC)
"Abstract:
By analyzing all the available Secret Message Serial (SMS) numbers originated by the Japanese CinC 1st Air Fleet, it is clear that no messages were sent by radio during the formation of the Strike Force during its transit to Hawaii. It was not until the attack on Pearl Harbor had commenced that radio transmissions began. The Strike Force maintained strict radio silence and thus there was no Allied foreknowledge of the attack through radio communications - despite revisionist claims to the contrary."
A. Jacobsen's use of SMS is incorrect - twice. In the abstract and title (i.e., Secret Message Serial, an error which ScottS repeats) above as well as his review of Stinnett's Day of Deceit at www.amazon.com.(i.e., Station Message Serial), Jacobsen is wrong there also.
SMS stands for Secret Message Series. For an explanation of SMS's see Stinnett (paperback edition, Notes section, page 333, note 16). Note who Stinnett used to vouch for the meaning of SMS.
B. Further, "... By analyzing all the available ..." begs the question of those known but not available SMSs. These identified SMSs, even today are under FOIA requests as yet to be released to the public. Stinnett's note from above addresses this by commenting on a gap of thirteen messages in the SMS series, these being sequential messages. Such a gap gives pause to Jacobsen's claim of "confirmed" on its surface and his expertise suffers. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.163.30.175 ( talk) 12:28, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
Not that it matters, but I see nothing refuting Jacobsen's terminology. Stinnett's claims are between 606 and 620. Those dates are between Nov. 1 and Nov. 3. By looking at various other Secret Message Serial numbers in the article you can see the list of dates and numbers. ScottS ( talk) 16:34, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
Nothing from Kisner's quotes on page 333 note 16 claims otherwise. Do you have another source to site? ScottS ( talk) 18:07, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
Again can you quote a source please from page 333 or other? ScottS ( talk) 16:23, 13 December 2007 (UTC)
No quote I see. In short yet another incorrect/unsupported claim from Jamaskin. ScottS ( talk) 18:11, 13 December 2007 (UTC)
From Jacobsen's abstract above is: "It was not until the attack on Pearl Harbor had commenced that radio transmissions began."
Or beginning with the sortie from Hitokappu Wan until "bombs away" and the "Thunder Fish" launch - not a peep - all frequencies at all times. So says Jacobsen. [For a narrative of this attack, see "Torpedoing Pearl Harbor" by David Aiken, Military History December 2001 issue, pages 46-53, continued on 82.]
However, Jacobsen neglects some details. Some of these are from The Pearl Harbor Papers - Inside the Japanese Plans which provides another perspective - from the Japanese viewpoint.
"From skipper of I-72 on 1255 7 Dec., to Advance Force and Task Force, received on 1433 7 Dec. (Telegram)
The enemy is not in the Lahaina anchorage. 1255 "
N.B., Dates and times were kept by the IJN relative to Toyko local time. Also, recall the placement of the International Date Line. And, within the book cited the usage of "signal" and "wireless" and "telegram" are not consistent. The two messages above use telegram as a radio transmission. [Aiken also uses telegram.]
So, on the facts, provided from the Japanese "eyes" - Jacobsen is incorrect.
[Extant is a FOIA-released Station H Intercept Log is a 6Dec41 intercepted transmission from call sign WA HI 8 - a Kido Butai submarine.] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.163.30.175 ( talk) 13:19, 12 December 2007 (UTC) Commander Genda who helped plan the attack stated "We kept absolute Radio Silence" I'm not interested in your poor speculation. Former Lieutenant Commander Chuichi Yoshoka who was communications officer on the flagship Akagi, said he did not recall any ship dispatching a radio message before the attack. I see nothing in the Goldstein and Dillon "Pearl Harbor Papers" that refutes Radio Silence. Furthermore The Japanese after battle report clearly states "The success of the surprise operation was attributed to the following factors: ... 4. Concealment of the plan. ... STRICT RADIO SILENCE. In order to keep strict radio silence thorough steps such as taking off fuses in the circuit, holding and sealing the keys were taken. During the operation, the strictest radio silence was perfectly carried out."
ScottS ( talk) 16:50, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
WAHI8 was not a Kido Butai submarine as Wilford claimed. Most likely, it was a submarine in the southern or Philippine action or was connected with the Sixth Fleet. There were only three Kido Butai submarines, and there is no evidence that they sent any radio messages. Furthermore, Captain Kijiro in charge of the three Kido Butai submarines stated that nothing of interest occurred during the transit to Hawaiian waters. See Jacobsen text note 8 ScottS ( talk) 18:13, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
Let's consult Jacobsen for clarity:
From: Philip H. Jacobsen List Editor: "H-DIPLO [Laderman]" Editor's Subject: Cryptology and Pearl Harbor [Jacobsen] Author's Subject: Cryptology and Pearl Harbor [Jacobsen] Date Written: Mon, 5 Feb 2001 05:30:16 GMT Date Posted: Tue, 6 Feb 2001 12:16:25 –0500
The last paragraph of this document is:
“Let me assure everyone concerned that the people that worked both on JN-25B and the traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications in late 1941 were dedicated, competent and and experienced professionals. With a much larger staff, up to date equipment and dedicated communications circuits perhaps the outcome might have been different. Any blame should be placed on those who didn't provide the resources to do so. A few dedicated men with relatively little to work with did an excellent job of sifting through two complete call sign changes within a month as well as many other wartime security measures employed by the Japanese including almost complete radio silence and still came up with the a lot of information on the massive Japanese fleet intentions and movements of November/December 1941. And they were and are not now engaged in any conspiracy or coverup.”
[N.B., the “and and” appears in the original text]
In particular, from the above is seen, “ ... other wartime security measures employed by the Japanese included almost complete radio silence ...”
The operative words here are “almost complete” ...
Jacobsen, in his own words.
—Preceding
unsigned comment added by
172.132.176.50 (
talk •
contribs) 06:31, 13 December 2007
Jacobsen clearly does not subscribe to the view that the Kido Butai (Akagi) broke radio silence, I would suggest reading more current works to clarify. Further support comes from my own conversations with him. I would also suggest that you talk to, or read Wilford and Villa. ScottS ( talk) 16:28, 13 December 2007 (UTC) You'll need to clarify your other gibberish. ScottS ( talk) 17:06, 13 December 2007 (UTC)
Nope I haven't got it yet. I however was under the impression that you had read more current published material from Jacobsen/Villa/Wilford ScottS ( talk) 17:57, 13 December 2007 (UTC)
"Pearl Harbor: Radio Officer Leslie Grogan of the SS Lurline and his Misidentified Signals," Philip H. Jacobsen, Cryptologia, Volume 29, Number 2, April 2005, pages 97-120.
From page 115:
"... Besides, 375 kHz was an air and sea navigational frequency and regular naval communications was not permitted on sea navigational frequencies. ..."
Well, Jacobsen is wrong. Why?
Letter from Lt. John Lietwiler, Fort Mills, P.I. to Lt. Robert Densford, U.S. Navy Department, Washington, D.C., dated 6Oct41 [FOIA-released - Declassified 3/3/200]
Last paragraph of letter has:
" ... In project Baker, it has been decided to supply a generator instead of running a power line. The said generator has arrived, and I am now angling for a suitable site and house. It will aid us no end when installed as we now have to make a daily battery trip from here. What is the last word on the Collins Baker sent in some bearings on 375 KC, and Geiken says they couldn't get that low with the equipment he knew about. .."
Or, the US Navy documented as using 375 KC to sent "bearings."
From pages 115-116:
" ...In order to overcome this unreliability, the U.S. Navy limited its experiments with automatic re-broadcasting of Morse signals mainly to situations where the original signal was from a steady source like a land-line such as between San Francisco and San Diego. Even for single point-to-point circuits using high frequencies, they employed widely spaced, large directional antennas like rhombics as well as huge banks of diversity receivers. This kept the incoming signal at a more or less constant amplitude with the narrow 'dynamic range' of their keying devices and greatly reduced the 'dropouts' on the receiver's high speed inked tape recorders. Ships at sea in those days generally didn't have the space needed for large directional antennas for the huge banks of early diversity receivers required to provide a reliable automatic re-broadcasting effort with long-distance sky wave signals."
Seems Jacobsen is wrong - again. As the following demonstrates:
Mailgram No. 080037, RESTRICTED, from 10Jul41, FM: COM 11, TO: COM 12, INFO: OPNAV, BUSHIPS, CINCPAC, COMS 13, 14 [RG 181, A6-1/A1-1, Declassified 8/7/00]
"PARAGRAPH THREE URLTR JULY SECOND TRAFFIC ROUTING ALTERNATE PROVISIONS AUTOMATIC REBROADCAST IS PRACTICABLE AT SANDIEGO X POINT LOMA REBROADCAST INSTALLATION IS COMPLETE AND OPERATION IS SATISFACTORY X DESIREABLE THAT YOU UTILIZE THESE FACILITIES AS MUCH AS PRACTICABLE IN ORDER THAT MORE PERSONNEL AT POINT LOMA WAY RECEIVE EXPERIENCE IN OPERATION OF NEW EQUIPMENT X NO REASON EXISTS FOR ANY DIFFICULTY IN REBROADCASTING ON ANY FREQUENCY FROM SANFRANSCISO WASHINGTON PEARL HARBOR OR VESSELS OF THE FLEET X ONLY LIMITATIONS POWER OF TRANSMITTERS AT PRESENT AVAILABLE X SUGGEST DAILY ONE HOUR USE IN HIGH SPEED HANDLING."
So says the US Navy in July 1941 - "No reason exists for any difficulty ... " from shore stations or vessels of the fleet.
Page 117, footnote 63:
" ... RUSI8 was unidentified for November and the Akagi would not have send a movement report two days after leaving port. ..."
Again, Jacobsen is wrong, again.
Jacobsen, who ScottS has parroted above, are relying on a very old copy of the Station H Movement Reports. This has been explained in some detail, e.g., use of "white out" tape and liquid, ..., etc.
With patience and persistence, the FOIA procedure does work - perhaps not Mercury-like - but it does work. The FOIA-released document showing the Jacobsen/ScottS regarding CV AKAGI error is available in the public domain, multitple sources are given above.
The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable, by George Victor, Ph.D., Potomac Books, Inc., 2007, [ISBN-10 159 797 0525].
From page 302:
"Whether intentionally or not, Roosevelt exposed the fleet to a Japanese attack by stationing it in Hawaii. Then he intentionally used naval units as lures by ordering them on various expeditions in the Pacific. Withholding key information from Kimmel and Short increased the fleet's exposure greatly and it was most glaringly increased by not sending a warning on December 6, 1941.
Despite the history of war, the idea that Roosevelt withheld warnings from Kimmel and Short for the purpose of getting the United States openly into a European war is still unthinkable to many people, but to fewer and fewer as the years past. As has happened over time with other unthinkable acts, the repugnance aroused by the idea of using the Pacific Fleet as a lure will probably continue to fade." —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.132.165.172 ( talk) 14:22, 14 December 2007 (UTC)
What Pearl Harbor Materials would the readership, if they could, like to see declassified immediately? And, why those?
For example, from the www.amazon.com book reviews for Stinnett's Day of Deceit is:
Some Documents Still Not Declassified, December 9, 2000, by Dave Mann (Brentwood, TN USA)
"I served with the US Army Special Security Group (USASSG) during the period 1984 to 1987 and worked on a 'declassification review' of pre-World War Two and World War Two 'Special Intelligence' documents. We safeguarded several thousand linear feet of files inside a vault at Arlington Hall Station, VA. There were hundreds of linear feet of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) documents pertaining to Pearl Harbor. I admit that I was so dulled by the continuous adrenal rush of reading yet another document revealing some 50-year old historical snippet that I really did not attempt to think about the importance of what I read. After reading this book and comparing it to my memory I sat shocked at the accuracy of the author's research. It is no longer hard to believe in the perfidy of America's politicians after 8 years of The Arkansas Mafia and the Clintons; this book will make it very clear that the politicians of the 1930's and 1940's were every bit as bad as we can imagine. Buy this book and read it now."
—Preceding
unsigned comment added by
172.132.176.50 (
talk •
contribs) 06:31, 13 December 2007
Given his review I suspect he is the perfect gullible reader for Stinnett. This reminds me,...Stinnett, Wilford and Wiley often make claims of classified or missing documents. However, a little research often proves their claims to be incorrect. Like the Wilford "missing" Record of prosperity page 3 or when Stinnett claims "That there are 300 pages of RDF fixes [sic] that were originated by VICTOR [Samoa] between July and December 1941 locked in Archives II vaults at College Park, Maryland" page 212. Often the claims are outdated or were the result of poor research. I'm of cource not saying there aren't any classified documents, however I am saying that you can't trust what Stinnett/Wilford/Villa often claim. ScottS ( talk) 16:51, 13 December 2007 (UTC)
You're the one with the implied sinister nature of classfied PH docs. Does this pertain to all documents or just the ones you want/ or just can't find? Did this apply to the Crane files pre 1999 before those were brought to the public? ScottS ( talk) 18:08, 13 December 2007 (UTC)
I deleted this:
This is as mistaken as the belief of Lurline's radioman, based on an inadequate grasp of naval communications. Under radio silence, navies resort to older techniques, developed & used for decades before radio, blinker light & morse; when these are inappropriate, flag & semaphore, in use for over 200yr, are available. Trekphiler 12:36, 14 December 2005 (UTC)
Odd. A verified and sourced quote from a known text [A. J. Barker's Pearl Harbor - Battle Book 10] - deleted. The "radioman" in question here (Grogan) held a US Navy reserve commission and had decades of military and maritime experience beginning with the US Navy in WWI; signal flags and narrow-beam blinkers of necessity mean "line of sight" and are useless in heavy weather (e.g., From Layton's And I Was There page 249 " ... Naguno's striking force had run into the first really big storm ...") and/or when vessels are scattered beyond the horizon.
Besides Farago's The Broken Seal (Bantam paperback edition - POSTSCRIPT), also see Wilford's Pearl Harbor Redefined for one; of, course, Stinnett's Day of Deceit is another; and, Victor's The Pearl Harbor Myth is another. And, as Prange flags SHIRIYA as part of the Kido Butai, also Prados' Combined Fleet Decoded. There are also several recent journal articles.
To fact-check the above, see Farago's The Broken Seal (paperback edition), on lower page 381, regarding Grogan, is " ... whose own credentials included a reserve commission in the U. S. Navy with years of service in Naval Communications."
On Grogan ... "So he may have had experience ..." No, he definitively did have a US naval communications background - decades worth; no "may have..." about it.
Mention of "triangulation" - agreed. However, common practice then as now ... "relative bearings." These are used to determine the general direction of a signal source, and if multiple relative bearings are taken over time of the signal, movement in the source can be established.
All of the Japanese merchant fleet had returned to Home Waters; Grogan did not say Russian vessels - very easy for him to determine. He did use the call sign for Japanese shore stations. No doubt, his now "missing" radio log would be helpful.
Perhaps ... but we now have at least six (6) "broken radio silence" instances in the public domain (viz., Ranneft, Ogg, Grogan, 30Nov41 COMSUM14 AKAGI "tactical circuit" message, and "code movement" annotated report from STATION H on 28Nov41, and also from STATION H, submarine call sign WA HI 8 on 6Dec41) all occuring at approximately the same time. All are independent of each other. There are other examples. None, however, generated an action such as, e.g., CINCPAC: FLASH IMMEDIATE: UNKNOWN SIGNAL SOURCE APPROX N-NW PEARL ADVANCING WESTERLY X INVESTIGATE X REPORT X
On Japanese survivors ... Yes, yes, ... as Prange says. But we also have contradictory claims, some even from the Japanese. What we DO NOT have are the official records ... say, the US Navy Mid-Pacific RDF records for all monitoring stations (i.e., Hawaii, Samoa, Dutch Harbor, Midway, Wake, Guam, ...), nor various "Y" services such as - from Canadian records (Gordon Head, Esquimalt, ...), nor Dutch files (Batavia), nor British files (Singapore, Hong Kong), nor Australian/New Zealand RDF stations during this period. So, why are these all - US and Allied - RDF logs still classified in July 2007 even after numerous and quite specific FOIA requests? Any surmise?
[Stinnett's Day of Deceit (paperback edition), on pages 266-67 shows an August 1941 disposition/RDF bearing chart for Call Sign "8E YU" - CV AKAGI, and on page 315 shows a handwritten STATION CAST RDF report (viz., TESTM dispatch) from 5 December 1941. Wilford's MA Thesis, on page 167, shows TESTM messages numbers 051515, 051525, and 051535 as sent to STATION HYPO, in their encoded and decoded form. To note, from TESTM 051535, "VICTOR" is the US Navy RDF monitoring station in America Samoa.
Mr. Stinnett and now Dr. Wilford are to be highly commended for their superlative efforts as these are the first public displays of this RDF data, which clearly demonstrate the US Navy's excellent RDF skills and in situ capabilites.]
Unless you've got a source that isn't a conspiracy nut, I'm more inclined to believe the Japanese on this one. Their records, reproduced in Prange, Goldstein, & Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, indicate the radio keys were removed. Moreover, "narrow beam blinker"? I'm thinking of 24" searchlights (if needed). And do you really believe professional navy navigators can't keep station in heavy weather? Or that they'd be beyond "line of sight"? Just how much separation do you think they were keeping from Akagi, anyhow? Over the horizon? "So, why are these all - US and Allied - RDF logs still classified in July 2007 "? BTHOOM. Considering the number of people in USG with the ability, & inclination, to classify things secret even as we speak, & a general tendency by bureaucrats & politicians not to want to release any information, I'm not too surprised by this; I can just hear the CIA & NSA wanks saying it'll compromise sources & methods. (Yeah, al Q still uses radios, that's the method... Or is it NSA/CIA persuading the carriers to give up your phone/email records, just like they did the cable coys, when that was against the law...?) Trekphiler 02:43, 27 July 2007 (UTC)
"Over the horizon?" ...
Beyond the Horizon ... a few seeds along the way for those Baker Street irregulars;
A. Hawaii Operation, VADM Shigeru Fukudome, "US Naval Institute Proceedings", December 1955, pp. 1315-1331. Something about a Patrol Mission for three submarines (I-19, I-21, and I-23).
B. "Formation for Alert Steaming" from The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans, edited by Goldstein and Dillon, on page 187.
Submarine Division is shown on flank of Akagi. Comment is due to fog, positioned some 8 miles away.
From The American Practical Navigator (aka Bowditch), Appendix, simplified formula to calculate the distance to the horizon from varying "lookout" heights. Who sees farther, a lookout on AKAGI's island or a lookout on the I-boats, even with the I-boat being 8 miles "nearer" the horizon?
The answer begets a question: What good are these "patrol" I-boats on my flank? Sanity check?
C. From Layton's And I Was There, page 213, "Three large submarines, ... scouted two hundred miles ahead of the striking force, ...
So, let's see, curvature of the earth, following seas, ... Yup, beyond the horizon. Flags, blinkers, ... ain't gonna work. They are useless.
D. Also edited by Goldstein and Dillon, The Pacific War Papers: Japanese Documents of World War II, from "Japanese Monograph No. 102: Submarine Operations December 1941-April 1942", on page 235:
"Besides the above forces, attached to the Carrier Striking Force from the 6th Fleet to perform patrol duties, were the submarines I-19, I-21 and I-23. In addition to acting as the Patrol Unit in front of the Carrier Striking Force, this unit was to rescue the crews of downed aircraft and be prepared to resist counterattack.
"... the Patrol Unit in front of the Carrier Striking Force, ..." Goldstein and Dillon contradict themselves.
Any surmise as to why? [Hint: Need to rationalize/cloud "radio silence" ...]
As another "sanity check" of Prange and associates, another question. Prange's At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, on page x of the Introduction, second to last paragraph has: "The Japanese put very little about the Pearl Harbor plan on paper, and what was available aboard four of the carriers of Nagumo's force (including his flagship, Akagi) went down at Midway in June 1942.
If this statement is so, where did the "papers" in the references used above (items B and D) come from? In Prange, there are many, many other errors.
A. Re: Kuriles - may want to check your comment - a citation would also help; "hence" as an implied QED is unsupportable here, got any cross bearings? Familiar with Rochefort's impressions of IJN radio deception efforts (See Layton, pages 228-229)? Of course, recall mention of those still classified RDF and "code movement" reports from the period - that curious pattern of FOIA denials.
[Another odd thing about the Kuriles, before 1941 the US Navy had a very detailed and complete set of charts for "Hitokappau Wan" (now O. Iturup), and yet in the APHB is the comment about an unknown port. But that is another thread ...]
B. Re: Patrol Unit of three I-boats. Patrol Mission SOP - surface cruising ahead of main force was then the norm; submerge to avoid detection. Why?
Lookouts perched on the conning tower (now called the "sail") constantly scanning versus using a periscope - extended fully - to scan. Who "sees" farther? (Recall Bowditch).
The tasking of a Patrol Mission is what? Does that change for "peace time" - a non sequitur.
From Japanese sources of the planning and operational aspects of the three I-boats (See "Jane's Fighting Ships of World War II for I-boat specificatons), their patrol line advanced in front of the Striking Force main body, and well beyond visual range. It is hundreds of miles ahead in fact as the Japanese and Layton tell us.
So, how again does the main body of the Striking Force communicate with these I-boats? Or, what would cause such a need to contact these I-boats, established as "being over the horizon" ...?
C. Causes such as: (a) the known and several changes in course of the Striking Force, (b) the December 5th alert (See: The Pearl Harbor Papers, edited by Goldstein and Dillon, pages 38-39) which caused a immediate zig-zagging and wide dispersal of the main body, (c) weather (See: Morison's Two Ocean War, page 46), ..., etc.
[An aside here, when vessels within a convoy were alerted to the danger of attack (e.g., surface raider, submarines), what was their reaction, e.g., do they scatter? Or, if the convoy experienced heavy seas and poor visibility? And, did these "events" place any vessels beyond the horizon? What was done to re-group the convoy?]
And, lest we forget, Nagumo was sensitive to a timeline, as other Japanese operations were in process.
D. Re: those flags and blinkers. It is your statement " .. wouldn't use them, at all, ..." Where did this "..., at all" come from? Where is the citation from Stinnett's work (edition and page) which says that? The initial statement regarding flags and blinkers ... "line-of-sight".
Now - just how can Akagi's signalmen, no matter how expert, use flags and/or blinkers to communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats - as they are far beyond "sight" ... patrolling hundreds of miles ahead of the Striking Force?
And, " ... which the continuous (or repeated) DF fixes imply; ..." Citation? Context?
As you seem to have missed it, or are perhaps ignoring it:
"Since skippers and crews of oilers were veterans who had grown up at sea for many years, they were able to master refueling works and others in a comparatively short period of training, but a difficult problem for them was to maintain formation at night without any lamps. Vessels that had been in formation in the evening often became lost to sight in the following morning. ..."
To repeat ... but a difficult problem for them was to maintain formation at night without any lamps. Vessels that had been in formation in the evening often became lost to sight in the following morning. ...
Or lost to sight ...
Rengo Kantai Extracts by Ryunouke Kusaka, Chapter 12, The Pearl Harbor Papers - Inside the Japanese Plans, editors Goldstein and Dillon, page 152. (Oh, yes, a Japanese source.) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.163.30.175 ( talk) 13:00, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
From Farago's The Broken Seal Bantam Press Edition
Footnote, page 47
"The United States Navy had a generally low opinion of the seamanship of the Combined Fleet, and the exercises off Mihonoseki did little to change it. Designed to train crews for action at night, they ended in disaster when two cruisers and two destroyers collided in the dark. The vessels were seriously damaged and some two hundred sailors lost their lives in the embarrassing accident. The commanding officer of one of the cruisers 'atoned' for the mishap by committing suicide." —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 ( talk) 12:15, 2 January 2008 (UTC)
I (re)did an insert in the page about US knowledge of Japanese war plans. I think it is important and very relevant to this debate that the US Navy did in fact have advance knowledge of the war plans of the Imperial Japanese Navy -- it's traditional war plans, that is! These had been inspired by the defeat of the Russian Baltic fleet in 1905 and they were maintained throughout the 1930s and well into the 1940s for the eventuality of a conflict with the USA.
The common theme of Japanese war plans from the 1920s until well into the 1940s, was a defensive strategic posture of the IJN. The initiative to advance across the Pacific was to be left to the US Navy. The Japanese would use their superiority in night operations and torpedo attack (including the use of the famed Type 93 or Long Lance torpedo) to wage an attrition campaign against the numerical superior US battle fleet. The battle fleet would then fight a Decisive Battle against this weakened US fleet under favourable conditions, near its home ground. In the 1920s that was still expected to happen very close to Japan, in the 1930s and 1940s the expected location gradually shifted to the central Pacific.
This is what the US Navy knew about Japanese war plans, and what it expected to happen; its own war plans were based on the same set of assumptions. The IJN's staff adhered to this concept right until and even after Pearl Harbour. The attack on Pearl Harbour was a strategic surprise because it was a fairly radical diversion from the traditional plan, although it could also be interpreted as taking the strategy of attrition of the US fleet by light forces to a logical extreme.
There is a parallel with the other great strategic surprise of the first war years, the German attack on France in May 1940. In that case, too, the Germans achieved surprise in part because the French actually knew the traditional war plans of their opponent. (Literally, as a copy had fallen into the hands of the Belgians.)
81.164.88.220 ( talk) 13:08, 26 January 2008 (UTC) Mutatis Mutandis, 26 January 2008
I deleted:
because, frankly, I'm not sure what it was trying to do; the point was already made in the 'graph above it clearly enough. I also deleted this:
as unencyclopedic. They may be valid points for more research; try answering some of them. I'm guessing the Hewitt Report asked {& answered!) these questions; try citing it. Or sources that do answer them. Trekphiler ( talk) 03:08, 4 January 2008 (UTC)
<--Y'know, rather than complaining, why don't you source it, for those of us who don't live next door to the Library of Congress? No, wait, you'd rather attack people who disagree with your purblind ignorant views. My mistake. Trekphiler ( talk) 13:16, 9 March 2008 (UTC)
I deleted
and
I can already hear the complaints about deleting sourced material, so for the zealots, let me make it crystal clear: if you can demonstrate the significance of this material, rather than just use it to hint special knowledge (which is all it's doing now; calling Shiriya a "naval unit", but conveniently ignoring "an auxiliary", i.e., not a fleet unit {I won't even ask about the relevance of the relationship to "the great Admiral"}), put it back in. That is, show how these lists put the Kido Butai en route to Pearl. As I read it, the "calling marus" is routine housekeeping, carried on by the radiomen left behind, as part of the deception program; unless you can show different, leave it out. Trekphiler ( talk) 13:25, 9 March 2008 (UTC)
Psst, ... Thimble, her ain't a'headin' south.
Some other SHIRIYA messages (by date and not SRNs) in addition to SRN-115398 above add more detail and include:
18 Nov
From: Sec1stAirFlt To: CdrDesDiv7 Info: CO SHIRIYA
STRIKING FORCE Secret Operations Order No. 6 was not sent to the SHIRIYA. Please arrange to supply her with a copy of same.
20 Nov
From: SHIRIYA Action: COS CarDiv1, Combined Fleet
1. I will complete loading aviation gasoline and other miscellaneous equipment 21 Nov. 2. The main generator and other minor repairs will be completed 23 Nov. 3. Expect to get underway on 24 Nov and join up during morning of 27 Nov. 4. STRIKING FORCE Secret Operations Order No. 6 has not been received.
21 Nov
From: CO SHIRIYA To: CrdDesDiv7
We are undergoing overhaul at Yokosuka. Expect to depart 24 Nov and arrive at Sea on 27 Nov. Advise rendezvous point your unit. Regarding refueling at Sea …
Finally, it is HIJMS SHIRIYA ... and, yes, her is a "fully-fledged" member of the IJN.
So, on absolutely no standing, Thimble deletes sourced material again ... becoming forever known as half-Thimble for making a mess and not cleaning it up - again!
<-- Good to see you actually answered all that.... (Ooops, my bad.) Caught you with Cpn Travis, did I? Trekphiler ( talk) 13:02, 12 March 2008 (UTC)
This section is smudging the facts a bit. Yamamoto who planned the attack disagreed with battleships being superior to battleships and from what I've read in some books, he planned the attack for when it happened based on the hope that the Aircraft carriers would be in dock, he missed them by 2-3 days. Also note that the IJN strike force consisted of large amounts of carriers. This section leads people to believe that all members of both Navies considered carriers inferior, infact there was a divide in the navies, older Admirals who had been with battleships most of their lives and younger officers who trained with carriers. Similar to how some of my older relatives refuse to learn metric and continue to use it, and complain when something is not in Imperial (we're Canadian, not a shot at Americans). Commissioned officers works on a merit system, but also a seniority and political system, quite a few leading IJN officers for instance would have been in the Battle of Tsushima (Yamamoto Isoroku included), and would of considered ships like the Yamato new and top of the line. Younger officers who may of had their first commands or first served on carriers would hold very different opinions. Who knows what opinion Roosevelt had. Also, saying that "aircraft carriers were classified as fleet scouting elements, and hence relatively expendable" doesn't make sense, thats 2+2=4. Aircraft carriers as scouts could remain safely behind battleships and still scout far ahead of all other ships, no expendable ship displaced 19800 tonnes empty and has a complement of 2200+ people. Thats more than 10x a Tribal class destroyer. Twice the personnel complement of the Arizona, with a similar displacement. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 ( talk) 05:55, 2 April 2008 (UTC)
Also, the Kido Butai came in from the north, closer to the Aleutians than Wake or Midway. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 ( talk) 06:05, 2 April 2008 (UTC)
If the battleships were so universally considered superior, why the Kido Butai? 6 aircraft carriers and escorts. 6 scouts and escorts hardly sound like "the single most powerful naval fleet", not my words, by the words of Wikipedia on the Kido Butai. In addition, while trying to say how unsafe they were out in the ocean surrounded by the IJN, Midway was shelled at the same time as Pearl Harbor, the next day Malaya was invaded by the 25th Army under Yamashita and the Americans were kicked out of Shanghai. Then on the 9th goes Bangkok. Peking is overrun on the 11th. On the 13th the Philippines are invaded by the 14th. On the 16th Borneo is invaded. And on the 23rd, Wake Island is captured. Seems like the safest place during all of this was 200 miles west of Hawai. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 ( talk) 06:28, 2 April 2008 (UTC)
<--
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For those who are a bit curious and clearly at the will of the moderators, they might wish review the document found at "www.fas.org/irp/nsa/safford.pdf" (approx. 635 kb).
This is a document widely known in the Pearl Harbor lore as SRH-149 (SRH - Special Research History), and is of interest to many for several reasons, for example, the manpower levels applied to IJN codes in 1941, ..., etc.
It is titled A Brief History of Communications Intelligence in the United States, the author being Laurance F(rye). Safford, Captain, US Navy (Retired). This document's sub-title is Captain Safford's version of the pre-Pearl Harbor History, prepared 21-27 March 1952, (with special reference to coordination and cooperation).
Some items to note about this version of SRH-149:
(A) Title page for this document has "Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 10-27-2005 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended." (E.O. 12958 - Executive Order No. 12958), and
(B) Within this "Declassified and approved for release by NSA ..." document, pages 14, 15, 17, 18, and 20 remain today heavily redacted.
(C) At the bottom of page 15 is a redacted message. It is an example to note - the Japanese send the same message twice, first "en clair" and then enciphered; clearly poor procedure on the Japanese part.
So, for a document written in March 1952 (nearly 56 years ago) and partially declassified and released in October 2005 - just over two years ago - those who say ALL of the Pearl Harbor documents have long been - even decades ago - declassified and released into the public domain are incorrect. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.44 ( talk) 15:25, 8 December 2007 (UTC)
Question about "Radio Silence of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force Confirmed Again: The Saga of the Secret Message Serial (SMS) Numbers" by Philip H. Jacobsen, Crytpologia Volume 31, Number 3, July 2007, pages 223-232.
What does SMS mean? —Preceding
unsigned comment added by
172.166.7.92 (
talk) 11:10, 11 December 2007 (UTC)
In the 1930s each command or ship in the Japanese Navy used a "one-up" reference system. A "one up" gave a consecutive number, 000 through 999 (and then repeated) for each successive administrative message. This reference number was called a Secret Message Serial number (SMS)
ScottS (
talk)
23:25, 11 December 2007 (UTC)
"Abstract:
By analyzing all the available Secret Message Serial (SMS) numbers originated by the Japanese CinC 1st Air Fleet, it is clear that no messages were sent by radio during the formation of the Strike Force during its transit to Hawaii. It was not until the attack on Pearl Harbor had commenced that radio transmissions began. The Strike Force maintained strict radio silence and thus there was no Allied foreknowledge of the attack through radio communications - despite revisionist claims to the contrary."
A. Jacobsen's use of SMS is incorrect - twice. In the abstract and title (i.e., Secret Message Serial, an error which ScottS repeats) above as well as his review of Stinnett's Day of Deceit at www.amazon.com.(i.e., Station Message Serial), Jacobsen is wrong there also.
SMS stands for Secret Message Series. For an explanation of SMS's see Stinnett (paperback edition, Notes section, page 333, note 16). Note who Stinnett used to vouch for the meaning of SMS.
B. Further, "... By analyzing all the available ..." begs the question of those known but not available SMSs. These identified SMSs, even today are under FOIA requests as yet to be released to the public. Stinnett's note from above addresses this by commenting on a gap of thirteen messages in the SMS series, these being sequential messages. Such a gap gives pause to Jacobsen's claim of "confirmed" on its surface and his expertise suffers. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.163.30.175 ( talk) 12:28, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
Not that it matters, but I see nothing refuting Jacobsen's terminology. Stinnett's claims are between 606 and 620. Those dates are between Nov. 1 and Nov. 3. By looking at various other Secret Message Serial numbers in the article you can see the list of dates and numbers. ScottS ( talk) 16:34, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
Nothing from Kisner's quotes on page 333 note 16 claims otherwise. Do you have another source to site? ScottS ( talk) 18:07, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
Again can you quote a source please from page 333 or other? ScottS ( talk) 16:23, 13 December 2007 (UTC)
No quote I see. In short yet another incorrect/unsupported claim from Jamaskin. ScottS ( talk) 18:11, 13 December 2007 (UTC)
From Jacobsen's abstract above is: "It was not until the attack on Pearl Harbor had commenced that radio transmissions began."
Or beginning with the sortie from Hitokappu Wan until "bombs away" and the "Thunder Fish" launch - not a peep - all frequencies at all times. So says Jacobsen. [For a narrative of this attack, see "Torpedoing Pearl Harbor" by David Aiken, Military History December 2001 issue, pages 46-53, continued on 82.]
However, Jacobsen neglects some details. Some of these are from The Pearl Harbor Papers - Inside the Japanese Plans which provides another perspective - from the Japanese viewpoint.
"From skipper of I-72 on 1255 7 Dec., to Advance Force and Task Force, received on 1433 7 Dec. (Telegram)
The enemy is not in the Lahaina anchorage. 1255 "
N.B., Dates and times were kept by the IJN relative to Toyko local time. Also, recall the placement of the International Date Line. And, within the book cited the usage of "signal" and "wireless" and "telegram" are not consistent. The two messages above use telegram as a radio transmission. [Aiken also uses telegram.]
So, on the facts, provided from the Japanese "eyes" - Jacobsen is incorrect.
[Extant is a FOIA-released Station H Intercept Log is a 6Dec41 intercepted transmission from call sign WA HI 8 - a Kido Butai submarine.] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.163.30.175 ( talk) 13:19, 12 December 2007 (UTC) Commander Genda who helped plan the attack stated "We kept absolute Radio Silence" I'm not interested in your poor speculation. Former Lieutenant Commander Chuichi Yoshoka who was communications officer on the flagship Akagi, said he did not recall any ship dispatching a radio message before the attack. I see nothing in the Goldstein and Dillon "Pearl Harbor Papers" that refutes Radio Silence. Furthermore The Japanese after battle report clearly states "The success of the surprise operation was attributed to the following factors: ... 4. Concealment of the plan. ... STRICT RADIO SILENCE. In order to keep strict radio silence thorough steps such as taking off fuses in the circuit, holding and sealing the keys were taken. During the operation, the strictest radio silence was perfectly carried out."
ScottS ( talk) 16:50, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
WAHI8 was not a Kido Butai submarine as Wilford claimed. Most likely, it was a submarine in the southern or Philippine action or was connected with the Sixth Fleet. There were only three Kido Butai submarines, and there is no evidence that they sent any radio messages. Furthermore, Captain Kijiro in charge of the three Kido Butai submarines stated that nothing of interest occurred during the transit to Hawaiian waters. See Jacobsen text note 8 ScottS ( talk) 18:13, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
Let's consult Jacobsen for clarity:
From: Philip H. Jacobsen List Editor: "H-DIPLO [Laderman]" Editor's Subject: Cryptology and Pearl Harbor [Jacobsen] Author's Subject: Cryptology and Pearl Harbor [Jacobsen] Date Written: Mon, 5 Feb 2001 05:30:16 GMT Date Posted: Tue, 6 Feb 2001 12:16:25 –0500
The last paragraph of this document is:
“Let me assure everyone concerned that the people that worked both on JN-25B and the traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications in late 1941 were dedicated, competent and and experienced professionals. With a much larger staff, up to date equipment and dedicated communications circuits perhaps the outcome might have been different. Any blame should be placed on those who didn't provide the resources to do so. A few dedicated men with relatively little to work with did an excellent job of sifting through two complete call sign changes within a month as well as many other wartime security measures employed by the Japanese including almost complete radio silence and still came up with the a lot of information on the massive Japanese fleet intentions and movements of November/December 1941. And they were and are not now engaged in any conspiracy or coverup.”
[N.B., the “and and” appears in the original text]
In particular, from the above is seen, “ ... other wartime security measures employed by the Japanese included almost complete radio silence ...”
The operative words here are “almost complete” ...
Jacobsen, in his own words.
—Preceding
unsigned comment added by
172.132.176.50 (
talk •
contribs) 06:31, 13 December 2007
Jacobsen clearly does not subscribe to the view that the Kido Butai (Akagi) broke radio silence, I would suggest reading more current works to clarify. Further support comes from my own conversations with him. I would also suggest that you talk to, or read Wilford and Villa. ScottS ( talk) 16:28, 13 December 2007 (UTC) You'll need to clarify your other gibberish. ScottS ( talk) 17:06, 13 December 2007 (UTC)
Nope I haven't got it yet. I however was under the impression that you had read more current published material from Jacobsen/Villa/Wilford ScottS ( talk) 17:57, 13 December 2007 (UTC)
"Pearl Harbor: Radio Officer Leslie Grogan of the SS Lurline and his Misidentified Signals," Philip H. Jacobsen, Cryptologia, Volume 29, Number 2, April 2005, pages 97-120.
From page 115:
"... Besides, 375 kHz was an air and sea navigational frequency and regular naval communications was not permitted on sea navigational frequencies. ..."
Well, Jacobsen is wrong. Why?
Letter from Lt. John Lietwiler, Fort Mills, P.I. to Lt. Robert Densford, U.S. Navy Department, Washington, D.C., dated 6Oct41 [FOIA-released - Declassified 3/3/200]
Last paragraph of letter has:
" ... In project Baker, it has been decided to supply a generator instead of running a power line. The said generator has arrived, and I am now angling for a suitable site and house. It will aid us no end when installed as we now have to make a daily battery trip from here. What is the last word on the Collins Baker sent in some bearings on 375 KC, and Geiken says they couldn't get that low with the equipment he knew about. .."
Or, the US Navy documented as using 375 KC to sent "bearings."
From pages 115-116:
" ...In order to overcome this unreliability, the U.S. Navy limited its experiments with automatic re-broadcasting of Morse signals mainly to situations where the original signal was from a steady source like a land-line such as between San Francisco and San Diego. Even for single point-to-point circuits using high frequencies, they employed widely spaced, large directional antennas like rhombics as well as huge banks of diversity receivers. This kept the incoming signal at a more or less constant amplitude with the narrow 'dynamic range' of their keying devices and greatly reduced the 'dropouts' on the receiver's high speed inked tape recorders. Ships at sea in those days generally didn't have the space needed for large directional antennas for the huge banks of early diversity receivers required to provide a reliable automatic re-broadcasting effort with long-distance sky wave signals."
Seems Jacobsen is wrong - again. As the following demonstrates:
Mailgram No. 080037, RESTRICTED, from 10Jul41, FM: COM 11, TO: COM 12, INFO: OPNAV, BUSHIPS, CINCPAC, COMS 13, 14 [RG 181, A6-1/A1-1, Declassified 8/7/00]
"PARAGRAPH THREE URLTR JULY SECOND TRAFFIC ROUTING ALTERNATE PROVISIONS AUTOMATIC REBROADCAST IS PRACTICABLE AT SANDIEGO X POINT LOMA REBROADCAST INSTALLATION IS COMPLETE AND OPERATION IS SATISFACTORY X DESIREABLE THAT YOU UTILIZE THESE FACILITIES AS MUCH AS PRACTICABLE IN ORDER THAT MORE PERSONNEL AT POINT LOMA WAY RECEIVE EXPERIENCE IN OPERATION OF NEW EQUIPMENT X NO REASON EXISTS FOR ANY DIFFICULTY IN REBROADCASTING ON ANY FREQUENCY FROM SANFRANSCISO WASHINGTON PEARL HARBOR OR VESSELS OF THE FLEET X ONLY LIMITATIONS POWER OF TRANSMITTERS AT PRESENT AVAILABLE X SUGGEST DAILY ONE HOUR USE IN HIGH SPEED HANDLING."
So says the US Navy in July 1941 - "No reason exists for any difficulty ... " from shore stations or vessels of the fleet.
Page 117, footnote 63:
" ... RUSI8 was unidentified for November and the Akagi would not have send a movement report two days after leaving port. ..."
Again, Jacobsen is wrong, again.
Jacobsen, who ScottS has parroted above, are relying on a very old copy of the Station H Movement Reports. This has been explained in some detail, e.g., use of "white out" tape and liquid, ..., etc.
With patience and persistence, the FOIA procedure does work - perhaps not Mercury-like - but it does work. The FOIA-released document showing the Jacobsen/ScottS regarding CV AKAGI error is available in the public domain, multitple sources are given above.
The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable, by George Victor, Ph.D., Potomac Books, Inc., 2007, [ISBN-10 159 797 0525].
From page 302:
"Whether intentionally or not, Roosevelt exposed the fleet to a Japanese attack by stationing it in Hawaii. Then he intentionally used naval units as lures by ordering them on various expeditions in the Pacific. Withholding key information from Kimmel and Short increased the fleet's exposure greatly and it was most glaringly increased by not sending a warning on December 6, 1941.
Despite the history of war, the idea that Roosevelt withheld warnings from Kimmel and Short for the purpose of getting the United States openly into a European war is still unthinkable to many people, but to fewer and fewer as the years past. As has happened over time with other unthinkable acts, the repugnance aroused by the idea of using the Pacific Fleet as a lure will probably continue to fade." —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.132.165.172 ( talk) 14:22, 14 December 2007 (UTC)
What Pearl Harbor Materials would the readership, if they could, like to see declassified immediately? And, why those?
For example, from the www.amazon.com book reviews for Stinnett's Day of Deceit is:
Some Documents Still Not Declassified, December 9, 2000, by Dave Mann (Brentwood, TN USA)
"I served with the US Army Special Security Group (USASSG) during the period 1984 to 1987 and worked on a 'declassification review' of pre-World War Two and World War Two 'Special Intelligence' documents. We safeguarded several thousand linear feet of files inside a vault at Arlington Hall Station, VA. There were hundreds of linear feet of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) documents pertaining to Pearl Harbor. I admit that I was so dulled by the continuous adrenal rush of reading yet another document revealing some 50-year old historical snippet that I really did not attempt to think about the importance of what I read. After reading this book and comparing it to my memory I sat shocked at the accuracy of the author's research. It is no longer hard to believe in the perfidy of America's politicians after 8 years of The Arkansas Mafia and the Clintons; this book will make it very clear that the politicians of the 1930's and 1940's were every bit as bad as we can imagine. Buy this book and read it now."
—Preceding
unsigned comment added by
172.132.176.50 (
talk •
contribs) 06:31, 13 December 2007
Given his review I suspect he is the perfect gullible reader for Stinnett. This reminds me,...Stinnett, Wilford and Wiley often make claims of classified or missing documents. However, a little research often proves their claims to be incorrect. Like the Wilford "missing" Record of prosperity page 3 or when Stinnett claims "That there are 300 pages of RDF fixes [sic] that were originated by VICTOR [Samoa] between July and December 1941 locked in Archives II vaults at College Park, Maryland" page 212. Often the claims are outdated or were the result of poor research. I'm of cource not saying there aren't any classified documents, however I am saying that you can't trust what Stinnett/Wilford/Villa often claim. ScottS ( talk) 16:51, 13 December 2007 (UTC)
You're the one with the implied sinister nature of classfied PH docs. Does this pertain to all documents or just the ones you want/ or just can't find? Did this apply to the Crane files pre 1999 before those were brought to the public? ScottS ( talk) 18:08, 13 December 2007 (UTC)
I deleted this:
This is as mistaken as the belief of Lurline's radioman, based on an inadequate grasp of naval communications. Under radio silence, navies resort to older techniques, developed & used for decades before radio, blinker light & morse; when these are inappropriate, flag & semaphore, in use for over 200yr, are available. Trekphiler 12:36, 14 December 2005 (UTC)
Odd. A verified and sourced quote from a known text [A. J. Barker's Pearl Harbor - Battle Book 10] - deleted. The "radioman" in question here (Grogan) held a US Navy reserve commission and had decades of military and maritime experience beginning with the US Navy in WWI; signal flags and narrow-beam blinkers of necessity mean "line of sight" and are useless in heavy weather (e.g., From Layton's And I Was There page 249 " ... Naguno's striking force had run into the first really big storm ...") and/or when vessels are scattered beyond the horizon.
Besides Farago's The Broken Seal (Bantam paperback edition - POSTSCRIPT), also see Wilford's Pearl Harbor Redefined for one; of, course, Stinnett's Day of Deceit is another; and, Victor's The Pearl Harbor Myth is another. And, as Prange flags SHIRIYA as part of the Kido Butai, also Prados' Combined Fleet Decoded. There are also several recent journal articles.
To fact-check the above, see Farago's The Broken Seal (paperback edition), on lower page 381, regarding Grogan, is " ... whose own credentials included a reserve commission in the U. S. Navy with years of service in Naval Communications."
On Grogan ... "So he may have had experience ..." No, he definitively did have a US naval communications background - decades worth; no "may have..." about it.
Mention of "triangulation" - agreed. However, common practice then as now ... "relative bearings." These are used to determine the general direction of a signal source, and if multiple relative bearings are taken over time of the signal, movement in the source can be established.
All of the Japanese merchant fleet had returned to Home Waters; Grogan did not say Russian vessels - very easy for him to determine. He did use the call sign for Japanese shore stations. No doubt, his now "missing" radio log would be helpful.
Perhaps ... but we now have at least six (6) "broken radio silence" instances in the public domain (viz., Ranneft, Ogg, Grogan, 30Nov41 COMSUM14 AKAGI "tactical circuit" message, and "code movement" annotated report from STATION H on 28Nov41, and also from STATION H, submarine call sign WA HI 8 on 6Dec41) all occuring at approximately the same time. All are independent of each other. There are other examples. None, however, generated an action such as, e.g., CINCPAC: FLASH IMMEDIATE: UNKNOWN SIGNAL SOURCE APPROX N-NW PEARL ADVANCING WESTERLY X INVESTIGATE X REPORT X
On Japanese survivors ... Yes, yes, ... as Prange says. But we also have contradictory claims, some even from the Japanese. What we DO NOT have are the official records ... say, the US Navy Mid-Pacific RDF records for all monitoring stations (i.e., Hawaii, Samoa, Dutch Harbor, Midway, Wake, Guam, ...), nor various "Y" services such as - from Canadian records (Gordon Head, Esquimalt, ...), nor Dutch files (Batavia), nor British files (Singapore, Hong Kong), nor Australian/New Zealand RDF stations during this period. So, why are these all - US and Allied - RDF logs still classified in July 2007 even after numerous and quite specific FOIA requests? Any surmise?
[Stinnett's Day of Deceit (paperback edition), on pages 266-67 shows an August 1941 disposition/RDF bearing chart for Call Sign "8E YU" - CV AKAGI, and on page 315 shows a handwritten STATION CAST RDF report (viz., TESTM dispatch) from 5 December 1941. Wilford's MA Thesis, on page 167, shows TESTM messages numbers 051515, 051525, and 051535 as sent to STATION HYPO, in their encoded and decoded form. To note, from TESTM 051535, "VICTOR" is the US Navy RDF monitoring station in America Samoa.
Mr. Stinnett and now Dr. Wilford are to be highly commended for their superlative efforts as these are the first public displays of this RDF data, which clearly demonstrate the US Navy's excellent RDF skills and in situ capabilites.]
Unless you've got a source that isn't a conspiracy nut, I'm more inclined to believe the Japanese on this one. Their records, reproduced in Prange, Goldstein, & Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, indicate the radio keys were removed. Moreover, "narrow beam blinker"? I'm thinking of 24" searchlights (if needed). And do you really believe professional navy navigators can't keep station in heavy weather? Or that they'd be beyond "line of sight"? Just how much separation do you think they were keeping from Akagi, anyhow? Over the horizon? "So, why are these all - US and Allied - RDF logs still classified in July 2007 "? BTHOOM. Considering the number of people in USG with the ability, & inclination, to classify things secret even as we speak, & a general tendency by bureaucrats & politicians not to want to release any information, I'm not too surprised by this; I can just hear the CIA & NSA wanks saying it'll compromise sources & methods. (Yeah, al Q still uses radios, that's the method... Or is it NSA/CIA persuading the carriers to give up your phone/email records, just like they did the cable coys, when that was against the law...?) Trekphiler 02:43, 27 July 2007 (UTC)
"Over the horizon?" ...
Beyond the Horizon ... a few seeds along the way for those Baker Street irregulars;
A. Hawaii Operation, VADM Shigeru Fukudome, "US Naval Institute Proceedings", December 1955, pp. 1315-1331. Something about a Patrol Mission for three submarines (I-19, I-21, and I-23).
B. "Formation for Alert Steaming" from The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans, edited by Goldstein and Dillon, on page 187.
Submarine Division is shown on flank of Akagi. Comment is due to fog, positioned some 8 miles away.
From The American Practical Navigator (aka Bowditch), Appendix, simplified formula to calculate the distance to the horizon from varying "lookout" heights. Who sees farther, a lookout on AKAGI's island or a lookout on the I-boats, even with the I-boat being 8 miles "nearer" the horizon?
The answer begets a question: What good are these "patrol" I-boats on my flank? Sanity check?
C. From Layton's And I Was There, page 213, "Three large submarines, ... scouted two hundred miles ahead of the striking force, ...
So, let's see, curvature of the earth, following seas, ... Yup, beyond the horizon. Flags, blinkers, ... ain't gonna work. They are useless.
D. Also edited by Goldstein and Dillon, The Pacific War Papers: Japanese Documents of World War II, from "Japanese Monograph No. 102: Submarine Operations December 1941-April 1942", on page 235:
"Besides the above forces, attached to the Carrier Striking Force from the 6th Fleet to perform patrol duties, were the submarines I-19, I-21 and I-23. In addition to acting as the Patrol Unit in front of the Carrier Striking Force, this unit was to rescue the crews of downed aircraft and be prepared to resist counterattack.
"... the Patrol Unit in front of the Carrier Striking Force, ..." Goldstein and Dillon contradict themselves.
Any surmise as to why? [Hint: Need to rationalize/cloud "radio silence" ...]
As another "sanity check" of Prange and associates, another question. Prange's At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, on page x of the Introduction, second to last paragraph has: "The Japanese put very little about the Pearl Harbor plan on paper, and what was available aboard four of the carriers of Nagumo's force (including his flagship, Akagi) went down at Midway in June 1942.
If this statement is so, where did the "papers" in the references used above (items B and D) come from? In Prange, there are many, many other errors.
A. Re: Kuriles - may want to check your comment - a citation would also help; "hence" as an implied QED is unsupportable here, got any cross bearings? Familiar with Rochefort's impressions of IJN radio deception efforts (See Layton, pages 228-229)? Of course, recall mention of those still classified RDF and "code movement" reports from the period - that curious pattern of FOIA denials.
[Another odd thing about the Kuriles, before 1941 the US Navy had a very detailed and complete set of charts for "Hitokappau Wan" (now O. Iturup), and yet in the APHB is the comment about an unknown port. But that is another thread ...]
B. Re: Patrol Unit of three I-boats. Patrol Mission SOP - surface cruising ahead of main force was then the norm; submerge to avoid detection. Why?
Lookouts perched on the conning tower (now called the "sail") constantly scanning versus using a periscope - extended fully - to scan. Who "sees" farther? (Recall Bowditch).
The tasking of a Patrol Mission is what? Does that change for "peace time" - a non sequitur.
From Japanese sources of the planning and operational aspects of the three I-boats (See "Jane's Fighting Ships of World War II for I-boat specificatons), their patrol line advanced in front of the Striking Force main body, and well beyond visual range. It is hundreds of miles ahead in fact as the Japanese and Layton tell us.
So, how again does the main body of the Striking Force communicate with these I-boats? Or, what would cause such a need to contact these I-boats, established as "being over the horizon" ...?
C. Causes such as: (a) the known and several changes in course of the Striking Force, (b) the December 5th alert (See: The Pearl Harbor Papers, edited by Goldstein and Dillon, pages 38-39) which caused a immediate zig-zagging and wide dispersal of the main body, (c) weather (See: Morison's Two Ocean War, page 46), ..., etc.
[An aside here, when vessels within a convoy were alerted to the danger of attack (e.g., surface raider, submarines), what was their reaction, e.g., do they scatter? Or, if the convoy experienced heavy seas and poor visibility? And, did these "events" place any vessels beyond the horizon? What was done to re-group the convoy?]
And, lest we forget, Nagumo was sensitive to a timeline, as other Japanese operations were in process.
D. Re: those flags and blinkers. It is your statement " .. wouldn't use them, at all, ..." Where did this "..., at all" come from? Where is the citation from Stinnett's work (edition and page) which says that? The initial statement regarding flags and blinkers ... "line-of-sight".
Now - just how can Akagi's signalmen, no matter how expert, use flags and/or blinkers to communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats - as they are far beyond "sight" ... patrolling hundreds of miles ahead of the Striking Force?
And, " ... which the continuous (or repeated) DF fixes imply; ..." Citation? Context?
As you seem to have missed it, or are perhaps ignoring it:
"Since skippers and crews of oilers were veterans who had grown up at sea for many years, they were able to master refueling works and others in a comparatively short period of training, but a difficult problem for them was to maintain formation at night without any lamps. Vessels that had been in formation in the evening often became lost to sight in the following morning. ..."
To repeat ... but a difficult problem for them was to maintain formation at night without any lamps. Vessels that had been in formation in the evening often became lost to sight in the following morning. ...
Or lost to sight ...
Rengo Kantai Extracts by Ryunouke Kusaka, Chapter 12, The Pearl Harbor Papers - Inside the Japanese Plans, editors Goldstein and Dillon, page 152. (Oh, yes, a Japanese source.) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.163.30.175 ( talk) 13:00, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
From Farago's The Broken Seal Bantam Press Edition
Footnote, page 47
"The United States Navy had a generally low opinion of the seamanship of the Combined Fleet, and the exercises off Mihonoseki did little to change it. Designed to train crews for action at night, they ended in disaster when two cruisers and two destroyers collided in the dark. The vessels were seriously damaged and some two hundred sailors lost their lives in the embarrassing accident. The commanding officer of one of the cruisers 'atoned' for the mishap by committing suicide." —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 ( talk) 12:15, 2 January 2008 (UTC)
I (re)did an insert in the page about US knowledge of Japanese war plans. I think it is important and very relevant to this debate that the US Navy did in fact have advance knowledge of the war plans of the Imperial Japanese Navy -- it's traditional war plans, that is! These had been inspired by the defeat of the Russian Baltic fleet in 1905 and they were maintained throughout the 1930s and well into the 1940s for the eventuality of a conflict with the USA.
The common theme of Japanese war plans from the 1920s until well into the 1940s, was a defensive strategic posture of the IJN. The initiative to advance across the Pacific was to be left to the US Navy. The Japanese would use their superiority in night operations and torpedo attack (including the use of the famed Type 93 or Long Lance torpedo) to wage an attrition campaign against the numerical superior US battle fleet. The battle fleet would then fight a Decisive Battle against this weakened US fleet under favourable conditions, near its home ground. In the 1920s that was still expected to happen very close to Japan, in the 1930s and 1940s the expected location gradually shifted to the central Pacific.
This is what the US Navy knew about Japanese war plans, and what it expected to happen; its own war plans were based on the same set of assumptions. The IJN's staff adhered to this concept right until and even after Pearl Harbour. The attack on Pearl Harbour was a strategic surprise because it was a fairly radical diversion from the traditional plan, although it could also be interpreted as taking the strategy of attrition of the US fleet by light forces to a logical extreme.
There is a parallel with the other great strategic surprise of the first war years, the German attack on France in May 1940. In that case, too, the Germans achieved surprise in part because the French actually knew the traditional war plans of their opponent. (Literally, as a copy had fallen into the hands of the Belgians.)
81.164.88.220 ( talk) 13:08, 26 January 2008 (UTC) Mutatis Mutandis, 26 January 2008
I deleted:
because, frankly, I'm not sure what it was trying to do; the point was already made in the 'graph above it clearly enough. I also deleted this:
as unencyclopedic. They may be valid points for more research; try answering some of them. I'm guessing the Hewitt Report asked {& answered!) these questions; try citing it. Or sources that do answer them. Trekphiler ( talk) 03:08, 4 January 2008 (UTC)
<--Y'know, rather than complaining, why don't you source it, for those of us who don't live next door to the Library of Congress? No, wait, you'd rather attack people who disagree with your purblind ignorant views. My mistake. Trekphiler ( talk) 13:16, 9 March 2008 (UTC)
I deleted
and
I can already hear the complaints about deleting sourced material, so for the zealots, let me make it crystal clear: if you can demonstrate the significance of this material, rather than just use it to hint special knowledge (which is all it's doing now; calling Shiriya a "naval unit", but conveniently ignoring "an auxiliary", i.e., not a fleet unit {I won't even ask about the relevance of the relationship to "the great Admiral"}), put it back in. That is, show how these lists put the Kido Butai en route to Pearl. As I read it, the "calling marus" is routine housekeeping, carried on by the radiomen left behind, as part of the deception program; unless you can show different, leave it out. Trekphiler ( talk) 13:25, 9 March 2008 (UTC)
Psst, ... Thimble, her ain't a'headin' south.
Some other SHIRIYA messages (by date and not SRNs) in addition to SRN-115398 above add more detail and include:
18 Nov
From: Sec1stAirFlt To: CdrDesDiv7 Info: CO SHIRIYA
STRIKING FORCE Secret Operations Order No. 6 was not sent to the SHIRIYA. Please arrange to supply her with a copy of same.
20 Nov
From: SHIRIYA Action: COS CarDiv1, Combined Fleet
1. I will complete loading aviation gasoline and other miscellaneous equipment 21 Nov. 2. The main generator and other minor repairs will be completed 23 Nov. 3. Expect to get underway on 24 Nov and join up during morning of 27 Nov. 4. STRIKING FORCE Secret Operations Order No. 6 has not been received.
21 Nov
From: CO SHIRIYA To: CrdDesDiv7
We are undergoing overhaul at Yokosuka. Expect to depart 24 Nov and arrive at Sea on 27 Nov. Advise rendezvous point your unit. Regarding refueling at Sea …
Finally, it is HIJMS SHIRIYA ... and, yes, her is a "fully-fledged" member of the IJN.
So, on absolutely no standing, Thimble deletes sourced material again ... becoming forever known as half-Thimble for making a mess and not cleaning it up - again!
<-- Good to see you actually answered all that.... (Ooops, my bad.) Caught you with Cpn Travis, did I? Trekphiler ( talk) 13:02, 12 March 2008 (UTC)
This section is smudging the facts a bit. Yamamoto who planned the attack disagreed with battleships being superior to battleships and from what I've read in some books, he planned the attack for when it happened based on the hope that the Aircraft carriers would be in dock, he missed them by 2-3 days. Also note that the IJN strike force consisted of large amounts of carriers. This section leads people to believe that all members of both Navies considered carriers inferior, infact there was a divide in the navies, older Admirals who had been with battleships most of their lives and younger officers who trained with carriers. Similar to how some of my older relatives refuse to learn metric and continue to use it, and complain when something is not in Imperial (we're Canadian, not a shot at Americans). Commissioned officers works on a merit system, but also a seniority and political system, quite a few leading IJN officers for instance would have been in the Battle of Tsushima (Yamamoto Isoroku included), and would of considered ships like the Yamato new and top of the line. Younger officers who may of had their first commands or first served on carriers would hold very different opinions. Who knows what opinion Roosevelt had. Also, saying that "aircraft carriers were classified as fleet scouting elements, and hence relatively expendable" doesn't make sense, thats 2+2=4. Aircraft carriers as scouts could remain safely behind battleships and still scout far ahead of all other ships, no expendable ship displaced 19800 tonnes empty and has a complement of 2200+ people. Thats more than 10x a Tribal class destroyer. Twice the personnel complement of the Arizona, with a similar displacement. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 ( talk) 05:55, 2 April 2008 (UTC)
Also, the Kido Butai came in from the north, closer to the Aleutians than Wake or Midway. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 ( talk) 06:05, 2 April 2008 (UTC)
If the battleships were so universally considered superior, why the Kido Butai? 6 aircraft carriers and escorts. 6 scouts and escorts hardly sound like "the single most powerful naval fleet", not my words, by the words of Wikipedia on the Kido Butai. In addition, while trying to say how unsafe they were out in the ocean surrounded by the IJN, Midway was shelled at the same time as Pearl Harbor, the next day Malaya was invaded by the 25th Army under Yamashita and the Americans were kicked out of Shanghai. Then on the 9th goes Bangkok. Peking is overrun on the 11th. On the 13th the Philippines are invaded by the 14th. On the 16th Borneo is invaded. And on the 23rd, Wake Island is captured. Seems like the safest place during all of this was 200 miles west of Hawai. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 ( talk) 06:28, 2 April 2008 (UTC)
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