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I created the second archive of the discussion as it was greatly needed. N i g h t F a l c o n 9 0 9 0 9' T a l k 16:34, 6 March 2007 (UTC)
It seems that the title 2000-2006 was no good, because the next section was entitled August 31 2006 - 2007 I believe. In any case, I changed it to 2000-August 2006 However, the first entry there is 2002, so we should change it to 2002-August 2006 perhaps? Why can't we just put everything from 2006 in the same section? that would be cleaner. This is minor, I know, but it is bugging me ;-) N i g h t F a l c o n 9 0 9 0 9' T a l k 16:26, 6 March 2007 (UTC)
1- ENTEC was set up for the transfer of the FULL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE and not "to operate Bushehr". If you think it was only meant to "operate Bushehr" then POST YOUR CITATION AS I HAVE POSTED MINE.
2- STOP INSISTING THAT IRAN WAS REQUIRED TO BE REPORTED TO THE UNSC WHEN I HAVE SPELLED OUT VERSE BY VERSE WHAT XII.C and ARTICLE 19 says, I have furhter cited 3 sources that say that "diversion of miltiary use" is required, the now I have a fourth THAT YOU DELETED WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION:
SOURCE: http://www.asil.org/insights/2004/10/insight041105.htm —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.10 ( talk) 20:57, 4 February 2008 (UTC)
Don't pull the "I am an expert" nonsense. So am I. Go start your own blog if you want to interject your own opinions instead of facts. Wikipedia is not your personal blog and this isn't the place to resolve "arguments" - it is a place to cite sources. I have provided several sources and cited them - valid, authoritative sources - and you simply delete them and insert a bare sentence without any citations. If you have contrary soures, cite them along with mine and let the readers decide. But in the meantime, here's my fifth source (found at
http://www.payvand.com/news/07/dec/1044.html) in support of the contention that Iran's breaches of safeguards did not amount to a violation of the NPT justifying UNSC referral, written by Dr M. Sahimi of USC who has also published Forced to Fuel at the Harvard International Review (
http://www.harvardir.org/articles/1294/)
You're free to disagree, but you can't use Wikipedia for your own opinions and you MUST acknowledge contrary facts.
There seems to be an effort by someone to misconstrue the legal application of Iran's safeguards agreement with respect to declared and undeclared nuclear activities.
Iran's basic safeguard agreement with the IAEA only applies to declared nuclear activities. The purpose of the Additional Protocol is to address the potential existence of undeclared nuclear activities. The IAEA has certified, twice, that the declared nuclear material and activities in Iran have been accounted for and none have been diverted to military use. Therefore, as Michael Spies of the Lawyer's Committee for Nuclear Policy has written, Iran is in fact in compliance with its basic safeguards agreement.
The question of the potential existence of undeclared nuclear activities is dealt with by the Additional Protocol. The IAEA only certifies the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in countries which have ratified the Additional Protocol. Iran has not ratified it, and is thus not legally bound by it (though Iran has permitted the expanded inspections anyway for a period of approximately 2 years.) This is not a violation of Iran's safeguard agreement, nor is it a basis for suspicion. According to the last IAEA report, this does indeed put Iran in the same category as 32 other nations. The following paragraphs, which are supported by the analysis by the Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear Policy, accurately reflect these facts and should not be removed:
Sorry, but this analysis is essentially incorrrect. Iran's safeguards agreement requires Iran to declare all its nuclear material. That's in Article I of the agreement. As a legal matter, the IAEA considers nuclear material to be diverted if it has been declared and then went missing or if it was never declared at all. After the revelations in 1991 about Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, the IAEA conclouded that the safeguards agreement by itself did not give the Agency the tools it needed to deal effectively with undeclared nuclear activities. The Additional Protocol strengthens the IAEA's capabilities to deal with undeclared activities, but it is not the basis for its responsibility to address undeclared activities or of Iran's responsibility to declare them. NPguy 03:03, 28 September 2007 (UTC)
I wish you would sign your posts. I never know if this is one person or several, or where your posts begin and end. Here are some specific errors in your argument:
Ummm... no. You are not qualified to judge what the Lawyer's Committee for Nuclear Policy says is "unfounded" because obviously you don't know what you're talking about. The safeguard agreement applicable to Iran (as with others) requires that there be no diversion of nuclear material to weapons-related activities. The IAEA's certification that all declared nuclear material has been accounted for, and none has been diverted for weapons-related activities, means that Iran was in compliance with its safeguards agreement, just as Michael Spies states. Without the Additional Protocol in force, the IAEA can only state this about declared material in Iran or in any other country. Of course you can speculate that "undeclared" material exists in Iran, but that's speculation. Nothing in Iran's safeguards agreement requires Iran to prove the absense of undeclared activities. In fact, tHat's why we now have the Additional Protocol, which implements more stringent inspections designed to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material/activities. And Iran implemented the Additional Protocol for 2 years, with still no evidence of undeclared material/activities.
Once a country violates its safeguards agreement, as Iran did for 18 years, the burden of proof is on that country to demonstrate that it has come back into compliance with its safeguards obligation to provide a complete declaration. One way to do that would be to implement the Additional Protocol. Another would be to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve open questions (see Article 3 of the safeguards agreement) and respond to the IAEA's requests for information (see Article 69).
The bulk of the provisions of the safeguards agreement apply to declared material and facilities, and most safeguards implementation is focused on declared material and facilities. But it is incorrect to claim that the safeguards agreement deals only with declared materials and unwarranted to conclude that simply by observing the provisions of its safeguards agreement that deal with declared materials Iran is complying fully with its safeguards obligations. NPguy 04:01, 5 October 2007 (UTC)
What you don't seem to want to understand is this: the point is that the IAEA can ONLY reach conclusions about declared material. WIthout the Additional Protocol in place (in Iran or in any other country) the IAEA does NOT make any determination about undeclared activities.
These are rhetorical questions not legal ones. Iran is absolutely under no obligation WHATSOEVER to do anything beyond rectify its safeguard breaches which it has done. It was under no obligation WHATSOEVER to allow additional inspections and implement the Additional Protocol, which it did. It has met its burden. If you have suspicions of your own, Wikipedia is not the place to air them. The UNSC's offer to "cooperate" with Iran's nuclear program effectively deprives Iran of the sovereign right to operate its own nuclear fuel cycle. Get your own blog and rant and rave there. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.10 ( talk) 18:27, 5 February 2008 (UTC)
Or, similarly, someone from within Iran. I'm tempted to revert this page back to the STONE AGE!
So let me understand this. Iran is building nukes because of "Lack of confidence in the international community"? That sentence right there just screams bias. Where are the wikicops when you need em? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.140.22.70 ( talk) 19:40, 19 October 2007 (UTC)
I have to say... was this written by the Shah himself? I mean wow. I came here looking for unbiased factual information, and was pretty shocked. I'm not going to touch the article, though.
This article even claims that the furor over their nuclear program is not that they could be developing nuclear weapons, but that they might get the technology to do so vis a vis a civillian program. Are you serious? So no one, right or wrong, believes that they might have a weapons program now? It's not even worth a footnote?
Good luck.
207.115.84.2 ( talk) 23:47, 6 June 2008 (UTC)davepl
Gawdat Bahgat, whose opinions are featured so prominently at the opening paragraphs of this article, is entitled to his view that Iran is seeking a nuclear "capability" but that is only an opinion and so should not be there unless countervailing facts are presented, namely, that any country with a basic nuclear infrastructure including Japan, S Korea, Argentina, and Brazil are similarly theoretically "capable" of making nukes at some indefinite point in the future if they so decide, thus making the charge against Iran a lot of nonsense. Furthermore, the fact should be presented that Iran has offered - repeatedly - to take steps well beyond its legal obligations to minimize the remote possibility that a civilian, IAEA monitored nuclear program could even theoretically be diverted to weapons use by, for example, offering to renounce plutonium reprocessing and by placing significant limits to its uranium program. The insistence on repeatedly editing out these facts and instead relying on vague and essentially meaningless statements about "capabilities" is an indicator of bias.
I am shocked at the heavy pro-Iran bias in this discussion. There is no hint that Iran persistently violated its safeguards agreement with the IAEA for nearly two decadees, as the IAEA reported to the Board of Governors in November 2003 [1], which the Board of Governors recognized as noncompliance in September 2005 [2] and asked that it be reported to the UN Security Council in February 2006 [3]. The nuclear activities that Iran deliberately concealed from the IAEA -- in violation of the safeguards agreement it undertook pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty -- are those most directly related to the development of a nuclear weapons capability, namely uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.
It is unfortunately true that IAEA Director General ElBaradei said that there was no "evidence" that Iran had a nuclear weapons program. Such a statement is both ouside the IAEA's responsibility (to detect and report diversions and noncompliance) and was based on a tortured reading of the word "evidence" as tantamount to "proof." There is ample circumstantial evidence that Iran was pursuing the development of a nuclear weapons capability -- perhaps not weapons themselves but the key capability to produce material that can be used in weapons. This evidence comes both from the fact that Iran pursued enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in violation of its NPT safeguards obligations and from the fact that it lacks a plausible economic justification for an enrichment program. In general, a country would need a large number of operating nuclear power plants for investment in an enrichment capability to make economic sense, where Iran lacks even a single operating nuclear power plant.
Indeed, Dr. ElBaradei has noted that Iran's actions have created a "confidence deficit," and that it is up to Iran to take action to restore confidence. Iran has been offered assistance in nuclear power and an assured supply of nuclear fuel, if it takes the but only if Iran suspendes its enrichment program. These offers would provide a much more rapid and reliable means for Iran to meet its future energy needs than its current course. The fact that Iran continues to reject these offers further erodes international confidence in its intent.
The UN Security Council is the competent international authority responsible for maintaining international peace and security. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council has the authority to demand action by a UN Member State if necessary to maintain international peace and security. Acting under that authority, the Council has demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment program [4]. Iran's refusal to do so is a violation of international law and compounds concerns over Iran's intentions. NPguy 02:15, 25 March 2007 (UTC)
This may seem like a legal technicality, but it goes to the core of the purpose of the NPT. The spread of nuclear weapons poses such a large threat to international security that the international community has decided that it cannot afford to wait for such proof. And Iran, as a party to the NPT, has accepted the threshold set in the NPT. NPguy 03:16, 25 July 2007 (UTC)
Sorry but the UNSC does not have the authority to demand that a nation give up rights that are recognized by a treaty such as Iran's inalienable right to nuclear technology as recognized by Article IV of the NonProliferation Treaty.
Regarding limits on the UNSC, ICJ Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice has been quoted to say:
"The Security Council, even when acting genuinely for the preservation or restoration of peace and security, has a scope of action limited by the State's sovereignty and the fundamental rights without which that sovereignty cannot be exercised."
And as ICJ Judge Lauterpacht has written:
"The relief which Article 103 of the Charter may give the Security Council in case of conflict between one of its decisions and an operative treaty obligations cannot - as a simple hierarchy of norms - extend to a conflict between a Security Counsel resolutions and jus cogens"
The International Law Commission recently addressed this very issue:
"The question has sometimes been raised whether also Council resolutions adopted ultra vires prevail by virtue of Article 103. Since obligations for Member States of the United Nations can only derive out of such resolutions that are taken within the limits of its powers, decisions ultra vires do not give rise to any obligations to begin with. Hence no conflict exists...
If United Nations Member States are unable to draw up valid agreements in dissonance with jus cogens, they must also be unable to vest an international organization with the power to go against peremptory norms. Indeed both doctrine and practice unequivocally confirm that conflicts between the United Nations Charter and norms of jus cogens result not in the Charter obligations’ pre-eminence, but their invalidity. In this sense, the United Nations Charter is an international agreement as any other treaty. This is particularly relevant in relation to resolutions of the Security Council, which has more than once been accused of going against peremptory norms."
SOURCE: UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, p.176-177
I just corrected several misrepresentations and misinterpretations introduced by recent edits. For example, one anonymous editor asserted without citation:
In fact, many countries have civil nuclear technology, but relatively few have enrichment or reprocessing, which are the key to a nuclear weapons capability. The EU-3 and the UN Security Council do not object to Iran having a civil nuclear program. They have demanded only that Iran suspend its previously clandstine enrichment program.
Enrichment is different. By this standard, Argentina and Brazil do have the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. They are among the relatively few that do.
Thus, it is a true statement that Irans' "capability" to potentially make a bomb is shared by several other nations, and so to say that Iran has developed such a capability has no meaning. Its like saying someone who has a butter knife has the "capability" to use it as a murder weapon.
I was simply making a technical distinction between nuclear energy writ large and the most sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. This is a critical distinction. NPguy 03:19, 22 August 2007 (UTC)
Your personal determination that only the actual possession of an active enrichment program provides the "capability" to make nukes is arbitrary and misleading.
Your are not applying this "critical distinction" clear when you selectively apply it to Iran and repeatedly censor edits that point out that, first, the "capability" to make a bomb is shared by many countries that have a nuclear program, and second, that Iran has offered to place limits on its nuclear program well beyond its legal obligations that would minimize such a theoretical possibility. In short, you're passing off one-sided speculation as fact.
Another edit claimed that:
which is also false, since the United States supports the EU-3 proposal to assist Iran's civil nuclear program if Iran suspends enrichment.
Iran's contracts for the delivery of nuclear fuel have been repeatedly violated, and anyway Iran is under no obligation whatsoever to give up enrichment and allow itself to become reliant on foreign fuel sources. Furthermore, as BASIC has written, the "offer" to assist Iran's nuclear program was vague and non-binding.
Another claimed:
Presubly the author meant that these undeclared activities had NO relationship to a weapons program, but the IAEA has made no such conclusion.
that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme.” http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf
Finally, there is the claim:
There is a huge difference from uranium prospecting and uranium enrichment, and no basis for concluding that Iran planned to engage in enrichment solely because it had a uranium mine. There were grounds for suspicion, since Iran's uranium resources are low grade and expensive to recover. However, if Iran had stated its intention to engage in enrichment, the IAEA would not have waited until August 2002 to raise questions.
Again, you're evading the point, which was that Iran's enrichment program was not a secret since the discovery and mining of uranium specifically intended for enrichment was made quite publicly known.
Actually, Iran not only informed the IAEA of plans for enrichment, but the IAEA was cooperating with Iran's enrichment program until 1983. And, when the Chinses pulled out of building Iran's uranium conversion facility under US pressure, the Iranians informed the IAEA that they would continue the program and Elbaradei himself came to Iran and saw the construction. Your insistence on removing cites to these facts is telling.
And the same IAEA said quite clearly that the past failures to report were not related to a weapons program, that there was no diversion of material to nuclear weapons. In fact, Iran is hardly unique in its "failure to report" - for example, both S. Korea and Egypt were caught conducting secret nuclear experiments which included plutonium extraction and uranium enrichment to almost weapons-grade concentrations for over 2 decades.
Again, you're making arguments as an advocate, which means that you're biased and not qualified to edit the wiki entry.
I've also made a number of edits above to limit the unfortunate interruptions to some of my earlier posts. I haven't deleted anything, but I have moved some mid-paragraph interruptions that messed up the formatting to after the paragraph. Please learn to edit more politely. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol14/141/141wood.pdf
Because this article was too long(102 kb) I moved Timeline which was 32kb to a new article: Timeline of Nuclear programme of Iran-- Sa.vakilian( t- c) 05:29, 29 March 2007 (UTC)
I substitute the template of government of Iran with Nuclear programme of Iran. I think it's more relevant and useful.-- Sa.vakilian( t- c) 06:34, 29 March 2007 (UTC)
An anon changed all spellings of "program" to British English in May 2006 [5]. Nobody seems to have asked why. It was previously in American English before this. WP:MOS says that you stick with one and don't switch it around much — it should have been reverted at the time, there is no reason to prefer British English here, and up until one unilateral and anonymous change it was in American English. I'm changing it back now. -- Fastfission 14:31, 30 March 2007 (UTC)
To explain my edit to the new section, many countries in the Middle East have expressed interest in nuclear power. Among those that have expressed such interest publicly are Algeria, Libya, Jordan, and the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (in Addition to Saudi Arabia, these are Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates). Unlike Iran, which is pursuing the full nuclear fuel cycle and claims this is for peaceful purposes, these other countries have only stated an interest in nuclear power.
The other inaccuracy was the statement that Israel was the only other country to have "such a program." In fact, no other country in the Middle East currently has a nuclear power program. Israel has a safeguarded (i.e. subject to IAEA inspection and verification) research reactor at Soreq and an unsafeguardeed heavy water reactor and reprocessing plant at Dimona, generally considered to be part of a nuclear weapons program. Several other countries in the region have nuclear research reactors, including Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Syria and Turkey. Finally, since the section doesn't express "viewpoints" of any country explicitly, I changed the heading to "responses."
NPguy
02:42, 15 April 2007 (UTC)
Since the nuclear programs of Saudi Arabia and Egypt exist independent of Iran's, it is wrong to suggest their nuclear program exists as a "response" to Iran's program.
Since I'm the one who posted the complaint about bias in this article, here are my suggestions for needed amendments:
With these additions and changes, which I'll work on as time permits, much of the evident bias and selectivity will be corrected. NPguy 03:16, 15 April 2007 (UTC)
An anonymous user deleted a POV paragraph from the article, which I think is useful to keep on the discussion page. This paragraph expresses a POV that is worth acknowledging and responding to.
My reaction is that the United States has dramatically changed its position and no longer opposes nuclear power in Iran. In fact, the United States, along with the UN Security Council, is prepared to support expanded nuclear cooperation and other trade with Iran if it gives up certain suspicious and previously hidden nuclear activities. The Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors oppose Iran's pursuit of nuclear activities unnecessary for a nuclear power program, in particular the enrichment plants at Natanz and the 40 megawatt heavy water "research" reactor under construction at Arak. The former could be used to produce high-enriched uranium but is not needed to produce reactor fuel since Russia has offered a lifetime fuel supply contract for Bushehr. The latter could be used to produce weapon-grade plutonium and is not needed for the stated nuclear research purposes.
It is understandable that the Iranian public would have a different perception, given the unfortunate history between Iran and the United States (the coup against Mossadegh, the hostage crisis, U.S. support for Iraq in its war against Iran). However, it is not just the United States but the responsible international bodies that have presented Iran with this choice. The choice of Iran's government to continue construction of these facilities will deprive Iran of an expanded nuclear power program and other economic and trade benefits. NPguy 02:23, 30 April 2007 (UTC)
Your reaction is wrong and quite obviously you are not qualified to edit anything that has to do with Iran's nuclear program. The US has NOT simply told iran to give up "suspicious and previously hidden nuclear activities" - Iran's enrichment program is neither suspicious nor was it previously "hidden" (in fact Iran invited iAEA inspectors to visit its uranium mines in 1992, Iran discussed openly the discovery of uranium on national radio, Iran tried to cooperate with the IAEA in establishing an enrichment facility in Isfahan in 1983 b ut was thwarted by the US, and Iranian contracts with other countries were thwarted by the US. Giving up enrichment is the equivalent of giving up a nuclear program since then Iran becomes reliant on the whims of foreigners in supplying Iran's nuclear needs. And as the BASIC report noted, the offers that the US and EU made to Iran were just an "empty box"
You are biased and should not be editing this entry in any way.
A series of Anonymous IP editors (all using the same ISP in England) and one named editor ( User:DreddMoto) have been changing this article to British spelling and moving the location to Nuclear programme of Iran. The article was originally written using American spelling; please stop changing the spelling to British usage. This issue has already been addressed on this talk page ( here), with the consensus appearing to be to keep the American spelling. Horologium t- c 19:23, 14 June 2007 (UTC)
Someone with the time should try and work in stuff such as contained in these comments by Najmedin Meshkati [6] who takes the view that the way things are headed now is dangerous since Iran is relying on outdated and potentially dangerous technology which could lead to another Chernobyl disaster. Nil Einne 13:39, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
The Chernobyl reactor is fundamentally a different design. However, it should be noed that the US has pressured the IAEA to drop cooperative technical assistance programs with Iran in the area of civilian reactor safety operations.
NPguy left a message at Talk:Peremptory norm, asking for comments about the legal discussions on this page. First of all, can I ask everyone here to (1) please sign all your comments with four tildes and (2) stop adding comments in the middle of discussion threads. The conversation above is virtually impossible to follow — it's not clear who said what, and who's replying to which comment. (For example, Nil Einne's admonition that "This is not the place for soapboxing" is now six paragraphs away from the comment to which it referred.)
Having said that, I did enjoy reading the conversation, and particularly the following unsigned comment:
Whoever wrote that comment is "not qualified in the field of international law". He or she suggests that the "sovereign right to use atomic energy" is jus cogens. This is absolute nonsense, and you won't find a single reliable source who supports this position.
If you want to discuss the legality of Iran's nuclear programme or the UNSC resolution, please stick to arguments that have been made by reliable sources. Sideshow Bob Roberts 10:49, 22 August 2007 (UTC)
- The Security Council, even when acting genuinely for the preservation or restoration of peace and security, has a scope of action limited by the State's sovereignty and the fundamental rights without which that sovereignty cannot be exercised.
Several comments are in order here:
Please sign your comments. NPguy 15:51, 25 August 2007 (UTC)
Your intentional confusion of a safeguards breach with an NPT violation is false. An NPT violation occurs when there has been diversion for non-peaceful uses. Accordng to the IAEA, there has been no such diversion in Iran. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.84.142.221 ( talk) 02:15, 19 January 2008 (UTC)
I am quite well familiar with the "intricacies" so let me enlighten you:
Fortunately, the IAEA Statute is available online at
http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html. A full reading Article XII.C makes things a bit clearer about what "non-compliance" refers to by setting out three requirements for compliance:
1- The first requirement is "accounting referred to in sub paragraph A-6 of this article"
Paragraph A-6 of Article XII, in turn, states that inspectors are to be sent to account for fissionable materials and ensure none have been diverted for a "military purpose".
The IAEA did send these inspectors to Iran - many many times. El-Baradei confirmed in Paragraph 52 of his November 2003 report that "to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme." And again, after extensive inspections, El-Baradei wrote Paragraph 112 of his November 2004 report that "all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities."
In short, inspections happened as required, and no diversion of fissile material to a "military purpose" was found. Thus, Iran did not violate this section of the article - a point that several others including Michael Spies of the Lawyers Committee for Nuclear Policy has made too.
2- The second requirement under Article XII.C of the Statute is "determining whether there is compliance with the undertaking referred to in sub paragraph F-4 of article XI"
A quich check of Article XI shows that it applies to "Agency Projects" meaning the projects in which the the IAEA has provided technical assistance to a requesting country. And, subparagraph F-4 specifically requires that the assistance provided by the IAEA shall not be used for military purposes and shall be subject to safeguards.
Last I checked, the IAEA did not provide any such assistance to Iran which has been used for military purposes - in fact the US killed the IAEA's technical assistance to Iran's enrichment program in 1983, as well as all of Iran's other contracts with other nations to provide the necessary enrichment technology that Iran was quite legally entitled to obtain. Thus, I don't see how this provision applies, let alone how Iran could have violated it.
3- The third requirement is compliance "with the measures referred to in sub-paragraph A-2 of this article"
Subparagraph A-2 of Article XII requires observance of "health and safety" standards. There has been no allegation that Iran's centrifuge program has violated a health and safety law. Again, there hasn't even been an allegation of any violation of this section either.
In short, past breaches of safeguards agreements do not constitute a violation of the statute unless there's been a diversion for militay purposes - which the IAEA has repeatedly said is not to case in Iran.
In fact the IAEA has found discrepancies the accounting of nuclear material in as many as 15 countries at a time (including S. Korea, Taiwan, and Egypt) - a few of which were later caught conducting secret and potentially weapons-related nuclear experiments - and yet they weren't referred to the UNSC for supposedly violating Article III of the NPT.
OK, all clear now? [end of unsigned posting]
You have quoted selectively and incompletely and omitted the key point. The full quotation is "to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose referred to in sub- paragraph F-4 of article Xl, with the health and safety measures referred to in sub- paragraph A-2 of this article, "and with all other conditions of the project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States concerned."
Thus, the IAEA is to report any non-compliance with safeguards agreements.
Granted, there is a threshold test for non-compliance. Missing a deadline on a required report falls below the threshold. Providing an incomplete initial declaration and refusing a requested special inspection to resolve the question (as North Korea did) falls above it. The mere fact that other countries have had safeguards failures that fall below the threshold is not particularly meaningful to whether Iran's safeguards failures crossed the threshold to non-compliance.
You cite 15 countries, but I am only aware of seven. Five (Iraq, Romania, North Korea, Libya and Iran)) have been found in non-compliance. By the way, I don't believe any was cited for diversion (though the IAEA's inability to verify non-diversion - a different matter - was part of some non-compliance decisions), and only two (Iraq and Libya) involved ""smoking gun" proof of military purposes.
The only other recent cases (since 1990) were Egypt and South Korea. These were safeguards failures that were significant enough to report to the Board of Governors but were not considered by the Board to constitute non-compliance. NPguy ( talk) 03:31, 23 January 2008 (UTC)
( talk) 04:09, 26 January 2008 (UTC)
THIS IS THE BOTTOM LINE.
I have consistently cited Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute as the basis for reporting Iran's non-compliance to the UN Security Council. I have never referred to Article 19 of Iran's safeguards agreement for that purpose. Aside from that, I see nothing in your latest rant that I haven't already thoroughly debunked. I think anyone reading our posts will have little difficulty determining which one of knows what he or she is talking about. NPguy ( talk) 03:48, 2 February 2008 (UTC)
And I pointed out to you that IRan's Safeguards also specifically requires a diversion of non-peaceful uses. We can go around in circles all you want.
I see also that you've deleted the citation to the ASIL article that clearly stated that evidence of nuclear weapons is required for a violation of Article III of the NPT.
Face it, you've lost, your credibility is shot because you're obviously pushing an agenda, and all you can do is try to delete these reference. But I'll just keep putting them back. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.10 ( talk) 20:03, 4 February 2008 (UTC)
Iran's safeguards agreement defines legal obligations between Iran and the IAEA. But it's not the only legal instrument that applies. The IAEA Statute defines independent legal obligations on the IAEA. Those obligations include reporting noncompliance to the Security Council. The Board of Governors met that obligation by reporting Iran's non-compliance.
I deleted the reference because it was irrelevant to the point you were making. That reference was discussing to whether it was correct to cite Iran under a different provision of the IAEA Statute, namely Article III.B.4. I don't mind addressing that point somewhere in the article, but it is irrelevant to the question of whether Article XII.C applies. NPguy ( talk) 02:36, 5 February 2008 (UTC)
IRON PERUVIA:... is it a coincidence or a predestined factor in all things - that europe's economy is in serious downturn discordant of semantic nuclear iran; ; the fortune that favours my bravery finds that scandavia in opprtunity knocks completion has turner price grand prix jurisdiction; ; revolution suggests that iranian-nuclear-weapons exist in saracen-detainee-paradox, but where iran outweighs europe at this point in semantic-power via superpower, there becomes that this as truist political position has more stone-depth to it than it did in such a mystoconfident first principle; ; iran will never be allowed this saracen-decadance by america because of illijitamate procedure in all counts supremacies-beholder; ; because of this it seems at this disjuncture that korea has semantic-nuclear-power over all supremacies mystoinclusive of staged-economy; ; theoretically because of this, korea is in parisian league with iran & yet the only thing binding them is this naval-opportunity; ; theoretically because of that - they should market such a co-operation-coincidence of means in some large or small way; ; the failure of either to realise this realises that they have been in league for at least 15 years on nuclear-semantic levels regards mysto-deconstuction of superpower in all their ways; ; this merchant navy in scandanavian recline prooves the revolving-opportunity-door in semantic-control on all superlevels; ; in that case should it not realise this league of semi-iranian-korean-nuclear-family, (Sheik Kaliff) and accsess the door controls more opportunistically via regards the UN; ; it is the first nuclear principle of xerox-machine-midas-paraperpetuality that holds iran as part of the mechanism of the revolving door; ; it is the second nuclear-familiar principle of foresightedness (automatic door repsonse) that holds korea into this welcoming; ; that scandanavia sees the door without these principles in glasshouse-unfascinated-circumstance realises a trapezium of a xerox-automatic-kindred that wishes to control the scandanavian embassy via this entire iron peruvia... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.156.27.123 ( talk) 13:49, 6 October 2008 (UTC)
I've made articles about the nuclear program of a number of nations, and as I'm running out of countries, I wonder if there's something I could do for Iran. It's difficult though, because a Nuclear power in Iran article would clearly conflict with this article, and I see that people have already done so much work on this subject.
Anyway, there is some work that I would like to see done. Firstly, I think that an article on separate facilities (the big ones) could be appropriate. I've also made a map by the same convention I've done for other nations. - Theanphibian ( talk • contribs) 15:02, 2 September 2007 (UTC)
Image:Shah-nukeIran.jpg is being used on this article. I notice the image page specifies that the image is being used under fair use but there is no explanation or rationale as to why its use in this Wikipedia article constitutes fair use. In addition to the boilerplate fair use template, you must also write out on the image description page a specific explanation or rationale for why using this image in each article is consistent with fair use.
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BetacommandBot 05:30, 13 September 2007 (UTC)
This subject was described very little in this article, although it should be. Just two random references: [8] [9] Biophys 04:13, 18 September 2007 (UTC)
The article is poorly written, in particular preposition usage is as if by a non-native writer. Vocabulary and usage are also often non-native, imprecise or inappropriate. Finally, paragraph organization lacks unity, especially the Overview paragraphs. Made some changes, but much more needs to be done. Points 3 and 4 in Overview are written in an incoherent manner that someone with substantive knowledge would need to fix. ( Haberstr 16:04, 20 September 2007 (UTC))
Now if that doesn't smack of flip-flopping. The USA and Israel today voted at the U.N. against a resolution to turn the Middle East into a Nuclear Weapon free zone. Arabs push through U.N. watchdog vote against Israel By Mark Heinrich - Thursday, September 20th, 2007 - 3:45 PM ET __ CaribDigita 03:27, 21 September 2007 (UTC)
I was planning to post a discussion outlining how the bias on this page might be redressed. Instead I find a busy anonymous poster has gone out of his or her way to exacerbate the bias. The point of this article ought to be to provide basic facts, yet it is filled with selective and unrepresentative citations by analysts who seem to be explaining away Iran's safeguards violations and its refusals to comply with the legally binding demands of the UN Security Council. Most independent analyses of Iran's nuclear program find serious cause for concern that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.
The above paragraph complaining is itself very biased. Most poeple who open NPOV are either 100% pro iran or 100% pro israel the only regional power who fears irans nuclear technology be they civilian or not. For a neutral article, I recommend posting the technical realities from IAEA and the history of the program dating to the US friendly Shah. All neutral observers should keep this in mind. To me it seems the whole thing is hyped, becuase if iran started in the 60s and 70s, it is far behind schedule. It is at least 30+ years behind the original schedule paid for by Shah. As of this posting Iran is without a single operational power generating reactor. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.44.253.212 ( talk) 00:16, 28 November 2007 (UTC)
Unfortunately, the people who are bent on making excuses for Iran have far more time on their hands than I do in trying to fix this article.
If I were to try to fix this article, I would begin by scrubbing to rely on primary sources and less on media or analysts' reporting of those facts. My next step would be to recount the history of Iran's two deals with the EU3 (the Teheran agreement of October 2003 and the Paris agreement of November 2004. In both cases Iran pledged to suspend its enrichment program, but it later failed to carry out its commitments and eventually withdrew from both agreements. Then I would consolidate and scrub the statements of Iran's and other countries' positions to focus on well-sourced official statements that are (unlike much of what's currently there) relevant to the nuclear issue. This would have the advantage of makingthe article shorter and more coherent as well as more balanced
Any chance we can get agreement to revamp this article along these lines? NPguy 03:04, 22 September 2007 (UTC)
"One seeming flaw is that it would only address questions that are already on the table. Should additional questions arise, the agreement would not help resolve those." This seems like a virtual tautology to me, the Agreement is not designed to resolve questions that do not exist, it is designed to address all the questions the IAEA have asked. If they have further questions, then the IAEA has the right to address those too, in the normal manner. By criticising the agreement for not addressing issues not raised by the IAEA, it sounds like you're criticising a man of 6ft 4 for not be being 6ft 5.
Furthermore, according to the IAEA, the new agreement will allow it to "further promote the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Iran and its ability to conclude the exclusive peaceful nature of the Iran's nuclear activities."
Regarding this 'key question' -who has posed this and where? The Security Council has made a political demand, for Iran to cease doing something it has a legal right to do but, so far as UNSCR 1696 is concerned, that is entirely pursuant to Iran cooperating with the IAEA to the end of proving that Iran's programme is entirely peaceful. Having read the text ( http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/22/PDF/N0645022.pdf?OpenElement ), I can see nothing referring to or implying any 'underlying problem'. Dwtray2007 07:27, 23 September 2007 (UTC)
It's frustrating that people don't seem to get the basic argument. Iran cheated on its NPT safeguards obligations for nearly two decades, secretly pursuing an enrichment program that would give it the capability to produce nuclear weapons. What is the right response? Is it simply to allow Iran to continue to pursue that progam in the open, under IAEA safeguards? That implies that the only problem was the secrecy, rather than the significance of the actions being carried out in secret and the suspected reason for that secrecy. Or is the proper response to require Iran to stop what it was doing in secret - developing a nuclear weapons capability? The NPT doesn't actually say. It leaves it to the UN Security Council to address safegaurds violations. The Council has concluded that simply accepting safeguards is not enough - Iran must suspend its enrichment program. Yet Iran refuses to do so.
I find this very worrisome. Iran has lost international confidence and refises to take the one key step necessary to rebuild confidence. Given these facts, I have a hard time understanding why so many are supporting Iran's position. The best I can come up with is that they distrust the U.S. government. U.S. actions in Iraq have certainly earned distrust. But just because the United States says something doesn't mean that it's wrong, and the United States is far from alone in viewing Iran's nuclear program with alarm. NPguy 01:06, 24 September 2007 (UTC)
Please do not forget that we are trying to pose an objective view, try to leave opinions on if you find this worrysome or not on the side. Please abstain from posting information that is used to follow a certain tendency or only support particular points of view. Just keep this in mind for the betterment of the articles!! Superdudemx 04:00, 12 October 2007 (UTC)
The IAEA knows the percentage of Iranian enrichment, which I don't believe even exceeds 5%, and the exact number of centrifuges, which doesn't even surpass 2000 I believe. Even without the safeguards agreement, you cannot possibly convince anyone that Iran's program is more covert than say, the United States. Do you know, with reasonable accuracy, how many gas centrifuges the USA has? I highly doubt it. All of it is classified (as it would be for Britain, France, etc), and if the IAEA wanted to enter an American facility that has been weaponized, they'd have to go through hell. I'm not trying to suggest Iran deserves a nuclear weapon simply because America has one, but let's keep things in perspective. Iran's program is clearly more transparant than any of the programs used by any of the nuclear powers. Iran's been fairly obedient with the IAEA, even if they haven't ratified the safeguards. I don't think bringing up the IAEA works in your favor, considering the IAEA is staunchly against the hawkish American stance, and they have been fairly consistant in that position. Further, the IAEA has still concluded that there is no legitimate way for anyone to claim Iran is developing nuclear weapons, beyond speculation, at this time. The ironic thing about the Iranian nuclear program is that their program is even less developed then they themselves are claiming it is. Iran is essentially inviting conflict by mouthing off. They're 5+ years away at best, and the IAEA would easily be able to alert the UN if a weaponized Iran is imminent (and the program would be able to be attacked immediately). Considering the IAEA is able to determine when or when not Iran has reached industrial capacity, when or when not Iran has reached weapons-grade level, when or when not Iran has surpassed what would be deemed appropriate for a civilian reactor, I would say that is a fairly transparant program. - MadarB 20:40, 25 October 2007 (UTC)
The IAEA also concluded, in what I believe is still there most recent circular (aug 27) that they have "been able to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear materials at the enrichment facilities in Iran and [have] therefore concluded that it remains in peaceful use."
They may not yet be able to say with certainty that Iran's entire nuclear program is peaceful but that is a difficult determination to make (elements of proving a negative in fact). What is clear is that they've yet to see serious evidence of of a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA also states that the agreement they now have with Iran will "further promote the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Iran and its ability to conclude the exclusive peaceful nature of the Iran's nuclear activities."
It's true that we shouldn't give Iran special credit simply for meeting their treaty obligations, although, in the international arena, that is something of a rarity. Dwtray2007 08:42, 26 October 2007 (UTC)
Another reason we shouldn't give Iran credit merely for meeting its treaty obligations is that it hasn't. Iran was found to have violated those obligations for nearly twenty years, systematically concealing its enrichment program. It is also an overstatement to say that the IAEA has yet to see serious evidence of a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA has yet to label what it has reported as such, but it is not a great leap to see several elements of Iran's reported history as disturbing indications of possible weapons intent, including:
None of these is conclusive, and plausible explanations have been offered for a few, but taken together they provide serious grounds for suspicion. NPguy 02:22, 27 October 2007 (UTC)
It is not an 'overstatement' to say the IAEA has seen no evidence of Iranian nuclear weaponization: it is to relate almost verbatim what the IAEA's head has himself said, a matter of days ago. You are entitled to your opinion but the purpose of this article is to relate the words and judgements of authoritative sources, not the opinions of its contributors. Therefore, as long as the IAEA says it has seen "no evidence" of Iranian nuclear weaponization, that is what this article should report. If other authoritative sources question the IAEA's judgement then we should also report that but it is not our place to second-guess those sources. Leaps, whether great or small, are not in our remit. Dwtray2007 12:46, 30 October 2007 (UTC)
None of these taken together is conclusive, but taken together they offer serious grounds for suspicion. -- 69.210.15.210 06:05, 27 October 2007 (UTC)
Let's not forget that the United States was responsible for initiating the Iranian nuclear program in the first place while Iran was still led by an American-sponsored monarch. Dick Cheney, ironically, was one of the biggest pushers for a nuclearized Iran. Iran's program may have been "active" for 18 years, but to pretend as though it was reaching industrial scale level, or that it was an immediate threat to world security, is a joke. If Iran were heavily invested into their nuclear program during the 80s and 90s, then they would have reached weapon-capacity by now, which they haven't. It was clearly on the back burner, regardless of its illicitness. Even so, that would be completely irrelevent to the current state of this conflict. This is a current event, isn't it? As of right now, the IAEA seems fairly content with Iran's compliance. Bringing up the events of the 80s and 90s seems to be a new trend in American foreign policy (see: the invasion of Iraq based on unsubstatiated chemical weapons claims from the 1980s). Speculation should be left out of this article. This is an encyclopedia. Perhaps you could say that Westerners fear Iran may be trying to develop a nuclear weapons program, but it must also be made clear that the IAEA is staunchly against the hawkish stance of the USA and that the IAEA is pleased by Iran's compliance in recent months. Wikipedia shouldn't be used as a war propaganda tool. - MadarB 22:59, 27 October 2007 (UTC)
I'm not sure how it is relevant that the United States supported Iran's nuclear program in the 1970s, so let me respond to the other part of this comment. The hard part in developing an enrichment capability is the research and development to learn the tricks of making the technology work. After that, scaling up to industrial production is a relatively simple matter. So the fact that Iran was working on it for 18 years at a small scale does not mean Iran was not trying, nor does it mean Iran was not making important progress. The reason western countries are alarmed is that Iran is now proceeding unimpeded by efforts to keep the program secrect and is getting closer to overcoming the main technical obstacles to producing bomb-grade uranium. It is important to note that a relatively small scale plant (about 5,000 SWU) is capable of producing a bomb's worth of uranium in a year, where a much larger plant is needed (over 100,000 SWU) to enrich uranium to fuel a power plant. NPguy 18:41, 31 October 2007 (UTC)
Further, Israel, Pakistan(!), and India are all nuclear powers that are not on the NPT. Iran hasn't unprovokingly went to war in centuries. Israel has gone to war frequently, many times aggressively. Pakistan and India are the only two nuclear powers to ever declare war on each other (after a nuclear standoff just one year prior). Pakistan, of course, is a sanctuary for terrorism, and an ally to the Taliban. 68.43.58.4223:29, 27 October 2007
In editing the overview section I deleted the claim that Iran had offered to delay its uranium enrichment program for several years. The citation referred to IAEA Director General ElBaradei's hope that Iran would make such an offer, but there is no indication that Iran ever did make such an offer. Had Iran done so it would have have been big news and provided the basis for broader negotiations. NPguy 02:09, 4 November 2007 (UTC)
Note this paragraph about how Iran proposed that: "Iran will continue negotiating with the EU-3 regarding enrichment issues for two years, and after two years, if the negotiations fail, will resume enrichment activities....Certainly, the last item was a novelty and the EU-3 diplomats have some explaining to do as to why they were not interested...there is no evidence that any respected member of the Western media made any attempt to get their hands on Iran's proposal." —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.85.7.4 ( talk) 07:24, 13 July 2008 (UTC)
Dwtray2007 and I have gone back and forth about a few words about whether Iran has the right to enrich uranium. In general, enrichment is not by itself a violation of the NPT. However, any peaceful activity must be undertaken in conformity with the other articles ofthe NPT, particularly Articles I, II and III. Under Article II, Iran may not undertake enrichment for weapons. Many observers (including me) believe the purpose of Iran's enrichment program is to develop a nuclear weapons capability. The arguments to support this view are circumstantial, and it is practically impossible to produce definitive evidence of Iran's intent.
However, Iran clearly violated Article III of the NPT by keeping that program secret from the IAEA. In response, the UN Security Council took a decision that limits Iran's right to enrich uranium. Iran does not have the "right" to enrich uranium in violation of a binding decision of the Security Council.
This is the main reason I have been deleting shorthand references to Iran's "right" to enrich uranium. The issue is too complicated to address in that shorthand. NPguy ( talk) 03:16, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
Resolution 1696 does not state that Iran has breached the NPT. Some people, including you, may believe that Iran is developing nuclear weapons but the IAEA has found no "concrete evidence" that this is so.
While the SC has required Iran to cease uranium enrichment, there is debate about whether it is entitled to do so as the right to enrich can be seen as a sovereign right and, therefore, part of jus cogens. The SC, in fact the Charter itself, even bearing in mind article 103, cannot override jus cogens. So the argument goes, the right to enrich is a sovereign right, as demonstrated by the fact that the US and USSR began enriching before the NPT and UN came into existence. As a result of this, a respectable argument can be made that, by asking Iran to cease enrichment, the SC has acted ultra vires. Therefore, while the SC can insist on inspections, Iranian disclosure or even limited military strikes against known weapons, it cannot call on Iran to cease its "inalienable" right to enrichment in defense of international peace and security and certainly not in order to uphold the NPT (since the demand itself violates Article IV).
Anyway, I'm willing for my parenthetical remark in the article to be removed but I think there should be a section discussing the legal conflict (as perceived by some) between the NPT and the SC. Dwtray2007 ( talk) 08:54, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
First of all, the way you have changed the text is fine. But . . .
I am unaware of any serious doubt that Iran violated its obligations under Article III of the NPT. That Article requires Iran to "accept safeguards" on "all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within [its territory], under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere." The IAEA reported that Iran undertook a deliberate pattern of undeclared nuclear activities using undeclared nuclear materials at undeclared nuclear facilities over a period of 18 years, thus failing to "accept" safeguards on "all" peaceful nuclear activities.
And most observers believe Iran is pursuing at least a latent nuclear weapons capability - the enrichment program really makes no sense otherwise. But although I believe Iran is pursuing a weapons program, I don't believe the evidence of a violation of Article II is compelling. In fact, I think the issue is a distraction. The NPT was set up so that safeguards violations would trigger international action. The Council's actions seem perfectly in line with that intent. You don't have to prove the purpose of the safeguards violation; that is much too high a standard.
As far as I can tell, there is nothing to the claim that "jus cogens" has anything to do with Iran's proclaimed right to enrichment. No one has produced a citation of any expert making this legal claim, and my attempt to get a response from the international legal community produced a rather dismissive reply. The claim that enrichment is a "sovereign right" seems to be based not on "jus cogens" but on the more prosaic principle that sovereign entities have rights to act autonomously unless they agree voluntarily to limit those through agreements with other sovereign entities. "Jus cogens" seems to serve the opposite purpose - to define inherent limits to the autonomy of states even if they do not explicitly agree to those limits. Human rights is the usual example.
But Iran ratified the NPT and the UN Charter, so it accepted limits on its sovereign rights. Let's work with rights and obligations as stated in the foundational legal documents (the NPT, the IAEA Statute and the UN Charter). If there's a case that the UN Security Council exceeded its authority in demanding that Iran suspend enrichment, let's discuss it in terms of those documents. NPguy ( talk) 04:09, 27 November 2007 (UTC)
Recent intelligence reports in the United States now suggest that Iran has in fact been correct and that their nuclear weapons program was terminated in 2003 (4 years ago). Shouldn't this be included? [10] [11], just a news link... it is essentially a current event. The American intelligence community is now in agreement with Russia and China that Iran poses no immediate nuclear weapons threat and that even if Iran were to reinitiate research on nuclear weapons and the development of bombs, they wouldn't even possess enough enriched uranium for a single weapon until 2010-2015. - 68.43.58.42 20:15, 4 December 2007 (UTC)
I added a reference yesterday, in the lead paragraph. NPTGuy has also worked on it. Dwtray2007 ( talk) 23:48, 4 December 2007 (UTC)
And I put it back. There remains a question over whether Iran's claims of the peaceful purpose of its nuclear program are correct. In particular, Iran's enrichment program and heavy water reactor have been called into question. The NIE is relevant to that question. NPguy ( talk) 17:47, 22 December 2007 (UTC)
Irans heavy water reactor at Arak is subject to IAEA safeguards. If you want to speculate about "peaceful" do it elsewhere. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.84.142.221 ( talk) 02:32, 19 January 2008 (UTC)
If anyone thinks the article is POV state your concerns here. Drive by tagging is not appropriate. The last time NPOV was mentioned was two months ago and has long ago been addressed. 199.125.109.108 ( talk) 00:54, 23 December 2007 (UTC)
As it currently stands, this article is extremely long -- and it will undoubtedly continue to grow even longer as more time passes. Therefore I would like to split of the section "Nuclear facilities in Iran" as a separate article under the same heading. If there are no serious objections, I will do this in the coming week. Cgingold ( talk) 04:04, 6 January 2008 (UTC)
Regarding the latest, it is hardly "original research" to observe in reading the previous paragraph that there is a logical gap between public statement about mining and conversion and the underlying claim that Iran's enrichment program was well-known. Mining and conversion are not the same as enrichment.
More generally, better to discuss here than in the titles of our edits.
And why do you insist on remaining anonymous? NPguy ( talk) 04:27, 23 January 2008 (UTC)
I tagged the statement to refer others to the talk page. The statement in question:
However, Iran's claims ignore the fact that all the cited public statements referred to activities other than enrichment (mining and conversion), and the fact that Iran failed to meet its obligations to report its enrichment activities to the IAEA as required by its safeguards agreement.
is not supported by the citation you have provided. Wikipedia's no original research policy states Wikipedia does not publish "unpublished facts, arguments, speculation, and ideas; and any unpublished analysis or synthesis of published material that serves to advance a position" and further recommends " Citing sources and avoiding original research are inextricably linked: to demonstrate that you are not presenting original research, you must cite reliable sources that provide information directly related to the topic of the article, and that directly support the information as it is presented."
The statement you have provided cannot be found in the citation you have provided and I am interested in capturing the information contained within the document. I welcome discussion on why you think the citation covers what you are saying (though I am skeptical since it seems indirect and hard to follow). I would rather encourage you to find a quote which you find represenative (and would also note that if the issue is later resolved in the document, Wikipedia should also note this).. -- 68.72.38.42 ( talk) 04:45, 23 January 2008 (UTC)
I think we could work with partially quoting some of these:
"It is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored."
"Iran failed to report "the import of natural uranium metal in 1994 and its subsequent transfer for use in laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer of resulting waste."
"As corrective actions, Iran has undertaken to submit ICRs relevant to all of these activities, to provide design information with respect to the facilities where those activities took place, to present all nuclear material for Agency verification during its forthcoming inspections and to implement a policy of co-operation and full transparency."
-- 68.72.38.42 ( talk) 04:07, 24 January 2008 (UTC)
Those are good quotes, but they don't convey the whole picture. As the report as a whole makes clear, Iran made none of the required declarations for its enrichment activities, neither the laser nor the centrifuge enrichment activities. Thus my short summary is more complete than these extended quotes.
The problem with this particular point is that Iran is making an argument that is essentially without merit. Therefore simply citing the argument without a rebuttal is misleading. As for the suggestion of removing everything in the preceding point that does not support the claim Iran is making, that would leave only the first sentence. I'm not sure the claim in this sentence is correct because it refers to a document that is not available online.
Whether you agree with that assessment or not, the larger problem is with the whole section titled "Iran." It is entirely out of place and seems to exist primarily to record Iranian arguments on its own behalf. Such arguments belong in the section "Iranian viewpoint." Where this section presents facts and actions, those probably should be embedded in the chronological history above. NPguy ( talk) 02:59, 25 January 2008 (UTC)
NPguy ( talk) 04:15, 26 January 2008 (UTC)50. The recent disclosures by Iran about its nuclear programme clearly show that, in the past, Iran had concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities, with resultant breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement. Iran’s policy of concealment continued until last month, with co-operation being limited and reactive, and information being slow in coming, changing and contradictory. While most of the breaches identified to date have involved limited quantities of nuclear material, they have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing. And although the materials would require further processing before being suitable for weapons purposes, the number of failures by Iran to report in a timely manner the material, facilities and activities in question as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement has given rise to serious concerns.
51. Following the Board’s adoption of resolution GOV/2003/69, the Government of Iran informed the Director General that it had now adopted a policy of full disclosure and had decided to provide the Agency with a full picture of all of its nuclear activities. Since that time, Iran has shown active co-operation and openness. This is evidenced, in particular, by Iran’s granting to the Agency unrestricted access to all locations the Agency requested to visit; by the provision of information and clarifications in relation to the origin of imported equipment and components; and by making individuals available for interviews. This is a welcome development.
Rather than cite the document itself, we could state decisions which have taken place in an objective matter. The text would provide positives and negatives from a time to the present. I think one version of this could look like:
In 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors concluded, in a rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions, that Iran's past safeguards "breaches" and "failures" constituted "non-compliance" with its Safeguards Agreement. In 2008, the IAEA worked to resolve many of these outstanding issues addressed in an August 2007 workplan.
The wording might need a little work and it would obviously have all the references in the actual article. If there was a particular point left out that you felt was important, we could add it in as long as it is attributed and cited (perhaps the IAEA or Board of Governors list particularly important 'breaches' or 'failures' which should be included). A brief Iranian response might also be necessary, if there is any.. -- 68.72.38.42 ( talk) 15:25, 26 January 2008 (UTC)
46. Iran has now acknowledged that it has been developing, for 18 years, a uranium centrifuge enrichment programme, and, for 12 years, a laser enrichment programme. In that context, Iran has admitted that it produced small amounts of LEU using both centrifuge and laser enrichment processes, and that it had failed to report a large number of conversion, fabrication and irradiation activities involving nuclear material, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium.
The problem was where it was using the source to support a statement 'disproving' the previous Iranian claims on national radio, etc. I have since removed this portion. I think it is fine to use the document cited to show that Iran hid aspects of its nuclear program for 18 years, and think we should add in information about the most recent four years as well. -- 68.72.38.42 ( talk) 06:02, 27 January 2008 (UTC)
(No one said that Iran had fully declared its enrichment program -- only that its program was not a secret, so don't mischaracterize the assertions by creating strawmen)
I removed most of the claims because they do not refer to enrichment but to mining or conversion. I left one which refers to enrichment (though it was not a declaration), but marked it dubious because I cannot find the cited source online. The claim is that France agreed to help Iran with Iran's enrichment program. If this is a reference to Iran's investment in Eurodif, that would not support the claim.
Could the person who posted this please provide a relevant quote from that source that supports the claim? NPguy ( talk) 02:12, 28 January 2008 (UTC)
This is frustrating because you claim to know certain facts but fail to produce them. I have asked for quotes because your citations are not readily available and because your summaries of facts have often been misleading. For example, if the United States offered assistance with enrichment it would have been before 1979, which is irrelevant in discussing a program reconstituted in 1986. Your citation regarding Argentina is unsourced. All the other facts refer to the fuel cycle but not specifically to enrichment. They are not equivalent.
By the way, it is public record that Iran failed to declare its enrichment program to the IAEA. The IAEA reports are on its web site. NPguy ( talk) 23:33, 3 February 2008 (UTC)
Your summary confirms my suspicion that the arrangement with Argentina was not about enrichment. You refer to milling and fuel fabrication. These are not enrichment. Production of UF6 is not enrichment either. As for actual enrichment, the IAEA has reported publicly that Iran did not make any declarations of enrichment activities until confronted in 2002 with public statements by a third party.
You may be trying to make the point that the activities Iran was pursuing implied that it was also pursuing enrichment. If that is your point, I actually agree with you. But unlike you I interpret it as cause for concern - why was Iran pursuing the fuel cycle if not for enrichment? If it was for enrichment, why did Iran not declare any enrichment activities to the IAEA? Iran's uranium reserves are too small and to support an independent nuclear power program, but they are large enough to support a weapons program. These reserves ar low grade and far more expensive than uranium readily available on the international market. But cost is less of an object for a nuclear weapons program. It all fits together. NPguy ( talk) 03:04, 5 February 2008 (UTC)
AND
I put a verify source tag up to note the concern, and it should stay until another editor can independently verify the citation. If it can't be confirmed after a given amount of time, or a reasonable amount of counter-evidence is provided, then it would make sense to remove the statement(s). The ideal thing would be a consensus of what happened, but I guess that can't always be achieved.. --
68.23.10.26 (
talk)
04:27, 5 February 2008 (UTC)
![]() | This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
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I created the second archive of the discussion as it was greatly needed. N i g h t F a l c o n 9 0 9 0 9' T a l k 16:34, 6 March 2007 (UTC)
It seems that the title 2000-2006 was no good, because the next section was entitled August 31 2006 - 2007 I believe. In any case, I changed it to 2000-August 2006 However, the first entry there is 2002, so we should change it to 2002-August 2006 perhaps? Why can't we just put everything from 2006 in the same section? that would be cleaner. This is minor, I know, but it is bugging me ;-) N i g h t F a l c o n 9 0 9 0 9' T a l k 16:26, 6 March 2007 (UTC)
1- ENTEC was set up for the transfer of the FULL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE and not "to operate Bushehr". If you think it was only meant to "operate Bushehr" then POST YOUR CITATION AS I HAVE POSTED MINE.
2- STOP INSISTING THAT IRAN WAS REQUIRED TO BE REPORTED TO THE UNSC WHEN I HAVE SPELLED OUT VERSE BY VERSE WHAT XII.C and ARTICLE 19 says, I have furhter cited 3 sources that say that "diversion of miltiary use" is required, the now I have a fourth THAT YOU DELETED WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION:
SOURCE: http://www.asil.org/insights/2004/10/insight041105.htm —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.10 ( talk) 20:57, 4 February 2008 (UTC)
Don't pull the "I am an expert" nonsense. So am I. Go start your own blog if you want to interject your own opinions instead of facts. Wikipedia is not your personal blog and this isn't the place to resolve "arguments" - it is a place to cite sources. I have provided several sources and cited them - valid, authoritative sources - and you simply delete them and insert a bare sentence without any citations. If you have contrary soures, cite them along with mine and let the readers decide. But in the meantime, here's my fifth source (found at
http://www.payvand.com/news/07/dec/1044.html) in support of the contention that Iran's breaches of safeguards did not amount to a violation of the NPT justifying UNSC referral, written by Dr M. Sahimi of USC who has also published Forced to Fuel at the Harvard International Review (
http://www.harvardir.org/articles/1294/)
You're free to disagree, but you can't use Wikipedia for your own opinions and you MUST acknowledge contrary facts.
There seems to be an effort by someone to misconstrue the legal application of Iran's safeguards agreement with respect to declared and undeclared nuclear activities.
Iran's basic safeguard agreement with the IAEA only applies to declared nuclear activities. The purpose of the Additional Protocol is to address the potential existence of undeclared nuclear activities. The IAEA has certified, twice, that the declared nuclear material and activities in Iran have been accounted for and none have been diverted to military use. Therefore, as Michael Spies of the Lawyer's Committee for Nuclear Policy has written, Iran is in fact in compliance with its basic safeguards agreement.
The question of the potential existence of undeclared nuclear activities is dealt with by the Additional Protocol. The IAEA only certifies the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in countries which have ratified the Additional Protocol. Iran has not ratified it, and is thus not legally bound by it (though Iran has permitted the expanded inspections anyway for a period of approximately 2 years.) This is not a violation of Iran's safeguard agreement, nor is it a basis for suspicion. According to the last IAEA report, this does indeed put Iran in the same category as 32 other nations. The following paragraphs, which are supported by the analysis by the Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear Policy, accurately reflect these facts and should not be removed:
Sorry, but this analysis is essentially incorrrect. Iran's safeguards agreement requires Iran to declare all its nuclear material. That's in Article I of the agreement. As a legal matter, the IAEA considers nuclear material to be diverted if it has been declared and then went missing or if it was never declared at all. After the revelations in 1991 about Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, the IAEA conclouded that the safeguards agreement by itself did not give the Agency the tools it needed to deal effectively with undeclared nuclear activities. The Additional Protocol strengthens the IAEA's capabilities to deal with undeclared activities, but it is not the basis for its responsibility to address undeclared activities or of Iran's responsibility to declare them. NPguy 03:03, 28 September 2007 (UTC)
I wish you would sign your posts. I never know if this is one person or several, or where your posts begin and end. Here are some specific errors in your argument:
Ummm... no. You are not qualified to judge what the Lawyer's Committee for Nuclear Policy says is "unfounded" because obviously you don't know what you're talking about. The safeguard agreement applicable to Iran (as with others) requires that there be no diversion of nuclear material to weapons-related activities. The IAEA's certification that all declared nuclear material has been accounted for, and none has been diverted for weapons-related activities, means that Iran was in compliance with its safeguards agreement, just as Michael Spies states. Without the Additional Protocol in force, the IAEA can only state this about declared material in Iran or in any other country. Of course you can speculate that "undeclared" material exists in Iran, but that's speculation. Nothing in Iran's safeguards agreement requires Iran to prove the absense of undeclared activities. In fact, tHat's why we now have the Additional Protocol, which implements more stringent inspections designed to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material/activities. And Iran implemented the Additional Protocol for 2 years, with still no evidence of undeclared material/activities.
Once a country violates its safeguards agreement, as Iran did for 18 years, the burden of proof is on that country to demonstrate that it has come back into compliance with its safeguards obligation to provide a complete declaration. One way to do that would be to implement the Additional Protocol. Another would be to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve open questions (see Article 3 of the safeguards agreement) and respond to the IAEA's requests for information (see Article 69).
The bulk of the provisions of the safeguards agreement apply to declared material and facilities, and most safeguards implementation is focused on declared material and facilities. But it is incorrect to claim that the safeguards agreement deals only with declared materials and unwarranted to conclude that simply by observing the provisions of its safeguards agreement that deal with declared materials Iran is complying fully with its safeguards obligations. NPguy 04:01, 5 October 2007 (UTC)
What you don't seem to want to understand is this: the point is that the IAEA can ONLY reach conclusions about declared material. WIthout the Additional Protocol in place (in Iran or in any other country) the IAEA does NOT make any determination about undeclared activities.
These are rhetorical questions not legal ones. Iran is absolutely under no obligation WHATSOEVER to do anything beyond rectify its safeguard breaches which it has done. It was under no obligation WHATSOEVER to allow additional inspections and implement the Additional Protocol, which it did. It has met its burden. If you have suspicions of your own, Wikipedia is not the place to air them. The UNSC's offer to "cooperate" with Iran's nuclear program effectively deprives Iran of the sovereign right to operate its own nuclear fuel cycle. Get your own blog and rant and rave there. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.10 ( talk) 18:27, 5 February 2008 (UTC)
Or, similarly, someone from within Iran. I'm tempted to revert this page back to the STONE AGE!
So let me understand this. Iran is building nukes because of "Lack of confidence in the international community"? That sentence right there just screams bias. Where are the wikicops when you need em? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.140.22.70 ( talk) 19:40, 19 October 2007 (UTC)
I have to say... was this written by the Shah himself? I mean wow. I came here looking for unbiased factual information, and was pretty shocked. I'm not going to touch the article, though.
This article even claims that the furor over their nuclear program is not that they could be developing nuclear weapons, but that they might get the technology to do so vis a vis a civillian program. Are you serious? So no one, right or wrong, believes that they might have a weapons program now? It's not even worth a footnote?
Good luck.
207.115.84.2 ( talk) 23:47, 6 June 2008 (UTC)davepl
Gawdat Bahgat, whose opinions are featured so prominently at the opening paragraphs of this article, is entitled to his view that Iran is seeking a nuclear "capability" but that is only an opinion and so should not be there unless countervailing facts are presented, namely, that any country with a basic nuclear infrastructure including Japan, S Korea, Argentina, and Brazil are similarly theoretically "capable" of making nukes at some indefinite point in the future if they so decide, thus making the charge against Iran a lot of nonsense. Furthermore, the fact should be presented that Iran has offered - repeatedly - to take steps well beyond its legal obligations to minimize the remote possibility that a civilian, IAEA monitored nuclear program could even theoretically be diverted to weapons use by, for example, offering to renounce plutonium reprocessing and by placing significant limits to its uranium program. The insistence on repeatedly editing out these facts and instead relying on vague and essentially meaningless statements about "capabilities" is an indicator of bias.
I am shocked at the heavy pro-Iran bias in this discussion. There is no hint that Iran persistently violated its safeguards agreement with the IAEA for nearly two decadees, as the IAEA reported to the Board of Governors in November 2003 [1], which the Board of Governors recognized as noncompliance in September 2005 [2] and asked that it be reported to the UN Security Council in February 2006 [3]. The nuclear activities that Iran deliberately concealed from the IAEA -- in violation of the safeguards agreement it undertook pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty -- are those most directly related to the development of a nuclear weapons capability, namely uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.
It is unfortunately true that IAEA Director General ElBaradei said that there was no "evidence" that Iran had a nuclear weapons program. Such a statement is both ouside the IAEA's responsibility (to detect and report diversions and noncompliance) and was based on a tortured reading of the word "evidence" as tantamount to "proof." There is ample circumstantial evidence that Iran was pursuing the development of a nuclear weapons capability -- perhaps not weapons themselves but the key capability to produce material that can be used in weapons. This evidence comes both from the fact that Iran pursued enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in violation of its NPT safeguards obligations and from the fact that it lacks a plausible economic justification for an enrichment program. In general, a country would need a large number of operating nuclear power plants for investment in an enrichment capability to make economic sense, where Iran lacks even a single operating nuclear power plant.
Indeed, Dr. ElBaradei has noted that Iran's actions have created a "confidence deficit," and that it is up to Iran to take action to restore confidence. Iran has been offered assistance in nuclear power and an assured supply of nuclear fuel, if it takes the but only if Iran suspendes its enrichment program. These offers would provide a much more rapid and reliable means for Iran to meet its future energy needs than its current course. The fact that Iran continues to reject these offers further erodes international confidence in its intent.
The UN Security Council is the competent international authority responsible for maintaining international peace and security. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council has the authority to demand action by a UN Member State if necessary to maintain international peace and security. Acting under that authority, the Council has demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment program [4]. Iran's refusal to do so is a violation of international law and compounds concerns over Iran's intentions. NPguy 02:15, 25 March 2007 (UTC)
This may seem like a legal technicality, but it goes to the core of the purpose of the NPT. The spread of nuclear weapons poses such a large threat to international security that the international community has decided that it cannot afford to wait for such proof. And Iran, as a party to the NPT, has accepted the threshold set in the NPT. NPguy 03:16, 25 July 2007 (UTC)
Sorry but the UNSC does not have the authority to demand that a nation give up rights that are recognized by a treaty such as Iran's inalienable right to nuclear technology as recognized by Article IV of the NonProliferation Treaty.
Regarding limits on the UNSC, ICJ Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice has been quoted to say:
"The Security Council, even when acting genuinely for the preservation or restoration of peace and security, has a scope of action limited by the State's sovereignty and the fundamental rights without which that sovereignty cannot be exercised."
And as ICJ Judge Lauterpacht has written:
"The relief which Article 103 of the Charter may give the Security Council in case of conflict between one of its decisions and an operative treaty obligations cannot - as a simple hierarchy of norms - extend to a conflict between a Security Counsel resolutions and jus cogens"
The International Law Commission recently addressed this very issue:
"The question has sometimes been raised whether also Council resolutions adopted ultra vires prevail by virtue of Article 103. Since obligations for Member States of the United Nations can only derive out of such resolutions that are taken within the limits of its powers, decisions ultra vires do not give rise to any obligations to begin with. Hence no conflict exists...
If United Nations Member States are unable to draw up valid agreements in dissonance with jus cogens, they must also be unable to vest an international organization with the power to go against peremptory norms. Indeed both doctrine and practice unequivocally confirm that conflicts between the United Nations Charter and norms of jus cogens result not in the Charter obligations’ pre-eminence, but their invalidity. In this sense, the United Nations Charter is an international agreement as any other treaty. This is particularly relevant in relation to resolutions of the Security Council, which has more than once been accused of going against peremptory norms."
SOURCE: UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, p.176-177
I just corrected several misrepresentations and misinterpretations introduced by recent edits. For example, one anonymous editor asserted without citation:
In fact, many countries have civil nuclear technology, but relatively few have enrichment or reprocessing, which are the key to a nuclear weapons capability. The EU-3 and the UN Security Council do not object to Iran having a civil nuclear program. They have demanded only that Iran suspend its previously clandstine enrichment program.
Enrichment is different. By this standard, Argentina and Brazil do have the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. They are among the relatively few that do.
Thus, it is a true statement that Irans' "capability" to potentially make a bomb is shared by several other nations, and so to say that Iran has developed such a capability has no meaning. Its like saying someone who has a butter knife has the "capability" to use it as a murder weapon.
I was simply making a technical distinction between nuclear energy writ large and the most sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. This is a critical distinction. NPguy 03:19, 22 August 2007 (UTC)
Your personal determination that only the actual possession of an active enrichment program provides the "capability" to make nukes is arbitrary and misleading.
Your are not applying this "critical distinction" clear when you selectively apply it to Iran and repeatedly censor edits that point out that, first, the "capability" to make a bomb is shared by many countries that have a nuclear program, and second, that Iran has offered to place limits on its nuclear program well beyond its legal obligations that would minimize such a theoretical possibility. In short, you're passing off one-sided speculation as fact.
Another edit claimed that:
which is also false, since the United States supports the EU-3 proposal to assist Iran's civil nuclear program if Iran suspends enrichment.
Iran's contracts for the delivery of nuclear fuel have been repeatedly violated, and anyway Iran is under no obligation whatsoever to give up enrichment and allow itself to become reliant on foreign fuel sources. Furthermore, as BASIC has written, the "offer" to assist Iran's nuclear program was vague and non-binding.
Another claimed:
Presubly the author meant that these undeclared activities had NO relationship to a weapons program, but the IAEA has made no such conclusion.
that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme.” http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf
Finally, there is the claim:
There is a huge difference from uranium prospecting and uranium enrichment, and no basis for concluding that Iran planned to engage in enrichment solely because it had a uranium mine. There were grounds for suspicion, since Iran's uranium resources are low grade and expensive to recover. However, if Iran had stated its intention to engage in enrichment, the IAEA would not have waited until August 2002 to raise questions.
Again, you're evading the point, which was that Iran's enrichment program was not a secret since the discovery and mining of uranium specifically intended for enrichment was made quite publicly known.
Actually, Iran not only informed the IAEA of plans for enrichment, but the IAEA was cooperating with Iran's enrichment program until 1983. And, when the Chinses pulled out of building Iran's uranium conversion facility under US pressure, the Iranians informed the IAEA that they would continue the program and Elbaradei himself came to Iran and saw the construction. Your insistence on removing cites to these facts is telling.
And the same IAEA said quite clearly that the past failures to report were not related to a weapons program, that there was no diversion of material to nuclear weapons. In fact, Iran is hardly unique in its "failure to report" - for example, both S. Korea and Egypt were caught conducting secret nuclear experiments which included plutonium extraction and uranium enrichment to almost weapons-grade concentrations for over 2 decades.
Again, you're making arguments as an advocate, which means that you're biased and not qualified to edit the wiki entry.
I've also made a number of edits above to limit the unfortunate interruptions to some of my earlier posts. I haven't deleted anything, but I have moved some mid-paragraph interruptions that messed up the formatting to after the paragraph. Please learn to edit more politely. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol14/141/141wood.pdf
Because this article was too long(102 kb) I moved Timeline which was 32kb to a new article: Timeline of Nuclear programme of Iran-- Sa.vakilian( t- c) 05:29, 29 March 2007 (UTC)
I substitute the template of government of Iran with Nuclear programme of Iran. I think it's more relevant and useful.-- Sa.vakilian( t- c) 06:34, 29 March 2007 (UTC)
An anon changed all spellings of "program" to British English in May 2006 [5]. Nobody seems to have asked why. It was previously in American English before this. WP:MOS says that you stick with one and don't switch it around much — it should have been reverted at the time, there is no reason to prefer British English here, and up until one unilateral and anonymous change it was in American English. I'm changing it back now. -- Fastfission 14:31, 30 March 2007 (UTC)
To explain my edit to the new section, many countries in the Middle East have expressed interest in nuclear power. Among those that have expressed such interest publicly are Algeria, Libya, Jordan, and the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (in Addition to Saudi Arabia, these are Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates). Unlike Iran, which is pursuing the full nuclear fuel cycle and claims this is for peaceful purposes, these other countries have only stated an interest in nuclear power.
The other inaccuracy was the statement that Israel was the only other country to have "such a program." In fact, no other country in the Middle East currently has a nuclear power program. Israel has a safeguarded (i.e. subject to IAEA inspection and verification) research reactor at Soreq and an unsafeguardeed heavy water reactor and reprocessing plant at Dimona, generally considered to be part of a nuclear weapons program. Several other countries in the region have nuclear research reactors, including Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Syria and Turkey. Finally, since the section doesn't express "viewpoints" of any country explicitly, I changed the heading to "responses."
NPguy
02:42, 15 April 2007 (UTC)
Since the nuclear programs of Saudi Arabia and Egypt exist independent of Iran's, it is wrong to suggest their nuclear program exists as a "response" to Iran's program.
Since I'm the one who posted the complaint about bias in this article, here are my suggestions for needed amendments:
With these additions and changes, which I'll work on as time permits, much of the evident bias and selectivity will be corrected. NPguy 03:16, 15 April 2007 (UTC)
An anonymous user deleted a POV paragraph from the article, which I think is useful to keep on the discussion page. This paragraph expresses a POV that is worth acknowledging and responding to.
My reaction is that the United States has dramatically changed its position and no longer opposes nuclear power in Iran. In fact, the United States, along with the UN Security Council, is prepared to support expanded nuclear cooperation and other trade with Iran if it gives up certain suspicious and previously hidden nuclear activities. The Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors oppose Iran's pursuit of nuclear activities unnecessary for a nuclear power program, in particular the enrichment plants at Natanz and the 40 megawatt heavy water "research" reactor under construction at Arak. The former could be used to produce high-enriched uranium but is not needed to produce reactor fuel since Russia has offered a lifetime fuel supply contract for Bushehr. The latter could be used to produce weapon-grade plutonium and is not needed for the stated nuclear research purposes.
It is understandable that the Iranian public would have a different perception, given the unfortunate history between Iran and the United States (the coup against Mossadegh, the hostage crisis, U.S. support for Iraq in its war against Iran). However, it is not just the United States but the responsible international bodies that have presented Iran with this choice. The choice of Iran's government to continue construction of these facilities will deprive Iran of an expanded nuclear power program and other economic and trade benefits. NPguy 02:23, 30 April 2007 (UTC)
Your reaction is wrong and quite obviously you are not qualified to edit anything that has to do with Iran's nuclear program. The US has NOT simply told iran to give up "suspicious and previously hidden nuclear activities" - Iran's enrichment program is neither suspicious nor was it previously "hidden" (in fact Iran invited iAEA inspectors to visit its uranium mines in 1992, Iran discussed openly the discovery of uranium on national radio, Iran tried to cooperate with the IAEA in establishing an enrichment facility in Isfahan in 1983 b ut was thwarted by the US, and Iranian contracts with other countries were thwarted by the US. Giving up enrichment is the equivalent of giving up a nuclear program since then Iran becomes reliant on the whims of foreigners in supplying Iran's nuclear needs. And as the BASIC report noted, the offers that the US and EU made to Iran were just an "empty box"
You are biased and should not be editing this entry in any way.
A series of Anonymous IP editors (all using the same ISP in England) and one named editor ( User:DreddMoto) have been changing this article to British spelling and moving the location to Nuclear programme of Iran. The article was originally written using American spelling; please stop changing the spelling to British usage. This issue has already been addressed on this talk page ( here), with the consensus appearing to be to keep the American spelling. Horologium t- c 19:23, 14 June 2007 (UTC)
Someone with the time should try and work in stuff such as contained in these comments by Najmedin Meshkati [6] who takes the view that the way things are headed now is dangerous since Iran is relying on outdated and potentially dangerous technology which could lead to another Chernobyl disaster. Nil Einne 13:39, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
The Chernobyl reactor is fundamentally a different design. However, it should be noed that the US has pressured the IAEA to drop cooperative technical assistance programs with Iran in the area of civilian reactor safety operations.
NPguy left a message at Talk:Peremptory norm, asking for comments about the legal discussions on this page. First of all, can I ask everyone here to (1) please sign all your comments with four tildes and (2) stop adding comments in the middle of discussion threads. The conversation above is virtually impossible to follow — it's not clear who said what, and who's replying to which comment. (For example, Nil Einne's admonition that "This is not the place for soapboxing" is now six paragraphs away from the comment to which it referred.)
Having said that, I did enjoy reading the conversation, and particularly the following unsigned comment:
Whoever wrote that comment is "not qualified in the field of international law". He or she suggests that the "sovereign right to use atomic energy" is jus cogens. This is absolute nonsense, and you won't find a single reliable source who supports this position.
If you want to discuss the legality of Iran's nuclear programme or the UNSC resolution, please stick to arguments that have been made by reliable sources. Sideshow Bob Roberts 10:49, 22 August 2007 (UTC)
- The Security Council, even when acting genuinely for the preservation or restoration of peace and security, has a scope of action limited by the State's sovereignty and the fundamental rights without which that sovereignty cannot be exercised.
Several comments are in order here:
Please sign your comments. NPguy 15:51, 25 August 2007 (UTC)
Your intentional confusion of a safeguards breach with an NPT violation is false. An NPT violation occurs when there has been diversion for non-peaceful uses. Accordng to the IAEA, there has been no such diversion in Iran. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.84.142.221 ( talk) 02:15, 19 January 2008 (UTC)
I am quite well familiar with the "intricacies" so let me enlighten you:
Fortunately, the IAEA Statute is available online at
http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html. A full reading Article XII.C makes things a bit clearer about what "non-compliance" refers to by setting out three requirements for compliance:
1- The first requirement is "accounting referred to in sub paragraph A-6 of this article"
Paragraph A-6 of Article XII, in turn, states that inspectors are to be sent to account for fissionable materials and ensure none have been diverted for a "military purpose".
The IAEA did send these inspectors to Iran - many many times. El-Baradei confirmed in Paragraph 52 of his November 2003 report that "to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme." And again, after extensive inspections, El-Baradei wrote Paragraph 112 of his November 2004 report that "all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities."
In short, inspections happened as required, and no diversion of fissile material to a "military purpose" was found. Thus, Iran did not violate this section of the article - a point that several others including Michael Spies of the Lawyers Committee for Nuclear Policy has made too.
2- The second requirement under Article XII.C of the Statute is "determining whether there is compliance with the undertaking referred to in sub paragraph F-4 of article XI"
A quich check of Article XI shows that it applies to "Agency Projects" meaning the projects in which the the IAEA has provided technical assistance to a requesting country. And, subparagraph F-4 specifically requires that the assistance provided by the IAEA shall not be used for military purposes and shall be subject to safeguards.
Last I checked, the IAEA did not provide any such assistance to Iran which has been used for military purposes - in fact the US killed the IAEA's technical assistance to Iran's enrichment program in 1983, as well as all of Iran's other contracts with other nations to provide the necessary enrichment technology that Iran was quite legally entitled to obtain. Thus, I don't see how this provision applies, let alone how Iran could have violated it.
3- The third requirement is compliance "with the measures referred to in sub-paragraph A-2 of this article"
Subparagraph A-2 of Article XII requires observance of "health and safety" standards. There has been no allegation that Iran's centrifuge program has violated a health and safety law. Again, there hasn't even been an allegation of any violation of this section either.
In short, past breaches of safeguards agreements do not constitute a violation of the statute unless there's been a diversion for militay purposes - which the IAEA has repeatedly said is not to case in Iran.
In fact the IAEA has found discrepancies the accounting of nuclear material in as many as 15 countries at a time (including S. Korea, Taiwan, and Egypt) - a few of which were later caught conducting secret and potentially weapons-related nuclear experiments - and yet they weren't referred to the UNSC for supposedly violating Article III of the NPT.
OK, all clear now? [end of unsigned posting]
You have quoted selectively and incompletely and omitted the key point. The full quotation is "to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose referred to in sub- paragraph F-4 of article Xl, with the health and safety measures referred to in sub- paragraph A-2 of this article, "and with all other conditions of the project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States concerned."
Thus, the IAEA is to report any non-compliance with safeguards agreements.
Granted, there is a threshold test for non-compliance. Missing a deadline on a required report falls below the threshold. Providing an incomplete initial declaration and refusing a requested special inspection to resolve the question (as North Korea did) falls above it. The mere fact that other countries have had safeguards failures that fall below the threshold is not particularly meaningful to whether Iran's safeguards failures crossed the threshold to non-compliance.
You cite 15 countries, but I am only aware of seven. Five (Iraq, Romania, North Korea, Libya and Iran)) have been found in non-compliance. By the way, I don't believe any was cited for diversion (though the IAEA's inability to verify non-diversion - a different matter - was part of some non-compliance decisions), and only two (Iraq and Libya) involved ""smoking gun" proof of military purposes.
The only other recent cases (since 1990) were Egypt and South Korea. These were safeguards failures that were significant enough to report to the Board of Governors but were not considered by the Board to constitute non-compliance. NPguy ( talk) 03:31, 23 January 2008 (UTC)
( talk) 04:09, 26 January 2008 (UTC)
THIS IS THE BOTTOM LINE.
I have consistently cited Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute as the basis for reporting Iran's non-compliance to the UN Security Council. I have never referred to Article 19 of Iran's safeguards agreement for that purpose. Aside from that, I see nothing in your latest rant that I haven't already thoroughly debunked. I think anyone reading our posts will have little difficulty determining which one of knows what he or she is talking about. NPguy ( talk) 03:48, 2 February 2008 (UTC)
And I pointed out to you that IRan's Safeguards also specifically requires a diversion of non-peaceful uses. We can go around in circles all you want.
I see also that you've deleted the citation to the ASIL article that clearly stated that evidence of nuclear weapons is required for a violation of Article III of the NPT.
Face it, you've lost, your credibility is shot because you're obviously pushing an agenda, and all you can do is try to delete these reference. But I'll just keep putting them back. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.10 ( talk) 20:03, 4 February 2008 (UTC)
Iran's safeguards agreement defines legal obligations between Iran and the IAEA. But it's not the only legal instrument that applies. The IAEA Statute defines independent legal obligations on the IAEA. Those obligations include reporting noncompliance to the Security Council. The Board of Governors met that obligation by reporting Iran's non-compliance.
I deleted the reference because it was irrelevant to the point you were making. That reference was discussing to whether it was correct to cite Iran under a different provision of the IAEA Statute, namely Article III.B.4. I don't mind addressing that point somewhere in the article, but it is irrelevant to the question of whether Article XII.C applies. NPguy ( talk) 02:36, 5 February 2008 (UTC)
IRON PERUVIA:... is it a coincidence or a predestined factor in all things - that europe's economy is in serious downturn discordant of semantic nuclear iran; ; the fortune that favours my bravery finds that scandavia in opprtunity knocks completion has turner price grand prix jurisdiction; ; revolution suggests that iranian-nuclear-weapons exist in saracen-detainee-paradox, but where iran outweighs europe at this point in semantic-power via superpower, there becomes that this as truist political position has more stone-depth to it than it did in such a mystoconfident first principle; ; iran will never be allowed this saracen-decadance by america because of illijitamate procedure in all counts supremacies-beholder; ; because of this it seems at this disjuncture that korea has semantic-nuclear-power over all supremacies mystoinclusive of staged-economy; ; theoretically because of this, korea is in parisian league with iran & yet the only thing binding them is this naval-opportunity; ; theoretically because of that - they should market such a co-operation-coincidence of means in some large or small way; ; the failure of either to realise this realises that they have been in league for at least 15 years on nuclear-semantic levels regards mysto-deconstuction of superpower in all their ways; ; this merchant navy in scandanavian recline prooves the revolving-opportunity-door in semantic-control on all superlevels; ; in that case should it not realise this league of semi-iranian-korean-nuclear-family, (Sheik Kaliff) and accsess the door controls more opportunistically via regards the UN; ; it is the first nuclear principle of xerox-machine-midas-paraperpetuality that holds iran as part of the mechanism of the revolving door; ; it is the second nuclear-familiar principle of foresightedness (automatic door repsonse) that holds korea into this welcoming; ; that scandanavia sees the door without these principles in glasshouse-unfascinated-circumstance realises a trapezium of a xerox-automatic-kindred that wishes to control the scandanavian embassy via this entire iron peruvia... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.156.27.123 ( talk) 13:49, 6 October 2008 (UTC)
I've made articles about the nuclear program of a number of nations, and as I'm running out of countries, I wonder if there's something I could do for Iran. It's difficult though, because a Nuclear power in Iran article would clearly conflict with this article, and I see that people have already done so much work on this subject.
Anyway, there is some work that I would like to see done. Firstly, I think that an article on separate facilities (the big ones) could be appropriate. I've also made a map by the same convention I've done for other nations. - Theanphibian ( talk • contribs) 15:02, 2 September 2007 (UTC)
Image:Shah-nukeIran.jpg is being used on this article. I notice the image page specifies that the image is being used under fair use but there is no explanation or rationale as to why its use in this Wikipedia article constitutes fair use. In addition to the boilerplate fair use template, you must also write out on the image description page a specific explanation or rationale for why using this image in each article is consistent with fair use.
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BetacommandBot 05:30, 13 September 2007 (UTC)
This subject was described very little in this article, although it should be. Just two random references: [8] [9] Biophys 04:13, 18 September 2007 (UTC)
The article is poorly written, in particular preposition usage is as if by a non-native writer. Vocabulary and usage are also often non-native, imprecise or inappropriate. Finally, paragraph organization lacks unity, especially the Overview paragraphs. Made some changes, but much more needs to be done. Points 3 and 4 in Overview are written in an incoherent manner that someone with substantive knowledge would need to fix. ( Haberstr 16:04, 20 September 2007 (UTC))
Now if that doesn't smack of flip-flopping. The USA and Israel today voted at the U.N. against a resolution to turn the Middle East into a Nuclear Weapon free zone. Arabs push through U.N. watchdog vote against Israel By Mark Heinrich - Thursday, September 20th, 2007 - 3:45 PM ET __ CaribDigita 03:27, 21 September 2007 (UTC)
I was planning to post a discussion outlining how the bias on this page might be redressed. Instead I find a busy anonymous poster has gone out of his or her way to exacerbate the bias. The point of this article ought to be to provide basic facts, yet it is filled with selective and unrepresentative citations by analysts who seem to be explaining away Iran's safeguards violations and its refusals to comply with the legally binding demands of the UN Security Council. Most independent analyses of Iran's nuclear program find serious cause for concern that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.
The above paragraph complaining is itself very biased. Most poeple who open NPOV are either 100% pro iran or 100% pro israel the only regional power who fears irans nuclear technology be they civilian or not. For a neutral article, I recommend posting the technical realities from IAEA and the history of the program dating to the US friendly Shah. All neutral observers should keep this in mind. To me it seems the whole thing is hyped, becuase if iran started in the 60s and 70s, it is far behind schedule. It is at least 30+ years behind the original schedule paid for by Shah. As of this posting Iran is without a single operational power generating reactor. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.44.253.212 ( talk) 00:16, 28 November 2007 (UTC)
Unfortunately, the people who are bent on making excuses for Iran have far more time on their hands than I do in trying to fix this article.
If I were to try to fix this article, I would begin by scrubbing to rely on primary sources and less on media or analysts' reporting of those facts. My next step would be to recount the history of Iran's two deals with the EU3 (the Teheran agreement of October 2003 and the Paris agreement of November 2004. In both cases Iran pledged to suspend its enrichment program, but it later failed to carry out its commitments and eventually withdrew from both agreements. Then I would consolidate and scrub the statements of Iran's and other countries' positions to focus on well-sourced official statements that are (unlike much of what's currently there) relevant to the nuclear issue. This would have the advantage of makingthe article shorter and more coherent as well as more balanced
Any chance we can get agreement to revamp this article along these lines? NPguy 03:04, 22 September 2007 (UTC)
"One seeming flaw is that it would only address questions that are already on the table. Should additional questions arise, the agreement would not help resolve those." This seems like a virtual tautology to me, the Agreement is not designed to resolve questions that do not exist, it is designed to address all the questions the IAEA have asked. If they have further questions, then the IAEA has the right to address those too, in the normal manner. By criticising the agreement for not addressing issues not raised by the IAEA, it sounds like you're criticising a man of 6ft 4 for not be being 6ft 5.
Furthermore, according to the IAEA, the new agreement will allow it to "further promote the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Iran and its ability to conclude the exclusive peaceful nature of the Iran's nuclear activities."
Regarding this 'key question' -who has posed this and where? The Security Council has made a political demand, for Iran to cease doing something it has a legal right to do but, so far as UNSCR 1696 is concerned, that is entirely pursuant to Iran cooperating with the IAEA to the end of proving that Iran's programme is entirely peaceful. Having read the text ( http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/22/PDF/N0645022.pdf?OpenElement ), I can see nothing referring to or implying any 'underlying problem'. Dwtray2007 07:27, 23 September 2007 (UTC)
It's frustrating that people don't seem to get the basic argument. Iran cheated on its NPT safeguards obligations for nearly two decades, secretly pursuing an enrichment program that would give it the capability to produce nuclear weapons. What is the right response? Is it simply to allow Iran to continue to pursue that progam in the open, under IAEA safeguards? That implies that the only problem was the secrecy, rather than the significance of the actions being carried out in secret and the suspected reason for that secrecy. Or is the proper response to require Iran to stop what it was doing in secret - developing a nuclear weapons capability? The NPT doesn't actually say. It leaves it to the UN Security Council to address safegaurds violations. The Council has concluded that simply accepting safeguards is not enough - Iran must suspend its enrichment program. Yet Iran refuses to do so.
I find this very worrisome. Iran has lost international confidence and refises to take the one key step necessary to rebuild confidence. Given these facts, I have a hard time understanding why so many are supporting Iran's position. The best I can come up with is that they distrust the U.S. government. U.S. actions in Iraq have certainly earned distrust. But just because the United States says something doesn't mean that it's wrong, and the United States is far from alone in viewing Iran's nuclear program with alarm. NPguy 01:06, 24 September 2007 (UTC)
Please do not forget that we are trying to pose an objective view, try to leave opinions on if you find this worrysome or not on the side. Please abstain from posting information that is used to follow a certain tendency or only support particular points of view. Just keep this in mind for the betterment of the articles!! Superdudemx 04:00, 12 October 2007 (UTC)
The IAEA knows the percentage of Iranian enrichment, which I don't believe even exceeds 5%, and the exact number of centrifuges, which doesn't even surpass 2000 I believe. Even without the safeguards agreement, you cannot possibly convince anyone that Iran's program is more covert than say, the United States. Do you know, with reasonable accuracy, how many gas centrifuges the USA has? I highly doubt it. All of it is classified (as it would be for Britain, France, etc), and if the IAEA wanted to enter an American facility that has been weaponized, they'd have to go through hell. I'm not trying to suggest Iran deserves a nuclear weapon simply because America has one, but let's keep things in perspective. Iran's program is clearly more transparant than any of the programs used by any of the nuclear powers. Iran's been fairly obedient with the IAEA, even if they haven't ratified the safeguards. I don't think bringing up the IAEA works in your favor, considering the IAEA is staunchly against the hawkish American stance, and they have been fairly consistant in that position. Further, the IAEA has still concluded that there is no legitimate way for anyone to claim Iran is developing nuclear weapons, beyond speculation, at this time. The ironic thing about the Iranian nuclear program is that their program is even less developed then they themselves are claiming it is. Iran is essentially inviting conflict by mouthing off. They're 5+ years away at best, and the IAEA would easily be able to alert the UN if a weaponized Iran is imminent (and the program would be able to be attacked immediately). Considering the IAEA is able to determine when or when not Iran has reached industrial capacity, when or when not Iran has reached weapons-grade level, when or when not Iran has surpassed what would be deemed appropriate for a civilian reactor, I would say that is a fairly transparant program. - MadarB 20:40, 25 October 2007 (UTC)
The IAEA also concluded, in what I believe is still there most recent circular (aug 27) that they have "been able to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear materials at the enrichment facilities in Iran and [have] therefore concluded that it remains in peaceful use."
They may not yet be able to say with certainty that Iran's entire nuclear program is peaceful but that is a difficult determination to make (elements of proving a negative in fact). What is clear is that they've yet to see serious evidence of of a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA also states that the agreement they now have with Iran will "further promote the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Iran and its ability to conclude the exclusive peaceful nature of the Iran's nuclear activities."
It's true that we shouldn't give Iran special credit simply for meeting their treaty obligations, although, in the international arena, that is something of a rarity. Dwtray2007 08:42, 26 October 2007 (UTC)
Another reason we shouldn't give Iran credit merely for meeting its treaty obligations is that it hasn't. Iran was found to have violated those obligations for nearly twenty years, systematically concealing its enrichment program. It is also an overstatement to say that the IAEA has yet to see serious evidence of a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA has yet to label what it has reported as such, but it is not a great leap to see several elements of Iran's reported history as disturbing indications of possible weapons intent, including:
None of these is conclusive, and plausible explanations have been offered for a few, but taken together they provide serious grounds for suspicion. NPguy 02:22, 27 October 2007 (UTC)
It is not an 'overstatement' to say the IAEA has seen no evidence of Iranian nuclear weaponization: it is to relate almost verbatim what the IAEA's head has himself said, a matter of days ago. You are entitled to your opinion but the purpose of this article is to relate the words and judgements of authoritative sources, not the opinions of its contributors. Therefore, as long as the IAEA says it has seen "no evidence" of Iranian nuclear weaponization, that is what this article should report. If other authoritative sources question the IAEA's judgement then we should also report that but it is not our place to second-guess those sources. Leaps, whether great or small, are not in our remit. Dwtray2007 12:46, 30 October 2007 (UTC)
None of these taken together is conclusive, but taken together they offer serious grounds for suspicion. -- 69.210.15.210 06:05, 27 October 2007 (UTC)
Let's not forget that the United States was responsible for initiating the Iranian nuclear program in the first place while Iran was still led by an American-sponsored monarch. Dick Cheney, ironically, was one of the biggest pushers for a nuclearized Iran. Iran's program may have been "active" for 18 years, but to pretend as though it was reaching industrial scale level, or that it was an immediate threat to world security, is a joke. If Iran were heavily invested into their nuclear program during the 80s and 90s, then they would have reached weapon-capacity by now, which they haven't. It was clearly on the back burner, regardless of its illicitness. Even so, that would be completely irrelevent to the current state of this conflict. This is a current event, isn't it? As of right now, the IAEA seems fairly content with Iran's compliance. Bringing up the events of the 80s and 90s seems to be a new trend in American foreign policy (see: the invasion of Iraq based on unsubstatiated chemical weapons claims from the 1980s). Speculation should be left out of this article. This is an encyclopedia. Perhaps you could say that Westerners fear Iran may be trying to develop a nuclear weapons program, but it must also be made clear that the IAEA is staunchly against the hawkish stance of the USA and that the IAEA is pleased by Iran's compliance in recent months. Wikipedia shouldn't be used as a war propaganda tool. - MadarB 22:59, 27 October 2007 (UTC)
I'm not sure how it is relevant that the United States supported Iran's nuclear program in the 1970s, so let me respond to the other part of this comment. The hard part in developing an enrichment capability is the research and development to learn the tricks of making the technology work. After that, scaling up to industrial production is a relatively simple matter. So the fact that Iran was working on it for 18 years at a small scale does not mean Iran was not trying, nor does it mean Iran was not making important progress. The reason western countries are alarmed is that Iran is now proceeding unimpeded by efforts to keep the program secrect and is getting closer to overcoming the main technical obstacles to producing bomb-grade uranium. It is important to note that a relatively small scale plant (about 5,000 SWU) is capable of producing a bomb's worth of uranium in a year, where a much larger plant is needed (over 100,000 SWU) to enrich uranium to fuel a power plant. NPguy 18:41, 31 October 2007 (UTC)
Further, Israel, Pakistan(!), and India are all nuclear powers that are not on the NPT. Iran hasn't unprovokingly went to war in centuries. Israel has gone to war frequently, many times aggressively. Pakistan and India are the only two nuclear powers to ever declare war on each other (after a nuclear standoff just one year prior). Pakistan, of course, is a sanctuary for terrorism, and an ally to the Taliban. 68.43.58.4223:29, 27 October 2007
In editing the overview section I deleted the claim that Iran had offered to delay its uranium enrichment program for several years. The citation referred to IAEA Director General ElBaradei's hope that Iran would make such an offer, but there is no indication that Iran ever did make such an offer. Had Iran done so it would have have been big news and provided the basis for broader negotiations. NPguy 02:09, 4 November 2007 (UTC)
Note this paragraph about how Iran proposed that: "Iran will continue negotiating with the EU-3 regarding enrichment issues for two years, and after two years, if the negotiations fail, will resume enrichment activities....Certainly, the last item was a novelty and the EU-3 diplomats have some explaining to do as to why they were not interested...there is no evidence that any respected member of the Western media made any attempt to get their hands on Iran's proposal." —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.85.7.4 ( talk) 07:24, 13 July 2008 (UTC)
Dwtray2007 and I have gone back and forth about a few words about whether Iran has the right to enrich uranium. In general, enrichment is not by itself a violation of the NPT. However, any peaceful activity must be undertaken in conformity with the other articles ofthe NPT, particularly Articles I, II and III. Under Article II, Iran may not undertake enrichment for weapons. Many observers (including me) believe the purpose of Iran's enrichment program is to develop a nuclear weapons capability. The arguments to support this view are circumstantial, and it is practically impossible to produce definitive evidence of Iran's intent.
However, Iran clearly violated Article III of the NPT by keeping that program secret from the IAEA. In response, the UN Security Council took a decision that limits Iran's right to enrich uranium. Iran does not have the "right" to enrich uranium in violation of a binding decision of the Security Council.
This is the main reason I have been deleting shorthand references to Iran's "right" to enrich uranium. The issue is too complicated to address in that shorthand. NPguy ( talk) 03:16, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
Resolution 1696 does not state that Iran has breached the NPT. Some people, including you, may believe that Iran is developing nuclear weapons but the IAEA has found no "concrete evidence" that this is so.
While the SC has required Iran to cease uranium enrichment, there is debate about whether it is entitled to do so as the right to enrich can be seen as a sovereign right and, therefore, part of jus cogens. The SC, in fact the Charter itself, even bearing in mind article 103, cannot override jus cogens. So the argument goes, the right to enrich is a sovereign right, as demonstrated by the fact that the US and USSR began enriching before the NPT and UN came into existence. As a result of this, a respectable argument can be made that, by asking Iran to cease enrichment, the SC has acted ultra vires. Therefore, while the SC can insist on inspections, Iranian disclosure or even limited military strikes against known weapons, it cannot call on Iran to cease its "inalienable" right to enrichment in defense of international peace and security and certainly not in order to uphold the NPT (since the demand itself violates Article IV).
Anyway, I'm willing for my parenthetical remark in the article to be removed but I think there should be a section discussing the legal conflict (as perceived by some) between the NPT and the SC. Dwtray2007 ( talk) 08:54, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
First of all, the way you have changed the text is fine. But . . .
I am unaware of any serious doubt that Iran violated its obligations under Article III of the NPT. That Article requires Iran to "accept safeguards" on "all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within [its territory], under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere." The IAEA reported that Iran undertook a deliberate pattern of undeclared nuclear activities using undeclared nuclear materials at undeclared nuclear facilities over a period of 18 years, thus failing to "accept" safeguards on "all" peaceful nuclear activities.
And most observers believe Iran is pursuing at least a latent nuclear weapons capability - the enrichment program really makes no sense otherwise. But although I believe Iran is pursuing a weapons program, I don't believe the evidence of a violation of Article II is compelling. In fact, I think the issue is a distraction. The NPT was set up so that safeguards violations would trigger international action. The Council's actions seem perfectly in line with that intent. You don't have to prove the purpose of the safeguards violation; that is much too high a standard.
As far as I can tell, there is nothing to the claim that "jus cogens" has anything to do with Iran's proclaimed right to enrichment. No one has produced a citation of any expert making this legal claim, and my attempt to get a response from the international legal community produced a rather dismissive reply. The claim that enrichment is a "sovereign right" seems to be based not on "jus cogens" but on the more prosaic principle that sovereign entities have rights to act autonomously unless they agree voluntarily to limit those through agreements with other sovereign entities. "Jus cogens" seems to serve the opposite purpose - to define inherent limits to the autonomy of states even if they do not explicitly agree to those limits. Human rights is the usual example.
But Iran ratified the NPT and the UN Charter, so it accepted limits on its sovereign rights. Let's work with rights and obligations as stated in the foundational legal documents (the NPT, the IAEA Statute and the UN Charter). If there's a case that the UN Security Council exceeded its authority in demanding that Iran suspend enrichment, let's discuss it in terms of those documents. NPguy ( talk) 04:09, 27 November 2007 (UTC)
Recent intelligence reports in the United States now suggest that Iran has in fact been correct and that their nuclear weapons program was terminated in 2003 (4 years ago). Shouldn't this be included? [10] [11], just a news link... it is essentially a current event. The American intelligence community is now in agreement with Russia and China that Iran poses no immediate nuclear weapons threat and that even if Iran were to reinitiate research on nuclear weapons and the development of bombs, they wouldn't even possess enough enriched uranium for a single weapon until 2010-2015. - 68.43.58.42 20:15, 4 December 2007 (UTC)
I added a reference yesterday, in the lead paragraph. NPTGuy has also worked on it. Dwtray2007 ( talk) 23:48, 4 December 2007 (UTC)
And I put it back. There remains a question over whether Iran's claims of the peaceful purpose of its nuclear program are correct. In particular, Iran's enrichment program and heavy water reactor have been called into question. The NIE is relevant to that question. NPguy ( talk) 17:47, 22 December 2007 (UTC)
Irans heavy water reactor at Arak is subject to IAEA safeguards. If you want to speculate about "peaceful" do it elsewhere. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.84.142.221 ( talk) 02:32, 19 January 2008 (UTC)
If anyone thinks the article is POV state your concerns here. Drive by tagging is not appropriate. The last time NPOV was mentioned was two months ago and has long ago been addressed. 199.125.109.108 ( talk) 00:54, 23 December 2007 (UTC)
As it currently stands, this article is extremely long -- and it will undoubtedly continue to grow even longer as more time passes. Therefore I would like to split of the section "Nuclear facilities in Iran" as a separate article under the same heading. If there are no serious objections, I will do this in the coming week. Cgingold ( talk) 04:04, 6 January 2008 (UTC)
Regarding the latest, it is hardly "original research" to observe in reading the previous paragraph that there is a logical gap between public statement about mining and conversion and the underlying claim that Iran's enrichment program was well-known. Mining and conversion are not the same as enrichment.
More generally, better to discuss here than in the titles of our edits.
And why do you insist on remaining anonymous? NPguy ( talk) 04:27, 23 January 2008 (UTC)
I tagged the statement to refer others to the talk page. The statement in question:
However, Iran's claims ignore the fact that all the cited public statements referred to activities other than enrichment (mining and conversion), and the fact that Iran failed to meet its obligations to report its enrichment activities to the IAEA as required by its safeguards agreement.
is not supported by the citation you have provided. Wikipedia's no original research policy states Wikipedia does not publish "unpublished facts, arguments, speculation, and ideas; and any unpublished analysis or synthesis of published material that serves to advance a position" and further recommends " Citing sources and avoiding original research are inextricably linked: to demonstrate that you are not presenting original research, you must cite reliable sources that provide information directly related to the topic of the article, and that directly support the information as it is presented."
The statement you have provided cannot be found in the citation you have provided and I am interested in capturing the information contained within the document. I welcome discussion on why you think the citation covers what you are saying (though I am skeptical since it seems indirect and hard to follow). I would rather encourage you to find a quote which you find represenative (and would also note that if the issue is later resolved in the document, Wikipedia should also note this).. -- 68.72.38.42 ( talk) 04:45, 23 January 2008 (UTC)
I think we could work with partially quoting some of these:
"It is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored."
"Iran failed to report "the import of natural uranium metal in 1994 and its subsequent transfer for use in laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer of resulting waste."
"As corrective actions, Iran has undertaken to submit ICRs relevant to all of these activities, to provide design information with respect to the facilities where those activities took place, to present all nuclear material for Agency verification during its forthcoming inspections and to implement a policy of co-operation and full transparency."
-- 68.72.38.42 ( talk) 04:07, 24 January 2008 (UTC)
Those are good quotes, but they don't convey the whole picture. As the report as a whole makes clear, Iran made none of the required declarations for its enrichment activities, neither the laser nor the centrifuge enrichment activities. Thus my short summary is more complete than these extended quotes.
The problem with this particular point is that Iran is making an argument that is essentially without merit. Therefore simply citing the argument without a rebuttal is misleading. As for the suggestion of removing everything in the preceding point that does not support the claim Iran is making, that would leave only the first sentence. I'm not sure the claim in this sentence is correct because it refers to a document that is not available online.
Whether you agree with that assessment or not, the larger problem is with the whole section titled "Iran." It is entirely out of place and seems to exist primarily to record Iranian arguments on its own behalf. Such arguments belong in the section "Iranian viewpoint." Where this section presents facts and actions, those probably should be embedded in the chronological history above. NPguy ( talk) 02:59, 25 January 2008 (UTC)
NPguy ( talk) 04:15, 26 January 2008 (UTC)50. The recent disclosures by Iran about its nuclear programme clearly show that, in the past, Iran had concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities, with resultant breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement. Iran’s policy of concealment continued until last month, with co-operation being limited and reactive, and information being slow in coming, changing and contradictory. While most of the breaches identified to date have involved limited quantities of nuclear material, they have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing. And although the materials would require further processing before being suitable for weapons purposes, the number of failures by Iran to report in a timely manner the material, facilities and activities in question as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement has given rise to serious concerns.
51. Following the Board’s adoption of resolution GOV/2003/69, the Government of Iran informed the Director General that it had now adopted a policy of full disclosure and had decided to provide the Agency with a full picture of all of its nuclear activities. Since that time, Iran has shown active co-operation and openness. This is evidenced, in particular, by Iran’s granting to the Agency unrestricted access to all locations the Agency requested to visit; by the provision of information and clarifications in relation to the origin of imported equipment and components; and by making individuals available for interviews. This is a welcome development.
Rather than cite the document itself, we could state decisions which have taken place in an objective matter. The text would provide positives and negatives from a time to the present. I think one version of this could look like:
In 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors concluded, in a rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions, that Iran's past safeguards "breaches" and "failures" constituted "non-compliance" with its Safeguards Agreement. In 2008, the IAEA worked to resolve many of these outstanding issues addressed in an August 2007 workplan.
The wording might need a little work and it would obviously have all the references in the actual article. If there was a particular point left out that you felt was important, we could add it in as long as it is attributed and cited (perhaps the IAEA or Board of Governors list particularly important 'breaches' or 'failures' which should be included). A brief Iranian response might also be necessary, if there is any.. -- 68.72.38.42 ( talk) 15:25, 26 January 2008 (UTC)
46. Iran has now acknowledged that it has been developing, for 18 years, a uranium centrifuge enrichment programme, and, for 12 years, a laser enrichment programme. In that context, Iran has admitted that it produced small amounts of LEU using both centrifuge and laser enrichment processes, and that it had failed to report a large number of conversion, fabrication and irradiation activities involving nuclear material, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium.
The problem was where it was using the source to support a statement 'disproving' the previous Iranian claims on national radio, etc. I have since removed this portion. I think it is fine to use the document cited to show that Iran hid aspects of its nuclear program for 18 years, and think we should add in information about the most recent four years as well. -- 68.72.38.42 ( talk) 06:02, 27 January 2008 (UTC)
(No one said that Iran had fully declared its enrichment program -- only that its program was not a secret, so don't mischaracterize the assertions by creating strawmen)
I removed most of the claims because they do not refer to enrichment but to mining or conversion. I left one which refers to enrichment (though it was not a declaration), but marked it dubious because I cannot find the cited source online. The claim is that France agreed to help Iran with Iran's enrichment program. If this is a reference to Iran's investment in Eurodif, that would not support the claim.
Could the person who posted this please provide a relevant quote from that source that supports the claim? NPguy ( talk) 02:12, 28 January 2008 (UTC)
This is frustrating because you claim to know certain facts but fail to produce them. I have asked for quotes because your citations are not readily available and because your summaries of facts have often been misleading. For example, if the United States offered assistance with enrichment it would have been before 1979, which is irrelevant in discussing a program reconstituted in 1986. Your citation regarding Argentina is unsourced. All the other facts refer to the fuel cycle but not specifically to enrichment. They are not equivalent.
By the way, it is public record that Iran failed to declare its enrichment program to the IAEA. The IAEA reports are on its web site. NPguy ( talk) 23:33, 3 February 2008 (UTC)
Your summary confirms my suspicion that the arrangement with Argentina was not about enrichment. You refer to milling and fuel fabrication. These are not enrichment. Production of UF6 is not enrichment either. As for actual enrichment, the IAEA has reported publicly that Iran did not make any declarations of enrichment activities until confronted in 2002 with public statements by a third party.
You may be trying to make the point that the activities Iran was pursuing implied that it was also pursuing enrichment. If that is your point, I actually agree with you. But unlike you I interpret it as cause for concern - why was Iran pursuing the fuel cycle if not for enrichment? If it was for enrichment, why did Iran not declare any enrichment activities to the IAEA? Iran's uranium reserves are too small and to support an independent nuclear power program, but they are large enough to support a weapons program. These reserves ar low grade and far more expensive than uranium readily available on the international market. But cost is less of an object for a nuclear weapons program. It all fits together. NPguy ( talk) 03:04, 5 February 2008 (UTC)
AND
I put a verify source tag up to note the concern, and it should stay until another editor can independently verify the citation. If it can't be confirmed after a given amount of time, or a reasonable amount of counter-evidence is provided, then it would make sense to remove the statement(s). The ideal thing would be a consensus of what happened, but I guess that can't always be achieved.. --
68.23.10.26 (
talk)
04:27, 5 February 2008 (UTC)