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I have changed 180 Wing to be 140 Wing. RAF History page shows the signal sent and the sqns all belong to 140 Wing. Sfortune 08:11, 11 April 2006 (UTC)
After have created the french interwiki link, I saw that the french version is quite different than the english one. The french one includes this operation as part of the global Operation Fortitude of desinformation. There were no much and important of french resistance people to free in this prison. Who's right ? TCY 17:13, 11 November 2006 (UTC)
Apologies if I'm editing incorrectly. My father, Kenneth Cohen, was the MI6/SIS officer responsible for this operation. It had nothing to do with FORTITUDE, an error that has somehow crept into some French sources. One French source even states that the operation was launched to free my father from Amiens when he was not in France between just before the fall of Paris and mid-June 1944. I'm guessing it was for the benefit of my father's friend, Gilbert Renault/Colonel Rémy, and his network of perhaps for my God-mother's ALLIANCE network. I hope this is OK C.cohen ( talk) 21:05, 10 March 2021 (UTC)
The attack was requested by Dominique Ponchardier of the Maquis, through MI6, to free Maquis prisoners. It had nothing to do with Fortitude South (the British plan to make the Germans think the Allied invasion would come at Calais), which was an MI5 deception operation (as was Fortitude North, the parallel plan to make the Germans think the invasion might come in Norway instead). That is merely a conspiracy theory popular in France. Jack Fishman's 1983 book And The Walls Came Tumbling Down, and the author's research notes, contain most of the relevant witness statements, and these reappear in Robert Lyman's 2014 book The Jail Busters, written with the benefit of access to Fishman's archive. The great resistant Gilbert Renault -- 'Remy' -- was perfectly aware of the origin and purpose of the operation and never understood why people made an unnecessary mystery of it. This article, like a lot of Wikipedia articles, is unfortunately so bad that it can't be fixed on a 'running repairs' basis. It would need a complete remake. Khamba Tendal ( talk) 19:07, 20 August 2015 (UTC)
Some of the resistants in Amiens jail had been told they were to be shot. Pierre Bracquart, telephone engineer working for the American OSS, was told on 8 February that he would be shot on 16 February (but it didn't happen -- perhaps the Germans were playing mind games). Jean Beaurin of the Communist FTPF was told he would be executed on 20 February. (Lyman, pp.112-114.) Raymond Vivant, sous-prefet of Abbeville and head of the OCM resistance network, had been arrested and put in Amiens on 12 February. Gilbert Renault later wrote that Vivant himself, just before his arrest, had reluctantly sent Ponchardier's request for an air attack to London. (Lyman, p.113.) There may have been recently-arrested British MI6 agents in Amiens jail as well. (Lyman, p.118.) The MI6 files have not made it into the National Archives -- it is not called the Secret Intelligence Service for nothing -- but Ponchardier said that in February he sent details of the prison to his MI6 handler 'Captain Thomas' (probably Lt Neil Whitelaw, who reported to Lt-Col Kenneth Cohen, desk officer for France). (Lyman, p.116.) Gilbert Renault of the BCRA in London (Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action, the Gaullist secret service) seems to have been aware. Pickard, of course, knew Renault, and possibly Ponchardier, from his time as CO 161 Special Duties Squadron RAF from October 1942 to April 1943, flying Lysanders and Hudsons to take agents in and out of occupied France. (Lyman, pp.168-169.) He also knew Renault's friend Philippe Level, who was serving in the RAF and flew as a 21 Sqn navigator on the Amiens raid.
It seems that MI6, meaning either the deputy chief Lt-Col Sir Claude Dansey or C himself, Maj-Gen Sir Stewart Menzies, proposed the attack to Air Commodore GWP 'Tubby' Grant at Air Ministry Directorate of Intelligence. (Lyman, p.125.) On Friday 11 February Brig-Gen AC Strickland, US Army, Deputy SASO at HQ Allied Expeditionary Air Force, acting for Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, commander AEAF, wrote to Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, commander 2nd Tactical Air Force, requesting the attack 'on a certain important target in France.' The actual details were in an enclosed letter from Air Ministry Directorate of Intelligence (Research), written by Air Commodore James Easton but probably relying on information from Grant, which typically has not made it into the National Archives. (Lyman, p.128.) Obviously the request had to go to Embry's 2 Group, the only viable formation to execute the attack, and back-channels were in operation, so Embry and Pickard may already have known about it before the formal order.
It wasn't called Operation Jericho. That was a name invented for publicity purposes much later. It was simply Ramrod 564. Khamba Tendal ( talk) 20:11, 22 January 2017 (UTC)
Hello, This attack is described in the book « Rendez vous avec le destin » written by Col. R. Lallemand who was the leader of the typhoon escort. There are some discrepancies between his narrative and the article:
Pinson 14:27, 24 December 2006 (UTC)
No, the pictures were taken by the RAF Film and Photographic Unit's usual Mosquito B.IV DZ414 O-Orange, with her usual camerman Fg Off Lee Howard but without her usual pilot Sqn Ldr Charles Patterson -- Flt Lt Tony Wickham of 21 Sqn, invariably and mistakenly credited to the FPU, stood in. Khamba Tendal ( talk) 19:23, 20 August 2015 (UTC)
The introduction to the article notes "No prisoners were scheduled for execution as the offical account states". This is ambiguous, could somebody clarify? Does it mean that no prisoners were scheduled for execution (reference required), supporting the text of the official account? Or does it mean that no prisoners were scheduled for execution (reference required) in contradiction to what the official account states? What does the official account state? reference to the official account as well please. Thanks for helping clear up this ambiguity.-- mgaved ( talk) 17:29, 23 October 2011 (UTC)
This article was automatically assessed because at least one article was rated and this bot brought all the other ratings up to at least that level. BetacommandBot 07:39, 27 August 2007 (UTC)
There were six 487 Sqn aircraft on the raid, not seven. One was flown by Max Sparks.
Have edited his name and aircraft back in, along with his navigator Dunlop, the aircraft serial number, and the squadron code. Have edited Cullum out, as none of the sources list a pilot by that name.
"Max Sparks' is not a nom de guerre, or alias, or anything else but the fellow's real name. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 58.164.44.131 ( talk) 23:41, 28 October 2013 (UTC)
Key Publishing's Flypast Special on the Mosquito leads off with an article on MM417, and states specifically that it was brought on as EG-T to replace HX982, which had been damaged on Operation Jericho. Will edit the page back from MM417 to HX982 to reflect this, add source. 120.146.66.185 ( talk) 12:48, 22 January 2014 (UTC)
Looking up DZ414 some identify it as an aircraft of/operated by the RAF Film Production Unit, at RAF Benson, also the site of one or more PRU units. GraemeLeggett ( talk) 13:28, 11 June 2020 (UTC)
Got caught in an edit conflict then couldn't get my restoration of your edit to save. "Invalid CSRF token" or something but it seems that I'm back in again. Keith-264 ( talk) 19:13, 11 June 2020 (UTC)
An IWM catalogue entry - for the briefing model - gives the escorts as "174, 198 and 245." GraemeLeggett ( talk) 21:42, 11 June 2020 (UTC)
Jackson, R. "Combat Legend: de Havilland Mosquito". 2003. Airlife. Shrewsbury. ISBN 1-84037-358-X p. 47 has each aircraft carrying 2 × 500lb bombs, which seems more realistic than the article text which has a pair of Mosquitos carrying 8. Keith-264 ( talk) 20:12, 12 June 2020 (UTC)
Quite an impressive source but not written as history so it's taking time to dig out details. He's convincing on the French side of things, especially the number of prisoners being undercounted because of overcrowding and the Gestapo–Milice foot-dragging in their reporting of the number of their prisoners in the gaol. There may be discrepancies in the article as i've only changed the total twice. Not to worry I'll continue tomorrow. Keith-264 ( talk) 23:10, 23 June 2020 (UTC)
Expanded and revised section, more to come. Keith-264 ( talk) 16:50, 26 June 2020 (UTC)
Although Fishman's book is an important resource, containing interviews with most of the surviving participants at that time, the thesis that the raid's main purpose was to spring Raymond Vivant is completely false. Vivant was arrested, by his own account, on 12 February. (Robert Lyman, The Jail Busters: the Secret Story of MI6, the French Resistance and Operation Jericho, London, Quercus, 2014, ISBN 978-1-78206-536-4, p.1. Note that Jack Fishman gave Robert Lyman all his files.) The operation had already been ordered on 10 February, by letter from Air Ministry to HQ Allied Expeditionary Air Force, relayed on 11 February from AEAF to Second Tactical Air Force. (Lyman, pp.128-129.) It is therefore impossible that the purpose of the raid was to spring Vivant. And Wild Bill Donovan and the OSS had nothing to do with it. Vivant himself, just before his arrest, was instrumental in passing the request from Dominique Ponchardier of the Sosies network to the BCRA in London and hence to MI6. It's daft of the article to refer to the BBC interview which sought to show that SOE knew nothing about it. Of course SOE knew nothing about it. It wasn't their baby. It was a BCRA request to SIS and from there to Air Ministry. This has been perfectly well known since Ponchardier himself and Gilbert Renault ('Colonel Remy') wrote about it in the 1940s and 1950s.
The object of the raid, at a very low point for the Resistance, with so many members captured, was simply to spring as many as possible, to demonstrate to the Germans and the French that the Resistance had powerful allies who had not forgotten them, and to uncover the Gestapo's spy network in the region by debriefing the escapers, who were likely to have a good idea as to who'd betrayed them. Ponchardier wrote that he later saw a German report admitting that German intelligence in the region was disrupted for two months after the raid. (Lyman, p.267.) Gilbert Renault wrote that:- 'Thanks to those escaped prisoners, who were immediately in touch once again with the Resistance movement, it was possible for them to identify at least sixty Gestapo agents. German counter-espionage in the whole region became comparatively useless, and thus many arrests were avoided that would otherwise doubtless have been made.' (Lyman, p.269.) What is true is that the escape of Vivant (he was actually recaptured very soon, but then escaped again from an insecure location and remained at large) added to the prestige of the Resistance, the RAF and the Allies, because he was so popular locally. (Lyman, pp.262-3.) It is also true that in terms of Allied strategy this was just the time to bolster the Resistance, because their help would soon be needed, for instance in sabotaging trains to delay enemy troop movements during the invasion. There's no mystery about this and God knows why people keep pretending there is a mystery when the Resistance figures who requested the raid have been on record about it since 1946.
The article's also wrong about 21 Squadron's role. They were simply the reserve. There is no truth in the story that they were meant to flatten the prison and kill everybody if the escape didn't come off, even though this absurd idea was given out by the Air Ministry in late 1944. Such an action would serve no purpose. Ian McRitchie of 464, who was shot down and captured that day, claimed to have heard the instruction, but only many decades later when it had become part of the accepted mythology of the raid, and no one else present at Pickard's briefing recalled any such thing. 21 Squadron were just detailed to break the walls if 487 and 464 failed. (Lyman, pp.181-182.) Wing Commander Dale of 21 Squadron remembered Pickard telling him, 'We'll use the signals "Red" and "Green", repeated three times, so that if you hear me say, "Red, red, red," you'll know you're being warned off and will go home without bombing. If I say, "Green, green, green," it's all clear for you to go in and bomb.' (Lyman, p.179.) 'Daddy' -- as in 'Daddy Daddy Daddy, red red red,' Pickard's actual transmission on the day -- was not a code word, it was simply Wing Commander Dale's nickname. Khamba Tendal ( talk) 19:43, 16 March 2021 (UTC)
The article isn't finished but I take your point. Regards Keith-264 ( talk) 21:44, 7 June 2024 (UTC)
This is the
talk page for discussing improvements to the
Operation Jericho article. This is not a forum for general discussion of the article's subject. |
Article policies
|
Find sources: Google ( books · news · scholar · free images · WP refs) · FENS · JSTOR · TWL |
![]() | This article is rated Start-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
I have changed 180 Wing to be 140 Wing. RAF History page shows the signal sent and the sqns all belong to 140 Wing. Sfortune 08:11, 11 April 2006 (UTC)
After have created the french interwiki link, I saw that the french version is quite different than the english one. The french one includes this operation as part of the global Operation Fortitude of desinformation. There were no much and important of french resistance people to free in this prison. Who's right ? TCY 17:13, 11 November 2006 (UTC)
Apologies if I'm editing incorrectly. My father, Kenneth Cohen, was the MI6/SIS officer responsible for this operation. It had nothing to do with FORTITUDE, an error that has somehow crept into some French sources. One French source even states that the operation was launched to free my father from Amiens when he was not in France between just before the fall of Paris and mid-June 1944. I'm guessing it was for the benefit of my father's friend, Gilbert Renault/Colonel Rémy, and his network of perhaps for my God-mother's ALLIANCE network. I hope this is OK C.cohen ( talk) 21:05, 10 March 2021 (UTC)
The attack was requested by Dominique Ponchardier of the Maquis, through MI6, to free Maquis prisoners. It had nothing to do with Fortitude South (the British plan to make the Germans think the Allied invasion would come at Calais), which was an MI5 deception operation (as was Fortitude North, the parallel plan to make the Germans think the invasion might come in Norway instead). That is merely a conspiracy theory popular in France. Jack Fishman's 1983 book And The Walls Came Tumbling Down, and the author's research notes, contain most of the relevant witness statements, and these reappear in Robert Lyman's 2014 book The Jail Busters, written with the benefit of access to Fishman's archive. The great resistant Gilbert Renault -- 'Remy' -- was perfectly aware of the origin and purpose of the operation and never understood why people made an unnecessary mystery of it. This article, like a lot of Wikipedia articles, is unfortunately so bad that it can't be fixed on a 'running repairs' basis. It would need a complete remake. Khamba Tendal ( talk) 19:07, 20 August 2015 (UTC)
Some of the resistants in Amiens jail had been told they were to be shot. Pierre Bracquart, telephone engineer working for the American OSS, was told on 8 February that he would be shot on 16 February (but it didn't happen -- perhaps the Germans were playing mind games). Jean Beaurin of the Communist FTPF was told he would be executed on 20 February. (Lyman, pp.112-114.) Raymond Vivant, sous-prefet of Abbeville and head of the OCM resistance network, had been arrested and put in Amiens on 12 February. Gilbert Renault later wrote that Vivant himself, just before his arrest, had reluctantly sent Ponchardier's request for an air attack to London. (Lyman, p.113.) There may have been recently-arrested British MI6 agents in Amiens jail as well. (Lyman, p.118.) The MI6 files have not made it into the National Archives -- it is not called the Secret Intelligence Service for nothing -- but Ponchardier said that in February he sent details of the prison to his MI6 handler 'Captain Thomas' (probably Lt Neil Whitelaw, who reported to Lt-Col Kenneth Cohen, desk officer for France). (Lyman, p.116.) Gilbert Renault of the BCRA in London (Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action, the Gaullist secret service) seems to have been aware. Pickard, of course, knew Renault, and possibly Ponchardier, from his time as CO 161 Special Duties Squadron RAF from October 1942 to April 1943, flying Lysanders and Hudsons to take agents in and out of occupied France. (Lyman, pp.168-169.) He also knew Renault's friend Philippe Level, who was serving in the RAF and flew as a 21 Sqn navigator on the Amiens raid.
It seems that MI6, meaning either the deputy chief Lt-Col Sir Claude Dansey or C himself, Maj-Gen Sir Stewart Menzies, proposed the attack to Air Commodore GWP 'Tubby' Grant at Air Ministry Directorate of Intelligence. (Lyman, p.125.) On Friday 11 February Brig-Gen AC Strickland, US Army, Deputy SASO at HQ Allied Expeditionary Air Force, acting for Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, commander AEAF, wrote to Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, commander 2nd Tactical Air Force, requesting the attack 'on a certain important target in France.' The actual details were in an enclosed letter from Air Ministry Directorate of Intelligence (Research), written by Air Commodore James Easton but probably relying on information from Grant, which typically has not made it into the National Archives. (Lyman, p.128.) Obviously the request had to go to Embry's 2 Group, the only viable formation to execute the attack, and back-channels were in operation, so Embry and Pickard may already have known about it before the formal order.
It wasn't called Operation Jericho. That was a name invented for publicity purposes much later. It was simply Ramrod 564. Khamba Tendal ( talk) 20:11, 22 January 2017 (UTC)
Hello, This attack is described in the book « Rendez vous avec le destin » written by Col. R. Lallemand who was the leader of the typhoon escort. There are some discrepancies between his narrative and the article:
Pinson 14:27, 24 December 2006 (UTC)
No, the pictures were taken by the RAF Film and Photographic Unit's usual Mosquito B.IV DZ414 O-Orange, with her usual camerman Fg Off Lee Howard but without her usual pilot Sqn Ldr Charles Patterson -- Flt Lt Tony Wickham of 21 Sqn, invariably and mistakenly credited to the FPU, stood in. Khamba Tendal ( talk) 19:23, 20 August 2015 (UTC)
The introduction to the article notes "No prisoners were scheduled for execution as the offical account states". This is ambiguous, could somebody clarify? Does it mean that no prisoners were scheduled for execution (reference required), supporting the text of the official account? Or does it mean that no prisoners were scheduled for execution (reference required) in contradiction to what the official account states? What does the official account state? reference to the official account as well please. Thanks for helping clear up this ambiguity.-- mgaved ( talk) 17:29, 23 October 2011 (UTC)
This article was automatically assessed because at least one article was rated and this bot brought all the other ratings up to at least that level. BetacommandBot 07:39, 27 August 2007 (UTC)
There were six 487 Sqn aircraft on the raid, not seven. One was flown by Max Sparks.
Have edited his name and aircraft back in, along with his navigator Dunlop, the aircraft serial number, and the squadron code. Have edited Cullum out, as none of the sources list a pilot by that name.
"Max Sparks' is not a nom de guerre, or alias, or anything else but the fellow's real name. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 58.164.44.131 ( talk) 23:41, 28 October 2013 (UTC)
Key Publishing's Flypast Special on the Mosquito leads off with an article on MM417, and states specifically that it was brought on as EG-T to replace HX982, which had been damaged on Operation Jericho. Will edit the page back from MM417 to HX982 to reflect this, add source. 120.146.66.185 ( talk) 12:48, 22 January 2014 (UTC)
Looking up DZ414 some identify it as an aircraft of/operated by the RAF Film Production Unit, at RAF Benson, also the site of one or more PRU units. GraemeLeggett ( talk) 13:28, 11 June 2020 (UTC)
Got caught in an edit conflict then couldn't get my restoration of your edit to save. "Invalid CSRF token" or something but it seems that I'm back in again. Keith-264 ( talk) 19:13, 11 June 2020 (UTC)
An IWM catalogue entry - for the briefing model - gives the escorts as "174, 198 and 245." GraemeLeggett ( talk) 21:42, 11 June 2020 (UTC)
Jackson, R. "Combat Legend: de Havilland Mosquito". 2003. Airlife. Shrewsbury. ISBN 1-84037-358-X p. 47 has each aircraft carrying 2 × 500lb bombs, which seems more realistic than the article text which has a pair of Mosquitos carrying 8. Keith-264 ( talk) 20:12, 12 June 2020 (UTC)
Quite an impressive source but not written as history so it's taking time to dig out details. He's convincing on the French side of things, especially the number of prisoners being undercounted because of overcrowding and the Gestapo–Milice foot-dragging in their reporting of the number of their prisoners in the gaol. There may be discrepancies in the article as i've only changed the total twice. Not to worry I'll continue tomorrow. Keith-264 ( talk) 23:10, 23 June 2020 (UTC)
Expanded and revised section, more to come. Keith-264 ( talk) 16:50, 26 June 2020 (UTC)
Although Fishman's book is an important resource, containing interviews with most of the surviving participants at that time, the thesis that the raid's main purpose was to spring Raymond Vivant is completely false. Vivant was arrested, by his own account, on 12 February. (Robert Lyman, The Jail Busters: the Secret Story of MI6, the French Resistance and Operation Jericho, London, Quercus, 2014, ISBN 978-1-78206-536-4, p.1. Note that Jack Fishman gave Robert Lyman all his files.) The operation had already been ordered on 10 February, by letter from Air Ministry to HQ Allied Expeditionary Air Force, relayed on 11 February from AEAF to Second Tactical Air Force. (Lyman, pp.128-129.) It is therefore impossible that the purpose of the raid was to spring Vivant. And Wild Bill Donovan and the OSS had nothing to do with it. Vivant himself, just before his arrest, was instrumental in passing the request from Dominique Ponchardier of the Sosies network to the BCRA in London and hence to MI6. It's daft of the article to refer to the BBC interview which sought to show that SOE knew nothing about it. Of course SOE knew nothing about it. It wasn't their baby. It was a BCRA request to SIS and from there to Air Ministry. This has been perfectly well known since Ponchardier himself and Gilbert Renault ('Colonel Remy') wrote about it in the 1940s and 1950s.
The object of the raid, at a very low point for the Resistance, with so many members captured, was simply to spring as many as possible, to demonstrate to the Germans and the French that the Resistance had powerful allies who had not forgotten them, and to uncover the Gestapo's spy network in the region by debriefing the escapers, who were likely to have a good idea as to who'd betrayed them. Ponchardier wrote that he later saw a German report admitting that German intelligence in the region was disrupted for two months after the raid. (Lyman, p.267.) Gilbert Renault wrote that:- 'Thanks to those escaped prisoners, who were immediately in touch once again with the Resistance movement, it was possible for them to identify at least sixty Gestapo agents. German counter-espionage in the whole region became comparatively useless, and thus many arrests were avoided that would otherwise doubtless have been made.' (Lyman, p.269.) What is true is that the escape of Vivant (he was actually recaptured very soon, but then escaped again from an insecure location and remained at large) added to the prestige of the Resistance, the RAF and the Allies, because he was so popular locally. (Lyman, pp.262-3.) It is also true that in terms of Allied strategy this was just the time to bolster the Resistance, because their help would soon be needed, for instance in sabotaging trains to delay enemy troop movements during the invasion. There's no mystery about this and God knows why people keep pretending there is a mystery when the Resistance figures who requested the raid have been on record about it since 1946.
The article's also wrong about 21 Squadron's role. They were simply the reserve. There is no truth in the story that they were meant to flatten the prison and kill everybody if the escape didn't come off, even though this absurd idea was given out by the Air Ministry in late 1944. Such an action would serve no purpose. Ian McRitchie of 464, who was shot down and captured that day, claimed to have heard the instruction, but only many decades later when it had become part of the accepted mythology of the raid, and no one else present at Pickard's briefing recalled any such thing. 21 Squadron were just detailed to break the walls if 487 and 464 failed. (Lyman, pp.181-182.) Wing Commander Dale of 21 Squadron remembered Pickard telling him, 'We'll use the signals "Red" and "Green", repeated three times, so that if you hear me say, "Red, red, red," you'll know you're being warned off and will go home without bombing. If I say, "Green, green, green," it's all clear for you to go in and bomb.' (Lyman, p.179.) 'Daddy' -- as in 'Daddy Daddy Daddy, red red red,' Pickard's actual transmission on the day -- was not a code word, it was simply Wing Commander Dale's nickname. Khamba Tendal ( talk) 19:43, 16 March 2021 (UTC)
The article isn't finished but I take your point. Regards Keith-264 ( talk) 21:44, 7 June 2024 (UTC)