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OK, this needs to be split up. Any ideas for useful page titles? -- FOo 23:01 14 Jul 2003 (UTC)
OBSCURE RELATION example Clark Kent is Superman was removed for its irrelevance to the topic. ie it was not sufficiently generic and too American for globally encompassing understanding. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.209.62.164 ( talk) 19:50, 15 March 2012 (UTC)
I'm curious what the point of this paragraph is:
Whatever it is, I think it would be expressed more clearly in something like this:
Would this be a reasonable replacement, or would the replacement result in missing some more profound point? Maybe something more profound would arise, for example, if we considered non-spatial things -- because non-spatial things don't have the constraint that "they can't be in the same place at the same time".
-- Ryguasu 12:48, 9 Sep 2003 (EDT)
I would like to take Ryguasu's proposal one step further: a definition of identity should not refer to any particular property, not even spatial location: after all, we may wonder if two things we see in the same spot, but at different times, are the same. So my phrasing would be something like:
Rp 22 Nov 2003
Identity has a sense in which things share An Identiy, i.e. "black", or two " black and four footed", or more "black four footed and called 'puss' ". In another sense it's scope includes cultural and phyiological filters or precepts. It is cumulative, quantitative and qualitative, it accretes, like datae or quantae. This is proximately related to categories and "forms". Taken as such we can look on socrates idea of "joints" rather clearly. Thus the aforementioned "ambiguity" is really the ambiguity of "grey" in that it can be more grey or less, more ore less identical. It is a primitive term to some philosophical systems. An identity may subsume a name, names associate with other names, systems are built. Some of the 'identiy' concepts are found in group theory, in some things it is identical but it is different in others. Thus the concepts of Definition or 'naming' by shared and/or excluded traits.
An identity/name may refer to a braod category or small. As names are added the category narrows till an idividual is represented, that is a thing is represented which by it's exclusions can only represent one thing; holding, by convention , some terms as absent ( eg time, for an a individual man). comments please.wblakesx
I moved the following paragraph from metaphysics to here (it was already discussed above as, well, at least questionable):
Two objects can be called identical, meaning that they have the same shape, size and other properties. Thus, when we interchange the two objects, we do not see any difference. However, in terms of a stricter sense of identity, the initial and final situation are different. By observing not just the initial and final situation but the move itself, we can know this.
Wikipedia is an encyclopedia - so in the paragraph "Metaphysics" in the article "Identity" it should describe, what identity means in metaphysics - and there, the above paragraph makes no sense. If two descriptions of objects share all properties - well, then that's it, it's the same object they refer two. -- denny vrandečić 15:31, Sep 6, 2004 (UTC)
What about the most common use of the word identity, as in one's identification or proof of identity? Pedant
In my hunt for an identity operator article, I discovered many pages relating to identity in its different contexts and meanings. Many of these pages have overlapping content, poor clarification what the word identity means in different fields, etc. Perhaps this is due to the ambiguety of the word itself, but I still feel that this could be cleaned up or better organized. Just some examples: identity, Identity (disambiguation), List of mathematical identities, Identity (mathematics), Identity element, Identity function, Identity Property of Addition. For instance, this page seems to focus on the philosophy meaning but it has sections on logic and computer programming which seems inappropriate. It seems there are two directions this page can go in:
Personally, I'd be in favor of the second route, but give me some input.
I've done what I could to clean up this page; it needs help, now, from someone who can integrate the material (see [1]). Bryan 18:01, 19 November 2005 (UTC)
How about merging this with Ship of Theseus itself? The two are quite similar.
The Ship of Theseus thought experiment is important in its own right and should not merge with this article.
I agree that the Ship of Theseus should not be merged with identity, altough it is a puzzle about identity it also a puzzle about material constitution and material coincidence. -- RickardV 21:10, 23 July 2007 (UTC)
This section looks somewhat spurious to me. I assume that what should be being talked about is duplicates sharing intrinsic properties, not qualitative properties? A proper philosopher needs to fix this section up. Ben Finn 20:18, 21 May 2007 (UTC)
This was just a thought. I think both titles should direct to the same article (or possibly one of them to a section, etc.) Gregbard 06:44, 31 May 2007 (UTC)
But "Clark Kent = Superman" is not, to my mind, an expression of mathematics.
also, the "Charlie Brown = Satan" example seems like it ought to be removed... either that or I'm missing the point.. or am woefully behind on my popular culture?... —Preceding
unsigned comment added by
71.236.169.226 (
talk)
04:40, 25 March 2008 (UTC)
In ordinary discourse, identity, sameness and equality are not at all the same (no pun intended).
Moreover, these terms have been run-together for far too long by logicians and philosophers, an issue raised here:
Saunders, S. (2006), 'Are Quantum Particles Objects?', Analysis 66, 1, pp.52-62
and in more detail at my site:
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2006.htm
Rosa Lichtenstein ( talk) 16:46, 12 September 2008 (UTC)
Is surely VERY weak, and personal essay like.-- Philogo ( talk) 01:36, 13 March 2009 (UTC)
SHARNI —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.100.108.130 ( talk) 18:24, 16 February 2010 (UTC)
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Baruch Spinoza, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause --- Are they that important? More important than Leibniz? None of them is mentioned in the article.
The Golden Rule, Shunyata --- certainly everything is somehow related to everything else (in philsophy), but in some cases the relation is a long-distance one. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 131.152.208.69 ( talk) 02:26, 9 December 2010 (UTC)
I removed the essaylike wall of text that was added before the lede. Please _DO NOT_ restore this text as it was; we can discuss here on this article talk page what, if anything should be incorporated to the article, but the lede must be a brief, accessible precis of the article contents. Moreover, the tone of the text removed was, to my mind (and I'm willing to be convinced otherwise) not appropriate for an encyclopedia article. BrideOfKripkenstein ( talk) 19:41, 13 June 2011 (UTC)
This is what the article is about and why you should care:
In philosophy, identity usually refers to the idea that a person or object can change over time in many ways, but still remain, in some meaningful sense, the same person or object, despite the changes. This is the idea of numerical identity over time, not to be confused with qualitative identity, which is exact similarity. A person is born as a small baby, grows up, grows old, and finally dies. The person that dies bears little similarity to the baby, so, in what sense is it "the same person"? That is the challenge for the philosopher to explain, in the case of personal identity over time. The identity of inanimate objects over time also presents certain philosophical problems, but the case of personal identity over time is the most important and challenging, for obvious reasons. Robinson (1985) discussed an interesting nonhuman case. An amoeba reproduces by symmetrical binary fission. There are now two amoebae where previously there was one ... so what has happened to the parent amoeba? Has it "died"? Does it still exist? Is it identical with one or both of the daughter amoebae? Robinson's solution is a controversial one, invoking "multiple occupancy", whereby, basically, there were two amoebae all along, fully coincident until they diverged by the fission process! Issues of identity over time, and particularly issues of personal identity over time, are linked to the theory of materialism, in the sense that the possible solutions to the identity question differ between materialist and nonmaterialist theories. Personal identity over time is also linked to four-dimensionalism, a metaphysical theory of time. An interesting question is whether personal identity over time on a materialist view implies that the orthodox view of what human beings think they are is significantly unrealistic, particularly with regard to the generally high level of importance that we give to our lives, ultimate death, and the ethics by which we live. In the book Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984) famously proposed just such a view. Materialist theories of personal identity over time all have the counterintuitive consequence that there isn't a fully robust difference between my life vs. someone else's life, my death vs. someone else's death, my suffering vs. someone else's suffering, etc. Events could happen, in principle, which render it indeterminate whether a death is your death, or someone else's. For example, if a teletransporter machine was invented which took you apart, atom by atom, and beamed the information to Mars, where local atoms were assembled according to that information to create a person physically and psychologically identical to you when you stepped into the teletransporter back on Earth, and then that person was murdered, is it you who has been murdered? Should you worry about what happens to you after teletransportation, or is it not your problem? Why is it any more your problem if it happens without you first being teletransported? By contrast, the nonmaterialist can claim that it is a fundamental fact, for any real or imaginary circumstance, whether you continue to exist or not. While this idea may seem intuitively correct, the problem is that it does not appear to be possible to prove the existence of any such "fundamental fact", scientifically or even just rationally. Because of this limitation, nonmaterialism is a "dead end", both scientifically and philosophically. Analytic philosophers can only explore the consequences of various materialist theories. They do not necessarily either believe or disbelieve the materialist theories that they so explore, though there can be a very fine line between believing a theory as opposed to merely "running with it". These are some of issues at stake in the philosophy of identity.
In principle, the hypothetical teletransporter, as described above, could simultaneously beam two (or more!) copies of your information to different places, and assemble two people, both with equal claim to be you! This is analogous to the amoeba fission example (above). This presents the nonmaterialist with rather a problem, and they can only deny that such a circumstance is in any way possible, perhaps because teletransportation, of necessity, kills the original person. But it presents the materialist with no such problems, except only in deciding which alternative (materialist) theory of personal identity is the best theory to go with, theory choice being independent of any further fundamental (="robust") facts about the case. The materialist already knows all the relevant facts, we can imagine, and must merely select the best (or, at least "a good") way to express those facts in terms of personal identity. This is what philosophers of identity do. The "multiple occupancy" theory of Robinson (1985), as described above for amoebae undergoing fission, could easily be extended to this case, and thus represents one materialist option, though not necessarily "the best option" (whatever that really means?) It is unclear if what philosophers of identity do is merely an "academic" exercise, or whether it could have any useful practical applications. Zelenak (2009) has attempted to link philosophy of personal identity with tax policy! Parfit (1984) had argued, in effect, that it is just as unethical to start smoking oneself, as it is to encourage someone else to start. In either case, one is putting at risk the future health of the smoker, and just because, in one case, that smoker is "your future self" doesn't make any sort of fundamental difference to the facts.
As an alternative to the "multiple occupancy" theory of Robinson (1985), Gallois (1998) proposed "occasional identity". Robinson (1985) seems to have tacitly assumed that if you allow both daughter amoebae to have existed before fission (see below), then there must have been two (coincident but distinct) amoebae in existence before fission. Gallois (1998) rejected this in favour of saying that there was only one amoeba before fission, but that both daughter amoebae were identical (to it and to each other) then, but not now. It is important to reiterate that both Robinson and Gallois are materialists, who don't disagree on any of the physical facts of the case, as might be given to them by a scientist who has studied the fission of amoebae. It is merely a case of which is the "better theory". Braddon-Mitchell & Miller (2004) defend the view that personal identity over time is a matter of convention, but again they are materialists trying to defend what they consider to be a "better theory". Sider (2001) suggests that "occasional identity" may conflict to some extent with preferred materialist theories of time. At any rate, it is likely that the adoption of any practical applications from personal identity theory will forever be hampered by lingering doubts over the truth of materialism, upon which everything depends. Just as it is impossible to prove that facts about personal identity are fundamental (i.e., disprove materialism), it is equally impossible to prove materialism (with absolute certainty). This would be the only risk associated with stepping into a teletransporter. If materialism is true, then no problem. If materialism is false, then the consequences of teletransportation on humans are unknown and therefore possibly seriously unpleasant. On the whole, materialists tend to be scientists, academics, and/or "materialists" in the colloquial sense, whereas nonmaterialists tend to be more "spiritually" inclined people, who place greater value on such things as emotions, love, and free will. The biggest challenge facing the materialist is to explain the phenomenon of qualia in purely physical terms. The usual response is for them to simply assume that qualia can be explained in purely physical terms somehow. In fact, qualia are the only real stumbling block for materialism. In a world without qualia, there would still be no absolute proof of materialism, but there would also be no reason or motivation to doubt materialism. Materialism would be the natural default assumption. Furthermore, the abstract possibility of nonmaterialism without qualia would be in no significant way different to materialism (by way of a very rough analogy, it would be like a world with banks but no money ... possible, but utterly pointless!)
Just by way of clarification, the only reason why Robinson (1985) needed to allow both daughter amoebae to have existed before fission, was to prevent having to say that any amoeba had ceased to exist (i.e. "died") because of the fission, so, basically, nothing died because the same two amoebae are present both before and after the fission event.
— Philogos ( talk) 00:58, 14 June 2011 (UTC)
'In philosophy, identity, from Latin: identitas (“sameness”), is the exact sameness of things. According to Leibniz's law two things sharing every attribute are not only similar, but are the same thing. The concept of sameness has given rise to the general concept of identity, as in personal identity and social identity.
An entity can only be fully identical with itself. Any difference gives rise to a separate identity. Thus identity is whatever makes an entity definable and recognizable, in terms of possessing a set of qualities or characteristics that distinguish it from other entities.[1][2] In layman's terms, identity is whatever makes something the same or different'
Fantastic, so this article is all about the fact that a person or object is identical with itself and nothing else, or at best about what makes a person or object identical to itself. Either way, sounds like a riveting read! Stho002 ( talk) 01:45, 14 June 2011 (UTC)
Hey everybody, has anybody noticed that the current lede fails rather miserably to 'establish significance, include mention of notable criticism or controversies, and be written in a way that makes readers want to know more'? Any suggestions about what can be done to remedy this?? Stho002 ( talk) 01:52, 14 June 2011 (UTC)
Stho002 ( talk) 02:33, 14 June 2011 (UTC)
On behalf of the general audience, I have replaced the misleading and confusing expression "just in case", with its correct, and easily understood equivalent, " if, and only if" (also, in more technical writing, "if and only if"). The following explains the error:
![]() | This article is rated Start-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
OK, this needs to be split up. Any ideas for useful page titles? -- FOo 23:01 14 Jul 2003 (UTC)
OBSCURE RELATION example Clark Kent is Superman was removed for its irrelevance to the topic. ie it was not sufficiently generic and too American for globally encompassing understanding. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.209.62.164 ( talk) 19:50, 15 March 2012 (UTC)
I'm curious what the point of this paragraph is:
Whatever it is, I think it would be expressed more clearly in something like this:
Would this be a reasonable replacement, or would the replacement result in missing some more profound point? Maybe something more profound would arise, for example, if we considered non-spatial things -- because non-spatial things don't have the constraint that "they can't be in the same place at the same time".
-- Ryguasu 12:48, 9 Sep 2003 (EDT)
I would like to take Ryguasu's proposal one step further: a definition of identity should not refer to any particular property, not even spatial location: after all, we may wonder if two things we see in the same spot, but at different times, are the same. So my phrasing would be something like:
Rp 22 Nov 2003
Identity has a sense in which things share An Identiy, i.e. "black", or two " black and four footed", or more "black four footed and called 'puss' ". In another sense it's scope includes cultural and phyiological filters or precepts. It is cumulative, quantitative and qualitative, it accretes, like datae or quantae. This is proximately related to categories and "forms". Taken as such we can look on socrates idea of "joints" rather clearly. Thus the aforementioned "ambiguity" is really the ambiguity of "grey" in that it can be more grey or less, more ore less identical. It is a primitive term to some philosophical systems. An identity may subsume a name, names associate with other names, systems are built. Some of the 'identiy' concepts are found in group theory, in some things it is identical but it is different in others. Thus the concepts of Definition or 'naming' by shared and/or excluded traits.
An identity/name may refer to a braod category or small. As names are added the category narrows till an idividual is represented, that is a thing is represented which by it's exclusions can only represent one thing; holding, by convention , some terms as absent ( eg time, for an a individual man). comments please.wblakesx
I moved the following paragraph from metaphysics to here (it was already discussed above as, well, at least questionable):
Two objects can be called identical, meaning that they have the same shape, size and other properties. Thus, when we interchange the two objects, we do not see any difference. However, in terms of a stricter sense of identity, the initial and final situation are different. By observing not just the initial and final situation but the move itself, we can know this.
Wikipedia is an encyclopedia - so in the paragraph "Metaphysics" in the article "Identity" it should describe, what identity means in metaphysics - and there, the above paragraph makes no sense. If two descriptions of objects share all properties - well, then that's it, it's the same object they refer two. -- denny vrandečić 15:31, Sep 6, 2004 (UTC)
What about the most common use of the word identity, as in one's identification or proof of identity? Pedant
In my hunt for an identity operator article, I discovered many pages relating to identity in its different contexts and meanings. Many of these pages have overlapping content, poor clarification what the word identity means in different fields, etc. Perhaps this is due to the ambiguety of the word itself, but I still feel that this could be cleaned up or better organized. Just some examples: identity, Identity (disambiguation), List of mathematical identities, Identity (mathematics), Identity element, Identity function, Identity Property of Addition. For instance, this page seems to focus on the philosophy meaning but it has sections on logic and computer programming which seems inappropriate. It seems there are two directions this page can go in:
Personally, I'd be in favor of the second route, but give me some input.
I've done what I could to clean up this page; it needs help, now, from someone who can integrate the material (see [1]). Bryan 18:01, 19 November 2005 (UTC)
How about merging this with Ship of Theseus itself? The two are quite similar.
The Ship of Theseus thought experiment is important in its own right and should not merge with this article.
I agree that the Ship of Theseus should not be merged with identity, altough it is a puzzle about identity it also a puzzle about material constitution and material coincidence. -- RickardV 21:10, 23 July 2007 (UTC)
This section looks somewhat spurious to me. I assume that what should be being talked about is duplicates sharing intrinsic properties, not qualitative properties? A proper philosopher needs to fix this section up. Ben Finn 20:18, 21 May 2007 (UTC)
This was just a thought. I think both titles should direct to the same article (or possibly one of them to a section, etc.) Gregbard 06:44, 31 May 2007 (UTC)
But "Clark Kent = Superman" is not, to my mind, an expression of mathematics.
also, the "Charlie Brown = Satan" example seems like it ought to be removed... either that or I'm missing the point.. or am woefully behind on my popular culture?... —Preceding
unsigned comment added by
71.236.169.226 (
talk)
04:40, 25 March 2008 (UTC)
In ordinary discourse, identity, sameness and equality are not at all the same (no pun intended).
Moreover, these terms have been run-together for far too long by logicians and philosophers, an issue raised here:
Saunders, S. (2006), 'Are Quantum Particles Objects?', Analysis 66, 1, pp.52-62
and in more detail at my site:
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2006.htm
Rosa Lichtenstein ( talk) 16:46, 12 September 2008 (UTC)
Is surely VERY weak, and personal essay like.-- Philogo ( talk) 01:36, 13 March 2009 (UTC)
SHARNI —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.100.108.130 ( talk) 18:24, 16 February 2010 (UTC)
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Baruch Spinoza, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause --- Are they that important? More important than Leibniz? None of them is mentioned in the article.
The Golden Rule, Shunyata --- certainly everything is somehow related to everything else (in philsophy), but in some cases the relation is a long-distance one. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 131.152.208.69 ( talk) 02:26, 9 December 2010 (UTC)
I removed the essaylike wall of text that was added before the lede. Please _DO NOT_ restore this text as it was; we can discuss here on this article talk page what, if anything should be incorporated to the article, but the lede must be a brief, accessible precis of the article contents. Moreover, the tone of the text removed was, to my mind (and I'm willing to be convinced otherwise) not appropriate for an encyclopedia article. BrideOfKripkenstein ( talk) 19:41, 13 June 2011 (UTC)
This is what the article is about and why you should care:
In philosophy, identity usually refers to the idea that a person or object can change over time in many ways, but still remain, in some meaningful sense, the same person or object, despite the changes. This is the idea of numerical identity over time, not to be confused with qualitative identity, which is exact similarity. A person is born as a small baby, grows up, grows old, and finally dies. The person that dies bears little similarity to the baby, so, in what sense is it "the same person"? That is the challenge for the philosopher to explain, in the case of personal identity over time. The identity of inanimate objects over time also presents certain philosophical problems, but the case of personal identity over time is the most important and challenging, for obvious reasons. Robinson (1985) discussed an interesting nonhuman case. An amoeba reproduces by symmetrical binary fission. There are now two amoebae where previously there was one ... so what has happened to the parent amoeba? Has it "died"? Does it still exist? Is it identical with one or both of the daughter amoebae? Robinson's solution is a controversial one, invoking "multiple occupancy", whereby, basically, there were two amoebae all along, fully coincident until they diverged by the fission process! Issues of identity over time, and particularly issues of personal identity over time, are linked to the theory of materialism, in the sense that the possible solutions to the identity question differ between materialist and nonmaterialist theories. Personal identity over time is also linked to four-dimensionalism, a metaphysical theory of time. An interesting question is whether personal identity over time on a materialist view implies that the orthodox view of what human beings think they are is significantly unrealistic, particularly with regard to the generally high level of importance that we give to our lives, ultimate death, and the ethics by which we live. In the book Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984) famously proposed just such a view. Materialist theories of personal identity over time all have the counterintuitive consequence that there isn't a fully robust difference between my life vs. someone else's life, my death vs. someone else's death, my suffering vs. someone else's suffering, etc. Events could happen, in principle, which render it indeterminate whether a death is your death, or someone else's. For example, if a teletransporter machine was invented which took you apart, atom by atom, and beamed the information to Mars, where local atoms were assembled according to that information to create a person physically and psychologically identical to you when you stepped into the teletransporter back on Earth, and then that person was murdered, is it you who has been murdered? Should you worry about what happens to you after teletransportation, or is it not your problem? Why is it any more your problem if it happens without you first being teletransported? By contrast, the nonmaterialist can claim that it is a fundamental fact, for any real or imaginary circumstance, whether you continue to exist or not. While this idea may seem intuitively correct, the problem is that it does not appear to be possible to prove the existence of any such "fundamental fact", scientifically or even just rationally. Because of this limitation, nonmaterialism is a "dead end", both scientifically and philosophically. Analytic philosophers can only explore the consequences of various materialist theories. They do not necessarily either believe or disbelieve the materialist theories that they so explore, though there can be a very fine line between believing a theory as opposed to merely "running with it". These are some of issues at stake in the philosophy of identity.
In principle, the hypothetical teletransporter, as described above, could simultaneously beam two (or more!) copies of your information to different places, and assemble two people, both with equal claim to be you! This is analogous to the amoeba fission example (above). This presents the nonmaterialist with rather a problem, and they can only deny that such a circumstance is in any way possible, perhaps because teletransportation, of necessity, kills the original person. But it presents the materialist with no such problems, except only in deciding which alternative (materialist) theory of personal identity is the best theory to go with, theory choice being independent of any further fundamental (="robust") facts about the case. The materialist already knows all the relevant facts, we can imagine, and must merely select the best (or, at least "a good") way to express those facts in terms of personal identity. This is what philosophers of identity do. The "multiple occupancy" theory of Robinson (1985), as described above for amoebae undergoing fission, could easily be extended to this case, and thus represents one materialist option, though not necessarily "the best option" (whatever that really means?) It is unclear if what philosophers of identity do is merely an "academic" exercise, or whether it could have any useful practical applications. Zelenak (2009) has attempted to link philosophy of personal identity with tax policy! Parfit (1984) had argued, in effect, that it is just as unethical to start smoking oneself, as it is to encourage someone else to start. In either case, one is putting at risk the future health of the smoker, and just because, in one case, that smoker is "your future self" doesn't make any sort of fundamental difference to the facts.
As an alternative to the "multiple occupancy" theory of Robinson (1985), Gallois (1998) proposed "occasional identity". Robinson (1985) seems to have tacitly assumed that if you allow both daughter amoebae to have existed before fission (see below), then there must have been two (coincident but distinct) amoebae in existence before fission. Gallois (1998) rejected this in favour of saying that there was only one amoeba before fission, but that both daughter amoebae were identical (to it and to each other) then, but not now. It is important to reiterate that both Robinson and Gallois are materialists, who don't disagree on any of the physical facts of the case, as might be given to them by a scientist who has studied the fission of amoebae. It is merely a case of which is the "better theory". Braddon-Mitchell & Miller (2004) defend the view that personal identity over time is a matter of convention, but again they are materialists trying to defend what they consider to be a "better theory". Sider (2001) suggests that "occasional identity" may conflict to some extent with preferred materialist theories of time. At any rate, it is likely that the adoption of any practical applications from personal identity theory will forever be hampered by lingering doubts over the truth of materialism, upon which everything depends. Just as it is impossible to prove that facts about personal identity are fundamental (i.e., disprove materialism), it is equally impossible to prove materialism (with absolute certainty). This would be the only risk associated with stepping into a teletransporter. If materialism is true, then no problem. If materialism is false, then the consequences of teletransportation on humans are unknown and therefore possibly seriously unpleasant. On the whole, materialists tend to be scientists, academics, and/or "materialists" in the colloquial sense, whereas nonmaterialists tend to be more "spiritually" inclined people, who place greater value on such things as emotions, love, and free will. The biggest challenge facing the materialist is to explain the phenomenon of qualia in purely physical terms. The usual response is for them to simply assume that qualia can be explained in purely physical terms somehow. In fact, qualia are the only real stumbling block for materialism. In a world without qualia, there would still be no absolute proof of materialism, but there would also be no reason or motivation to doubt materialism. Materialism would be the natural default assumption. Furthermore, the abstract possibility of nonmaterialism without qualia would be in no significant way different to materialism (by way of a very rough analogy, it would be like a world with banks but no money ... possible, but utterly pointless!)
Just by way of clarification, the only reason why Robinson (1985) needed to allow both daughter amoebae to have existed before fission, was to prevent having to say that any amoeba had ceased to exist (i.e. "died") because of the fission, so, basically, nothing died because the same two amoebae are present both before and after the fission event.
— Philogos ( talk) 00:58, 14 June 2011 (UTC)
'In philosophy, identity, from Latin: identitas (“sameness”), is the exact sameness of things. According to Leibniz's law two things sharing every attribute are not only similar, but are the same thing. The concept of sameness has given rise to the general concept of identity, as in personal identity and social identity.
An entity can only be fully identical with itself. Any difference gives rise to a separate identity. Thus identity is whatever makes an entity definable and recognizable, in terms of possessing a set of qualities or characteristics that distinguish it from other entities.[1][2] In layman's terms, identity is whatever makes something the same or different'
Fantastic, so this article is all about the fact that a person or object is identical with itself and nothing else, or at best about what makes a person or object identical to itself. Either way, sounds like a riveting read! Stho002 ( talk) 01:45, 14 June 2011 (UTC)
Hey everybody, has anybody noticed that the current lede fails rather miserably to 'establish significance, include mention of notable criticism or controversies, and be written in a way that makes readers want to know more'? Any suggestions about what can be done to remedy this?? Stho002 ( talk) 01:52, 14 June 2011 (UTC)
Stho002 ( talk) 02:33, 14 June 2011 (UTC)
On behalf of the general audience, I have replaced the misleading and confusing expression "just in case", with its correct, and easily understood equivalent, " if, and only if" (also, in more technical writing, "if and only if"). The following explains the error: