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This article seems accurate -- though in need of references, citations, and copy editing -- on the role of this small Ishmali convert community from which the Fatamid dynasty created an important military unit in the period 900 - 1100. Included even in that section is a lot of unverified claims and Amazigh nationalist propaganda content. The bits on the role in the "21st century role" of this small (thousands) 10th century mountain community is just nonsense. How are Agadez Niger Tuareg communities part of this? They speak a Berber language, that's how. And that's what most of this essay is about: a vehicle for contemporary Algerian ethnic conflict. Needs a tear down from someone with some academic background in 10th century Arab history. T L Miles ( talk) 18:56, 5 December 2012 (UTC)
@
Cplakidas: A quick question regarding the Kutama leader
al-Hasan ibn Ammar.
:
As far as I know, the Kutama general who held the Wasita title (a title that was created specifically for him) was "Hassan ibn Ammar al-Kutami", who obviously was not Arab. Having checked the linked article, I see what appears to be synthesis of material (biography of al-Kalbi, etc), with only the last part applying to the "al-Kutami".
Since you created the article, could you please go through it and let me know if I'm missing something? Thanks. M.Bitton ( talk) 23:33, 1 September 2020 (UTC)
He promoted ibn Ammar al-Kutami, appointing him to the post of Wasata, which was similar to the rank of vizier. [1]
The Kutama demanded that the leadership of the government be trusted to their chief, al-Hasan b. Ammar. The youthful caliph capitulated and appointed Ibn Ammar as Wasita. [2]
the Kutama shaykhs made it clear that their allegiance to his son was dependent on their being given control of the government. Accordingly, al-Hasan b. ‘Ammar was made wasita.cannot mean anything other than al-Hasan b. ‘Ammar was one of the Kutama (putting them in control).
[Wāsiṭa] ... The first person upon whom it was bestowed was the Kutāmī chief Ibn ʿAmmār, at the time of al-Ḥākim’s coronation. [3]
the effective power in the state resting with the Wasita [q.v.] Ibn 'Ammar al-Kutami, the leader of the Berber troops and faction. Ibn 'Ammar's power was no doubt irksome to the young Caliph and his guardian; the supremacy of the Berbers undoubtedly angered the Turks and other Easterners in the army, and probably also the general Egyptian population. [4]
The person who halted Sitt al-Mulk's entrance to the caliphal palace was not one of the holders of power — that is, the vizier, the wäsita or the military chief commander — but rather Barjawan, who, up until this point, was 'only' the guardian of the imam-caliph-to-be. Indeed, as shown above, the power-holders appeared to have been on Sitt al-Mulk's side. Although the highest among the holders of power, the Berber wasita Ibn 'Ammar al-Kutami, does not appear to have been overtly implicated in the coup attempt; both his position as military commander of the Berber troops and the fact than he, more than anyone else, had the power to stop Sitt al-Mulk, but did not do so, lead us to believe that he might have played some role in this event. [5]
...in spite of the good treatment accorded to Manjutakin, the Turkish mercenaries were deeply jealous of the favour shown by Ibn 'Ammar to his fellow Berbers. [6]
In 377/987-988, the Fatimids tried unsuccessfully to recruit fresh Kutama soldiers from their homelands in North Africa. Both events contributed to the decline of Kutama predominance in the Fatimid state. This is not to say that they were relegated to a position Of unimportance; the Kutama participated in every Fatimid military undertaking in Egypt, as well as in Syria. Al-Aziz appreciated the continuing centrality of the Kutama_ In order to ensure a smooth transition of rule to his son, the future al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, then only an eleven and a half year old boy, he entrusted the management (tadbir) of al-Hakim's affairs to Muhammad Hasan ibn 'Ammar, an important Kutami chief. Ibn Ammar arrived in Egypt shortly after the conquest of the country by Jawhar and was involved in military affairs. Under al-Aziz, Ibn Ammar performed administrative tasks. Following the coronation of al-Hakim, Ibn Ammar ruled the state for a short period. His rule was characterized by an attempt to restore the pre-eminent position of the Kutama. As a result, the Turks and other Eastern groups felt themselves relegated to the position of ahl al-dhimma. The bitter struggle for supremacy in the Fatimid State deteriorated into violent clashes eventually leading to the downfall of Ibn Ammar. [1]
@ Cplakidas: I have managed to access the relevant pages of Halm's book. Here's what he thinks (translated from German into English):
The Kutama Berber al-Hasan ibn Ammar emerged as the strong man in the reign of the eleven-year-old caliph, and this seemed to herald a return of the Berbers to power. Most of the Kutama warriors, however, had stayed away from the homage ceremony in the castle and had gathered outside the city on the festival site to express their displeasure. Their resentment was directed at the "finance minister" Isa ibn Nasturus, who apparently refused to give in to their demand for a pay increase. However, Ibn Ammar and some other leaders succeeded in persuading them to give in, and so they appeared before al-Hakim's throne on October 15, 996 ... The Berber Ibn Ammar was now raised to regent in a solemn ceremony and received the title amin ad-dawla (trustee of the state) with the « mediator » (wisata) - which corresponded to the vizier; It was the first time in the history of the Fatimids that a dignitary was awarded a special name of honour (laqab). [9]
M.Bitton ( talk) 00:06, 5 September 2020 (UTC)
References
This article is rated C-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
This article seems accurate -- though in need of references, citations, and copy editing -- on the role of this small Ishmali convert community from which the Fatamid dynasty created an important military unit in the period 900 - 1100. Included even in that section is a lot of unverified claims and Amazigh nationalist propaganda content. The bits on the role in the "21st century role" of this small (thousands) 10th century mountain community is just nonsense. How are Agadez Niger Tuareg communities part of this? They speak a Berber language, that's how. And that's what most of this essay is about: a vehicle for contemporary Algerian ethnic conflict. Needs a tear down from someone with some academic background in 10th century Arab history. T L Miles ( talk) 18:56, 5 December 2012 (UTC)
@
Cplakidas: A quick question regarding the Kutama leader
al-Hasan ibn Ammar.
:
As far as I know, the Kutama general who held the Wasita title (a title that was created specifically for him) was "Hassan ibn Ammar al-Kutami", who obviously was not Arab. Having checked the linked article, I see what appears to be synthesis of material (biography of al-Kalbi, etc), with only the last part applying to the "al-Kutami".
Since you created the article, could you please go through it and let me know if I'm missing something? Thanks. M.Bitton ( talk) 23:33, 1 September 2020 (UTC)
He promoted ibn Ammar al-Kutami, appointing him to the post of Wasata, which was similar to the rank of vizier. [1]
The Kutama demanded that the leadership of the government be trusted to their chief, al-Hasan b. Ammar. The youthful caliph capitulated and appointed Ibn Ammar as Wasita. [2]
the Kutama shaykhs made it clear that their allegiance to his son was dependent on their being given control of the government. Accordingly, al-Hasan b. ‘Ammar was made wasita.cannot mean anything other than al-Hasan b. ‘Ammar was one of the Kutama (putting them in control).
[Wāsiṭa] ... The first person upon whom it was bestowed was the Kutāmī chief Ibn ʿAmmār, at the time of al-Ḥākim’s coronation. [3]
the effective power in the state resting with the Wasita [q.v.] Ibn 'Ammar al-Kutami, the leader of the Berber troops and faction. Ibn 'Ammar's power was no doubt irksome to the young Caliph and his guardian; the supremacy of the Berbers undoubtedly angered the Turks and other Easterners in the army, and probably also the general Egyptian population. [4]
The person who halted Sitt al-Mulk's entrance to the caliphal palace was not one of the holders of power — that is, the vizier, the wäsita or the military chief commander — but rather Barjawan, who, up until this point, was 'only' the guardian of the imam-caliph-to-be. Indeed, as shown above, the power-holders appeared to have been on Sitt al-Mulk's side. Although the highest among the holders of power, the Berber wasita Ibn 'Ammar al-Kutami, does not appear to have been overtly implicated in the coup attempt; both his position as military commander of the Berber troops and the fact than he, more than anyone else, had the power to stop Sitt al-Mulk, but did not do so, lead us to believe that he might have played some role in this event. [5]
...in spite of the good treatment accorded to Manjutakin, the Turkish mercenaries were deeply jealous of the favour shown by Ibn 'Ammar to his fellow Berbers. [6]
In 377/987-988, the Fatimids tried unsuccessfully to recruit fresh Kutama soldiers from their homelands in North Africa. Both events contributed to the decline of Kutama predominance in the Fatimid state. This is not to say that they were relegated to a position Of unimportance; the Kutama participated in every Fatimid military undertaking in Egypt, as well as in Syria. Al-Aziz appreciated the continuing centrality of the Kutama_ In order to ensure a smooth transition of rule to his son, the future al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, then only an eleven and a half year old boy, he entrusted the management (tadbir) of al-Hakim's affairs to Muhammad Hasan ibn 'Ammar, an important Kutami chief. Ibn Ammar arrived in Egypt shortly after the conquest of the country by Jawhar and was involved in military affairs. Under al-Aziz, Ibn Ammar performed administrative tasks. Following the coronation of al-Hakim, Ibn Ammar ruled the state for a short period. His rule was characterized by an attempt to restore the pre-eminent position of the Kutama. As a result, the Turks and other Eastern groups felt themselves relegated to the position of ahl al-dhimma. The bitter struggle for supremacy in the Fatimid State deteriorated into violent clashes eventually leading to the downfall of Ibn Ammar. [1]
@ Cplakidas: I have managed to access the relevant pages of Halm's book. Here's what he thinks (translated from German into English):
The Kutama Berber al-Hasan ibn Ammar emerged as the strong man in the reign of the eleven-year-old caliph, and this seemed to herald a return of the Berbers to power. Most of the Kutama warriors, however, had stayed away from the homage ceremony in the castle and had gathered outside the city on the festival site to express their displeasure. Their resentment was directed at the "finance minister" Isa ibn Nasturus, who apparently refused to give in to their demand for a pay increase. However, Ibn Ammar and some other leaders succeeded in persuading them to give in, and so they appeared before al-Hakim's throne on October 15, 996 ... The Berber Ibn Ammar was now raised to regent in a solemn ceremony and received the title amin ad-dawla (trustee of the state) with the « mediator » (wisata) - which corresponded to the vizier; It was the first time in the history of the Fatimids that a dignitary was awarded a special name of honour (laqab). [9]
M.Bitton ( talk) 00:06, 5 September 2020 (UTC)
References