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There is some sort of confusion here that I want to clear up before letting the recent edit through. As I understand it, 'existence' is not disputed by Nagarjuna - only inherent existence is disputed. If there were no existents, then all objects would have the same ontological significance as the horn of a hare, a hairy tortoiseshell, etc. and karma would not function. If we recollect that the project of Wisdom is to overturn Nirvana, we can identify that the specific quality of objects that is being invalidated is their efficaciousness as sources of happiness or suffering - a mistaken perception which leads to clinging/grasping (Upādāna/Taṇhā) ( 20040302 ( talk) 16:24, 27 January 2012 (UTC)) Likewise, can you provide the specific verse of chapter15 of the MMK ? ( 20040302 ( talk) 16:24, 27 January 2012 (UTC))
A recent edit stated: "Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are existents available to perish. (Ref:Tsondru, Mabja. Ornament of Reason. Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 56-58, 405-417.)
Nagarjuna only asserts that phenomena do not arise as inherent existents. Nagarjuna does not deny mere existence. This seems to be a sticking point. I am not disputing that this is what Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü may say, but I certainly dispute that this is an accurate depiction of all Madhyamika views. It is quite clear that other Madhyamakas disagree with this assertion. Likewise, I do not know (and have not yet been given evidence) if Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü reached this conclusion, and if so, how he did. What I know for sure is that there are plenty of Madhyamikas who dispute it - most notably Tsongkhapa and his followers. What I believe is completely undisputed is that Nagarjuna asserts: "Whatever is dependently co-arisen / That is explained to be emptiness." For the Lede, we should avoid using distinctions which are unshared position.
It occurs to me that this is a more subtle point - that what we agree is refuted is (the Svatantrika position of) an assertion of a conventional existence of intrinsic nature. However, mere, or conventional existence / aka nominal existence remains necessary for us to avoid conflating dependant origination with the imaginary (such as horns of hares, hairs on a tortoise shell etc.)
I am genuinely curious here - if Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü actually does interpret Nagarjuna as denying mere existence how does he distinguish between objects that are real (eg. the four noble truths - the denial of which would make him a non-buddhist) and those which are purely imaginary (such as the aforementioned hare-horn or, in a more contemporary setting, hobbits)? ( 20040302 ( talk) 16:20, 29 January 2012 (UTC))
I do not claim that Tsongkapa denies using the Catuskoti.
The four extremes are to do with inherent existence, not mere existence. Tsongkhapa states (Lam-Rim-Chen-Mo, Snow Lion, Vol 3. p156) Question: "If these things cannot withstand rational analysis, then how is it possible for something to exist where reason has refuted it?" Reply: "You are mistakenly conflating the inability to withstand rational analysis with invalidation by reason. Many who have made this error claim that production and such exist even though rational analysis of reality refutes them. This is reckless chatter, so we do not agree. To ask whether something can withstand rational analysis is to ask whether it is found by a line of reasoning that analyses reality. Candrakirti's commentary on The Four Hundred Stanzas (13.11) says: ...because our analysis is intent upon seeking intrinsic nature. So this (Catuskoti) is seeking to discover whether forms and so forth have an intrinsic nature that is produced, ceases, and so forth. [...] It is not that this line of reasoning searches for mere production and cessation. [...] The fact that this line of reasoning does not find them does not entail that it refutes them. Rather, reason refutes something that - if it did exist - would have to be established by reason, but which reason does not establish. Conventional consciousnesses establish the production and cessation of forms etc. though such forms and such exist, reasoning consciousness does not establish them. [...] For example, a visual consciousness does not find sounds, but this does not refute them. If production and so forth existed essentially - i.e.. were established in final reality, then reason would have to find them because it accurately analyses whether forms and such have essentially existing production and cessation. Since such analysis does not find production and so forth, it refutes production, cessation and so forth that exist essentially.
Candrakirti's says the following: (all taken from the aforementioned commentary on Aryadeva's 400 verses) Incorrect position: Aryadeva means that compounded phenomena lack production because this analysis (Catuskoti) refutes all forms of production. Reply: In that case, the production of compounded phenomena would not be like a magician's illusion. Rather we would make it understood using examples such as the son of a barren woman (horn of a hare, etc). Wary of the absurd implication that dependent-arisings would not exist, we avoid such comparisons. Instead we compare the production of things to a magician's illusion and so forth, examples that do not contradict dependent-arising. Objection: If eyes and such do not exist, then how can the sensory faculties of organs such as the eye be considered things that result from karma? Reply: Would we refute that it is the nature of these to result from Karma? Objection: Since you are demonstrating (via Catuskoti) the refutation of eyes and such, how could you not refute that? Reply:Because our analysis is intent upon seeking intrinsic nature. We refute here that things exist essentially; we do not refute that eyes and such are products and are dependently arisen results of karma. Therefore, they exist. Hence, when eyes and such are explained only as results of karma, they do exist.
So, we can see from both Candrakirti and Tsonkhapa that the Madhyamikas do not refute existence. Likewise, they do not assert that the Catuskoti refute existence - and indeed explicitly state that the Catuskoti are to be used to search for intrinsic nature. Moreover, Candrakirti asserts existence - as long as we are talking about existence arising from dependent-arising. ( 20040302 ( talk) 17:06, 29 January 2012 (UTC))
Is that it? — Preceding unsigned comment added by CO2Northeast ( talk • contribs) 18:03, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
You are trying to drag me into a Tibetan debate. Its very clear the two main extremes are, based on your quote "things exist, things do not exist." CO2Northeast ( talk) 18:09, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
I have the book is front of me now. The whole tetralemma chapter is chapter 15. You are quoting chapter 12. You stated that chapter 12, the one which you are quoting from, deals with the tetralemma, but it doesn't. You left off part of your quote, again in a deceitful manner. Here is the whole quote "A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena (Chapter 15). Chapter 15 is not the "Rational Analysis" chapter, which is chapter 12. I am seeking admin action. CO2Northeast ( talk) 18:23, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
Bullshit. You said "There is no deceit. The title of the section in the original text is A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena. The entire chapter "Rational Analysis" of the translation is concerned with the catuskoti. There is no mistake here." NONE OF THIS IS TRUE. CO2Northeast ( talk) 18:58, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
Its not a disagreement. What is the real subtitle of chapter 12? Simple question. You said it was one thing, but it isn't. CO2Northeast ( talk) 19:03, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
The rational analysis of chapter 12 is not the tetralemma in anyway, shape or form. You saying otherwise is simply deceit or illiteracy. The tetralemma is exclusively in chapter 15, and only a smart part of chapter 15 at that. CO2Northeast ( talk) 19:19, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
Of course I find the tetralemma important. It is you who takes the opposite position, editing it out of the article. Nice try to flip our positions. The fact that you actually tried to flip our respective positions, is something which admins need to take a look at. Regarding sources, read your own book starting on page 189, which is the second part of chapter 15. LOL User:CO2Northeast|CO2Northeast]] ( talk) 19:42, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
Before we continue with this technical discussion, I would like to point out that I believe that there is indeed a dispute between us, which I would consider to be fairly called a basic disagreement. There is clearly no established consensus WP:CON yet between us, and again I suggest that we find a means to resolve this, such as a third opinion WP:3O.
I trust that we share the common belief that the use of the word 'tetralemma' is a directly recognisable translation/synonym of 'catuskoti'. I am also glad that we can share the text - and that we both accept the text as a WP:RS regarding the position of the Madhyamaka.
My understanding of your position is that you are stating that the Madhyamikas use the catuskoti to dispute conventional existence. Is that correct?
One of the statements from the book which we both recognise is ""A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena ". However, we both appear to read this in a different manner. My understanding of the sentence is this (I paraphrase) "A refutation developed through the tetralemma is not legitimate for conventional phenomena". Hence my consternation.
As you suggested, I am reading from page 189 - the discussion of the tetralemma. First of all, I find no mention of the 'subtle object of negation' that you repeatedly have asserted. The section that I am reading is titled A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena.
Qualm: The Madhyamaka text refute all four parts of the tetralemma– a thing or intrinsic nature (1)exists [...], and (4) neither exists nor does not exist. Reason refutes everything, as there are no phenomena that are not included among these four. Reply: As indicated earlier "thing" has two meanings. (note 383 indicates that 'earlier' is referring to 597.16: page 145, para 2) Between these two, we refute the assertion that things essentially exist in terms of both truths; however at the conventional level we do not refute things that can perform functions. [...] Thus you should understand that all methods for refuting the tetralemma are like this, involving some qualifier such as 'essentially'. Suppose you refute the tetralemma without affixing any such qualification. You refute the position that things exist and you refute the position that things do not exist;
Continuing, on page 190, I read: Here in the Fundamental Treatise, "empty" and "non-empty" refer to being empty and not empty of intrinsic nature, and they are used in this way throughout the entire text, from beginning to end. For me, this is clear evidence that Madhyamikas do not use the tetralemma to dispute conventional existence.
Likewise, as mentioned above, Candrakirti's commentary on The Four Hundred Stanzas (13.11) says: ...because our analysis is intent upon seeking intrinsic nature. makes it clear to me that the analysis of Madhyamikas is intent on seeking intrinsic nature.
I am still waiting from you for Madhyamaka sources that disclose a 'subtle object of negation', or an assertion that the Catuskoti is used to dispute conventional existence. ( 20040302 ( talk) 10:08, 30 January 2012 (UTC))
What are the 4 extremes? Simple question. CO2Northeast ( talk) 15:42, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
For the Madhyamika, the four extremes are the extremes of inherent existence, inherent non-existence, inherent 'existence and non-existence' and inherent 'neither existence nor non-existence'. The reason why I am explicitly mentioning that this is to do with inherent existence is due to the cite above: p190: Here in the Fundamental Treatise, "empty" and "non-empty" refer to being empty and not empty of intrinsic nature, and they are used in this way throughout the entire text, from beginning to end. For me, this is clear evidence that Madhyamikas do not use the tetralemma to dispute conventional existence. Moreover, A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena indicates clearly that the tetralemma is not to be used as a refutation of conventional phenomena.
The contention is this: You wrote Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are existents available to perish I disagree with this sentence, unless we gloss it to be explicit that it is inherent existence that we are talking about, and inherent perishing. Madhyamikas accept conventional existents and conventional perishing. I am far more happy with the following sentence: Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as inherent existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are existents available to inherently perish. ( 20040302 ( talk) 16:39, 30 January 2012 (UTC))
Just settle the argument. I say the 4 extremes are existence, nonexistence, both and neither. What are the 4 extremes Sunray? CO2Northeast ( talk) 19:46, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
I guess someone is bringing up new issues. Very well. If you look at Jay Garfield's translation of the MMK, on page 220 it says "Essence by definition is eternal and independent". Nagarjuna is equating svabhāva with bhāva in this portion of chapter 15. CO2Northeast ( talk) 20:18, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
Please no partisan Tibetan material. Thank you. CO2Northeast ( talk) 22:12, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
The funny thing is the "disputed article" does not even contain my edits. Please add my edits regarding Abhidharma. Thank you. CO2Northeast ( talk) 23:37, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
Hi, everybody. I'm afraid I have to agree with March 2nd on this one, who said above: "For the Madhyamika, the four extremes are the extremes of inherent existence, inherent non-existence, inherent 'existence and non-existence' and inherent 'neither existence nor non-existence'."
I would like to quote from Nagarjuna's Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (28:8), wherein he also puts forth a 'positive' tetralemma, followed by Jay Garfield's commentary:
"Everything is real and is not real,
Both real and not real,
Neither real nor not real.
This is the Lord Buddha's teaching."
Jay Garfield: "This is the positive tetralemma regarding existence. Everything is conventionally real. Everything is ultimately unreal (that is, not unreal in just any sense, but unreal when seen from the ultimate standpoint). Everything has both characteristics--that is, everything is both conventionally real and ultimately unreal. Nothing is ultimately real or completely non-existent. That is, everything is neither real in one sense nor not-real in another sense."
Likewise, when reading the Heart Sutra, one should qualify all the no's as being "no inherent _____". For example, "Therefore, Shariputra, in emptiness there is no [inherently existent] form, no [inherently existent] feeling, no [inherently existent] discrimination.... Likewise, there is no [inherent] suffering, [inherent] origin, [inherent] cessation, or [inherent] path...." Amplifying Life ( talk) 02:11, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
Create a section on the two truths. Its pretty obvious by now, that this should have been done at the inception of the page. Madison34563 ( talk) 03:38, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
The Buddha's teaching of the Dharma is based on two truths: a truth of worldly convention and an ultimate truth. Those who do not understand the distinction drawn between these two truths do not understand the Buddha's profound truth. Without a foundation in the conventional truth the significance of the ultimate cannot be taught. Without understanding the significance of the ultimate, liberation is not achieved.
— Nagarjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārika 24:8-10 (Ref:Jay L. Garfield,Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: pp. 296, 298)
There are no deadlines, right? ( 20040302 ( talk) 09:59, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
Since I started the dispute, I think that I better make myself clear what it is I am disputing, and what I am not disputing. On the 27 January, Reifingam made a few changes to the article. (see http://en.wikipedia.org/?title=Madhyamaka&action=historysubmit&diff=473435515&oldid=470911728 ) These were the assertions made by Reifingam
As I stated at in my original post, 'existence' is not disputed by Nagarjuna - only inherent existence is disputed. If there were no existents, then all objects would have the same ontological significance as the horn of a hare, a hairy tortoiseshell, etc. karma would not function. Madhyamaka would be a nihilist school. ( 20040302 ( talk))
Sorry Madison34563, your statement appears to me to be a non-sequitur. Please show me how "nothing is ultimately real" is a disagreement with anything I have said. ( 20040302 ( talk) 14:44, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
If you look at Chapter 21 of the MMK, the whole thing is about arising and existence, which both have the same sanskrit word Bhava. Madison34563 ( talk) 17:21, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
Madison34563, the text that you have linked to is an extensive commentary by Mabja Jangchub Tsöndru. In this text, he does not always qualify existence as representing essential existence. In the forward of the book, on page IX/X, the Dalai Lama states: Nagarjuna's Root of the Middle Way presents a clear, firm philosophical thesis with respect to things' lacking true existence. It argues that just as sentient beings are devoid of innate existence, so are all Buddhas, the cycle of existence, and the tranquility of nirvana. I accept that statement. Can you? ( 20040302 ( talk) 18:19, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
CO2Northeast mentioned the Catuskoti as some defence for Reifingam's edits. My dispute did not - and really does not - revolve around the Catuskoti. The one regret that I have is to respond to CO2Northeast implicitly accepting the Catuskoti as four extremes. I do not find references to the Catuskoti as four extremes, but merely as piece of Buddhist dialectical apparatus offering four exhaustive alternatives. I agree that Nagarjuna uses the Catuskoti, but he does not depict them as four extremes. The middle way of the Madhyamaka are between the two extremes of essentialism and nihilism. Garfield p304 states "This defines the straits between which the middle path must be found, as well as the presupposition that generates both extremes" (My emphasis) ( 20040302 ( talk) 11:01, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
I am now reasonably persuaded that the editors Reifingam/Madison34563 and CO2Northeast are conflating the Middle Way (which has two extremes to avoid) with the Catuskoti (which have four exhaustive alternatives). This conflation is a mistake, as the two serve totally different purposes within the Madhyamaka. The two truths are likewise distinct from either of them. ( 20040302 ( talk) 11:14, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
Let me briefly attempt to demonstrate why the conflation of the Catuskoti with the Middle way is incorrect for the Madhyamaka. (Let us remember that the purpose of the Madhyamaka is to achieve insight, which leads directly to liberation from Samsara). A (Madhyamaka-defined) essentialist believes that phenomena are efficacious - they are seen as valid sources of happiness; for example: Someone who believes that they will be more happy by being rich. A (Madhyamaka-defined) nihilist is someone who disbelieves in causality and therefore there is no need to be responsible for one's actions; for example: Someone who disbelieves in rebirth. It is completely possible for an individual to hold to both of the extremes which are to be avoided. Meanwhile, the first two points of the Catuskoti/tetralemma are diametrically opposed: existence vs. non-existence. In Madhyamaka, the purpose of the tetralemma is to expose the essencelessness of phenomena. Above I have extensively cited Tsongkhapa and Candrakirti on these points. ( 20040302 ( talk))
(Addendum; 16:28, 31 Jan) My reading of the MMK 24.16 actually supports the view that someone who falls into the first extreme - that phenomena are efficacious - will likewise entail a wrong view regarding karma, and so also fall to the other extreme - a disbelief in causality. (Garfield, 302 trans.) If you perceive the existence of all things in terms of their essence, then this perception of all things will be without the perception of causes and conditions. So we can see that not only do Madhyamikas assert two extreme views to avoid (essentialism / nihilism), but that these views actually give rise to each other.
I should probably point out that I am aware of the caturanta - but I do not believe that Nagarjuna conflates the Caturanta with the Catuskoti, although I am aware that some Tibetan scholars may have asserted that. ( 20040302 ( talk))
Swith the word existence with eternalism. Since the specific Madhyamaka use of "existence" is actually closer to eternalism in meaning...... Madison34563 ( talk) 17:44, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
Your link points to the front cover of a book which does not include the word 'Eternalism' on it. And thank goodness that Wikipedia can be written better than it was. The fact that WP used 'eternalism' 6 years ago is no evidence. ( 20040302 ( talk))
Far more importantly, how do you respond to Candrakirti? ( 20040302 ( talk) 18:28, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
pg. 87 "Emptiness is, Nagarjuna claims, the famous Buddhist Middle way betweeen eternalism and nihilism." Madison34563 ( talk) 18:44, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
I have read enough of this text now (David F. Burton's 'Emptiness Appraised'). Burton is an accomplished academic, but he stands apart from Candrakirti, and says as much in his papers. For me, we cannot depend upon such a radical, even if rather qualified, view - as Burton is definitely in a minority, and possibly a minority of one. WP:UNDUE. I should point out that even Burton no longer uses the term 'eternalism' in his recent works, but instead uses 'essentialism'. Although I may accept other publications of Burton, I do not accept 'Emptiness Appraised' as a reliable source. Certainly not in this context. ( 20040302 ( talk) 20:12, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
The quote from Candrakirti (Madhyamakāvatāra 6.140) demonstrates that 'eternalism' does not suffice. I am grateful to hear that you are among Tibetan scholars. Ask them what the specific difference is between mu zhi and ta zhi - at first they may well say 'they are the same' - so ask why are there two separate phrases, and how they differ in purpose. The Sanskrit words are caturanta and catuskoti. They may still say 'it's the same', so then ask 'are the two extremes of the middle way the same as the first two extremes of the mu-zhi?' they may still reply 'yes', in which case ask 'so for those proponents of the first extreme, do they assert the opposite of those who assert the second extreme?' if the answer to that is yes, then cite MMK 24:16, otherwise ask them if it is not opposite, how do the catuskoti exhaust all logical alternatives. If the reply is 'via the third and fourth extreme' then ask - so why do the scholars talk about the middle way as avoiding two extremes, not four? Alternatively, ask if the purpose of the catuskoti in the MMK is to (1) demonstrate emptiness through analysis, (2) to demonstrate the extremes to be avoided, (3) both, or (4) neither/something else. Again, one can ask 'As an extreme, does the first of the catuskoti (caturanta), "it exists" refute conventional existence?' if the answer to this is Yes, then your Lama disagrees with Tsongkhapa, and we will need to find some sort of scholarship that supports this to demonstrate that your Lama is holding a significantly supported view. On my side I have recently (two weeks ago) discussed most of this with a Lharampa Geshe, and he supported my views, although we was swiftly able to demonstrate that my understanding of the Cittamatra is far less clear. ( 20040302 ( talk) 13:13, 4 February 2012 (UTC))
Just now I have once again talked with a Lharampa Geshe who is also a professor of Indian philosopy. He suggests that, within the context of the Madhyamaka, the terms མཐའ་བཞི (caturanta) and མུ་བཞི (catuskoti) are somewhat similar and are, at times, used as synonyms. However, he agrees with me and categorically states that the first two of the མུ་བཞི are not to be confused with the མཐའ་གཉིས - the two extremes to be avoided in the middle way, and that these things are completely different. ( 20040302 ( talk) 18:54, 4 February 2012 (UTC))
Users who are discussing issues on this page are requested to avoid editing the article until all disputes are resolved. I've reverted to the last version prior to this dispute. Please leave it at that. Sunray ( talk) 19:03, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
CO2Northeast, Madison34563 - having weighed the arguments above do you have anything further to add regarding the three disputes I have delineated above, or anything to add regarding the dispute that I have made (in light of Candrakirti) against the use of the word 'eternalism' ? Or can I close this particular discussion? ( 20040302 ( talk) 10:50, 3 February 2012 (UTC))
Here is something 182.72.170.14 ( talk) 22:41, 3 February 2012 (UTC)
These the disputes that I ( 20040302 ( talk)) am aware of. Which (if any) of these may we consider closed? Are there any other disputes that I have not included
In the talk above, and previously, I (and others) have vigorously opposed the use of 'eternalism' for the Madhyamaka article. But there is some strong provenance for the term, and what I want to do is to examine that here. I know that WP is not an area for WP:SYNTH. However, I don't think it's fair to voice such a strong opposition to eternalism without some basic justification.
There are several prototype sutras for the Madhyamaka view, such as SN 12.17 [2] or [3], and SN 12.15 [4]. These express two extreme views: (Pali: sassatavāda / ucchedavāda ; Skt: śāśvatavāda / ucchedavāda; ) which themselves are commonly translated as 'Eternalism' and 'Annihilationism'. In SN12.17, we see ... the eternalist statement, 'Existing from the very beginning, stress is self-made.' , likewise SN 12.15 states: "'Everything exists', this is one extreme; 'nothing exists,' this is the other extreme." and the footnotes state: Atthitaa: "is-ness." The theory of "Eternalism" (sassatavāda). / Natthitaa: "is-not-ness." The theory of "Annihilationism" (ucchedavāda).
These two extremes are known as the (Skt: dvayānta, Tib: མཐའ་གཉིས) which are namely (Skt: śāśvatānta/ucchedānta, Tib: རྟག་མཐའ / ཆད་མཐའ). The (skt) term 'śāśvata' (which prefixes śāśvatavāda, śāśvatānta, and other related phrases) translates to [5] "eternal , constant , perpetual, for ever more, incessantly", so in many ways it is fair to accept eternalism as a literal rendition of the traditional term.
However these terms have been repeatedly raised by historical scholars and academics as well as modern academics. It is because of this that Candrakirti and many other Madhyamikas are so vehement (MT 6:140) about the issue, and they have been at pains to point out that Nagarjuna - and the Madhyamaka movement in general - uses the term śāśvatavāda to describe a view that holds onto inherent existence or essential existence rather than permanent or eternal existence. Candrakirti also states (in Bodhisattvayogacaryācatuḥśatakaṭikā 256.1.7 The self is an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature. The non-existence of that is selflessness.).
In SN12.17, Lord Buddha defines his meaning of sassatavāda: ""'He who performs the act also experiences [the result]' [...] this amounts to the sassatavāda.". My reading of this is that a view of an efficacious self (he who performs.. experiences) entails (amounts to) sassatavāda. In this sense, Lord Buddha may be stating that a notion of inherent existence entails a belief in some form of permanence. But as Candrakirti points out, a belief in permanence is not the basis of grasping/clinging that keeps us bound to Samsara.
Although a belief in a phenomenon's permanence entails a belief in it's efficacy as an object of grasping (likewise, if we accept my reading of SN12.17, then we can also say that a notion of inherent existence, or an efficacious self, entails a belief in some form of permanence) one may still recognise a phenomenon's impermanence and yet still hold onto it having some efficacy. In other words, understanding it's impermanence alone is not enough to free us from Samsara. If this were the not the case, then we would not need three marks of existence, but two - as Anicca would be enough to liberate us, whereas actually we must also understand Anatta (and Dukkha, of course).
Therefore, although a very literal translation of śāśvatānta would be "the extreme of eternalism" - I believe this to be non-contextualised, in that it describes an entailment of an innate view, rather than the problem itself. The Madhyamaka literature repeatedly distances itself from a reading which holds onto the idea that all one must eliminate is a view of eternalism, and I remain convinced that we would be making a mistake if we imply that here. Certainly, we could consider adding a section to the article which explores this. I welcome further discussion on this though, and do not consider the matter closed yet. ( 20040302 ( talk) 11:20, 6 February 2012 (UTC))
Yes, definitely. An example of something which is permanent and not-inherently existent would be a cessation. I am saying that the 'eternalism' aspect of the innate grasping onto the continuation/constancy of things, and the suffering that is present when they end is very powerful but it is distinct from the 'selfhood' / 'inherence' / 'essence' aspect of the innate grasping onto the inherent existence of things, which is even more powerful and insidious. However, we have to accept that the traditional name given to the extreme of essentialist grasping is śāśvatavāda - which translates to 'eternalist view' (which, when talking about positive phenomena, normally indicates lack of momentary change, rather than everlasting existence). Just as I cannot imagine a view of 'eternalism' which does not also imply some form of 'essentialism', I also cannot imagine a view of 'essentialism' that does not imply some form of 'eternalism' - though I am willing to be shown an example of either. However, I CANl imagine a view of 'non-eternalism' which does not entail 'non-essentialism', and possibly a view of 'non-essentialism' which does not entail 'non-eternalism' (eg, via dependence upon parts). ( 20040302 ( talk) 17:03, 6 February 2012 (UTC))
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There is some sort of confusion here that I want to clear up before letting the recent edit through. As I understand it, 'existence' is not disputed by Nagarjuna - only inherent existence is disputed. If there were no existents, then all objects would have the same ontological significance as the horn of a hare, a hairy tortoiseshell, etc. and karma would not function. If we recollect that the project of Wisdom is to overturn Nirvana, we can identify that the specific quality of objects that is being invalidated is their efficaciousness as sources of happiness or suffering - a mistaken perception which leads to clinging/grasping (Upādāna/Taṇhā) ( 20040302 ( talk) 16:24, 27 January 2012 (UTC)) Likewise, can you provide the specific verse of chapter15 of the MMK ? ( 20040302 ( talk) 16:24, 27 January 2012 (UTC))
A recent edit stated: "Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are existents available to perish. (Ref:Tsondru, Mabja. Ornament of Reason. Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 56-58, 405-417.)
Nagarjuna only asserts that phenomena do not arise as inherent existents. Nagarjuna does not deny mere existence. This seems to be a sticking point. I am not disputing that this is what Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü may say, but I certainly dispute that this is an accurate depiction of all Madhyamika views. It is quite clear that other Madhyamakas disagree with this assertion. Likewise, I do not know (and have not yet been given evidence) if Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü reached this conclusion, and if so, how he did. What I know for sure is that there are plenty of Madhyamikas who dispute it - most notably Tsongkhapa and his followers. What I believe is completely undisputed is that Nagarjuna asserts: "Whatever is dependently co-arisen / That is explained to be emptiness." For the Lede, we should avoid using distinctions which are unshared position.
It occurs to me that this is a more subtle point - that what we agree is refuted is (the Svatantrika position of) an assertion of a conventional existence of intrinsic nature. However, mere, or conventional existence / aka nominal existence remains necessary for us to avoid conflating dependant origination with the imaginary (such as horns of hares, hairs on a tortoise shell etc.)
I am genuinely curious here - if Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü actually does interpret Nagarjuna as denying mere existence how does he distinguish between objects that are real (eg. the four noble truths - the denial of which would make him a non-buddhist) and those which are purely imaginary (such as the aforementioned hare-horn or, in a more contemporary setting, hobbits)? ( 20040302 ( talk) 16:20, 29 January 2012 (UTC))
I do not claim that Tsongkapa denies using the Catuskoti.
The four extremes are to do with inherent existence, not mere existence. Tsongkhapa states (Lam-Rim-Chen-Mo, Snow Lion, Vol 3. p156) Question: "If these things cannot withstand rational analysis, then how is it possible for something to exist where reason has refuted it?" Reply: "You are mistakenly conflating the inability to withstand rational analysis with invalidation by reason. Many who have made this error claim that production and such exist even though rational analysis of reality refutes them. This is reckless chatter, so we do not agree. To ask whether something can withstand rational analysis is to ask whether it is found by a line of reasoning that analyses reality. Candrakirti's commentary on The Four Hundred Stanzas (13.11) says: ...because our analysis is intent upon seeking intrinsic nature. So this (Catuskoti) is seeking to discover whether forms and so forth have an intrinsic nature that is produced, ceases, and so forth. [...] It is not that this line of reasoning searches for mere production and cessation. [...] The fact that this line of reasoning does not find them does not entail that it refutes them. Rather, reason refutes something that - if it did exist - would have to be established by reason, but which reason does not establish. Conventional consciousnesses establish the production and cessation of forms etc. though such forms and such exist, reasoning consciousness does not establish them. [...] For example, a visual consciousness does not find sounds, but this does not refute them. If production and so forth existed essentially - i.e.. were established in final reality, then reason would have to find them because it accurately analyses whether forms and such have essentially existing production and cessation. Since such analysis does not find production and so forth, it refutes production, cessation and so forth that exist essentially.
Candrakirti's says the following: (all taken from the aforementioned commentary on Aryadeva's 400 verses) Incorrect position: Aryadeva means that compounded phenomena lack production because this analysis (Catuskoti) refutes all forms of production. Reply: In that case, the production of compounded phenomena would not be like a magician's illusion. Rather we would make it understood using examples such as the son of a barren woman (horn of a hare, etc). Wary of the absurd implication that dependent-arisings would not exist, we avoid such comparisons. Instead we compare the production of things to a magician's illusion and so forth, examples that do not contradict dependent-arising. Objection: If eyes and such do not exist, then how can the sensory faculties of organs such as the eye be considered things that result from karma? Reply: Would we refute that it is the nature of these to result from Karma? Objection: Since you are demonstrating (via Catuskoti) the refutation of eyes and such, how could you not refute that? Reply:Because our analysis is intent upon seeking intrinsic nature. We refute here that things exist essentially; we do not refute that eyes and such are products and are dependently arisen results of karma. Therefore, they exist. Hence, when eyes and such are explained only as results of karma, they do exist.
So, we can see from both Candrakirti and Tsonkhapa that the Madhyamikas do not refute existence. Likewise, they do not assert that the Catuskoti refute existence - and indeed explicitly state that the Catuskoti are to be used to search for intrinsic nature. Moreover, Candrakirti asserts existence - as long as we are talking about existence arising from dependent-arising. ( 20040302 ( talk) 17:06, 29 January 2012 (UTC))
Is that it? — Preceding unsigned comment added by CO2Northeast ( talk • contribs) 18:03, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
You are trying to drag me into a Tibetan debate. Its very clear the two main extremes are, based on your quote "things exist, things do not exist." CO2Northeast ( talk) 18:09, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
I have the book is front of me now. The whole tetralemma chapter is chapter 15. You are quoting chapter 12. You stated that chapter 12, the one which you are quoting from, deals with the tetralemma, but it doesn't. You left off part of your quote, again in a deceitful manner. Here is the whole quote "A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena (Chapter 15). Chapter 15 is not the "Rational Analysis" chapter, which is chapter 12. I am seeking admin action. CO2Northeast ( talk) 18:23, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
Bullshit. You said "There is no deceit. The title of the section in the original text is A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena. The entire chapter "Rational Analysis" of the translation is concerned with the catuskoti. There is no mistake here." NONE OF THIS IS TRUE. CO2Northeast ( talk) 18:58, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
Its not a disagreement. What is the real subtitle of chapter 12? Simple question. You said it was one thing, but it isn't. CO2Northeast ( talk) 19:03, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
The rational analysis of chapter 12 is not the tetralemma in anyway, shape or form. You saying otherwise is simply deceit or illiteracy. The tetralemma is exclusively in chapter 15, and only a smart part of chapter 15 at that. CO2Northeast ( talk) 19:19, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
Of course I find the tetralemma important. It is you who takes the opposite position, editing it out of the article. Nice try to flip our positions. The fact that you actually tried to flip our respective positions, is something which admins need to take a look at. Regarding sources, read your own book starting on page 189, which is the second part of chapter 15. LOL User:CO2Northeast|CO2Northeast]] ( talk) 19:42, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
Before we continue with this technical discussion, I would like to point out that I believe that there is indeed a dispute between us, which I would consider to be fairly called a basic disagreement. There is clearly no established consensus WP:CON yet between us, and again I suggest that we find a means to resolve this, such as a third opinion WP:3O.
I trust that we share the common belief that the use of the word 'tetralemma' is a directly recognisable translation/synonym of 'catuskoti'. I am also glad that we can share the text - and that we both accept the text as a WP:RS regarding the position of the Madhyamaka.
My understanding of your position is that you are stating that the Madhyamikas use the catuskoti to dispute conventional existence. Is that correct?
One of the statements from the book which we both recognise is ""A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena ". However, we both appear to read this in a different manner. My understanding of the sentence is this (I paraphrase) "A refutation developed through the tetralemma is not legitimate for conventional phenomena". Hence my consternation.
As you suggested, I am reading from page 189 - the discussion of the tetralemma. First of all, I find no mention of the 'subtle object of negation' that you repeatedly have asserted. The section that I am reading is titled A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena.
Qualm: The Madhyamaka text refute all four parts of the tetralemma– a thing or intrinsic nature (1)exists [...], and (4) neither exists nor does not exist. Reason refutes everything, as there are no phenomena that are not included among these four. Reply: As indicated earlier "thing" has two meanings. (note 383 indicates that 'earlier' is referring to 597.16: page 145, para 2) Between these two, we refute the assertion that things essentially exist in terms of both truths; however at the conventional level we do not refute things that can perform functions. [...] Thus you should understand that all methods for refuting the tetralemma are like this, involving some qualifier such as 'essentially'. Suppose you refute the tetralemma without affixing any such qualification. You refute the position that things exist and you refute the position that things do not exist;
Continuing, on page 190, I read: Here in the Fundamental Treatise, "empty" and "non-empty" refer to being empty and not empty of intrinsic nature, and they are used in this way throughout the entire text, from beginning to end. For me, this is clear evidence that Madhyamikas do not use the tetralemma to dispute conventional existence.
Likewise, as mentioned above, Candrakirti's commentary on The Four Hundred Stanzas (13.11) says: ...because our analysis is intent upon seeking intrinsic nature. makes it clear to me that the analysis of Madhyamikas is intent on seeking intrinsic nature.
I am still waiting from you for Madhyamaka sources that disclose a 'subtle object of negation', or an assertion that the Catuskoti is used to dispute conventional existence. ( 20040302 ( talk) 10:08, 30 January 2012 (UTC))
What are the 4 extremes? Simple question. CO2Northeast ( talk) 15:42, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
For the Madhyamika, the four extremes are the extremes of inherent existence, inherent non-existence, inherent 'existence and non-existence' and inherent 'neither existence nor non-existence'. The reason why I am explicitly mentioning that this is to do with inherent existence is due to the cite above: p190: Here in the Fundamental Treatise, "empty" and "non-empty" refer to being empty and not empty of intrinsic nature, and they are used in this way throughout the entire text, from beginning to end. For me, this is clear evidence that Madhyamikas do not use the tetralemma to dispute conventional existence. Moreover, A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena indicates clearly that the tetralemma is not to be used as a refutation of conventional phenomena.
The contention is this: You wrote Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are existents available to perish I disagree with this sentence, unless we gloss it to be explicit that it is inherent existence that we are talking about, and inherent perishing. Madhyamikas accept conventional existents and conventional perishing. I am far more happy with the following sentence: Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as inherent existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are existents available to inherently perish. ( 20040302 ( talk) 16:39, 30 January 2012 (UTC))
Just settle the argument. I say the 4 extremes are existence, nonexistence, both and neither. What are the 4 extremes Sunray? CO2Northeast ( talk) 19:46, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
I guess someone is bringing up new issues. Very well. If you look at Jay Garfield's translation of the MMK, on page 220 it says "Essence by definition is eternal and independent". Nagarjuna is equating svabhāva with bhāva in this portion of chapter 15. CO2Northeast ( talk) 20:18, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
Please no partisan Tibetan material. Thank you. CO2Northeast ( talk) 22:12, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
The funny thing is the "disputed article" does not even contain my edits. Please add my edits regarding Abhidharma. Thank you. CO2Northeast ( talk) 23:37, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
Hi, everybody. I'm afraid I have to agree with March 2nd on this one, who said above: "For the Madhyamika, the four extremes are the extremes of inherent existence, inherent non-existence, inherent 'existence and non-existence' and inherent 'neither existence nor non-existence'."
I would like to quote from Nagarjuna's Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (28:8), wherein he also puts forth a 'positive' tetralemma, followed by Jay Garfield's commentary:
"Everything is real and is not real,
Both real and not real,
Neither real nor not real.
This is the Lord Buddha's teaching."
Jay Garfield: "This is the positive tetralemma regarding existence. Everything is conventionally real. Everything is ultimately unreal (that is, not unreal in just any sense, but unreal when seen from the ultimate standpoint). Everything has both characteristics--that is, everything is both conventionally real and ultimately unreal. Nothing is ultimately real or completely non-existent. That is, everything is neither real in one sense nor not-real in another sense."
Likewise, when reading the Heart Sutra, one should qualify all the no's as being "no inherent _____". For example, "Therefore, Shariputra, in emptiness there is no [inherently existent] form, no [inherently existent] feeling, no [inherently existent] discrimination.... Likewise, there is no [inherent] suffering, [inherent] origin, [inherent] cessation, or [inherent] path...." Amplifying Life ( talk) 02:11, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
Create a section on the two truths. Its pretty obvious by now, that this should have been done at the inception of the page. Madison34563 ( talk) 03:38, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
The Buddha's teaching of the Dharma is based on two truths: a truth of worldly convention and an ultimate truth. Those who do not understand the distinction drawn between these two truths do not understand the Buddha's profound truth. Without a foundation in the conventional truth the significance of the ultimate cannot be taught. Without understanding the significance of the ultimate, liberation is not achieved.
— Nagarjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārika 24:8-10 (Ref:Jay L. Garfield,Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: pp. 296, 298)
There are no deadlines, right? ( 20040302 ( talk) 09:59, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
Since I started the dispute, I think that I better make myself clear what it is I am disputing, and what I am not disputing. On the 27 January, Reifingam made a few changes to the article. (see http://en.wikipedia.org/?title=Madhyamaka&action=historysubmit&diff=473435515&oldid=470911728 ) These were the assertions made by Reifingam
As I stated at in my original post, 'existence' is not disputed by Nagarjuna - only inherent existence is disputed. If there were no existents, then all objects would have the same ontological significance as the horn of a hare, a hairy tortoiseshell, etc. karma would not function. Madhyamaka would be a nihilist school. ( 20040302 ( talk))
Sorry Madison34563, your statement appears to me to be a non-sequitur. Please show me how "nothing is ultimately real" is a disagreement with anything I have said. ( 20040302 ( talk) 14:44, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
If you look at Chapter 21 of the MMK, the whole thing is about arising and existence, which both have the same sanskrit word Bhava. Madison34563 ( talk) 17:21, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
Madison34563, the text that you have linked to is an extensive commentary by Mabja Jangchub Tsöndru. In this text, he does not always qualify existence as representing essential existence. In the forward of the book, on page IX/X, the Dalai Lama states: Nagarjuna's Root of the Middle Way presents a clear, firm philosophical thesis with respect to things' lacking true existence. It argues that just as sentient beings are devoid of innate existence, so are all Buddhas, the cycle of existence, and the tranquility of nirvana. I accept that statement. Can you? ( 20040302 ( talk) 18:19, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
CO2Northeast mentioned the Catuskoti as some defence for Reifingam's edits. My dispute did not - and really does not - revolve around the Catuskoti. The one regret that I have is to respond to CO2Northeast implicitly accepting the Catuskoti as four extremes. I do not find references to the Catuskoti as four extremes, but merely as piece of Buddhist dialectical apparatus offering four exhaustive alternatives. I agree that Nagarjuna uses the Catuskoti, but he does not depict them as four extremes. The middle way of the Madhyamaka are between the two extremes of essentialism and nihilism. Garfield p304 states "This defines the straits between which the middle path must be found, as well as the presupposition that generates both extremes" (My emphasis) ( 20040302 ( talk) 11:01, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
I am now reasonably persuaded that the editors Reifingam/Madison34563 and CO2Northeast are conflating the Middle Way (which has two extremes to avoid) with the Catuskoti (which have four exhaustive alternatives). This conflation is a mistake, as the two serve totally different purposes within the Madhyamaka. The two truths are likewise distinct from either of them. ( 20040302 ( talk) 11:14, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
Let me briefly attempt to demonstrate why the conflation of the Catuskoti with the Middle way is incorrect for the Madhyamaka. (Let us remember that the purpose of the Madhyamaka is to achieve insight, which leads directly to liberation from Samsara). A (Madhyamaka-defined) essentialist believes that phenomena are efficacious - they are seen as valid sources of happiness; for example: Someone who believes that they will be more happy by being rich. A (Madhyamaka-defined) nihilist is someone who disbelieves in causality and therefore there is no need to be responsible for one's actions; for example: Someone who disbelieves in rebirth. It is completely possible for an individual to hold to both of the extremes which are to be avoided. Meanwhile, the first two points of the Catuskoti/tetralemma are diametrically opposed: existence vs. non-existence. In Madhyamaka, the purpose of the tetralemma is to expose the essencelessness of phenomena. Above I have extensively cited Tsongkhapa and Candrakirti on these points. ( 20040302 ( talk))
(Addendum; 16:28, 31 Jan) My reading of the MMK 24.16 actually supports the view that someone who falls into the first extreme - that phenomena are efficacious - will likewise entail a wrong view regarding karma, and so also fall to the other extreme - a disbelief in causality. (Garfield, 302 trans.) If you perceive the existence of all things in terms of their essence, then this perception of all things will be without the perception of causes and conditions. So we can see that not only do Madhyamikas assert two extreme views to avoid (essentialism / nihilism), but that these views actually give rise to each other.
I should probably point out that I am aware of the caturanta - but I do not believe that Nagarjuna conflates the Caturanta with the Catuskoti, although I am aware that some Tibetan scholars may have asserted that. ( 20040302 ( talk))
Swith the word existence with eternalism. Since the specific Madhyamaka use of "existence" is actually closer to eternalism in meaning...... Madison34563 ( talk) 17:44, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
Your link points to the front cover of a book which does not include the word 'Eternalism' on it. And thank goodness that Wikipedia can be written better than it was. The fact that WP used 'eternalism' 6 years ago is no evidence. ( 20040302 ( talk))
Far more importantly, how do you respond to Candrakirti? ( 20040302 ( talk) 18:28, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
pg. 87 "Emptiness is, Nagarjuna claims, the famous Buddhist Middle way betweeen eternalism and nihilism." Madison34563 ( talk) 18:44, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
I have read enough of this text now (David F. Burton's 'Emptiness Appraised'). Burton is an accomplished academic, but he stands apart from Candrakirti, and says as much in his papers. For me, we cannot depend upon such a radical, even if rather qualified, view - as Burton is definitely in a minority, and possibly a minority of one. WP:UNDUE. I should point out that even Burton no longer uses the term 'eternalism' in his recent works, but instead uses 'essentialism'. Although I may accept other publications of Burton, I do not accept 'Emptiness Appraised' as a reliable source. Certainly not in this context. ( 20040302 ( talk) 20:12, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
The quote from Candrakirti (Madhyamakāvatāra 6.140) demonstrates that 'eternalism' does not suffice. I am grateful to hear that you are among Tibetan scholars. Ask them what the specific difference is between mu zhi and ta zhi - at first they may well say 'they are the same' - so ask why are there two separate phrases, and how they differ in purpose. The Sanskrit words are caturanta and catuskoti. They may still say 'it's the same', so then ask 'are the two extremes of the middle way the same as the first two extremes of the mu-zhi?' they may still reply 'yes', in which case ask 'so for those proponents of the first extreme, do they assert the opposite of those who assert the second extreme?' if the answer to that is yes, then cite MMK 24:16, otherwise ask them if it is not opposite, how do the catuskoti exhaust all logical alternatives. If the reply is 'via the third and fourth extreme' then ask - so why do the scholars talk about the middle way as avoiding two extremes, not four? Alternatively, ask if the purpose of the catuskoti in the MMK is to (1) demonstrate emptiness through analysis, (2) to demonstrate the extremes to be avoided, (3) both, or (4) neither/something else. Again, one can ask 'As an extreme, does the first of the catuskoti (caturanta), "it exists" refute conventional existence?' if the answer to this is Yes, then your Lama disagrees with Tsongkhapa, and we will need to find some sort of scholarship that supports this to demonstrate that your Lama is holding a significantly supported view. On my side I have recently (two weeks ago) discussed most of this with a Lharampa Geshe, and he supported my views, although we was swiftly able to demonstrate that my understanding of the Cittamatra is far less clear. ( 20040302 ( talk) 13:13, 4 February 2012 (UTC))
Just now I have once again talked with a Lharampa Geshe who is also a professor of Indian philosopy. He suggests that, within the context of the Madhyamaka, the terms མཐའ་བཞི (caturanta) and མུ་བཞི (catuskoti) are somewhat similar and are, at times, used as synonyms. However, he agrees with me and categorically states that the first two of the མུ་བཞི are not to be confused with the མཐའ་གཉིས - the two extremes to be avoided in the middle way, and that these things are completely different. ( 20040302 ( talk) 18:54, 4 February 2012 (UTC))
Users who are discussing issues on this page are requested to avoid editing the article until all disputes are resolved. I've reverted to the last version prior to this dispute. Please leave it at that. Sunray ( talk) 19:03, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
CO2Northeast, Madison34563 - having weighed the arguments above do you have anything further to add regarding the three disputes I have delineated above, or anything to add regarding the dispute that I have made (in light of Candrakirti) against the use of the word 'eternalism' ? Or can I close this particular discussion? ( 20040302 ( talk) 10:50, 3 February 2012 (UTC))
Here is something 182.72.170.14 ( talk) 22:41, 3 February 2012 (UTC)
These the disputes that I ( 20040302 ( talk)) am aware of. Which (if any) of these may we consider closed? Are there any other disputes that I have not included
In the talk above, and previously, I (and others) have vigorously opposed the use of 'eternalism' for the Madhyamaka article. But there is some strong provenance for the term, and what I want to do is to examine that here. I know that WP is not an area for WP:SYNTH. However, I don't think it's fair to voice such a strong opposition to eternalism without some basic justification.
There are several prototype sutras for the Madhyamaka view, such as SN 12.17 [2] or [3], and SN 12.15 [4]. These express two extreme views: (Pali: sassatavāda / ucchedavāda ; Skt: śāśvatavāda / ucchedavāda; ) which themselves are commonly translated as 'Eternalism' and 'Annihilationism'. In SN12.17, we see ... the eternalist statement, 'Existing from the very beginning, stress is self-made.' , likewise SN 12.15 states: "'Everything exists', this is one extreme; 'nothing exists,' this is the other extreme." and the footnotes state: Atthitaa: "is-ness." The theory of "Eternalism" (sassatavāda). / Natthitaa: "is-not-ness." The theory of "Annihilationism" (ucchedavāda).
These two extremes are known as the (Skt: dvayānta, Tib: མཐའ་གཉིས) which are namely (Skt: śāśvatānta/ucchedānta, Tib: རྟག་མཐའ / ཆད་མཐའ). The (skt) term 'śāśvata' (which prefixes śāśvatavāda, śāśvatānta, and other related phrases) translates to [5] "eternal , constant , perpetual, for ever more, incessantly", so in many ways it is fair to accept eternalism as a literal rendition of the traditional term.
However these terms have been repeatedly raised by historical scholars and academics as well as modern academics. It is because of this that Candrakirti and many other Madhyamikas are so vehement (MT 6:140) about the issue, and they have been at pains to point out that Nagarjuna - and the Madhyamaka movement in general - uses the term śāśvatavāda to describe a view that holds onto inherent existence or essential existence rather than permanent or eternal existence. Candrakirti also states (in Bodhisattvayogacaryācatuḥśatakaṭikā 256.1.7 The self is an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature. The non-existence of that is selflessness.).
In SN12.17, Lord Buddha defines his meaning of sassatavāda: ""'He who performs the act also experiences [the result]' [...] this amounts to the sassatavāda.". My reading of this is that a view of an efficacious self (he who performs.. experiences) entails (amounts to) sassatavāda. In this sense, Lord Buddha may be stating that a notion of inherent existence entails a belief in some form of permanence. But as Candrakirti points out, a belief in permanence is not the basis of grasping/clinging that keeps us bound to Samsara.
Although a belief in a phenomenon's permanence entails a belief in it's efficacy as an object of grasping (likewise, if we accept my reading of SN12.17, then we can also say that a notion of inherent existence, or an efficacious self, entails a belief in some form of permanence) one may still recognise a phenomenon's impermanence and yet still hold onto it having some efficacy. In other words, understanding it's impermanence alone is not enough to free us from Samsara. If this were the not the case, then we would not need three marks of existence, but two - as Anicca would be enough to liberate us, whereas actually we must also understand Anatta (and Dukkha, of course).
Therefore, although a very literal translation of śāśvatānta would be "the extreme of eternalism" - I believe this to be non-contextualised, in that it describes an entailment of an innate view, rather than the problem itself. The Madhyamaka literature repeatedly distances itself from a reading which holds onto the idea that all one must eliminate is a view of eternalism, and I remain convinced that we would be making a mistake if we imply that here. Certainly, we could consider adding a section to the article which explores this. I welcome further discussion on this though, and do not consider the matter closed yet. ( 20040302 ( talk) 11:20, 6 February 2012 (UTC))
Yes, definitely. An example of something which is permanent and not-inherently existent would be a cessation. I am saying that the 'eternalism' aspect of the innate grasping onto the continuation/constancy of things, and the suffering that is present when they end is very powerful but it is distinct from the 'selfhood' / 'inherence' / 'essence' aspect of the innate grasping onto the inherent existence of things, which is even more powerful and insidious. However, we have to accept that the traditional name given to the extreme of essentialist grasping is śāśvatavāda - which translates to 'eternalist view' (which, when talking about positive phenomena, normally indicates lack of momentary change, rather than everlasting existence). Just as I cannot imagine a view of 'eternalism' which does not also imply some form of 'essentialism', I also cannot imagine a view of 'essentialism' that does not imply some form of 'eternalism' - though I am willing to be shown an example of either. However, I CANl imagine a view of 'non-eternalism' which does not entail 'non-essentialism', and possibly a view of 'non-essentialism' which does not entail 'non-eternalism' (eg, via dependence upon parts). ( 20040302 ( talk) 17:03, 6 February 2012 (UTC))