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Archive 1 | Archive 2 |
Shouldn't US still a operator of F-5E/Fs? So can anyone change the operator map color of US, from red to blue? Bryan TMF ( talk) 07:33, 13 February 2011 (UTC)
The F-5 would seem to be an iconic fighter that is as much of a design breakthrough as more famous fighters such as the P-51 and F-86. It reversed the trend to greater cost, weight, and complexity that fighters were suffering under, and was competitive with much more expensive aircraft at least through the 1980's. The concepts it embodied were similar to those of the F-16, which received much more credit and are presented in some works ("Boyd" and "The Mind of War") as original breakthroughs more than a decade later. Would a section pointing out the big picture of where the F-5 fits in the history of fighter aircraft be a worthwhile improvement to the article? Candidate first draft text is as follows. This draft probably needs help to maintain a neutral point of view when communicating a possibly contentious topic (the quality of Air Force decisions on procurement).
"The lack of procurement of the F-5 by the U.S. Air Force and its lack of participation in a major war have reduced its prominence among historically significant fighters. Nonetheless, the F-5 embodies many of the design concepts that are well respected in the F-16 Falcon, the most numerically significant fighter in the USAF. Like the F-16, it is based on maneuverability, low procurement and maintenance cost, light weight, friendly flight characteristics, multirole capability, and just enough complexity to achieve the desired mission. It is recognized that Pentagon F-16 proponents such as Colonels John Boyd and Everest Riccione, and analyst Pierre Sprey, correctly identified the high value of light fighters, no more than necessary cost and complexity, and the fact that gun armed fighters and air-to-air dog fighting were still effective and necessary. They successfully and significantly improved the effectiveness of the USAF by guiding the definition of the F-16 and shepherding it into production.
What is not so commonly recognized is the fact that the F-5 and its proponents had pioneered many of the same correct concepts nearly 15 years earlier. The F-5 proved that it was possible to improve the performance of fighters while stepping back to the lower weight and complexity of earlier fighters, and to greatly improve the cost effectiveness of a modern air force. Had the USAF had the foresight to recognize the full value of the F-5 and procure it in volume beginning in the early 1960's, the U.S. would have had both a more combat effective and cost effective Air Force in the 1960's and 1970's (reference Sprey article on this point).
Though the U.S. Air Force is once again leaning to preferring complexity and resulting high cost and lower numbers of aircraft with the F-22 and F-35, the value of the light weight lower cost fighter is recognized elsewhere. A successful modern example is the Saab JAS-39 Gripen." FarronDacus ( talk) 19:53, 31 January 2013 (UTC)Farron Dacus
The design of the Mig-23 did not result from the examination of F-5's captured in 1975. The Mig-23 entered service in 1970. 203.184.41.226 ( talk) 05:15, 1 February 2013 (UTC)
In the segment under Operational History, the source written by Sprey appears dubious.
Sprey's document looks at a specific subset of the ACEVAL/AIMVAL tests, but not the tests as a whole. RADM Julian Lake, Navy Test Director of the ACEVAL/AIMVAL trials noted the Blue Force Navy F-14 and Air Force F-15 aircrews achieved an overall 2:1 exchange ratio vs. Red Force F-5's (Lake, Jon (ed.) "F-14 Tomcat, Shipborne Superfighter", pg. 84-85), RADM Paul Gillcrist reiterates this, among the other findings which he considered to be important takeaways from ACEVAL/AIMVAL (Gillcrist, Paul T., "TOMCAT! The Grumman F-14 Story", pg. 93, 95). It is repeated again by Donald Auten (CAPT, USNR) in his biography of Capt John Monroe "Hawk" Smith (Auten, "Roger Ball!" pg. 390). Capt Smith flew in assistance of the Red Force after they had been badly outmatched by the Blue Force F-14 crews and provided the Red Force with new tactics to help combat the F-14's radar (Auten, pg. 344, Jans, Andre & Dixon, Daniel (Ed.), "Hoser Here, Shoot!" pg. 134-135). One of the Tomcat pilots involved (and top exchange rate scorer of the entire exercise - Jans & Dixon (Ed.), pg. 100) recalled that at certain points in the trials, scores could be as lopsided as 6:1 in favor of the F-14 ( http://www.tomcat-sunset.org/forums/index.php?topic=2441.msg62542#msg62542; pg. 149 - "[We] just recounted a tactic that our section spawned. We called it the "Piston". One of those complicated and difficult to execute profiles. This, for a while, drove our 2v2 and 2v1 kill ratio up into about the 6 to 1 realm of magnificence!").
This information is in stark contrast to what Sprey listed (in "Effectiveness of Air to Air fighters F-86 to F-18", pg 139-140):
"The outcome, despite the artificialities, was surprisingly similar to Featherduster, for the first three weeks, the F-14s and F-15s were hopelessly outclassed and demoralized [by the F-5]. Eventually, they adapted with more suitable tactics. In the first test, AIMVAL, the pairs and fours of F-14s had an overall score of slightly less than 1 to 1 against the F-5s while the F-15s scored slightly above 1 to 1. In the second test, with further "tuning" of the rules, the F-14s did slightly better than breaking even with the F-5s in non-1v1 engagements; the F-15s got almost 2 to 1."
The above is with respect to a specific set of tests, also discussed by RADM Julian Lake (Lake, Jon (ed.), pg. 84), wherein the F-5's were equipped with Radar Warning Receivers and as discussed by Auten and mentioned by Lake, had received new tactics from the TOPGUN XO on exploiting a weakness in the Pulse Doppler radar used by the F-14. Sprey tried to spin the results further into the F-5's favor, writing that the F-14's and F-15's were "hopelessly outclassed and demoralized". Perhaps for that span of the tests the F-5's outscored the larger fighters, but Sprey did not mention that the F-5 crews themselves were badly beaten by at least the F-14 crews during other portions of the very same tests. RADM Lake provides the exchange rates in other segments for the F-14's as between 1.4:1 and 2:1, which is not listed by Sprey, nor is the overall test result of 2:1, nor the engagements that favored the Blue Force F-14's at as high as 6:1. Gervasi, in Arsenal of Democracy II indicated that at points in the test, the F-14 exchange rate was between 1.3 and 1.4 to 1, and the F-15's "fared even worse" (Gervasi, pg. 123) the low rate matches what RADM Lake recalled for one of the portions of the test (listed above), but again not the overall results.
One must also consider the circumstances under which Sprey, an advocate of light fighters, was writing. In the year 1982, the Hornet program was still controversial; it needed all the help it could get, and even RADM Gillcrist who was a later critic of the Super Hornet program (Gillcrist, pg. 188), was one of the people fighting to keep the original F/A-18 alive at the time (ibid, pg. 188-189). By misrepresenting the record of the crews of the larger fighters, Sprey made a stronger case for lightweight fighter programs, regardless of the fact that the F-5 did not achieve an overall test exchange rate of better than 1:1. On the other hand, it must also be said that the F-14 and F-15 cost about 6 times an F-5 when the tests were being conducted in 1976-77 (Gervasi 97, 120, 125) . With this in mind, the F-5 achieved better rates by cost per aircraft against both the F-14 and F-15, rather than by aircraft "shot down."
Recommend re-tailoring the section with the overall results, or mentioning specifically that during portions of the test, the F-5 crews were able to achieve positive exchange rates against the F-14 and F-15. Possible: "The F-5E, when equipped with the all-aspect AIM-9L, proved itself to be a fearsome opponent in visual range combat against more complex and expensive fighters. During realistic trials at Nellis AFB in 1977, aircrews in the much simpler Tiger fought Navy F-14's and Air Force F-15's equipped with long range radar, Visual Target Acquisition Systems and AIM-7 Sparrow Beyond Visual Range missiles to an overall exchange rate of only 2:1 [1] [2] [3], and achieved superior exchange rates at different points in the tests [4] [5]. At a unit cost of about one-sixth that of the larger fighters, the F-5's were clearly victorious from a cost perspective. [6]." USAFDude ( talk) 01:21, 2 October 2013 (UTC)
The origin needs to be rewritten. I tried a quick fix, but it was reverted. The T-38 article says the F-5 is a product of the T-38, the F-5 article says the T-38 is a product of the F-5. The T-38 had a slightly earlier first flight, and both are basically a parallel N-156 (N-156F and N-156T) development. Lastdingo ( talk) 11:22, 8 February 2014 (UTC)
Done I read the T-38 article and it has the following: (... two N-156T prototypes ...) [reading 'between the lines']. Agreed? -- Charles Edwin Shipp ( talk) 14:21, 24 November 2014 (UTC)
The Curtiss P-40 Warhawk, the Me-109, and the Fw-190 operational histories all possess combat loss tables in their articles. Although not graphed, the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt article lists 3,752 aerial kills at a cost of 3,499 P47s lost to all causes in combat. The North American P-51 Mustang article shows figures of destroying 550 enemy aircraft in the air and 466 on the ground, at a cost of 2,520 Mustangs.
The Grumman F6F Hellcat article, and this one should be graphed because it is somewhat more detailed, gives figures of: 270 Hellcats lost to air to air combat, 553 lost to anti-aircraft ground and shipboard fire, and 341 F6Fs lost to operational causes, with another 1,298 Hellcats destroyed during training and ferry functions.
Now to look at one editor's reasoning for removing a professionally drawn up statistics table, which apparently was well researched and properly sourced: He states: "I really do not see this as DUE WEIGHT when coverage of others losses in other conflicts are not covered in a loss by loss basis, typically this is not deemed notable."
I'm not sure what "due weight" means, but I'll try to answer it as what I think it means. The editor's "Due Weight" might mean that the listing of F-5 losses isn't important; in which case, as noted in the above examples, it must be! Just taking a very small sample; the Me109, Fw190, and the P40 Warhawk had tables, and nearly every WWII aircraft appeared (from the few samples looked at) had at least statistics concerning losses and/or aerial victories (kills). The tables appeared to be well researched and properly sourced, and they did enhance the Wikipedia articles, making the information far more easily understood.
The F-5 Freedom Fighter loss rate data needs to be part of the article. After all, the ME-109 and the FW-190 get to keep theirs! And nearly all aircraft articles mention combat losses! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.14.159.1 ( talk • contribs) 01:14 26 March 2014
The Wiki article Battle of Trafalgar has 2 tables depicting French, Spanish, and British losses at the battle of Trafalgar in 1805. And they list casualties by ship!
The Order of Battle at the Battle of Trafalgar has a table that is nearly 1 1/2 feet long! It lists the name of the ship, type of ship, number of guns per vessel, and how many sailors were killed on each warship. According to some editors, that data is "not notable"? Then according to that criteria, that "Trafalgar" data should be removed. That would not be acceptable. Nearly all technical articles concerning warships, firearms, etc. have data and putting them into easily readable formats such as graphs, tables, and graphs, etc. should not be an issue.
I fail to see why this topic of tables and charts is even being discussed. What should be discussed is why sourced information is being removed w/o discussion. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.116.79.187 ( talk • contribs) 21:26 March 2014
Have you seen the "PRODUCTION OF SPECIFIC MODEL AIRCRAFT" listed under many Wiki aircraft articles? There are lists in Wiki articles for nearly everything.:
Its not too clear about what this "talk" is concerned about. If its about the information within the "table" or the table itself, either way "tables" can be beneficial, as well as making reading easier for people to understand. The three samples depicted below, including the F5 are and should be, respectively, a fine contribution to their appropriate article:
German Type 23 Torpedo Boat (Table depicted in Wiki article)
Name | Launched | Completed | Fate |
---|---|---|---|
Mowe (Seagull) | 1926 | 1926 | Sunk by bombing in LeHavre 14 June 1944 |
Falke (Falcon) | 1926 | 1926 | Sunk by bombing in LeHavre 14 June 1944 |
Greif (Grifrow) | 1926 | 1927 | Torpedoed by aircraft 24 May 1944 |
Kondor (Condor) | 1926 | 1927 | Mined 23 May 1944, decommissioned 01 Aug 1944 |
Albatross | 1926 | 1928 | Wrecked by accidental grounding 10 Aug 1940 during invasion of Norway |
Seeadler (Sea Eagle) | 1926 | 1927 | Sunk by British MTBs during action of 13 May 1942 while escorting auxiliary cruiser Stier |
German Type 24 Torpedo Boat (Table as depicted in Wiki article)
Name | Launched | Completed | Fate |
---|---|---|---|
Wolf | 1927 | 1928 | Mined 08 Jan 1941 near Dunkirk |
IIti (Polecat) | 1927 | 1928 | Sunk by British MTBs during action of 13 May 1942 while escorting the auxiliary cruiser Stier |
Jaguar | 1928 | 1929 | bombed 14 June 1944 |
Leopard | 1928 | 1929 | wrecked in collision with minelayer "Prevssen" 30 Apr 1940 |
Luchs (Lynx) | 1928 | 1929 | Torpedoed by HMS Submarine "Thames" 26 July 1940 |
Tiger | 1928 | 1929 | wrecked in collision with destroyer Max Schultz 25 Sept 1939 |
Date | F-5 Model | Unit | Cause of Loss/Remarks |
---|---|---|---|
12-16-65 | F-5C | 4503rd Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) | Ground fire, small arms |
7-03-66 | F-5C | 10th Fighter Commando Squadron (FCS) | Ground fire, small arms |
8-08-66 | F-5C | 10th FCS | Operational loss, engine failure |
8-22-66 | F-5C | 10th FCS | Ground fire, 20mm and .50 caliber machine guns |
9-10-66 | F-5C | 10th FCS | Ground fire, small arms |
9-26-66 | F-5C | 10th FCS | Ground fire, small arms |
12-07-66 | F-5C (2) | 10th FCS | Ground fire, small arms |
3-04-67 | F-5C | 10th FCS | Operational loss, engine failure |
All three of these "tables" are informative, attractive, and seemingly well organized. They are fine contributions to the topics that they represent.'
This article states: "it was perhaps the most effective air-to-air fighter possessed by the U.S. in the 1960s and early 1970s" The reference cited is hardly definitive for such a bold statement. Indeed, for a statement like this, one would have to get some pretty heavy hitters lined up to back it up - otherwise it just comes off as silly. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 192.158.48.16 ( talk) 19:11, 17 July 2014 (UTC)
I added the photo because it was the only photo of a Royal Bahraini Air Force F-5I think it adds to the article because of it's rarity.
Articseahorse (talk) 16:31, 24 November 2014 (UTC)
I think a short text should point out here that 2 front fuselage of F-5E are the front fuselage of the X-29. if we have a look at the YF-17 the difference is not much bigger to the F-5E. Two X-29As were built by Grumman from two existing Northrop F-5A Freedom Fighter airframes (63-8372 became 82-0003 and 65-10573 became 82-0049) [1] FFA P-16 ( talk) 17:34, 29 December 2014 (UTC)
I think this 2 are missing may someone can build it into the text.
They used it in flight tests to finde out the weak points of the F-5e and also used it to adapt usefule desings of the F-5E for the Aero Vodochody factory. FFA P-16 ( talk) 17:48, 29 December 2014 (UTC)
Turkish Air Force has phased out F-5 from active duty by the summer of 2013, only the aerobatic demonstration team keep using F-5, thus it can be removed from the operator list. And I believe it's better someone edit the operator map accordingly, I don't know how to edit that. 188.119.1.66 ( talk) 16:23, 10 February 2015 (UTC)
The basic description of the aircraft should not involve assumptions about the US policy towards light fighters, or the origins/history of the aircraft. That is not what the description is for.
including things such as a supposed double standard because the USAF bought the trainer version is not something that belongs in the summary or description of the aircraft.
Production numbers also are not the main point of a summary and description. It does not matter if we know how much of something was produced, if we dont know WHAT IT IS. That is the entire purpose of a summary and description of the aircraft itself. How much the aircraft was produced does not warrant replacing that the aircraft is 8th most common fighter, or replacing the entire purpose and performance of the aircraft with sections of its design history.
Replacing the main purpose of the aircraft with minor details about different models is not acceptable. Dont replace the main USAF role of the aircraft AS AN AGGRESSOR with information about models which werent produced or have little to do with the overall F-5 design. Replacing the words involving the MAIN ROLE OF THE AIRCRAFT with wording about a rare recon version make the summary vague and pointless. Pointing out many small facts about rare versions does not warrant removing almost the entire text regarding its main role as an aggressor.
Please, stick to the point when editing the description, include the most relevant information, and avoid replacing the most important information with small details which have little to do with the overall aircraft.
For instance, editing the description to involve the winning of the early 70s contract has nothing to do with the overall description of the aircraft. That belongs in history, not in the summary and description.
The description should involve the type of aircraft, how it generally compares, and what it is most well known for. Replacing this with small details and leaving out the large details and replacing them with details that describe nothing ABOUT THE AIRCRAFT ITSELF is absurd. Please refrain from this in the future. DbivansMCMLXXXVI ( talk) 14:28, 2 March 2015 (UTC)
Removing claims such as hourly cost, the purpose of the aircraft, or any other information that are ALREADY SUPPORTED should not be removed and replaced by past revisions THAT INCLUDE THEY VERY SAME INFORMATION. Please refrain from this in the future. — Preceding unsigned comment added by DbivansMCMLXXXVI ( talk • contribs) 16:55, 2 March 2015 (UTC)
The additional information that was restored is absurd. If you dont like something, dont revert it to a version that says the same thing with the same sources, but includes pointless information.
If you have a problem with one of the facts, please remove it and do not revise it to a version that is filled with all sorts of out of place information and things which do not belong in a summary. Thank you. DbivansMCMLXXXVI ( talk) 17:39, 2 March 2015 (UTC)
In the first few days of March 2015 there was an explosion of edits and a stable and fundamentally sound (in my opinion) introductory section was rewritten in a struggle between several editors. As a result all discussion of major fighter effectiveness factors was removed from the introduction.
I would submit that the issue of effectiveness is a major one for the F-5, and for any fighter plane. The main factors of effectiveness as promoted by Pierre Sprey and other professional air combat experts are in order of importance:
1. The element of surprise.
2. The element of winning numbers (cost and reliability)
3. Maneuver advantage.
4. Weapon systems effectiveness (ability to score reliable shoot-downs).
It was claimed under the talk section "Really?" that it appeared "silly" to note that the F-5 might have been the most effective U.S. fighter of the 1960's and early 1970's according to these criteria. That concern was mostly based on the assertion also claimed under "Really?" that surprise and its small visual signature component were not that important. That is a mistaken statement based on the historical record which proves that the majority of shoot-downs are based on ability to surprise without being surprised, which is in turn based on small size, good visibility out of the cockpit, and lack of engine smoke (all attributes possessed by the F-5, but certainly not by the contemporaneous F-4). It was argued by example that the F-14 with long range Phoenix missiles might claim the title of most effective by surprising from very long range. However, the reality based historical record is the complete opposite. The only 3 times a Phoenix missile shot was ever tried (due to difficult identification at long range) no kills were scored. The concept of the very long range air to air missile has so far failed (after spending approximately $1Billion and scoring no kills) and been retired from U.S. military service, so it cannot be claimed to be in any way "effective". The claim might be made that modern Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) based radars that do not give away the radar source offer a long range element of surprise independent of aircraft size, but this is not applicable to the F-5 of the 1960's and 1970's. Those radars did not exist then, and the small visual and radar cross sections of the F-5 were key to its effectiveness.
Also critical to its effectiveness are low cost, high reliability, high maneuverability, and an effective weapons suite of heat seeking missiles and guns (no gun on the contemporary F-4 of the 1960's, only smoky engines visible over 20 miles away and missiles with about 10% kill probability). Along with surprise these are key reality based measures of effectiveness that deserve to be in the article.
Neglecting to note these factors presents a negatively biased perception of the F-5 in the most fundamental way, and degrades the quality of the article. Would be acceptable to the other editors to add this material back in the Design section? Question asked March 4, 2015. -- FarronDacus ( talk) 05:11, 5 March 2015 (UTC)
The N-156 was a fighter. Its first successful sales came from a version they developed into a trainer, the T-38. They then successfully sold it in its original form as the F-5 fighter. That does not mean it was "developed from" the T-38. One might say that a F-94 is developed from a T-33, as it used the stretched fuselage of the trainer. The F-5 is the N-156; the T-38 is to the F-5 as the T-33 is to the F-80. Which version was adopted by the USAF first is irrelevant; the F-5 was designed by Northrop as a single seat fighter, and then modified it into a trainer.
If you care to glance at the actual article: "The F-5 development effort was formally started in the mid-1950s by Northrop Corporation for a low-cost, low-maintenance fighter. The company designation for the first design as the N-156, intended partly to meet a U.S. Navy requirement for a jet fighter to operate from its escort carriers, which were too small to operate the Navy's existing jet fighters. That requirement disappeared when the Navy decided to withdraw the escort carriers; however Northrop continued development of the N-156, both as a two-seat advanced trainer, designated as N-156T, and a single-seat fighter, designated as N-156F.
That in no way indicates that they went through the trouble of shortening a T-38 and figuring out how to fit armament to it...that is what "developed from" suggests. They already had an armed, single-seat fighter, which they had developed into a 2-seat trainer.
And if you disagree that constitutes the T-38 being developed from the F-5, perhaps "related to " might be a better term. .45Colt 04:30, 11 May 2015 (UTC)
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How come Sprey is credited in this manner? The only employment he had in aerospace was with Grumman (Not General Dynamics who developed the F-16 series) and as a special assistant to SecDef. He was a proponent of E-M theory, for certain, but surely any credit should be given to John Boyd as opposed to Sprey. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.224.6.191 ( talk) 17:56, 22 May 2018 (UTC)
This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 1 | Archive 2 |
Shouldn't US still a operator of F-5E/Fs? So can anyone change the operator map color of US, from red to blue? Bryan TMF ( talk) 07:33, 13 February 2011 (UTC)
The F-5 would seem to be an iconic fighter that is as much of a design breakthrough as more famous fighters such as the P-51 and F-86. It reversed the trend to greater cost, weight, and complexity that fighters were suffering under, and was competitive with much more expensive aircraft at least through the 1980's. The concepts it embodied were similar to those of the F-16, which received much more credit and are presented in some works ("Boyd" and "The Mind of War") as original breakthroughs more than a decade later. Would a section pointing out the big picture of where the F-5 fits in the history of fighter aircraft be a worthwhile improvement to the article? Candidate first draft text is as follows. This draft probably needs help to maintain a neutral point of view when communicating a possibly contentious topic (the quality of Air Force decisions on procurement).
"The lack of procurement of the F-5 by the U.S. Air Force and its lack of participation in a major war have reduced its prominence among historically significant fighters. Nonetheless, the F-5 embodies many of the design concepts that are well respected in the F-16 Falcon, the most numerically significant fighter in the USAF. Like the F-16, it is based on maneuverability, low procurement and maintenance cost, light weight, friendly flight characteristics, multirole capability, and just enough complexity to achieve the desired mission. It is recognized that Pentagon F-16 proponents such as Colonels John Boyd and Everest Riccione, and analyst Pierre Sprey, correctly identified the high value of light fighters, no more than necessary cost and complexity, and the fact that gun armed fighters and air-to-air dog fighting were still effective and necessary. They successfully and significantly improved the effectiveness of the USAF by guiding the definition of the F-16 and shepherding it into production.
What is not so commonly recognized is the fact that the F-5 and its proponents had pioneered many of the same correct concepts nearly 15 years earlier. The F-5 proved that it was possible to improve the performance of fighters while stepping back to the lower weight and complexity of earlier fighters, and to greatly improve the cost effectiveness of a modern air force. Had the USAF had the foresight to recognize the full value of the F-5 and procure it in volume beginning in the early 1960's, the U.S. would have had both a more combat effective and cost effective Air Force in the 1960's and 1970's (reference Sprey article on this point).
Though the U.S. Air Force is once again leaning to preferring complexity and resulting high cost and lower numbers of aircraft with the F-22 and F-35, the value of the light weight lower cost fighter is recognized elsewhere. A successful modern example is the Saab JAS-39 Gripen." FarronDacus ( talk) 19:53, 31 January 2013 (UTC)Farron Dacus
The design of the Mig-23 did not result from the examination of F-5's captured in 1975. The Mig-23 entered service in 1970. 203.184.41.226 ( talk) 05:15, 1 February 2013 (UTC)
In the segment under Operational History, the source written by Sprey appears dubious.
Sprey's document looks at a specific subset of the ACEVAL/AIMVAL tests, but not the tests as a whole. RADM Julian Lake, Navy Test Director of the ACEVAL/AIMVAL trials noted the Blue Force Navy F-14 and Air Force F-15 aircrews achieved an overall 2:1 exchange ratio vs. Red Force F-5's (Lake, Jon (ed.) "F-14 Tomcat, Shipborne Superfighter", pg. 84-85), RADM Paul Gillcrist reiterates this, among the other findings which he considered to be important takeaways from ACEVAL/AIMVAL (Gillcrist, Paul T., "TOMCAT! The Grumman F-14 Story", pg. 93, 95). It is repeated again by Donald Auten (CAPT, USNR) in his biography of Capt John Monroe "Hawk" Smith (Auten, "Roger Ball!" pg. 390). Capt Smith flew in assistance of the Red Force after they had been badly outmatched by the Blue Force F-14 crews and provided the Red Force with new tactics to help combat the F-14's radar (Auten, pg. 344, Jans, Andre & Dixon, Daniel (Ed.), "Hoser Here, Shoot!" pg. 134-135). One of the Tomcat pilots involved (and top exchange rate scorer of the entire exercise - Jans & Dixon (Ed.), pg. 100) recalled that at certain points in the trials, scores could be as lopsided as 6:1 in favor of the F-14 ( http://www.tomcat-sunset.org/forums/index.php?topic=2441.msg62542#msg62542; pg. 149 - "[We] just recounted a tactic that our section spawned. We called it the "Piston". One of those complicated and difficult to execute profiles. This, for a while, drove our 2v2 and 2v1 kill ratio up into about the 6 to 1 realm of magnificence!").
This information is in stark contrast to what Sprey listed (in "Effectiveness of Air to Air fighters F-86 to F-18", pg 139-140):
"The outcome, despite the artificialities, was surprisingly similar to Featherduster, for the first three weeks, the F-14s and F-15s were hopelessly outclassed and demoralized [by the F-5]. Eventually, they adapted with more suitable tactics. In the first test, AIMVAL, the pairs and fours of F-14s had an overall score of slightly less than 1 to 1 against the F-5s while the F-15s scored slightly above 1 to 1. In the second test, with further "tuning" of the rules, the F-14s did slightly better than breaking even with the F-5s in non-1v1 engagements; the F-15s got almost 2 to 1."
The above is with respect to a specific set of tests, also discussed by RADM Julian Lake (Lake, Jon (ed.), pg. 84), wherein the F-5's were equipped with Radar Warning Receivers and as discussed by Auten and mentioned by Lake, had received new tactics from the TOPGUN XO on exploiting a weakness in the Pulse Doppler radar used by the F-14. Sprey tried to spin the results further into the F-5's favor, writing that the F-14's and F-15's were "hopelessly outclassed and demoralized". Perhaps for that span of the tests the F-5's outscored the larger fighters, but Sprey did not mention that the F-5 crews themselves were badly beaten by at least the F-14 crews during other portions of the very same tests. RADM Lake provides the exchange rates in other segments for the F-14's as between 1.4:1 and 2:1, which is not listed by Sprey, nor is the overall test result of 2:1, nor the engagements that favored the Blue Force F-14's at as high as 6:1. Gervasi, in Arsenal of Democracy II indicated that at points in the test, the F-14 exchange rate was between 1.3 and 1.4 to 1, and the F-15's "fared even worse" (Gervasi, pg. 123) the low rate matches what RADM Lake recalled for one of the portions of the test (listed above), but again not the overall results.
One must also consider the circumstances under which Sprey, an advocate of light fighters, was writing. In the year 1982, the Hornet program was still controversial; it needed all the help it could get, and even RADM Gillcrist who was a later critic of the Super Hornet program (Gillcrist, pg. 188), was one of the people fighting to keep the original F/A-18 alive at the time (ibid, pg. 188-189). By misrepresenting the record of the crews of the larger fighters, Sprey made a stronger case for lightweight fighter programs, regardless of the fact that the F-5 did not achieve an overall test exchange rate of better than 1:1. On the other hand, it must also be said that the F-14 and F-15 cost about 6 times an F-5 when the tests were being conducted in 1976-77 (Gervasi 97, 120, 125) . With this in mind, the F-5 achieved better rates by cost per aircraft against both the F-14 and F-15, rather than by aircraft "shot down."
Recommend re-tailoring the section with the overall results, or mentioning specifically that during portions of the test, the F-5 crews were able to achieve positive exchange rates against the F-14 and F-15. Possible: "The F-5E, when equipped with the all-aspect AIM-9L, proved itself to be a fearsome opponent in visual range combat against more complex and expensive fighters. During realistic trials at Nellis AFB in 1977, aircrews in the much simpler Tiger fought Navy F-14's and Air Force F-15's equipped with long range radar, Visual Target Acquisition Systems and AIM-7 Sparrow Beyond Visual Range missiles to an overall exchange rate of only 2:1 [1] [2] [3], and achieved superior exchange rates at different points in the tests [4] [5]. At a unit cost of about one-sixth that of the larger fighters, the F-5's were clearly victorious from a cost perspective. [6]." USAFDude ( talk) 01:21, 2 October 2013 (UTC)
The origin needs to be rewritten. I tried a quick fix, but it was reverted. The T-38 article says the F-5 is a product of the T-38, the F-5 article says the T-38 is a product of the F-5. The T-38 had a slightly earlier first flight, and both are basically a parallel N-156 (N-156F and N-156T) development. Lastdingo ( talk) 11:22, 8 February 2014 (UTC)
Done I read the T-38 article and it has the following: (... two N-156T prototypes ...) [reading 'between the lines']. Agreed? -- Charles Edwin Shipp ( talk) 14:21, 24 November 2014 (UTC)
The Curtiss P-40 Warhawk, the Me-109, and the Fw-190 operational histories all possess combat loss tables in their articles. Although not graphed, the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt article lists 3,752 aerial kills at a cost of 3,499 P47s lost to all causes in combat. The North American P-51 Mustang article shows figures of destroying 550 enemy aircraft in the air and 466 on the ground, at a cost of 2,520 Mustangs.
The Grumman F6F Hellcat article, and this one should be graphed because it is somewhat more detailed, gives figures of: 270 Hellcats lost to air to air combat, 553 lost to anti-aircraft ground and shipboard fire, and 341 F6Fs lost to operational causes, with another 1,298 Hellcats destroyed during training and ferry functions.
Now to look at one editor's reasoning for removing a professionally drawn up statistics table, which apparently was well researched and properly sourced: He states: "I really do not see this as DUE WEIGHT when coverage of others losses in other conflicts are not covered in a loss by loss basis, typically this is not deemed notable."
I'm not sure what "due weight" means, but I'll try to answer it as what I think it means. The editor's "Due Weight" might mean that the listing of F-5 losses isn't important; in which case, as noted in the above examples, it must be! Just taking a very small sample; the Me109, Fw190, and the P40 Warhawk had tables, and nearly every WWII aircraft appeared (from the few samples looked at) had at least statistics concerning losses and/or aerial victories (kills). The tables appeared to be well researched and properly sourced, and they did enhance the Wikipedia articles, making the information far more easily understood.
The F-5 Freedom Fighter loss rate data needs to be part of the article. After all, the ME-109 and the FW-190 get to keep theirs! And nearly all aircraft articles mention combat losses! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.14.159.1 ( talk • contribs) 01:14 26 March 2014
The Wiki article Battle of Trafalgar has 2 tables depicting French, Spanish, and British losses at the battle of Trafalgar in 1805. And they list casualties by ship!
The Order of Battle at the Battle of Trafalgar has a table that is nearly 1 1/2 feet long! It lists the name of the ship, type of ship, number of guns per vessel, and how many sailors were killed on each warship. According to some editors, that data is "not notable"? Then according to that criteria, that "Trafalgar" data should be removed. That would not be acceptable. Nearly all technical articles concerning warships, firearms, etc. have data and putting them into easily readable formats such as graphs, tables, and graphs, etc. should not be an issue.
I fail to see why this topic of tables and charts is even being discussed. What should be discussed is why sourced information is being removed w/o discussion. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.116.79.187 ( talk • contribs) 21:26 March 2014
Have you seen the "PRODUCTION OF SPECIFIC MODEL AIRCRAFT" listed under many Wiki aircraft articles? There are lists in Wiki articles for nearly everything.:
Its not too clear about what this "talk" is concerned about. If its about the information within the "table" or the table itself, either way "tables" can be beneficial, as well as making reading easier for people to understand. The three samples depicted below, including the F5 are and should be, respectively, a fine contribution to their appropriate article:
German Type 23 Torpedo Boat (Table depicted in Wiki article)
Name | Launched | Completed | Fate |
---|---|---|---|
Mowe (Seagull) | 1926 | 1926 | Sunk by bombing in LeHavre 14 June 1944 |
Falke (Falcon) | 1926 | 1926 | Sunk by bombing in LeHavre 14 June 1944 |
Greif (Grifrow) | 1926 | 1927 | Torpedoed by aircraft 24 May 1944 |
Kondor (Condor) | 1926 | 1927 | Mined 23 May 1944, decommissioned 01 Aug 1944 |
Albatross | 1926 | 1928 | Wrecked by accidental grounding 10 Aug 1940 during invasion of Norway |
Seeadler (Sea Eagle) | 1926 | 1927 | Sunk by British MTBs during action of 13 May 1942 while escorting auxiliary cruiser Stier |
German Type 24 Torpedo Boat (Table as depicted in Wiki article)
Name | Launched | Completed | Fate |
---|---|---|---|
Wolf | 1927 | 1928 | Mined 08 Jan 1941 near Dunkirk |
IIti (Polecat) | 1927 | 1928 | Sunk by British MTBs during action of 13 May 1942 while escorting the auxiliary cruiser Stier |
Jaguar | 1928 | 1929 | bombed 14 June 1944 |
Leopard | 1928 | 1929 | wrecked in collision with minelayer "Prevssen" 30 Apr 1940 |
Luchs (Lynx) | 1928 | 1929 | Torpedoed by HMS Submarine "Thames" 26 July 1940 |
Tiger | 1928 | 1929 | wrecked in collision with destroyer Max Schultz 25 Sept 1939 |
Date | F-5 Model | Unit | Cause of Loss/Remarks |
---|---|---|---|
12-16-65 | F-5C | 4503rd Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) | Ground fire, small arms |
7-03-66 | F-5C | 10th Fighter Commando Squadron (FCS) | Ground fire, small arms |
8-08-66 | F-5C | 10th FCS | Operational loss, engine failure |
8-22-66 | F-5C | 10th FCS | Ground fire, 20mm and .50 caliber machine guns |
9-10-66 | F-5C | 10th FCS | Ground fire, small arms |
9-26-66 | F-5C | 10th FCS | Ground fire, small arms |
12-07-66 | F-5C (2) | 10th FCS | Ground fire, small arms |
3-04-67 | F-5C | 10th FCS | Operational loss, engine failure |
All three of these "tables" are informative, attractive, and seemingly well organized. They are fine contributions to the topics that they represent.'
This article states: "it was perhaps the most effective air-to-air fighter possessed by the U.S. in the 1960s and early 1970s" The reference cited is hardly definitive for such a bold statement. Indeed, for a statement like this, one would have to get some pretty heavy hitters lined up to back it up - otherwise it just comes off as silly. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 192.158.48.16 ( talk) 19:11, 17 July 2014 (UTC)
I added the photo because it was the only photo of a Royal Bahraini Air Force F-5I think it adds to the article because of it's rarity.
Articseahorse (talk) 16:31, 24 November 2014 (UTC)
I think a short text should point out here that 2 front fuselage of F-5E are the front fuselage of the X-29. if we have a look at the YF-17 the difference is not much bigger to the F-5E. Two X-29As were built by Grumman from two existing Northrop F-5A Freedom Fighter airframes (63-8372 became 82-0003 and 65-10573 became 82-0049) [1] FFA P-16 ( talk) 17:34, 29 December 2014 (UTC)
I think this 2 are missing may someone can build it into the text.
They used it in flight tests to finde out the weak points of the F-5e and also used it to adapt usefule desings of the F-5E for the Aero Vodochody factory. FFA P-16 ( talk) 17:48, 29 December 2014 (UTC)
Turkish Air Force has phased out F-5 from active duty by the summer of 2013, only the aerobatic demonstration team keep using F-5, thus it can be removed from the operator list. And I believe it's better someone edit the operator map accordingly, I don't know how to edit that. 188.119.1.66 ( talk) 16:23, 10 February 2015 (UTC)
The basic description of the aircraft should not involve assumptions about the US policy towards light fighters, or the origins/history of the aircraft. That is not what the description is for.
including things such as a supposed double standard because the USAF bought the trainer version is not something that belongs in the summary or description of the aircraft.
Production numbers also are not the main point of a summary and description. It does not matter if we know how much of something was produced, if we dont know WHAT IT IS. That is the entire purpose of a summary and description of the aircraft itself. How much the aircraft was produced does not warrant replacing that the aircraft is 8th most common fighter, or replacing the entire purpose and performance of the aircraft with sections of its design history.
Replacing the main purpose of the aircraft with minor details about different models is not acceptable. Dont replace the main USAF role of the aircraft AS AN AGGRESSOR with information about models which werent produced or have little to do with the overall F-5 design. Replacing the words involving the MAIN ROLE OF THE AIRCRAFT with wording about a rare recon version make the summary vague and pointless. Pointing out many small facts about rare versions does not warrant removing almost the entire text regarding its main role as an aggressor.
Please, stick to the point when editing the description, include the most relevant information, and avoid replacing the most important information with small details which have little to do with the overall aircraft.
For instance, editing the description to involve the winning of the early 70s contract has nothing to do with the overall description of the aircraft. That belongs in history, not in the summary and description.
The description should involve the type of aircraft, how it generally compares, and what it is most well known for. Replacing this with small details and leaving out the large details and replacing them with details that describe nothing ABOUT THE AIRCRAFT ITSELF is absurd. Please refrain from this in the future. DbivansMCMLXXXVI ( talk) 14:28, 2 March 2015 (UTC)
Removing claims such as hourly cost, the purpose of the aircraft, or any other information that are ALREADY SUPPORTED should not be removed and replaced by past revisions THAT INCLUDE THEY VERY SAME INFORMATION. Please refrain from this in the future. — Preceding unsigned comment added by DbivansMCMLXXXVI ( talk • contribs) 16:55, 2 March 2015 (UTC)
The additional information that was restored is absurd. If you dont like something, dont revert it to a version that says the same thing with the same sources, but includes pointless information.
If you have a problem with one of the facts, please remove it and do not revise it to a version that is filled with all sorts of out of place information and things which do not belong in a summary. Thank you. DbivansMCMLXXXVI ( talk) 17:39, 2 March 2015 (UTC)
In the first few days of March 2015 there was an explosion of edits and a stable and fundamentally sound (in my opinion) introductory section was rewritten in a struggle between several editors. As a result all discussion of major fighter effectiveness factors was removed from the introduction.
I would submit that the issue of effectiveness is a major one for the F-5, and for any fighter plane. The main factors of effectiveness as promoted by Pierre Sprey and other professional air combat experts are in order of importance:
1. The element of surprise.
2. The element of winning numbers (cost and reliability)
3. Maneuver advantage.
4. Weapon systems effectiveness (ability to score reliable shoot-downs).
It was claimed under the talk section "Really?" that it appeared "silly" to note that the F-5 might have been the most effective U.S. fighter of the 1960's and early 1970's according to these criteria. That concern was mostly based on the assertion also claimed under "Really?" that surprise and its small visual signature component were not that important. That is a mistaken statement based on the historical record which proves that the majority of shoot-downs are based on ability to surprise without being surprised, which is in turn based on small size, good visibility out of the cockpit, and lack of engine smoke (all attributes possessed by the F-5, but certainly not by the contemporaneous F-4). It was argued by example that the F-14 with long range Phoenix missiles might claim the title of most effective by surprising from very long range. However, the reality based historical record is the complete opposite. The only 3 times a Phoenix missile shot was ever tried (due to difficult identification at long range) no kills were scored. The concept of the very long range air to air missile has so far failed (after spending approximately $1Billion and scoring no kills) and been retired from U.S. military service, so it cannot be claimed to be in any way "effective". The claim might be made that modern Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) based radars that do not give away the radar source offer a long range element of surprise independent of aircraft size, but this is not applicable to the F-5 of the 1960's and 1970's. Those radars did not exist then, and the small visual and radar cross sections of the F-5 were key to its effectiveness.
Also critical to its effectiveness are low cost, high reliability, high maneuverability, and an effective weapons suite of heat seeking missiles and guns (no gun on the contemporary F-4 of the 1960's, only smoky engines visible over 20 miles away and missiles with about 10% kill probability). Along with surprise these are key reality based measures of effectiveness that deserve to be in the article.
Neglecting to note these factors presents a negatively biased perception of the F-5 in the most fundamental way, and degrades the quality of the article. Would be acceptable to the other editors to add this material back in the Design section? Question asked March 4, 2015. -- FarronDacus ( talk) 05:11, 5 March 2015 (UTC)
The N-156 was a fighter. Its first successful sales came from a version they developed into a trainer, the T-38. They then successfully sold it in its original form as the F-5 fighter. That does not mean it was "developed from" the T-38. One might say that a F-94 is developed from a T-33, as it used the stretched fuselage of the trainer. The F-5 is the N-156; the T-38 is to the F-5 as the T-33 is to the F-80. Which version was adopted by the USAF first is irrelevant; the F-5 was designed by Northrop as a single seat fighter, and then modified it into a trainer.
If you care to glance at the actual article: "The F-5 development effort was formally started in the mid-1950s by Northrop Corporation for a low-cost, low-maintenance fighter. The company designation for the first design as the N-156, intended partly to meet a U.S. Navy requirement for a jet fighter to operate from its escort carriers, which were too small to operate the Navy's existing jet fighters. That requirement disappeared when the Navy decided to withdraw the escort carriers; however Northrop continued development of the N-156, both as a two-seat advanced trainer, designated as N-156T, and a single-seat fighter, designated as N-156F.
That in no way indicates that they went through the trouble of shortening a T-38 and figuring out how to fit armament to it...that is what "developed from" suggests. They already had an armed, single-seat fighter, which they had developed into a 2-seat trainer.
And if you disagree that constitutes the T-38 being developed from the F-5, perhaps "related to " might be a better term. .45Colt 04:30, 11 May 2015 (UTC)
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How come Sprey is credited in this manner? The only employment he had in aerospace was with Grumman (Not General Dynamics who developed the F-16 series) and as a special assistant to SecDef. He was a proponent of E-M theory, for certain, but surely any credit should be given to John Boyd as opposed to Sprey. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.224.6.191 ( talk) 17:56, 22 May 2018 (UTC)